Policy of Member States of the Council of Europe in the light of the present international situation

Report | Doc. 718 | 14 October 1957

Committee

Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy

Rapporteur :

Mr Kurt Georg KIESINGER, Germany

Origin

See 16th Sitting, 21st October 1957 (referred back to the Political Committee) and Reference No. 178. 1957 - 9th Session - Second part

Thesaurus

A 1. Draft Recommendation presented by the Political Committee

The Assembly

Considering that the peoples of the six-Power Communities have now decided to unite in a closely integrated economic community;

Considering that other European countries are trying to associate with the Common Market through the formation of a free trade area ;

Considering that the political integration of Europe will be assisted by the economic developments over the next twelve or fifteen years, but that other preparatory steps must be taken to strengthen Europe's position in the world;

Considering that there should be full and effective consultation on foreign policy, if possible within a broad European framework;

Recalling its Recommendation 133 of 11th January 1957 calling upon the Committee of Ministers " to work out... a concrete and effective method for coordinating their national foreign policies as a preparation for drawing up a common policy "—which has not been answered by the Committee of Ministers;

Recalling also Recommendation 139 of 4th May 1957 which intimated that Member Governments " should do everything possible to develop the habit and practice of effective prior consultation in all major matters which affect the partnership of European nations " and went on to propose that " the Prime Ministers of Europe should meet from time to time... to try to work out a common policy ",

Recommends to the Committee of Ministers :

a that they should give a complete and detailed reply to Recommendation 133 and Recommendation 139;

b that they should develop a system of full consultation with a view to the ultimate formulation of a common European foreign policy; it being understood that if certain countries do not find it appropriate to follow this course, others must proceed without delay;

c that they should take into consideration the following as means to achieve this end :

a meetings of Prime Ministers from time to time for informal discussions on major questions of policy;

b regular and more frequent meetings of Foreign Ministers to discuss all major questions affecting the European partnership of nations

c the setting up of a standing group of personalities and permanent officials of suitable rank and calibre, possibly attached to a European organisation, to prepare in common the work of the regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers;

d that they should develop a common policy in particular on the following specific questions :

a Disarmament: The Western Powers should continue their efforts to stop the arms race through the conclusion of a first disarmament agreement providing for a suspension of nuclear tests related to a cut-off in the production of nuclear materials;

b German Reunification : The Member Governments should try by joint efforts to bring about a general settlement with Soviet Russia within which German reunification can be achieved. They should tell the Soviet Union once again that there can be no permanent settlement if the Soviet Union continues to insist on the partition of Germany and to deny free elections to the people of the Soviet-occupied zone;

c Eastern Europe : The Member Governments should make it clear to the Soviet Union that they will never cease to raise the issue of the freedom of the countries of Eastern Europe, an issue so tragically illustrated by the events of Budapest. At the same time they should re-state their willingness to contribute to settlements that would establish good-neighbourly relations between these countries, once they are independent, and the Soviet Union;

d The Middle East and relations with newly-developing countries.

B 2. Draft Order presented by the Political Committee [(1) Adopted by the Committee by 11 votes to 1 with 4 abstentions.]

The Assembly,

Considering that the Committee of Ministers have in the past to a large extent failed to act on a large number of its recommendations, especially those of a political nature, and that some of them, notably Recommendation 133, have been ignored;

Considering that it is of major importance that there should be full consultation among Member Governments on foreign affairs with a view to coordinating policies and eventually formulating a common policy,

Invites the Political Committee to set up a Special Group from among its members to enquire into the machinery or procedure required to establish fuller and more effective consultation among Member States on foreign policy; to meet Members of Parliament, members of the Governments and senior officials in member countries; and to make a report.

C 3. Explanatory Memorandum submitted by M. KIESINGER

1. Since the Assembly last held a debate on the general policy of the Council of Europe, in April/May this year, the European treaties providing for the formation of a Common Market and Euratom have received parliamentary approval in France, Germany and Italy, and the setting up of the necessary institutions is now only a matter of time. That is indeed a major success to be placed on the credit side for those working for European unity everywhere. Another landmark has been reached on the road towards European union which began at the Congress held at The Hague in 1948.

