B Explanatory
memorandum by Lord Prescott, rapporteur
1 Introduction
and background: where do we stand?
1. Climate change is one of the greatest threats our
society is facing in the 21st century. The battle against climate
change and natural resource degradation compels us to think and
act together beyond our conventional boundaries.
Note This
battle is just as paramount as our efforts to agree on the new action
framework for the Millennium Development Goals beyond 2015. Our
success, or failure, will determine the type of world we leave for
future generations.
2. If we get it right, we will not only safeguard our planet’s
resources for the future, but also create huge new economic opportunities.
We could thus pursue sustainable growth, lifting millions of people
out of poverty. And, we could create hundreds of thousands of high-quality
jobs in new businesses competing in a low-carbon, resource-efficient
global economy.
3. But if we fail, the disruption to the global climate and environment
will be unprecedented. Mass movements of population and conflict
over depleted resources will likely be commonplace, notably in the poorest
parts of the world. The existing obstacles to development – such
as water scarcity, agricultural limitations and poor health – will
become too costly and difficult to overcome. Glaciers will melt,
affecting the fresh water supply to millions of human beings, and
sea levels will rise, threatening low-lying and coastal habitats
including many big cities. Extreme weather events will become more
common and more frequent, leading to destroyed lives and damaged
economies. All these effects will hit the poorest hardest.
4. Against this background and these frightening prospects, the
United Nations climate change negotiations are among the most complex
international talks ever undertaken. Tackling climate change has profound
implications for our economy and energy use, for our environment
and for politics. It raises questions of responsibility and equity,
as well as technology and finance. And it requires commitments from
every country in the world. But most importantly, our action must
be reconciled with the need for sustainable growth. Without serious
global commitment to reduce greenhouse gases, climate change would
exceed the capacity of natural and human systems to adapt.
5. The Kyoto Protocol, agreed in 1997 and in force from 2005,
set specific emissions reduction targets for industrialised countries
for the 2008-2012 period as recommended by experts. Agreed in 2009,
the non-binding Copenhagen Accord recognised the need to limit temperature
rise in this century to below 2°C. Most scientists warn that beyond
this threshold climate change will become dangerous, with irreversible
and potentially catastrophic environmental changes and attendant
socio-economic consequences. They consider that a reduction of global
greenhouse gas emissions
Note of
50% to 85% from 1990 levels is necessary by 2050. Given the significant
time delay between the release of emissions and temperature rise,
the window of opportunity to achieve a reduction of this scale is
closing fast.
6. Under the Durban Platform, approved in 2011, countries agreed
to start negotiations on a new international agreement “with legal
force” to be effective in 2020, with talks to be completed by 2015.
Even though the Kyoto Protocol has been extended to a second commitment
period from 2013 to 2020, most major economies have not yet made
any specific commitments and some even withdrew from the process
(Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia).
Note It is now clear
that international negotiations alone will not suffice and that key
countries have to help create the political conditions for a global
deal by acting at home, for example by adopting relevant domestic
legislation.
7. This report will set out a vision for what a new global agreement
on climate change should look like and will make some recommendations
to both governments and parliaments about priorities for action
between now and 2015. We shall first look at why action on climate
change is necessary, then see how it could be achieved and finally
propose the key elements of the desired outcome.
2 Global
risks for human well-being
8. When the first warning about global climate warming
due to human activities was issued thirty-five years ago, we were
struck by the extent and speed of the changes occurring on our planet.
Note It
has since become increasingly clear that our natural world is no
longer able to provide enough resources and CO2 absorption capacity
to sustain the prevalent economic model, much less so to allow it
to continue growing. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) presented evidence that man-made emissions of CO2 far exceeded
the natural range of the last 650 000 years. According to the Panel’s
most recent report, “[e]ach of the last three decades has been successively
warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850”.
Note Several major boomerang
effects are to be expected on our living environment: they concern
natural resources, economic activities and the living space of the
population.
2.1 Risks to natural
capital
9. Nature’s riches – such as soil, forests, water and
biodiversity – constitute ecosystems with precious common assets
which provide value for people and the economy.
