B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Marietta Karamanli, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. The Covid-19 pandemic which
swept the world from the start of 2020 was and is above all a public
health crisis. Saving lives and protecting people’s health has understandably
been governments’ top priority. At the same time, the pandemic has
had a major impact on all aspects of our lives and societies, including
the way democratic institutions work. The Parliamentary Assembly
took stock of these effects for the first time in October 2020 by
adopting
Resolution
2337 (2020) and
Recommendation
2179 (2020) “Democracies facing the Covid-19 pandemic”.
2. In November 2020, I tabled a motion for a resolution on “Protecting
the pillars of democracy during health crises”
Note with the support of several colleagues.
It called on the Assembly to closely monitor the impact of the ongoing
health crisis, and of any future crises, on the pillars of the democratic
system, particularly the functioning of parliaments and elections
during emergency situations.
3. When the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy appointed
me as rapporteur in February 2021, I indicated my intention to include
two additional aspects in my future report – the impact of the pandemic
on local democracy and on civil society – and to organise hearings
with experts. I also planned to work closely with national delegations
to identify good practices for exercising parliamentary control
over government action. However, the deterioration of international
affairs following the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine
radically altered our priorities.
4. In addition, the pandemic also made meeting up in person more
difficult, so I was only able to hold online meetings, doing so
with Mr Andreas Kiefer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe’s
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Mr Pierre Garrone, Head
of Division in the Secretariat of the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), and Mr Filip Pazderski (Institute
of Public Affairs, Poland), who led work to compile the report on
the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on fundamental rights
and civic space
Note for the European
Economic and Social Committee. I should like to thank everyone I
was in touch with for their helpful contributions and for providing
some very useful documents.
5. In light of the recent uptick in the number of Covid-19 cases
in many countries around the world, the emergence of new variants
yet to be properly studied and other diseases in circulation, for
example the monkeypox infections, a new report following up on
Resolution
2337 (2020) is both pertinent and timely. New climate and environmental
emergencies in the near future may prompt the public authorities
to take fresh emergency measures putting democratic order at risk.
2 Parliaments
and Covid-19
2.1 The
challenges of the pandemic
6. The Covid-19 pandemic has had
a major impact on parliaments and all governmental institutions,
which faced both political and operational challenges. At political
level, governments wielded considerably more regulatory power during
this period, putting parliamentary influence and scrutiny to the
test. Parliaments had to strike a balance between continuing to
fulfil their constitutional responsibilities to ensure the continuity
of democratic governance, introducing and carefully overseeing emergency
executive powers to combat the virus, adopting safe working practices
to lead by example and protecting the health of parliamentarians,
staff and visitors to their buildings.
7. Parliaments are places where people meet, deliberate on and
pass public policies – they hold political leaders to account and
provide a forum for national debate. By their very nature, they
include a variety of members representing a wide range of views,
with collegiality, as well as adversarial and public debate, as distinguishing
features. First and foremost, however, they are inherently democratic
bodies, in which all members elected by and on behalf of the people
have an equal vote. By holding debates in public, they differ from
many other governmental bodies. As representatives of society, they
forge vital links between members of the public and the policies
that are carried out on their behalf. Together, these functions
ensure that parliaments provide political and democratic accountability
and strengthen public support and the legitimacy of the entire democratic
system.
8. Several of these core functions were sorely tested by the
pandemic. First, it immediately challenged the ability of parliaments,
which bring together many different members and parties, to convene
in the traditional fashion. Some responded by opening up debate
and putting their activities online. Others chose to limit the number
of members taking part. Some cut back on the number of meetings
or the range of activities they would normally undertake. Others
changed their voting procedures.
9. The pandemic also meant that governments had to make decisions
quickly in a volatile context, as failing to act could result in
even more adverse impacts on health. In many cases, this led to
less parliamentary control and accountability. In the early days
of the pandemic, such trade-offs were necessary, but over time there
was a growing danger that governments would become accustomed to
this policy-making arrangement and that ultimately, legislation
would become the exclusive prerogative of the executive.
10. Governments clearly have an interest in getting their intended
policies on the statute book as quickly and easily as possible.
There are many good reasons, however, why parliaments traditionally
serve to slow down this process. It is the basic principle of democracy
that hearing many voices and different points of view makes for
better outcomes.
