Observation of the parliamentary elections in Georgia (26 October 2024)
Election observation report
| Doc. 16079
| 28 November 2024
- Author(s):
- Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Iulian BULAI,
Romania, ALDE
1 Introduction
1. On 23 April 2024, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Georgia invited the Parliamentary Assembly
to observe the parliamentary elections in the country. On 27 August
2024, in accordance with the constitution, the President of Georgia
called parliamentary elections for 26 October 2024. On 27 May 2024,
the Bureau of the Assembly decided to set-up an ad hoc committee composed of 30
members, plus the two co-rapporteurs of the Committee on the Honouring
of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee), to observe the elections. I was appointed
as the committee's chairperson. The composition of the ad hoc committee (thereafter “PACE
delegation”) is provided in Appendix 1.
2. Georgia is under the monitoring procedure of the Assembly
and has therefore committed to inviting the Assembly to observe
elections and fulfilling its obligations as a member State of the
Council of Europe. In response to recent developments in Georgia,
the Assembly held a current affairs debate in April 2024 as well as
an urgent debate in June 2024 which resulted in the adoption of
Resolution 2561 (2024) “Challenges to democracy in Georgia”. The PACE delegation
notes that Georgia has signed and ratified the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and its Additional Protocol (ETS No.
9), which enshrine fundamental principles crucial for a functioning
democracy, including the right to free elections (Article 3 of the
Additional Protocol), freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
and association, and the prohibition of discrimination (Articles
10, 11, and 14 of the Convention).
3. In accordance with the co-operation agreement signed between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) on 4 October 2004, Ms Katharina Pabel
represented the Venice Commission and provided legal support to
the PACE delegation.
4. A two-day pre-electoral mission took place on 23-24 September
2024 in Tbilisi to assess the electoral campaign and the broader
political environment. The mission's programme is outlined in Appendix
2, and my pre-electoral statement is provided in Appendix 3.
5. For the observation of the parliamentary elections on 26 October
2024, the PACE delegation worked from 24 to 27 October as part of
an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), together with delegations
from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE-PA), the European Parliament (EP),
and Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO-PA), as well as the electoral observation mission of the OSCE’s
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).
The programme of the meetings held during this period is detailed
in Appendix 4.
6. The PACE delegation thanks the Georgian authorities for their
invitation and assistance, as well as all interlocutors and international
partners for their co-operation. The delegation also extends its
great appreciation for the support of the Council of Europe Office
in Georgia in facilitating the smooth organisation of the election
observation mission meetings.
7. We regret however to report that PACE observers from Ukraine
experienced long delays at passport control upon both arrival and
departure from Georgia, with no explanation provided. This is not
acceptable and is inconsistent with the invitation extended to international
observers.
8. The IEOM issued a joint press release (see Appendix 5) and
a “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions”,
Note which provide detailed information.
These documents were presented at a joint press conference in Tbilisi
on 27 October 2024.
9. The IEOM concluded that, while voters were offered a choice
between 18 candidate lists and candidates could generally campaign
freely, Georgia’s parliamentary elections were marred by an uneven
playing field, tension, pressure, entrenched polarisation and concerns
over recently adopted legislation and its impact on fundamental
freedoms and civil society. Preparations for the elections were
well-administered, including extensive voter education on the use
of new voting technologies; election day was generally procedurally
well-organised. The elections, however, were characterised by widespread
reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees,
highly divisive campaign rhetoric, a significant imbalance in financial resources
and advantage of incumbency, polarised media environment concerns
over the impartiality and political instrumentalisation of the oversight
body as well as under-representation of women on party lists and in
the campaign. Election day was characterised by a tense environment,
with frequent breaches of voting secrecy and several procedural
inconsistencies, extensive tracking of voters as well as reports
of intimidation and pressure on voters that negatively impacted
public trust in the process.
2 Context and recent developments
10. The elections took place in
a context of deep political polarisation, with significant antagonism
between the government and the opposition on one hand, the government
and the office of the President on the other, as well as widespread
social discontent due to the adoption of various pieces of controversial
legislation.
11. In 2023 and 2024, large-scale protests erupted against the
Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, often referred to by civil
society as the “Russian law” or “foreign agent law”, that was unexpectedly
introduced in April 2024 (after it had been withdrawn in 2023) and
adopted in May 2024. In June 2024, both the Assembly and the
Venice
Commission called for the law to be repealed in its current form.
Note During
and in the aftermath of the protests, protesters, civil society
groups, and journalists were subject to violence and intimidation.
The law has had a stigmatising effect on civil society organisations
and independent media. The law was challenged by the President,
38 members of parliament, and over 120 civil society and media organisations before
the Constitutional Court, which deemed the case admissible on 9
October 2024 but declined to suspend its applicability pending a
final ruling. On 17 October, 16 media organisations, 120 civil society
groups, and four individuals filed a joint complaint with the European
Court of Human Rights, arguing that the law violates the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
12. Furthermore, on 17 September 2024, the Georgian Parliament
adopted the Law on Protection of Family Values and Minors, despite
the
recommendations of the Venice Commission. This law introduces measures that
discriminate against the LGBTI community and could restrict freedoms
of assembly and expression.
13. The campaign led by the ruling Georgian Dream party (GD) focused
on themes such as the “Global War Party” conspiracy and retribution
against political opponents. The party's rhetoric called for the
eviction of the United National Movement (UNM) and “all its successors
and affiliates” – referred to by GD as the “collective UNM” – from
the political scene, which, in effect, would mean a ban on key opposition.
The campaign also sought to promote a crackdown on the LGBTI community
in the name of defending traditional values and protecting children.
Additionally, the party emphasised the need to amend Georgia's constitutional
order to restore the country’s territorial integrity. Honorary chairperson
of the GD Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that the elections should lead
to “Nuremberg trials for the UNM”
Note accusing them of triggering the
war on orders from foreign powers and offering to “apologise” for
the war.
Note The campaign
heavily relied on fear-based rhetoric, often invoking images of
the war in Ukraine, and was further exacerbated by provocative statements
from Russian officials, who warned against a potential “colour revolution”
driven by Western powers (and alleged manipulation of OSCE/ODIHR
by the United States), which deepened the polarisation of Georgian
society along geopolitical lines.
14. Additionally, there were increasing institutional tensions
between the ruling party and the President of Georgia, Salomé Zourabichvili,
culminating in an attempt to impeach her which, in the end, did
not receive the required support from Parliament.
Note The President vetoed several
laws, including the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and
a law abolishing the mandatory gender quota for candidate lists.
These vetoes were overridden by Parliament. While the president
signed an amnesty law as a humanitarian gesture, she criticised its
timing – just before the elections – as “indirect voter bribery.”
Note In an effort
to address the political crisis and support Georgia’s European Union
integration, the president drafted the “
Georgian
Charter” aimed at abolishing laws harmful to the country's European
path, restoring trust in the justice and electoral systems, and preparing
for snap parliamentary elections to be held in a “free and fair
environment.” She also sought to unite opposition parties around
this vision, and while most of them signed the Charter, their respective
interpretations of the roadmap remained unclear.
15. These elections were the first ones since Georgia had been
granted candidate status in December 2023, though accession has
been de facto halted by the
European Union since June 2024 due to democratic backsliding.
16. The political landscape is dominated by the ruling GD, which
has been in power since 2012. In the 2020 parliamentary elections,
nine political parties and coalitions won seats, with the GD securing
90 of the 150 seats. The UNM-led coalition became the largest opposition
faction, winning 36 seats. In the years that followed, the opposition
became increasingly fragmented due to internal instability within
the parties. The 2021 local elections further solidified the ruling
party's dominant position, with the GD winning 63 out of 64 mayoral races.