2. It is true that the arrangements for a free trade area to be built around the Common Market and to include as many European States as possible are still being negotiated. In another report, your Committee renew their full support for this endeavour which, if it is successful, will complete the pattern of European economic integration for the years to come. The time is therefore appropriate to pause and to take stock, to ask the question : " Where do we go from here? What are the next steps that might be taken to achieve European unity once the economic measures which we have advocated are under way?"

3. Cautiously, the words " political community " are advanced, and it is in that direction that we shall have to move. It is not a question of resuscitating the constitutional projects of four or five years ago, which were perhaps too remote from reality at the time and have suffered at least a temporary eclipse. The Messina Conference turned its back on political integration for the time being and set in motion the drive for economic integration which is being brought to fruition. But the establishment of the Common Market and attendant free trade area will be a slow process taking ten or fifteen years. No doubt it will help, in some measure, to increase the degree of political interdependence between the participating countries. Yet, at the same time, we cannot wait another decade before the political union of Europe is again talked about. We must now approach the intermediate stages. The first of these is to seek to co-ordinate, within a broader or narrower framework, the foreign policies of Member States, and to try and achieve a common policy on those issues which affect Europe as a whole. Let us guard against making this vital issue of a " common foreign policy " dependent on the success of economic integration. The economic integration of Europe will undoubtedly help to establish solidarity in foreign policy, but it is not a pre-requi-site for such solidarity.

4. The debates on the international situation which have been held regularly in the Consultative Assembly during the past few years have shown that it is possible, among Members of Parliament from fifteen countries, to come to a broad agreement on foreign policy. But the resolutions and recommendations which have embodied this broad community of ideas on the problems of the clay have not been matched, so far, by a corresponding activity at the level of the Foreign Ministers. Since the Suez crisis there have been exchanges of views in the Committee of Ministers at the rate of twice a year, and resolutions have been adopted which have been forwarded to the Assembly. These show that only limited consultations have taken place on certain of the problems of the moment, usually on the basis of prepared statements, while there cannot be said to be any joint mapping-out of a long-term policy or even close consultation before action is taken by individual members of the European partnership of nations concerned in a particular issue.

5. It has been the main concern of the Assembly during its last two political debates to seek some improvement in this situation. On 11th January 1957 the Assembly called upon the Committee of Ministers " to work out a concrete and effective method for co-ordinating their national foreign policies as a preparation for drawing up a common policy " (Recommendation 133). No reply has ever been made to this recommendation, and efforts made by your Rapporteur in April/May to find out why the annual report of the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly made no reference to it met with the vague reply that the recommendation had been sent to Member Governments.

6. On 4th May 1957, after a number of speakers had dwelt on the crucial need for greater and more effective co-ordination in the foreign policy of Member States, the Assembly recommended that Member Governments " should do everything possible to develop the habit and practice of effective prior consultation on all major matters likely to affect thé partnership of European nations ". It went on to propose that " as a major contribution to this end, the Prime Ministers of Member States should meet from time to time to discuss matters of common interest and to try and map out a common course among as many European partners as possible " (Recommendation 139).

7. The response of the Committee of Ministers in this case too, has been disappointing. On 6th July 1957, their Deputies informed the Assembly Representatives in the Joint Committee that political consultations were already taking place in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and elsewhere. They pointed to the two resolutions which had recently been adopted by the Committee of Ministers (Resolutions (56) 23 and (57) 12) which, they said, attempted to define a community of approach in relation to certain problems. As regards meetings of Prime Ministers, they said that such meetings were not excluded, a priori, in exceptional cases.

8. Nor is the Assembly quite convinced yet that everything possible is being done by the Governments of Member States at the United Nations and at meetings of other worldwide organisations, to ensure that their permanent representatives consult together and with other delegates from democratic countries, with a view to concerting their attitude and, if possible, arriving at a joint point of view. The intention is not to create a monolithic European bloc, for your Committee agree that the purpose of international organisations is to build bridges between nations and not to separate them into rigid groups. But there is a feeling in the Assembly that the European Powers could exert a greater influence for good, and it would be in accordance with our desire to establish a European community, if their representatives would consult together more often and with delegates from other like-minded nations to put forward constructive policies.

9. In the light of what precedes we have to demonstrate and establish anew the need for developing consultation with a view to co-ordinating and ultimately adopting a common European policy; we have to explain why it is in the interests of the peoples of Europe that the foreign policies of their countries should be gradually synchronised and finally united; we have to show the reasons which militate in favour of such a course and we have to take account of the divergent interests which some Member States may have; and, we have to show how and where a common European policy can, step by step, be evolved.