11. There are many reasons why parliamentary scrutiny is vital.
I will discuss this at more length in the next section. As a matter
of principle, accountability is an inherent part of parliamentary
democracy. There are also important reasons why it is needed in
practical terms.
12. First of all, effective parliamentary scrutiny fosters good
governance. Putting policy decisions on the table, giving people
a public springboard to ask tough questions and forcing ministers
to consider how they will respond all help to avoid misguided policy
choices and lead to better political decision-making.
13. Secondly, parliamentary oversight in a public setting encourages
transparent policy-making. Governments have the chance to explain
the rationale behind their policies in public and if these arguments hold
water even under close scrutiny, it reinforces public trust in their
decisions.
14. Evading scrutiny must by no means become a habit in the post-pandemic
era – for it will lead to both poor quality policies and lousy politicians.
Even when parliaments have been able to scrutinise law-making, their
efforts have been seriously compromised by the impact of Covid-19
measures on house business.
15. Measures to tackle the pandemic that have restricted parliamentarians’
ability to participate and make a contribution have seriously undermined
the principle of equality that is central to any parliamentary democracy. Sometimes
the number of members attending sittings was reduced out of necessity.
In some parliaments, voting was also restricted to specific members
via proxy voting agreements.
16. These developments are a problem in themselves and were compounded
by the fact that they tended to act as a power boost for party leaderships.
The leaders of parliamentary groups often decided who could take
part – keeping participation and voting rights for themselves while
excluding “ordinary members of parliament”.
17. Restricting participation undermines equality as well as diversity,
and therefore endangers the fundamental principles of democratic
representation. While party leaderships may find this situation convenient,
it ultimately weakens parliamentary democracy and the sharing of
political responsibility.
18. The introduction of electronic participation for debates and
votes in some parliaments helped to preserve equality and diversity.
Some might even argue that these mechanisms contribute to reinforcing
these principles and should therefore be kept in place. But the
utmost caution is required here.
19. Although replacing physical procedures with virtual ones may
seem to be an effective solution and preserves parliaments’ public-facing
role, the groundwork for some crucial decisions is actually laid
beforehand and in parallel discussions – some would say it all takes
place behind the scenes. Meeting online makes any kind of informal
interaction much less likely. When parliaments switch to electronic
procedures, parliamentarians find it harder to gauge the mood and
the various views within their own parties, preventing them from
building alliances and holding any sway over party leaders. Virtual
procedures also make it much more difficult for members to network
informally with those in other parties. Such channels of communication are
all vital to holding governments and leaders to account, however.
20. Members of government also miss being able to sense the “mood
in the room” when half the seats are empty or when many of those
attending are scattered around the country and are only pixels on
a computer screen. Debates lack spontaneity, which again weakens
accountability. In this environment, relations are likely to be
more fragile and become polarised along party lines.
21. These are all reasons why it is vital to ensure parliaments
can continue operating in normal conditions during times of crisis.
We must make sure that we break any bad habits that may have formed
during the pandemic, especially when they give the executive power
over the legislature or party leaders control over members. We also
need to be wary of any changes – even those seen as modernising
how we work – that undermine the informal channels of communication
and opportunities to connect that are the key to making our parliaments
work.
22. Parliamentary democracy is a fragile and precious asset built
up gradually over the centuries that must be cherished. We must
be extremely careful not to inadvertently weaken it further through
urgent alterations made during the pandemic.
2.2 Scrutiny
of government action to deal with the crisis
23. Our colleague Ian Liddell-Grainger’s
report on “Democracies facing the Covid-19 pandemic”
Note set out the key roles of parliamentary
oversight of government action and it is worth noting them here:
- transparency and openness: parliament
should shed light on the operations of government. It provides a
public arena in which government’s policies and actions are debated,
exposed to scrutiny and held up to public opinion;
- delivery: parliamentary oversight should test whether
the government’s policies have been implemented, and whether they
are having the desired impact;
- value for money: parliament needs to approve and scrutinise
government spending. It should highlight waste within publicly funded
services, and aim to improve the economy, efficiency and effectiveness
of government expenditure, therefore ensuring that every penny is
put to the best and most effective use;
- tackling corruption and misuse of power: parliament should
protect the rights of citizens by detecting and preventing abuse
of power, arbitrary behaviour and illegal or unconstitutional conduct
by government and deterring excessive and improper behaviour.