17. For the 2024 elections, most opposition parties formed three
coalitions: the “Coalition for Change” (comprising Ahali, Girchi
– More Freedom, Droa!, and the Republican Party); “Strong Georgia”
(made up of “Strong Georgia – Lelo”, For the People, Freedom Square,
and Citizens); and “Unity – to Save Georgia” (a coalition of UNM,
European Georgia [EG], and Strategy Aghmashenebeli [SA]).
3 Legal framework, electoral system, and
recent developments
18. The 150-member Georgian Parliament
is directly elected for a four-year term. These elections were the first
held under a fully proportional election system, using a single
nationwide constituency with closed candidate lists. This proportional
system was adopted in 2017. It had long been recommended by both
the Assembly and civil society to promote greater pluralism in parliament,
strengthen the institution, and avoid super-majorities, thereby
enhancing the democratic system of checks and balances. Parties
must surpass a 5% threshold to be allocated seats. The formation
of pre-electoral coalitions is not permitted. Georgian citizens aged
18 and older elect their representatives to the single-chamber legislature.
The incoming parliament forms the government and, as part of the
electoral college responsible for electing the president (following
the 2017 constitutional reform), plays a significant role in the
presidential election.
19. These elections marked the first nationwide vote in which
electronic voting technologies were used on a large scale, with
2 262 out of 3 044 (72%) electoral precincts implementing electronic
voting, covering 90% of the voters. This meant that voter registration,
vote counting, and summary protocols for voting results were all
carried out electronically.
Note In 768 precincts, voting was conducted
using traditional methods.
20. The law does not provide for independent verification or certification
of the electronic technologies used. In October 2023, the Central
Election Commission (CEC) selected a private company to conduct
a compliance audit, which according to the CEC, confirmed that the
devices met international standards and national legislation. In
October 2024, just before the elections, the CEC tasked the same
company with conducting a follow-up audit specifically related to
the parliamentary elections. However, despite the completion of
two out of three audit phases, the audit report was not published
before election day. Key stakeholders, including political parties
and citizen observers, were not granted access to the audit process
and had limited access to related documentation, which limited transparency.
This lack of openness was in contrast to the 2022 Committee of Ministers
Guidelines on
the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in electoral processes
in Council of Europe member States and Recommendation
CM/Rec(2017)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on standards
for e-voting.
21. The CEC conducted a large-scale information campaign to inform
voters about the changes in the voting procedure, including the
use of electronic devices, starting one and a half years before
election day. For example, demonstrations of the electronic voting
devices were organised gradually across Georgia in public gathering
places. Additionally, the CEC organised training sessions for members
of the Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) to ensure they were
well-prepared for the new system.
Note
22. Voters living abroad are eligible to participate in the elections,
provided they register with a Georgian consular registry or a Georgian
diplomatic mission or consulate.
Note Polling stations are established
at diplomatic missions or consular offices, but only if there are
at least 50 registered voters in a given location. However, as reported
by our pre-electoral delegation, access to polling stations – 67
stations across 42 countries – was deemed insufficient. These stations
were restricted to locations within embassies, limiting the possibility
for the diaspora to vote. Despite calls from the president, opposition
parties, and civil society organisations for more accessible voting
options, such as additional polling stations, electronic voting,
or extended voting periods, these concerns were not addressed.
23. Overall, the legal framework provides an adequate basis for
conducting democratic elections; however, several long-standing
OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations remain unaddressed,
“among others, constituency delimitation, restrictive residence
requirements for presidential and parliamentary candidates and other
undue criteria on voter and candidate eligibility, additional aspects
regarding the formation of election commissions, provisions on the
misuse of official position for campaign purposes, high donation
limits for election campaigns affecting the level playing field,
further regulation and oversight of campaign finance, further elaborating
media campaign regulations, strengthening the framework for electoral dispute
resolution to ensure effective legal remedy, recounts and annulments,
and measures to prevent voter intimidation”, as recalled by the
Venice Commission in June 2024.
Note
24. The Election Code has been amended over 20 times since the
last parliamentary elections, with the most significant changes
occurring in 2022 and 2024. The Venice Commission has repeatedly
stated that the frequent amendments to the electoral legislation
in Georgia could undermine the integrity of the electoral process
and hinder the country’s ongoing efforts to consolidate its democracy.
25. While the 2022 amendments did not provide the comprehensive
reform recommended by the Venice Commission, they were adopted following
consultations and cross-party support. These changes address several
previous recommendations from the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR,
including measures to improve the impartiality of lower-level election
bodies and citizen observers, the introduction of additional grounds
for automatic recounts, and the establishment of clearer deadlines
for election dispute resolution.
26. The election is administered by a three-tier system: the CEC
at the national level, 73 District Election Commissions (DECs),
and around 3 030 PECs. The CEC is composed of 17 members: 8 nominated
by the Speaker of Parliament and appointed by Parliament, and 9
nominated by opposition parties.
27. However, amendments to the Electoral Code adopted in 2023
and 2024, without an inclusive consultative process or broad political
support, altered the election procedures for the CEC chairperson
and non-partisan members (despite recommendations from the Venice
Commission to the contrary). These changes also modified the CEC’s
decision-making process, which, as highlighted by the Assembly,
Note could potentially allow the ruling
majority to exert control over all CEC decisions. In practice:
- candidates for the chairperson
and non-partisan members of the CEC will now be proposed by the Speaker
of Parliament (previously, it was by the President of Georgia);
- the Chairperson and non-partisan members of the CEC must
be elected by a 3/5 majority in the first round, but only a simple
majority is required in subsequent rounds as a mechanism to prevent
deadlock;
- the position of vice-chairperson of the CEC, who was previously
appointed by the opposition, has been abolished;
- the CEC Advisory Group for dispute resolution has been
dissolved;
- a decision by the CEC that does not secure a 2/3 majority
can be immediately submitted for a new vote at the same meeting,
with only a simple majority then required for its adoption.
28. In addition, on 16 August 2024, the CEC issued a decree requiring
the chairperson of each PEC to draw lots to assign duties among
commission members one week before the election, rather than on
election day. This raised concerns about the potential for undue
pressure on election officers prior to election day.
29. Despite constitutional provisions mandating the State to ensure
gender equality, the Georgian Parliament abolished mandatory gender
quotas and other temporary measures designed to increase women’s participation
in public life in May 2024. This led to a significant decline in
the number of women candidates in these elections. In my pre-electoral
statement, I expressed concern over this measure, which I view as
a political deal – the initiators, Girchi MPs, secured the ruling
party’s support for the amendment in exchange for their votes for
the candidate backed by the GD for the chairmanship of the CEC.
This decision has had a negative impact on women's participation
in political life and, in my view, represents a step backwards and
yet another indication of the country’s democratic backsliding.
30. Georgia has a complex and fragmented system for resolving
electoral disputes, which is often seen as a significant barrier
to access to electoral justice. The procedure for resolving electoral
disputes is spread across various levels of the Election Administration
– Central Election Commission, District Election Commissions, and
Precinct Election Commissions – and requires the complainant to
be a direct victim of the alleged violation of electoral law. This
means that voters themselves cannot lodge complaints, except in
cases of exclusion from the voter list. The Venice Commission has
repeatedly recommended simplifying the procedure and making it more
accessible.
4 Key findings of the PACE pre-electoral
mission
31. During our pre-electoral mission
to Tbilisi on 23-24 September 2024, we met with a wide range of electoral
stakeholders. These elections were taking place at a critical juncture
in Georgia’s European integration process. In this context, free
and fair elections, accepted as legitimate by all stakeholders,
were considered essential for safeguarding the country’s rightful
place in European structures.
