B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Dumery, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. In many countries, it has become
commonplace for certain political parties to focus on migrants and refugees
during election campaigns, claiming that they constitute a threat
to the values, way of life and identity of the indigenous population.
In this way, these political parties are part of a trend which is
radicalising government anti-migration policy and thereby fostering
a resurgence of xenophobia and racism in European politics.
2. Xenophobia is usually defined as “a pathological fear of foreigners
or foreign countries”. It is a kind of aversion to people one does
not know or who come from a foreign country. Xenophobia is a sentiment
or a perception of things based on stereotypes that are shaped by
society rather than on rational fact.
3. Foreigners, and migrants in particular, are portrayed as a
burden on society and are subjected to many forms of violence and
prejudice.
4. A number of factors have helped to encourage manifestations
of xenophobia and campaigns against immigrants or, quite simply,
against foreigners. One major factor is the economic and financial
crisis and the collapse of the job market. In addition, and as a
result of various terrorist attacks, there is also a feeling of insecurity
and fear of the future, and a link is perceived between migrants
and crime, despite police findings and statistics which show this
generalisation to be ill-founded.
5. It hardly needs saying that Europe has a long history of emigration
but has only become a continent of immigration over the course of
the last few decades. Europe’s ageing populations are divided between
the need to accept immigrants and so preserve their level of welfare,
and the fear that a huge influx of immigrants may destroy the cultural
identity of European societies. This state of affairs has fostered
the emergence of what is commonly called the “threatened majority”
as a principal political force in the European arena.
6. Concerns about migration have therefore become an excuse behind
which the population hides the fears and uncertainties created by
the problems outlined above.
7. Election campaigns have come to be a platform from which extremist
political parties and movements can promote racist, xenophobic and
anti-immigrant thinking. The xenophobic parties that have emerged
or markedly strengthened their position in recent elections, gaining
seats in national parliaments and the European Parliament, have
exploited these various factors and advocated extremely harsh policies
relating to migrants and refugees.
8. In some European countries, the recent electoral breakthrough
of xenophobic parties has drastically affected the political landscape,
in that the other parties have not been able to secure a stable
majority and have consequently had to form coalitions or agree to
co-operate. All these instances of closer ties have lent legitimacy
to the position and role of the extremists. Because opposition to
immigration is a core tenet of all these parties, the leaders of
mainstream parties and governments who co-operate with them or who
campaign using xenophobic populist ideas that are likely to be vote
winners have been encouraged to toughen their policy and statements
on migration and migrants, thereby helping in turn to spread xenophobic
and racist attitudes. Indeed, in some countries, the population’s
resistance to racism and xenophobia has weakened significantly in
recent years.
2 Terminology
9. The rapporteur wishes to point
out that the term “radical populism” describes the underlying ideology
of the new racist and xenophobic parties which are emerging in Europe.
The parties in question are usually to the right, or far right,
of the political spectrum and it is true that in some respects they
have connections with the “traditional” neo-Nazi or neo-fascist
movements of post-Second World War Europe. The term “populism” is often
used very vaguely, to contrast “the people” with “the elite”, in
calls for changes in the social order or for political mobilisation.
The terms “xenophobic populism” and “xenophobic populist parties”
will therefore be used in order to clearly distinguish these parties
from what is traditionally understood by “populism”.
10. In an effort to gather as much information as possible and
to analyse underlying developments and trends as effectively as
possible, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons
held a hearing in Corfu (Greece) on 2 June 2011. The rapporteur
also went to Copenhagen and Stockholm to talk to members of parliament
and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
the media and gather information on factors which are adding to
the rise in the number of statements which are xenophobic or hostile to
migrants, and on mechanisms and legal provisions in force in Council
of Europe member States to combat extremism, racial discrimination
and hate speech, particularly during election campaigns.
11. This report seeks to offer recommendations which may help
members of the Parliamentary Assembly and policy makers to achieve
a politically more positive and more realistic portrayal of migrants
and asylum seekers.