24. The legal rules introduced during the public health emergency
to scrutinise government action tackling the crisis should be questioned,
paying particular attention to the role of parliament and the courts
along with the existing and new institutional players involved in
the management of this unprecedented situation (for example, the
executive, independent authorities and scientific authorities).
2.3 The
nature of the public health crisis and the setting up of a special
legal framework
25. The public health crisis is
consistent with a state of emergency where powers that go beyond
ordinary law are given to the executive in order to deal with exceptional
and temporary situations and circumstances. The scale of the Covid-19
crisis has revealed that the existing legal tools are somewhat unsuitable.
26. The creation of legal rules that are sufficiently versatile
to deal with various types of public health crises or emergencies
of another kind (for example, climate, environmental and energy
crises, etc.) on a large scale must therefore be considered, as
required by the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.
27. A distinction must be made between “threats to public health”
and “public health crisis” so that infringements of fundamental
freedoms and rights are justified and proportionate. In the same
way, the scientific authorities set up during the Covid-19 crisis
must be made permanent on terms that ensure their independence and
safeguard public trust in them.
28. It must be possible to create such legal rules under established
constitutional law, or by revising the national Constitution, or
by establishing overarching rules applicable to states of emergency
(whether security‑, health- or climate-related).
29. However, the enactment in ordinary law of measures adopted
during the public health crisis must be ruled out.
2.4 Ensuring
the continuity of parliamentary work
30. To this end, parliaments, which
must continue to play their threefold role of representing, legislating
and scrutinising, could use a toolkit designed specifically to enable
them to continue to go about their business. This could include
targeted operational adjustments in relation to:
- deliberation, substantive and
procedural rules on law making (for example changing parliaments’
rules regarding the physical or hybrid presence of their members;
adjusting voting arrangements);
- scrutiny by parliamentarians of decisions taken by the
executive (for example simplifying the procedures for putting questions
[oral or written] to the government; initiating thematic monitoring,
fact-finding missions and regular hearings of government members
in committee) in order to provide legal safeguards against possible
infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms;
- involving parliamentarians in the work done by scientific
authorities, in particular with regard to countering misinformation;
- involving parliamentarians in the co-ordination work between
State services and local authorities in order to check whether measures
implemented at local level are necessary and proportionate;
- subsequent parliamentary scrutiny of the crisis management
through parliamentary committees of inquiry or parliamentary missions;
- the power to bring cases before judicial bodies in the
event of emergencies (constitutional courts or councils or high
courts).
2.5 The
need for greater judicial scrutiny
31. Because certain measures clash
with rights and freedoms and due to the risks of abuse and arbitrary decisions,
full access to the courts must be guaranteed, or even increased,
so that judicial scrutiny of regulatory and individual measures
may be carried out.
- This scrutiny
should systematically be carried out by the constitutional court
by way of an ex ante or ex post review when a matter is
referred to it in order to confirm that the health-related state
of emergency is fully compatible with the rule of law.
- Scrutiny by the administrative courts of all adopted regulations
which have not yet been transposed into law, insofar as they are
administrative decisions, must be guaranteed and strengthened.
- The administrative courts and the ordinary courts should
also be able, as courts with responsibility for freedoms, to carry
out unhindered judicial reviews that are stricter and more meticulous
than normal in relation to individual situations that arise (for
example by rebutting the presumption of urgency where a state of
emergency has been decreed); to do this, they must have adequate
material and working resources to ensure the effectiveness of their
interventions.
- The courts must also identify the “essential” tasks to
be performed so that they can continue to act in a swift and co-ordinated
manner, and practical arrangements to this end.
3 Public
health crises and elections
32. The rapid spread of the Covid-19
pandemic in 2020 resulted in the postponement or suspension of elections
and referendums in several countries. The adoption of measures outside
ordinary law also affected freedom of movement and freedom of assembly,
which are vital to any electoral process.
33. However, elections must be held in a context that gives citizens
time and the means to find out about the different political options
available and their respective merits so that they can understand
the reasons why each party advocates the political plan that it
offers.
34. The above-mentioned report on “Democracies facing the Covid-19
pandemic” of October 2020 already pointed out the parameters to
be considered when holding or postponing elections during a public
health emergency.
