Elections in times of crisis: challenges and opportunities
Summary report and conclusions of the Bern Conference (9-10 May 2023)
Progress report
| Doc. 15791 Add. 1
| 16 June 2023
- Author(s):
- Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Damien COTTIER,
Switzerland, ALDE
1 Introduction
1. Democratic elections are the
foundations on which our democracies are built. Yet, there have
been dramatic challenges, ranging from health pandemics to the return
of full-scale war to Europe, as well as terror attacks, foreign
interferences in elections, and natural disasters. While information
and communication technologies (ICTs) promise new ways of voting,
they also bring new risks as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cyber
tools expand the scope for disinformation and manipulation prior
to elections.
2. These challenges and opportunities were discussed at the parliamentary
conference on “Elections in times of crisis” (hereafter the Bern
Conference
Note) organised by the Parliamentary
Assembly in co-operation with the Swiss Parliament on 9-10 May 2023
in the Swiss National Council in Bern on the occasion of the 60th anniversary
of the Swiss accession to the Council of Europe. The event brought
together some 130 politicians, Council of Europe institutional partners
(Venice Commission, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and
Directorate General of Democracy and Human Dignity (DG II), Committee
on Artificial Intelligence – CAI), and representatives of electoral
management bodies (EMBs), international organisations, academia,
and civil society, to exchange views on how to ensure democratic
elections even in difficult times caused by multiple crises (see
programme in Appendix 1).
3. The conference was aimed at reaffirming the leading role of
the Council of Europe in electoral matters in Europe, starting from
standard setting with the right to free elections, guaranteed by
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, to legal expertise, monitoring, election observation and technical
co-operation in a broad variety of fields. It provided the first
public international forum to highlight the work carried out by
the various institutions of the Organisation within the
Council
of Europe Electoral Cycle as introduced in autumn 2022.
4. To encourage active political participation across the member
States, a 30-member ad hoc committee was set up by the Bureau of
the Assembly in January 2023 to participate in this conference (see
appendix 2), alongside the Swiss members of parliament, other individual
members of the Parliamentary Assembly and secretariats of national
delegations. The discussions could also be followed online through
live streaming. At the end of the two-day conference, the participants
adopted a Final Declaration (hereafter the Bern Declaration) which
is appended to this report (see Appendix 3).
5. The Bern Conference preceded the Reykjavik Summit of Heads
of State and Governments by a week and offered an additional opportunity
to endorse the “Reykjavik Principles of Democracy” ahead of the
Summit. Conference participants underscored the need to prevent
and resist democratic backsliding, including in situations of emergency,
crises, and armed conflicts, and called upon all member States to
stand firm against authoritarian tendencies, to actively enable
and encourage democratic participation through free and fair elections,
to respect relevant human rights standards and to take all appropriate
measures against any interference in electoral processes. At the
same time, they agreed that while major crises present a test for democracy,
they also provide an opportunity for member States to learn from
each other and to adapt to the challenges and changes more quickly.
6. As was underlined by Mr Martin Candinas, President of the
Swiss National Council, in his welcome address, “No election alone
is a guarantee for a functioning democracy. But a democracy has
no legitimacy without elections. Free and fair elections are an
indispensable means for citizens to express their opinion and to
be able to make decisions. Crises, disasters and wars raise challenges
for organisers at all levels on issues to which there are sometimes
still no clear answers. Innovations, especially of a technological
nature, promise answers. They promise new, more representative forms
of voting. But can they deliver on their promises in the longer
term?”
7. This is what this timely conference set out to discuss:
- how the consecutive crises,
ranging from a global pandemic to a war in the heart of Europe,
have impacted the functioning of democratic institutions, including
the proper and periodic conduct of electoral processes;
- how the democratic institutions have been striving to
find the right balance between emergency situations and respect
of fundamental rights, notably freedom of expression and of the
press, freedom of assembly and association for political purposes;
- how to define measures that can strengthen the resilience
of democratic institutions when faced with emergency situations
or new technology-generated threats; and
- How to assure the holding of a democratic election in
times of crisis, in full compliance with the cardinal principles
of Europe’s Electoral Heritage, namely universal, equal, free, secret
and direct suffrage.
8. The Parliamentary Assembly wishes to thank its institutional
partners, the Swiss Parliament and, moderator David Eades and all
speakers for their contribution to the success of this landmark
conference. A particular gratitude to Mr Rast’o Kužel, General Rapporteur
of the conference, for drafting the Final Declaration and compiling
this summary report.
2 The
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on elections
9. The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated
the challenges to fundamental rights, electoral norms, and practices
that existed prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and brought some new
ones. It highlighted serious gaps in legal frameworks and challenged
numerous countries to rethink how to deliver safe, technically sound,
and credible elections while seeking to keep the balance between
democratic rights and health issues. Notwithstanding these challenges,
alongside the question of whether to adapt the scheduled elections
or postpone them, the pandemic also presented opportunities for
positive change, unprecedented information sharing and innovation.
10. The conference recalled the new challenges related to the
state of emergency, which must be subject to conditions such as
respect for the rule of law, necessity, proportionality, temporality,
effective parliamentary and judicial control, predictability of
emergency legislation, and loyal cooperation between state institutions. The
field of elections is no exception to these principles. The fundamental
principles of electoral law, as affirmed in Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 to the European Court of Human Rights
Note and developed in the Venice Commission’s
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters,
Note must be respected even in a state
of emergency. While states of emergency are exceptional, they entail
a risk of tilting the work of democratic institutions in favour
of the executive. It is thus important to ensure that democratic
norms and values be always respected, whatever the circumstances.
11. Many countries do not allow elections to be held during a
state of emergency. However, elections should be held as soon as
the whole electoral process can comply with the basic principles.
The experience of countries that organised elections during the
pandemic was discussed, providing useful lessons learned as well as
highlighting challenges. More specifically, participants examined
the conclusions and findings of a new report published by International
IDEA titled “
Elections During Emergencies
and Crises: Lessons for Electoral Integrity from the Covid-19 Pandemic”,
Note which provides a thematic analysis
of electoral integrity during the pandemic using 26 country case
studies, and a number of useful recommendations.
12. Countries which already had underlying electoral vulnerabilities
were less able to respond to these new challenges, with the pandemic
compounding existing problems and creating new issues. Other countries
were able to weather the storm either because they did not have
these prior vulnerabilities or because relevant bodies took early
action, collaborated, and communicated clearly. Some countries were
inventive in introducing alternative voting methods. The wider use
of ICTs or alternative voting methods, such as postal voting, needs however
careful consideration concerning the capacity of states and EMBs
to implement them properly within the given context, while ensuring
the respect of all principles of democratic elections and referenda.