10. Why then a common European policy? Because it is our firm belief that the European countries which are members of the Council of Europe have common interests to defend and because they stand, jointly, for common values. In spite of the diversity of national traditions, there exists a common heritage of European culture and way of life, having as its central idea the freedom and dignity of man. The protection and extension of this heritage, threatened above all by aggressive Communist ideology and policy, represents the supreme justification for European political solidarity.

11. The European countries have vast economic interests in common. The existence of huge markets outside Europe has forced them to create a common market (and possibly a free trade area as well) to enable them to withstand competition. Europe is much more dependent than, say, the United States or the Soviet Union on overseas countries for food, raw materials, fuel and power. It is also for this reason in a particularly precarious position. Recent developments in the Middle East have shown that this area, with its vital oil supplies, is a highly vulnerable sphere of common European interests. In the vast new countries which have achieved self-determination and self-government, and which are now in process of industrialisation and development, the peoples of Europe share common interests. These countries need our material, spiritual and moral assistance. On the other hand, we Europeans are largely dependent on them. If we fail to develop new and close co-operation, the tidal wave of nationalism in these countries may turn to Communism. This is indeed a task of enormous magnitude and difficulty, and it calls for common action.

12. A third argument for developing a European policy is that since the second world war Europe is no longer the nerve-centre of the world. Two immense Powers dominate the scene by reason of their geographical area, their population, their economic and military strength, especially their atomic power : the United States and Soviet Russia. Within a short time, an industrialised China may join these two big Powers. Situated between them, Europe will be unable to uphold her freedom of action and independence unless she unites.

13. A common European foreign policy cannot be realised in future except in very close contact with the United States. But it is neither in the interests of Europe nor the United States that Europe should forever remain wholly dependent on the United States. Since the end of the second world war, the U. S. A. has given its support to all efforts in favour of European unity. Europe shares common interests and a common background with the United States, but there is no doubt that while we have many vital problems in common, there are others which are of more intimate concern to either the Americans or the Europeans. There are problems which concern the European countries almost exclusively, or at least much more than the United States. The former cannot hope to solve their problems except by common efforts on a European front. M. Paul-Henri Spaak, our former distinguished colleague and now Secretary-General of N. A. T. O., recently called for the NATO partners to keep each other mutually informed, consult one another and find a common line of action before taking decisions in foreign policy. He said that, unless the NATO States co-ordinated their foreign policy, the Atlantic Alliance would collapse in a few years. He may be right, but, if we want to co-ordinate our foreign policy with that of the United States, we have first to co-ordinate our European policies, not with the intention of drifting away from the United States, but in order to find a more solid form of co-operation with them.

14. A determining factor of our era is, above all, the rapid development of science and technology, including armaments technology. It is sufficient to mention three revolutionary developments : atomic weapons of all kinds, inter-continental rockets, and man-made satellites. The influence of developments in technology on foreign policy has always been great and has often been decisive. Today it is greater than ever. This applies to all Powers, both those which possess atomic weapons and other modern technical equipment, and those which do not. Naturally, the problem for the " have-nots " is different from that for the atomic Powers. And the position is different again for the highly-industrialised and densely populated countries of Western Europe as compared with, say, the countries of Asia or Latin America since geographical position is of major importance even in the age of inter-continental rockets. In recent months we have listened to discussions and differences of opinion between leading statesmen and military men on the need for Western strategy to adjust itself to changed or changing technical developments. Strategy, of course, must adjust itself also to the changing international political situation. But, equally, the foreign policy of States—and the foreign policy of groups of States where such exists-— must take account of the changing strategic situation. Those are the political aspects of European defence, to the discussion of which the Consultative Assembly has always attached great value. It is obvious that this is a field which urgently calls for a continuous combined effort from the countries of Europe.

15. The difficulties are real, as different States are bound to have different interests. Certain Member States have certain special vital interests : for example, the United Kingdom has a special interest in the Commonwealth, France in the French Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany is particularly interested in securing the reunification of Germany in conditions of freedom. Each of these questions is of extreme importance to the country concerned. They are capable of making the development of á common European foreign policy extremely difficult and complicated, but, far from preventing a common front in foreign policy, they amount to a challenge, since the satisfactory solution of such special problems is in the clear interests of the other States.

