B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Annicka Engblom, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. The main idea on which this
report relies is that the media are essential agents for peaceful
development and fair allocation of understandings, opportunities
and resources in the constantly changing context of a democratic
society. The public functions of the media – informational media
in particular – consist of informing as well as providing cultural
and political support and guidance in the making of choices with
regard to these opportunities and resources. This role of the media
entails collecting and sharing a representative range of views about
a problem and its solutions, to help institutions shape final decisions
that could be
reflected upon, understood,
and supported by a large part of the population, namely,
deliberated. The deliberative aspect
is essential for substantial democratic processes, and the media
are its main guarantor.
Note
2. This contribution of the media to democratic processes becomes
particularly difficult and complex during current crises, due to
a variety of factors and dynamics.
3. Firstly, news media outlets and platforms tend to shape information
around the new needs and feelings of digitally active audiences,
instead of covering contexts, the variety of views available, and
distinguishing between opinions and validated information. Business-driven
digital platforms allow audiences to express themselves, and algorithmic
dynamics overexpose citizens to content reflecting their own views.
The journalist’s profession is more and more an underpaid and precarious,
multi-skilled job; due to this transitional status of the sector,
it is less able to make space for democratic and societal needs.
4. Secondly, uncertainties and fears triggered by crises limit
the individuals’ predisposition for a lengthy deliberative and educational
exchange. Fears quickly take over social media spaces, where direct
and individual opinions become dominant. Once shared in these “democratising”
platforms, institutional and scientific guidance becomes as disputed
as individual opinions are.
5. Thirdly, journalism has a complicated relation with science,
which should inform institutions’ work during crises. Science complexity
and time-consuming processes clash with the journalistic philosophy
of truth and clear-cut “facts”, whereas media simplifications of
science can trigger new fears and further limit the predisposition
to deliberative exchange. During crises, all these factors and dynamics
can more easily be exploited by partisan agents and technological
determinants, which further nourish citizens’ fears and frustrations.
6. This combination of structural, mediatic and social dynamics
puts pressure on the relations at the basis of the matrix that is
responsible for the democratic formation of public opinion. This
is the matrix composed by institutions, services, experts, citizens
and informational agents (namely, journalists, news media, digital
media platform, other media outputs), which work to shape public
debates and solutions to problems. Global and regional crises dangerously
test some of the foundational pillars of the democratic process,
such as the comprehensive provision of coherent information, its
easy retrieval and understanding, and the ability to monitor and
respond to new needs, views, and fears in rational ways. Citizen’s
trust in institutions and science is put under pressure, and new
communicative constraints affect crisis management.
7. However, while democratic deliberation is more difficult during
crises, it is more important than in normal times, when the democratic
debate has established and stable channels to consider and evaluate
change. In this report, I recommend a comprehensive and longitudinal
approach, in which the key functions of the media during crises
are part of a wider approach. This approach stretches beyond the
duration of the crisis and entails the collaboration of institutions,
experts, services, media and publics in consolidating a coherent
and flexible communicative network for debate management for the
public good.
8. My analysis builds on the excellent background report by Dr
Giuliana Tiripelli,
Note who I warmly thank for her
outstanding work. I have also taken account of the contribution
by other experts,
Note and by several members of the Committee.
2 Key functions of the media in times
of crisis
9. Times of crisis are times in
which the links between social and individual life come to the fore
and the “social contract” is put under test. Ideally, the media
should help the public make sense of change and understand what
new choices need to be made at the individual and social level,
in order to support a peaceful and fair transition to a new – temporary
or permanent – organisation of social life, thus minimising the
potential damages caused by the crisis. The media should therefore
provide all required elements for individuals to understand not
only what set of choices are available to them as individuals, in
the new context, but also why certain social needs must have priority
over others, and how they are to be prioritised.
10. The new visibility that social needs gain during a crisis
creates two important tensions in the community. The first tension
is caused by the need to reconcile the individual’s freedoms and
ideologies with new social needs and priorities. This reconciliation
of needs is more difficult in communities that strongly rely on
principles of individual freedoms as pillars of their culture, instead
of collective ones. The second tension is caused by the fast-paced
rhythm that a crisis imposes on the debate, which makes it more
challenging to develop effective and substantial, deliberative processes
in favour of the new social priorities. This fast-paced rhythm implies
that digital media usually remain the only “spaces” able to circulate
new information – especially “interpretive information” – quickly
followed by news media.
Note This
allows digital media to dictate the agenda and the interpretations
to be discussed, according to technological and discursive dynamics
that are not based on transparent structures and principles. Institutions
struggle to quickly evaluate and absorb the public’s views into policies,
and publics struggle to understand the value of new institutional
inputs.
11. It is therefore important that the media include approaches
that counterbalance these two tensions before and during crises.
The media’s ability to highlight the links between social and individual
life, and to bring to the fore the benefits of belonging to a community,
which entails having responsibilities and roles as well as freedoms,
becomes crucial before and during a crisis. The ability to continue
offering channels for effective and healthy deliberation, where
a variety of new and old views are not only expressed, but also
brainstormed and reshaped collectively during frantic times, is
another essential function of the media during crises.
