



Resolution 2680 (2026)¹

The role of the OECD in evaluating the impact of artificial intelligence on the future of work

Parliamentary Assembly

1. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and related digital technologies is ushering in a new era offering significant opportunities but also posing major threats. Societies and economies must be equipped for the ongoing AI and digital transition, in order to keep up with the pace of technological advancements, harness their benefits and mitigate their risks. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, enlarged to include delegations from the national parliaments of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member States which are not members of the Council of Europe, as well as a delegation from the European Parliament, believes that this requires urgent and continuous attention due to its significant impact, notably on people, the economy, labour markets, education, public services and governance.
2. AI is already transforming the ways in which people interact, study, conduct research, organise production, and work. It has the potential to become a general-purpose technology with far-reaching effects across a wide range of sectors. Consequently, control over AI technology and infrastructure, as well as the large data sets required for its operation, has major strategic and geopolitical implications.
3. To address these challenges, both the OECD and the Council of Europe have adopted a range of instruments. In particular, in September 2024, the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225), the first international treaty of its kind in this field, was opened for signature. The Council of the OECD adopted in 2019 and amended in 2024 a Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence, containing the following Principles for responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI: inclusive growth, sustainable development and well-being; respect for the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, including fairness and privacy; transparency and explainability; robustness, security and safety; and accountability.
4. The enlarged Assembly held its last debate in January 2024, with the adoption of [Resolution 2526 \(2024\)](#) on “Globalisation in times of crisis and war: the role of the OECD since the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, which called on the Council of Europe and the OECD to continue working together in the field of AI. The enlarged Assembly emphasises that the Council of Europe, the OECD and their member States must be prepared to harness the benefits of AI and related digital technologies, while anticipating and countering any disruption to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment.
5. The enlarged Assembly welcomes the OECD’s ongoing work to develop a wide range of tools, repositories, indicators and research programmes on AI. These contribute to the monitoring of policies, the measurement of impacts, the identification of incidents and hazards, the assessment of capabilities, and the provision of information to governments, parliaments, businesses, social partners and citizens.

1. *Assembly debate* on 1 October 2026 (35th sitting) (see [Doc. 16472](#), report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Marietta Karamanli; and [Doc. 16492](#), opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Maria-Gabriela Horga; and [Doc. 16489](#), opinion of the Committee on Migration, International Protection and Economic Co-operation, rapporteur: Ms Larysa Bilozir). *Text adopted by the Assembly* on 1 October 2026 (35th sitting).

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6. According to the OECD, while the potential impact of AI on productivity growth is expected to be positive, it remains difficult to predict its overall magnitude. AI's impact is likely to be uneven across economic activities: it may generate efficiency gains for specific tasks, particularly in sectors such as finance, information and communication technology services, media and professional services. In contrast, sectors such as agriculture, construction, healthcare and elder care and other activities involving a high physical and manual intensive component, may be less exposed to AI. The extent of these productivity gains will depend on the rate at which AI is adopted, a process that can be accelerated by strengthening the relevant infrastructure, data and skills. It will also depend on the availability of complementary technologies, and on the capacity of firms and public authorities to integrate AI responsibly and support sectoral transformation.

7. Over the next 10 years, significant differences in macroeconomic gains related to AI are expected among OECD countries. The enlarged Assembly is concerned that the benefits of AI could be concentrated among countries, regions and firms that already have stronger digital infrastructure, higher-skilled workers, and greater financial and institutional capacity. Differences in rates of adoption of AI between capital regions and large cities, rural areas and remote, peripheral or underdeveloped regions, innovation leaders and laggards, and between large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are already apparent and may exacerbate existing inequalities. Europe's weaker position compared to the United States and China in terms of AI investment, infrastructure, computing capacity and advanced models raises questions regarding economic growth, democratic governance and oversight, the safety of both personal and commercial data, and digital sovereignty.

8. The precise impact of AI on employment also remains difficult to assess and is likely to be mixed. AI is expected to create new jobs, while simultaneously destroying existing ones, reconfiguring occupations and changing the organisation of work. According to the OECD, occupations at the highest risk of automation account for an average of 27% of employment in OECD countries, though some regions display much higher percentages. At the same time, employment has grown in the occupations most exposed to AI.

