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Policy of Member States of the Council of Europe in the light of the present international siuation

Report
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
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1.

1. There has been no appreciable improvement in the much criticised operation of the Council of Europe since the last session of the Assembly in January 1958.

2. Recommendation 150, which the Assembly adopted in October 1957, invited Member States to consult together systematically on all major questions affecting the European partnership of nations. It was approved in principle by the Committee of Ministers in the Ministers' Resolution (57) 26 of 13th December 1957, but practical effect has not really been given to this declaration of policy.

3. Resolution 145 of 17th January 1958 —which called for a concerted response to the Soviet proposals for a " summit conference " and for a common European policy arrived at in co-operation with the United States was duly sent to the Committee of Ministers, but the Ministers have not yet examined it.

4. Your Rapporteur hopes that the Special Group set up by the Assembly to find an answer to this lack of co-ordination at European level will soon be submitting their report.

5. The concern of the Assembly in this connexion is reinforced by the following considerations:

6. First, there is the progress achieved within N. A. T. 0. towards greater harmony in the Western approach to the Soviet Union. The American reaction to the Soviet Note of 28th February 1958 has been made known to the other Members of N. A. T. 0. with a view to a reply being worked out in common. Also, in another context, the final communiqué of the S. E. A. T. 0. Conference at Manila instructed the Secretary-General of that Organisation to inform N. A. T. 0. of the conclusions reached there.

7. Second, there is the influence exerted by the European Members at the session of the North Atlantic Council in Paris in December 1957. It appears that when they arrived our American partners were more anxious about the organisation of defence than about the re-opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union and that the united front of the European democracies led to a more judicious balance being introduced into the final communiqué, which gave equal importance to both questions.

8. This increase of influence, which was brought about by greater coherence, should now inspire the Council of Europe in its work. While it is true that the Council of Europe has not the same membership as N. A. T. 0. and cannot directly strengthen the European position in N. A. T. 0., it is not without value that a unity of purpose should be arrived at on foreign policy within the Council of Europe, in order to give greater weight to the statements of those who represent Europe in the Atlantic organisation. It is therefore more than ever necessary that the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers should define, within the framework which is theirs, the position of the fifteen countries situated on this side of the Atlantic, with a view to strengthening the influence of the European partners within N. A. T. 0.

9. Even if the Committee of Ministers, contrary to our legitimate expectations, were to persist in a casual or deplorably negligent attitude towards the Assembly's deliberations, the latter body should, and indeed must, none the less endeavour to outline a common policy for solving the main problems arising in the international field.

10. It is indeed urgent for the Western nations to concert their policy in advance through discussions in a representative Assembly of their several parliaments, if they are not once again to be taken by surprise and placed in a defensive and difficult position in the face of the political, economic and psychological struggle that now divides the world.

11. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the Consultative Assembly should not be content with a policy of resistance and containment in relation to Soviet moves, but that it should rather give thought to some positive and inspiring European action that will serve as a unifying force not only against potential enemies, but in the task of giving effect to our own ideals. Events imperiously demand that we follow this course.

12. It is a fact that the material aid of the United States of America, generous though it is, has had little real hold on public opinion, which is more sensitive to the spectacular peace overtures of the Soviet Union, because these furnish a direct answer to their fear of the destruction that would be brought about by a nuclear war.

13. It is also a fact that to oppose the facile slogans of Soviet propaganda with logical arguments does not provide an answer. There is a clear necessity for putting forward concrete and positive proposals capable of affecting decisively the psychological struggle which is being waged on both sides.

14. Europe, with long centuries of experience and thought behind her, must not only use rigorous logic in dealing with the Soviet Union, but it must show a sensitiveness which will make its proposals correspond to the deep longings of its peoples. For that reason, and because it is considered that a purely negative attitude could only create a sense of false security in the present agitated state of the world, your Rapporteur insists on the need to define, in a positive manner, the position of Europe:

a. in the accepted likelihood of a summit conference in the near future;

b. in relation to proposals for general or regional disarmaments;

c. in the face of the present designs of the Arab world which threaten all Europe (A separate report on this will be presented for the second part of the Tenth Session of the Assembly);

d. in relation to the dangerous wavering of the non-committed countries between a pro-Western attitude and alignment on the Soviet Union (Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by M. Devinat, Doc. 800).