12. Another key function of the media, and especially of journalism,
during crises is their ability to cover debates and developments
about uncertain and non-tangible “facts” in ways that are clear
and acceptable for audiences. Debates about crises, including ideas
proposed by scientific experts and institutions, are usually qualified
by a focus on risk, risk management, uncertainty of results and
new but invisible social dynamics. It is crucial that media are
equipped so as to cover these intangible and nonetheless powerful
“facts” and grey areas in ways that can be fully understood by audiences,
to prevent inaccurate and simplistic causal explanations from filling
gaps in understanding.
13. Crises often produce a loss of critical infrastructure, and
a communication mix that includes both traditional and digital media
can be lifesaving.
Note Hence, it is important that institutions,
services, experts, journalists, and civil society are deeply rooted,
visible, and active in online media, and that they apply contingency
and coordinated plans allowing them to share public messages across
different media. Developing a strong mixed-media approach across
sectors, where digital media are tools and not partners, is particularly
important to deactivate polarisation and misinformation driven by
digital conglomerates and exclusivist narratives, which will deprive
democratic deliberations of space.
14. In developing effective media functions, it is crucial that
the loss of critical infrastructure is understood symbolically and
contextually, as well as materially. Crises challenge cultural and
discursive dynamics, which are at least as important than the material
infrastructure of communication, and they do this in a variety of
ways. When a crisis threatens shared social and cultural values
of a specific community, the tendency in a community is to rally
around the flag.
Note This
is especially the case during terrorist attacks, wars, or moral
panics, when the media could play a crucial role in facilitating
dialogue and multicultural understanding and in preventing or minimising
oppression and conflict. However, when a crisis threatens dominant
understandings of individual freedoms, debates tend to polarise
and fragment the community itself. These polarising crises are likely
to be the crises of the future, and their impact on public debates
demand a comprehensive media approach for informing and engaging
the public effectively.
2.1 Informing
the public
2.1.1 Informing
the public about the measures taken by authorities
15. Informing publics about the
measures taken by authorities is the first step in the development
of a strong media role during the management of a crisis. The main
limitations in the provision of information in this context are
not only given by the lack of quality of, or access to, the information
provided to media by authorities and experts; they also concern
intrinsic journalistic demands and the quality of current “post-global”
debates.
16. In digital contexts, quality investigative journalism can
be misinterpreted; as a consequence, it may strengthen polarising
views and lack of trust in institutions. Offering cues to interpret
and explain complex processes that are still in the making and still
need to be fully uncovered is a key element of critical research and
investigation, which is aimed at unveiling unfair and misguided
actions of powerful authorities and businesses, such as corruption
and abuse of power. As such, this kind of journalism should always
be supported.
17. However, in the lonely digital environment, during a situation
marked by uncertainty and fear, individuals do not really deliberate
about this content; rather, they tend to use these cues to confirm
simplistic interpretations.
18. This example shows that, if left alone in the clickbait space
where many citizens look for confirmation of their views, even the
best investigative journalism may contribute to vilify the quality
of information and to nourish simplistic, inflammatory and polarising
interpretations. The danger is that of a self-fulfilling prophecy: institutional
and experts’ discourses are reframed to fit journalistic needs,
but audiences only take what they need to confirm their beliefs.
While the public understands that it is promised quick and univocal
solutions, it remains unable to engage critically with the grey
areas and uncertainty of science; it can therefore more easily feel
legitimised to resist requests for quick behavioural change. Once
beliefs are confirmed, resisting the change required by institutions
can easily be understood as a tool to participate in the struggle
for society’s democratic nature and freedom from oppression.
19. Local and nationalistic frames are another important element
that shapes the effectiveness of quality information about the measures
taken by authorities during crises. This is because crises confer
“new significance on doing normal things as a way of performing
one’s nationhood and calibrating national solidarities”.
Note In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic,
nationalism was linked to new evaluations of panic buying and mask-wearing,
and to conspiracy theories circulated on social media.
Note Unlike
previous international disasters of the post-cold war era, such
as Fukushima, the media discourse about Covid-19 appeared to be strongly
nation-focused and often excessively critical of international institutions.
20. With the next crisis, we may see less responsible behaviour
if the media focus on these “organic” nationalistic frames. This
is because nationalist frames are more common among populist groups,
and research has demonstrated that environmental protection supported
by populist groups does not coincide with the changes required by
the challenge of climate change.
Note Critical media scholars also worry
about “the danger of nationalist ideology in a state of exception
and a crisis of humanity”, namely “that authoritarian characters
such as Trump are prone to use violence, which can result in wars”,
etc.
