C Explanatory memorandum
by Lord Foulkes, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. For many years, the Committee
on Culture, Science, Education and Media has been encouraging football
organisations to have a proactive approach to the protection of
human rights.
Note We
must continue to work with partners to ensure that football governance
strongly upholds our values. Therefore, the present report will
take up three key human right related themes.
- develop sound co-operation between key football actors
and public authorities, on the occasion of key sports events and
beyond;
- strengthen the protection of minor players, in particular
from sexual abuses and exploitation, and support the development
of young players as persons and citizens (not only to enhance their professional
skills);
- promote gender equality and the role of women in football,
beyond the development of women’s football itself.
2. In addition to the call for enhanced human rights protection,
our previous report on “Good football governance” also denounced,
among other pending issues in football governance, the financial
excesses, which go hand in hand with growing inequalities.
Note At
present, football exists with too many wide gaps: between the professional
football and the grassroots/amateur level and between the football
elite – the richest leagues, clubs and players – and the others.
With this widening gap (in terms of financial resources and, as
a consequence, quality) the risk increases that football will be
reduced to a mere aspect of show business, with genuine competition
taking place only between a few major teams while others play only
a minor role at best.
3. If we want to protect sports and football, sports and football
governance should be aimed at reducing these gaps. There is a need
for greater solidarity (and a more balanced distribution of resources)
within the football system to ensure its greater stability. A second
core area for consideration is, therefore, football’s economic model.
In this connection, the report looks at ways to avoid the socially
unacceptable financial excesses, to preserve a fair and solidarity-based
economic model, and to ensure greater solidarity between professional
and amateur football, as well as a fair social return for the football-related
financial outlay made by the public authorities.
Note
4. One problem linked to the above issues is the legal framework
and in particular regulations on transfers, the status of agents
and intermediaries, player ownership and the status and protection
of players’ rights. Indeed, shortcomings of the legal framework
may facilitate abuses and excesses, contribute to inequalities and have
an adverse effect on the promotion of sporting values.
5. In this respect, the report analyses the ongoing (FIFA lead)
reforms of the transfer system, including agency. This is a pressing
issue for all partners, and it acquires a new significance in the
present context. In addition, a higher level of redistribution and
maybe a redefinition of priorities in resources allocation should
also consolidate the capability of the whole system to uphold other
important aims, namely in the field of human rights protection.
This is certainly key at European level; but I attach importance
to sound foundations for a balanced distribution of resources also
at a global level. FIFA regulations and development programmes have, therefore,
a crucial role.
6. Reducing financial gaps and aiming at greater solidarity within
the football system should be given a new significance in the present
context: financial disparities and ways to progressively reduce
them must now be considered within the framework of the disastrous
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. We must consider further
how football key actors (being the football organisations, clubs
and media or business companies) could strike a different balance
between self-centred money flows and community solidarity and could
significantly reinforce corporate social responsibility and develop
concrete programmes to uphold key values, and to help our societies
to rise to the challenges that the pandemic obliges us to face.
This choice also corresponds to the resolve to keep human rights
at the centre of our analysis.
7. To reach the above-mentioned objectives, football stakeholders
should work more closely with fans and their associations. Fans’
– but also players’ – involvement in football decision making within
the different governance settings (at local, national, European
and international levels) is a question that has not been really dealt
with by previous reports of the Parliamentary Assembly on football
governance. Giving fans and players a stronger voice and fostering
their active involvement in football governance can also help develop
community outreach and reinforce social responsibility. Therefore,
the report touches upon this question too.
8. Finally, FIFA and UEFA have institutionalised and strengthened
their co-operation with the Council of Europe (as they are also
doing with other organisations) within the framework of the memorandums
of Understandings that they have signed with our Organisation. I
believe we should seek to reinforce and widen this co-operation
with FIFA and UEFA, and also to develop collaboration with other
stakeholders, with the aim to act together more effectively to solving
problems.
9. For this reason, I have involved our traditional partners
and some new ones in the various stages of preparation of this report
and I thank them for their constructive collaboration. I am referring
not only to their contribution to the hearing that our committee
held on 4 December 2020,
Note but
also to the online meetings that I had with our partners
Note and
to the many exchanges of information that took place with them,
since early 2020, through the Secretariat of the committee. I cannot
forget, moreover, the valuable contribution of the experts who took
part in our work
Note and
of our institutional partners from the Enlarged Partial Agreement
on Sport (EPAS).
Note
2 Human rights protection and the organisation
of major sports events
2.1 The
question of human rights respect and, in particular, of decent working
conditions for all workers in Qatar
10. Qatar 2022 is drawing closer.
During the first 6 months of 2021, calls for a boycott of this controversial World
Cup have contributed once again to put the issue of the working
conditions in this country under the spotlight, also following an
article by
The Guardian according
to which more than 6 500 migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have died in Qatar during the period 2011-2020.
Note
11. The Assembly, in its
Resolution
2053 (2015) “The reform of football governance”, called on FIFA
to urgently request the authorities of Qatar to “take without delay
all necessary measures to secure respect for the fundamental rights
of all foreign migrant workers employed in their country” (para.
13.2.1.) and to “co-operate with the International Labour Organization
(ILO) in verifying the effective observance of these rights by both
public and private enterprises operating in Qatar” (para. 13.2.2).
12. While we could regret that FIFA eventually decided not to
repeal its decision of 2 December 2010, as our Assembly had requested,
Note our
2017 report on “Good football governance”
Note acknowledged the concrete initiatives
taken by FIFA to respond to the Assembly calls concerning working
conditions in Qatar. Our rapporteur, Ms Anne Brasseur (who did not
hesitate in highlighting some pitfalls in the FIFA governance system)
sincerely commended these initiatives (see in particular paras.
60 to 62). PACE
Resolution
2200 (2018) “Good football governance” nevertheless recommended
that FIFA “encourage the Qatari authorities to ensure that the worker
welfare standards applicable to workers employed at the 2022 World
Cup construction sites apply to all workers” (para. 11.1.1.)
13. In this respect, FIFA’s efforts but also the great work of
the ILO,
Note of
the international trade union movement and of other organisations
active in Qatar are to be praised. There is no doubt that the labour
reform agenda in Qatar has reached many key milestones and had a
direct and positive impact on workers. Among the most important
results, Law n° 18 of 2020 removed the need for migrant workers
to obtain their employer’s permission to exit the country or to
change jobs (thus removing the most problematic aspects of the so
called “kafala” system) and established, for the first time in the
region, a non-discriminatory minimum wage. The Wage Protection System,
which has been introduced in 2015 to monitor the payment of workers’
wages, has contributed to reduce wage abuses and help resolving
wage disputes. A national policy on Occupational Safety and Health
has been adopted; since May 2021, new rules has enhanced workers’
protection against heat stress. The major reforms also apply to
domestic workers; after the adoption in 2017 of a new legislation protecting
their rights, domestic workers now benefit from an improved standard
contract adopted in 2021. Qatari labour legislation provides today
new models which could be helpful to other countries with large
migrant populations, in the Middle-East and beyond.
14. It is also important to recognise the Qatari Government’s
engagement in co-operation with partners
Note and in ensuring transparency.
Note The commitment to dialogue and to transparency
by the Government of Qatar is in itself an important step forward.
It is important that this transparency and communication continue
on the progress made and on the remaining challenges.
15. While the achievements in Qatar’s labour reform agenda are
laudable, there is still much to be done. Statistics show that football
is fostering improvements, but the reform is faced with implementation
challenges: non-payment of wages remains a serious concern and new
rights (for example in relation to working hours during the summer)
are not fully respected and enforced everywhere; some unscrupulous
employers oppose resistance to change and still make use of illegal
means to retain control of their workers (for example cancelling
the workers’ Qatari identity cards, thus leaving them without a
legal status in the country, or filing absconding charges); the
capacity of the labour inspectorate needs to be significantly reinforced.