2. Europe and the Summit Conference

15. The principle of a summit conference has been accepted, and agreement has gradually been reached on the necessary preparatory steps: first, a meeting of Ambassadors, then a meeting of Foreign Ministers, and, lastly, the conference, itself.

16. While the various notes exchanged between the Soviet Union and the Western countries leave no doubt as to this sequence, three questions have not yet received clear answers:

16.1. who will take part in the preparation of the conference and in the conference itself?

16.2. what will be the precise objective of those who will prepare the work of the conference? and

16.3. what subjects will be discussed at the preliminary meetings and afterwards at the conference?

17. The idea of a careful preparation to the conference has been a major preoccupation of the Western countries, which are anxious to achieve concrete and specific results. As the conference is at the highest level and therefore allows of no appeal the three questions mentioned above must be examined with particular care.

The Participants

2.1.

18. There are two opposite views as regards the number of countries which would take part in the summit conference.

19. The Western position is that only France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union would take part in the conference and would entrust their Foreign Ministers with the preparatory work.

20. The Soviet view, on the other hand, is that invitations should be extended either to all Member States of N. A. T. 0. and the Warsaw Pact, as well as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Austria, or — if a more restricted number of participants were thought desirable — France, Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

21. Are the first preliminary meetings which took place on 17th April 1958 between the Ambassadors of the three Western Powers and M. Gromyko an indication that the Western Powers are likely to get their way? One cannot give an affirmative reply at the present time. M. Gromyko has refused to receive the three Ambassadors together, and this suggests that the Moscow meetings are more likely to be talks in the traditional manner between Ambassadors rather than a preliminary conference. Moreover, the Soviet Union is continuing in its attempts to enlarge the meeting of Foreign Ministers beyond what was intended at the level of the Ambassadors. It wishes the meeting of Foreign Ministers to be attended by four Members of N. A. T. 0. (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy), four members of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, the U. S. S. R. Rumania and Czechoslovakia) and three neutral countries (India, Sweden and Yugoslavia).

22. Two dangers must in any case be avoided: a conference limited to the two major Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and a conference with too many delegates which would turn it into a show instead of being a purposeful meeting.

23. If a Four-Power meeting were not acceptable, and another solution had to be found, the only consideration should be to try and ensure a better balance between East and West or possibly to enable the Council of Europe as such to be represented.

Role of the Participants

24. Whether in the case of the meetings of the ambassadors or of the subsequent meeting of the Foreign Ministers, there have so far been two tendencies. The Soviet Union wants to discuss only questions of procedure relating to the preparation of the summit conference; the Western countries want to examine questions of substance at this exploratory stage.

25. There are psychological and tactical reasons for this second approach.

26. It is essential to discuss problems of substance right from the beginning if it is desired that the summit conference should only confirm agreements already reached during the preparatory period or put the final touch to agreements made possible by the prior work of the diplomats and the Foreign Ministers. There must be some prospect of agreement, in view of the fact that our peoples are anxiously hoping for a lessening of tension, and any cause of disappointment must be avoided in a subject so important as that of a summit conference.

27. Moreover, the absence of any examination of problems of substance during the preparatory period could be considered as a means of avoiding any decision on the most serious questions because they have been insufficiently explored, and this could be a trick to ensure the maintenance of the status quo in Europe.

28. The attitude now taken up by the Soviet Union dispels certain doubts which we previously had. The purpose of the meeting of ambassadors is to organise the summit conference, but the Ministers will also be able to exchange views on certain questions which either party would like to see placed on the Agenda. The Soviet Union also considers that the conference ought to take place even if the Foreign Ministers cannot come to any agreement.

Subjects to be discussed

29. While the points of view have been brought nearer together as regards those taking part in the conference and also as regards the preparatory work which is to precede the conference, no agreement is yet in sight as regards the questions to be discussed.

30. The position of the Soviet Government is that disarmament is the main problem. It even appears that, after having provoked a facile reaction against atomic weapons and installation of bases in Europe, the Soviet Union is above all, and perhaps with this as its sole aim, trying by this summit conference to prevent the installation of missile launching sites which the West considers necessary to organise its defence against nuclear attack. The precise time-table for the preparatory steps, as indeed for the meeting of the conference itself, show a desire for speed which may be symptomatic.

31. It is absolutely essential to place other questions besides disarmament on the agenda of the conference in order that the object of the conference should not be too uncertain. There are matters which are particularly urgent.