32. Our delegation observed an unprecedented level of political
polarisation, which had turned the upcoming elections into a de facto referendum on Georgia’s
democratic trajectory and foreign alignment.
33. We were alarmed by public statements from the GD calling for
a constitutional majority to ban the opposition. We strongly urged
all stakeholders to refrain from such rhetoric, which threatens
to undermine political pluralism. Calls to prohibit opposition parties
would significantly derail Georgia’s commitment to its obligations
as a member State of the Council of Europe.
34. We also observed the chilling effect of the controversial
Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence on activists and domestic
election observers in the lead-up to the elections. This was compounded
by crackdowns on demonstrations and expressions of dissent; allegations
of harassment and intimidation; and hate speech against opposition
members, civil society actors, and media representatives.
35. In this context, the decision by the Anti-Corruption Bureau
(ACB) to designate a number of NGOs – including Transparency International
(TI) – as “subjects with declared electoral goals,” thereby subjecting
them to the same financial oversight and restrictions as political
parties, was deeply concerning. This decision ultimately forced
TI to end its election observation activities. The international
community swiftly reacted. In a joint statement, the PACE co-rapporteurs
for the monitoring of Georgia and myself deemed the decision unacceptable
and likely to undermine public trust in the electoral process. We
urged the relevant authorities to uphold the legitimacy of the elections
and ensure that TI Georgia, along with other respected civil society organisations,
could carry out their observation duties without interference or
hindrance.
Note Following this,
the Prime Minister instructed the ACB to reverse its decision. At
the time, the application of legal provisions by the ACB appeared
selective and inconsistent during the campaign.
36. Concerns were raised during our meetings about the potential
misuse of administrative resources and the pressure exerted on civil
servants, as well as the limited access to polling stations for
the Georgian diaspora (as discussed above).
37. While the media landscape in Georgia is diverse, it is highly
polarised. The instrumentalisation of private media outlets for
political propaganda has undermined independent journalism, fostering
divisive political rhetoric and impeding voters' ability to make
informed choices. The safety of journalists remains a serious concern,
with recent incidents of assaults, intimidation, and pressure, as
documented by the
Council
of Europe’s Safety of Journalists Platform. Additionally, several defamation lawsuits filed by
public officials against opposition-affiliated media and journalists
have further hindered investigative journalism, exacerbating the
already fragile financial state of the media. The Georgian National
Communications Commission (ComCom), which oversees broadcast media,
holds excessive sanctioning power, and its appointment process does
not ensure its independence.
38. While we welcomed the introduction of the full proportional
electoral system – a long-standing request from the Assembly and
civil society – we noted that the combined effects of the 5% threshold
and the prohibition on election blocs could undermine the impact
of this crucial 2017 electoral reform. Furthermore, the May 2024
amendment allowing parties to designate a candidate for one of the
30 districts
Note further diluted the intent of establishing
a fully proportional system.
39. Our delegation also believed that the swift publication of
preliminary results, facilitated by the introduction of electronic
voting that would allow the establishment and transmission of preliminary
results to the CEC immediately after the closing of the polling
stations, would help reduce tensions on election day. However, we
emphasised that the CEC must not only act impartially, but also
be perceived as impartial. Recent changes to the legislation and
internal rules, which could potentially undermine public trust in
the electoral process, were raised with the relevant authorities
during our visit.
5 Election Day Observation
40. On election day, 500 international
short-term observers were deployed across nearly 2 000 polling stations,
ensuring significant coverage of the electoral process. PACE teams
were deployed in Tbilisi and its surrounding areas, as well as in
several other cities and their surroundings, including Bolnisi,
Dusheti, Gori, Kaspi, Khashuri, Marneuli, Mtskheta, Rustavi, Sagarejo,
Sighnaghi, Telavi, Tianeti, Tsalka and Vakhtangisi.
41. Most members of the PACE delegation found that, overall, the
elections were well-organised, with trained officers at many polling
stations. The functioning of the electronic voting devices did not
raise major concerns in most of the polling stations observed.
42. There was a prevailing sense that two distinct realities existed
on election day: one inside the polling stations, where the voting
process was generally well administered, and another outside, where
a very different atmosphere prevailed.
43. Most PACE observers agreed that the overall election environment,
including but not limited to election day, was heavily influenced
by party-based intimidation and voter control.
44. Several teams, particularly those observing in rural areas,
reported a widespread pattern of intimidation of voters as they
entered polling stations by large groups of strongmen from the ruling
party.
45. This sense of intimidation was further heightened by the presence
of cameras installed by the ruling party in most (if not all) of
the polling stations observed.
Note These
cameras recorded all activity within the polling stations, violating
the principle of voting secrecy when placed close to the voting
machines. The presence of these cameras increased the pressure on
voters and contributed to the prevailing sense of “Big Brother is watching
you”. In some of the observed polling stations, there was confusion
over the ownership of these cameras, with some election officers
mistakenly believing they had been provided by the CEC.
46. One team observed stationary minivans parked outside polling
stations, with numerous individuals inside. Party observers and
members of the outside crowds were in constant communication with
the people in the minivans, who appeared to be performing tasks
that were difficult to define, but likely included monitoring or
counting voters.
47. Representatives of the ruling party attempted to control the
activities inside the polling stations visited by one PACE team,
even interfering in conversations between PACE observers and other
accredited observers by demanding translations from English into
Georgian.
48. PACE teams observed that many so-called “citizen observers”
were unable to identify the organisations they represented and had
to struggle to read the names of these “organisations” from their
badges. These individuals admitted that they were working for these
“organisations” only for election day. It became clear that they
were, in fact, affiliated with the ruling party. Some of these “observers”
refused to speak with PACE observers and exhibited aggressive behaviour.
49. Vote buying was witnessed by one PACE team, while another
team received credible reports of organised vote buying throughout
the day, with payments of 50 GEL per vote for the ruling party.
50. A PACE team observed voters taking photos of their ballots,
raising concerns about voting secrecy and the integrity of the voting
process.
51. An unacceptable incident occurred during a PACE team's observation
at a polling station in the village of Bodbe, Sighnaghi district.
The team’s car was deliberately vandalised by a group of approximately 40 unfriendly
strongmen outside the polling station. A tyre was punctured, and
the perpetrators attempted to make it appear like an accident by
deliberately smashing an old vehicle into the already damaged car.
52. Procedural irregularities were also noted by several PACE
teams during the counting process, including instances of ruling
party observers leaving and re-entering polling stations during
the count, as well as directly interfering with the counting procedure.
53. However, some PACE teams reported that they did not observe
any irregularities on election day.
54. The PACE observations are consistent with the findings of
the IEOM, which reported that while election day was generally well-organised
and administered in an orderly manner, it was marked by a tense environment,
multiple incidents of physical altercations, and widespread intimidation
of voters and citizen observers. IEOM observers frequently noted
signs of pressure on voters, overcrowding, and procedural inconsistencies.
In many instances, party representatives recorded the voting process
and tracked voters, raising concerns about potential intimidation.
Moreover, voting secrecy was potentially compromised in 24% of observations
made by IEOM observers, due to the manner of ballot insertion into
vote-counting devices or inadequate polling station layouts. Although
the presence of both citizen and party observers contributed to
the transparency of the process, many citizen observers appeared
to be acting on behalf of specific political contestants.
6 Outcome of the elections and post-electoral
developments
55. The CEC announced the official
results on 16 November 2024. This session was marked by significant tension.
