B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Yelyzaveta Yasko, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. After more than 3 years, the
illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression
waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine continues to have
a deep and grave impact on the lives of the Ukrainian people, caused
by the Russian Federation’s serious violations of international
law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.
2. This is particularly evident for the situation of Ukrainian
prisoners of war (PoWs), which requires urgent international intervention.
3. Ukrainian PoWs are being victims of summary executions, widespread
and systematic torture, and ill-treatment, amounting to war crimes.
This state of affairs calls for urgent intervention by the international community,
first and foremost to secure the release of all PoWs. To this end,
political negotiations are of paramount importance.
4. According to the Ukrainian authorities, thousands of Ukrainian
servicepersons are currently in Russian captivity in 186 detention
facilities, both in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine
and in the Russian Federation. As of 6 May 2025, 4 757 Ukrainians
(both PoWs and civilians) have been released from Russian captivity
since the start of the full-scale war, and 64 exchanges of PoWs
have taken place.
5. The information received from those who have returned from
captivity indicates that the Russian Federation is systematically
violating numerous obligations under the Third Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
6. All parties involved should engage in political negotiations
that prioritise the exchange and release of PoWs, as was already
emphasised by Ukraine´s President Zelenskyy in his 10-point Peace
Formula: in particular, point 4 calls for the release of all prisoners
and deportees, on an “all for all” basis. In the meantime, diplomatic
efforts should also be intensified to ensure that all detainees
are treated in accordance with international humanitarian law and
released without delay.
7. The Parliamentary Assembly can play a role in exerting political
pressure to ensure compliance with international agreements and
to hold accountable those who violate international law.
2 Previous work of the Parliamentary
Assembly
8. The Assembly has already expressed
its concern about the situation of Ukrainian PoWs. This report will build
on this previous work, namely:
- Resolution 2448 (2022) “Humanitarian consequences and internal and external
displacement in connection with the aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2463 (2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2556 (2024) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”.
9. Through
Resolution
2562 (2024) “An urgent call to Europe and its partners: envisioning
immediate and long-term policy solutions in support of the displaced
people of Ukraine”, the Assembly declared that it should urgently
address the issue of Ukrainian PoWs and efforts to negotiate their
release, with particular reference to the need to halt the bogus
trials opened by the occupying forces of the Russian Federation
against Ukrainian PoWs. The Assembly also expressed its support
for the measures taken to facilitate the exchange of PoWs in order
to prevent further violence.
10. In addition, the Assembly, through
Resolution 2573 (2024) and
Recommendation
2285 (2024) “Missing persons, prisoners of war and civilians in
captivity as a result of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine”, adopted under urgent procedure, made a number of recommendations
and declared that it “will remain seized of the topic of Ukrainian
prisoners of war and civilians held in captivity by the Russian Federation
until the last person is released”.
11. It should also be noted that members of the Assembly issued
two written declarations on the matter namely declarations
No. 751 (Doc. 15598) “Status of prisoners of war under international humanitarian
law must be respected” (30 August 2022), and
No. 778 (Doc. 15790) “Call on the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the international community to demand that the Russian Federation
fully complies with the international humanitarian law concerning
the Ukrainian prisoners of war” (27 June 2023).
12. More recently, in
Resolution
2588 (2025) “European commitment to a just and lasting peace in
Ukraine”, the Assembly called for the imposition of targeted sanctions
on those “involved in the deportation, forcible transfer and unjustifiable
delay in the repatriation of Ukrainian children, civilians and prisoners
of war”. In
Resolution
2598 (2025) “Russian war of aggression against Ukraine: the need
to ensure accountability and avoid impunity”, the Assembly considered
that “any peace negotiations must unconditionally address the human
dimension of the war, including the […] mutual release and repatriation
of all prisoners of war, according to the formula ‘all for all’”.
3 The
Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War
13. The Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols were adopted in order to regulate the
conduct of armed conflicts. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949
Note defines PoWs as members of the armed
forces, militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces,
who have fallen into the power of the enemy.
Note The provisions of the Third Geneva Convention ensure
the humane treatment of PoWs and their protection under international
humanitarian law.