16. I do not wish to disregard or undervalue progress made, but
I cannot be satisfied with the present working conditions in Qatar.
I believe we would not consent for our citizens to work under the
conditions that thousands of workers experience there to date. True,
most of these workers were (and are) escaping from worse situations
and needed these jobs to survive; true, in many other countries
standard working conditions are far below ILO standards: however,
these are not reasons to accept what is not acceptable. Quoting Mr Infantino:
“(…) There is definitely still room for further progress, and we
will continue to work closely with the authorities and all stakeholders
to promote a progressive agenda that should be of long-term benefit
to all workers in Qatar, whether involved in the preparation of
the event or not.”
Note During the remote meeting I had with
Mr Infantino on 8 April 2021, he told me that FIFA will keep on
working with the Qatari partners to seek to achieve further progress.
I am confident that this commitment will be respected.
17. Calls for a boycott could now be somewhat too late and I tend
to agree with Mr Infantino that dialogue could achieve more. Constructive
engagement and dialogue with the Government of Qatar have been conducive
to positive impact and are the way forward to achieve more progress.
Nevertheless, I would appeal to FIFA that they should not take any
sanctions against any teams or any players choosing not to participate to
the World Cup because of their wish to uphold human rights. A sanction
in this case would be a great mistake. Moreover, the “starting point”
in Qatar, concerning working conditions, was really bad; the respect
of basic ILO standards should rather be a precondition to be a credible
candidate and not a target to reach after being designated as the
host country of the FIFA World Cup.
18. Finally, we should not forget that there are large European
companies that are operating in Qatar and it is our responsibility
to ensure that they respect our values.
2.2 Human
rights conditionalities as standard “contractual clauses” for bidding
countries
19. We expect that countries hosting
major sports events – this goes beyond football, of course – are
ready to assume their obligations in different areas and meet them
effectively. For example, no doubt they must ensure safety of all
sports equipment and security of the national and foreign audience
attending the events, and of people leaving or moving within the
areas where they take place. There are expectations concerning the
capacity to plan investments and build or renew infrastructure paying
attention to costs for society (seeking to ensure positive social
and economic returns) and to the need to safeguard the environment.
I believe that, in the same vein, we should insist on the human
rights dimension, and expect that all bidders to major international
sport events, such as FIFA and UEFA competitions, are bound to ensure
the respect of key human rights standards if they wish to host the
events in question.
20. Resolution 2200
(2018) recommended that FIFA and UEFA, each within its sphere
of responsibility:
- “introduce effective checks on compliance with
the obligations entered into by countries that apply to host major
football competitions and by their national associations” (para.
11.2.1);
- “insist with the governments
of host countries on the necessity to protect fundamental civil
and political rights, and in particular freedom of expression –
including the freedom of the media – and freedom of peaceful assembly,
and this not only in connection with their competitions, but beyond” (para.
11.2.2);
- “ensure that all cases of serious
breaches of human rights, including the rights of workers, by private companies
involved in the organisation of their competitions, beginning with
those who build stadiums and infrastructure, are made public and
that effective penalties are applied when the follow-up measures recommended
by supervisory bodies are not implemented; the governments of host
countries must accept this responsibility” (para. 11.2.3).
2.2.1 FIFA
requirements regarding the protection of fundamental civil and political
rights
22. Since November 2017, FIFA has
been integrating human rights requirements into its bidding processes. As
part of these requirements, FIFA asks bidders to identify risks
to fundamental civil and political rights associated with FIFA’s
tournaments, and to present plans to address them.
23. The bidding governments are required to submit a “Declaration”
including the following statement:
- “The Government will fully
support FIFA and the Member Association in their efforts to achieve
that the hosting and staging of the Competition and any legacy and
post-event related activities do not involve adverse impacts on
internationally recognised human rights, including labour rights.
- The Government is committed
to respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights, including
labour rights, in connection with the hosting and staging of the
Competition and any legacy and post-event related activities, with
particular attention to the provision of security, potential resettlement
and eviction, labour rights (including those of migrant workers),
the rights of children, gender and other forms of discrimination
and freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and will ensure
that access to effective remedies is available where such adverse
impacts do occur, including judicial and non-judicial complaint
mechanisms with the power to investigate, punish and redress human
rights violations.”
24. As part of the government guarantees, governments are also
required to ensure that all security forces, both public and private,
deployed in relation to the tournament are trained to comply with
relevant international standards on human rights compliant policing,
including, but not limited to, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the International Code
of Conduct for Private Security Providers. These codes include respect
for fundamental civil and political rights. Furthermore, FIFA requires
bidders for the FIFA World Cup and the FIFA Women’s World Cup to
commission detailed human rights context assessments by competent
and independent entities approved by FIFA.
Note
25. Throughout the preparation and hosting of the event, FIFA
works closely with the respective member association and the host
government to ensure that all entities involved implement their
human rights obligations. This includes, for instance, the development
and implementation of joint strategies and action plans, as well
as specific policies and procedures, and regular assessments of
government responses to relevant human rights risks, including through
engagement with external stakeholders.
26. FIFA and/or tournament organisers implement measures to monitor
compliance with human rights standards (in particular concerning
labour rights), operate grievance mechanisms to allow for adverse
impacts to be reported and strive to ensure adequate levels of transparency.
Note Where
problematic issues are identified, FIFA engages with host governments
through the established joint procedures and using various forms
of leverage in accordance with its responsibilities under the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights.
2.2.2 UEFA
requirements regarding the protection of fundamental civil and political
rights
27. UEFA’s requirements regarding
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are listed
in the dedicated section of the Requirements of the relevant competition,
which include the bidder’s compliance with, among others:
- the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights;
- the eight ILO fundamental conventions as set out in the
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up;
- the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women;
- the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child.
28. When submitting their bid, candidates must confirm their commitment
to the protection of human rights. Among other demands, they are
asked to:
- assess the most prominent
potential risks to human rights associated with their bid;
- detail the public commitment of the candidate’s government
in relation to human rights as concerns the competition;
- describe how these public commitments will be embedded
into organisational standards;
- outline an action plan and remedy mechanisms in the case
of human rights issues.
29. Moreover, the candidates/hosts national associations are contractually
bound via the agreement with UEFA to a number of principles extracted
from the United Nations Global Compact and the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights in connection with the products
and services they provide.
30. When signing the staging agreement, the host association endorse
the responsibility to act as the interface with the local and national
authorities. I would suggest, however, that UEFA should require
the commitment not only of the national associations but also –
and primarily – of the governments of the bidder countries, and
should set proper mechanisms of direct dialogue with them to discuss
and solve potential problems.
3 The
protection of children and underage players
31. Resolution 2200 (2018) recommended that FIFA and UEFA, each within its sphere
of responsibility:
- “ensure compliance with the transfer rules
in order to prevent “trading in children” and consider, in collaboration
with the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), the mechanisms and measures
required to put a stop to the chain of “forced transfers” of underage
players, which falls within the definition of human trafficking” (para.
11.2.4);
- “initiate a reflection on the
protection of underage players and the promotion of their education,
(…) by taking account of the specific proposals in the report entitled
“Good football governance” (Doc. 14452) and of Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)10
of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection
of child and young athletes from dangers associated with migration” (para.
11.2.5);
- “increase the funds allocated
to education programmes and the financial support for educational
projects launched by national associations” (para. 11.2.7).
3.1 Regulations
32. The protection of minors must
remain one of the main concerns of football regulators. It is understandable
that clubs look for the best talents, but “business” has pushed
clubs and agents to lower the age at which players are recruited.
There is, of course, a consensus on the need to ensure adequate
protection to minors, including through limitations to their international
transfers. What this protection should be, however, is at present
being debated among the stakeholders within the context of the reform
of the transfer system. I will deal with this question in the corresponding
section (see 6.4).