Some protests occurred outside the CEC office, and several individuals
were detained by police. During the session, opposition CEC member
Davit Kirtadze (UNM) allegedly referred to CEC chairperson Kalandarishvili
as a “black mark” – seemingly alluding to black marks on the ballot
paper that allegedly violated the secrecy of the vote – and threw
black paint at him. As a result, Mr Kirtadze was expelled from the
meeting room, briefly interrupting the session. The Prosecutor's
Office initiated an investigation into Mr Kirtadze. We unequivocally
condemn this physical attack on the CEC chairperson, which is entirely
unacceptable.
56. According to data released by the CEC, a total of 2 111 834
voters participated in the election out of 3 508 294 registered
voters, resulting in a voter turnout of 58,94%. A total of 34 974
ballots were declared invalid. The use of electronic devices to
scan ballots at polling stations and the immediate transmission
of results to the CEC enabled the publication of preliminary results
1 hour and 45 minutes after voting ended.
57. The official results announced by the CEC indicate that the
GD party secured 53.93% of the votes, with four coalitions entering
parliament. GD won the majority of votes in all districts except
for the capital, Tbilisi (where the four major coalitions together
garnered 46%), Rustavi, and the diaspora vote (where GD secured just
15%). GD performed particularly well in rural areas, including remote
regions and ethnic minority constituencies, which have traditionally
been strongholds of Georgia’s ruling parties. In contrast, the GD narrowly
won in other major cities. The UNM-led Unity – National Movement
coalition suffered a dramatic decline, losing about half of its
support, some of which shifted to the newly-formed Coalition for
Change, created just months before the election by former UNM members.
№
|
Name of the Political
Party
|
Number of votes received
|
%
|
Number of Mandates received
|
+/- compared to 2020
elections
|
3
|
The Party of Georgian
Unity and Development
|
3 892
|
0.19%
|
|
|
4
|
Coalition for Change
– Gvaramia, Melia, Girchi, Droa
|
229 161
|
11.03%
|
19
|
+ 17
|
5
|
Unity-National Movement
|
211 216
|
10.17%
|
16
|
23
|
6
|
European Democrats
|
7 955
|
0.38%
|
|
|
8
|
Alliance of Patriots
of Georgia
|
50 599
|
2.44%
|
|
|
9
|
Strong Georgia – Lelo,
For the People, For Liberty!
|
182 922
|
8.81%
|
14
|
+ 8
|
10
|
Georgian Labour Party
|
15 103
|
0.73%
|
|
|
12
|
Our United Georgia
|
1 845
|
0.09%
|
|
|
16
|
Change Georgia
|
12 528
|
0.60%
|
|
|
17
|
Georgia
|
2 780
|
0.13%
|
|
|
20
|
Free Georgia
|
4 145
|
0.20%
|
|
|
21
|
Tribuna
|
2 483
|
0.12%
|
|
|
23
|
We
|
2 593
|
0.12%
|
|
|
25
|
Gakharia for Georgia
|
161 521
|
7.78%
|
12
|
New party
|
26
|
Left Alliace
|
1 260
|
0.06%
|
|
|
27
|
Georgian's Unity
|
4 500
|
0.22%
|
|
|
36
|
Girchi
|
62 223
|
3.00%
|
|
|
41
|
Georgian Dream
|
1 120
053
|
53.93%
|
|
-1
|
58. As required by law, the CEC
announced on 29 October that it would recount ballots from five
randomly selected polling stations in each electoral district. Of
the 366 electoral precincts (approximately 14% of the total), the
results remained unchanged for 334 precincts, representing 91.25%
of the recounted precincts. For the remaining 32 precincts, the
data from the summary protocols showed slight changes.
Note
59. In contrast, the results of the elections were immediately
challenged by opposition parties, which declared they would not
recognise the election outcomes and would refuse to take up their
parliamentary mandates, thereby preventing the parliament from achieving
the quorum. The main opposition coalitions have since organised
protests, demanding new elections.
60. President Salomé Zourabichvili declared the elections “illegitimate”
and described the outcome of the parliamentary vote as fraudulent.
She claimed that modern technology had been used to cover up electoral fraud
and suggested that the country had fallen victim to a “Russian special
operation”.
61. Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the “Gakharia for Georgia” party,
called on 29 October 2024 for the transfer of the voter base to
a neutral, objective platform where voters could independently verify
their participation – including details such as the precinct and
time of voting. His request was rejected by a court on 8 November. Mr
Gakharia also demanded that the contract signed with Smartmatic,
as well as any subsequent changes to the contract, be made publicly
available.
NoteNote
62. The Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation into allegations
of vote rigging and called on anyone with evidence to come forward
and testify. However, the opposition has raised concerns, claiming
that the investigation will not be independent, as the head of the
Prosecutor’s Office was appointed by the GD-dominated parliament.
63. Immediately following election day, domestic election observers
reported multiple breaches of voting confidentiality, incidents
of ballot stuffing, and various procedural irregularities.
64. The monitoring coalition “My Voice” filed complaints in 29
constituencies, seeking the annulment of results from 246 polling
stations. The complaints cited a range of violations, including
breaches of voting secrecy, instances of proxy voting and multiple
voting by individuals, failure to verify voter markings, voting without
proper markings, physical and verbal attacks at polling stations,
obstruction of observation (particularly during the verification
process), the presence of unauthorised and aggressive individuals
in the polling areas, and electoral agitation by commission members.
Note
65. “My Vote” a local observer mission representing dozens of
Georgian civil society organisations, accused the electoral administration
of playing a central role in executing a
large-scale
election-rigging operation orchestrated by the ruling party. The mission called
for an investigation and the annulment of over 300 000 votes – approximately
10% of the electorate.
66. The Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) called for the annulment
of results in all 2 263 precincts where new voting technologies
were used, citing violations of voting secrecy. GYLA argued that
the thin paper ballots allowed voters’ choices to be revealed through
transparency, thus compromising voter anonymity. In addition to
filing 11 complaints regarding pre-election violations, GYLA requested
the annulment of summary protocols from 460 precincts and the recalculation
of results. It also called for disciplinary action against members
of the PECs in 349 of these cases.
Note
68. The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
(ISFED) reported “a number of inexplicable discrepancies in the
data provided by the CEC”. ISFED found significant differences in
the gender distribution of registered voters versus actual voter
turnout in certain electoral districts. In some cases, the male
voter turnout exceeded 100%, which ISFED described as “theoretically
improbable”.
Note
69. The final 2024 exit poll analysis, conducted by the leading
US consulting firm HarrisX, raised concerns about “statistically
inexplainable data discrepancies by the Central Election Commission
amounting to over 8% of the total vote, or at least 172 523 raw
votes, across a minimum of 27 districts.” The discrepancy could
not be explained “by statistical variance, pointing to possible
voting irregularities”.
Note
70. The CEC reported that a total of 1 201 appeals were filed
with district electoral commissions (DECs). Of these, 167 were either
partially or fully satisfied, 917 were rejected, and 107 were not
considered. The appeals primarily called for the cancellation or
recount of results in precincts (537 appeals), requested disciplinary action
against election officials (477 appeals), and 47 appeals did not
specify any particular demand. As a result of these appeals, the
results of 12 mobile ballots were annulled, and the results of 12
precincts were recounted.
Note
71. According to the CEC’s database as of 7 November, 102 decisions
made by 73 DECs were appealed to first instance courts. Only two
of these appeals were successful: one in Tetritskaro and one in
Gori, both located in eastern Georgia. In the Tetritskaro case,
the court found that the secrecy of the vote had been violated,
while in the Gori case, the court ordered a recount of the results
in one precinct.
72. All rulings of the first instance courts were subsequently
appealed to the Tbilisi and Kutaisi Appeal Courts, depending on
the jurisdiction. The two successful appeals at the first instance
level were also challenged by the CEC.