13. Participants also discussed the temptation by the executive
powers to misuse the state of emergency for political gains as well
as the important role of media, which needs to remain balanced even
in such situations, where incumbents are naturally getting more
coverage.
14. Participants stressed that EMBs should conduct systematic
reviews of the rules and procedures focusing on resilience, agility,
and adaptability. These processes should include all affected stakeholders,
in particular public authorities, political parties, and civil society
organisations (CSOs), and be transparent to the media and the wider
public. A need to have a non-partisan cross-party dialogue was discussed,
with changes to be made at lower levels, including operational decisions
on polling stations. Focusing the debate on the operational level
helps to keep it less polarised and less impacted by big politics.
Importantly, given the fact that there will be future crises, there
is a need to have properly functioning institutions that are flexible
and which have learned lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic.
15. Election observation is an integral part of the transparency
of electoral processes. It was clearly affected by the physical
absence of observers for elections held during the Covid-19 pandemic
due to health or security reasons. However, the pandemic also presented
innovations such as remote and online monitoring, which were introduced
to compensate for the limited presence on the ground and which underlined
the need to develop a joint framework on how election observation
missions should approach emergency situations.
16. The need for better coordination among international observers
was mentioned in the context of attempts, by some countries, to
try to limit the number of observers, and other aspects of their
observation, advancing health or security considerations, when they
were rather intended to prevent them from conducting their observation
in line with their mandate and methodology.
3 The impact of
natural disasters on elections
17. The planet has been suffering
the negative effects of the climate crisis, which makes certain
natural disasters more frequent and their consequences more devastating,
as demonstrated by the recent earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria.
There is a need to revise regulations to adapt to these crises.
When it comes to their impact on political stability, risk management
strategies should be adopted before disasters strike and crisis
management once they have occurred.
18. EMBs have always had to cope with natural hazards, but the
threat posed by such phenomena has become more apparent in recent
years. According to a report by the Institute for Economics and
Peace (IEP),
Note the number of natural disasters,
including floods and cyclones, has tripled in the last four decades.
This development is consistent with the predictions of climate scientists,
and therefore it is highly likely that national and subnational
elections will be more frequently affected by natural hazards in
the future. It is thus important to develop a risk-based approach
when it comes to the climate crisis and to effectively manage and
mitigate the impact of these extreme events on communities and societies.
Governments need to identify the possible external hazards affecting
electoral processes. It is important to determine the appropriate
State agencies and local and regional administrations that will
have the mandates, skillsets, and resources to act during crises.
19. In this respect, PACE
Resolution
2493 (2023) on “Political strategies to prevent, prepare for, and
face the consequences of natural disasters”
Note was mentioned, calling on member
States to flesh out the right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable
environment as an additional protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights, or to the European Social Charter, or frame it
as a stand-alone convention. It asks member States,
inter alia, to protect vulnerable
people and to reinforce the resilience of populations against all
extreme events and their short-, middle-, and long-term consequences,
including with regard to migration. Member States could also consider
establishing an intergovernmental committee to exchange best practices
and existing models for protecting the climate, the so-called Reykjavik
Committee.
20. Participants discussed different cases of countries affected
by natural hazards, including Türkiye, Syria, Pakistan, Haiti, Japan,
the US (New Orleans), and others. To protect electoral integrity,
some countries agreed to postpone elections, whereas others could
proceed according to their plan. There is always a need for careful consideration
on whether to proceed or postpone the polls, and such a decision
should not be rushed while balancing a situation of emergency, the
access and universality of the vote, and the continuity of the institutions.
21. Participants also shared their experience in getting support
from international organisations in crisis management, capacity
building, and strategic management planning, which was essential
due to their lack of experience and resources in this area. The
timing was highlighted as being essential, with risk management and
proper plans put in place in advance of any future natural disasters.
This includes enacting respective legislation to deal with emergency
situations, including arrangements for alternative voting methods,
such as early voting or voting by mail, which can increase voters’
access to polls, especially in places that are vulnerable to the
effects of disasters and severe weather events.
22. The conference considered more specifically the case of the
recent catastrophe in Türkiye only three months ahead of the presidential
and parliamentary elections of 14 May 2023, which affected 13 million
people living in the earthquake-hit provinces (approximately 9 million
voters), claimed 50,000 lives (according to official statistics)
and destroyed over 100,000 buildings, with an estimated damage of
more than $ 100 billion in the long run. The authorities were immediately
faced with at least five major challenges: the constitutional restrictions
not allowing postponement in cases other than war, the registration
of the 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs); redesign of
electoral districts caused by the relocation of people; security
measures to be taken to carry out polls in the affected areas; and
campaigning in these provinces. Participants observed that while
the Turkish electoral authorities having immediately put in place
an electronic system of registration of IDPs in their new locations,
in a situation where people could not access electronic data easily,
only half of those people could register. Electronic solutions,
despite their apparent efficiency, are not the most fit-for-purpose
solutions in cases of wide-scale emergencies. Similarly, carrying
voters by buses to their original places of voting could put electoral
integrity at stake.
23. Participants therefore identified the need for the creation
of a single framework that would combine best practices from risk
management, resilience building, and crisis management to be put
through parliaments well ahead of such unexpected natural disasters
that would further strengthen a whole-of-society approach to the delivery
of elections during or after emergencies as the most urgent need.
Such a framework would help enhance the capacity of EMBs and other
relevant institutions to deal with these challenges. A need for
support of EMBs in strategic planning was also mentioned, to be
provided by international organisations, especially for those EMBs
that lack capacity and resources.
24. It is important for EMBs to have specific guidelines based
on a proper risk assessment and expert analysis. This would include
a plan for voter registration arrangements which should be agreed
upon well in advance of any such disaster. Appointing responsible
personnel within EMBs who will be in charge of risk management would
help the EMBs to be better prepared. Participants also recommended
proper training of polling workers at all levels of election administration.
25. In turn, national parliaments should enact legislation in
normal times to deal with such emergency situations and anticipate
alternative voting arrangements such as early voting, postal voting
or online voting.
4 The impact of
military conflicts, war and terrorism on elections
26. Elections held amid ongoing
armed conflicts have been rare as it is nearly impossible to meet international
democratic standards in such circumstances. Armed conflicts generate
restrictions on movement as well as population displacement, both
within and outside the countries concerned. Even if not all electoral standards
can be applied in the event of a major crisis, the core electoral
principles must be upheld if elections are to be meaningful and
enjoy voters’ trust. In this respect, the Congress Report from 2020
on “Local and regional elections in major crisis situations”
Note was highlighted, which portrays
the difficulties faced by states and electoral authorities with
regard to elections, at all levels of government, in the face of
risks to the life, health and security of the population.