3 Factors
contributing to growing anti-immigrant feelings
3.1 Fear
of the future
12. A number of factors help foster
increasing manifestations of xenophobia and campaigns against immigrants
or, quite simply, against “foreigners”. One major factor is the
fear engendered by numerous European policies. The effects of the
economic crisis, profound social and demographic changes, the growth of
migration and, more specifically, the inexorable pace of change
which causes people to lose control over their lives and the way
in which the very identity of communities is being transformed are
all factors that inflame anti-migrant feelings. The general public
has lost faith in the ability of governments to cope with these
changes and manage them effectively, concluding that neither States
nor political parties of whatever persuasion have the faintest idea
of what the future of Europe should look like. Consequently, fear
of immigration has become a determining factor not only in member
States but also in the policies of the European Union.
3.2 Sense
of losing control
13. The sense of a loss of control,
created initially by globalisation and made worse by the collapse
of national economies and job markets, is reflected in some cases
by a desire for clearly demarcated frontiers and restrictions on
access – something the politicians should not underestimate. In
a situation where millions of workers are unemployed, a disproportionately
large share of them immigrants, the pressures brought to bear by
xenophobic populists give rise to ideologies which seek a scapegoat.
3.3 Terrorist
attacks
14. In the aftermath of the 9/11
bombings in the United States and the subsequent terrorist acts
in Europe, Islamophobia has become a factor that unites far-right
members of parliament and xenophobic populists who are currently
enjoying greater electoral success in Europe than the anti-Semitic
parties. These parties’ political influence and propaganda have
caused many mainstream parties and ruling coalitions to follow a
similar path. Discrimination against Muslims is now part of the
political climate, and asylum seekers and migrants are trapped in
the general atmosphere of intolerance and rejection of those who
are “different”, those who are “foreign”.
3.4 Xenophobic
populist parties
15. In north and west European
States, the rise of xenophobic populist parties has coincided with
the decline of the powerful social-democratic parties, and with
it their egalitarian and rights-based ideologies. Recent initiatives
to “modernise” these parties’ appeal to their electorates have created
a foothold for new and exclusionist approaches which seek a more
restrictive “managed” immigration and a common rejection of multiculturalism.
This divides communities rather than bringing individuals together.
16. Finally, the new public relations strategy of giving xenophobic
populist parties an “image makeover” has won them a degree of respect,
allowing them to gain power and influence. These groups have also
learned to use democratic procedures for their own ends. Through
ambitious demonstrations and campaigns focusing on freedom of speech,
the far right increasingly portrays itself as a keen champion of
democracy, playing on the fears of European citizens in order to
promote their “cause” by offering simple answers to social challenges
that are complex. By placing the emphasis on family issues and family
activities, they have been successful with voters, in particular
an increasing number of women.
17. The tragic events of 22 July 2011 in Norway put the spotlight
on the activities of militant extremists. Another strain of far-right
activists born of “street politics” and the skinhead culture is
often responsible for violent (including physical) attacks on individuals,
mosques, synagogues and cemeteries, as well as property and businesses
owned by minority groups and migrants. Such street politics are
based on campaigning using stereotypes and the inaccurate depiction
of migrants and asylum seekers as “Islamic terrorists” or “foreign criminals”.
18. Other examples are provided by the Russian skinhead movement
which, according to the Sova Centre, had approximately 70 000 members
in 2009 (71 people were murdered and 333 injured in racist attacks
in that year). Hungary’s Jobbik movement has had considerable success
in the space of just a few years. In the parliamentary elections
in 2010, the party obtained 16.6% of the votes, giving them 47 seats.
The party even has a paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard, which
is strongly reminiscent of the Arrow Cross Party of the 1940s. Jobbik
has also initiated co-operation amongst several of the xenophobic
parties in Europe. In October 2009, a far-right alliance, the Alliance
of European National Movements (AENM), was formed.
19. Some parties build their ideology on ethnic or “nativist”
nationalism and regionalism, seeking to redefine citizenship and
residence rights and to restrict such rights to real or imagined
indigenous core populations. The common denominator of all these
parties is that their campaigning stresses the “cultural pressure”
which migrants and asylum seekers place on their host countries.
The programmes and policies of these parties and their representatives
stress the need for tight curbs on immigration. In their view, the
welfare State cannot survive in the countries of immigration, and
their electioneering accuses migrants and asylum seekers of unfairly
taking up social benefits and entitlements to housing and health
care which should be available only to “true citizens”.