33. Furthermore, the FIFA Forward Development Programme Regulations
2.0 oblige member associations and confederations to “take measures
to protect and safeguard children and minors from potential abuses
and to protect their well-being within football” (article 8, para.
1t).
34. Within the UEFA framework, art. 23bis of the UEFA club licensing
regulations (Child protection and welfare) provides that clubs “must
establish and apply measures, in line with any relevant UEFA guidelines,
to protect, safeguard and ensure the welfare of youth players and
ensure they are in a safe environment when participating in activities
organised by the licence applicant”.
35. The HatTrick V programme
provides funding to developments such as the elaboration by the
national associations of a Corporate Social Responsibility strategy.
The regulations refer to “child safeguarding” (i.e. providing a
safe and secure playing environment for children and ensuring that
effective policies, practices and procedures are in place to prevent
harm) as part of this strategy.
3.2 Key
ongoing initiatives to strengthen child protection and promote young
players education
36. FIFA is working with the confederations
and the 211 member associations to help raise awareness of the importance
of child safeguarding at all levels in football. In July 2019, FIFA
launched its
FIFA
Guardians™ programme, which is intended to help member associations
and confederations in strengthening child and vulnerable adult safeguarding
measures across football. FIFA prepared (with technical support
and guidance from an expert working group comprising representatives
from the Council of Europe, UNICEF, Safe Sport International and
several member associations with expertise in this area) a toolkit
/ practical handbook on the steps needed to develop and implement
policies and procedures to prevent and address harm and ensure the well-being
of all football actors, especially children.
37. Concerning training and capacity building, in January 2021,
FIFA announced the launch of the FIFA Guardians Safeguarding in
Sport Diploma, a major global education programme (developed with
The Open University, in co-operation with experts, practitioners
and academics in the field from all over the world). This Diploma
is designed to professionalise the role of safeguarding officers
in football and to raise safeguarding standards around the world.
This is the first academic programme of its kind; it provides the
211 FIFA member associations with a dedicated, interactive educational
resource to develop safeguarding best practice, with an aim of eradicating
harassment and violence of which children who plays football, or
indeed any sport, may be victims.
38. Together with UNESCO, FIFA has also developed a
Football for Schools programme which
is intended to teach “life skills” through football, including:
- personal understanding (for
example taking responsibility, communication, identifying with role
models, active listening, the balance of both winning and losing
and positive lessons that each teaches);
- the challenges that young people face (for example bullying,
discrimination, conflicts, peer pressure);
- sporting values (for example friendship, teamwork, helping
hands, respect for each other);
- health and well-being (for example fighting infections,
good hygiene, asking for help, safe spaces).
39. In partnership with the foundation
Terre
des hommes, UEFA developed a digital platform, “
safeguarding.eu”, which provides
a central online information and learning resource aiming at enhancing
the knowledge, skills and practices in football, to help its member
associations and other football stakeholders to increase their knowledge
and skills in the field of child protection and to create safer
football environments for all children who play football. The project
is centred around a child safeguarding toolkit and four online courses that
address this issue. Resources relating to the safeguarding of children
in sport and, in particular, in European football are available
(in English only) in the
Library and
News sections of the platform.
40. The Football in Schools programme
Note and UEFA support to coach education
and grassroots football activities of its member associations
Note are
also aimed to educate children and young people through football, and
more specifically through the development of teachers and coaches
(including young coaches), for example by creating a safe learning
environment, using a modern coaching methodology that emphasises learning,
fun and social interaction, etc.
41. The UEFA Grassroots Leader course and the UEFA C Diploma course
syllabus are also intended, among others, to create a motivational
climate (for example a culture of learning, inclusion and friendship, sense
of belonging, engagement, child’s empowerment and autonomy, personal
improvement and effort) and to uphold child’s psychological and
social development (for example develop curiosity, resilience, problem-solving,
decision-making, and information processing skills, creativity,
self-esteem; teach them how to improve teamwork). In addition, The
UEFA Foundation supports more than twenty projects linking to education
inside and outside of Europe.
Note
3.3 New
powerful projects to enhance child and youth protection in football
(and sport)
42. In the context of the EU social
dialogue committee, UEFA, ECA, European Leagues and FIFPRO are considering
developing a (European) research project to map the existing standards
for the protection of minors in elite academies and identify potential
gaps with regards to the rights of the child. Specifically, the research
would:
- look into the existing
regulations and quality standards relating to the protection of
minors in elite academies across leagues and clubs;
- compare the existing standards on the protection of minors
in elite academies with global child protection standards based
on the UN declaration on the rights of the child;
- develop a global framework (and list) of quality standards
on the protection of minors in elite academies based on the rights
of the child.
43. This project can really contribute to better assess the quality
of child protection in football; I consider that we should support
it and encourage the involvement and contribution of national decision
makers to its successful launching and implementation.
44. There is another project to which I attach the greatest importance,
and which represents to me a fundamental step towards effective
child protection in football and in sport. This is the project on
the establishment of a Safe Sport centre or agency that FIFA is
considering with other partners and Ms Joyce Cook presented to us
during our hearing of 4 December 2020.
45. As Ms Cook recalled, many high-profile cases have come to
light in recent years of child abuse across sports and around the
world, including football, with recent cases that have been widely
publicised such as in Afghanistan and in Haiti. Cases of abuse must
be addressed immediately when they are reported, however, they are
complex and difficult to investigate. There is a need to ensure
that safety of victims comes first and that whistle-blowers, victims
and their families are not put at further risk of harm. FIFA has
had cases of death threats, without being able to turn to, to rely
on or to trust statutory criminal justice and child protection agencies on
the ground, for support and for investigation and prosecution of
perpetrators of these crimes.
46. Such competencies fall beyond the capabilities of sports alone.
Hence FIFA is calling for the establishment of a new international
centre for safe sports. It should be multi-sports, multi-agency
and multi-government, to deal with these cases of abuse; an entity,
efficient, agile and pragmatic in providing a pool of services and
expertise that could assist all stakeholders to eradicate abuse
in sports, putting the needs of victims first. I wholeheartedly
support this project and I do hope that our Assembly will be able
to mobilise all our governments so that they commit themselves to
ensuring that this project could be speedily achieved.
47. During our hearing of 4 December 2020, we heard that sexual
assault is unfortunately a reality in sport. Through its intergovernmental
networks, the Council of Europe has mobilised efforts to tackle
the problem. The “Start to Talk” initiative calls on member States
to take three types of action which it helps them to develop through
support packages comprising a set of tools.
Note Currently,
the EPAS is launching pilot projects to establish networks of child
welfare officers in sport under its “Child Safeguarding in Sport”
scheme. This module will probably be added to the existing tools.
To date, about twenty Council of Europe countries make use of such
schemes. I believe, however, that the Assembly must encourage higher
political mobilisation in all our member States. I would also like
to recall the action plan against sexual violence in sports which
we adopted in 2018, in Tbilisi,
Note and hope that parliamentary delegations
to the Assembly could give it more visibility.
4 Promoting
gender equality and the role of women in football
48. Resolution 2200 (2018) recommended that FIFA and UEFA, each within its sphere
of responsibility:
- “promote the adoption by their member associations
of rules enshrined in their statutes in order to ensure that the
composition of their executive boards and standing committees includes
a number of women at least proportional to the number of female
members registered, with a minimum number of places reserved for
women in all cases” (para. 11.2.6.);
- “strengthen their financial
support for training programmes to promote leadership for women
at national level and to increase the number of female coaches and
referees” (para. 11.2.8.);
- “use a higher percentage of
their resources to promote women’s football, particularly in countries
where associations are less wealthy, by studying forms of co-operation
with national associations” (para. 11.2.9.);
- “launch an information campaign
to combat sexual harassment and gender discrimination” (para. 11.2.10).