35. During my videoconference meeting with Mr Pierre Garrone on
11 April 2022, we reviewed the Venice Commission’s main recommendations
for holding elections in crisis situations, including pandemics,
as set out in two documents
Note drawn up by this body, which is an internationally
renowned authority on electoral matters. Its recommendations will
continue to apply to any future health crises.
36. It should be noted that Article 3 of the Additional Protocol
(ETS No. 9) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5) provides for a fundamental right to participate at regular intervals
in free elections on the choice of the legislature.
Note However, this
right is not absolute and should be considered in conjunction with
other rights, primarily the right to life enshrined in Article 2
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Holding elections during
a pandemic, civil unrest or natural disasters may put voters’ lives
at risk. In addition, similar protection may be derived from the
right to health guaranteed by Article 11 of the revised European Social
Charter (ETS No. 163), which is broader than that of Article 2 of
the Convention, and to the right to (physical) security, which it
derives from Article 5 of the Convention on the right to liberty
and security.
Note
37. In addition, legislation on elections during emergencies should
be adopted in advance. This is in keeping with the principle of
stability of electoral law, which is a guarantee of legal certainty.
Implementing this recommendation ensures that emergencies are not
used by ruling majorities to amend electoral legislation to their
benefit shortly before elections, without such amendments being
objectively linked to the emergency situation.
38. Moreover, the electoral framework that applies during emergencies
should govern not only any decision to postpone elections, but also
the conditions for holding them, including campaigns, voting procedures
and public health measures to ensure that votes may be cast, etc.
The scope of the thinking should be widened by considering practical
arrangements that would enable the electoral process to continue.
It should focus on the need to make procedural changes to the Electoral
Code during health crises in relation to the following aspects:
- new campaigning methods (for
example use of public or private media; use of the internet and
social media);Note
- increasing the number of voting methods: extending the
right to vote by proxy; introducing e‑voting;Note voting by correspondence;
- increasing the limits on election spending for periods
beyond the initial election deadline;
- the need to ensure effective electoral competition by
enabling media which are not usually required to reflect a plurality
of opinions to hold local debates;
- implementing public health measures and taking other steps
to ensure that votes can be cast and that observation exercises
can take place.
39. In any event, the legal framework for elections must be unambiguous,
comprehensible and transparent, and its implementation must be impartial
and unbiased. These decisions, and all those that affect these extraordinary
electoral processes, must be taken in a transparent manner and,
if possible, by consensus, giving detailed consideration to the
precise circumstances (for an epidemic: public health information,
the country’s capacity to react, rates of spread of the disease,
etc.). They must be subject to independent review, preferably by
a court.
4 The
pandemic’s impact on local democracy
40. The pandemic has had a major
impact on the way local and regional democracy works. Through their public-facing
role, elected local and regional authorities are on the front line.
Mayors and local elected representatives are expected to be on hand
to respond to public concerns and come up with practical solutions.
41. The Covid-19 pandemic brought about a shift in the balance
of power at local, regional and national levels in many countries,
in some cases even putting local democracy “on hold”.
42. Particularly when the pandemic first broke out, there was
a tendency in several Council of Europe member States to centralise
crisis management at national government level on the one hand,
while on the other, to put local authorities in charge of dealing
with the pandemic’s impact without providing the necessary resources
or giving them the opportunity to take part in drawing up and determining
crisis response policies.
43. Local governments have been at the frontline of efforts to
mitigate the pandemic’s effects. They were called on to deal with
the public health emergency on the one hand, while limiting as much
as possible its social and economic impacts. Despite sweeping layoffs
after the economy ground to a halt, local authorities had to keep
basic services running and find solutions to this unprecedented
crisis. They also played a crucial role in fostering the solidarity
of communities and enabled civil society to come together and contribute
to community resilience.
44. When I met online with Mr Andreas Kiefer, Secretary General
of the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities,
we discussed some aspects of Covid-19’s impact on local democracy.
45. I would first like to congratulate the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities on providing a hub for local authorities
Note to pool their pandemic experiences
and responses. On the hub’s homepage, the Congress has stressed
the importance of all authorities joining together throughout Europe
to tackle the Covid-19 crisis in a spirit of solidarity that must
be felt at all levels: European, national, local and regional. Efforts
should also be united to support local and regional authorities
which, because of their specific responsibilities and public-facing
role, are on the front line of the response to the major Covid-19
crisis.