14. The responsibility for the treatment of PoWs lies with the
Detaining Powers. PoWs must be treated humanely at all times and
without exception. The Third Geneva Convention protects them from
all acts of violence, torture and ill-treatment, whether physical
or psychological, including acts of intimidation, insults and exposure
to public curiosity. Furthermore, it also provides indications regarding
the minimum acceptable conditions of detention that the Detaining
Power must ensure for them, in terms of accommodation, food, clothing,
hygiene and medical care.
15. The Third Geneva Convention states that the Convention shall
be applied with the co-operation and under the scrutiny of Protecting
Powers, whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties
to the conflict. Article 5 of Protocol Additional I of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions further indicates that the Parties should designate
a Protecting Power without delay from the beginning of the conflict,
and “shall, likewise without delay and for the same purpose, permit
the activities of a Protecting Power which has been accepted by
it as such after designation by the adverse Party”. If a Protecting
Power is not designated or accepted, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) may offer its good offices to designate
a Protecting Power to which the Parties may agree; if this is also
not possible, the ICRC may act as a substitute.
16. No Protecting Powers have yet been designated in the context
of the full-scale war of aggression by the Russian Federation against
Ukraine: Switzerland has offered its good offices to both parties
as a Protecting Power, and has negotiated an agreement with Ukraine
to represent Ukrainian interests in the Russian Federation, but
this mandate was rejected by Russia in August 2022.
Note Subsequently, Russia also rejected other
States’ initiatives to undertake the role of Protecting Power.
17. Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention states that the
delegates of the Protecting Powers or of the ICRC “shall have permission
to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly
to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and shall have
access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall
also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival
of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview
the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners’ representatives, without
witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter”. Article
126 also indicates that they “shall have full liberty to select
the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these
visits shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except
for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional
and temporary measure.”
18. Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are parties to the
Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, numerous reports continue to indicate
systematic violations of these Conventions by the Russian Federation, including
denial of access to PoWs by the ICRC and other monitoring mechanisms,
and inhumane treatment of detainees. Many Ukrainian soldiers are
currently being held by the Russian Federation in conditions that violate
international standards. Their whereabouts and treatment remain
largely unknown, raising serious concerns for their well-being and
rights.
19. The Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified and
accepted, and are therefore an extremely and uniquely powerful tool.
International humanitarian law however only works when it is fully
respected. On the other hand, it would be very complicated, given
the current international political environment, for a new tool
to be established with this same universal recognition.
4 The
situation of Ukrainian prisoners of war
20. The exact number of Ukrainian
PoWs and civilians held by the Russian Federation is currently unknown. According
to data provided by the Ukrainian authorities, over 70 000 people,
including both civilians and military personnel, are included in
the Register of Persons Missing under Special Circumstances.
Note As indicated above, thousands
of Ukrainian servicepersons are currently in Russian captivity in
186 detention facilities, both in the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. As of 6 May 2025, 4 757
Ukrainians (both PoWs and civilians) have been released from Russian
captivity since the start of the full-scale war, and 64 exchanges
of PoWs have taken place. It is worth noting that 1 358 Ukrainians
were returned from Russian captivity in 2024, and that as of May
2025, Russia was still holding over 16 000 Ukrainian civilians in
detention.
21. The ICRC, on the other hand, claimed in February 2025 to have
registered 50 000 missing people in the war, indicating that 90%
of them were servicepersons, without however providing a breakdown
of their nationalities.
Note
4.1 The
Russian violations of international humanitarian law
22. The Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy held an online hearing on 1 October 2024 with
the participation of Mr Dmytro Lubinets, Ombudsman of Ukraine, who
provided an update on the current situation of Ukrainian PoWs, also
describing the work of his Office to ensure their release and return
to their families. The Ombudsman of Ukraine is responsible for the
implementation of Point 4 of Ukraine’s Peace Formula – the release
of all prisoners and deportees. In particular, his office conducts
regular meetings of the relevant Working Group, with the active
participation of Norway, Canada and other international partners.
23. The situation described by Mr Lubinets is grim. Quoting the
Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, he said
that 95% of Ukrainian PoWs returned from captivity had testified
that they had been victims of torture and ill-treatment.
