Use of the provisional reference "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" at the Council of Europe
Information report
| Doc. 11524
| 08 February 2008
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Pedro AGRAMUNT,
Spain, EPP/CD
- Thesaurus
Summary
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is not a name.
It is a provisional reference created in 1993 for the specific use
of the United Nations, pending resolution of the dispute which pits
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” against Greece over
the use of the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia”. Later, the
United Nations provisional reference was adopted by other international
organisations, including the Council of Europe, pending a solution
of the dispute.
This information report tries to illustrate the positions
of the two parties as regards the name issue and the state of the
negotiations to achieve a solution. It concludes that this dispute,
which is often trivialised by those who are not directly concerned,
raises many matters on which the Parliamentary Assembly should focus
its attention, such as the concepts of nationhood and national minority;
the rise of nationalism; the interpretation and manipulation of
history for political purposes and the teaching of history.
1 Introduction
1. “The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia” is not a name. It is a provisional reference created
in 1993 for the specific use of the United Nations, pending resolution
of the dispute arising from the constitutional name “Republic of
Macedonia”, which this country chose for itself upon becoming independent.
Later this provisional reference, initially intended for use by
the United Nations, was adopted by other international organisations, including
the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This dispute pits “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” against Greece.
2. To my knowledge, it is the first time in history that the
choice of a name has created a bilateral dispute. The only European
examples which occur to me which could have created a similar case
are that of Luxembourg, which is the name of a sovereign state as
well as the name of a province in Belgium, and that of Moldova,
which is a sovereign state as well as a region in Romania. The similarities,
however, stop there, because as far as I know there is no political
contention concerning the use of those names.
3. The dispute between Greece and “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, instead, is a very heated one, and is strongly felt
by the populations of both countries. It is also very long lasting:
over fifteen years.
4. It should be very clear from the outset that the dispute over
the use of the name “Macedonia” is in no way an attempt to call
into question the existence of “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” as a sovereign state. For a young independent state,
however, the name is of great importance in the context of the consolidation
of its standing in international relations and of its own sense
of national identity.
5. The vast majority of states having diplomatic relations with
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” recognise it under its
constitutional name, either de jure or
de facto. This now applies to 115 states, including (in Europe)
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey.
Within multilateral organisations, however, even those states still
use the conventional, provisional title.
6. Other states, including most members of the European Union,
recognise it under the name “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,
even if, as in Germany and Italy, there have sometimes been parliamentary initiatives
calling for a change.
2 The position of the countries
concerned on the name issue
7. I will try to describe the
position of the parties to this dispute, as explained to me during
my visit in October and November 2007.
2.1 Greece
8. Usurpation
of Greece’s cultural and historical legacy. Greece considers
the use of the constitutional name “Macedonia” as usurpation of
a name belonging to Greek history and heritage, which, moreover,
have nothing to do with the culture and legacy of the current inhabitants
of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, who are descended
from Slavs that settled in the region in the 6th century, long after
the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia. The Macedonians of the Kingdom
of Macedonia, instead, were Greeks, who spoke Greek and took part
in the Olympic Games, which was a prerogative of Greeks and denied
to all foreigners.
9. For Greece, this historical clarification is crucial, since
the name issue is only the tip of the iceberg: in its opinion, the
authorities of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” are engaging
in a very dangerous exercise of rewriting history, which – more
or less deliberately – encourages their citizens to believe they
are descendants of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia, that is, of
a non-Greek Macedonian ethnic group that settled in the region before
the Slavs arrived. This rewriting of history extends to provocative
gestures, such as the Gruevski government’s decision to rename Skopje
airport “Alexander the Great” in 2007, and numerous other initiatives
which started with independence and have come thick and fast since
1997. Moreover, Greece considers “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” responsible for failing to discourage acts by private entities
or individuals which could result in animosity, hostility and violence,
including abroad.
10. Risk of leading to territorial
claims. For Greece, the ultimate risk in this type of
process is that of opening the door to future territorial claims.
It is well aware that “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
introduced constitutional amendments in 1992, explicitly renouncing
all territorial claims against its neighbours. However, in its view,
obfuscating certain historical facts, or even manipulating them
in school or military contexts, may well spark a spirit of revenge
among the general public. For example, Greece points out that many
of the history and geography books
Note used in schools and military academies
treat “Macedonia” as a single ethnic and geographical entity. Part
of that entity is said to have been partitioned between several
states in the region – including Greece – which implies full-scale
foreign occupation.
11. Obviously, any suggestion of “occupation” may well provoke
irredentist reactions – not necessarily now, but perhaps in the
future. During my visit, I was shown a documentary filmed in Skopje’s
schools, which, the Greek authorities claim, is proof of the confusion
surrounding “Macedonia’s” ethnic and geographical borders, not just
among pupils, but also among teachers.