16. It may, perhaps, be useful to consider the case of the United Kingdom in this connection, for one of the principal and most important problems of the day is how the United Kingdom can be encouraged to come towards Europe and to associate itself more and more closely with European affairs. British representatives have, in the past, pointed to the fact that if Britain was a member of the European Community, she was first and foremost a member of the Commonwealth, which includes several members of the Afro-Asian group. Rather than the formation of a European bloc, she has on the whole favoured a looser form of consultation which has enabled her to keep in very close touch with her Commonwealth partners. Thus, at the United Nations, she prefers to consult in an ad hoc manner with like-minded countries which are prepared to sponsor a particular point of view on a given subject. Your Rapporteur fully understands this policy, but at the same time he wishes to stress that the creation of a European Community demands a certain reappraisal. Just as the United Kingdom is trying to become associated with the Common Market through the formation of a free trade area, it is greatly to be hoped that in the political field a comparable effort will be made.

17. It is thus the contention of your Rapporteur that the necessary basis exists for developing step by step a common European foreign policy. If the European Powers recognise and accept this, they must not be content with makeshift discussions and ad hoc conferences convened to meet situations which are forced upon them. They must, instead, shoulder together the task of planning in advance so far as possible the common policy to be followed. Only a foreign policy worked out and implemented in common has any chance of contributing to the solution of the international political problems of our century.

18. There remains the question of how a common foreign policy is to be achieved. At the very least it would be necessary, first, to insist on the fullest possible use of permanent consultation on all important matters affecting Europe. Such consultation should go on through diplomatic channels, but also and especially in European institutions, particularly the Council of Europe. Your Committee have suggested that in order to give such consultation due importance there should be, from time to time, as the need might be felt, informal meetings of the Prime Ministers. Such meetings would help to establish greater confidence, among Member States and would give a lead in coordinating their foreign policy. The analogy is, of course, with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, the basic idea being that if a group of men get into the habit of meeting round a table from time to time—even if there is no agenda or the agenda is a vague one—-they will exchange views and ideas and build up a tradition of consultation which will produce results. The Assembly's view was that it would be useful for the Prime Ministers to get together instead of merely holding, separately, bilateral talks. By providing an opportunity for a general exchange of views, such meetings would help to prevent the kind of crisis that occured in November 1956, and would help gradually to develop a common attitude with regard to foreign policy concerning the most urgent problems. As has already been mentioned, the response of the Committee of Ministers to this proposal has been so far largely negative. Your Committee propose that the matter should be taken up again in the Joint Committee where the Foreign Ministers will he urged to establish a system of permanent effective consultation.

19. A greater measure of coordination might be achieved if a permanent body of experts could be called upon to prepare studies —and perhaps also frame proposals—from time to time, to be used by the Foreign Ministers when they meet to discuss problems affecting Europe as a whole, for example East/West relations, the question of the satellite countries, our attitude towards the newly-developing countries. These officials could do the spade-work in common which might facilitate the task of the Foreign Ministers. Your Rapporteur would like to recall in this connection that representatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the U. S. A. met in Washington earlier this year to review the problem of German reunification. Their labours helped to frame the joint declaration issued in Berlin on 29th July 1957.

20. The Committee of Ministers have, on a number of occasions, paid tribute to the valuable work done by the Consultative Assembly in reviewing regularly the world problems which demand solutions. They have invited the Assembly to continue the free and frank discussions which have been held twice or three times a year since 1953. Your Committee agree that these debates have been useful, but their impact on the conduct of affairs would have been greater if the Committee of Ministers had discussed the Assembly's conclusions soon after their adoption with a view to examining and mapping out the common policy advocated in them. Your Committee firmly believe that it is now up to the Committee of Ministers to make greater use of the advice tendered to them.

21. The tension between East and West continues to dominate our world. Almost all the problems of foreign policy with which the Western countries have to deal are dominated by this prevailing consideration. Experience so far has shown that the attempt to solve specific problems in the face of the general tension which continues to exist has resulted at best in postponing a genuine solution, but often enough, too, in dangerous setbacks for the free world. The Western world, and we Europeans in it, must try, in concert, to find a comprehensive solution if it is at all possible. As long as a common concept of this nature has not been developed among the members of the Council of Europe, it is pointless to enter new summit negotiations with the Soviet Union. Improvised negotiations would, in all probability, lead to fresh disappointments.