4 Mechanisms
and legal provisions in force in Council of Europe member States
and at Council of Europe level
20. This rise in xenophobia is
currently affecting and eroding democratic principles and undermining
respect for individuals and their human dignity. Both internationally
and in the Council of Europe member States there are numerous legal
instruments which, if used well, should enable the values which
our Organisation espouses to reassert themselves, with the establishment,
as a result, of a real strategy for combating xenophobia, especially
during election campaigns, a period that is very often sensitive
and when the strongest arguments are brought to bear in order to
persuade the public.
4.1 Nationally
21. Member States already have
legal remedies for countering racist election campaigns and laws
against incitement to racial hatred, Holocaust denial or blatant
anti-religious attacks. Recent experience shows that there is scope
for legislative bodies to review and strengthen existing legislation,
its operation, and the sanctions against politicians who flout these
legal principles. There are also electoral commissions, electoral courts,
or regulatory bodies which can punish politicians if they behave
inappropriately before or during elections.
22. Member States are bound by a number of international treaties.
For example, Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Article 20 of
the United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) require States to ensure that national legislation
makes incitement to racial discrimination or the spread of ideas
stigmatising a group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin
a criminal offence punishable by law.
23. The democratic political parties of Europe gave a formal commitment
to uphold the principle of non-discrimination and to combat racist
political discourse when, in February 1988, they signed the Charter
of European Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society. In this
they undertook, amongst other things, to uphold basic human rights
(rejection of racist violence, incitement to racial hatred and persecution
or any other form of racial discrimination), not to publish views
or positions that might foster racist or other prejudice, to deal responsibly
and fairly with sensitive topics, and to refrain from co-operating
with political parties that incite racial hatred.
4.2 At
European level
24. The Council of Europe has also
adopted a number of texts on the issue of hate speech, and the need
to make such speech a criminal offence. According to Committee of
Ministers Recommendation No. (97) 20 on “hate speech”, the expression
covers “all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote or
justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms
of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed
by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and
hostility against minorities, migrants and people of migrant origin”.
25. In 2008, the Council of Europe launched its 2008-10 anti-discrimination
campaign and published a manual on hate speech which reviews the
relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This manual
places a number of constraints on freedom of expression, a concept
which may vary depending on the context in which statements are
made, the position of the persons making them (politicians, journalists
or civil servants), the instruments used (press, television) and
the potential impact of these statements. It must not be forgotten
that political extremism and hate speech very often try to manipulate
the right to freedom of expression for their own ends. But freedom
of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), is not an absolute right. As stipulated
in the Assembly’s
Resolution 1345
(2003) on racist, xenophobic and intolerant discourse in politics,
this right to freedom of expression “may be limited by competing
public interests, amongst which are the prevention of disorder,
the protection of morals and the protection of the rights of others.
In particular, this allows for limitation of these rights and freedoms when
they are exercised in such a way as to cause, incite, promote, advocate,
encourage or justify racism, xenophobia or intolerance”.
26. More recently, on 1 July 2009, the Committee of Ministers
adopted a Declaration on Human Rights in Culturally Diverse Societies,
in which it emphasises that the preservation and promotion of a
democratic society based on respect for diversity requires resolute
action against all forms of discrimination. The declaration also
calls on political leaders to speak and act in such a way as to
foster dialogue and respect human rights.
27. In addition, in 2005, the European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance (ECRI) published a Declaration on the Use of Racist,
Anti-Semitic and Xenophobic Elements in Political Discourse, in
which it clearly stated that such discourse was increasingly “infecting”
mainstream political parties, and appeared especially in debates
on immigration and asylum, as well as in statements which gave a
distorted picture of Islam designed to present that religion as
a threat or to encourage anti-Semitic feeling.
28. In 2011, the Council of Europe commissioned a group of Eminent
Persons to prepare a report on the subject of “living together”.
This group also considered the issues covered in this report.
29. The Eminent Persons’ report stated that these new political
parties “have a much broader base, stretching into virtually all
strata of society, regardless of education level, gender or status.
They can appeal to almost anyone who feels that his or her livelihood
and way of life is threatened by the economic crisis, and by immigration.