Note
2.1.2 Explaining
new measures to tackle a crisis
21. Science journalism and science
communication ought to play a major role during a crisis, for when
a crisis arises scientific experts are expected to explain solutions
and justify new measures. What can limit current science journalism
and communication in fulfilling this role is the fact that they
focus on hard science, quantitative research and innovation (including
new discoveries in medical and health science). Science news and
programmes are scarce and often dramatised, and they do not explain
the complexity of scientific work. The production of science news
tends to follow traditional journalistic norms, only showing the
outcomes of complex processes, while science journalism formation
and training remain debatable and fluid.
Note
22. This focus on innovation and hard science strongly limits
the function of the media during crises, because it obscures the
social nature of the changes and responsibilities involved in the
management and solution of the emergency. A crisis such as the Covid-19
pandemic affects and disrupts factors and processes that are not
only medical, but also – and especially – social. Similarly, a focus
on quantities hides qualitative repercussions of crises, and while
numbers are thought to be objective, recent developments have shown
that numbers are not objectively interpreted by citizens (see, for
example, the reactions to the quantitative information about blood
clots of the AstraZeneca vaccine).
23. Soft sciences, such as social sciences, can unveil the qualitative
and social implications of crises and thus enable audiences to understand
how their practical behaviour may impact on their community. Unlike
the hard sciences, the soft sciences are able to show what links
an individual to their community, to explain the qualities of phenomena
and how invisible systems shape their lives, thus offering explanations
for fear and frustrations that go beyond ideas of “powerful elites”
or “corrupted politicians”. It is in these qualitative understandings
that a full grasp of new obligations can arise from among citizens,
but rarely do soft science receive a media coverage worth of their
value.
Note
24. The lack of focus on the processes and uncertainty of research
(both hard and soft science) can strengthen expectations among audiences
and citizens of rapid solutions to crises. These expectations can nourish
discontent and mistrust in expert knowledge when these rapid solutions
do not arrive as soon as expected, or if problems are encountered.
Note This absence of
coverage about how science is practically conducted, its collegial
nature, and how results in one area can enrich other disciplines,
is mainly the by-product of journalistic norms, such as the tendency
to produce a coverage that focuses on a clearly defined “fact”,
which fits into the space and format available to the journalist
and which needs little contextual information.
25. Finally, science journalism formation and training are still
unstable and fluid. Former scientists, especially from the hard
sciences, can recycle themselves into valuable science journalists
working on innovative platforms and fact-checking, potentially proposing
a positivist bias which is typical of the hard sciences. However,
soft and hard science communication itself is still not a clearly
distinct profession, while the traditional role of the permanent
and professional journalist covering science for a specific news
outlet is slowly disappearing.
26. At the same time, scientists in a variety of disciplines have
been pressured for years now to test and improve their media skills,
and to present their individual work to the media – something they
have done quite promptly during the Covid-19 crisis. The mediatised
culture and upskilling of the scientist into a “media expert” has
produced extra workload for scientific experts, while it has pushed
some research centres and institutions to brand research messages
for enhanced visibility. The emphasis on a “home-made” knowledge
exchange by scientists as individuals (who are not experts in communication!)
has made it possible for a few VIP researchers to appear in live
news and TV programmes.
27. The outcome of this has been a cacophony of voices, with no
clear roles or visible chains of authority in shaping accurate knowledge.
In Italy, for example, the mediatic over-exposition of the views
of scientific experts was perceived – over time – more as a source
of confusion than a source of clarification.
Note The personalised media focus on
the individual scientist makes it easier for active audiences to
respond to their knowledge confusion by approaching information
that simplifies complex processes, by producing their own “science”
coverage online, or by selecting the “expert” who provides the hypothesis
that they want to hear.
2.1.3 Quality
information as a remedy against disinformation
28. Explaining change is not just
about fact-checking or fighting disinformation,
Note and the attempts by institutions
and scientists to respond to the loss of control over information
and public understanding may produce more damage than benefits if
they are not included in a wider approach. The biggest threats to democratic
societies experiencing modern crises are much more about citizens’
lack of trust in institutions and experts than about the availability
of accurate and fact-checked information, or the potential dangers
produced by a limitation of quality information.
29. This happens because fear plays a major role at the start
of a new crisis, and “facts” can do very little against fear. It
is also not possible for every citizen to fully understand a crisis
as a scientist would do. The current fragmentation of social structures
and communities of belonging makes it more difficult for individuals to
find shared and comprehensive explanations for sudden threats in
the present. The political economy of the web (for example personalisation
of news) further compartmentalises their views.
30. Therefore, citizens who doubt the efficacy and safety of new
anti-crisis measures, such as Covid vaccines, are not ignorant,
and their general education may have little to do with their attitudes
towards science; they are, simply, non-experts.
31. While it is crucial that authorities protect democracy without
restricting freedom of expression, it is equally essential that
they protect the debate against interest-linked exploitations of
mediated discourses, to protect a deliberative debate against populist
and polarising debate dynamics. Partisan utilisation of media discourses
successfully exploits existing ideas and identities, and they can
deprive the debate of deliberative substance and jeopardise support
for new measures safeguarding social and individual safety. Dry
and sensationalist coverage, and digital new personalisation, can
strengthen support for populistic and polarising narratives in the
debate, which represents authorities as an “elite” operating against
the public good, as an enemy of the citizens. These are all forms
of disinformation, which however flourish from wider social and communication
dynamics.