22. It is in the light of these fundamental considerations that your Committee has felt it desirable to recommend that the Committee of Ministers should consult and endeavour to reach a common policy on the following questions : developments in the Soviet Union; disarmament and nuclear tests; German reunification; Hungary and the other satellite countries; Poland and Yugoslavia; the Middle East; relations with the newly-developing countries [(2) This question is being dealt with separately by your Committee. M. Devinat is preparing a report which is expected to bo ready for discussion by the Committee shortly.]

1 Developments in the Soviet Union

23. It is suggested in some quarters that the Soviet overtures for new " summit talks " should be taken up. But a study of the developments in the Soviet Union since our meeting in May is hardly encouraging. The deposition of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch and Shepi-lov may be considered the most important recent event in the Soviet Union. It seems quite beyond doubt that this affair was a victory for Party Secretary Khrushchev over a rival group. A more difficult question to answer is whether this victory was that of one ideological tendency over another, for up till then, the demoted leaders had not formed a common ideological group. All the same, it may be said that a few of those dismissed belonged to the remnants of the Stalinist elements condemned at the XXth Party Congress.

24. It is very difficult to ascertain the strength of the opposition against official policy and where the Red Army stands. The new leaders in the Kremlin are clearly using different methods both in their internal policy and in their external policy from those of Stalin. It would, however, be extremely premature to speak of any liberalisation in connection with a regime that still maintains a monopoly of power for the ruling party and totalitarian forced labour. What appears to be happening is that a measure of freedom has been allowed in discussion, but only within the ideological boundaries of the official present-day interpretation of Communism. In three recent speeches to workers and intellectuals Khrushchev made it quite clear that criticism that oversteps this mark will be ruthlessly suppressed. These speeches were recently reproduced throughout thè various Soviet Republics and given wide publicity. Mass demonstrations of approval were organised

25. In August 1957, many of the individual Soviet Republics composing the U. S. S. R. enacted bills on " intensifying the struggle against anti-social and parasitic elements " which provide for " measures of social compulsion in the form of deportation from two to five years with compulsory labour at the place of deportation ".

26. All our experience so far with the Soviet Union, as incidentally with all totalitarian regimes, has shown that we must expect internal difficulties and disputes to lead to a stiffening of her attitude in foreign affairs. For totalitarian Party and State leaders fighting for their position will usually carry out diversionary manoeuvres directed against allegedly hostile foreign Powers, or they will strive for successes in foreign policy in order to suppress their internal difficulties. The behaviour of the Soviet Government recently—their sudden unyielding mood at the London disarmament negotiations, their aggressive policy in the Middle East and their numerous accusations against the Western countries—fits into this pattern.

27. Likewise, her attitude at the present session of the United Nations in New York, so soon after her overwhelming condemnation on the Hungarian question, is another example of the skill with which the Soviet Union has developed the art of " conflict management " in international affairs. Your Rapporteur refers to the Soviet proposal that the question of peaceful coexistence based on non-agression and non-intervention in internal affairs should be placed on the agenda. The same technique is used on such questions as the suspension of nuclear tests, which is presented to Afro-Asian countries as a clear-cut issue, whereas the Western case is more complicated. And again on ail " colonial " issues the Soviet Union poses as the champion of nationalism, whereas, of course, dependent peoples in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are refused independence.

2 Disarmament and Nuclear Tests

28. The disarmament plan of the Western Powers who took part in the London meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-committee was disclosed in detail on 29th August 1957. What is proposed is this : if the Soviet Union will accept some valid degree of " open skies " and ground inspection, agree to some cuts in conventional arms and work out during the next year a system of nuclear inspection which would permit a ban on the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, the Western Powers would be prepared to accept now a two-year suspension of nuclear tests. If agreement on inspection measures could not be achieved, so as to allow an end to the production of nuclear weapons, the suspension of tests would be called off after two years.

