Recalling the recent conclusions of the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and of the Group of
States against Corruption (GRECO) concerning Malta, the Assembly
notes the following:
2.1 the Prime
Minister of Malta is predominant in Malta’s constitutional arrangements,
sitting at the centre of political power, with extensive powers
of appointment;
2.2 the Office of the Prime Minister has taken over responsibility
for various areas of activity that present particular risks of money
laundering, including online gaming, investment migration (“golden passports”)
and regulation of financial services, including cryptocurrencies;
2.3 senior officials in the civil service are appointed by
the Prime Minister, which is problematic from the perspective of
checks and balances. Large numbers of “persons of trust” are appointed
to public posts through non-transparent procedures that provide
for exceptions to merit-based appointments, which may be illegal,
and is a danger to the quality of the civil service;
2.4 Malta’s unicameral parliament consists of poorly remunerated
part-time members, to many of whom (notably from the governing party)
the government has given well-paid positions as contractors, as
persons of trust or on public bodies, which – along with the fact
that almost half of the governing party members are also ministers
– contributes to the parliament as a whole failing to assure an
effective control over the executive;
2.5 judges and magistrates are appointed by the Prime Minister,
who exercises an unfettered discretion to choose from amongst formally
qualified candidates and may even disregard the advice of the body
established to determine whether candidates are qualified. This
allows for potential political influence, which is incompatible
with judicial independence and the rule of law;
2.6 the Attorney General is appointed by the Prime Minister
and both provides legal advice to the government and prosecutes
criminal offences, which is problematic from the perspective of
democratic checks and balances and the separation of powers;
2.7 the recently proposed State Advocate Bill does not respond
to all of the Venice Commission's recommendations and is inadequate
to reform the office of Attorney General;
2.8 the Commissioner of Police is appointed and can be dismissed
by the Prime Minister, who dismissed or saw four Commissioners resign
between 2013 and 2016. This contributes to a public perception that
the police force is not politically neutral in the service of the
State when enforcing the law and protecting citizens;
2.9 magisterial inquests as a means of investigating criminal
offences improperly allow victims and alleged perpetrators of crimes
to choose an avenue of investigation. They are poorly co-ordinated
with police investigations, take an inordinately long time and tend
towards confusion, inefficiency and ineffectiveness;
2.10 the procedure for committing criminal cases to trial may
be extremely slow, with serious consequences if it results in suspects
being released on bail upon expiry of the preventive custody time limit;
2.11 the effectiveness of the office of Parliamentary Ombudsman
is undermined by the government’s failure to provide information
necessary for its work and the parliament’s failure to act on cases
where public authorities have rejected the Ombudsman’s recommendations;
2.12 the effectiveness of the office of Auditor General is
undermined by a lack of means, resulting in delays to important
audits;
2.13 the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, Malta’s specialist
anti-money laundering body, has had its authority and reputation
damaged through its role in various recent scandals. The European
Banking Authority (EBA) found that the Financial Intelligence Analysis
Unit breached European Union anti-money laundering standards in
a way that pointed to general and systemic shortcomings;
2.14 the office of Commissioner for Standards in Public Life,
intended to prevent conflicts of interest among politicians and
State officials, appears to lack the necessary means, including
powers of investigation and sanction, to fulfil its role effectively;
2.15 the Freedom of Information Act is undermined by many exceptions
to the principle of access to official documents, with the result
that public authorities systematically obstruct requests for official documents
and the transparency of the administration is not guaranteed;
2.16 the Protection of the Whistle-blower Act, although in
many ways laudable, is undermined by a lack of protection for whistle-blowers
who report to the media, by the role of the Attorney General and Commissioner
of Police in granting immunity to potential whistle-blowers and
by the fact that the reporting channel for external whistle-blowers
is the Cabinet Office;
2.17 the Permanent Commission Against Corruption is structurally
flawed, utterly ineffective in practice and could be abolished,
providing other necessary reforms are introduced.