Note These resources ensure benefits
ranging from crops, animals and water supply to food security, climate
regulation, health and protection from natural hazards. In providing
these vital services and goods, nature delivers what is understood
as “natural capital”.
10. In much the same way that investors use financial capital
to generate profits, natural capital yields a flow of valuable ecosystem
services. Failing to account for the depreciation of natural capital
can lead to an overestimate of net national wealth, income and well-being.
Natural capital is however typically ignored by conventional government
accounts and given a default value of zero. This is despite its
potential to influence economic performance and prosperity by exposing
a nation to a wide range of risks and opportunities. One such risk
is that an erosion of nature’s capacity to deliver ecosystem goods
and services acts as a break on progress and development.
11. This connection can potentially lead to a spiral of conflicts
and insecurity, especially in regions – such as some areas in Africa
– having suffered from recent ethnic or political conflict and relying
on climate-dependent sectors, notably rain-fed agriculture.
Note The
United Nations General Assembly recognised the relation between climate
change impacts on natural capital and possible security risks. It
therefore qualifies climate change as a “threat multiplier”. By
affecting water resources, food security, health, habitats and other
important factors, climate change can also trigger political instability
and conflicts over resources.
12. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Note – a synthesis by over 1 300 scientists
from 95 countries that was initiated by the United Nations and published
in 2005 – gauged the consequences of ecosystem change for human
well-being. The findings show that human activity over the last
fifty years has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible
loss of biodiversity. If many of these changes have brought net
gains in human well-being and economic development, they have been
achieved at the cost of the degradation of our environment. About
60% of the ecosystem services examined in the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment are being degraded or used unsustainably, notably fresh
water supply, fisheries, air and water purification, as well as
the regulation of regional and local climate, natural hazards, diseases
and pests.
13. Climate change is one of the most significant drivers of this
process, alongside habitat degradation (due to massive changes in
the use of land and water courses), overexploitation, invasive alien
species and pollution. Climate change is leading to more frequent
severe weather events and alteration in rainfall patterns, with
implications for agriculture, flood control and the migration of
humans, species and diseases. Our natural world is thus under enormous
pressure and its resilience is diminishing. The balance of scientific
evidence suggests that there will be much net harm in ecosystem
services worldwide if the global mean surface temperature increases
more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels or at rates greater than
0.2°C per decade.
14. An international climate change agreement in 2015 must recognise
risks to the environment and sustainable development and highlight
the need to better value natural capital in the pursuit of the objectives set
out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Moreover, the value of natural capital has to be better integrated
into national accounts so as to allow governments to identify, reduce
and mitigate development risks linked to the depletion of natural
resources, as well as reaping opportunities from the protection
and restoration of the natural environment.
2.2 The risk of the
“carbon bubble”?
15. Recent scientific findings warn us about the issue
of the so-called “carbon bubble” – a notion based on the assumption
that there is a finite limit to the atmospheric space for greenhouse
gases while still ensuring that warming does not exceed 2°C. This
issue of the bubble arises because the combined proven oil, gas
and coal reserves currently on the balance sheets of energy companies
will produce far more carbon dioxide emissions when consumed than
this finite limit.
16. Studies by the Potsdam Institute for Climate impact Research
in Germany suggest that to reduce the probability of exceeding 2°C
warming by 20%, the global carbon allowance between 2000 and 2050
is 886 gigatonnes of CO2. However, by 2011,
over one third of this had already been emitted, leaving only 565 gigatonnes
of CO2 in the global “carbon budget” for
the next four decades. Yet the total potential emissions from burning
the world’s proven fossil fuel reserves are a staggering 2 795 gigatonnes
of CO2. Thus only one-fifth of the total
reserves could be used unmitigated.
17. The IPCC report of 27 September 2013 endorsed a world “carbon
budget” saying that no more than 1 trillion tons of carbon could
be burned and CO2 released into the atmosphere.
Half of that amount has already been used up and the ceiling on
global emissions might be reached by 2040. The United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) Emissions Gap Report of 5 November 2013 underlines that no
more than 44 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent
could be released by 2020 so as to respect the 2°C target and set
the stage for further cuts needed.
18. Investors are fearing a financial bubble if the value of energy
companies shrinks due to climate-related action, since the estimated
global carbon budget could be used up even earlier – in just 16
years.