32. The question of the captive nations is bound up with the problem of freedom in the world, and no compromise or even the appearance of a compromise is possible in this field. We must, by mentioning it, demonstrate our unflinching resolve to uphold this principle. If it is possible for the time being to adjourn the placing of this question on the agenda of the summit conference, it is only because questions have to be dealt with in a certain order, and because, in our view, it is in the ultimate interests of the satellite countries that the first breach in Soviet oppression should be made on behalf of Germany alone.

33. Without stipulating that German reunification must be a sine qua non for any other discussion, it is necessary that this question should be put on the agenda of the summit conference.

34. This is not a problem which concerns the two Germanies alone, as Marshal Bulganin has asserted on a number of occasions, and which could therefore be settled by bilateral agreement between Bonn and Pankow. The point at issue is that the national territory of a nation is divided, and its reunification is a condition for peace in Europe. Should another rising take place in Eastern Germany like that which took place in Hungary, one must realise that Western Germany will not be able to remain passive in the face of armed intervention by the Soviet Union —and we can thus perceive the danger for world peace which the absence of a solution to this problem implies.

35. A further reason for including German reunification on the agenda of the summit conference is its close connection with the fundamental problem which the summit conference will have to examine: that of disarmament in its general or regional aspects.

3. Europe and disarmament

36. Preoccupation with defence against aggression, however legitimate, is no justification for an exclusively military approach to the problem of security. This would damage the Western Powers in the eyes of those who look to them for a lead and would improve the chances of Soviet propaganda aimed paradoxically at " putting over " the U. S. S. R. as a champion of peace in the world.

37. What is unacceptable, then, in the successive and sometimes contradictory Soviet notes should be rejected, but any useful suggestions they may contain should be seized upon and explored.

38. This critical examination must be undertaken with special reference to the following three of the nine points mentioned in the Notes of Marshal Bulganin of 8th January and 1st February 1958, namely the limitation of nuclear and intercontinental risks, the creation of neutralised zones and the improvement of psychological relations between East and West.

Limitation of nuclear and intercontinental risks

39. Having rejected the Western disarmament plan in August 1957, and then refused to take part in either the Five-Power Disarmament Sub-commission or the new United Nations Commission of 25 members, the Soviet Union has shown willingness to take specific action in the field of disarmament as follows:

40. The Soviet Union is in favour of the immediate cessation—for two or three years-^-of nuclear tests while combining this with an undertaking by the U. S. S. R., the United States and the United Kingdom not to use nuclear weapons.

41. The Soviet Union also proposes that the use of outer space for military purposes should be prohibited (as originally proposed by President Eisenhower on 15th March 1958) and that a new United Nations Agency should be set up to supervise the peaceful use of outer space and inaugurate future international co-operation in scientific research in this field.

42. Far from neglecting these proposals> we must study them with care so as to bring out what is essential in them.

3.1. Suspension of nuclear tests

43. The suspension of nuclear tests is a question which appeals to public opinion—and it appears to be, at least at first sight, capable of being supervised without great difficulty despite the controversies which still surround the detection of underground tests.

44. There are, however, still two dangers. On the one hand a suspension would consolidate the position of countries which have already carried out tests and possess nuclear bombs. On the other hand, it would work in favour of those who, at the time of the cessation of tests, were ahead of the other countries in nuclear development.

45. It is quite evident that the suspension of all new tests does not deprive a country of existing stocks of bombs and it allows it to continue to produce bombs in any way that does not require testing. It is also clear that such cessation can imply invulnerable predominance if the temporary advantage of one country-—at the present moment the Soviet Union—is permanently consolidated by the prohibition of any new tests on the part of its challengers.

46. These dangers explain the conditions insisted upon by the Western nations for the acceptance of the Soviet proposals.

47. The European nations want to go beyond the cessation of nuclear tests. They consider logically that this must be combined with the conversion of existing stocks to peaceful uses and the prohibition of manufacture of fissile materials for military purposes. For them there is a vital link between these three conditions.

48. The United States has a slightly different point of view. It is more preoccupied by the fact that the suspension of tests would make it impossible for it to catch up with the temporary advantage now enjoyed by the Soviet Union, the more so as it is about to launch a new series of tests. In the American view, it is only when the balance in nuclear weapons has been established between the two sides that the cessation of tests can become effective on the basis of reciprocal security.