49. During our hearing of 4 December 2020, it has not been possible
to discuss this important question. However, both FIFA and UEFA
provided us with detailed information on their efforts and programmes
intended to promote gender equality and the role of women in football.
Note I wish to commend our partners for
their work and for the results that they are already achieving,
which is not possible to present here exhaustively. The following
are just a few selected examples.
50. In 2018, FIFA launched its Women’s Football Strategy, which
describes FIFA’s long-term vision for the development of women’s
football at all levels. One of the key pillars of this strategy
is to develop the ecosystem of women’s football and to raise overall
standards at all levels of the women’s game in collaboration with
the confederations and all 211 member associations through various
projects and initiatives, including the FIFA Forward Development
Programme, the FIFA Foundation and the FIFA Women’s Development
Programme. FIFA will invest a total of USD 1 billion in women’s
football over the course of the 2019-2022 period.
51. In 2019, in order to provide a comprehensive picture and benchmarking
tool on the current landscape of women’s football globally, FIFA
published the “FIFA Women’s Football Survey”; data therein will
help to design and tailor strategic women’s football initiatives
in the future. In September 2020, FIFA published the first-ever “Women’s
Football Administrator Handbook”. This handbook offers a better
understanding of how strategies, practices and procedures can reinforce
the objectives of developing women’s football and fostering gender equality,
and it proposes good practices learned from experience.
52. UEFA has increased funding to its women's football development
programme by 50% as of 2020. As part of this funding, all member
associations will have to employ dedicated staff for the development
and progression of women’s football and have a dedicated women’s
football strategy. In the 2019-20 season, UEFA co-funded 92 projects
across its member associations to a total of €11.5 million (€ 5.5
million of which came through the HatTrick Programme). Moreover,
UEFA committed a further € 50 million to the promotion, visibility and
development of women’s football.
53. Among other initiatives, the UEFA Academy organises the annual
“Women in Football Leadership Programme”
to support the careers of women capable of influencing the football
industry today and in the future. Since its inauguration, 5 member
associations (Northern Ireland, Ireland, Germany, Finland and France)
have devised their own national programmes.
54. The Assembly advocates a balanced representation of women
in the bodies of sports organisations at all levels. Both FIFA and
UEFA report positive developments within national associations and
give concrete examples. Both organisations are encouraging these
developments. However, I would like this process to speed up and
that FIFA and UEFA ask all national associations to include in their
statutes a quota (of at least 25%) of positions reserved for the
less well-represented sex (generally women) in their executive bodies
and committees. This should become a conditionality to benefit from
development funds.
5 Rethinking
football’s economic model
5.1 Widening
gaps between leagues and clubs: the danger of polarisation and financial imbalances
55. The European Leagues commissioned
KPMG to prepare a report on “The financial Landscape of European
Football”, which was delivered in November 2020. The analysis therein
is of great interest for our purposes. The starting point is that
“
Football is the world’s most popular
sport and Europe is its largest market.” This market
has experienced a rapid growth and a significant expansion of club
finances over the past two decades, driven by three main revenue
streams, namely club commercial income (sponsorship, merchandising and
commercial partnerships), central league revenue (broadcasting rights
and league sponsorship) and UEFA club competitions (UCC) revenue.
Note
56. From 2009 to 2018 the total revenue of European football rose
from €11 719 million to €21 083 million, with an increase in all
revenue streams: commercial income rose from €4 372 million to €7 965
million (namely 82% growth); league broadcasting rose from €4 076
million to €7 890 million (namely 94% growth); UCC revenue rose
from €692 million to €2 092 million (namely 202% growth). Matchday
revenue
Note remains
an important income, although the evolution is less pronounced (from
€2 081 million to €3,138 million, namely 51% growth).
57. This rapid commercial expansion has not been (and is not)
even, however, and has resulted in a widening gap between leagues
and clubs. Following the cluster-based analysis of the KPMG report,
in 2018, the gap between the total operating revenue of “Cluster
A”, namely the 5 major European leagues (in alphabetical order:
England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain), and of “Cluster B” (Belgium,
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey) was of €12,697
million (against €6,202 million in 2009). The average operating
revenue per club is €160.1 million in 2018 for “Cluster A” (against
€82.1 million in 2019); it is of €31.7 million in 2018 for “Cluster
B” (against 19.2 million in 2009) and significantly less for the
others. Over the period 2009-2018, revenue growth of the top ten
clubs of “Cluster A” has been 212%, for the other clubs of “Cluster
A” 187% and for clubs of the other clusters only 150%. On the positive
side, European football has been growing everywhere; on the negative
side, we must acknowledge increasing polarisation.
58. Financial gaps between leagues are inevitable to a certain
extent, as they are partly dependent on differences in domestic
markets and socio-economic conditions, but they have increased.
However, polarisation and widening gaps are also due to the diverging
scale of media markets in different countries and to the UCC revenue
distribution scheme. Top leagues – and top clubs within them – benefited
from the raising values of broadcasting rights more than the others.
For “Cluster A”, the share of broadcasting revenue is 44%. It drops
to 21% for “Cluster B”, and is only 12-2% in Clusters C, D and E.
59. UCC revenue distributions to clubs have further increased
the financial differences between top clubs within each league and
the others. Indeed, the KPMG report deplores a greater dominance
by a fewer number of clubs in many domestic leagues and the sporting
advantage these top clubs have from regular participation in UCC
competitions. In other terms, UCC revenue distributions are having
a distortive effect due to their increased size and their concentration
to a small number of top clubs in each league.
60. Another feature of this increasingly polarised ecosystem is
the expansion of the transfer market, with transfer spending over
€8 billion in 2018, against a transfer revenue of €6 billion (namely
a negative balance of €2 billion). The growing transfer spending
at the top is supporting the football ecosystem to some extent,
as top leagues – with the remarkable exception of the French League
1
Note –
are “net spenders” and clubs from the other leagues are “net sellers”.
61. A key issue for all stakeholders is how to address this polarisation.
My understanding is that there are no miracle solutions and that
the stakeholders have difficulties in agreeing on possible ways
forward.
62. The UEFA has recently modified the structure of its club competitions:
from season 2021/22, the Europa League (UEL) will slim down from
48 to 32 clubs and a third 32 team competition, the UEFA Europa
Conference League (UECL), will be introduced. The corresponding
revenue is projected at €3.5 billion per year for the 2021-24 cycle,
with approximately 85% from TV rights and 15% from sponsorship and
licensing. On this basis, the 32 UEFA Champions League (UCL) clubs
will share €2.032 billion (equivalent to 74% of club prize money), the
32 UEL clubs €465 million (17%) and the UECL clubs €235 million
(9%).
Note In addition to cross subsidies from
the UCL to the UEL and the UECL (projected at more than €400 million),
from 2021/22 between €245 million and €280 million will be paid
in direct solidarity to clubs (€105 million for qualifying round
payments and €140 million-€175 million for youth investment to non-participating
clubs).
63. While the new UCC system offers more sporting opportunities
to a broader number of clubs and its revenue distribution mechanism
includes a significant solidarity component, I doubt that the latter
will be sufficient to avoid that the system will keep on triggering
increasing gaps. I am aware that UEFA must pay attention to expectations
of different stakeholders with diverging interests; I am also convinced
that it is not correct to pretend that UEFA should solve alone the
problem of polarisation. However, the criteria retained for allocating
the UCL prize money and the level of solidarity which the system
ensures do not allow to avoid further increases of the financial
gap between top clubs within each league and the others. In this
respect, it is quite difficult for our Assembly to take position
and I believe it is for the stakeholders to keep on discussing possible ways
to change the systems progressively. I wish, however, to make two
suggestions.
64. First, I consider that the 10-year club coefficient is not
a good allocation criterion, because it increases distortions; thus,
the share of 30% of the revenue distributed according to this criterion
could progressively be reduced and eventually disappear. UEFA could
allocate the corresponding amount to solidarity, increasing for example
money to invest in youth training and education and in the development
of women football.