27. If conducted in a true spirit of democracy, elections can
reduce tensions, resolve conflicts and bestow on a government the
legitimacy necessary to govern effectively. But elections can also
exacerbate existing conflicts and spark new ones, or even civil
wars. A lot depends on the electoral system and the design of electoral
law. A majoritarian winner-takes-all electoral system tends to lead
to high stake elections, whereas proportional representation or
at least a mixed electoral system tends to be less prone to post-election
violence. Power-sharing models can be a solution. The legitimacy
of electoral processes is also key, as is the perception of security.
In times of conflict, security becomes the first concern for people.
When the stakes are high, EMBs struggle to uphold international
standards.
28. Therefore, it is important to have a list of criteria, which
should be permanently monitored, defining minimum conditions for
calling elections after a state of emergency or martial law has
been lifted and actions that ensure they remain as democratic as
possible. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, and each case
must be reviewed individually. Security considerations and measures
to protect the rights to life, health, and security need careful
balancing against the right to political participation and the integrity
of electoral processes. Such a roadmap would help generate broader
political consensus on the timing and other conditions for holding
post-war elections.
29. As regards Ukraine, the Conference stood united against Russia’s
war of aggression against Ukraine and called on their governments
to continue providing full support to the country. It was agreed
that once the guns fell silent, it would be important to uphold
the integrity of elections to be held in Ukraine at all levels of elected
offices and to support Ukraine with the necessary resources to mitigate
the huge impact of the war. These elections were going to be particularly
targeted by the continuous smear campaign of Russian propaganda,
malign interference, cyber-attacks and disinformation. For its part,
the Council of Europe, in co-operation with the international community,
indicated its readiness to serve as the key international platform
to support its member State, Ukraine, in ensuring that the necessary
pre-conditions for elections in the post-war period are met.
30. The participants discussed a need for a roadmap with a timeframe
for the first post-war elections in Ukraine and an agreement among
political parties, possibly in the form of a code of conduct, on
the minimal conditions necessary for holding these elections. In
terms of preparedness, the country is today divided into three types
of territories: central and western Ukraine which continue to function
almost normally without any major threat to democracy; the territories
with a short period of occupation or affected by activities of war;
and the territories which have been under occupation for years.
There might be a need for a variable application of international
standards on elections and functioning of democratic institutions.
Participants heard of concrete experiences from countries that had
held post-conflict elections, highlighting a need not to rush with
the elections but to first ensure sufficient security, human and
financial resources, and proper international assistance.
31. As a pre-condition for holding democratic elections, there
is a need to have a stable election law without frequent changes
to the rules shortly before elections. Ukraine would also need to
find a consensus among its political forces at both central and
local levels on the electoral system it wishes to establish after
the war. As mentioned above, introducing a fully proportional representation
or at least a mixed electoral system would be less prone to post-election
tensions. The importance of a meaningful political dialogue was
stressed to ensure voters’ trust and avoid a winner-takes-all approach,
which had proved to be a destabilising factor in other countries
when the first post-conflict elections were held.
32. Questions of active and passive suffrage require complementary
legislation. While restrictions of suffrage can be dictated by security
considerations and public expectation, they must be based in law
and strictly respect the principles of legitimacy, fairness and
transparency in line with international standards.
33. The discussion also focused on externally and internally displaced
people and the need to ensure that they are included on the voter
list and can exercise their franchise in the first post-war elections.
Considering that there exist no international obligations or universally
recognised standards regarding out-of-country voting in peacetime,
not to mention in (post-)war situations, the Chair of the Central
Electoral Committee of Ukraine requested the Council of Europe institutions
to develop general guidelines on out-of-country voting.
34. It will also be important to ensure the security of the electoral
process and simultaneously make sure that the role of the security
forces will be properly defined and limited according to international
standards and good practices. The security assessment should be
conducted based on clear criteria. The need for the first post-war
elections in Ukraine to be irreproachably democratic was highlighted
by several participants.
35. It is also important to include EMBs in all planning processes,
as they are the ones who understand how to run the elections. The
need to have a trial run prior to elections was also mentioned.
36. Participants recommended the need to ensure sufficient safeguards
against foreign interference in the Ukrainian elections as well
as supporting the media environment, so it can provide sufficient
information to voters to enable informed choices during the first
post-war elections.
5 The impact of
foreign interference, AI and ICTs on elections
37. Elections in the present time
are not only threatened by physical warfare but also by hybrid wars. Elections
used to be mostly about domestic issues, but nowadays they have
become supercharged moments in the complex and increasingly polarized
societies. And they are increasingly about the countries’ international orientation
(e.g., EU unity around sanctions, vis-à-vis Russia relating to the
war in Ukraine, etc), which makes them much more profitable to target
and influence. Interfering is cheap, it does not require special
equipment, allows to train agents fast and the results are seen
quickly. The main goal of such interference is to fuel polarisation
and disseminate harmful content, more precisely disinformation,
misinformation, hate speech, fake news and deep fakes, which cast
doubts about the integrity of the vote, and blur the lines between
reality and fiction.
38. Despite the many players in this field working to standardise
and to systemise knowledge about foreign and domestic interference
issues, participants admitted that there was still a very low political
and societal recognition of how harmful and impactful foreign interference
could be, and how systematic, sophisticated and structurally embedded
they were in the foreign policy machinery of the «bad actors».
39. The backsliding of our own democracies is also to blame, which
renders the responses to such attacks less robust. Thus, while it
is important to deal with the external threats, one also needs to
look at the functioning of the media and the civil society, at civic
education and social media literacy in our countries. All these
issues will be covered by the upcoming Assembly report titled “Foreign
Interference: a threat to democratic security in Europe”.
Note
40. With the expanding use and dependency on ICTs, the risks of
elections’ manipulation grow. Just like any tool, AI and cyber technology
can be used both for good and bad purposes. Cyber-attacks can undermine
the legitimacy and fairness of elections and the mechanisms to protect
them. In this context, participants recalled the importance of the
Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and its Protocols,
especially the Second Additional Protocol on Enhanced Co-operation,
which are crucial instruments for securing electoral processes.
The Second Protocol, open to ratification, aims to provide additional
and expedited tools for enhanced co-operation and disclosure of
electronic evidence, such as direct co-operation with service providers
across borders or co-operation in emergency situations.
Note
41. The spread of harmful content has become a critical challenge
as it undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and
in the media, while also negatively impacting the accuracy and reliability
of the information that feeds public opinion. As a result, citizens
struggle to discern what is true and what is false. Extreme views,
conspiracy theories and populism flourish, and once-accepted truths
and institutions are questioned.
42. While such content must be tackled, any restriction to fundamental
rights, notably in such cases freedom of expression, must comply
with the European Convention on Human Rights and, more generally,
with the requirement that they have a basis in law, are in the general
interest and respect the principle of proportionality.