49. These two approaches are both based on logical principles, but is it not a fact that they are only valid in theory?

50. The conversion of existing bombs to peaceful uses raises the question whether it is technically possible, while prohibition of manufacture implies that the distinction between uses for military and peaceful purpose has been solved. The important point in all this question is the prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb. One does not see exactly why States would want to keep existing stocks of bombs or would want to make more of them if, in the end, their use was prohibited and the prohibition was enforced. The essential point is therefore the question of effective control to ensure that what exists or what might be produced is not used.

51. On the other hand, the prior equalisation of the atomic power of each of the countries in question is a condition which is impossible of realisation. There will never be an equilibrium, scientific advantage lying at one time with one country and later with another, It is conceivable that the present Soviet proposal is a clever attempt to cash in on a temporary scientific advantage and maybe it is appropriate not to accept suddenly the cessation of nuclear tests. But that is a question not so much of principle as of timing.

52. With such a delicate problem confronting us, it seems that the recommendation which might be proposed to the Consultative Assembly should take account of two fundamental considerations: that of control and that of the psychological consequences of refusing to work for the ultimate cessation of nuclear tests.

53. Something can be done about control. In a speech made at the beginning of April in Budapest M. Khrushchev, having previously announced the unilateral cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, stated that his country was prepared to accept international supervision of nuclear tests. These are words which ought to be exploited by the Western nations with the greatest vigour so that they may become deeds. President Eisenhower has proposed that American and Russian technicians should study jointly a system of control. M. Pineau has urged the setting up of an international control agency whose purpose would be to ensure that undertakings in this field are respected. Mr. Harold Macmillan is of the same mind. That is indeed the best way of getting out of the present deadlock.

54. A system of control, which would have to be very detailed, ought logically to be established before the cessation of tests so that the obligations undertaken in this field should not be in danger of being respected only unilaterally. But this is the point where the logical and psychological aspects of the problem meet. If, in order to have watertight guarantees that the cessation of nuclear tests will be loyally carried out, we await the establishment, which will take a long time, of flawless control, is there not a risk that, because we are too exclusively preoccupied with material security, we shall suffer a defeat on the propaganda plane, faced as we are with anxious people fearing the consequences of nuclear war and worried by the effects on health of tests in peacetime?

55. The Assembly will have to weigh carefully these different dangers.

56. It is, of course, true that the cessation of nuclear tests is only an obstacle to the armaments race and not properly speaking a measure of disarmament. It is true also that the refusal of the Soviet Union to take part in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission may well cast a doubt on the sincerity of its proposals. However, while such objections have their value for those who hold responsibility in the matter, what chances are there that they will be taken into consideration by our peoples in their present state of disquiet—and what real possibility of action will those in authority have if their " no-cessation of tests " policy not only is not backed but is decidedly rejected by public opinion?

57. These are the logical and psychological aspects which make a choice so difficult.

58. In any case, even if the cessation of nuclear tests can be agreed for the future, it could not by itself relieve us of the responsibility for organising our defence against the nuclear weapons at present possessed by the countries of the world.

59. It is in fact clear that so long as some countries have nuclear weapons the others cannot be restricted to out-of-date armaments, i.e. have no rockets, tactical weapons, or long or medium-range missiles capable of destroying the bases of a possible aggressor (otherwise they might as well say in advance that they will not defend themselves).

60. The question of launching-sites would not be solved by the cessation of nuclear tests. It is bound up with the banning, subject to strict control, of all atomic weapons, as mentioned above.

3.2. The ban on intercontinental weapons

61. The Soviet declaration of 15th March 1958 poses one condition and makes one suggestion for agreeing that outer space should not be used for military purposes.

62. The condition is the liquidation of foreign bases in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa i.e., the elimination of bomber bases and of future launching sites in the United" Kingdom, France, Italy and Turkey, and also of the American and French installations in North Africa.

63. In other words, in return for an undertaking by the Soviet Union not to use intercontinental missiles, the West is asked from the outset to abandon the bases for the strategic deployment of its forces. It is obvious that this demand cannot be accepted in this absolute form and in isolation. It could only be considered within the context of a general disarmament agreement.

64. As regards the suggestion made, it amounts to this: missiles could only be launched into outer space as part of an international programme, while there would be organised under the auspices of the United Nations, first, a system of control and secondly international co-operation in scientific research on the use of outer space.