Note
24. The Russian authorities impose appalling conditions of detention
on PoWs, systematically resorting to psychological and physical
torture, which in several cases has led to long-term health consequences,
extreme weight loss (one Ukrainian soldier was recorded as having
lost 77 kilos in just five months), and death. PoWs are kept in
unhygienic conditions, in overcrowded cells, deprived of sleep,
isolated in the dark, forced to stand for long periods of time in
the cold and in their underwear, or physically exerted.
25. In many cases, they are subjected to beatings and sexual violence,
administered electric shocks, and denied medical care. Denial of
medical assistance to those in need is a recurring issue in the
testimonies of former PoWs. The United Nations Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine reported a general absence or denial
of medical care by Russian authorities to detainees who were injured,
ill, or had suffered trauma after torture. This neglect often resulted
in the deaths of detainees.
26. Mr Lubinets said that the information received from those
released from captivity indicates that the Russian Federation is
systematically violating the Third Geneva Convention relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War with regard to the right to humane
treatment (Article 13); the right to decent conditions of detention
(Articles 22, 25, 29); the right to adequate food (Article 26);
the right to an initial medical examination and adequate medical
attention (Articles 15, 20, 30, 31, 46); the right to have family
members informed about the condition and capture of prisoners of
war, as well as to receive information (Articles 48, 69, 70); the
right to decent conditions during the evacuation and transfer (Articles
20, 46 to 48); the prohibition of forcing a prisoner of war to serve
in the armed forces of an enemy State (Article 130), and others.
27. In addition, the Russian Federation does not allow representatives
of international organisations such as the ICRC or the United Nations
to visit PoWs regularly. This is a flagrant violation of the Third
Geneva Convention. Independent investigations
Note have identified at least 29 clandestine
detention facilities across Russia and temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine – none of which are accessible to the ICRC – where torture,
electrocution, starvation, and mock executions occur routinely.
28. Russia is holding Ukrainian PoWs in temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine, both in mainland areas as well as in Crimea: this is
complicating the relevant ICRC activities, and makes it impossible
for the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) monitoring mechanisms to operate. Such placement is also
often in violation of the Third Geneva Convention, which prohibits
detaining PoWs near the frontline or other dangerous zones. Satellite
images and witness testimonies confirm that Ukrainian PoWs are routed
through Crimea by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) before
being taken to the Russian Federation, also in violation of the
Third Geneva Convention’s ban on transferring PoWs without ICRC oversight.
29. Russia did not abide by the requirements of the Third Geneva
Convention expressed in Article 122, which foresees that “each of
the Parties to the conflict shall institute an official Information
Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power”. Ukraine, on the
other hand, established a National Information Bureau on 17 March
2022.
Note Russia has also failed to establish
a Mixed Medical Commission to examine wounded and sick PoWs and
make decisions on their repatriation (Article 112), whereas Ukraine
established it in August 2023.
30. Ukrainian PoWs are also subjected to arbitrary executions.
On 29 July 2022, a blast occurred in the penal colony No. 120 near
Olenivka, in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, killing at least 50
Ukrainian PoWs and injuring 151 others. To date, there has been
no proper investigation into the tragedy, as the Russian Federation has
not allowed access to the UN or other independent bodies. The Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
however, concluded that the explosion was not caused by rockets fired
by Ukraine (as claimed by the Russian Federation), and that “the
pattern of structural damage appeared consistent with a projected
ordnance having travelled on an east-to-west trajectory”.
Note
31. The testimonies of former POW who were present at Olenivka
also report that no immediate medical attention was provided to
the injured, and that several of them died in front of the penal
colony’s leadership, which did nothing to prevent this.
Note To date,
the perpetrators of the Olenivka massacre have not been punished.
32. Every month, Ukrainian POW are victims of summary executions
by Russian forces on the battlefield, after being captured and once
they are
hors de combat, and
videos of these horrific crimes are posted on social media. The
Ombudsman of Ukraine informed Amnesty International that the Prosecutor
General’s Office had documented 177 summary executions, of which
109 occurred in 2024.
Note As an example, in October
2024, drone footage allegedly showed the execution of 16 Ukrainian
POW.
Note The Office of the
Ombudsman of Ukraine is also aware of numerous cases of deaths of
POW held in captivity, as a result of torture, disease and lack
of medical attention.