In fact, some of them combine these xenophobic attitudes with an
appeal to social liberalism, defence of the welfare State and seemingly
left-wing economic policies... In western Europe, hostility to immigration
is their common theme. In many central and eastern European countries,
similar anxieties are directed against the Roma, and sometimes other
national minorities, including Jews.”
30. As is apparent from the above, member States of the Council
of Europe, particularly governments, have not remained passive in
the face of this phenomenon. Even so, and despite existing legislation,
one major factor remains, namely the attitude of the public, which
has evolved over many years, and also the attitudes of governments
themselves.
31. One example is that of Austria, where the FPÖ’s inclusion
in the centre-right coalition government of 1999 led to the temporary
suspension of Austria from EU programmes and member State discussions.
But things have moved on, and nowadays Europe has become used to
having racist parties as part of the parliamentary system. In Denmark,
the minority coalition government has, over the last ten years,
included the xenophobic Danish People’s Party (DPP). The Netherlands
followed this same path, and the entry of former neo-fascists into
the Italian Government go largely unnoticed.
4.3 Strategies
for fighting extremism and xenophobia
32. There is no easy answer to
the question of how far one should go in interacting politically
with radical xenophobic populist parties. European experience ranges
from ignoring them or deliberately excluding them from political
affairs (as in Sweden), erecting a cordon
sanitaire (as in Belgium or France), partial co-operation (as
in Denmark and the Netherlands), right up to full co-operation (as
with the FPÖ in Austria, which is part of the government, or the
radical right-wing parties that have been integrated into government).
Unfortunately, it is too soon to analyse what impact these strategies
have had on the position of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees
or what the public perception of these groups may be. Consequently,
I believe that there is a pressing need for an objective analysis
of this impact.
33. On the other hand, the strategy of discrediting extremist
parties by giving them political responsibility has led to concessions
being made to these parties and the ideologies they espouse. In
Denmark, for example, the role of the anti-Muslim and anti-European
Danish People’s Party has been pivotal, forcing through dozens of new
laws to curb immigration.
34. The strategy of more centrist players, aimed at controlling
the xenophobic populist parties’ agenda by promoting a similar agenda
themselves (described by political scientists as “triangulation”),
especially on issues such as tighter curbs on immigration and the
criminalisation of irregular migration, has not paid off either. This
strategy has been clearly apparent in recent political and governmental
statements, especially in the run-up to an election, which reject
the idea of multiculturalism and diversity.
35. The political exclusion or cordon
sanitaire approach has been effective only in a few instances,
where the parties concerned were small. The moment they become significant
in size, these parties have to be allowed a say in the political
process, and democratic parties are obliged to work with xenophobic
ones. This form of co-operation could have the effect of minimising
the xenophobic or racist pronouncements which these parties are
likely to disseminate.
36. In other European countries, exemplary measures have been
taken to inform the public about the hate-filled agenda of the racist
parties. In Sweden, for example, in the run-up to the parliamentary
elections of 2010, all the mainstream parties pledged not to seek
support from the Sweden Democrats. The two main political blocs
regarded the Democrats as xenophobes who preached ideas incompatible
with the commonly held view that people are equal regardless of
their national origin, ethnicity or religion. During the election
campaign, the parties already represented in the Swedish Parliament,
along with the Swedish television networks, excluded Sweden Democrats
from the televised political debates. This did not stop them from
gaining 20 seats in the parliament (5.7% of the votes). Nonetheless,
they have been marginalised and have no say in policy making. After
the elections, both the coalition and opposition parties signed
an agreement that they would pursue an even more open and migrant-friendly
policy on immigration.
37. Against this background one factor is more decisive than others,
namely the role played by the media. This role is crucial during
election campaigns because the image of migrants and asylum seekers
which the public and the electorate are given will depend very much
on the way they are depicted in the media.
5 Role
of the media, opinion polls and referendums in shaping the image
of migrants and asylum seekers
5.1 Media,
Internet and social networks
38. The media has a crucial responsibility
in shaping the image of migrants and their descendants. The press,
television, and now the Internet all provide wider coverage of politicians’
messages at election time. The latter often quote media messages
and present them as established popular opinions, downplaying the
fact that the media has its own agendas through the influence of
proprietors or support for particular political parties.