46. As part of monitoring of the European Charter of Local Self-Government
(ETS No. 122) and its Additional Protocol on the right to participate
in the affairs of a local authority (CETS No. 207), the areas of
the Charter which member States found most challenging to comply
with were already pinpointed by the Congress in 2017. It identified
the following recurring issues:
- inadequacy
of financial resources for local and regional authorities (Article
9 of the Charter);
- restricted definition, allocation and exercise of local
competences (Article 4 of the Charter);
- lack of consultation by central government (Articles 4.6
and 9.6 of the Charter);
- absence of direct applicability of the Charter in domestic
legal systems (singled out as a root cause of the recurring problems).
47. In January 2021, in the throes of the Covid-19 crisis, the
Congress reassessed member State compliance with the Charter.
Note It
found that these recurring issues had worsened during the coronavirus pandemic.
The coronavirus outbreak had seen a number of countries disproportionately –
and in violation of the Charter – recentralise finances and competences
assigned to the local level of government, justifying these actions
by the need to stop the spread of Covid-19. The failure to comply
with the principles enshrined in the Charter is a worrying development
since democratic and open societies should respond to and combat
the pandemic while continuing to uphold democratic principles.
48. The provisions that seem to have been most widely disregarded
during the pandemic are those on the “financial resources of local
authorities” set out in Article 9.
Note The
report shows that most local budget revenues are found to cover
only own and delegated “mandatory” tasks and functions, leaving
little funding for local authorities’ own spending priorities.
49. The report notes, among other things, recurring issues relating
to limited local financial autonomy which worsened during the pandemic:
- inadequate and undiversified
financial resources available to local authorities;
- limited own income and low proportion of own revenues
in local budgets;
- mismatch between delegated tasks and attributed (concomitant)
funding;
- overwhelming financial dependency of local government
on State transfers, grants and subsidies;
- inefficiency of the equalisation system and lack of clarity
in the distribution of State grants;
- lack of appropriate consultation on allocation of financial
resources;
- over-regulation in certain areas which increases the cost
of provision of services for local authorities that they must finance
from their own resources;
- limited access to capital markets.
50. The other key Charter provision that was compromised during
the public health crisis was the principle of consultation between
all levels of government. Some local elected representatives complained
that their council meetings were nothing more than emails being
sent back and forth, and in some cases, this was only to rubber-stamp
decisions already made at other levels of government anyway, even
for issues that warranted a genuine debate. Very few, if any, local
political meetings were held during the pandemic and citizen participation
also decreased significantly.
51. It should also be noted that some local government authorities
limited access to public debates by refusing or being slow to make
deliberations, debates and minutes available to the general public,
despite the availability of tools like videoconferencing and the
internet. The need to ensure public trust requires the greatest possible
transparency. New practices could be introduced in this area as
well, supplementing existing rights rather than limiting them.
52. The Congress also noted that the pressure on local elected
representatives went as far as their being targets of violence and
hate speech, a trend which emerged well before the pandemic but
considerably picked up during the health crisis. As they were on
the front line, local government representatives had to take a stand on
restrictive measures decided at national level, defend them in their
constituencies and implement them.
53. The pandemic also had an impact on the holding of local and
regional elections. Experience in this regard varied from country
to country, with some simply postponing elections, while others
went ahead with them despite the public health crisis. Although
the right to free elections (Article 3 of the Additional Protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights) has no bearing on local
elections, as it only applies to those at national level, it is
enshrined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government and its
Additional Protocol on the right to participate in the affairs of
a local authority. A balance therefore needs to be struck between protecting
the public and ensuring local government is legitimised by voters.
54. The Congress also stressed that the contribution by local
self-government has undoubtedly benefited the global response to
the pandemic and should remain an important part of the concerted
effort to address the pandemic impacts in the long-term and ensure
collective recovery.
55. With this in mind, it should be noted that the Congress made
the issue of “Resilient societies: Effective local and regional
responses to public health crises” one of its priorities for 2021-2026.
Note It aims to promote effective solutions
for tackling public health crises and emergencies and dealing with
their fallout by improving emergency planning to strike the right
balance between centralised and decentralised authorities within
multi-level governance systems and ensure they interact effectively.
56. The Congress also carries out vital work to disseminate best
practices and ensure that local elected representatives are better
prepared for future crises. For example, it has drawn up a series
of handbooks on human rights for local and regional authorities.