9. According to OECD evidence, AI can improve job quality by improving performance, reducing physical strain, automating routine tasks, and promoting inclusion, for example for people with disabilities. However, excessive algorithmic management, intrusive monitoring of workers, and opaque decision making, combined with insufficient protection of workers' physical and mental health, could have negative repercussions on job quality and workers' rights.

10. The enlarged Assembly emphasises that technology alone does not determine whether jobs will be lost or created by AI. To achieve a favourable outcome, a combination of responsible decisions by companies, social dialogue with workers, as well as labour reskilling, upskilling and reallocation policies will be needed.

11. Education and skills training policies are central to ensuring a fair digital transition. The enlarged Assembly welcomes the development by the OECD and the European Commission of the AI Literacy Framework for Primary and Secondary Education, which aims to equip students with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to understand and use AI safely and effectively. AI, particularly generative AI (GenAI) tools, can enhance performance, learning processes, teaching and tutoring. At the same time, these tools may also lead to overreliance, hindering the development of independent and critical thinking.

12. The enlarged Assembly is concerned that the adoption of AI tools in the workforce may exacerbate existing inequalities among workers. Women are underrepresented in occupations with the highest exposure to AI and, at the same time, they are overrepresented in certain occupations that may be at a higher risk of automation, such as clerical roles. Furthermore, women are less likely to participate in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. Inequalities may also emerge among different age groups: young people are particularly vulnerable, as entry-level jobs are more easily automated, while older people are at risk as they are less likely to adapt to using AI tools. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers face comparable risks of exclusion and discrimination, in particular where AI-based tools are used without adequate safeguards, for recruitment, identity verification, skills-matching or residence and work-permit decisions affecting them. AI technologies, however, have the potential to significantly improve the inclusion of people with disabilities in the workforce.

13. Cultural and creative labour employment are among the most exposed to GenAI. High exposure does not necessarily mean job destruction, but it does require labour market policies to support shifting skills demands. OECD work on AI highlights the importance of policies that support lifelong learning, responsible AI adoption that complements human labour, protection of job quality and the broad sharing of productivity gains. This is especially important in cultural and creative industries, where self-employment, project-based work, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, precarious conditions and limited social protection can make adapting to technological change more difficult.

14. Other reasons for concern are cybersecurity risks, and potential issues with copyright and intellectual property stemming from the use of GenAI tools. This is particularly concerning given the use of “data scraping” practices, which involve the automatic extraction of public or non-public data and information from third-party sources to train AI models. The risks from these practices could be sharper for SMEs, particularly in creative industries, which have more limited resources to protect their data. Fair compensation for the use of copyrighted material in training models, clearer licensing frameworks, and stronger transparency around the use of creative works in AI systems will therefore be important not only for equity, but also for maintaining the long-term sustainability of creative careers and cultural production.

15. The media and journalism are also affected, as the uncontrolled use of AI can have repercussions on the quality of information, on pluralism, and, ultimately, on democracy. In intellectual, creative, and journalistic professions, the goal should not be to produce more content at a lower cost, but to use AI to free up time for investigation, creation, interpretation, fact-checking, human interaction, and editorial responsibility

16. The OECD is also conducting research into the use of AI by public authorities in core government functions. The enlarged Assembly recognises that the full potential of AI tools in different public services remains untapped, and that careful design, implementation and monitoring will be required to mitigate risks.

17. The enlarged Assembly believes that Europe needs to innovate and strengthen its digital ecosystem to reduce the gap with countries such as the United States and China in terms of digital infrastructure (data centres; hardware; computing capacity; advanced models) and investment, and to prevent growing disparities across firms, sectors and places. This means fostering open and fair trade, which facilitates access to technology without increasing Europe’s dependencies or reinforcing the dominant positions of a few large companies. Europe must therefore promote effective competition, data interoperability, fair access to essential digital infrastructure, and common rules to regulate AI and monitor its development. The enlarged Assembly stresses the necessity to invest in order to ensure European AI sovereignty. Given that AI technologies are avid energy and water consumers, Europe must also ensure that the digital transition is balanced by environmental considerations.

18. In light of the above, the enlarged Assembly invites member States of the Council of Europe and the eligible member States of the OECD to sign and ratify the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in order to allow its rapid entry into force, and encourages non-member States worldwide to request to accede to it, as soon as they have the opportunity to do so.