Note Energy companies continue exploration
and development of fossil fuel reserves, which is adding new fossil
resources into the balance and hence escalates the likelihood that
climate objectives will be missed. A global climate change agreement
in 2015 must take this systemic risk into account and include proposals
for the G20 to support more strongly a shift towards a green economy.
2.3 Climate refugees:
where is the refuge?
19. Humanity’s ecological footprint is increasingly visible
and its effects translate into growing numbers of environmental,
or climate, refugees. Voices from the developing world, in particular
small insular States,
Note are seriously
worried about the viability of human habitats on their territory
which will go under water if oceans continue to warm. Indeed, the
IPCC’s Working Group I report of 27 September 2013 confirms that
ocean warming dominates the climate system and represents over 90%
of the energy cumulated in the global system between 1971 and 2010;
even if emission levels stabilise or stop, global warming effects
will persist for several centuries.
20. In its
Resolution
1655 (2009) “Environmentally induced migration and displacement:
a 21st century challenge”, the Assembly noted that “over 30 million
people worldwide are displaced because of the increase in desertification,
droughts, rising sea levels … and extreme weather events” that are
all exacerbated by climate change. The United Nations estimates
that there could be at least 250 million climate refugees by 2050. It
appears that the world’s poorest regions, which have contributed
the least to the global warming, will be the main source of climate
refugees.
21. Our legal and humanitarian systems at both national and international
levels are ill-adapted to deal with the challenge. To avoid human
tragedies, developed countries, including in Europe, will have to
activate solidarity and resettlement mechanisms. As the Council
of Europe Human Rights Commissioner has pointed out, “[w]ith the
growing awareness of the harms caused by climate change it will
be necessary to clarify in further depth the obligations that must
be connected to the right to a healthy environment”.
Note Mary Robinson, the former United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, was also alarmed at
the collective failure to grasp the scale and the urgency of the
problem, as climate change reveals “countless weaknesses” in the existing
institutional architecture concerning human rights protection.
3 The need for a
new international agreement and national action
22. The clock is ticking and the cost of inaction is
growing. “Business as usual” is no longer a path to follow. Politicians
worldwide must rise up to the challenge and act so as not to steal
prosperity from future generations. We have the basis for action
if we build on the Durban Platform and institutional proposals concerning
green growth from bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), the UNEP and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), to mention just a few. National action, unlike
in the past, should feature more prominently in paving the way for
a new international agreement.
3.1 Implications of
the Durban Platform for action
23. The Durban Platform
Note represents
an important milestone in the history of international climate negotiations.
The explicit goal of “ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts
by all Parties” is a significant departure from negotiations on
the Kyoto Protocol which excluded the possibility of any commitments
for developing countries. The Durban Platform thus replaced the
long-standing division of the world into countries with ambitious
responsibilities and those with none. Yet reaching an agreement
that covers all countries while respecting the different circumstances
in each nation will be hugely challenging.
24. However, considering that the Durban Platform provides only
a very general framework for negotiators, a number of key questions
remain open as regards:
- legal
aspects – it is not clear what form an “outcome with legal force”
could take, nor how the notion “agreed outcome with legal force”
should be interpreted;
- the structure of the agreement remains to be defined either
as a single deal or multiple agreements, some being mandatory and
others optional. Some countries would prefer a centralised or “top
down” agreement, while others would prefer the opposite. Negotiators
need to take inspiration from both approaches;
- contents: the negotiations should address “mitigation,
adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency
of action, and support and capacity-building” but does not specify
how these issues should be addressed, nor that they should be part
of the final outcome.
3.2 Factors influencing
negotiating positions
25. Negotiating an international climate change agreement
is a dynamic process, particularly when talks span many years. Negotiators
are no doubt influenced by the state of the global and national
economy, their interpretation of lessons from the Kyoto Protocol
and their view on science, as well as perceptions of fairness, beliefs
about intergenerational equity and domestic political processes
and interests. Moreover, in recent years, we have seen a marked
shift in the dynamics of the climate change debate, notably in developing countries.
Key factors that influence negotiating positions and their relative
importance vary from country to country.