65. Second, the European Leagues should consider establishing
a solidarity fund, which could be fed by a small percentage of TV
rights perceived at national level by the richest leagues. I am
aware this is not an easy proposal; but if we know that polarisation
is mainly triggered by the raising values of broadcasting rights perceived
by the major leagues, the logical consequence is that they are the
source of revenue which could sustain a solidarity mechanism. The
idea, however, could not be to distribute money for free: such a
solidarity fund should be designed to support sound projects (including
where appropriate joint projects involving different leagues) in
line with strategic goals. Financial aid could also be in the form
of “matching grants”, thus complementing targeted financial efforts
by beneficiary clubs or leagues. I believe that, in the present
context of recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, such a fund could
also aim at promoting collaborative project development with fans
associations. I would add that dialogue with UEFA and FIFA, and
sound coordination of actions implemented, should help avoiding
that resources available for solidarity be misused because of overlapping
initiatives and duplication of efforts.
5.2 Financial
excess: wages and transfer transactions
66. Financial excess in football
is perhaps at it its most glaring in the profiles of the best paid
players. Looking at figures just before the Covid-19 pandemic: the
8 highest-paid soccer players in the world, according to Forbes’s
2019 edition of its annual list of the most highly paid athletes,
play in 4 of the leading 5 European Leagues. Three of these – Lionel
Andres Messi, Cristiano Ronaldo et Santo Júnior Neymar da Silva
– were atop the Forbes list, out-earning the superstars of American
Football, golf, basketball and baseball.
67. In 2020, notwithstanding salary cuts, Ronaldo earned US$105
million, MessiUS US$104 million and Neymar over US$95 million. And
in 2021, Messi’s earnings reached US$130 million, and Ronaldo US$120 million;
Neymar lags behind (if we can say that) with his US$95 million.
True, they are exceptional players and part of their income comes
from their sponsors. Moreover, I am not contesting that these are
champions who bring value for money to their clubs. To understand
this, it may be sufficient to recall that they are superstars on
the social networks: Ronaldo has more than 500 million followers
across Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, Messi more than 330 million
and Neymar more than 280 million; this means the highest visibility
on social networks also for their respective teams. Nevertheless,
there is something wrong in the salary figures of these and other
top-level players, knowing that the football club’s debts are quite
high too.
68. Not all top professional players are on such heady and dizzying
paypackets: players earning millions are “just the tip of a much
larger global pyramid of professional footballers”.
NoteA
little less than 2% of players worldwide “earn more than US$720 000
a year”; outside the global elite, players’ salaries are at best
modest, with 74% earning less than US$4 000 per month and with over
45% paid under US$1 000 per month.
Note Beneath the
high earners there are substantial numbers of players earning their
living in poorer or lower leagues across the Americas and Asia,
parts of mid- and eastern Europe, and Africa.
69. It would be naïve to think or propose that the very best players
in the world should not be able to benefit from their talent, genius,
dedication and hard work in an inevitably concentrated and sometimes
cruelly brief career. But wages, in the top leagues and also in
those lower-tier divisions with ambitions to rise and rise to the
top, have proved inflationary, and contribute to the problems of
economic instability that flow from the commitment of uncertain
monies to get hold of, at any price in transfer and wages, the next
young star or the missing piece in the jigsaw.
70. At the centre of transfer transactions are the agents who,
working on all sides of the table but primarily for the cartel of
big clubs, siphon hundreds of millions of euros, dollars or pounds
into their own pockets as top clubs look to protect their profiles
by monopolising the market for starlets and proven superstars alike.
The nature of the transfer system is an issue of fundamental importance
to the economy of the sport, and its inconsistency as a wealth distribution
mechanism in football has created a burgeoning market in which huge sums
circulate among the elite clubs in a solipsistic economy of limited
circulation of resources. In principle, the system can reward and
incentivise clubs that carry out effective recruitment of players
and commit to good player development; the problem is that agents
are permitted to take far too high a percentage of the value of the
transaction as they act for both clubs and players in the process.
71. It is remarkable that, in 2018, despite the impressive financial
flows, (and the fact that European football as a whole had turned
profitable), around half of the top-tier clubs operated with deficits.
Operating costs reached €20 387 million in 2018 (namely around 70%
more than in 2009), with a significant increase of players’ wages
(from €7 488 million to €13 472 million) being the main cost driver
for clubs.
72. Domestic financial rules and UEFA Financial Fair Play (FFP)
had a positive impact, imposing more responsible spending and more
sustainable financial models.
Note However, within UEFA, only 17 leagues
(out of 55) generated an average positive net profit over the five-year
period 2014-2018. Because of the overspending on players’ wages,
clubs and the football ecosystem are exposed from a financial management perspective,
as annual income can fluctuate significantly. Indeed, this is what
has happened with the Covid-19 pandemic.
73. The systemic risks engendered by polarisation and financial
imbalances on the one hand and financial excesses on the other hand
have now been amplified by the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic
and its huge impact on clubs, leagues and also national associations
revenue flows.
Note And while the
reinforced level of co-operation among stakeholders and joint efforts
to respond to the crisis may give hope for the future (as noted
by the KPMG report), I cannot but express all my reprobation for
the position which has been taken by 12 of the most powerful European
clubs and their attempt to create a separate European Super League.
74. All football organisations, as well as fans – to whom we must
pay tribute – and many policy makers, reacted strongly and this
forced most of these clubs to declare that they would not pursue
the European Super League project. But we shall not be naïve: the
wounds are there; the idea will keep on floating and powerful financial
interests remain an attractive proposal to some who consider a closed-shop
tournament to be the best way to cash fresh money, no matter if
this is no more the game people love and if such a scheme could
kill football as we want it to be.
75. The promotion-and-relegation model of football makes it possible
for everyone to dream of a day of glory. Owners, players, staff,
followers, communities, sponsors and other interested parties can
dream that one day their club will be in the top tier of the country’s
professional league. The narrative of restoration, comeback, progression
and rise, the prospect of giant-killing encounters between small-town
nobodies and big metropolitan centres – all such possibilities fuel
the passions of followers and spectators, and of players who aspire
to ply their trade at the highest level.
76. The dominant economic model of football still allows such
dreams and aspirations to flourish, encouraged by a pyramid model
of involvement and participation that can accommodate all levels,
from the playground to the professional stadium. In practice, the
richest have become, for the most part, unassailable: but aspiration
from below remains a reality. Things differ in the USA, where a
professional sport franchise model, exemplified in the National
Football League is based upon controlled competition and established pathways
– in particular through College sports – for future elite performers.
5.3 Soft
budget control
77. The economics and finances
of sports organisations such as football clubs have long been recognised as
a distinctive and peculiar case. This has in large part been due,
as observed in the case of La Ligue in France, to the willingness
of clubs to be “drawn into spending more than their budget” to attract
top players and then “to beg patrons and tycoons to bail them out”.
Note Other parties willing to participate
and collude in such bail-outs include stakeholders such as fan groups,
along with municipalities and other political entities for which the
presence of a football club has constituted a welcome symbol of
community and heritage, as well as potential place-marketing in
the present and the future. Six types of softness have been identified
in the analysis and theorisation of Soft Budget-Constraint, and
all of these have been demonstrated to be deeply embedded in European
football and the operating practices of clubs.
Note
78. The six are:
- soft administrative
pricing, as in the provision to clubs of stadia or training facilities
at below-market prices;
- soft taxing, for instance tax emptions and amnesty on
or non-enforcement of tax debt;
- soft subsidies in an open form such as the cancellation
of deficits or debt by patrons or governments, to keep clubs in
business; or in more hidden forms such as inflated sponsorship deals;
- softness of credit conditions, including unpaid bills,
acceptance of overdrafts and common postponement and/or rescheduling
of debts;
- soft investments, in which sponsors, or a government pays
towards revenue-boosting infrastructure such as new stadia build;
- soft accounting, in which corners are cut, rules bypassed,
and legal conditions creatively overcome.