73. The Tbilisi Court of Appeals consolidated all appeals from
the GYLA and the “My Vote” coalition into a single case, while all
appeals related to ISFED were consolidated into another. On 6 November,
the court overturned the decision of the Gori District Court, which
had ordered a recount of the results in one precinct but upheld
the decisions of other first-instance courts that had ruled in favour
of the CEC.
74. On 7 November, following an exceptionally long deliberation
of nearly 24 hours, the Tbilisi Court of Appeals rejected the appeals
from GYLA and the “My Vote” coalition. The court also overturned
the Tetritskaro District Court's ruling regarding the breach of
voting secrecy, which had been in favour of the appellants.
Note
75. Similarly, the Kutaisi Court of Appeals consolidated the cases
filed by GYLA and ISFED. The court ruled on all cases, affirming
the decisions of the first instance courts, all of which had been
in favour of the CEC.
7 Conclusions
and recommendations
76. The parliamentary elections
of 26 October 2024 were marked by high polarisation of the political
and media landscape, hate speech against the opposition and civil
society and deep antagonism between the ruling party and the opposition
on the one hand, and the ruling party and the President on the other.
Our delegation is particularly concerned about the widespread climate
of party-organised intimidation, before and during the elections,
especially in rural areas, that marked these elections as well as
questions about the impartiality and independence of certain State
agencies responsible for implementing the law. Our delegation was
particularly alarmed by the public statements made during the campaign
by the ruling party calling for a ban on key opposition. These statements
were further echoed by the Prime Minister in response to post-electoral
protests, where he suggested that opposition parties should be declared
unconstitutional “if they continue to undermine the constitutional
order.”
77. Our findings, based on observations of the pre-electoral campaign
and election day, as well as credible and consistent reports from
domestic observers following the elections, raise concerns about
the correctness of the election results, namely whether the election
results truly reflect the will of the voters. Additionally, serious
doubts persist regarding whether the electoral environment provided
the necessary conditions for a fair election, enabling voters to
make an informed choice free from intimidation and undue pressure.
This is reflected in the response from the opposition and civil
society, which have expressed deep mistrust in both the results
and the institutions and continue to challenge the outcome of the
election.
78. In particular, the following issues must be highlighted, as
they significantly undermined the fairness of the electoral process
and challenged the legitimacy of its results:
- Transparency and fairness of the electoral process: last-minute
changes and adjustments made to the electoral process raised significant
concerns about its transparency and fairness. One of the most serious
issues was the breach of voting secrecy, which was observed in almost
a quarter of the polling stations visited by IEOM observers. This
issue undermined the integrity of the election, as secret suffrage
is a key feature of European electoral heritage, as set out in Article
3 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights and highlighted by the Venice Commission in its Code
of good practice in electoral matters.
- Politisation of State institutions: The decision by the
Anti-Corruption Bureau to designate certain NGOs, including Transparency
International, as “entities with political goals” was an unacceptable
move. Furthermore, recent amendments to the composition of the CEC
have raised questions about the impartiality of the CEC and undermined
the trust in this institution.
- Uneven playing field: The fairness of the elections was
compromised by unequal competition conditions between political
parties, with a clear advantage given to the ruling party. Administrative
resources were used to benefit the ruling party, creating an uneven
playing field. Additionally, unequal access to media outlets and
media polarisation further hindered balanced representation and
the dissemination of information, making it more difficult for voters
to make an informed choice.
- A widespread climate of intimidation and pressure targeted
both voters and activists, discouraging open participation. The
Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence contributed to the stigmatisation
of civil society groups, independent media, and dissenting voices.
Intimidation both inside and outside polling stations on election
day undermined voters’ sense of safety. Civil society organisations
and journalists faced significant pressure and harassment. Reports
of voter intimidation, coercion, and undue pressure were particularly
prevalent among public sector employees and the economically vulnerable.
- Controlled environment: A “Big Brother is watching you”
atmosphere was created by the installation of cameras by the ruling
party in polling stations, often violating rules of secrecy of the
vote. This led to a widespread sense of surveillance among voters
and activists, fostering an environment of potential voter control
and undermining trust in the electoral process.
- Democratic backsliding: Recent legislation restricting
freedom of expression and freedom of association, particularly before
and during the elections, along with the negative impact of abolishing
the gender quota law, have further contributed to the country’s
democratic backsliding.
79. Our delegation strongly encourages the authorities to address
the aforementioned issues, as they are critical to aligning with
European standards in electoral processes. They should be considered
in the framework of the PACE monitoring procedure and electoral
co-operation programmes. The authorities should in particular:
- as a priority measure, revise
the electoral framework ahead of the 2025 local elections and restore credibility
and impartiality of the CEC and the Anti-Corruption Bureau, in line
with the recommendations of the Venice Commission and Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO), in particular:
- reverse recent changes that eliminated the position of
the opposition-nominated deputy CEC chairperson, altered the selection
procedure for CEC members, and allowed the CEC to bypass the required
3/5 majority in repeat voting;
- in line with the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR’s December
2023 joint
opinion, reintroduce an anti-deadlock mechanism requirement
for the election/appointment of the CEC chairperson and non-partisan
members which favours qualified majorities;
- in addition, launch a comprehensive review of the legal
framework and electoral legislation, in line with Venice Commission
recommendations, to address other long-standing issues related to
comprehensive regulations to prevent the misuse of administrative
resources, oversight of campaign activities and finance, media regulations,
improved electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. These changes
should also prevent undue pressure on voters and the usurpation
of their identities, particularly by ensuring strict adherence to
proper voter identification procedures;
- ensure swift, credible, and transparent investigations
into all irregularities and allegations of vote manipulation, carried
out by independent bodies that enjoy the trust of all electoral
stakeholders. This is essential for restoring confidence in the
electoral process; additionally, provide full access to electoral data
(while safeguarding personal information) and facilitate comprehensive
electoral audits. This will enhance transparency and strengthen
trust in the electoral system;
- restore a climate conducive to genuinely competitive electoral
campaigns by repealing the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence,
which subjects civil society organisations and independent media
to undue stigmatisation and pressure. Demonstrate zero tolerance
for political violence and reinforce measures to prevent the misuse
of administrative resources;
- strengthen voter education programmes targeting in particular
first-time voters and minorities to raise awareness of electoral
rights, prevention of electoral corruption, misuse of administrative
resources, etc. in co-operation with civil society organisations;
- enhance voting secrecy, notably by reviewing rules on
recording electoral activities and the presence of cameras in polling
stations, and by regulating the storage and use of this data in
line with Council of Europe standards on data protection, ensuring
that such recordings do not breach voting confidentiality or lead
to intimidation;
- refrain from any rhetoric or actions that undermine pluralistic
democracy and risk violating the country’s obligations as a Council
of Europe member State.
80. The Assembly calls on the Georgian authorities to demonstrate
strong and genuine political will to address the shortcomings identified
during the election observation process, as highlighted in the IEOM Statement
of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
81. Given the prevailing climate of deep antagonism and mistrust,
the Assembly also calls on:
- the
Council of Europe to support, through its electoral expertise and
ongoing political dialogue, Georgia’s democratisation on its European
path, a goal shared by the vast majority of Georgian society. Pending the
completion of internal investigations, this could include assisting
in all endeavours, including at international level, aimed at restoring
trust and addressing, with all electoral stakeholders, post-election controversies,
allegations of frauds, and electoral shortcomings that further undermine
the integrity of the election results;
- the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to continue
to closely follow the situation in Georgia, to use his political
role to reaffirm the Council of Europe’s support to the democratic
process in Georgia and to facilitate constructive dialogue between
all parties concerned. The Assembly invites the Secretary General
to take all necessary steps in this respect.