Note In an unstable
and volatile region like the Balkans, the risk of dangerous developments
should not be underestimated, especially when ethnic and territorial
issues are involved.
12. Risk of confusion with the Greek
region of Macedonia. In addition, Greece argues that
the use of the name “Macedonia” for its northern neighbour creates
a risk of confusion with the Greek region of Macedonia and may bring
about prejudice to exports of products from this region.
2.2 “The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”
13. National
identity. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
is a newly-independent state, engaged in the process of consolidating
its democratic institutions and overcoming possible ethnic tensions
through the reinforcement of a sense of civic citizenship among
its population. Over time, not only have its borders varied considerably
but also its very existence has had no continuity, even as a non-independent
political entity, having been completely wiped off Europe’s map
after the Second Balkan War and incorporated by its neighbours.
The existence of a “Macedonian” language is questioned by other
Slavic countries, and so is the existence of a “Macedonian” ethnicity.
Even the independence of the “Macedonian” Orthodox Church is not consensually
accepted.
14. Against this background, it is clear that the recognition
of its constitutional name has for “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia” a crucial meaning: it would be the recognition of
its international legitimacy as a state and a nation with its own
language and heritage. Internally, recognition of the country’s
constitutional name would help to consolidate its national identity.
It must also be stressed that, during my visit, both ethnic Macedonian
and ethnic Albanian members of parliament expressed the same views
on the name issue.
15. Greek opposition to use of the constitutional name is artificial,
and motivated by a desire to deny the existence of a Macedonian
minority in Greece. The basic point is that every country is entitled
to the name it chooses. Greece never opposed use of the name “Macedonia”,
when the latter was one of the six federal entities that made up
Yugoslavia (1944-91) – but the problem arose when it became independent.
This change of attitude is disappointing since Greece, as the new
state’s neighbour, should have been one of the first to recognise
it; on the other hand, it may reflect a simple refusal to recognise
the existence of a “Macedonian” nation, and thus the presence of
a “Macedonian” minority on Greek territory. This is why Greece rejects
the constitutional name – which expresses nationality – but would
be prepared to accept a geographical name, such as “Upper Macedonia”.
Note
16. This is also the position of the “Rainbow Party” in Greece,
which claims to represent the interests of the country’s “Macedonian”
minority. This party – which decided not to take part in the last
parliamentary elections, and which in the previous ones obtained
only marginal support – stresses that the concept of “nation” promoted for
centuries by the Greek state sees today’s Greeks as an ethnically
homogeneous nation, and Ancient Greece’s only descendants.
Note It claims that, shortly
after “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” became independent,
the Greek authorities started renaming ministries (the Ministry
of Northern Greece became the “Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace”),
airports (Thessaloníki airport became “Thessaloníki-Macedonia” airport), etc.,
in order to strengthen the idea that use of the name “Macedonia”
was a Greek monopoly. In fact, there is documentary proof that there
was a “Macedonian” language in Greece – and thus a community which
spoke it – even before 1945.
Note
17. Moreover, the Skopje authorities dismiss fears that recognising
the country by its constitutional name might legitimise territorial
claims as groundless: this has not only been ruled out by the various
amendments to the constitution, but also runs contrary to the foreign
policy of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, which aims
at integration within the Euro-Atlantic structures in a peaceful
and co-operative spirit. According to Skopje, even the Badinter
Commission acknowledged that no hostile intent underlay the choice
of the constitutional name.
Note
18. Use of a reference or acronym is offensive. Skopje argues
that using a provisional reference to denote a sovereign state or,
even worse, the acronym FYROM is disrespectful.
3 Attempts to resolve the
dispute
3.1 Chronology
19. The UN has initiated a mediation
process to help resolve the dispute. The following are the main
steps taken so far:
7 April 1993
The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopts Resolution 817 (1993),
which:
- urges the parties to
the dispute to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia (Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen), in order to reach a speedy
settlement of their difference; and
- asks the UN Secretary-General to draft a report for submission
to the UNSC and recommends to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) the
admission of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, with such
a provisional reference “pending settlement of the dispute that
has arisen over the name of the state”.
8 April 1993
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” joins the United
Nations.
May 1993
Cyrus Vance, who in the meantime has been appointed Personal
Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, proposes the name “Nova Makedonija”.
This proposal is rejected by both parties.
18 June 1993
The UNSC adopts Resolution 845 (1993), which urges the parties
to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General.