26. National interest, or a perceived national interest, is an
overriding factor. Debates in the run-up to 2015 are likely to be
heated and no political leader will compromise his or her citizens’
prosperity for the sake of the global good, unless the proposed
agreement is seen as fair. National interest
Note can include a domestic assessment
of systemic climate risks and impacts for a given country as regards
the health sector, food security and energy use. Higher vulnerability
is likely to result in more co-operative behaviour and a more ambitious
negotiating position, but will not suffice to foster a global consensus.
27. Public and parliamentary opinion about the perceived risks
of climate change is also important, notably relative to other domestic
challenges. Carbon intensity
Note of the economy
also matters, in particular the assessment of impact-costs-benefits
to the economy from reducing emissions. The political influence
of high carbon-emitting industries should not be underestimated,
such as when these industries are significant players in terms of
exports or employment.
28. We also have to bear in mind opportunities relating to the
climate change agenda. This includes, for example, the extent to
which mitigation action will benefit the country via new commercial
opportunities related to green energy, goods and services, as well
as development aid and climate finance when appropriate. The growth
in green investment and the emergence of climate-friendly economic
models are helping to demonstrate the huge industrial opportunities
to countries that are willing to engage in this direction.
29. Competitiveness is another key factor, particularly in times
of economic hardship which today absorbs much attention of politicians.
The likelihood of continued economic difficulties in developed countries
could lower political confidence and undermine the financial capacity
needed to deliver an international agreement. At the same time,
the crisis does provide a chance to reassess our policies, systemic
risks and opportunities for better quality, “greener” growth. It
is crucial to convincingly demonstrate that low-carbon growth is
not only possible and affordable, but that it is the only path to
sustainable long-term growth.
30. The positions of key trading partners and competitors could
also have a big influence on a country’s negotiating position. For
example, Canada’s position has, to date, been closely aligned to
the United States, with whom it has strong economic ties. Similarly,
South Korea’s framework for Low Carbon Green Growth legislation
was driven, at least in part, by the risk that US climate legislation
could impose import tariffs on countries considered by the Congress
as not to be pulling their weight.
Note Some
of the US federal States have taken positive climate protection
initiatives: California, for instance, launched, in January 2013,
a cap-and-trade scheme (the world’s largest after the European Union)
for big emitters of greenhouse gases, which others, such as Quebec
in Canada, are planning to join.
31. Peers and negotiating groups are of great importance, because
countries tend to negotiate in groups. For example, developing countries
co-ordinate positions and negotiate as the G-77 plus China, while
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) goes further and promotes
high collective ambition, given these countries’ shared extreme
vulnerability to climate change impacts. The so-called Umbrella
Group is a club of non-EU developed countries that loosely co-ordinates
positions, and the EU countries negotiate as one block. It follows,
therefore, that the position of the most economically powerful countries
in a group will influence the overall group position. However, as
developing countries grow and diverge, their unity is crumbling
within the G-77 plus China group, while the voice of AOSIS and the
African Union is getting stronger. When interests diverge too much,
new alliances can be formed.
32. Reputation and leadership issues also matter. How a country
wishes to be viewed on the international stage may drive some countries
to take on relatively ambitious stances at the negotiation table.
Mexico, for instance, stands out as a regional leader and has taken
on a relatively progressive and coherent position both domestically
and internationally. Similarly, the Least Developed Countries (LDC)
group has recently enhanced its strategy so as to be seen as more
of a leader.
3.3 The role of national
action and legislation
33. The pace of international climate negotiations so
far has been painfully slow and inconsistent with the response that
the scientific evidence demands. Whilst the 18th Conference of Parties
in Doha in 2012 achieved the modest outcomes that were expected,
the difficulties encountered suggest that there will be many challenges
ahead of 2015, with much more difficult decisions to be taken.
34. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
alone cannot drive the politics of ambition. Instead it must capture
the outcome of political discussions held in other international
fora and nationally. At the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development in June 2012 (Rio+20), the Deputy Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom (and the head of the British delegation) noted
that it was the initiatives outside of the governmental process
which generated real momentum.