82. In the spirit of the Reykjavik Summit of Heads of State and
Government, where the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy were adopted,
the Assembly urges the Georgian authorities to take concrete steps
to secure and strengthen democracy, uphold good governance, and
“encourage democratic participation at all levels through free and
fair elections”.
83. The Assembly is ready to support this process, working within
the framework of its monitoring procedure and in close co-operation
with the Venice Commission.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee
Chairperson:
Mr Iulian Bulai, Romania
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Frank Schwabe, Germany
*
- Ms Anna-Kristiina Mikkonen, Finland
- Mr Yves Cruchten, Luxembourg
- Ms Aurora Floridia, Italy
- Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez, Switzerland
- Mr Didier Marie, France
- Mr Antonio Gutiérrez Limones, Spain
- Ms Blerina Gjylameti, Albania
- Mr Namık Tan, Türkiye
- Mr Jone Blikra, Norway
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Boriana Åberg, Sweden
*
- Mr Christophe Brico, Monaco
- Ms Linda Hofstad Helleland, Norway
- Mr Pablo Hispán, Spain
- Mr Reinhold Lopatka, Austria
- Mr Georgios Stamatis, Greece
- Mr Emanuelis Zingeris, Lithuania
European Conservatives
Group and Democratic Alliance (EC/DA)
- Mr Simone Billi, Italy
*
- Lord David Blencathra, United Kingdom
- Ms Olena Khomenko, Ukraine
- Mr Fabio Pietrella, Italy
- Mr Armen Gevorgyan, Armenia
- Mr Oleksii Goncharenko, Ukraine
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Iulian Bulai, Romania
*
- Mr Olivier Bitz, France
- Ms Béatrice Fresko-Rolfo, Monaco
- Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk, Ukraine
- Mr Ryszard Petru, Poland
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
- Mr Andrej Hunko, Germany
*
Co-rapporteurs AS/MON
(ex officio)
- Mr Claude Kern, France
– ALDE
- Ms Edite Estrela, Portugal – SOC *
Accompanying person
- Lady Tara Blencathra,
accompanying Lord David Blencathra
Secretariat of political
group
Venice Commission
- Ms Katharina Pabel,
member of the Venice Commission
- Mr Michael Janssen, Legal Advisor, Secretariat of the
Venice Commission
Secretariat
- Ms Sylvie Affholder,
Head of the Elections Division, Secretary of the ad hoc committee
- Mr Bogdan Torcătoriu, Senior Elections Officer, Elections
Division, Secretariat of the ad hoc committee
- Mr Bas Klein, Deputy Head of the Secretariat of the Monitoring
Committee
- Ms Carine Roller-Kaufman, Assistant, Elections Division
* Participants in the pre-electoral mission
Appendix 2 – Programme
of the pre-electoral delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
Monday,
23 September 2024
09:00-10:00 PACE delegation meeting
- Welcome by Mr Iulian Bulai, Head of Delegation
- Presentation by Ms Natalia Voutova, Head of the Council
of Europe Office in Tbilisi
- Presentation by Ms Edite Estrela, co-rapporteur of the
Monitoring Committee
- Presentation of the programme by the Secretariat
10:00-11:30 Meeting with members of the international community
(*)
- Romania: Ambassador Răzvan
Rotundu
- Germany: Ambassador Peter Fischer
- Sweden: Ambassador Anna Lyberg
- Italy: Ambassador Massimiliano D’Antuono
- Lithuania: Ambassador Darius Vitkauskas
- France: Ambassador Sheraz Gasri
- European Union Delegation: Ambassador Pawel Herczynski,
Deputy Head of Mission: Ms Zane Rungule, and Project Officer in
charge of elections: Mr Antonio Del-Bargi
11:30-13:00 Meeting with Mr Eoghan Murphy, Head of Mission,
Mr Marcell Nagy, Deputy Head of Mission, and members of the core
team of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission:
- Ms Daria Paprocka, Political
Analyst
- Ms Marcela Mašková, Election Analyst
- Ms Anna Melikyan, Legal Analyst
- Ms Elma Šehalić, Media Analyst
- Mr László Belágyi, Security Expert
13:15-14:15 Working lunch hosted by H.E. Salomé Zourabichvili,
President of Georgia
14:30-16:00 Meeting with representatives of the civil society
(*)
- Georgian Young Lawyers
Association (GYLA): Ms Nanuka Kruashvili
- Transparency International Georgia: Ms Eka Gigauri
- International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
(ISFED): Mr Levan Natroshvili
- Democratic Research institute: Mr Ucha Nanuashvili
16:00-17:30 Meetings with representatives of the media (*)
16:00-16:50
- Georgian
Public Broadcaster: Ms Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Director General,
and Mr George Gvimradze, Director of News and Current Affairs
- Rustavi 2: Mr Vako Avaliani
- Imedi TV: Mr Irakli Rukhadze
16:50-17:30
- Mtavari
Arkhi TV: Ms Tamta Muradashvili, Director of International Advocacy,
and Ms Nino Nakashidze, Deputy Director General
- Pirveli TV: Mr Zaal Udumashvili, Deputy Director
17:45-18:15 Meeting with representatives of the National Communications
Commission (ComCom)
- Mr Kakhi
Bekauri, Head of the ComCom
- Mr Ivane Makharadze, Commissioner
- Ms Nino Grdzelishvili, Head of International Relations
Tuesday, 24 September
2024
10:00-10:45 Meeting with Mr Aleksandre Darakhvelidze, Deputy
Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia
11:00-11:50 Meeting with members of the Central Election Commission
(CEC)
- Mr Giorgi Sharabidze,
Deputy Chairperson
- Mr Giorgi Javakhishvili, Secretary
- Mr Dimitri Javakhadze, Member
- Ms Maia Zaridze, Member
- Mr Giorgi Chikaberidze, Member
- Mr Gia Tsatsashvili, Member
- Mr Giorgi Dzagania, Member
- Mr Archil Anasashvili, Member – “Georgian Dream”
- Mr Levan Jgerenaia, Member – “Girchi”
- Mr Davit Kirtadze, Member – “United National Movement”
- Mr Giorgi Sioridze, Member – “Lelo”
- Ms Ana Khobakhidze, Member – “Giorgi Vashadze – Strategy
Aghmashenebeli”
- Mr Davit Jinjolava, Member – “European Georgia”
- Ms Nino Basilaia, Member – “European Socialists”
- Mr Ivane Norakidze, Member – “Aleko Elisashvili – Citizens”
- Ms Ia Pirtakhia, Member – “European Democrats of Georgia”
11:55-12:15 Meeting with Mr Giorgi Kalandarishvili, Chairperson
of the Central Election Commission of Georgia
12:30-14:00 Working lunch hosted by H.E. Shalva Papuashvili,
Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, with the participation of
the delegation of Georgia to the PACE
14:15-15:00 Meeting with Mr Razhden Kuprashvili, Head of the
Anti-Corruption Bureau
15:10-15:40 Meeting with the Parliamentary Opposition
- Ms Khatuna Samnidze, Chairperson
of the Parliamentary Political Group “Reforms Group”
- Ms Ana Buchukuri, Member of the Parliamentary Political
Group “For Georgia”
- Ms Khatia Dekanoidze, Member of the Parliamentary Political
Group “Eurooptimists”
- Mr Nika Matchutadze, Chairman of the Parliamentary Political
Group “For a National and Democratic State”
- Ms Ketevan Turazashvili, Member of the Parliamentary Political
Group “Citizens”
- Ms Tamar Kordzaia, non-affiliated Member of the Parliament
15:50-16:20 Meeting with the Parliamentary Majority
- Mr Givi Mikanadze, Head of the
Georgian Parliamentary Delegation to the PACE, Chairman of the Education,
Science and Youth Affairs Committee
- Mr Nikoloz Samkharadze, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee
- Ms Maka Botchorishvili, Chairperson of the Committee on
European Integration
- Mr Levan Karumidze, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee
on European Integration
Meetings with coalitions and
individual runners (*):
17:10-17:30 Unity to Save Georgia
[Faction United National Movement – United Opposition “Unity
Makes Strength”, European Georgia, Strategy Aghmashenebeli]
- Mr Zurab Tchiaberashvilli, International
Secretary
- Mr George Tsereteli
- Mr Giorgi Vashadze
17:35-17:55 Coalition for Change
[Representatives of Droa and the Republican Party present
in parliament]
- Mr Giga Lemonjava,
Executive Secretary
- Ms Marika Mikiashvili
18:00-18:20 Coalition Strong Georgia
[Parliamentary Political Group “Lelo-Partnership for Georgia”,
Parliamentary Political Group “Citizens”]
- Ms Salomé Samadashvili
- Mr Bakur Kvashilava, Movement Freedom Square
18:25-18:45 Party For Georgia
19:00-19:45 Delegation meeting and preparation of a statement
(*) Meetings organised by the Council of Europe Secretariat
Appendix 3 – Statement
of the Head of the pre-electoral delegation of the Parliamentary
Assembly
“Free and legitimate
elections essential to safeguard Georgia’s place in Europe”, says
head of PACE pre-electoral delegation, ending visit.