2.1.4 The
specific role of public service media
32. Public service media have a
crucial role to play in guaranteeing the presence of stable deliberative channels
and the circulation of coherent and authoritative discourses, in
the presence of disruptive communication dynamics triggered by crises.
33. Public service media provide information that supports the
public interest, while other media provide more information that
the public is interested in. The provision of clear information,
which respects the science, is the primary role of public service
media, which are among those authoritative institutions that successfully circulate
coherent messages before and during crises. The other crucial role
of public service media is that of holding to scrutiny the ways
in which political institutions protect the public interest and
the public good.
34. The relations between politics and public media should be
carefully monitored, to guarantee that media services can hold government
to scrutiny. At the same time, the flexibility of public media in
supporting education during a crisis should be protected and enhanced.
Note
35. The behavioural changes that are needed to responsibly act
during a crisis in a democratic society can be endorsed better when
they are meaningful for citizens. Public service media play a crucial
role in preparing the public to imagine, visualise and relate to
the future reality of forthcoming crises, in particular the climate change
crisis. This role could reduce the tendency to believe conspiracy
theories in order to explain unexpected events. In the particular
context of crises, public service media should encourage citizens
to develop critical thinking and the capacity to compare various
sources of information. Finally, public media should offer citizens
mediated spaces that may guarantee the unfolding of deliberative
processes during crises.
2.1.5 Information
via social media: risks and benefits
36. Social media represent “a two-way
communication between emergency services organisations and affected
populations”.
Note Services and institutions can use
social media to provide but also monitor and collect information
during crises, whereas citizens use them to ask for information
or to provide their own. In addition, traditional news media source
and draft news stories via user-generated content, instead of just
producing their own, and they have developed verification procedures
that allow them to play a new role: that of verifying the accuracy
of user-generated information.
37. The risks and opportunities for institutions, experts and
services of using social media during a crisis are many and widely
discussed in the literature, but one is particularly relevant in
this discussion: the timing and resources needed to manage, verify
and respond to new online debate dynamics, and the enormous quantity of
information triggered by a crisis. While communication experts had
previously made plans aimed at managing a pandemic crisis,
Note an effective approach via social
media was rarely implemented for the Covid-19 challenge.
Note
38. At the same time, researchers have alerted institutions about
the dangers of delegating too much to social media platforms. “When
viewed from the perspective of the potentially enormous opinion
power of social media, […] it becomes clear that making some social
media platforms the central locus of the governance of online communication
and enforcers of public value standards, not only enhances their
public accountability but also strengthens their grip on the very
process of democratic opinion formation”. Therefore, “dispersing concentrations
of opinion power and creating countervailing powers is essential
to preventing certain social media platforms from becoming quasi-governments
of online speech, while also ensuring that they each remain one
of many platforms that allow us to engage in public debate”.
Note In
this connection, social media should be encouraged to develop further
their fact-checking capacities to ensure that business interests
do not overshadow the need to respect ethical principles of any
publication online. Social media and digital platforms are great
promoters of debate, but they also give an illusion of freedom,
while they determine what citizens engage with. When left unmonitored,
their emphasis on the individual user as the nourishing machine
of the digital debate can restrict the popular understanding of
the importance of deliberative processes.
39. All this calls for a comprehensive and structural approach
to the maintenance and consolidation of a flexible network of communication
on social media, where the principal nodes are represented by institutions, experts
(including both communication and topic’s experts), services, civil
society and public media accounts. This network can quickly adapt
and flexibly manage information flows before and beyond the duration
of a crisis. Through this network, organic dynamics of information
online can be studied and supported or countered, across platforms
and beyond sectoral and national boundaries.
2.1.6 Monitoring
public understanding
40. An essential part of the deliberative
formation of democratic support for policies is the ability of institutions
to listen to citizens. Although some of this institutional listening
happens during civic assemblies and through pre-existing channels
of feedback collections, a large part of it can also be done by
monitoring and analysing public understanding of new crises and
policies. Such analysis can be supported by contemporary digital
analytics tools.
41. The Cambridge Analytica affair demonstrates that digital analyses
can be very effective to capture changing feelings and opinions
among a specific population. In that case, such effectiveness was
used to promote partisan outcomes and data were obtained through
ethical and legal breaches. This kind of research cannot be left
to, or coordinated with, private and social media or public relations
companies. Similarly, political representatives should not be involved
in the production and use of such research.
42. However, it is possible to monitor feelings and opinions in
perfectly legal and responsible ways. Before and during crises,
institutions and media should monitor citizens’ feelings, or “sentiment”,
and opinions as part of a larger and multidirectional process informing
new policies. For example, the analysis by Pulsar about the Covid
vaccine sentiment clearly shows trends and attitudes, which can
be further examined and contextualised.