35. The same is true of the climate change negotiations: the Conference
of Parties cannot drive the change alone. The annual meetings are
benchmarks that merely reflect change being driven elsewhere. If
we are to secure an agreement in 2015, governments will need to
deploy their political skills very differently over the next two
years, with a much greater focus on practical bilateral co-operation
with key countries. They will have to support national climate legislation
in parallel to the negotiations in order to create the political
conditions for success.
36. National legislation on climate change has traditionally followed
after an international agreement was reached so as to support implementation.
Yet, it is now clear that advancing national legislation helps create the
conditions that enable a global deal to be reached. This view is
fully shared by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Ms Christiana Figueres, who deems
domestic legislation on climate as the “absolutely critical, essential,
linchpin between action at the national level and international
agreements”.
Note She makes clear that the negotiations
under the Durban Platform will not succeed if the political conditions
are not ripe in key countries.
37. National climate action is triggered by a better understanding
of risks associated with climate change and the potential benefits
of taking action. The main benefits include increased resource efficiency,
which leads to lower costs and increased competitiveness, and stronger
energy security through more diversified supplies, away from fossil
fuels. We can also enjoy improved air quality as a result of cleaner,
better performing transports and secure early mover advantage in
embracing green technologies of tomorrow. All these benefits show
that rationalising energy use and incentivising domestic sustainable
production is not only possible, but also strategically valuable.
38. In fact, competitiveness and confidence are two main reasons
that explain why national action has a positive influence on international
talks. Indeed, countries that do not adequately price pollution
and emissions are effectively subsidising “dirty” industries by
not requiring them to pay the environmental costs. If, on the contrary,
a country takes action to price carbon and invest in green economy,
it will be motivated to encourage others to follow the suit so as
to reduce impacts from competition and develop comparative advantage. Domestic
legislation creates the political space for leaders to go further
and faster in the international negotiations, whilst their populations
begin to experience the benefits of energy security, efficiency
and resilience, together with a cleaner environment and reduced
vulnerability to price shocks.
39. The perceived unfairness in the implied allocation of emissions’
reduction action across countries still undermines the willingness
of many large economies (both developed and emerging ones) to make international
commitments. However, what is exciting about the current climate
negotiations is that many countries around the world are doing more
to tackle climate change domestically than their governments are willing
to sign up to internationally. This progress needs to be harnessed
at the international level as a way of facilitating a global agreement.
40. Successive failures to negotiate a legally binding agreement
have led to the widespread assumption that climate change is too
hard to solve. This legacy has also affected global co-operation.
The joint work of governments and parliaments therefore remains
central for a successful outcome in 2015. As the 3rd GLOBE Climate
Legislation Study demonstrates, there already exists a positive
trend with parliaments around the world mobilising and proposing
climate change legislation. Significantly, China announced, in April
2013, its plans to develop such legislation within one or two years.
41. National parliaments therefore have to engage fully and early
towards the desired outcome in global climate negotiations. Depending
on the interpretation of “an agreed outcome with legal force”, an
international agreement including the formal recognition of national
legislation is a real possibility. One such option would be a “legalisation”
of national commitments, potentially taken as domestic legislation.
42. However, for changes in national legislation to be fully legitimate
and to receive public support, they must be preceded by public information
actions. Political leaders and policy-makers need to explain clearly
to the public the likely risks of global warming and potential benefits
of changes in national legislation and policies. Despite the scientific
evidence on climate change, some population groups remain hesitant
or unwilling to contribute to joint efforts for financial reasons.
Some surveys even show that the ranks of climate-skeptics are increasing.
Note
4 Setting the framework
for a global deal
43. Since the launching of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, governments have
tried both “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to reducing global
emissions. Yet neither has achieved the levels of participation
or ambition necessary to tackle climate change. As shown above,
an agreement under the Durban Platform could take many different
forms. What I propose, however, is a mixed “top down and bottom
up” approach, including – for the first time – formal recognition
of national climate legislation.
44. A mixed approach would thus feature a core agreement with
a global target to reduce emissions in line with the commitment
(fixed in the Copenhagen Accord) to contain the global average rise
in temperature below 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels. It
would also include one or more schedules listing national targets and
actions, such as legislation.