33. The summary executions of Ukrainian POW by Russian forces
on the battlefield are motivated by Russian propaganda, including
anti-Ukrainian hate speech and genocidal calls, especially for what
concerns POW captured during military activities in the Kursk region
of the Russian Federation. Russia declared the military activities
in the Kursk region as so-called “counterterrorist operations”,
and
de facto denies the status of
POW to the Ukrainian servicepersons captured there, which is contrary
to the Third Geneva Convention.
Note
34. Similarly, Russia also denies the status of PoWs to approximately
50 Ukrainian citizens detained for their alleged participation in
the “Crimean Tatar Battalion”, which was, de
facto and de jure,
a “public formation for the protection of public order and the State
border” (“Asker”), as an auxiliary structure of the Kherson border detachment.
35. At least two high-profile Russian political figures publicly
called for the execution of Ukrainian PoWs. In July 2024, former
President and Deputy Chair of the Security Council Dmitri Medvedev
called for “total executions” on his Telegram channel. In October
2024, the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, publicly
stated that he had issued an order not to take Ukrainian soldiers
alive.
Note Although he later claimed
to have revoked this order, in December 2024 he threatened to use
Ukrainian PoWs as human shields against Ukrainian drones.
Note
36. Ukrainian POW are being racially discriminated against by
Russian forces: while in detention, they are strongly punished for
using the Ukrainian language, they are indoctrinated to believe
that they are “Russians”, and they are often forced to issue statements
that are subsequently submitted to public curiosity for propaganda
purposes, in violation of the Third Geneva Convention. Furthermore,
multiple former POW have testified to the use of sexual violence
and forced nudity as a means of “breaking” their identities, in
breach of Articles 13 and 17 of the Third Geneva Convention prohibiting
outrages upon personal dignity.
37. The Russian Federation also convicts and imprisons Ukrainian
POW on trumped-up charges. The Russian authorities are organising
so-called “trials” of Ukrainian POW: in total, the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation has initiated more than 4 000
criminal cases against almost 900 Ukrainians. In this regard, the
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
called on the Russian Federation authorities to immediately cease
the prosecution of captured combatants for the mere fact of having directly
participated in hostilities.
Note
38. Contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the
Russian Federation has not established special internment camps
for the detention of Ukrainian POW, who are mainly kept in the Russian
Federation’s penitentiary institutions. 186 places of detention
of Ukrainian POW and 29 places where military and civilian prisoners
are tortured and ill-treated have been identified. Furthermore,
the Russian Federation is keeping the vast majority of Ukrainian
POW in incommunicado detention, often for years at a time: this
amounts to inhuman treatment, and it is in violation of the Third
Geneva Convention.
Note
39. During a joint hearing organised on 30 January 2025 by the
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced
Persons and the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media,
members of the Assembly had the opportunity to hear from Mr Yulian
Pylypei, a Ukrainian marine and Mariupol defender, who had been held
for 2.5 years in Russian captivity. He described inhumane conditions
of detention in the several places he had been kept imprisoned by
Russia, including extremely overcrowded cells, lack of hygiene items,
spoiled food, and recurring beatings, which led to the amputation
of his leg, without proper tools nor painkillers.
4.2 Accountability
for Russian crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war
40. The information provided by
the Ombudsman of Ukraine during the hearing is consistent with various reports
issued by the OSCE/ODIHR, the OHCHR, and the UN Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The OHCHR, in particular, has
stated that it is not aware of any “prosecutions or convictions against
alleged perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment involving Ukrainian
POW by the Russian Federation”, highlighting the complete lack of
accountability for those responsible for these crimes, again in
violation of international humanitarian law.
Note
41. Overall, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on Ukraine indicated in its report distributed on 25 October 2024
that “Russian authorities have committed torture in all provinces
of Ukraine where areas have come under Russian control and in the
detention facilities investigated in the Russian Federation. This
confirms that torture has been widespread. Additional common patterns
in the way in which torture has been committed have shown that it
was systematic. These patterns concern the categories of persons
targeted, the commonality of methods employed, the aim for which
torture has been used, and the transposition of violent practices
common in Russian Federation detention facilities to similar facilities
in areas under Russian control in Ukraine”.