43. That said, throughout history, those seeking power have always
tried to gain influence to manipulate people to get their support.
And the past new technologies have also presented both risks and
opportunities. Already centuries ago, the printing press created
false news and inspired people to go to war with each other based
on false information. The introduction of every new technology (radio,
TV) has been followed by a sophisticated system of regulation laws,
media laws, and election laws, as well as by a societal consensus
that goes beyond mere laws and technical standards. The introduction
of the AI has brought about new forms of manipulation in the electoral
process, and it is simply not sufficiently regulated yet. Therefore,
the population does not know how to deal with it or whom to trust.
There is a need to find new ways to :
- establish transparency of data sources and algorithms;
- help people recognise when they are exposed to AI generated
content;
- preserve ultimate human control in essential decision
making; and
- ensure compliance of AI driven systems with electoral/democratic/human
rights and norms.
44. Participants recommended that governments step up the fight
against disinformation and propaganda aimed at undermining democratic
institutions. Interagency co-operation was highlighted as a prerequisite
for countering such interference. Other recommendations for EMBs
and other relevant actors included strengthening their own capacity
to track, analyse and anticipate cyber-attacks and disinformation.
EMBs should also be granted the necessary means to enhance their
communication and voter education strategies on information integrity
and work closely with civil society, educational institutions, and
media actors.
45. Participants also recommended that EMBs and other relevant
public and private actors strengthen cybersecurity and protect critical
infrastructures essential for elections, Internet-connected systems,
networks, software, and data from unauthorised exploitation, including
the security of offline election technologies. They stressed the
need to reinvent the system of watchdogs that are mutually watching
each other creating accountability, transparency and incentives
for those in power or those seeking power to behave, and incentives
for people to believe in the system. The AI Convention that the
Council of Europe Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAI) is
currently working on is such an instrument, one element in a larger
set of instruments that may be needed to re-establish rules that
are applicable, that create trust and that people adhere to so that
democracies can also function in the 21st century.
46. There is also a necessity to define the roles and responsibilities
of the new gatekeepers – social media platforms – to keep checks
and balances. Participants agreed on the necessity to enhance digital
media literacy, awareness, and education.
47. Another issue raised was the public–private relationship in
the service providing context of elections. Due to technology and
the capacities required for mastering technology, the number and
the profiles of actors involved in electoral governance are expanding.
It is paramount that electoral technologies are designed and operated
in a secure manner and that the EMBs maintain control over the electoral
processes and not the vendors. Private sectors delivering technology
should therefore be held to at least the same level of security standards
as the electoral officials. Instead of allowing vendors to tell
election management bodies what voters need, EMBs need the capacity
to examine implemented technologies and make their vendors accountable. They
would also need to be able to keep the source code and, for transparency
reasons, make it publicly available for auditing.
48. Emphasising the positive aspects of ICTs, participants highlighted
the capacities of digitalisation to lead to the re-examination and
analysis of existing processes, which would provide the opportunity
for improving already established processes and increasing their
accuracy and security. It can also contribute to developing a new
approach to crisis and risk management. Participants agreed that
maximizing transparency, throughout all aspects of the electoral
process, including procurement and certification of any equipment,
is key to developing trust in society for the use of ICTs.
49. Nevertheless, while AI contributes to the automation of data
analysis and has the potential to improve and support the upholding
of democratic values and processes including elections, its use,
due to algorithms applied in social media can also contribute to
social polarisation, resulting in the formation of separate groups that
no longer understand each other and find themselves increasingly
in conflict with one another. Understanding these dynamics is fundamental
for EMBs and practitioners to safeguard the integrity and credibility
of electoral processes.
51. The Swiss experience was given to indicate how important it
is to introduce alternative voting methods step-by-step, so they
eventually become well-established and, most importantly, trusted.
While non-digital voting processes, notably their system of postal
voting, is trusted and used by 90% of the voters in Switzerland, the
introduction of digital processes has been controversial. E-voting
was previously introduced but then suspended for four years. Following
this four-year gap, which has been used for increasing the accuracy
and security of established processes, Switzerland will restart
e-voting trials during a popular vote on 18 June. It is important
to stress that new digital procedures must be well prepared, must
be legally framed, and the necessary amount of time must be taken
to implement them. As such, security must come before speed.
52. Participants also discussed the use of ICTs in different stages
of the electoral process, such as e-voting machines or electronic
tabulation systems to speed up the process of vote tabulation. In
this context, the recent endeavours of Georgia and Albania to introduce
e-voting was discussed. In December 2022, Georgian legislators passed
amendments in the law according to which in the next parliamentary
elections of 2024, as many as 90 % of Georgian voters will experience
voter verification/voter registration and vote counting machines.
The system was tested at the mid-term elections in 10 municipalities
with success. However, because of the high risk of foreign interference
in the process, concerns remained as to the use of e-voting for voters
residing abroad.
53. Albania tested electronic voting first time in 2021, using
ballot counting machines in one of the constituencies in Tirana,
but wider application was impossible because of the pandemic. The
country was now ready to use a thousand new electronic devices at
the local elections of 14 May, which were inter alia observed by
the Congress,
Note OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament.
However, similarly to Georgia, the full capacity of the technology
was not being exploited as the machines would work offline. However,
the population is embracing technology and the state authorities
are looking for to offer an alternative.
54. When it comes to Internet voting, Estonia is the only country
that uses Internet/online voting nation-wide for all levels of elections,
with over half of the voters having voted online in the recent national
parliamentary elections of 5 March 2023. Its success may partly
be attributed to the very high level of trust in the electoral process
and in the impartiality of the non-political election administration,
but also to the symbiotic partnership which the public sector, including
the EMB, managed to build with the private sector. Together they
have developed the Internet voting system which has now been in
use for over 15 years and which is being improved from election
to election.
6 Conclusions
55. The Conference concluded on
a positive note, encouraging EMBs to go with modern times and upgrade their
capacities to harness the use of AI and ICTs in diverse ways, learn
from past experiences of recent crises and re-evaluate long-established
electoral procedures and practices to sustain advances and innovations
in the next electoral cycles.
56. Each of the crisis discussed has accelerated trends already
underway: towards multiple forms of voting, the expectations to
vote in advance, to have multiple streams of voting, and to have
fast results. Even before the mass exodus from Ukraine or the devastating
earthquakes in Türkiye, elections were expected to handle people
in movement, away from the electoral mainstay of controlled environment
connecting people to an address and that address to a polling station.
Three emerging trends will require electoral management bodies to
adapt their functioning to:
- the
demand for efficiency and resilience of institutions to handle the
multiplicity of challenges and multiple kinds of voting;
- the demand for radical transparency in all procedures,
and
- a fearless independence of EMBs that would use every platform
to protect the values of elections.