Note
43. The monitoring of sentiment and opinion should constitute
a first step in policy development, to map narratives and discourse
dynamics of social groups involved, and to identify cultural leaders
able to promote cohesive and effective debate development for specific
groups. Its results should inform the framing, circulation and timing
of institutional messages about new policies, targeting specific
groups of audience-citizens in different ways. A testing phase should
be included, before crisis development. Public service media should
play a primary role in digital audience research, in collaboration
with universities and institutions. The results of this research
should inform the alphabet used to translate institutional messages
about new policies into content that audience-citizens can easily
understand and relate to.
2.2 Involving
the public
2.2.1 Giving
space to doubts and questions
44. A stable message, which clearly
distinguishes between imagined and real dangers, would be ideal
to prompt citizens to take responsible measures against a crisis.
However, removing uncertainty and grey areas from the scientific
debate in order to produce comprehensible information and minimise
fears is potentially dangerous. This is because scientific knowledge
and crisis measures have no intrinsic stability. In these contexts,
a “no-doubt” message can highly damage trust in institutions and
experts as soon as new uncertainties or discoveries come to the
fore, which is very likely to happen during a major crisis.
45. This problem has been demonstrated by the current debate about
and reactions to the new precautionary checks on one of the Covid-19
vaccines.
Note Once the debate gets framed in polarised
ways, such as “safe versus dangerous”, it is very difficult for
the media and for institutions to reframe it. This is because the news
media tend to cover issues that are already part of newsworthy narratives.
However, citizens and scientists assign different meanings to terms
such as safe/unsafe: the understanding of risk by a scientist (for example,
1 in 10 000 has a major side effect) is different from the understanding
by a lay individual, for whom 1 in 10 000 (major side effect) is
a confirmation that they can experience side effects.
Note
46. Existing and new sociological and digital research should
be used to monitor and examine developing understandings of crises
and science. The news media should be encouraged to provide contextualised
and comparative stories and statistics (for example, serious vaccine
adverse reactions versus car accidents, or similar), to convey the
uncertainty of science to citizens without letting it trigger panic.
The aim should be to spread discourses citizens can rely on to think
about their own choices in navigating a crisis in responsible ways.
47. Finally, public media and institutions should collaborate
to provide permanent spaces for citizens to access and share knowledge
about the processes of science in transparent ways, and to appreciate
the constant evolution of scientific knowledge. Doubts and questions
should be framed in media debates as what makes democratic societies
grow. Social media can be a primary tool for this purpose, as a
part of a wider and flexible network of communicators, where experts,
citizens, cultural leaders and institutions flexibly share questions
and answers in constructive ways. This approach will contribute
to transform the cacophony of experts’ voices into a meaningful
and stabilising part of the deliberative process, against the instability
of populist and undemocratic narratives.
2.2.2 Stimulating
expert-based discussion about crises and changes
48. Communities of experts can
play an important role in stimulating constructive and clarifying
discussions about crises and change. International scientific networks
can collect a variety of perspectives on the same problem and use
their familiarity with scientific exchange to safely transport multidisciplinary
knowledge to other experts and citizens.
2.2.3 Stimulating
support for measures to counter the crisis
49. Easy access to, and reliance
on, scientific information does not happen automatically for many
citizens. In addition, it is not the quality of information alone
that enhances understanding and behavioural change,
Note especially during the tensest stages
of a crisis that affect subjective understandings of individual
freedom (such as the Covid-19). Accurate information and understanding
will not solve problems of denialism.
Note There are many other barriers for
citizens to overcome if they are to approach and use available quality
information for behavioural change, which are first of all structural
and social, and only secondarily technical and educational.
50. For these reasons, stimulating support for measures to counter
the crisis requires an investment in cultural power. While general
messages produced by experts may have polarising results, cultural
leaders embody narratives that social groups rely on to make sense
of what is happening. As a consequence, those who identify with
the corresponding group will relate the provided information more
easily to their experience.
2.2.4 Improving
citizens’ engagement during extraordinary change and measures
51. There are specific roles that
the media can play during extraordinary measures, apart from the informative
ones, as examined by emergency and crisis research.
Note
52. One area that has been overlooked until now is the role of
the media, in general, in supporting citizens’ mental health and
social interaction during times of extraordinary measures such as
lockdowns. Firstly, the media can offer forms of entertainment that
can replace other leisure activities that are unavailable during
a crisis. Secondly, they can provide guidance and make experiences
of mental health issues more visible and thus normalised. Third,
new media have proved excellent in filling interactional gaps when
in-person interaction was not possible (for example Zoom). These
online forms of socialisation could be continued beyond the duration
of a crisis, and adapted to solve other problems (such as disabilities,
traffic control). To achieve full potential in this area, it is
imperative that all State members guarantee permanent and ultrafast
Wi-Fi coverage to every home, as well as the necessary technical
tools, as a primary need and as a human right of every individual.