29. These proposals have been criticised on the ground that the suspension of nuclear tests is linked up with a cessation in the production of nuclear weapons. We should remember that suspending nuclear tests has little to do with bringing about disarmament. Only an ending of the production of nuclear weapons can result in any reduction of the competitive arms race. Because of the potential danger of radio-active fall-out from nuclear and thermonuclear tests, a subject of deep concern to the Assembly [(3) In reply to Recommendation 140, which called for a conference of distinguished scientists to report on radiation hazards likely to result from continued testing of nuclear explosive devices, the Committee of Ministers have said that, in view of the fact that there is a Scientific Committee set up by the General Assembly of the U. N. to study the effects of atomic radiation, there was no immediate need to convene a conference of scientists under the auspices of the Council of Europe. This Committee, whose mandate is a very wide one, is not expected to report until 1st July 1958. The report will be forwarded to the Assembly], it is true to say that an agreement on the suspension of tests would be a health agreement. It would, however, leave the nuclear Powers free to go on piling up stocks of existing nuclear weapons and would give a permanent advantage to those most advanced in their programme. It would not be a disarmament agreement..

30. The Western position on disarmament must be understood. We must ensure that disarmament is safe and that it will not make it easier for the Soviet Union to increase tension in various parts of the world to the mounting disadvantage of the West. The indications at present are, to say the least, uncertain, for, while the Soviet propaganda campaign for disarmament, as she understands it, continues at full pressure, Soviet warships appear in the Mediterranean and a compliant Syria falls within her reach.

31. On 26th August, Tass announced that an intercontinental ballistic missile had been fired in the Soviet Union a few days previously. The tests showed, according to Tass, that it was possible to direct the rocket to any place in the world. This announcement was probably intended to bring pressure on the Western Powers at the disarmament talks. A few days later M. Zorin dismissed the new Western proposals, and the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee came to a halt. The more recent proposals put forward by M. Gromyko at the General Assembly of the United Nations—that there should be a five-year ban on the use of nuclear weapons and a ban for two to three years on tests—makes no real advance on the previous Soviet position because they make no offer on the question of nuclear production.

32. It is true that M. Zorin has accepted, in relation to nuclear tests, that control posts should be set up in the United States, Britain and the U. S. S. R. and in " the Pacific area " to check that tests have actually stopped—and that an International Commission should supervise the ban and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. While these proposals are a step in the right direction, insofar as they recognise the need to control the banning of tests, they take no account of the Western view that the cessation of tests without a ban on the manufacture of fissionable material would do little to stop the nuclear arms race.

33. Your Committee propose that support should be given to the position that the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests cannot be entertained without taking into consideration a cut-off of nuclear production. As Mr. Harold Macmillan said in a recent letter to M. Bulganin, " You have but to say the word, and real progress is assured." The avoidance of the continuation of the arms race is the most important of the questions now being discussed in the world. It is therefore to be hoped that the negotiations will be renewed and pursued with vigour on both sides now that a comprehensive and concrete plan has been put forward.

3 German Reunification

34. On 29th July 1957, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States issued a joint declaration in Berlin reaffirming their common policy on German reunification and European security. This reaffirmed the responsibility assumed in 1945 and confirmed in 1955 at Geneva of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany, which was " not only an elementary requirement of justice for the German people, but the only sound basis of a lasting settlement in Europe." The declaration goes on to say that an all-German Government can only be established by free elections throughout Germany for an all-German National Assembly. The freedom of a united Germany to choose its own political and military associations is clearly stated. This means that a reunited Germany will be free, if it so wishes, to leave N. A. T. O. This had been made clear previously, but there had not been a four-Power declaration on the point. The Berlin statement again gave the Soviet Union to understand with all clarity that the Western Powers are ready to take practical measures to give due consideration, in the event of German reunification, to the justified security interests of all the States concerned. They declared themselves ready to engage in negotiations in a " spirit of flexibility and willingness to achieve an understanding."

35. The Soviet Union also professes to seek German reunification. In a memorandum published just before the four-Power declaration, the Government of the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany proposed the setting up of an all-German federation in which East Germany, with its unrepresentative regime, should take part. The same view was expressed in the Note of the Soviet Union dated 7th September 1957. The Communique issued on 13th August 1957 at the conclusion of the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to East Germany said yet again : " There can be no question of reuniting Germany at the expense of the German Democratic Republic and the social gains of the workers of that Republic." It is to be feared that the only solution the Soviet Union is at present prepared to entertain is one that would guarantee the Communist regime in the Eastern part of Germany and initiate a Communist influence in the Federal Republic

36. The solution of the German question, which is connected with so many other problems in the present world situation, seems only possible in conjunction with a broad settlement between West and East. The Assembly has constantly expressed the view that a united Europe, by its very existence, would contribute greatly to such a broad settlement. There is indeed little hope of solving the German problem on the basis of continued independent rival and even conflicting national policies in Western Europe. Hence the development of a common European concept of foreign policy is specially important and urgent for this particular problem, which has always been regarded by the Assembly not as a question affecting Germany alone, but as one of the most vital European problems.