57. The major challenge is that in the electoral environment principles
collide: transparency collides with secrecy, secrecy collides with
security, inclusion collides with integrity, etc. The more voter
groups are to be included, the more the elections need to move away
from the controlled environment, which is the polling station. Election
officials will be on the frontlines navigating these colliding principles
in real time. It is therefore urgent to get them better equipped
with a set of parameters that are adapted to the modern world that embraces
innovation and that helps build and reinforce resilient, flexible,
open and transparent systems capable of standing up to future crises
and challenges.
58. Similarly, election observation would need to enhance its
capacities by moving from extending its traditional observation
practices in the paper ballot world to multiple spaces and time
frames, which might require a greater use of locally recruited observers
and updating the Declaration of Principles, the Venice Commission’s
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters other best practice standards
on election observation for both elections during emergencies and
elections online and offline.
7 Recommendations
and ways forward
59. The Bern Declaration, adopted
at the end of two days of interactive discussions, lays out a roadmap
of action for governments, EMBs and relevant international organisations
to strengthen the capacities to assess, upgrade, and maintain the
integrity of elections in the era of multiple crises. It also outlines
the ways forward in dealing with the new risks and challenges brought
about by the expansion of ICTs and AI technologies how to harness
them for positive application and innovation that could reinvigorate
public trust in democratic institutions.
60. Conference participants recommended that member States revise
electoral legislation to specify the circumstances under which postponing
elections is permitted in emergencies and to avoid making last-minute changes
to electoral law. Also, it further recommended to ensure that sufficient
financial resources are available for such emergencies, including
the appropriate use of technology. Decisions relating to the conduct of
elections during emergencies should be made through consensual processes
in a political space that includes all relevant stakeholders.
61. Member States should also consider undertaking comprehensive
risk assessments to check whether their electoral processes are
sufficiently robust to overcome both ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ conditions,
while guaranteeing the respect of all principles of democratic elections
and referenda. In this regard, conference participants pointed to
election observation as an integral part of the transparency and
integrity of electoral processes. Participants called on governments
to extend a standing invitation to all international organisations with
an electoral observation mandate to make election observation possible
and more systematic in their respective member states at all levels,
and thus ensure better implementation of electoral standards and
a deeper entrenchment of democracy.
62. The Russian Federation's large-scale aggression against Ukraine
and its hybrid character have highlighted the urgency for Council
of Europe member States to update their national security concepts
and to continue work to upgrade election security and combat harmful
content.
63. There is a need for EMBs and other state agencies to consider
special voting arrangements, such as early voting or voting by mail,
and notably for IDPs to increase their access to polls, especially
in places that are vulnerable to the effects of disasters and severe
weather events. Introducing electronic voting or any method that
has not been sufficiently tested, should be avoided.
64. The Conference supported the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy
and the initiation of the “Reykjavik process” for the political
recognition of the right to clean, healthy and sustainable environments
to strengthen member States’ resilience and risk management capacities
to mitigate the impacts of climate crises. It commended the Council
of Europe’s important standard setting role in curbing cybercrime,
regulating the development, design and application of AI and e-governance,
fighting undue interference, and ensuring the standards of free
and fair elections as means to elect independent and effective parliaments
and democratic institutions.
65. However, the participants also recognised that the European
value-based standards developed over several decades have been catered
for times of peace and progress, which bend low in the face of the
current tides of multiplication of crisis, democratic backsliding
and new threats of hybrid warfare used in alternative spaces. Thus,
in light of the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy and the Bern
Declaration, the scope and impact of the Council of Europe activities
in the field of democratic elections should be further reinforced, including
by
a developing a set of standards
and criteria for the preparation, conduct, assessment and observation
of post-conflict elections;
b drafting general guidelines for out-of-country voting,
which should also cover refugees of wars and armed conflicts. Such
guidelines could also specify the level of support during post-conflict
elections from other Council of Europe member States where these
refugees reside;
c co-ordinating international support vis-à-vis Ukraine
in holding its first post-war elections to maximise its impact.
Under the impulsion of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of
Europe could play a leading role in drafting a roadmap with a timeframe
for the first post-war elections in Ukraine, in co-ordination with
other key stakeholders;
d developing a joint framework on how election observation
missions should approach international, national and local crises
and reinforce their capacity to assess the integrity of elections
in emergency situations as well as in the cyber space. This framework
should ensure that the methodology considers the many new challenges
and technologies at stake (e-voting, observation and monitoring
of remote and online elections, online campaigns, AI-related interferences
in the electoral process)
66. The Council of Europe and other international organisations
should also support their member States’ efforts to combat undue
interference in electoral systems and processes, including by pinpointing
shortcomings in election legal frameworks that do not ensure the
full exercise of fundamental freedoms. The upcoming Parliamentary
Assembly’s report on foreign interference provides a list of tools
to prevent, detect, and counter foreign interference in elections.
Such tools will be important to ensure and maintain public trust
and confidence to protect free and fair elections.
67. The Parliamentary Assembly could prepare a specific report
as a follow-up on the topics discussed at the Bern conference in
commitment to ensure that the first act of democratic participation
remains free, safe and secure despite the challenging circumstances.
Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly, the ad hoc committee
was composed as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Damien
COTTIER, Switzerland
Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
(SOC)
Mr Adnan DIBRANI, Sweden
Ms Róisín GARVEY, Ireland
Ms Thórhildur Sunna ÆVARSDÓTTIR, Iceland
Mr Ion PRIOTEASA, Romania
Ms Edite ESTRELA, Portugal
Ms Jelena MILOŠEVIĆ, Serbia
Mr Predrag SEKULIĆ, Montenegro
Mr Constantinos EFSTATHIOU, Cyprus
Ms Cécile HEMMEN, Luxembourg
Mr Haluk KOÇ, Türkiye
Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
Mr Lulzim BASHA, Albania
Mr Corneliu-Mugurel COZMANCIUC, Romania
Mr Georg GEORGIEV, Bulgaria
Ms Sylvie GOY-CHAVENT, France
Ms Arusyak JULHAKYAN, Armenia
Mr Reinhold LOPATKA, Austria
Ms Isabel MEIRELLES, Portugal
Mr Cristian-Augustin NICULESCU-ȚÂGÂRLAȘ, Romania
Mr Sergiy VLASENKO, Ukraine
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
Mr Damien COTTIER, Switzerland
Ms Liliana TANGUY, France
Ms Lesia ZABURANNA, Ukraine
Ms Valentina GRIPPO, Italy
European Conservatives Group and Democratic
Alliance (EC-DA)
Mr Ian PAISLEY, United Kingdom
Mr Erkin GADIRLI, Azerbaijan
Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
Mr Anton GOMEZ-REINO, Spain
Membres not belonging to a political group
(NR)
Ms Emine Nur GÜNAY,Türkiye
Ms Serap YAŞAR, Türkiye
Mr Ahmet YILDIZ, Türkiye
Members of the Council for Democratic
Elections of the Venice Commission (ex officio)
Mr Aleksander POCIEJ, Poland
Ms María Valentina MARTÍNEZ FERRO, Spain
Mr Davor Ivo STIER, Croatia
Secretariat
Ms Sylvie AFFHOLDER, Head, Secretary of the ad hoc committee,
Election Observation and Support Division
Ms Ivi-Triin ODRATS, Deputy Head of Election Observation and
Support Division
Ms Sachka SONRIER, Assistant to the Director of Committees
Ms Carine ROLLER-KAUFMAN, Assistant, Election Observation
and Support Division
Appendix 2 – Programme of the Conference
Tuesday, 9 May 2023
09:00 – 9:30 Registration of participants
09:30 – 10:00 Welcoming address
Chaired by: Mr Damien Cottier,
Chair of the Swiss delegation to the PACE, Chairperson of the PACE
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
- Mr Martin Candinas,
President of the Swiss National Council
- Mr Tiny Kox, President
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
- Ms Claire Bazy Malaurie,
President of the Venice Commission
- Mr Leendert Verbeek,
President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the
Council of Europe
10:00 – 11:30 SESSION 1: Pandemic and the polls – the impact
of Covid-19 on elections
Moderator of the Conference: Mr David
Eades, Chief Presenter, BBC
- The overall short-and long-term
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on electoral management policies
and practice
- Legal challenges and preparedness
for emergency situations – limits and vulnerabilities
- Special voting arrangements
during the pandemic: advantages, risks and sustainability
- International election observation
during the pandemic: what have we learned?
Chaired by: Mr Damien Cottier,
Chair of the PACE ad hoc committee, Chair of the Swiss delegation
to PACE
Panellists:
- Dr Massimo Tommasoli, Director
of Global Programmes and Permanent Observer for International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to the United Nations,
Stockholm
- Mr Eirik Holmøyvik,
Member of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, Professor
of Law, University of Bergen, Norway
- Mr Alexandr Berlinschii,
Secretary, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova
- Mr Matteo Mecacci,
Director, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR),
Warsaw
- Mr Roberto Montella,
Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Copenhagen
Parliamentary contributions:
- Ms Valentina Grippo, Italy, ALDE
- Mr Alexander Pociej, Poland, EPP
- Ms Cécile Hemmen, Luxembourg, SOC
- Ms Liliana Tanguy, France, ALDE
Exchange of views
11:30 – 11:50 Coffee break
11:50 – 13:00 SESSION 2: Universal suffrage amid universal
suffering – how natural disasters distort elections
- Natural
disasters short before elections: from legal considerations to logistics
- Proactive and reactive strategies
in protecting elections from natural disasters: risks management
vs crisis management
- Impact of natural hazards on
the campaign, accuracy of election results and the validity of the
electoral process
- Rebuilding public trust in
the integrity of elections following natural disasters
- Role of international community
support to election authorities in areas affected by natural disasters
Chaired by: Ms Despina Chatzivassiliou-Tsovilis,
Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe
Panellists:
- Mr Erik Asplund, Programme Officer,
Electoral Processes Programme, Focal point on natural hazards and
elections, International IDEA, Stockholm
- Dr Bernd Vöhringer,
Vice-President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe and President of the Chamber of Local Authorities
of the Congress, Lord Mayor of Sindelfingen, Baden-Württemberg
- Dr Emre Toros,
Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Communication, Hacettepe
University, Ankara / Fulbright scholar at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
(2022-2023)
Parliamentary contributions:
- Mr Nacho Sánchez Amor, MEP, Spain, S&D
- Mr Ahmed Yildiz, Türkiye, NR
Exchange of views
13:00 – 13:15 Family photo
13:15 – 14:30 Lunch break
14:30 – 16:00 SESSION 3: How to be fair in warfare? – the
impact of armed conflict on elections
Panel 1: Upholding the integrity of elections in times of
major security crisis (armed conflicts, major terrorist acts, internal
political instability)
- States’ duties and possible derogations
- Minimum conditions for elections
to be held and conducted in accordance with international standards
in situations of armed conflicts and terrorist acts
- Alternative voting methods
for elections in conflict areas
- Effects of external crisis
and war on national and local elections
- Interference of hybrid wars
in alternative spaces (cyberattacks, propaganda, political subversion,
…)
Chaired by: Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez,
Vice-Chairperson of the PACE Sub-Committee on Conflicts concerning
Council of Europe Member States, Monitoring rapporteur on the Republic
of Moldova, member of the Swiss delegation to PACE
Panellists:
- Mr Simon Geissbühler, Ambassador,
Head of the Peace and Human Rights Division at the Swiss Foreign
Ministry
- Mr Stewart Dickson,
Thematic Spokesperson of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
on the Observation of local and regional elections, Rapporteur on
“Local and regional elections in major crisis situations”, Vice-President
of the Council for Democratic Elections and member of the Northern
Ireland Legislative Assembly, United Kingdom
- Dr Irena Hadžiabdić,
Expert of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, Member
(and former Chairperson) of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
- Mr Vassilis Ntousas, Head
of European Operations, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German
Marshall Fund, Brussels
Parliamentary contributions:
- Mr Sergiy Vlasenko, Ukraine, EPP/CD
- Ms Maria Valentina Martínez
Ferrero, Spain, EPP/CD
Exchange of views
16:00-16:20 Coffee break
16:20-17:45 Panel 2: Suffrage after the cannons fall silent
– preparing Ukraine for its post-war elections
- Timeframes and minimum conditions
for calling national and (early) local elections after martial law
is lifted (in terms of security, political environment, logistics, finances,)
- Guaranteeing the vote of displaced persons within and
beyond Ukraine
- Registration regulations for displaced voters: how to
tackle risks of election frauds?
- Implementing alternative voting methods in situations
of damaged physical and electoral infrastructure; introducing necessary
safeguards
- Social media affecting the level playing field among candidates
- Material and technical support for the organisation and
conduct of post-war elections in Ukraine
Chaired by: Mr Nacho Sánchez
Amor, Special coordinator on election observation for the
European Parliament, Member of the European Parliament (Social and
democrats).