53. Mainstream media have a special role to play in improving
citizens’ engagement with extraordinary change. As well as contributing
in the general ways discussed above in this report, they are also
uniquely suited to set a shared timing for different activities
throughout the day, by strategically scheduling suitable programmes
for the different times of the day. This schedule can help individuals
in lockdown to separate work, leisure, and family time, when the
absence of structured, external interactions makes it difficult
to maintain healthy routines.
54. At the same time, the Covid-19 crisis has shown that existing
social media platforms can already play a crucial role in rebuilding
discourses and debates along constructive lines, with little intervention
from institutions. Both journalists and local institutions naturally
need time to provide new and accurate information and support in
extraordinary or unexpected circumstances. For this reason, during
the first lockdown of the Covid-19 pandemic, the absence of locally
focused information and interactional support was often compensated
for by the spontaneous formation of Covid mutual aid groups on social
media, which responded to the local public’s need for practical
information and reassurance.
55. This example demonstrates that citizens strongly need to “deliberate”
during crises, as a way to regain control and reorganise meaning,
and that local institutions should be ready to adapt quickly and
reshape spontaneous media dynamics into deliberative spaces, where
new ideas of community life are shared and reorganised. This would
also help to raise awareness and expand the knowledge of the public
on both the technical and the social nature of the changes and responsibilities
associated with managing and finding solutions to the emergency.
2.2.5 Facilitating
citizen participation in discussions about long-term changes
56. Without an appreciation of
the importance of science – both soft and hard science – in society,
citizens may find it difficult to deliberatively engage in dialogue
about long-term effects and policies. This is because citizens may
not have the tools to understand how their choices impact on the
community, now and in the future, and what they can do to improve
current and future community life. Citizens can feel empowered by
the idea of helping their own community if the links between themselves
and their community, and the benefits of being part of this community,
are real and clearly shown, and if options are explained.
57. Schools should be involved at all levels in order to explain
the links between soft and hard sciences and the intergenerational
implications of current individual choices. Both hard and soft sciences
should be brought to citizens more informally.
3 Collaboration
between the media and experts, public authorities, and the public
services
3.1 The
media as a key link between experts, public authorities, services
and the public
58. Approaches to mediated communication
for crisis management and resolution need to draw on existing studies
and research by experts of science communication, crisis communication,
and cultural and social communication dynamics. Previous work already
points to the need for a clear and open communication, which is
able to stimulate and strengthen responsible behaviours instead
of mistrust in institutions and institutional paternalism.
Note In democracies,
it is crucial that citizens are, and feel that they are, treated
as equal partners, contributing to crisis management and solutions.
Mediated communication should therefore not only be used to illustrate
or justify institutional decisions and research, but it should also
be used to show the difference that citizens can make in a crisis
through their behaviours and choices.
59. The 2012 report of the European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control entitled “Communication on immunisation – building trust”
Note makes it clear that building trust
and transparency is at the basis of a successful approach to communication.
The steps to prepare and implement a communication programme (on immunisation,
or other topics) contained in the 2012 ECDC already outlined a path
that should include a beneficial relationship between media, on
one hand, and experts, public authorities, services and the public, on
the other. This step-by-step approach is applicable to a variety
of crises, and it includes the formation of links with stakeholders,
including the media, which are coherent with the recommendations
proposed in this report.
60. The media are a crucial node in the wider network of communication,
involving experts, public authorities, services and the public.
Consequently, measures meant to stabilise flexible but authoritative communicative
links between all these actors, and to strengthen citizens’ views
about their roles in society, are essential components of communication
before, during and after crises.
3.2 Reinforcing
the legitimacy of the decisions taken by political leaders and institutions
61. Citizens may not be able to
grasp the importance of decisions taken by political leaders, even
when these decisions are science-based and even if they constitute
a well-balanced effort to meet a variety of needs for the social
good. This is due to a variety of predominantly long-term, cultural
factors with strong links to structural developments of individual
opportunities in society, which this report has discussed. This
lack of understanding may weaken public support for crisis prevention,
management and adjustment policies.
62. Democracies experience crises that are similar to those of
non-democratic countries, and the measures that both have to take
in order to protect their communities entail some limitation of
the individual’s freedom. The difficulty for a democratic country
– being based on the principle of individual freedom – is that of
having citizens make choices that help society without imposing
them on people. These choices can become preferred and sustained
by individuals if they see them as measures that allow them to fulfil
a role which they believe to be theirs in society.
63. An intersectoral, communicative network of experts, public
authorities, services, and the public, can reinforce the legitimacy
of the decisions taken by political leaders in these situations.
Such network can affirm accurate and constructive discourses in
the public debate through the media in flexible but coherent ways.
The general aim of this network has to be that of reinforcing messages
about the power of the individual to shape the well-being of society,
before, during and after the crisis, in parallel to the work being
done by institutions, experts and services.