79. This is a recipe for a lack of transparency in football club
development and administration, rendering clubs across the professional
spectrum vulnerable to financial crises. We mentioned above the
positive impact of the UEFA Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. It
has been claimed, however, that following UEFA’s introduction of
the FFP rules, the quality of financial reporting and statements
has diminished in European club football; and that explicit forms
of massaging of financial accounts have been adopted in order to
avoid FFP penalties, enabling clubs to simply carry on as before.
Note The question here might best be posed by
asking how well-intentioned FFP principles have been bypassed in
practice or applied unfairly.
80. It is the opinion of UEFA and the stakeholders that FFP regulations
should be reviewed
Note. At present, the following
outcomes are being considered among others:
- the system should move from an ex-post to a more ex-ante
approach, and focus on control of transfer payments and fees and
to players’ salaries (for example consider the establishment of
a ceiling), instead of solely considering the bottom line net result;
- there should be incentives to address the challenges generated
by the flexibility of revenue streams and the rigidity of the cost
structure;
- the grid of sanctions (and the way to impose them) should
be reconsidered, to ensure proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,
also paying attention to recidivism; financial penalties must be
combined with sporting penalties.
81. Some stakeholders are concerned, however, that the reform
could give more leeway on the expenditure side, as far as new liquidities
would be made available, which could advantage top clubs thus contributing
to increase polarisation. This is a problem that UEFA should bear
in mind.
82. There has been no sufficient time to explore further this
issue with the partners and therefore, I do not feel appropriate
to express straightforward views, but I would encourage a genuine
debate on the benefits (and potential drawbacks) of salary capping
or the capping of squad contracts for clubs at different levels
of the football ladder or pyramid, bearing in mind the need to protect
smaller clubs in particular from over-reaching in financial terms,
and to secure the mid- to long-term viability of league structures
and the promotion-relegation model.
83. Concerning the main events, bidding processes have encouraged
countries/national associations to think big when applying to host
the finals tournament of a men’s World Cup, or a European Championship,
and the neglected infrastructural legacies of Portugal 2004, South
Africa 2010, Brazil 2014 and even Russia 2018 are signals of a lack
of responsibility in some of the biggest decisions by football’s
governing bodies.
84. There have though been serious improvements in bidding principles
and processes in recent years, including the transparency of the
voting procedure for FIFA World Cup hosting rights for the men’s
World Cup 2026, and in the European sphere the experiment to disperse
UEFA’s European Championship (Euro 2020) across 12 cities in 12
European countries. Environmental impact concerns and assessable
legacy aims and goals should be embedded in all such processes to
avoid budget excesses, spiralling costs and the multiplication of
white-elephant facilities and venues.
6 Reform
of the transfer system
85. Since March 2017, the FIFA
Football Stakeholders Committee has been dealing with the reform
of the transfer system. I have reported on the reform process in
an information note
Note to which I refer. I will take up here
just a few elements and my analysis.
86. FIFA established, in October 2017, a task force including
representatives of FIFPRO, clubs, leagues, national associations,
UEFA, the other confederations and FIFA, to agree on how the transfer
system could be improved. The need for an in-depth review of the
system was clearly perceived and its drawbacks well identified:
- a transfer market driven by
speculation rather than solidarity;
- excessive transfer fees which are diverting money from
football development;
- growing influence of football agents, with an increasing
risk of conflicts of interests;
- greater contractual instability;
- massive inflation of transfer fees and player wages;
- increasing competitive imbalance.
87. To respond to the failures of the existing system, the following
areas have been considered: clearing house, intermediaries and agents,
training rewards, loans, transfer fee process, transfer of young
players, squad size and home-grown players, transfer windows (registration)
and fiscal regulation for transfer fees and players’ salaries.
88. In general, all the partners involved in the work of the task
force consider that the establishment of the clearing house, the
mandatory licensing of, and new regulations on, intermediaries at
international level, the modernisation of the solidarity and training
compensation schemes and the reform of the loan system are improvements
which will entail significant long-term benefits.
Note
89. This is also my opinion: the reform elements on which agreement
has already been reached are positive: they uphold legitimate interests
of players, clubs and other football stakeholders. I also value
the fact that the reform process is aimed at a high level of consensus
on the solutions, also with a view to speed up their effective implementation.
The question is, however, to what extent these steps forward respond
to all expectations and whether existing problems, while reduced,
remain partly unsolved and would thus require further consideration.
Note
90. A reform of this extent and complexity cannot be achieved
but progressively. It is also important to seek a wide consensus,
when possible, and this of course requires proper time for “negotiations”.
Taking account of the existence of huge financial interests and
sometimes quite diverging perspectives and expectations, it is not astonishing
that even for the key reform elements, results achieved are somewhat
interim ones. Moreover, FIFA’s role in mediating between the above-mentioned
diverging interests and expectations is quite hard. Our proposals
are intended to back FIFA (but also other partners’) efforts – and
not to express criticisms – with the hope to help removing strong
resistance to a reform which is touching upon very significant vested
interests.
91. FIFA has asked the Group of States against Corruption of the
Council of Europe (GRECO) to analyse and give an opinion on the
new transfer system. It is not my intention to reproduce the excellent
and quite detailed GRECO analysis, or the numerous recommendations
therein. My intention is to highlight a few (but key) elements of
concern that I have, and my position is coherent with the GRECO
approach and advice.
6.1 The
clearing house
92. The FIFA clearing house is
a separate entity from FIFA, which will act as a payment service
provider. In short, the clearing house should achieve securing proper
registration of all players, full traceability of their transfers
and correct calculation and payment of the training rewards. It
should also ensure, through a compliance assessment process, that
all the parties involved in financial transactions operated via
the clearing house comply with the national and international legal
obligations concerning international payment sanctions, anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorism financing.
93. However, at the beginning, only training rewards will be paid
via the clearing house and only in a later phase would the agents’
service and transfer fees be paid through the system. It might be
understandable that the new system is implemented progressively.
However, bearing in mind the importance of ensuring transparency
of all the financial flows related to transfers, it is of the utmost
importance that all agents’ service and transfer fees are processed
via the system of the clearing house as soon as possible; this should
also imply submitting the agents and their activity to the compliance
assessment procedures, while ensuring robust personal data protection.
94. In addition, FIFA regulations should establish enforceable
obligations to provide accurate data (and corresponding powers to
enquiry and punish any violations). The FIFA clearing house system
will apply to international transfers, but transparency must be
ensured also in the case of domestic ones; this might be pursued
through the establishment of domestic clearing houses, which should
all operate according to the same standards (so as to ensure a uniform
data collection and analysis).
6.2 Regulations
on football agents and their status
95. The regulation of the agency/intermediary
services is a sensitive and complex issue. The FIFA Players’ Agents
Regulations of 2008 provided for a regulated access to the profession,
requiring a license obtained through an exam; it also prohibited
dual representation. The FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries, issued
in 2015, introduced a much softer system, with only a few minimum
standard requirements: a licence was no longer required, intermediaries
were allowed to represent multiple parties in the same transaction (subject
to proper disclosure) and FIFA renounced its competence on intermediaries’
disputes and licencing. The implementation of these Regulations
has been delegated to national associations, and this has generated differences
and even inconsistencies between countries.
96. The widely shared perception is that these Regulations have
been a mistake (and FIFA recognises this). Consultation for a reform
process has been ongoing since April 2018 and this question was
included in the second reform package, endorsed by the FIFA Council
in Shanghai in October 2019.