42. The International Commission of Inquiry therefore concluded
that “Russian authorities have acted pursuant to a policy encouraging
torture against civilians and prisoners of war and have thereby
committed torture as a crime against humanity”.
Note
43. Several issues related to the recovery of damages for released
and exchanged Ukrainian POW are still not solved. The Register of
Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine, established under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
includes a number of categories of claims eligible for recording,
which cover violations also relevant for Ukrainian PoWs. These include
serious personal injury, sexual violence, torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, deprivation of liberty, and forced labour
or service. These categories are directly applicable to PoWs, including
from the point of view of addressing injuries such as psychological
harm that is specifically included in the scope of multiple categories. Enforced
disappearance is encompassed in the category for missing close family
members. All these categories are currently open for submission
of claims. In addition, the Register has published guidance material,
including answers to the most frequently asked questions with respect
to these categories and the Register’s process in general. At the
same time, further detailed guidelines may be helpful to assist
PoWs in the submission of claims to the Register and receiving other
required support.
Note In addition, dedicated funding or
procedural support for PoWs’ claims should be envisioned, as many
returned PoWs do not have legal assistance to file their cases.
44. As the Russian Federation was excluded from Council of Europe
in March 2022, it ceased to be Party to the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) on 16 September 2022. The international proceedings
on violations of human rights of Ukrainian PoWs committed after
that date have become an extremely complicated challenge: relevant
individual petitions and applications regarding violations may now only
be addressed at the international level through various UN treaty
bodies and monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, families have reported
waiting more than 18 months for a single communication from the
UN, severely undermining timely redress.
45. The investigation of crimes against Ukrainian PoWs by Ukrainian
courts is complicated by the high overload of Ukrainian legal enforcement
units, as well as by the lack of access to perpetrators, witnesses
and places of the incidents.
46. Investigations in other Council of Europe member States exercising
universal jurisdiction are not frequent, as former Ukrainian PoWs
generally do not reside in these States, which limits opportunities
for gathering testimonies and evidence.
47. The International Criminal Court has not provided information
about cases related to PoWs in the framework of its investigations
on Russian crimes committed in Ukraine.
5 The
situation of Russian prisoners of war
48. The situation of Russian PoWs
can be documented through the direct reports of international bodies, such
as the OSCE/ODIHR and the UN, as the Ukrainian authorities allow
access to the detention centres to assess the conditions of detention
and treatment of prisoners, and to conduct interviews with them.
In addition, Russian PoWs are allowed to communicate with their
relatives, and have access to medical care.
49. These reports show that Russian PoWs are generally treated
humanely and in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention. Ukrainian
authorities and armed forces need to ensure that they keep acting
in full compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and that any violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law are promptly
and properly investigated.
50. The main legal challenges for Ukrainian authorities relate
to Russian PoWs originating from the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine, who were either conscripted and mobilised illegally
by occupational forces, or else voluntarily joined the Russian troops.
For example, in April 2025, “at least 116 servicemen from occupied
Crimea, most likely Ukrainian citizens, have been confirmed as captured”
Note as Russian PoWs.
6 Current
international efforts
51. The release of PoWs and their
exchange between parties to an armed conflict may be considered
as measures to de-escalate tensions. International organisations,
designated Protecting Powers and other countries can play an important
role in mediating the negotiations between the parties involved.
The ICRC, in particular, has a specific mandate in this regard,
as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, especially when no Protecting
Powers are designated.
52. According to the Ukrainian Ombudsman, however, the ICRC has
so far been unable to ensure compliance with the rules of international
humanitarian law with regard to PoWs. The responsibility lies with
the Russian authorities, who largely impede access to the facilities
where Ukrainian PoWs are held. The vast majority of Ukrainian PoWs
who have been released and returned to Ukraine have declared that
they were never visited by ICRC staff or other international monitoring
bodies.
Note
53. The Assembly, in its
Resolution
2573 (2024) “Missing persons, prisoners of war and civilians in
captivity as a result of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine”, has already called on the Russian Federation to
fully respect the right of access of the ICRC to all places of detention,
and has called on the international community to support and encourage
the fulfilment of this mandate.