19. The enlarged Assembly further invites member States of both the Council of Europe and the OECD to:

19.1. adopt and implement coherent national strategies and regulatory frameworks for AI and digital transformation that are human-centred, rights-based, socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable, in line with the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law and with the OECD Principles for responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI;

19.2. ensure that the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law applies to all business entities operating on their territory in a manner consistent with the requirements of the European Social Charter (ETS No. 35 and ETS No. 163), the European Union AI Act, the OECD Principles for responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI and the related Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible AI, relevant International Labour Organization (ILO), conventions and national labour law;

19.3. establish monitoring mechanisms to assess the impact of AI on productivity, the labour market, wages, skills, job quality, occupational safety and health, equality, intellectual property and regional development;

19.4. sustain broad-based and open-source responsible AI diffusion and foster its effective integration, which will be key to maximising labour productivity and workers’ income in the medium term. Key levers for achieving this would include investing in computing, connectivity and complementary skills, and having in place broader economic framework conditions that allow firms and workers to adopt and experiment with the technology;

19.5. explore the feasibility of an international treaty that would prohibit the development of so-called “artificial superintelligence” technology and other advanced AI technologies worldwide until appropriate guardrails, regulatory frameworks and a multilateral supervisory body are in place to guarantee their safe use and full human control.

20. Regarding the impact of AI on the labour markets, the enlarged Assembly invites member States of both the Council of Europe and the OECD to:
- 20.1. support investments in human capital to help workers, jobseekers and employers seize the benefits of AI, navigate changing skill needs and demands and transition to new jobs;
 - 20.2. encourage the development and deployment of AI systems designed to complement human capabilities rather than diminish them, particularly by delegating repetitive or low-value-added tasks, supporting the detection of anomalies, improving workplace accessibility, and allowing workers the opportunity to understand, question, correct, or disregard the recommendations generated by the system;
 - 20.3. support efficient reallocation of labour across occupations and industries, including SMEs, as sluggish reallocation significantly limits the productivity benefits of AI. This involves facilitating the transition of workers affected by AI-driven productivity changes, while sustaining activity in less exposed sectors. This will require secure labour-market transition arrangements, strong social protection, targeted retraining and mobility support, developed through social dialogue and in consultation with workers and their representatives;
 - 20.4. promote awareness and building knowledge of the opportunities, functionalities, potential uses, limitations and impacts of AI systems in the labour market among workers (including managers) and employers, notably in SMEs, including possible biases and negative impacts on job prospects;
 - 20.5. conduct an impact assessment involving workers and their representatives, prior to the deployment of AI systems that are likely to have significant effects on workers or job seekers. This assessment should, in particular, examine the effects of the AI system on the organisation and intensity of work, autonomy, skills, compensation, health and safety, the protection of personal data, the risks of discrimination, the procedures for challenging decisions, and the allocation of responsibilities among the employer, the provider, and the user of the system;
 - 20.6. promote social dialogue through the appropriate and effective engagement of workers, trade unions, employers and their collective organisations, including through collective bargaining, to facilitate the trustworthy use of AI in the labour market;
 - 20.7. ensure the protection and respect of labour rights, including through regulation where necessary, and support employers in taking effective measures against potential labour rights abuses at all stages of the AI system lifecycle in the labour market, while involving workers and their representatives in the design, implementation and evaluation of such measures;
 - 20.8. consider developing appropriate measures to preserve workers' rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and privacy where the integration of AI systems in the labour market entails the collection of personal data from workers and jobseekers, in a proportionate manner, based on evidence of the benefits and risks;
 - 20.9. consider opportunities to leverage the use of AI to monitor and mitigate bias and discrimination in the labour market, to ground decisions on disaggregated data and evidence, and to help ensure that AI systems produce results that do not perpetuate and exacerbate, as a magnifying glass, entrenched systemic inequalities;
 - 20.10. support workers and employers in using trustworthy, safe and secure AI to prevent work-related injuries and ill health, and to improve job quality, while also addressing the risks for occupational safety and health in a proportionate manner;
 - 20.11. promote transparency, explainability, accountability and democratic approaches in the deployment and use of AI systems in the labour market, including in SMEs, taking a proportionate approach based on evidence of the benefits and risks, to help workers and employers understand how the systems work, what the outputs are, which are the cybersecurity risks, and who is responsible for ensuring they function properly;
 - 20.12. ensure that no decision regarding hiring, assignment, evaluation, compensation, promotion, disciplinary action, or termination of employment is made solely on the basis of an automated system without qualified human intervention, and guarantee that when automated systems are involved, this is comprehensibly explained to affected individuals and effective legal remedies are provided, if needed;
 - 20.13. seek to address gaps in territorial and regional infrastructure, data, skills and capacities for AI adoption, paying particular attention to the different challenges facing local and regional labour markets to ensure all regions have the potential to benefit from new tools;