97. The new regulations, which should enter into force in 2022,
are intended, on the one hand, to enhance agents professional and
ethical standards and, on the other hand, to reinforce the protection
of players and their contractual stability. They should include,
among other things: the reintroduction of a mandatory licensing system;
the prohibition of multiple representation to avoid conflicts of
interest; caps on commissions to avoid excessive and abusive practices,
preventing their inflation; establishment of an exclusive, simple
and fast dispute resolution system within FIFA to deal with agent-related
disputes of an international dimension. Two issues deserve specific
consideration.
98. First, concerning the issue of multiple
representation, the rule which is foreseen consists of
a general prohibition of representing two or more parties to the
same transaction; however, the same agent would be allowed to represent
the player and the engaging club in the same given transaction,
subject to a prior explicit written consent given by both clients.
This appears to be a kind of compromise. It might happen that the
player and the engaging club have diverging interests; therefore,
a risk of conflict of interest is there, and it will be essential
to counter it. Looking at the question from the perspective of players,
however, many players could be unable to pay (alone) proper agency
services if this option were not available.
99. Second, concerning commissions,
according to data in the FIFA Transfer Matching System, the total amount
of commissions paid to intermediaries in relation to international
transfers for 2019 was around USD 655 million; in 2020 (notwithstanding
the perceivable impact of the Covid-19 pandemic) the amount was
around USD 496 million. Commissions paid to agents are substantially
higher in reality, as the FIFA Transfer Matching System only captures
international transfers (and not domestic ones), commissions paid
by clubs (and not those paid by the players) and data that is (properly)
declared by users. Most of the agents’ fees are paid by clubs in
the UEFA countries.
100. The money reinvested via training reward mechanisms is much
less. For example, in 2018, the total amount of solidarity contributions
and training compensations was just above USD 90 million, i.e. six
times less than commissions for international transfers. In 2019,
payments to training clubs amounted, according to FIFA, at USD 75.5
million. It seems that the market speculation is driving resources
away from football development. Moreover, it is also creating an
incentive to engineer players’ mobility, thereby threatening contractual
stability; and it is likely to have a negative effect on players’
salaries.
101. For these reasons, FIFA is considering introducing
caps on the commissions:
- for the agent acting on behalf
of the player, the maximum commission would be 3% of the remuneration effectively
paid to the player under the new employment contract;
- for the agent acting on behalf of the engaging club, the
maximum commission would be 3% of the remuneration effectively paid
to the player under the new employment contract;
- for the agent acting on behalf of the releasing club,
the cap on the total commissions paid for the entire transaction
would be 10% of the gross transfer compensation.
102. This is progress: the proposed measures for agents are in
the right direction as they are realigning the agent regulation
with the objectives of the football transfer system. However:
- the commission on the gross
transfer compensation will be, in general, (much) more lucrative
than the commission on the player’s remuneration; because of this
lack of balance, agents will have more interest in fostering frequent
transfers, thus incentivising contractual instability;
- the caps concern only the commissions paid to agents,
and not other service fee forms, which could lead to side (hidden)
arrangements aimed at displacing agents’ revenues from commissions
to (inflated) fixed fees, giving a leeway to circumvent the proposed
caps;
- even with caps, the amounts paid to the agents will remain
much higher than the amount distributed as training and solidarity
payments.
103. It is not easy to find a solution which can meet at the same
time the need of paying a fair and reasonable remuneration to the
agents for their work, avoiding conflicts of interest, protecting
the players, avoiding pressure towards contractual instability and
preventing abusive, excessive and speculative practices. I trust that
the problems can be reduced by transparency; therefore, I believe
we must insist in asking that all commissions and fees paid to agents
are capped, registered, disclosed and monitored. Moreover, I think
it could be useful to consider establishing a ceiling (in addition
to the maximum percentage of 10% of the gross transfer amount) to
the total amounts which can be paid for a transaction to the agent
of the releasing clubs (for example US$10 million).
6.3 Solidarity
contributions and training compensation
104. Solidarity
contributions have been payable (since 2001) to any club
that has trained a player between the ages of 12 and 23, when an
international transfer
Note or
(since 1 July 2020) a domestic transfer
with an international dimension
Note takes
place. The contribution is calculated as 5% of the fees or any other compensation
agreed within the scope of a transfer and distributed proportionally
to all training clubs. Before 1st July
2020, only international transfers were concerned; this was against
the interests of the training clubs, and could provoke distortions
in the transfer market, since releasing clubs could tend to prefer
a domestic transfer to an international one, to avoid a 5% reduction
over the agreed transfer or loan fees.
105. The training compensation is
payable when a player is registered for the first time as a professional with
a club affiliated to a different association than the training club,
and then upon each subsequent international transfer until the end
of the calendar year of the player’s 23rd birthday.
The compensation is paid to clubs that have trained the player between
the calendar years from his 12th to 21st birthdays.
It is calculated by reference to training costs, established on
a confederation basis, with a precise determination made by individual
national associations, which divide their clubs into a maximum of
four categories.
106. To make the training rewards system more predictable, effective
and consistent, FIFA envisages to establish an additional levy of
1% of the agreed transfer fee, paid by the buying club to a “centralised
fund”, which will be used for the payment of the future training
compensations. Distribution criteria will also be reviewed so that
lower categories of clubs would receive relatively more from the
fund than higher categories.
107. This proposed change points in the right direction. However,
I believe that the system should seek to ensure a more balanced
proportion between the commissions paid to agents and training rewards.
It is expected that the reform will produce an increase in the amount
of solidarity and training compensation payments, on the one hand,
because it will avoid evasion and, on the other, because of the
envisaged additional 1% levy to finance a training compensation
fund, which is certainly to be commended. However, the agents of
the selling clubs would be entitled to perceive up to 10% of the
amount of the transfer. I believe that training should be valued
(thus remunerated) more than agency. Therefore, I propose that,
when the releasing club pays a commission higher than 6% to the
agent, the training compensation must equate to the total amount
paid to the agent;
Note the additional amount
of the training compensation should be paid to the “centralised
fund” by the releasing club.
6.4 International
transfers of minors
108. FIFA regulations prohibit international
transfers of minors, with some reasonable exceptions.
Note I believe this restrictive approach
is the right one. Nevertheless, FIFPRO argues that strict enforcement
of rules prohibiting international transfers can be counterproductive
to certain young players by limiting their football development
opportunities.
109. Among the exceptions, the most relevant one, namely the possibility
of international transfers between the ages of 16 and 18 within
the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA), is only available
to clubs of national associations in EU/EEA countries. According
to the CAS jurisprudence, this exception also applies to transfers
of players with an EU passport from clubs based in non-EU/EEA countries
to clubs based in EU/EEA countries. This, means, for example, that
South-American and African citizens holding double citizenships (one
being of an EU country) can benefit from the exception. Given the
relatively high number of players in this situation, the system
creates more opportunities for minors in Europe and minors with
EU/EEA nationality, compared to other regions. Therefore, the extension
of the current EU/EEA exception (redrafted on the basis of the case
law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) at a global level,
while adding supplementary mandatory criteria for the international
transfer of players between the ages of 16 and 18 has been considered.
110. The idea of establishing a uniform legal framework applicable
to all international transfers might have a certain appeal; however,
when removing the general prohibition of Article 19 of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players, the risks of exploitation
cannot but increase. There would also be a risk of a high concentration
of the youngest talents in the wealthier and most attractive clubs
(many of them being in Europe) and therefore an additional element
of imbalances.
111. In any case, the transfer of a minor must be subject to compliance
by the national associations and clubs with strict compulsory conditions,
to be verified before granting the authorisation to the transfer.
In particular (building also on the proposals of the task force)
national associations and clubs must ensure at least:
- effective protection of all
players of minor age against any form of exploitation and abuse;
- the effective provision, by the clubs to the minor-age
players they register, of a stable environment not only for professional
(football) development, but also for education and/or vocational
training, and adequate health and social insurance benefits;
- the stability of the contractual relation with the minor-age
player at least until the end of the season of the player’s 18th birthday;
- general working conditions not less favourable than those
of the other players of the club and not below the international
ILO standards;
- the assistance the minor-age player may need to find his
or her place within the hosting local community.