Panellists:
- Dr Volodymyr Venher, Associate
Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Public Law, National
University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Executive Director at the Kyiv-Mohyla
Rule of Law Research Centre, Kyiv, visiting fellow at the Brasenose College
and the Institute of European and comparative Law, University of
Oxford (2022-2023), United Kingdom
- Ms Olga Aivazovska,
Chairperson of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors
(GNDEM), Chairperson of the Civil Network OPORA, international expert in
electoral matters, Warsaw
- Mr Oleh Didenko,
Chairperson of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine
- Ms Meaghan Fitzgerald,
Director of Elections, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Warsaw
Parliamentary contributions:
- Ms Alina Zahoruiko, Verkhovna Rada Sub-committee on elections,
Ukraine
- Ms Lesya Zaburanna, Ukraine, ALDE
- Mr Sergiy Vlasenko, Ukraine, EPP
Exchange of views
19:00 Reception to mark the 60th anniversary
of the accession of Switzerland to the Council of Europe, with the
participation of Mr Alain Berset, President of the Swiss Confederation,
and Mr Bjørn Berge, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Wednesday, 10 May 2023
09:00 – 09:10 Keynote address by Mr Bjørn
Berge, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
on “Elections in times of crisis: the role of the 4th Summit
of the Council of Europe”
09:15-10:30 SESSION 4: Does digital mean danger? – how electronic
voting, AI and cyber are transforming elections
Chaired by: Ms Þórhildur Sunna
Ævarsdóttir, Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Artificial
Intelligence and Human Rights of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Iceland politician of the Pirate party, human
rights lawyer and journalist.
Panel 1: At the mercy of Digital: protecting the vote in
the digital warfare
- Mitigating the evolving security threats of
digital technologies on electoral processes (Artificial Intelligence,
cyber-attacks, foreign interference, energy crisis, ecological catastrophes)
– latest challenges
- Addressing cybercrime and cybersecurity:
crisis management in emergency situations
- False narratives: protecting
the vote in the war of mis- and disinformation
Panellists:
- Mr Thomas Schneider, Head of International
Affairs in the Federal Office of Communication, Switzerland; President
of the Committee on Artificial Intelligence of the Council of Europe
- Mr David Eray,
Head of the Swiss delegation to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities,
Minister of the Environment for the Canton of Jura, Thematic Spokesperson
of the Congress on Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence
- Dr Iuliia Spycher,
Researcher on Digitalisation of Public Administration, University of
Bern
Parliamentary contributions:
- Mr Constantinos Efstathiou, Cyprus, SOC
- Ms Viktoryia Podgorna, Verkhovna Rada Chairperson of the Sub-Committee
on e-democracy, Ukraine
Exchange of views
10:30 – 10:50 Coffee break
10:50 – 12:30 Panel 2: Harnessing the Power of Technology
and Innovation – rethinking electoral procedures
- The
benefits of the digital
- Re-evaluating long-established
electoral procedures and practices: sustaining advances and innovations
in the next electoral cycles
- Strengthening public trust
in the management of future electoral processes: challenges and
opportunities
Panellists:
- Ms Therese Pearce Laanela, Head
of Electoral Processes, International IDEA, Stockholm
- Mr Oliver Kask,
Judge, President of the National Election Commission of Estonia, Substitute
member of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, elections expert
- Mr Giorgi Kalandarishvili,
Chairman of the Central Election Commission of Georgia
- Ms Barbara Perriard,
Head of Political Rights Division, Federal Chancellery, Switzerland
Parliamentary contributions:
- Ms Cécile Hemmen,
Luxembourg, SOC
Exchange of views
12:30 – 13:00 Closing session
Chaired by: Mr Damien Cottier,
Chair of the Swiss delegation to PACE, Chairperson of the PACE Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
- Closing
remarks by Mr Rasťo Kužel,
Executive Director, MEMO 98, Slovakia, General Rapporteur of the
Conference
- Adoption of the Final Declaration
- Closing remarks by Ms Livia
Leu, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland
Appendix 3 – Final declaration
1. We, the participants
of the conference organised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (PACE), in co-operation with the Swiss Parliament,
on the 60th anniversary of the accession
of Switzerland to the Council of Europe, representing national parliaments,
electoral management bodies (EMBs), international organisations
and other profiles such as academics, practitioners, experts and
civil society representatives, have gathered in Bern on the eve
of the 4th Summit of the Heads of States
and Government of the Council of Europe (Reykjavik, 16-17 May 2023)
to discuss recent challenges and opportunities that we face while
organising elections.
2. Free and fair elections are the foundations on which our democracies
are built, based on the five cardinal principles of Europe’s Electoral
Heritage, namely universal, equal, free, secret, and direct suffrage.
Yet, our electoral management bodies (EMBs) face dramatic new pressures,
ranging from health pandemics, such as COVID-19, to the return of
full-scale war to Europe, or terror attacks, foreign state intervention
in elections and natural disasters. While modern information and
communication technologies (ICTs) promise new and more representative
ways of voting, they also bring dangers, as powerful new Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and cyber tools expand the scope for pre-poll
disinformation and manipulation.
3. In our conference discussion, a wide range of topics and proposals
were put forward, which we hereby bring to the attention of our
governments, EMBs, and international observers to support their
efforts to tackle these issues.
The impact of covid-19 on Elections
4. We recognise that the Covid-19
pandemic challenged fundamental rights and electoral norms as well
as the practices and approaches governing electoral management which
have been in place in recent decades. It rapidly highlighted serious
gaps in constitutional and legal frameworks and challenged numerous
countries to rethink how to deliver safe, technically sound, and
credible elections, requiring extraordinary swiftness and flexibility
of action. Notwithstanding the huge challenges, this global health
crisis also presented opportunities for growth, positive change,
and innovation that require an urgent review, adjustment, and a
meaningful application of new policies, systems, and approaches
to electoral management.
5. Based on the lessons learned during the pandemic, we call
on EMBs to conduct occasional systematic reviews of the rules, norms,
methods, and procedures that govern the organisation and administration
of elections, focusing on resilience, agility, and adaptability
while fulfilling their mandates. Consultative and transparent processes
have proved to be critical for election-related decision-making.
These processes should include all affected stakeholders, in particular
public authorities, political parties, and civil society organisations, and
be transparent to the media and the wider public.
6. We consider election observation to be an integral part of
the transparency of electoral processes, which was clearly affected
by the physical absence of observers for elections held during the
pandemic, due to health or security reasons. Their ability to conduct
comprehensive or systematic observation was undermined, preventing
them from helping to safeguard electoral integrity. However, the
pandemic also presented innovations such as remote and online monitoring,
which were introduced to compensate for the limited presence on
the ground, shifted long term observation over short term observation,
and underlined the need to develop a joint framework on how election
observation missions should approach emergency situations. In addition,
we call on our governments to extend a standing invitation to all
international organisations with an electoral observation mandate
to make election observation possible and more systematic in their
respective member states at all levels, and thus ensure better implementation
of electoral standards and a deeper entrenchment of democracy.