3.3 Reinforcing
public support for services
64. In general, citizens largely
support the work done by services (such as emergency or health services)
to prevent, manage or respond to crises. What is less visible for
citizens, and therefore less understood, is the complexity of the
service machine, and the amount of work and resources needed to
plan and act in coherent ways during a crisis. This lack of visibility
can weaken support for allocating resources needed and understanding
of the efforts and difficulties of key workers and emergency structures,
which in turn leads to more misrepresentations of services and their
processes.
65. An intersectoral, communicative network of experts, public
authorities, services, and the public, can pressure the media to
make such services – and their working processes – more visible
through the cultural products that shape a community’s views. This
is especially the case for entertainment products (for example Netflix
series), where typical roles and problems are popularised in fictional
stories for the wider public.
3.4 Reinforcing
the role of scientific evidence and experts in public debates
66. The Covid-19 crisis has clearly
highlighted a major weakness in the mediated communication of scientific
information during a crisis. Global institutions, which ought to
represent guidelines and actions worldwide, have often been vilified
in popular discourses, and their messages have remained unheard. Scientific
narratives, which by their very nature travel across borders, have
mostly been read through nationalistic or polarised frames.
67. It is possible to identify three general points for action.
The first is the need to consistently support scientists studying
the factors and processes related to the crisis (for example medical,
climate change scientists), making sure that they are protected
from political and partisan interference or from marketing needs of
their employing institutions. The second is to support and make
visible scientific research on communities experiencing change and
uncertainty, in the same way as scientific research on viruses and
other “hard” facts is supported in the public discourse.
Note The third is the need to support a
shift from personalised scientific communication towards a collective
one, a kind of communication of research visibly based on the international community
of researchers and their developing work.
68. There are two main kinds of “personalised information” that
appeared online during the Covid-19 pandemic. In both cases, such
“personalised information” was not part of a co-ordinated effort
to engage with the media and publics during the Covid-19 pandemic.
The first is that of actual communication experts, who decided to
spontaneously engage in the debate out of a sense of responsibility
and
in the absence of stabilised channels
for doing so within a pre-established, global-local network.
Note These agents of communication
already constitute a big part of the global-local network that is
required to manage mediated communication during a crisis: they
only need to be included and acknowledged as relevant nodes in the
network.
69. The second type is that of individual experts with expertise
not in communication but in the problems provoked by a crisis (for
example virologists for virus knowledge), who engage directly in
the crisis debate. Their experiences are usually marked by fluctuating
effects. During their media presence, they have shown both the strengths
of researchers and their weaknesses as communicators, to the point
that they have often endangered their own image as experts in their
own discipline. In the short term, their interventions in the media debate
have accentuated the personalisation of news, the sensational frames
and the polarisation of audiences. In the long term, however, this
impromptu and direct engagement of the scientist could stabilise and
contribute to the debate.
70. Many good practices already exist, which rely on a less personalised
approach, and which could be seen as part of the global-local multisectoral
network needed to sustain constructive communication during a crisis. From
a technical point of view, podcasts and audio platforms also offer
great and growing opportunities for the future communication of
science.
71. As the shaping of collective approaches and networks may take
time, higher education institutions offer a more flexible and already
available platform to quickly mobilise multidisciplinary knowledge
developed by students in public engagement activities under the
supervision of experts and research-active staff.
Note
3.5 Managing
crisis development: enabling public authorities to identify unforeseen
difficulties
72. The Covid-19 crisis has demonstrated
that the most hard and unforeseen difficulties during crises in democracies
relate to the management of the relations between public opinion,
media coverage and political choices.
73. The sociological study of the media becomes very important
in the support of cross-sectoral debate coordination before, during
and after crises. It can explain how the media and political realms
affect each other, and the dynamics that reinforce political debates,
with particular emphasis being placed on the dynamics of discourses
on which citizens rely. Sociological studies can, and should, inform
digital monitoring of debates, enabling public authorities to identify
a variety of difficulties and solutions in their approach to the
media.
74. In addition, exchanges between experts can identify unforeseen
difficulties for authorities and publics. Academic conferences are
spaces where early results of research are presented and examined
by a community of experts. By involving journalists in academic
conferences (for example hard and soft science conferences about
climate change, vaccinations, Covid-19, and more general conferences),
these potential and unforeseen difficulties can become more easily
visible for institutions. Conferences could use a journalist–expert
joint session to translate expert jargon into accurate news articles
for media audiences and focused reports for specific institutions.
75. In other words, journalism is not only a channel to communicate
to publics and allow public opinion formation, but also a channel
for expert knowledge to be transferred to institutions. Journalists
can also force experts to communicate their knowledge as a community
of experts, instead of individually, thus reflecting the real nature
of research as a community endeavour in the public debate. At the
same time, allowing journalists to become an established presence
in research would make them more knowledgeable about the research processes
and unveil invisible sociological dynamics that suddenly disrupt
social life during crises,
Note which they could use to contextualise
their news reports.