112. Consideration should also be given to the importance for the
minor of keeping contacts with his/her family, when it is not possible
to maintain the family unit.
113. Moreover, FIFA should elaborate, in collaboration with its
member associations, FIFPRO and other relevant stakeholders, as
well as with other partners and experts as required:
- model provisions to be included
in regulations of the confederations and/or of the national associations on
monitoring mechanisms, effective remedies and severe sanctions to
uphold the protection of minor players;
- a guide on the transfers of minor players and their protection,
including all relevant information for the young players and their
family, for example on risks of trafficking by fake agentsNote and their phishing
and scam practices on the internet (as well as on ways to detect
and avoid them), official procedures for international transfers,
standard rights and obligations of minor players and clubs, contact
points at FIFA and confederation/national levels, etc.; this guide
should be published in FIFA and confederations websites, in the
most common languages, and national associations should translate
and publish it in their respective languages.
114. Last, but not least, within the new regulatory framework for
agents and intermediaries, specific qualifications must be required
from whoever wishes to represent a minor, in addition to those needed
to get the professional license. There should be a public, centralised,
international agent register, listing all licensed agents with the
authority to represent minors, which would be made available via
the FIFA website.
7 Final
remarks
115. The profile of football in
global culture is prominent as never before. “No other sport, no
popular cultural form, has been subject to this degree of adulation.
Football is first: the most global and most popular of popular cultural
phenomena in the twenty-first century.”
Note Yet
the game must face today difficult challenges and evolve.
116. My report mainly focuses on two wide issues: the role of football
in upholding human rights and the need to rethink the functioning
of the football financial system. It is good that football continues
to be a prosperous business; however, it must remain based on values.
117. Football is not merely a market product, a lucrative global
commodity: it is a shared cultural practice that has caught the
imagination of the whole world. Good football governance requires
a cultural shift and an ethical stance which addresses the duties
and obligations of each stakeholder in relation to its partners.
In this sense, any reform to curb the financial excesses of football
institutions needs an ethical underpinning, in which the most valued
aspects of football culture are protected and nurtured.
118. The Daniel Funds Ethics Initiative at the University of Colorado
(Denver) Business School proposes that eight ethical principles
should inform institutional and organisational philosophies and
practice in the contemporary world, equally applicable across public,
private and voluntary sectors. These are integrity, trust, accountability,
transparency, fairness, respect, rule of law, and viability. I will
add to these principles the care for human dignity and human rights.
119. No doubt, such action points are essential if football is
to retain its significance as a vibrant cultural form rather than
becoming no more than just a profit-led money-making global commodity,
and to preserve its place across all levels of society, in all parts
of the world, as a symbol of reciprocally respectful competition
and meritocratic achievement, and as a source of humane inter-cultural
understanding and co-operation.
120. In the previous sections, I have presented many concrete proposals,
which I have also detailed in the draft resolution. Therefore, I
do not intend to repeat them in my conclusions. However, I believe
it is worth highlighting some key ideas behind these proposals.
121. Football governance must be designed to safeguard the realm
of fundamental rights and protect those who are more vulnerable,
starting from children; to reject all forms of exploitation, violence,
segregation and discrimination and to raise mutual understanding
and respect between all people; to promote gender equality and the
development of women football; to encourage and support human development
of all players.
122. In this respect, the report refers to many programmes and
projects which partners have developed to reinforce the protection
of young players particularly, but not only, against the risks of
exploitation and sexual abuse within the sports environment. These
efforts are to be commended. There is also a need to upgrade national
and local schemes for educating young players as persons and citizens:
the present crisis should alert all stakeholders to the importance
of helping football players to acquire the competences required
for them to have a place in society also beyond the period of their
sporting career.
123. Football governance must counter excesses and seek to reduce
polarisation through increased solidarity. Gaps between the major
teams and others, and between the best players and the rest, are
inevitable and to a certain extent natural. We will not be able
to eliminate them completely and I believe it would be a mistake
to try to do so. Both in sports competitions and in business, it
is only natural for the best, the most skilful and the most talented
to be recognised for their excellence and rewarded accordingly.
What is at issue here, however, is whether the gaps that have emerged
and are continuing to grow are reasonable.
124. More generous principles of financial redistribution should
be adopted so that the monies that circulate in and among an increasingly
narrow elite of rich clubs do not continue to further divide the
different layers of the football pyramid. New redistribution mechanisms
should be developed that can strengthen the economic base of football
and the viability of all stakeholders. Financial transparency should
be reinforced at all levels of football governance and institutions:
this would help revealing the excesses of some actors in the football marketplace,
and for the poorer clubs the nature and scale of their financial
crises.
125. Moreover, I think it is our duty to ensure that the economic
benefits associated with the football economy are shared more widely
with society as a whole. Therefore, beyond greater solidarity (and
a more balanced distribution of resources) within the football system,
football governance should aim at developing community outreach,
which should be included in the activities of all clubs and leagues.
The football world should be called to devote a (significantly)
higher share of the financial flow it generates (and namely the
amount of money derived from TV rights and sponsorships) to social
responsibility actions, namely to actions which should benefit the
society at large. Given the present context, stakeholders should
upgrade their respective social responsibility programmes and design
more ambitious social responsibility strategies, so that football
could foster cohesion within our communities and within our societies.
126. In this context, dialogue with fans should be strengthened.
Fans should be consulted more often and with more commitment. Clubs
and associations could consider switching marketing budgets and
departments over to community-liaison workers, whose primary brief
would be to foster fan groups and organisations where they do not
as yet exist, and/or to work with established fan groups and organisations
across the community. If clubs are to sustain links to communities
and constituencies of fans, and to claim any credible relationship
to the cultural legacies that the history of the game generates,
then a genuine way of bringing fan groups into the stakeholder network
should be established.
127. Decision making should be more inclusive and dialogue between
stakeholders should be reinforced. Interests are sometimes diverging,
and it is important that decisions are taken having regard to different positions.
Consensus will not always be possible, but all stakeholders should
act in good faith, be willing to collaborate and be open to solutions
which pay attention to the needs of other partners.
128. There are some tough questions to be answered, such as the
extent of FIFA’s regulatory powers when it comes to governing the
economic activity of agents and intermediaries, whether some elite
clubs could stage a competition (the European Super League) that
is independent from UEFA’s official interclub competitions and whether
(or not) holding the World Cup every two years would be appropriate.
I consider that the Assembly should take a stand on these issues,
even though it has not been possible to discuss them in depth; this
is reflected in the draft resolution.
129. Before concluding, I wish to stress that, while many topical
questions are discussed by the present report, it has not been possible
to examine all those that deserve consideration. Among others, I
will mention the theme of the complex (and sometimes dangerous)
relationships between the worlds of sport, business, politics and
communications, including, for example: the problem of the simultaneous
holding of both political offices and positions in sports institutions
or companies with significant financial interests in football; or
the conditions for granting public funds to sports companies and
associations.
130. In addition, football players – and more widely, athletes
in all sports – expect their rights as workers to be recognised
and protected and are calling on legislators to ensure this. The
relentless pace of competition and media pressure puts their physical
and mental health at risk, not to mention the dangers of violent
impacts (including when heading the ball) to which male and female
players are exposed from an early age. Complex issues arise with
regard to the exercise of their freedom of expression and the limits
that can be justifiably imposed on this freedom in the name of the
neutrality of sport.
131. Lastly, we need to be aware that the Council of Europe and
the Assembly have a role to play, that they must perform to the
best of their abilities, in supporting and promoting good initiatives
– like, for example, the project to set up a Safe Sport Entity –
and in guiding developments in sports governance and in the sports ecosystem
in general, to uphold our shared values.