13 September 1995
The parties conclude an interim accord, under which terms:
- they mutually recognise one
another;
- Greece lifts the embargo (which has been in force since
1994);
- “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” relinquishes
the flag with the motif of the ancient Star of Vergina, the symbol
of the Kings of Macedonia.
The following provisions of the accord, which is still in
force, should be mentioned:
- Article
6, which refers to the constitution of “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia” and makes it clear that nothing in that text must
be interpreted as legitimising territorial claims against neighbouring countries
or interference in their internal affairs;
- Article 7, which requires the parties to prohibit all
hostile action or propaganda by state-controlled agencies, and discourage
similar activities by private entities;
- Article 11, which allows Greece to object to the “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s” being admitted to, or being
a member of, any international organisation which refers to it by
another name;
- Article 21, which stipulates that the dispute concerning
the name must be resolved by political negotiation only, and may
not be referred to the International Court of Justice or settled
by other peaceful means.
21 December 1999
Following Cyrus Vance’s resignation, Matthew Nimetz is appointed
as Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General. Talks under his mediation
result in Athens dropping its demand that Skopje may not use the
name “Macedonia” in any form, in favour of a compound name like
“Upper Macedonia”; on its part, Skopje says it is ready to accept
a compound name in its relations with Greece but continues to demand
recognition of its constitutional name in both multilateral and
other bilateral relations.
March 2004
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” applies for EU
membership.
2005
Matthew Nimetz proposes the name “Republika Makedonija – Skopje”.
Greece does not accept the proposal but considers it as a basis
for constructive negotiations; “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” rejects the proposal and puts forward instead a double
formula where the international community would use “Republic of
Macedonia” and Greece use “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
October 2005
Matthew Nimetz launches a second proposal: “Republika Makedonija”,
in the Latin alphabet for international institutions and organisations.
Greece could use “Republika Makedonija – Skopje”. Macedonia finds
the proposal a good basis for solving the dispute while Greece rejects
the proposal.
December 2007
Matthew Nimetz visits both countries to relaunch the negotiations,
this time without making any prior proposals. Until now, no agreement
has been reached.
3.2 Scope of the negotiations
20. It is even more a matter of
concern that the two parties disagree on the scope of the negotiations:
Athens holds that once a mutually agreed name is found, it should
be accepted by all the UN states on the grounds that the very referral
of the issue to the UN Security Council proves that it is an issue
of international concern, and that Resolution 817 (1993) states
that this issue must be resolved in the interest of maintenance
of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region. In its
opinion, it is clear that if “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
had been admitted in the United Nations under a provisional name
pending a solution of the dispute, after a solution is found the
new name should be used. Skopje, instead, is prepared to accept the
name resulting from the negotiations in its relations with Greece,
but still demands that its constitutional name be recognised, both
in its multilateral and in its other bilateral relations.
3.3 Attitudes and constraints
of the parties
21. The impression that the UN
negotiations produced no result is not entirely accurate: while
Greece initially opposed even inclusion of the term “Macedonia”
in the new state’s name, it did eventually accept it as part of a
composite name. For its part, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
relinquished the flag it had chosen on independence, and amended
its constitution to allay Greek concerns.
22. That said, the chances of the negotiations’ succeeding appear,
so far, to be limited: in Greece, several surveys
Note have led the government to conclude
that public opinion would accept no further compromise, beyond acceptance
of the name “Macedonia” as part of a composite name. To understand
the political importance of the whole name issue, one needs to remember
that Greek Macedonia has a population of about 2 million (much the
same as that of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, that
is to say, 2.1 million) – which gives it considerable weight in
parliament, and corresponding influence on the stability of any
government (especially the current one, which has a very slim majority
and a prime minister of Macedonian origin).
23. The Greek authorities believe that “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia” is not prepared to accept any compromise on the name
issue, and is not fully committed to the negotiations. This, they
say, is even contrary to the values underlying the European process,
joining in which is one of Skopje’s priorities. On the other hand,
they point out, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” has
made considerable diplomatic efforts to obtain secure recognition
of its constitutional name at bilateral level. In this connection,
American recognition of the constitutional name in 2004 – according
to Greece, the price of military support in Iraq and involvement
in the unlawful inter-state transfer of detainees
Note – allegedly made Skopje more intransigent
on the name issue. American recognition is even more striking when
set against the words of Secretary of State Stettinius in 1944:
“This government considers talk of ‘Macedonian Nation’ … to be unjustified
demagoguery representing no ethnic or political reality”.
24. For its part, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
rejects Greece’s version of the reasons for American recognition
of its constitutional name, and points out that the terms of the
interim accord do not prevent it from seeking such recognition on
a bilateral basis. Moreover, the fact that numerous states have recognised
it under its constitutional name shows, in its view, that this is
a problem only for Greece, which has made it a unilateral issue.