4 Hungary and the other Soviet satellites

37. The main feature of Hungarian life during recent months has been the wave of trials of those who took part in the uprising. The concessions and promises extracted last October are being finally repudiated. A session of the National Assembly (the first since August 1956), held in May, postponed for two years the elections due then.

38. On 20th June 1957, the United Nations Special Committee published its report, which not only confirmed that the Hungarian October rising had been a spontaneous, national movement, but also drew attention to the violation of human rights practised by the Soviet-imposed Kadar regime. The report, which was unanimously endorsed by the representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, who made up the Committee, said :

" What took place in Hungary was a spontaneous national uprising, caused by longstanding grievances, of which the most important was the position of inferior status of Hungary with regard to the U. S. S. R. The uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of them Communists or former Communists. Those who took part in i t insisted that Democratic Socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure, and that the land reform and other social achievements should be safeguarded. It is utterly untrue that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary or that it drew its strength from ' imperialist ' circles in the West."

Stating that " evidence shows that Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used even in the first intervention ", the Committee gave a reminder that " no clause of the Warsaw Treaty provides for intervention by armed forces of the Soviet Union to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers."

On deportations the Committee stated : " Since November 4th 1956, deportation of Hungarian citizens to the U. S. S. R. has taken place on a considerable scale, the actual numbers cannot be accurately assessed but they run into thousands. The Committee has no proof that more than a part of the deportees has been returned to Hungary ". It concluded : " A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country, must, by the Soviet Union's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern. "

39. The report of the Special Committee was discussed and approved on 14th September 1957 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly at the same time condemned the Soviet Union by an overwhelming majority for its intervention in Hungary. Your Committee is gratified that the delegations of the Members of the Council of Europe were all agreed on this issue. There is not much hope that the Soviet Union will cease to flout the authority of the United Nations, that it will withdraw its military forces and cease to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary as she was formally called upon to do last year, but the fact that a solution has not been reached to restore freedom to Hungary does not absolve us from going on doggedly searching for a solution. We must see to it, in view of the Soviet campaign to take in the Afro-Asiatic powers by wilful distortion of the facts, that the truth about the October rising is made known far and wide

40. Your Committee take this opportunity to reaffirm that there can be no lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the West so long as the satellite countries, whose peoples long to be free, are kept in bondage. That does not mean that the West wishes to encourage these peoples to show hostility and belligerence to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the West is convinced that a lasting solution is only possible if good-neighbourly relations can be established between these countries and the Soviet Union. In a series of statements, Western statesmen have declared their readiness to contribute to bringing about such relations.

41. As mentioned earlier in this report, the Soviet Union has tabled a rather startling resolution in the United Nations on peaceful coexistence. This resolution is as follows :

" The General Assembly,

Considering that one of the most important purposes of the United Nations is to strengthen universal peace and to develop friendly relations among States, irrespective of their social structure;

Noting with satisfaction that many States have recently begun to base their relations one with another upon the following principles :

1 Mutual respect for one another's territorial integrity and sovereignty;

2 Non-aggression;

3 Non-intervention in one another's domestic affairs on any economic, political or ideological grounds whatsoever;

4 Equality and mutual benefit; and Peaceful co-existence;

5 Peaceful co-existence;

Recognizing that the application of these principles in relations among all States would be of exceptional importance in reducing international tension and extending international co-operation

Calls upon States to be guided by the aforesaid principles in their relations one with another and to settle solely by peaceful means any disputes which may arise among them."

Your Rapporteur has already indicated what the motives behind the resolution are. If, on the other hand, it could be taken seriously and not as a propaganda move, it would mean that the Soviet Union recognises the right of the satellite countries to decide their own future in freedom. In any case, the Western Powers should take the Soviet Union at her word.