54. The ICRC’s work is based on neutrality, which is not a moral
position but rather an operational necessity, and on confidential
dialogue. This allows it to build relationships with all the parties
involved, to find solutions, and, ultimately, to work safely in
the field, without compromising its objective of providing humanitarian
aid. For these reasons, it rarely makes one-sided condemnations
or public denunciations.
NoteResolution 2573 (2024) also calls on the ICRC to consider making an exception
to its confidentiality approach (if this does not go against the
interests of currently detained POW), in order to provide information
on the issues it is facing in gaining full access to Ukrainian POW.
55. At the end of the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension
of Ukraine's 10-Point Peace Formula, co-hosted by Canada, Ukraine
and Norway in Montreal on 30-31 October 2024, representatives of
more than 70 countries and international organisations adopted a
joint communiqué, highlighting the role of international and non-governmental
organisations with neutral, impartial and independent mandates as
effective intermediaries, as well as the valuable role of States
engaged in diplomacy and providing assistance and support services.
56. The joint communiqué also includes the Montreal Pledge, in
which the participants commit themselves to advocating for the enforcement
of the Geneva Conventions, to continuing to raise international
awareness, and to supporting ongoing efforts to identify mediating
States trusted by the parties to negotiate for the safe return of
POW.
Note
57. On 11 December 2024, the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy held a hearing with different representatives, including
from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. The members
of the committee and the invited guests discussed about the importance
of the obligation to protect while pursuing release and repatriation
operations.
58. Since the beginning of the full-scale war of aggression against
Ukraine, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has conducted
interviews with hundreds of Ukrainian POW and civilian detainees,
seeing clear patterns of violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights law. Torture is widespread and systematic.
In the Russian Federation's detention facilities, conditions are
consistently dire, dreadful, and inhumane. Deaths in custody are
regularly documented. Families often do not receive notifications
on the fate and whereabouts of individuals and regular communication
is denied.
59. Since the beginning of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression,
other countries have contributed to various exchanges of POW between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As of 6 May 2025, 64 POW exchanges
have taken place, some of them under the auspices of other countries,
such as Türkiye
Note or the United
Arab Emirates.
Note
60. Resolution 2573
(2024) also refers to these interventions and welcomes these
exchanges, while at the same time it encourages “the establishment
of a more permanent mechanism for the exchange or the release” of
PoWs, with the active involvement of the ICRC, and supporting the
idea of an “all for all” exchange, a comprehensive swap in which
both parties exchange all captured individuals – as a means of building
up mutual confidence in this matter.
61. The ICRC could support the political negotiations in several
other ways: as a neutral intermediary; by collecting and transmitting
information about PoWs, an activity already ongoing since March
2022 through its Central Tracing Agency Bureau for the international
armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine;
Note by supporting the establishment
of Mixed Medical Commissions (Ukraine established its own in August
2023, but its composition has not been endorsed by the Russian Federation);
and by supporting the identification of a Protecting Power: several
attempts have been made by Ukraine in this sense, but so far in vain,
due to the refusal of the Russian Federation.
62. A co-ordinated push for the exchange of PoWs could lead to
arrangements for their accommodation in neutral countries. While
there is not much previous experience of a mechanism of other States
hosting PoWs, the ICRC could provide its legal and protection expertise,
to build, together with the concerned parties, such mechanism.
7 Conclusions
63. This report is intended to
raise international awareness of the situation of Ukrainian PoWs
held by the Russian Federation and to encourage active action to
ensure their decent treatment and respect for their rights.
64. The Assembly should stand in solidarity with all PoWs, their
families and loved ones, and call upon the international community
to work to ensure that their rights and dignity are fully respected
and upheld.
65. The role of international humanitarian and monitoring bodies,
such as the ICRC, the OHCHR and the OSCE/ODIHR has to be acknowledged,
and their activities must be supported. ICRC, in particular, should
be granted access to all facilities where PoWs are detained, and
should be allowed to hold confidential interviews with them.
66. The international community needs to increase political and
diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation, so that it fully
complies with the Third Geneva Convention and engages in good faith
in the release and exchange of all Ukrainian PoWs.
67. Furthermore, political negotiations should be supported among
the concerned parties, in order to facilitate such exchanges and
possibly establish a structured and permanent mechanism, allowing
for the regular release and exchange of all PoWs, with special attention
to the seriously wounded and sick.