Indeed, when the number of recognising states reaches two thirds
of the UN’s membership, the possibility of a general assembly resolution
recognising the constitutional name cannot be ruled out.
4 Consequences of the dispute
4.1 On bilateral relations
25. Despite high passion on the
two sides of the border, the dispute on the name issue has not as
yet seriously affected bilateral co-operation and the two countries
deal pragmatically with each other. After the end of the commercial
embargo in 1995, Greece has become one of the main foreign economic
partners and investors for its northern neighbour, to such an extent
that it is currently its third biggest trading partner and the first
foreign investor. According to the Greek Foreign Minister, it is
estimated that Greek investment has helped to create 20 000 jobs
in “the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. Moreover, Greece
is the main regional investor in EU projects aimed at reconstruction
of the Balkans’ economy and infrastructure. According to Ms Bakoyannis,
if tension over the name issue increased, the pressure of public
opinion would make it hard to maintain this high level of financial
commitment.
26. Among the consequences of the dispute, however, are the limited
diplomatic relations between the two countries.
4.2 In the multilateral context
27. So far the name dispute has
not prevented the accession of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
to a number of international organisations of which Greece is also
a member and in which the UN provisional reference is used. “The
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, however, is very well aware
that the unresolved dispute could create obstacles or delays to
its current policy priorities such as NATO and above all EU membership
aspirations.
28. This seems to be confirmed by several statements by high-ranking
Greek representatives, including the Greek Foreign Minister, Dora
Bakoyannis, who said that “... the Hellenic Parliament, under any
composition, will not ratify the accession of the neighbouring country
to the EU and NATO if the name issue is not resolved beforehand”.
Note This question may arise in the very
near future as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is likely
to be invited, in April 2008, to join NATO.
29. The EU, for its part, has clearly stated that it will not
play a role in the name issue and that “renewed efforts are needed,
with a constructive approach, to find a negotiated and mutually
acceptable solution …, under the auspices of the UN, within the
framework of UN Security Council Resolutions (EEC) No. 817/93 and (EEC)
No. 845/93, thereby contributing to regional cooperation and good
neighbourly relations”.
Note
5 The use of the reference
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” by the Council of Europe
30. The motion for a recommendation
Note which
originated this report describes in full detail how the Council of
Europe decided to adopt the reference “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, as well as the various statements by Parliamentary
Assembly members in favour of a change of this decision:
- Resolution (95) 23 adopted by
the Committee of Ministers on 19 October 1995 invites the concerned state
to become a member of the Council of Europe and emphasises that
it will be “provisionally referred to as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia’”;
- although a number of Parliamentary Assembly members, including
rapporteurs, have expressed themselves in favour of a change of
the name policy by the Council of Europe, this has always been done
in memoranda or proposed amendments, which, respectively, are either
not binding on the Assembly, or have been rejected in the plenary.
31. I should recall that according to the motion originating this
report, the Assembly should take the initiative and propose that
the Council of Europe adopt for the country concerned its constitutional
name, also in light of:
- the
long duration of the dispute, which is going well beyond the common
meaning of “provisional”;
- the fact that the word “Yugoslavia” no longer refers to
any existing entity; and
- the principles of the Council of Europe, which should
guarantee the freedom of citizens, and consequently of their states,
to express and affirm their identity.
6 Conclusions
32. The name issue is often underestimated,
trivialised and misunderstood. Perhaps also due to the length of
the controversy, it has led to a certain fatigue in those who are
not directly affected, with the result that the two sides’ motives,
and the state of the negotiations, are not fully grasped. I am sure
few people realise that Greece is prepared to accept the name “Macedonia”,
but only as part of a composite name. Similarly, few know that the
country’s constitutional name has been recognised by 115 states
at bilateral level, including a small number in Europe. Even fewer
are aware that the parties disagree on the scope of the negotiations.
33. Having given this matter careful thought, I do not wish to
recommend that the Assembly propose to the Committee of Ministers
that it adopt the constitutional name to refer to “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”. This might create a situation in which one
Council of Europe member state – Greece – might question another’s
membership of our Organisation on the basis of the interim accord.
In my opinion, it would also constitute interference by our Organisation
in a dispute which should be resolved within the political process
already undertaken.
34. The name issue conceals many other matters which, in a difficult
regional context, are far more complicated, namely:
- the concepts of nationhood and
national minority, and application of these concepts;
- the rise of nationalism;
- the interpretation and manipulation of history for political
purposes;
- the teaching of history.
35. I believe that these are the issues on which the Council of
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly should instead focus its attention.