65. However paradoxical it may seem for the Soviet Union suddenly to come out in favour of using the United Nations after having refused to discuss disarmament there, this proposal seems well worth examining and acting upon. It is in fact entirely in line with the views of the West, which resolutely supports international control and international research for peaceful uses, and is determined to avoid statements without any practical significance and incapable of effective control in their application.

66. Thus, in this field, while the exaggerated nature of the conditions put forward needs to be exposed in order to obtain indispensable modifications within the framework of a general agreement on disarmament, a positive agreement must be sought on the basis of the proposals for international control made by the Soviet Union.

Creation of Neutral Zones

67. The desire for the reunification of Germany and the liberation of the satellite States, together with the continuing disagreement in the United Nations on general disarmament, combine to lead one to think in terms, if not of demilitarisation, at least of de-nuclearisation on a regional basis which would contribute towards both the liberation of the subject peoples (through removing the military control so far maintained in these countries) and the organisation of disarmament control on a regional, limited basis.

68. The Rapacki Plan is more or less in line with these ideas.

69. It provides for de-nuclearisation within a zone comprising, according to the original Polish plan, the two Germanies and Poland, to which the Soviet Union has added Czechoslovakia. De-nuclearisation implies a total ban on atomic weapons and means of defence against atomic weapons in the area.

70. Thus deprived of the most modern weapons, even defensive weapons, foreign troops, without being obliged to do so under the plan, would in practice be virtually forced to withdraw from the de-nuclearised zone in order to avoid being placed in a dangerous state of insecurity through the lack of such weapons.

71. This might provide an entirely new opportunity for two encouraging developments.

72. First, an international control system would be established to ensure compliance with the de-nuclearisation measures agreed upon and, because it would be easier to organise in this restricted zone, such control would constitute a test for the future in relation to the general problem of controlled disarmament.

73. Secondly, one would achieve the liberation of the area from all foreign troops and the countries concerned would be able to hold free elections and choose, by democratic means, the political system which they want.

74. It would be wrong not to take account of this view, however idealistic it may be, of the Rapacki Plan, for the raising of new hopes is an essential factor in the psychological struggle for influence in the world between the Soviet Union and Western nations. At the same time it would be just as much a mistake not to study quite objectively exactly what the consequences of this plan would be. Before we take up a position on this matter, in fact, we must compare the risks of military disengagement, on the one hand, with the hopes of political disengagement, on the other.

75. First, is there a real danger, as far as security is concerned, in accepting the Rapacki Plan?

76. It would have been desirable for the draft Resolution recently adopted by the Defence Armaments Committee of W. E. U. to throw greater light on the technical aspects of the matter. The final communique of the Conference of NATO Ministers on 15th, 16th and 17th April in Paris does not give any more detailed information on this special problem, and limits itself to setting out requirements for a defence system offering genuine overall protection. These documents show that the security of the West would be seriously affected if the plan were adopted in its present form.

77. Nevertheless, several distinguished personalities view the consequences of the plan with greater optimism.

78. Some might think that the intercontinental range of nuclear weapons reduces the value of arms maintained near frontiers. Others might think that the ability of N. A. T. 0. to meet from outside the Rapacki Plan area any attack is sufficient for Western defence. Others again might go so far as to feel that the spirit of rebellion revealed by events in Hungary prevents the Soviet Union from counting on divisions recruited in satellite countries, and that this diminution of Russian forces, by increasing our own security, allows us to look on the proposed de-nuclearisation with a certain degree of confidence. There appears to be no agreement on this point among military leaders themselves.

79. In any case there are certain factors on which we should reflect.

80. On the one hand, the prohibition of the manufacture of stocking of nuclear arms in a given area, wherever it may be, has never given that area a feeling of security, since the atomic weapons of an aggressor can always destroy it, even though it has no weapons of its own with which to counter-attack. We cannot settle in advance the problem of whether the presence of nuclear weapons attracts bombs or prevents their use because of the risk involved. The least one can say is that de-nuclearisation does not of itself provide any guarantee for the countries that agree to it.

81. Above all, on the other hand, the whole Western world is at stake here, and it is difficult to deny that, if the Rapacki Plan were adopted, the risks we run would be increased on two counts which would appear to be beyond question.

82. The departure of foreign troops from the proposed area could only be to the disadvantage of the West since, in terms of miles, the distance from the Russian side to the Pacific is ten times the distance between the Western side and the Atlantic. It is thus a fact that the evacuation proposed on both sides would increase the risk to the West. It is not even certain whether the withdrawal of American troops from the area envisaged (through depriving them of the necessary room for manoeuvre) might not oblige them to leave Europe altogether.