3.6 Support
by authorities for investigative and constructive journalism in
times of crisis
76. Journalism, unlike other knowledge-producing
sectors (such as research), is fast and adaptable, and it can adapt
in flexible ways during a crisis. However, digital journalism tends
to contain elements that are more likely to induce click baiting,
and attractive “critical” narratives can sometimes nourish polarisation
and fragmentation. Consequently, crisis coverage needs to rely on
more than just investigative and “watchdog” journalism. Communities
need information that not only holds powerful subjects to account.
They also need information that can make the practical and planning
efforts to solve a crisis visible, and that can show how others
may be affected by the individual decision to adopt responsible
behaviours.
77. Various journalism approaches, such as peace journalism, solutions
journalism and constructive journalism, can rebalance the debate
along these lines during crises. These models usually stem from
critical media studies, and they rely on clear empirical evidence
and theories about the wider feedback loops that nourish destructive
communication dynamics. In other words, these models can explain
why polarising media communication develops, and what political
and social factors contribute to it. They should therefore be fully supported
in educational and professional training, and included in research
and policies about media communication in times of crises.
4 Conclusions
78. Measures to enhance the role
of the media in crises should involve institutions, services, experts
and civil society. They should aim to protect spaces, time, interventions
and tools in order to make community, institutional and research
processes visible and approachable, as well as to shape and strengthen
trust and a sense of identity, purpose and belonging. Maintaining
a resilient and adaptable media base of this kind is the best way
to confront crises in democracies, because it allows for an effective
evaluation of ideas and support of a deliberative philosophy that
may prepare citizens for change. The member States’ efforts therefore
need to focus on long-term policies and measures, which start long
before a crisis begins.
79. The contribution of the media to democratic processes becomes
particularly difficult and complex during crises, due to a variety
of factors and dynamics. News media outlets and platforms tend to
shape information around the new needs and feelings of digitally
active audiences, instead of covering contexts, the variety of views
available, and distinguishing between opinions and validated information.
80. Uncertainties and fears triggered by crises limit the individuals’
predisposition for a lengthy deliberative and educational exchange.
Fears quickly take over social media spaces, where direct and individual
opinions become dominant. Moreover, journalism has a complicated
relation with science, which should inform institutions’ work during
crises.
81. In times of crisis, the media should help the public make
sense of change and understand what new choices need to be made
at the individual and social level. The media should therefore provide
all required elements for individuals to understand not only what
set of choices are available to them as individuals, in the new
context, but also why certain social needs must have priority over
others, and how they are to be prioritised.
82. The new visibility that social needs gain during a crisis
creates two important tensions in the community caused by: a). the
need to reconcile the individual’s freedoms and ideologies with
new social needs and priorities; b). the fast-paced rhythm that
a crisis imposes on the debate, which makes it more challenging
to develop effective and substantial, deliberative processes in
favour of the new social priorities.
83. It is therefore important that the media include approaches
that counterbalance these two tensions before and during crises.
The media’s ability to highlight the links between social and individual
life, and to bring to the fore the benefits of belonging to a community,
which entails having responsibilities and roles as well as freedoms,
becomes crucial before and during a crisis. The ability to continue
offering channels for effective and healthy deliberation, where
a variety of new and old views are not only expressed, but also
brainstormed and reshaped collectively during frantic times, is
an essential function of the media during crises. Another key function
of the media during crises is their ability to cover debates and
developments about uncertain and non-tangible “facts” in ways that
are clear and acceptable for audiences.
84. Crises often produce a loss of critical infrastructure, and
a communication mix that includes both traditional and digital media
can be lifesaving. Hence, it is important that institutions, services,
experts, journalists and civil society are deeply rooted, visible
and active in online media, and that they apply contingency and
co-ordinated plans allowing them to share public messages across
different media. This is particularly important to deactivate polarisation
and misinformation driven by digital conglomerates and exclusivist
narratives.
85. When a crisis threatens dominant understandings of individual
freedoms, debates tend to polarise and fragment the community itself.
These polarising crises are likely to be the crises of the future,
and their impact on public debates demand a comprehensive media
approach for informing and engaging the public effectively.
86. Informing publics about the measures taken by authorities
is the first step in the development of a strong media role during
the management of a crisis. Offering cues to interpret and explain
complex processes that are still in the making and still need to
be fully uncovered is a key element of critical research and investigation. This
kind of journalism should always be supported.
87. However, during a situation marked by uncertainty and fear,
individuals do not really deliberate about this content. Moreover,
they tend to use these cues to confirm simplistic interpretations.
Therefore, if left alone in the clickbait space where many citizens
look for confirmation of their views, even the best investigative journalism
may contribute to vilify the quality of information and to nourish
simplistic and polarising interpretations. While the public understands
that it is promised quick and univocal solutions, it remains unable to
engage critically with the grey areas and uncertainty of science.
It can therefore more easily feel legitimised to resist requests
for quick behavioural change. Once beliefs are confirmed, resisting
the change required by institutions can easily be understood as
a tool to participate in the struggle for society’s democratic nature
and freedom from oppression.