How natural disasters distort Elections
7. The planet is suffering the negative
effects of climate crisis which, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), makes certain natural disasters
more frequent and their consequences more devastating. Member States
need to include in their regulations, as soon as possible, measures
to adapt to climate change and offset the impact of the climate
crisis, including with regard to extreme natural events. When it
comes to their impact on a State’s political stability, we underline
the urgency of adopting strategies for risk management prior to
disasters and crisis management once they have occurred. A holistic
approach so that no one is left behind and stronger peer cooperation
locally, nationally and internationally are necessary in times of
normalcy and also when crises emerge. Such relationships are critical to
weathering extreme natural events, with established modalities and
pre-identified technical solutions serving as effective risk mitigation.
8. We call on governments to protect the right to a “safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment” and, in order to reach this
goal, to identify the possible external hazards affecting electoral
processes, as it is important to determine the appropriate State
agencies, essential service providers, local and regional administrations
that will have the mandates, skillsets and resources to act during
crises. The institutionalisation of crisis-management processes
determines the effectiveness of EMBs and other State institutions
in restoring the continuity of the electoral process. A single framework
that combines best practices from risk management, resilience building,
and crisis management further strengthens a whole-of-society approach to
the delivery of elections during or after emergencies.
9. We encourage states to modify their electoral legislation
to provide for holding elections during emergencies as well as clear
criteria for postponing of elections. We also call on EMBs to train
election officials in disaster preparedness and response and to
have contingency plans in place to ensure that electoral processes
can continue in times of crisis.
The impact of armed conflicts and war
on Elections
10. We recognise that elections held
amid ongoing armed conflicts are rare as it is nearly impossible
to meet international democratic standards in such circumstances.
Armed conflicts generate population displacement, both within and
outside countries. Large-scale displacement of people, voter intimidation,
and limited access to voting are major issues. We underline the
need for a roadmap defining minimum conditions for calling national
and local elections after a state of emergency or martial law is
lifted, as well as actions and milestones that ensure that elections
remain democratic and that media are free and diverse. The roadmap
needs to address the lack of documentation, restrictive residency
requirements and limited physical access to voting for internally
displaced persons and people temporarily residing abroad as well
as voter education resources. Security considerations and measures
to protect the rights to life, health, and security thus need careful balancing
against the right to political participation and the integrity of
electoral processes. Such a roadmap would help generate broader
political consensus on the timing and other conditions for holding
post-war elections. We believe that the Council of Europe, under
the impulsion of the Parliamentary Assembly, could play a leading
role in drafting such a roadmap, in co-ordination with other key
stakeholders.
11. We stand united against Russia’s war of aggression against
Ukraine and call on our governments to continue providing full support
to Ukraine. Once the guns fall silent, it will be important to uphold
the integrity of elections to be held in Ukraine at all levels of
elected offices, including ample resources to mitigate the huge impact
of the war. For its part, the Council of Europe, in co-operation
with the international community, will support its member State
Ukraine in ensuring that the necessary pre-conditions for the elections
in the post-war period are met.
How AI and ICTs are transforming Elections
12. We firstly recall the importance
of the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and
its Protocols, especially the Second Additional Protocol on Enhanced
Co-operation, which are crucial instruments for securing electoral
processes. We call for broader ratification of the Second Protocol,
which aims to provide additional and expedited tools for enhanced
co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence, such as direct co-operation
with service providers across borders or co-operation in emergency
situations.
13. We underline and commend the leading role of the Council of
Europe in developing standards in the digital era to safeguard human
rights online and offline, in particular the on-going work of the Committee
on Artificial Intelligence of the Council of Europe and its aim
to elaborate an international legally binding framework on the development,
design and application of AI, to be delivered by the end of 2023.
The 2022 Guidelines on the use of information and communication
technologies (ICT) in electoral processes in Council of Europe member
States and the 2020 Principles for a fundamental rights-compliant
use of digital technologies in electoral processes, both issued
by the Venice Commission, are also relevant reference documents.
14. We recognise that our elections are not only threatened by
physical warfare but also by hybrid wars. We have experienced foreign
electoral interference in several countries by different actors,
from inside and often from abroad. We call on our governments to
step up the fight against harmful content, in particular disinformation
and propaganda, which are aimed at undermining our democratic institutions.
Interagency co-operation is a prerequisite for countering such interference.
15. We call on EMBs and other relevant actors to strengthen their
own capacity to track, analyse and anticipate cyber-attacks and
conduct social media monitoring to create an early-warning system
aimed at identifying disinformation narratives and preparing adequate
responses. EMBs should also enhance their communications and voter
education strategies on information integrity, including by promoting
fact-checking as well as relevant media and information literacy
in order to build resilience against harmful content overall. Toward
this aim, they should work closely with civil society, education
institutions, and media actors, in close co-ordination with other
relevant State agencies. Processes marked by transparency and consultation
can help to mitigate dis/misinformation and fear.
16. With the expanded use and dependency on ICTs, the risks of
interference in and manipulation of democratic electoral processes
grow. Cyber-fuelled attacks can undermine the legitimacy of elections
and the mechanisms to protect them. We call on EMBs and other relevant
actors to strengthen cybersecurity and protect critical infrastructures
essential for the conduct of elections, Internet-connected systems,
networks, software, and data from unauthorised exploitation, including
the security of offline election technologies.
17. While AI contributes to the automation of data analysis and
has the potential to improve and support the upholding of democratic
values and processes, and institutions, including elections, its
use, in particular due to algorithms applied in social media, can
contribute to social polarisation, resulting in the formation of
separate groups that no longer understand each other and find themselves
increasingly in conflict with one another. AI can also have significant
gendered implications, including, among others, gender-based exclusion,
algorithmic bias and discrimination, the reinforcement of gender
stereotypes and the objectification of women. The use of AI can
affect minorities in similar ways, causing or exacerbating discrimination
based on ethnic or social origin, religious convictions, age, disability,
sexual orientation, gender identity or other characteristics. Understanding these
dynamics is fundamental for EMBs and practitioners to safeguard
the integrity and credibility of electoral processes.
18. However, we recognise the benefits of ICTs and call on EMBs
to upgrade their capacities to harness their use in diverse ways,
learning from their experience during the pandemic and re-evaluating
long-established electoral procedures and practices to sustain advances
and innovations in the next electoral cycles. We therefore call
on the Heads of States and Government to reaffirm their commitment
to take all measures to fight undue interference and ensure free
and fair elections as a means to elect independent and effective
parliaments and democratic institutions, consolidate pluralistic
democracy, prevent and resist democratic backsliding including in
situations of emergency, crisis and armed conflicts.