45. On the basis of analysis of the risks and costs of action
and inaction, an appropriate target for stabilising greenhouse gas
concentrations at 450-500 parts per million of CO2 equivalent
in the atmosphere
Note is
widely regarded as feasible and appropriate. This target should
guide national commitments. Currently, however, there is a gap between
the cumulative level of ambition at the national level and that
required to limit the temperature rise below 2°C.
46. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates
Note that the emissions gap in 2020 is
likely to be between 8 and 13 gigatons of CO2,
depending on the implementation of pledges. This means that emissions would
be 14% above what is needed to stabilise the situation. To narrow
this gap, domestic actions and targets have to match a global target
while also fitting national circumstances. National legal frameworks
therefore have to be adapted accordingly and be listed in a global
deal by 2020 at the latest, so that Parties take on balanced national
and international commitments.
47. The international processes accompanying the development of
legislation require special attention ahead of 2015 so as to boost
political conditions to enable a deal to be reached. They include
focus on capacity building, engagement between parliaments and governments,
and support for legislator peer groups.
48. A core agreement should also include institutional arrangements,
a financial mechanism and procedures for monitoring, reporting and
verification. It should also contain provisions relating to international
emissions trading and adaptation strategies, as well procedures
for reviewing, amending and expanding the agreement over time in
the light of the latest scientific evidence. In summary, the key
elements of a 2015 agreement and priority actions for building ambition
to offset climate change are:
- a
target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2030
and by at least 50% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels;
- the formal recognition of national climate change legislation
in the legally binding part of the outcome and a requirement for
countries to pass climate legislation by 2020 at the latest;
- support for international processes to assist the development
of national climate legislation, to spread good practice and to
promote common methodologies;
- a review of national pledges to ensure that they are aligned
with the global target and are equitable;
- transparency of performance of countries against their
national targets and actions (with yearly reporting), as well as
a process to evaluate the implementation of national legislation
and emission reductions;
- flexibility allowing countries to improve their legislation
and performance;
- international rules and mechanisms for emissions trading;
- a commitment to research and development, demonstration
and sharing of new technologies, and dissemination of best existing
technologies;
- financial and technical assistance to developing countries,
in particular the poorest ones, for climate change adaptation;
- recognition of the right to equitable access to sustainable
development, of the profound impact climate change will have on
ecosystems and economies, and of the importance of valuing natural
capital;
- finally, a call for international fora, notably the G8
and G20, to press for reform to support a shift towards a low-carbon
economy.
5 Conclusions
and scenarios for the future
49. Tackling climate change effectively and reaching
a new global agreement “with legal force” no later than 2015 is
a daunting task for the international community. The Durban Platform
of 2011 has set the roadmap for climate negotiations and represents
a real opportunity to develop a coherent approach to combating climate change.
To help build the broad consensus needed to achieve a breakthrough
in this process, national efforts can be a decisive drive. Parliaments
need to be involved at an early stage, along with governments. Together, they
should seek recognition for national climate change legislation
as an enabler that creates the political space for an international
agreement.
50. Drawing lessons from past failures and scaling up our ambition,
we must try a mixed “top down and bottom up” approach that would
feature a core agreement as outlined above. Countries should be
asked to pass climate legislation by 2020 at the latest. Their targets
and laws should be formally referred to in the legally binding part
of the outcome agreement.
51. Governments will hence need to invest more in bilateral co-operation
with key countries and support international mechanisms that help
advance national climate legislation, spread good practice, build
capacity amongst legislators and promote common methodologies. They
should ensure a proper review of national pledges so as to better
align national commitments with the global target and secure equity.
The value of natural capital must be duly recognised. Finally, annual
evaluation of progress is also a key element of a successful future
agreement on climate change.
52. Following its earlier initiative “Stop the Clock – Save our
Planet”,
Note the Parliamentary Assembly,
together with member States, is well placed to play an important
part in the global climate negotiations. This is paramount in the
light of the impact climate change will have on the enjoyment of
universally recognised fundamental rights.
Note Gaps in the existing legal protection
framework, in particular as regards climate refugees and displaced
persons, will have to be removed so as to build resilience against
climate change. The Council of Europe as a whole could speak up
more forcefully on the need for a stronger emphasis on human rights
in the global climate negotiations.