The second volume
Note focused
on social rights and includes a chapter on these rights during the
Covid-19 pandemic.
57. In my view, the Assembly and the Congress must increase co-operation
on these issues in order to ensure the sustainability and proper
functioning of democracy at all levels and in all circumstances,
even during public health crises. These efforts should also be publicised
more widely through appropriate social media messaging and communication
via mainstream newspapers and more specialist media.
5 The
pandemic’s impact on civil society organisations and individual
freedoms
58. This part of my report follows
on from my online meeting with Mr Filip Pazderski (Institute of
Public Affairs, Poland), who led work to compile a report on the
implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on fundamental rights and
civic space
Note for the European
Economic and Social Committee, and draws heavily on the main findings
of this survey of a significant number of civil society organisations.
Although the study examines the pandemic’s impact on civil society
organisations working in EU member States, the observations made
and conclusions of this consultation exercise are undoubtedly relevant
to all Council of Europe member States.
59. Civil society organisations are a vital part of any truly
democratic system and they play a crucial role in our societies.
Being independent from the State and the market, and by allowing
citizens to act collectively in many areas of common interest, they
are a key pillar of public life. They are often the first to act
or respond to people’s needs given the various constraints that
central public authorities have to work within and their slower reaction
times.
60. The pandemic has affected all aspects of our lives, resulting
in many restrictions on fundamental rights and the rule of law.
In some cases, these restrictions were introduced using fast-track
procedures and without any parliamentary scrutiny, underscoring
the democratic backsliding and authoritarian trends we face today.
61. Like all sectors of society, civil society organisations faced
disruptions to their operations and missions. They were, however,
at the forefront of efforts to support local communities by providing
emergency assistance and essential healthcare services. They also
sought to pursue their role in promoting human rights, acting as watchdogs,
monitoring government responses to the pandemic and holding policy
makers accountable. Fostering a safe and vibrant civic space is
therefore vital for sustaining social cohesion, the rule of law
and a healthy democracy.
62. On a positive note, civil society organisations have proved
to be extremely flexible during the pandemic. Many of them were
the first to be able to reorganise their activities to respond to
the needs of local communities. Organisations have usually done
this much faster than public administration or the private sector.
The pandemic has also changed the way many civil society organisations
operate. Being obliged to move their activities online led to an
acceleration of the digitisation of the sector. All of this has
allowed many civil society organisations to reach out to new audiences
or to carry out their work more effectively on a wider scale. It
also became easier to build coalitions of organisations, to exchange
experiences and develop common positions on the measures taken by
the authorities. In addition, it has increased the public visibility
of civil society organisations and public understanding of their
role in daily life. This a very important asset on which organisations
can build their standing in future.
63. At the same time, however, civil society organisations have
also been directly affected by blows to fundamental rights and the
rule of law. Although their public image has improved thanks to
their swift responses during the first waves of the pandemic, almost
all of the organisations reported a deterioration in their operating environment.
They also highlighted the reduced access to and sustainability of
funding, reduced access to decision-makers, as well as outright
threats and attacks.
64. The pandemic also had an adverse effect on the functioning
of civil society organisations. It is important to note that the
vast majority of these organisations said the pandemic had had a
negative impact on civil society as a whole in their country. Many
organisations, especially smaller ones and those operating outside big
cities, suspended their activities. The same happened to organisations
bringing together specific social groups with a higher proportion
of digitally excluded people – for example, the elderly or people
with disabilities. Despite the importance of their role for vulnerable
groups, some were unable to benefit from practical support measures
(for example masks) to meet with those affected.
65. A significant proportion of these civil society organisations
had not resumed their activities by the time the study was drafted
(at the beginning of 2022). Many people working in this field had
to deal with additional demands on their mental health, fatigue
from working remotely and growing uncertainty about the future, exacerbated
by long-term social isolation. Work-life balance was often difficult
to maintain, with work being carried out at irregular hours.
66. The pandemic was also often an opportunity for several EU
governments to reduce the transparency of their operations and obstruct
public scrutiny of their actions. Moreover, sometimes, under the
pretext of counteracting the effects of the pandemic, governments
introduced measures which restricted fundamental rights – above
all, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. They also sought
to silence critical voices, particularly those of journalists and
civil society activists. Several governments also lowered standards
for civil dialogue in law-making.