39. Obviously, not only representatives of democratic parties
make use of the fact that the media strongly influences public opinion
and political debate. Extreme-right players have emerged as real
media professionals in many countries. Some scholars argue that
right-wing rhetoric conveys more passion and emotion, and is therefore
more readily picked up by the media which is always eager for drama
and conflict, whereas moderate politicians are often content to
react to their opponents’ messages rather than proactively deliver
their own. The media can strongly affect political trends, especially
in countries where individual politicians have influence with the
press and television stations, such as Italy and Bulgaria.
40. Even senior mainstream politicians often use stereotypes and
the language of “common sense” racism in the media at election time,
thus creating a climate of fear and coarsening the debate. In some
ways, however, the media function as an independent social player
and not simply as a transmitter of our present-day concerns, and
they must be considered as such. The media set and drive the agenda
on immigration issues, but they also provide a reflection of public
and political debate. They often see fit to demonise immigrants
and other minorities, not only echoing anxieties and myths about
such groups that are prevalent in the general public, but actively
intensifying them by highlighting real or alleged “scandals” about
crime and benefit fraud, at the same time accusing the authorities
of covering these up and of allowing too many foreigners into the country.
41. Some European States have set restrictions on the language
and messages the media can use, in order to protect minorities and
migrants. Most have regulators or complaints procedures, but unfortunately
these have often proved ineffective in defending the rights of migrants
and asylum seekers and they clearly need reviewing.
42. The new media, particularly the Internet and social networks,
play an increasingly important role in spreading xenophobic and
anti-immigrant attitudes. A wide range of highly professional far-rightist
media has developed to this end. Without regulation, its presence
and activities are difficult to contain or prevent. For instance,
a strongly anti-Muslim video clip was released by the Sweden Democrats
before the 2010 elections. It was rejected by the mainstream television
companies but received a record number of hits on YouTube. On the
other hand, greater use could be made of the Internet and the social
networks as “counter-platforms” or more effective forums for exchanging
and communicating in combating racism.
43. It is worth remembering in this context that, on 22 February
2012, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe asked the Dutch
Government to clarify its position on a website that had broadly
been judged xenophobic, because it invited and disseminated negative
information about citizens of central and eastern European countries
working in the Netherlands. In his letter to the government, the
Secretary General emphasised the right to freedom of expression
but expressed doubts about the subject matter of this site and voiced
his concern at the fact that it was hosted by a political party
with links to the ruling coalition.
5.2 Opinion
polls
44. Politicians across Europe,
when challenged during election campaigns about the way they deal
with issues of migration and asylum, point to opinion polls as evidence
of voter attitudes and argue that they are simply reflecting rather
than creating intolerance at election time. The rapporteur would
point out, however, that the results of opinion polls often vary
depending on the sample surveyed and the age and educational and social
status of those questioned.
45. The political influence of racist discourse and rhetoric about
migrants and minorities is perhaps most apparent when used by xenophobic
populist parties in their campaigning for referendums, plebiscites,
citizens’ initiatives and petitions, ostensibly as another official
way of enabling the vox populi to
be heard. Research by the Irish Parliament, which is required by
the constitution to hold referendums, has shown that campaigning ahead
of referendums has more of an impact on results than election campaigns.
46. In Switzerland in 2009, the national consultation on minarets
was said to have reflected the true “voice of the people”. The facts
show that in Switzerland, far-right parties and groups which sponsor
federal and local referendums have for many years kept the issue
of Überfremdung (“too many
foreigners”) alive in their political discourse. Referendums were
the main means for far-right groups to develop their organisation
and propaganda methods. Here, Switzerland is a perfect case study,
demonstrating how xenophobic populist parties construct and politicise
a so-called “immigration problem” as a way of increasing their power
and exerting decisive influence on migration, citizenship and integration
policy. The Swiss example suggests that the work of politicians
who seek, through election and referendum campaigning, to create
a political climate hostile to immigration often makes more of an
impression than the actual presence of migrants in a country or the
true popular perception of immigration and migrants.
47. Recent plebiscites and referendums raise important issues
regarding the use and misuse of direct democracy. In the 27 European
Union countries, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) Regulation
came into force on 1 April 2012 as “the first transnational instrument
of participatory democracy in world history”. The ECI is designed
to encourage European citizens to submit requests on policies affecting
them. Recent experience highlights the danger that politicians and
political parties in member countries will continue to allow or encourage
“direct democracy” decision making which contravenes national treaty
obligations and breaches the fundamental human rights of migrants
and minorities. The implementation of the ECI will be accompanied
by clear guidelines which will prevent its misuse.