83. Moreover, no one denies the overwhelming superiority of the Soviets in conventional weapons. The danger would thus not only be the breaking up of N. A. T. 0., but of leaving the West at the mercy of Russian tanks. Any acceptance of the Rapacki Plan should thus necessarily be conditional upon its extension to conventional weapons and upon the establishment of a land and air control going beyond the neutralised area, since it is from beyond the area that conventional attacking forces would move.

84. Secondly, as against the risks of such a military disengagement, what are the chances for political disengagement?

85. As regards Germany, no . new step is proposed in the direction of reunification. In fact it is not impossible that the loosening of Germany's direct links with the Western world as a whole would not decrease the chances of reunification more than the departure of Russian troops from Eastern Germany might increase them.

86. As regards the satellite States, can we reasonably hope that it will be easier to liberate them? Not only has the Soviet Union not so far given its agreement to the extension of the Rapa-cki Plan to Hungary, but Mr. Khrushchev has warned those who are ready to foment disorder that if they attempt a new counter-revolution they will have to face the forces of all the Socialist peoples—and that Soviet forces will be put at the disposal of the working classes against the troublemakers. Can one be certain, in view of this, that the removal of all Russian forces from the Rapacki area will permit the restoration of freedom without the attacking Soviet troops returning on the pretext of intolerable provocation to the Communist regime?

87. The Assembly must take these considerations into account, but it must also, beyond any doubt, examine here also the psychological aspects of this tremendous problem.

88. It is dangerous to disappoint even those hopes which in any case are destined to be frustrated later. Rather than reject the Rapacki Plan outright, it would be better to improve the terms of the plan (a) by more complete control, extending, beyond the zone envisaged, to conventional forces, and (6) by the negotiation of political disengagement in return for any military disengagement which might be agreed to. It would be dangerous to compromise Western security by adopting a flexible and daring policy without adequate precautions. It would also be dangerous to disregard altogether, on the excuse of taking precautions, the. prospects opened up by the Rapacki Plan.

89. That being the situation, the Assembly must decide its position.

Improvement in East-West relations

90. It is a paradox that one of the best Soviet weapons is psychological. Skilfully responding to the hopes of all peoples, the Soviet Union proposes the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Members of N. A. T. 0. and Members of the Warsaw Pact, the discussion of steps likely to lead to an increase in world trade, and the end of war propaganda.

91. The psychological counter-offensive of the Western nations has been notoriously weak.

92. Without having too many illusions on its practical value, there is no reason why we should not give an affirmative answer to the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact. On this point we should follow Mr. Macmillan, and the nations should in concert sign a pact which, without in any way breaking up N. A. T. 0., could win over to the West those who are likely to be dazzled by the peace propaganda of the Soviet Union.

93. While trade relations are unlikely to lead to a rapid change in political outlook, it is, nevertheless, necessary to intensify them as much as possible. We, for our part, regret that it should have been the Soviet Delegate and not a representative of the West who should have proposed an East-West economic conference at the meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva on 10th April 1958.

94. But it is, above all, on the cultural and human level that active steps should be taken to encourage people to travel from East to West and vice versa so as to provoke, through travel and reading, a comparison between the position of the Soviet worker and of his Western counterpart, especially as regards individual freedom and dignity.

95. We are too shy about expressing our confidence in the ultimate triumph of liberty and, in psychological matters, we are perhaps unwise through excessive prudence. If we have stressed the psychological aspects of the problems which the Assembly has to examine it is precisely because nothing would be more dangerous than to forfeit the confidence of men because our attitude, however justified, is incomprehensible to them. Our conclusion in this respect will always be the same: individuals like nations are guided by self-interest in minor decisions and by sentiment on broader issues. Neither the fear that is in the world today nor our desire for rational solutions should allow us to forget the struggle for the souls of men which our adversaries are waging.

96. The Political Committee discussed the general lines of this Report at two meetings, in Berlin on 31st March, 1st and 2nd April 1958, and in Strasbourg on 28th April 1958. It was agreed by the Committee that the Rapporteur should present the report to the Assembly at the opening of the debate on the general policy of Member States of the Council of Europe in the light of recent developments in the international situation, on 2nd May 1958.