67. Civil society organisations, especially foundations and associations,
were not even involved in consultations on key laws aiming to address
the impact of the pandemic. Many laws were introduced in parliaments
without public consultation. Even when the social partners received
these documents to present their opinion, it was at the last moment
and with extremely tight deadlines.
68. The pandemic also hit many civil society organisations financially.
Foundations and associations were most affected, as the solutions
proposed by some governments to mitigate the impact of the pandemic
were usually not tailored to their needs. Some trade unions and
employers’ organisations managed to get through the pandemic period
with much less economic impact. However, particularly when it comes
to organisations representing workers, their financial situation
depends very much on the sector in which they operate. The situation
of those working in the sectors most affected by the pandemic, particularly
in countries where there was a lack of adequate forms of support
guaranteed by the State, was decidedly poor.
69. The authors of the study note that the Covid-19 pandemic did
not really create so many new problems, but rather highlighted or
compounded existing ones. It is therefore crucial to strengthen
the protection of fundamental rights in all circumstances and help
provide an environment in which civil society organisations may
be heard and may continue to perform their function.
70. While an exhaustive study of the key aspects of democracy
in times of crises and emergencies is beyond the scope of this report,
three issues should be considered more closely.
71. Firstly, access to reliable and verifiable information must
be guaranteed; the public has faced difficulties in getting hold
of reliable information, data and statistics produced and vetted
by the academic community. As a result, information that is vital
for managing the Covid-19 pandemic and future crises and emergencies
is hard to find and share.
72. Particular attention should therefore be paid to ensuring
that mechanisms are established to protect freedom of expression,
especially to enable people, journalists, civil society organisations,
decision makers, politicians, academics and scientists to freely
share their views and report on crisis management without any particular
restrictions, and without those involved having any fear for their
personal or professional livelihood. Any government support shall
take account and respect the diversity of media coverage.
73. On the other hand, many studies have shown that the most vulnerable
groups and minorities and those whose rights may be affected (for
example, women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities,
migrants, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities) have experienced
far greater difficulties in accessing services or asserting their
rights, including their right to health care. Targeted measures
and appropriate action should be taken to ensure that existing restrictions
do not affect them further and that they receive the same protection as
others.
74. Lastly, while the pandemic has accelerated digitisation and
personal data processing both online and in specialised information
systems, including for healthcare, tracking of personal data may
only be conducted in accordance with the wishes of individuals and
their rights with regard to confidentiality and on the understanding
that they may not be used during or after the crisis for any purpose
other than prevention and protection measures.
6 Conclusions
75. The Covid-19 pandemic has put
all aspects of life in our societies under strain, including the
way democratic institutions work.
Resolution
2337 (2020), adopted in the heat of the moment, warned Council of Europe
member States against any attempt to use the public health emergency
to undermine the fundamental principles of democracy.
76. Uncertainty about the nature and effects of Covid-19 and part
of the population’s consequent wish to be protected at all costs
may have served to further exacerbate the situation. Desire for
certainty may drive the emergence of authoritarian or even totalitarian
regimes.
77. Overall, pandemic management by member States ensured the
resilience, the continuity and proper functioning of democratic
institutions and mechanisms, including the democratic system of
checks and balances, parliamentary work and the holding of elections,
even at the most difficult times of the crisis, and paved the way
for a gradual return to normal. The Assembly provided key input
by drawing attention to the relevant Council of Europe standards.
Reference should also be made to the Secretary General’s highly valuable
contribution in the form of a “toolkit” for member States in April
2020
Note and to the outstanding work carried
out by the Venice Commission
Note and the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities.
Note
78. Dealing with the challenges arising from emergencies may present
opportunities to consolidate individual and collective rights in
new forms, they can be an opportunity to think about new risks and
anticipate the occurrence of new inequalities, to fight against
existing ones by protecting particularly vulnerable population groups,
strengthening democracy and the responsiveness of public authorities
at all levels.
79. However, while the worst of the pandemic seems to be behind
us, we must remain vigilant to prevent any new crises and emergencies
from undermining democracy. The Assembly should therefore continue
to be mindful of these issues and, in co-operation with other Council
of Europe entities and with observer and partner national parliaments
in member States, ensure that our institutions, as pillars of democracy,
are able to weather public health and other crises and play their
roles.
80. An accessible and transparent review of any progress made
and any restrictions imposed would raise public awareness of these
issues and feed into discussions.