A PACE pre-electoral delegation, headed by Iulian Bulai (Romania,
ALDE), has concluded a two-day visit to Georgia (23-24 September
2024) ahead of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024. Mr Bulai
stressed that these elections are taking place at a very crucial
moment in Georgia’s European integration trajectory. He underscored
that free and fair elections, that are accepted as legitimate by
all stakeholders, are essential to safeguard the country’s rightful
place in European structures.
“Our delegation is concerned that polarisation of the political
landscape has reached unprecedented levels, turning the forthcoming
elections into a de facto referendum on Georgia’s democratic trajectory
and foreign alignment. I share the concerns of the delegation’s
interlocutors about crackdowns on demonstrations and expressions
of dissent, which are fully legitimate in a democratic society.
The authorities are expected to act in line with human rights standards,
refrain from a disproportionate use of violence and demonstrate
their ability to conduct due and diligent investigations in cases
of violence,” he added.
“We are also concerned about allegations of harassment of
opposition members, as well as threats, intimidation and hate speech
against civil society and media representatives. I urge the relevant
authorities to fully and transparently investigate these allegations.
I deplore the chilling effect of the Law on Transparency of Foreign
Influence on activists and domestic election observers ahead of
the elections and I reiterate the Assembly’s demand to withdraw
this law, which is incompatible with European democratic and human
rights standards. I call on the authorities to show the utmost restraint
– we note in this respect that this legislation is being examined
by the Constitutional Court. In this respect, we are concerned about
the decision to designate NGOs as ‘entities with declared electoral
goals’ subject to the same financial oversight and restrictions
as political parties, which creates a chilling effect on domestic
observers.”
“These elections will be the first held under a fully proportional
election system in Georgia. However, the combined effect of the
five per cent threshold – despite several negotiations and provisional
agreements to lower it – and the prohibition of election blocs could
mitigate the effect of this crucial electoral reform from 2017. This
has been a long-standing recommendation of the Assembly and civil
society to increase pluralism in parliament, strengthen the parliament
and avoid super-majorities, thus enhancing the democratic system
of checks and balances,” said the head of delegation.
Mr Bulai added: “I very much deplore the amendment to the
electoral law that abolished the gender quota, which could have
a detrimental effect on women’s participation in political life
and I urge the political parties to ensure that a significant proportion
of women are on eligible position on party lists.”
“Our delegation was informed about, and I welcome, the speedy
publication of preliminary results made possible by the introduction
of electronic voting, which could help reduce tension on election
day. I also note the educational campaign for voters launched by
the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). I believe the CEC should
not only act impartially, but also be seen as impartial. However,
recent changes to the legislation and internal rules could undermine
public trust in the electoral process. Several interlocutors also
raised questions about access to polling stations for Georgians
living abroad,” Mr Bulai continued.
“We would also like to express our concern about politicised
state institutions and media. We heard concerns about the misuse
of administrative resources and pressure exerted on civil servants
that would impact a level playing field. I urge all stakeholders
to refrain from rhetoric that would seek to undermine political
pluralism, such as calling for the prohibition of the opposition,
which would seriously derail Georgia from its Council of Europe
membership obligations,” he concluded.
The six-member cross-party delegationNote led
by Mr Bulai met with the President of Georgia, the Speaker of the Parliament,
the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, members of the parliamentary
majority and opposition, the Chairperson and members of the Central
Electoral Commission, and the heads of the National Communications
Commission and Anti-Corruption Bureau, representatives of civil
society and the media, international observers as well as representatives
of the diplomatic corps.
A fully-fledged PACE delegation comprising 32 members, accompanied
by legal experts from the Venice Commission, will travel to Georgia
to observe the vote on 26 October 2024 alongside other international organisations.
Appendix 4 – Programme
of the meetings of the International Electoral Observation Mission
Thursday,
24 October 2024
09:30-10:00 Registration
10:00-10:30 Welcome and Introductory Remarks
- Pascal Allizard, Special Coordinator
and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission
- Iulian Bulai, Head of PACE Delegation
- Antonio López-Istúriz White, Head of the EP Delegation
- Faik Öztrak, Head of the NATO PA Delegation
- Pia Kauma, Head of the OSCE PA Delegation
10:30-12:30 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission (part 1)
- Welcome and
overview of the mission's work – Eoghan Murphy, Head of Mission
- Political overview: Contestants and the Election Campaign;
Q/A – Daria Paprocka, Political Analyst
- Media Landscape; Q/A – Elma Šehalić, Media Analyst
- Legal Framework, Electoral System, Electoral Dispute Resolution;
Q/A – Anna Melikyan, Legal Analyst
- Election Administration, Voter and Candidate Registration;
Citizen Observers; Q/A – Marcela Mašková, Election Analyst
- Voting Technologies – Tarvi Martens, New Voting Technologies
Analyst
- Security – László Belágyi, Security Expert
14:00-16:00 Socio-political Context
- Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International
Georgia
- Victor Kipiani, Chairman, Geocase (Thinktank)
- Julie Giorgadze, Senior Advisor, Public Movement Multinational
Georgia
- Nino Dolidze, Executive Director, International Society
for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)
- Nanuka Kurashvili, Director of the Democratic Institution
Support Program, Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA)
16:15-18:15 Media and Campaign
- Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Director General, Georgian Public
Broadcaster
- Tamta Muradashvili, Director, Mtavari Arkhi TV
- Irakli Rukhadze, Founder, Imedi TV
- Ivane Makharadze, Commissioner, National Communications
Commission
- Nino Gelashvili, Head Editor, Radio Liberty
- Mamuka Andguladze, Chairperson, Media Advocacy Coalition
Friday, 25 October 2024
09:00-09:45 Candidates / Representatives (part 1)
Georgian Dream
- Irakli
Kobakhidze, Prime Minister
- Nikoloz Samkharadze, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee and Head of the Georgian Delegation to the OSCE-PA
- Givi Mikanadze, Chairman of the Education, Science and
Youth Affairs Committee and Head of the Parliamentary Delegation
to PACE
- Maka Bochorishvili, Chairperson of the Committee on European
Integration
10:00-10:20 Candidates / Representatives (part 2)
Strong Georgia coalition: Lelo / For the People / Freedom
Square / Citizens
- Salomé Samadashvili,
Political Secretary
10:20-10:40 Candidates / Representatives (part 3)
For Georgia party
- Natia
Mezvrishvili, Deputy Chairperson and Head of Election Task Force
- Dimitri Tskitishvili, Leader, Former Member of Parliament
- Elguja Khokrishvili, Leader, Former Ambassador to Germany
10:45-11:30 Candidates / Representatives (part 4)
Unity – To Save Georgia coalition: UNM / Strategy Aghmashenebeli
/ European Georgia
- Tinatin
Bokuchava, Leader of coalition and Chairperson of UNM, and Gigi
Tsereteli, Chairperson of European Georgia
Coalition for Change: Akhali / Girchi – More Freedom / Droa
/ Republican Party / Activists for Future
- Giorgi Butikashvili, Head of the Office for Foreign Affairs
International and Non-Governmental Organizations
11:45-12:45 Election Administration and Institutions
- Giorgi Kalandarishvili, Chairperson
of the Central Election Commission of Georgia
- Razhden Kuprashvili, Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau
13:00-14:15 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission (part 2)
- Election-Day
Procedures, Marcela Mašková, Election Analyst
- STO Reporting, Andreas Roth, Statistical Analyst
- Briefing by Long-Term Observers deployed in Tbilisi and
surroundings
Followed by Meeting with Drivers and Interpreters
Saturday, 26 October 2024
All day Election Day – Observation in polling stations
Appendix 5 – Press
release of the International Election Observation Mission
Georgia’s elections
marred by an uneven playing field, pressure and tension, but voters
were offered a wide choice: international observers
TBILISI, 27 October 2024 –While voters were offered a choice
between 18 candidate lists and candidates could generally campaign
freely, Georgia’s parliamentary elections were marred by entrenched
polarization and concerns over recently adopted legislation and
its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society, as well as
highly divisive campaign rhetoric and widespread reports of pressure
on voters, international observers said in a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), and the European Parliament
(EP) noted deepening political divisions, as well as a significant
imbalance in financial resources and the many advantages taken by
the ruling party contributed to an already uneven playing field.