20.14. strengthen local labour market policies and local governments' capacity to understand the impact of AI on work, to support workers' adaptation, and to promote training;

20.15. promote through social dialogue and collective bargaining, the fair sharing of AI-driven productivity gains and explore and encourage the responsible use of AI to reduce the amount of employee's working hours, while maintaining productivity and growth, in order to support their work-life balance and improve their social well-being;

20.16. encourage voluntary and market-based mechanisms that enable employees to participate in the economic opportunities created by AI-driven productivity gains, including employee share ownership, share-option schemes and other forms of long-term financial participation, while fully respecting entrepreneurial risk, property rights and the freedom of companies to determine their ownership and remuneration structures;

20.17. ensure that AI-based tools used in recruitment, employment and residence- or work-permit procedures affecting migrant workers are subject to meaningful human oversight, are regularly audited for discriminatory bias, and comply with applicable international human rights and data protection standards;

20.18. ensure that AI-driven labour-matching and job-allocation tools are designed and monitored in a manner that avoids reinforcing the occupational segregation of migrant, refugee and other foreign workers into low-quality or precarious jobs, and actively supports their fair access to skilled employment matching their qualifications.

21. With regard to the impact of AI on the creative industries, the media, and journalism, the enlarged Assembly calls on the member States of the Council of Europe and the OECD to:

21.1. develop policies aimed at protecting businesses in the creative industries, in particular by revising intellectual property legislation and by regulating practices such as data scraping. The measures to be taken should also address the unauthorised use of protected content, the production of deepfakes, the standardisation of cultural products and the possibility of human creators being replaced by AI. The aim should be to limit the use of AI tools that would lead to the standardisation of language, formats, references, narratives and tastes, to the detriment of Europe's cultural, linguistic and intellectual diversity;

21.2. protect public-interest journalism, media pluralism and the integrity of information by ensuring that any use of AI systems in newsrooms complies with the principles of truthfulness, accuracy, independence, editorial accountability, protection of sources and pluralism;

21.3. ensure that no content generated or substantially modified by AI is published without effective human verification and without a clearly identified natural or legal person assuming editorial responsibility for it;

21.4. to invite media organisations and bodies representing journalists to negotiate collective agreements governing the introduction of AI, covering in particular the provision of information to and consultation with employees, permitted and prohibited uses, the protection of sources and confidential data, verification procedures, the labelling of synthetic content, the safeguarding of jobs and training pathways, as well as fair remuneration for the use of journalistic content.

22. Regarding the strengthening of education and training capabilities, the enlarged Assembly invites member States of both the Council of Europe and the OECD to:

22.1. invest substantially in and promote the development of lifelong learning on AI literacy to equip students and workers with the knowledge, critical thinking skills and ethical awareness needed to understand and use AI effectively and responsibly;

22.2. design policies to ensure that women and men have equal access to AI tools and AI-related STEM education and training. Special attention should be paid to low-skilled workers, young people in entry-level jobs, older workers, persons with disabilities, and regions with more vulnerable employment structures;

22.3. ensure that the use of GenAI in education prioritises long-term learning over short term performance gains, including by using general-purpose GenAI with pedagogical intent where appropriate, co-designing specialised educational AI tools involving teachers and students, and providing guidance to prevent overreliance, which could hinder cognitive development;

22.4. support teachers and education systems in leveraging AI as a complementary and augmenting tool, while safeguarding the human dimension of teaching, strengthening professional capacity and fostering evidence-based policies for the use of AI in classrooms;

22.5. promote dialogue and co-operation between local vocational education and training providers, innovation hubs and universities, industry and business representatives (including SMEs), workers' representatives and policy makers, to better anticipate AI-driven skills demand, provide reskilling and upskilling opportunities, and align future supply capacities.