5 Poland and Yugoslavia

42. In Poland, M. Gomulka has declared at the Ninth Plenum of the Polish United Workers Party that he would stand by the policies of the Polish national road to socialism, proclaimed at the Eighth Plenum, without yielding to pressure either from the Stalinists of from those who advocated more liberal policies. He denied that the Soviet road was obligatory for other Communist States. At the same time he defined the limits of Polish liberalisation.

43. M. Gomulka seems to have secured Marshal Tito's support during his visit to Belgrade. This may help to consolidate the position of his Government. But it seems prudent to warn against exaggerated hopes with regard to future developments. Bolh regimes in Poland and Yugoslavia are Communist regimes, no matter what the real opinion of the two peoples may be. Their fate is, therefore, inseparably bound up with the fate of world Communism and it must be excepted that both Governments, individualistic though they are as regards the practical application of Communism, are interested in consolidating and fortifying world Communism.

44. In Yugoslavia M. Djilas, former Vice-President of Yugoslavia, was sentenced, on October 4th, after a secret trial, to seven years' imprisonment on charges of " hostile propaganda " against the regime arising out of the publication abroad of his book The New Class In Poland, the newspaper Po Prostu, the weekly newspaper which for more than a year has been the mouthpiece of dissatisfied students and intellectuals in the Polish Communist Party and administration has been banned.

45. Your Committee has already expressed the view that it might be unwise to cold-shoulder the Poles, who wish to renew contact with the West after more than ten years in isolation on the grounds that their régime does not conform to our democratic standards. The question is whether we can help Poland to strengthen her autonomy and make it less dependent on the Soviet world. We have already said that the Western Powers, while realising the difficulties, should give such economic assistance as they can to Poland. The United States have already done so

46. Whether we can go further and establish, for instance, closer cultural links, depends on further developments in Poland.

6 The Middle East

47. Closer links between Syria and the Soviet Union have now been forged. The Syrians have accepted military aid as well as technical assistance. Although there are avowed Communists among the Syrian leaders, the present policy of Syria is fashioned by her desire for independence and her enmity towards Israel. It so happens that by following this course Syria is in process of becoming a Soviet sphere of influence inasmuch as her policy fits in with the Soviet programme of " conflict management ".

48. The latest developments underline Soviet determination to exploit nationalist :régimes to serve Soviet purposes. Economic aid, trade and arms are followed by technical advisers and political penetration. The greatest threat to stability in the area lies in the probable use of Syria as a spring-board for Communist-inspired subversive operations against her neighbours.

49. Faced with this new challenge, what can the Western Powers do? The idea of a declaration renouncing the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter has been put forward. But that is not a remedy. The Eisenhower Doctrine provides military aid in case of unprovoked aggression. What the Western Powers face in the Middle East, not only in Syria, hut also to a lesser extent in Egypt and the Yemen, is a large-scale campaign by the Soviet Union to earn friendship by pretending to support independence and by cheap loans, technical help and deliveries of obsolete arms, as a prelude to political penetration. The retort of the West must be an answer to this spread of Soviet Communist power, influence and perhaps ideology.

50. Your Committee are convinced that, in the long term, economic and social progress must be the foundation for stability in the Middle East. The Western Powers must therefore, jointly, try and encourage and develop regional economic co-operation. Ultimately, this may create an atmosphere for peace between Israel and the Arabs. In the social field, too, there is room for a vast programme. There is at present in Iraq a vast development plan. The Baghdad Pact, besides playing an important part, militarily, in defence of the free world, has an economic committee which is doing useful work. It is now necessary to help other Arab countries to co-operate together and with the friendly help and advice of the West, if asked for, to develop their resources for their own benefit.

51. The generous economic assistance given by the United States is helping the Arab countries to develop into more modern States, economically and politically sound. Important as the Eisenhower Doctrine may be, future developments in the Middle East will to a large extent depend on whether the Arabs believe that the Soviet Union or the West are their real friends.

52. Meanwhile, it is vitally necessary to work towards a relaxation of the tension arising from the dispute between the Arab States and Israel, the plight of the Arab refugees and the unresolved problems in connection with the Suez Canal.

53. Your Committee consider that the solution of all these urgent questions in the Middle East should continue to be pursued by all practicable means and by common efforts.