In the run-up to the elections, numerous civil society organisations
reported on the stigmatizing impact of the ‘law on transparency
of foreign influence’, together with incidents of attacks and intimidation.
This, along with potential sanctions for not complying with the
law, has also impacted their ability to carry out their work free
from undue pressure.
“Imbalances in financial resources, a divisive campaign atmosphere,
and recent legislative amendments were of significant concern throughout
this election process,” said Pascal Allizard, Special Co-ordinator
and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission. “Yet the engagement
shown on election day – from the active voter participation, robust
presence of citizen and party observers, and rich diversity of voices
– gives the sign of a system that is still growing and evolving,
with a democratic vitality under construction.”
Observers found the legal framework to be adequate for holding
democratic elections. However, some previous positive changes were
reversed by recent amendments, and several longstanding recommendations remain
unaddressed. While the earlier amendments were adopted following
inclusive public discussions, frequent revisions, including a number
made shortly before the elections and without broad cross-party support,
undermined its stability, and raised concerns about the potential
for misusing the changes to gain political benefit. At the same
time, the effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was undermined
by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political
instrumentalization of the oversight body.
“These elections were marked by high polarisation of the political
and media landscape, hate speech against the opposition and the
civil society and antagonism towards the office of the President,”
said Iulian Bulai, Head of the PACE delegation. “The quality of
the elections reflected the pre-electoral period. Given the cases
of vote-buying, widespread climate of pressure and party-organised
intimidation before and during the elections, especially in rural
areas, questions about the impartiality of state institutions, we
express our concerns about the electoral conditions, in particular
the uneven playing field which undermines trust in the outcome and explains
the reactions to the election results. These issues need to be addressed
by the authorities.”
Despite a constitutional obligation to ensure gender equality,
legal changes made this year have undermined this aim and led to
a significant decline in the number of women on party lists for
these elections. Party programmes lacked messages specifically targeting
women and featured few women in their campaigns. At the same time,
women politicians in Georgia continue to face deeply rooted stereotypes
and even violence.
“While we commend the largely peaceful election, the decline
in female candidates due to the removal of gender quotas is a setback
for diversity, especially as women’s active participation at polling
stations highlights their vital role and demand for greater representation,”
said Pia Kauma, Head of the OSCE PA delegation. “With the recent
adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, I hope
its implications for freedom of association and expression will
be re-evaluated in the next parliament to protect civil society's
vital work in Georgia and ensure all voices are heard.”
The election administration organized the elections efficiently,
but the public perception of its impartiality was harmed by concerns
about recent changes over its nomination and decision-making processes,
as well as perceived links between members without formal political
affiliation and the ruling party. For the first time, electronic
devices were used in most polling stations, and the election administration
made a significant effort to educate voters on their use ahead of
election day. Election day was generally well organized procedurally and
orderly, but it was marked by a tense environment. The secrecy of
the vote was frequently compromised and there were reports of intimidation
and pressure on voters.
“Respect for the shared values of individual liberty, democracy
and the rule of law is an essential condition for becoming a NATO
member. This election was yet another critical test for Georgia’s
democracy, and its aftermath will be another,” said Faik Öztrak,
Head of the NATO PA delegation. “It is now my duty to report back on
these elections – from election administration to intimidation and
pressure on voters – so that the Assembly can explore how to best
support the Georgian people, who have demonstrated again and again
that they want a democratic Georgia in the EU and NATO.”
The campaign was competitive although subdued, but the language
and imagery used were highly divisive. During the campaign, ruling
party representatives made public statements about their intention
to ban key opposition parties after the elections. Observers also
noted reports of intimidation, coercion and pressure on voters,
particularly on public sector employees and other groups, raising
concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without
fear of retribution.
“We continue to express deep concerns about the democratic
backsliding in Georgia. The conduct of yesterday’s election is unfortunately
evidence to that effect,” said Antonio López-Istúriz White, Head
of the EP delegation. “We will continue to closely follow the situation
in Georgia to see if the next government chooses to realign with
EU values and norms and reverse the negative tendencies of the last
months.”
Georgia’s media scene is diverse but highly polarized, and
depends on financing by political actors. Media monitoring carried
out by the observation mission showed clear political bias across
all outlets, while legal obligations for impartial news coverage
on commercial television were ignored. Although the public broadcaster’s
coverage of candidates was mostly positive or neutral in tone, it
devoted significantly more time to the ruling party than to other
parties. In addition, the safety of journalists remains a major
concern following a series of recent assaults, intimidation and
pressure.
“While the campaign offered voters a wide choice in the run-up
to Georgia’s parliamentary elections, which was good to see, that
is not enough to bring an election in line with international democratic
principles,” said Eoghan Murphy, who headed the ODIHR election observation
mission. “The deep polarisation in the country, the undue pressure
on voters and civil society, and the tension that we saw on election
day demonstrate that much work is still needed.”
The international election observation mission to the parliamentary
elections in Georgia totalled 529 observers from 42 countries, composed
of 380 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term observers, 60 parliamentarians
and staff from the OSCE PA, 39 from PACE, 38 from the NATO PA, and
12 from the EP.
For more information, please contact:
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: [email protected] or +48 609 522
266
Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA: [email protected] or +45
60 10 83 80
Sylvie Affholder, PACE: [email protected] or +33 623888647
Svitlana Svyetova, NATO PA: [email protected] or +32 478
554 816
Cristina Castagnoli, EP: [email protected]
or +32 470 880872