23. Recognising the potential impact of AI on the way the public sector operates and delivers services to citizens, including national and subnational governments, the enlarged Assembly calls on member States of both the Council of Europe and the OECD to:

23.1. support public administrations at all levels of government in preparing for AI through strategic civil service workforce and activities planning. This should include defining which tasks can be delegated to AI, assessing the impact on job roles and staffing, identifying future skills requirements, and investing in the reskilling and upskilling of civil servants and human resources professionals, as well as the recruitment of AI-literate individuals;

23.2. ensure that the use of AI in public-sector human resource management, including recruitment, promotion, learning and performance-related processes, remains merit-based, be transparent, explainable and contestable, with qualified human oversight and accountability for final decisions;

23.3. protect the job quality, autonomy, privacy and professional discretion of civil servants at all levels of government where AI is used in management, workflow allocation, monitoring or productivity tools, including by outlawing intrusive surveillance, and involving employees and their representatives in the design, implementation and evaluation of such systems;

23.4. promote the use of AI to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen learning and development in the public sector, while monitoring and evaluating its impact on fairness, productivity, employee well-being and service quality;

23.5. strengthen AI-related capabilities among senior leaders and decision-makers in the civil service, to ensure that they have a sufficiently detailed understanding of how AI systems function, their limitations, risks and operational implications, with a view to enabling them to make responsible and informed decisions on the use of AI in the civil service;

23.6. address the broader transformation of work driven by AI adoption in the public sector, including changes to tasks performed by humans, the redesign of roles and workflows, and the emergence of new job roles, and assess the impact on working conditions, job quality and the operating environment;

23.7. expand public-sector learning and development systems beyond basic AI literacy and ethics, which are well established now in many governments, to support the integration of AI into longer-term government operations. This should include the development of technical and role-specific skills, procurement knowledge, and substantial reskilling and upskilling strategies. Overall, the capacity of schools of government should be strengthened to enable them to autonomously design and deliver practical AI training;

23.8. provide targeted support for subnational governments by promoting data access and sharing across jurisdictions, facilitating interoperability, and strengthening digital infrastructure and workforce capabilities.

24. The enlarged Assembly invites the OECD to continue and deepen its work on measuring and evaluating the economic, social, territorial and environmental impacts of AI. The OECD should continue to make its evidence accessible to parliaments, through initiatives such as the OECD Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence, and should provide support to policy makers in defining practical, rights-compatible and socially inclusive reforms. The OECD should also strengthen its co-operation with the Council of Europe in the field of AI, in particular by promoting complementarity between Council of Europe legal standards and OECD policy tools.

25. The enlarged Assembly calls on the OECD to develop specific indicators for measuring the subnational, national and regional dimension of the artificial intelligence transition, including disparities in access to digital infrastructure, AI-related investment, skills and training, the capacity of SMEs to adopt AI technologies, and the creation of new employment opportunities, with a view to identifying and reducing the emerging 'regional AI divide'. The OECD is also invited to give due consideration to the specific impact of AI on migrant, refugee and cross-border workers.

26. Furthermore, the enlarged Assembly encourages the OECD to deepen its analysis of the various impacts of AI on work, drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, AI systems and tools that assist workers, alleviate arduous tasks, facilitate problem solving and ensure human oversight, and, on the other hand, those that dictate, monitor and accelerate the pace of work, and replace professional judgement with automated recommendations. In particular, the OECD could, in co-operation with the Council of Europe, the International Labour Organisation, the social partners, occupational health organisations and research institutes, develop a common framework for assessing the impact of AI on work, distinguishing in particular between “supportive” and “alienating” uses, and enabling the measurement of their effects on autonomy, workload, intensity, job quality, skills retention, health, discrimination and social dialogue.

27. Additionally, the OECD is encouraged to develop a common scorecard to compare, on a country-by-country basis, not only the uptake of AI, but also the proportion of organisations (businesses and public authorities) that have involved workers in its roll-out; the proportion of systems subject to an impact assessment on rights and working conditions; the effects on wages, working hours, work rates, health and autonomy; and actual access to training, broken down by gender, age, qualifications, employment status, region and company size.