6 Conclusions
and recommendations
48. Negative public reactions to
immigration and immigrants are on the rise almost everywhere in
Europe, along with a lack of faith in governments’ ability to manage
population flows properly and the impact which immigrants have on
jobs, public services and civic space. Many Europeans want governments
to organise more stable, predictable and usually smaller flows of
regular migrants, and they want a significant clamp-down on illegal
entry. They also want to see unscrupulous employers stopped from
undermining pay and working conditions, and to ensure that immigrants
learn the local language, obey the law, pay taxes and respect the civic
culture and institutions of their host country.
49. So the first challenge for politicians and policy makers is
to remedy the lack of public trust and reassure people that their
concerns are being heard and dealt with. All too often those who
lead mainstream political parties deem it easier, especially around
election time, to duck these issues which they perceive to be difficult or
contentious rather than tackle them head on. But backing away from
contentious issues only feeds popular discontent and drives people
into the arms of populist and xenophobic parties which promise,
through deceptively simplistic and emotional slogans, to find answers
to their concerns.
50. Democratic political leaders in Europe should be more willing
to assume their political responsibilities, spearheading the debate
on migration issues and fighting xenophobic, populist and far-right
rhetoric and ideologies. It is their job to make it clear that discrimination
and racism have no place in Europe’s societies of diversity and
that the public expression of xenophobic ideas must be punished
in accordance with the law.
51. Political leaders competing for office are public bodies and
they and their representatives should be subject to the same legal
constraints as civil society organisations. They should also be
penalised if they discriminate on grounds of ethnicity or religion
in terms of the membership and constitution of their parties or if,
through their activities and election campaigns, they promote racial
hatred and harassment of minorities and migrants.
52. As shown above, leadership is crucial in delivering a strong
message on immigration that is likely to win public support. The
rapporteur believes that the most effective response is to face
up to people’s fear of change, instead of simply quoting facts and
figures at them.
53. Political leaders need to prove to their public that they
are in control of both the composition and scale of immigration.
They need to strike the right balance between local anxieties, caused
by unemployment and the economic crisis, and long-term national
interests and priorities: they should, for example, promote the employment
of immigrants while at the same time taking care to preserve economic
competitiveness. Against this background, I would also like to recall
that the Transatlantic Council on Migration, at its plenary meeting
in May 2009 in Bellagio (Italy), said that citizenship must be accessible
to immigrants, that States must be encouraged to foster greater
integration and that right from the start of the process, immigrants
must be considered as potential citizens.
54. The actual words used when talking about immigration and the
integration of immigrants really matter: the right words shape public
opinion, foster support for policy initiatives and stave off criticism;
whereas the wrong words can inflame and polarise public opinion,
exacerbate existing anxieties and mobilise opposition. The language
used should thus be honest, unambiguous and should emphasise not
only the negatives but also the positives. Euphemisms backfire,
as they are seen as disingenuous and give the public the impression
of being manipulated.
55. The rapporteur believes that what is lacking most in public
discourse and the portrayal of migrants, especially in the context
of elections, is a positive message based on values that explains
why Europe’s societies need immigrants and why we benefit considerably
from their presence. If a proper balance can be found between values
and pragmatism this should dissipate many of the social tensions
and smooth the path to integration in both directions.
56. In view of the above, and by virtue of its remit, the Council
of Europe has a greater role than ever to play in combating extremism
and xenophobia. I welcome the fact that the Assembly has recently
and on several occasions voiced alarm at the rise of extremist movements
and parties which spread ideologies incompatible with democracy
and human rights and threaten the fundamental values of the Council
of Europe. The recent
Recommendation
1975 (2011) on living together in 21st-century Europe: follow-up
to the report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of
Europe emphasises in particular that the strengthening of common European
values and identity should be promoted in a way which does not eliminate
the different cultures of specific groups, but preserves and incorporates
their individualities in the common European framework. The recommendation
further warns that this process can be endangered by growing populist,
xenophobic and anti-immigration politics, and calls on member States
to develop policies to prevent such negative practices.
