C Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Frank Schwabe, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. The Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine is the largest and deadliest conflict in Europe since
the Second World War, causing thousands of casualties amongst civilians,
millions of displaced persons, widespread trauma, violence, death,
and devastation.
2. Although Ukraine and Ukrainians are bearing the brunt of this
aggression, this war is much more than a bilateral issue between
two States. In this war, not only are values and principles at stake,
but also peace and prosperity, in Europe and beyond.
3. In its Opinion 300 (2022), adopted on 15 March 2022, the Parliamentary
Assembly took a clear stand, unanimously reiterating its support
for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of
Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and condemning
the Russian Federation’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression.
In its Opinion, the Assembly said that, in light of the gravity
of its violations of international law and the ensuing breach of
trust, the Russian Federation could no longer be a member of the
Council of Europe.
4. That very day, the Russian Federation announced its withdrawal
from the Organisation and its intention to denounce the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). On 16 March 2022, the Committee
of Ministers formally decided on the Russian Federation’s exclusion
from the Council of Europe on the basis of Article 8 of its Statute
(ETS No. 1).
Note The Russian Federation remains a
High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights
until 16 September 2022.
5. The role of the Council of Europe in relation to this crisis
does not end with the Russian Federation’s exclusion from the Organisation.
The Council of Europe should be part of the international community’s
effort to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation to cease
the hostilities, withdraw its troops from the sovereign territory
of Ukraine and be held accountable for the crimes and damages it
has inflicted throughout this continued aggression. The Council
of Europe should deploy all available means to support and assist Ukraine,
during this war and in the future. It should also open a reflection
on its role in the new historical context created by this war.
6. The present report has been prepared to inform a general policy
debate to be held during the 2022 second part-session of the Assembly.
It is complementary to other reports which are currently under preparation
in several Assembly committees, dealing with the humanitarian situation;
ensuring accountability for war crimes, international humanitarian
law and human rights violations; and addressing security challenges in
Europe, to mention a few.
7. This report takes stock of the developments which have occurred
since the adoption of Opinion 300 (2022), even if the situation
is rapidly evolving and many facts and figures will be outdated
once the report is debated. Most importantly, the report puts forward
recommendations for action by the Council of Europe and its member
States, some of which were already outlined in the Opinion.
2 The security situation in Ukraine
8. Since 24 February 2022, the
Russian Federation has unleashed a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attacking
from three fronts, with strikes by land, air and sea, in the largest
military offensive that Europe has witnessed since the end of the
Second World War.
9. During the first week, the Russian military shifted from strategic
strikes against military targets using cruise missiles to a ground
attack and then laying siege to major cities, including by using
rocket artillery and cluster munitions against residential buildings,
hospitals, schools, and other civilian infrastructure.
10. At the time of writing, Russian forces have redeployed from
the area north of Kyiv towards the eastern regions of Ukraine, which
leads one to expect the imminence of a large-scale offensive in
the East. In the South, Russian forces continue to lay siege to
Mariupol. According to its Mayor, over 10 000 people have died because
of the siege.
Note
11. The weaponry and tactics used by the Russian military have
greatly exacerbated the plight of civilians. Recourse to heavy artillery,
multi-launch rocket systems and air strikes against populated areas
have contributed to the indiscriminate effects of this conflict.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has said there
are credible reports that Russian armed forces have used cluster
munitions in populated areas of Ukraine at least two dozen times
since the invasion began.
Note Add to this the alleged use of thermobaric weapons
Note and land mines, which have claimed
innocent lives, and the picture is harrowing. On 30 March 2022, the
Ukrainian Deputy Interior Minister said that approximately 300 000
km² of Ukrainian territory had been contaminated by explosive devices.
Note
12. In early April, the disturbing discovery of mass graves and
bodies of executed civilians along the streets of Bucha, a Kyiv
suburb, caused global outrage. While the Russian Federation claimed
that this was fake news and that the bodies were not there when
its forces were in control of the area, satellite imagery confirmed otherwise.
Note
13. Numerous testimonies are emerging of rape, including gang
rape, and sexual violence being carried out by Russian troops, sometimes
in front of the victims’ families, including children. “Alongside
murder, pillage and torture, rape is being used as a weapon to break,
demoralise and destroy people, homes and families”, as said by Zita
Gurmai, the Assembly General Rapporteur on violence against women.
Note
14. There is ample evidence that Russian forces use abduction
and arbitrary detention against the civilian population, especially
public officials, journalists, civil rights and political activists
and other persons having a prominent role at local level, as a way
to intimidate the population or to be exchanged for prisoners of
war. Mayors and local officials have been especially targeted.
Note In Motyzhyn, a village near Bucha,
the local mayor, Olga Sukhenko, was discovered half-buried in a
ditch alongside members of her family.
15. At the same time, there are allegations of violations of international
humanitarian law from the part of Ukrainian forces, including ill-treatment
and killing of prisoners of war and attacks against civilians.
Note
3 The
humanitarian consequences of the aggression
16. Day after day, the humanitarian
situation is increasingly dire. Over 1 400 civilians have been confirmed dead,
and 2 000 injured, since 24 February 2022, including almost 300
children.
Note The actual figures are certainly
much higher, as information from locations where intense hostilities
have been taking place, such as Mariupol, Volnovakha, Izium and
Irpin, is difficult to find and corroborate. Hundreds of thousands
of people are trapped in cities with no access to food, water, heat,
shelter, or electricity, with no respite in sight.
17. Access to health care is severely limited by insecurity and
the lack of basic supplies. The United Nations has verified dozens
of incidents in which medical facilities have been damaged, including
50 hospitals,
Note and Ukrainian Government figures
go as high as 135.
Note In early March, the shelling of
a maternity and children’s hospital in Mariupol was an example which
gave rise to international condemnation.
18. Due to the conflict, more than 4 in 10 people in Ukraine are
worried about finding enough to eat. The UN World Food Programme
has provided emergency assistance to one million people inside Ukraine,
Note and projects an exponential rise
in food insecurity across all areas of the country. Given the region’s
role in global wheat supply, there is great concern regarding the
conflict’s impact on humanitarian food assistance elsewhere.
19. Ukrainian cities have largely borne the brunt. Large urban
centres, from Kharkiv in the north to Mykolaiv in the south, have
witnessed relentless shelling and isolation from supplies. Almost
100 000 people remain trapped in Mariupol alone, which has been
under consistent heavy attack since the beginning of the invasion. 90%
of Mariupol’s residential buildings have been affected by active
fighting, with some 40% completely destroyed.
Note Authorities estimate that 300 people
were killed during the shelling of a theatre in the city on 6 March
2022. Similarly horrifying conditions are faced by the city of Chernihiv,
where 130 000 people – less than half of the normal population –
are stuck with little or no access to running water, electricity,
heat, medical care, or communications.
Note
20. The situation is also particularly worrying in eastern Ukraine,
an area which has already been exposed to eight years of armed conflict,
isolation of communities, deteriorating infrastructure, multiple
movement restrictions and high levels of landmines. In the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, 1 504 civilian casualties have been recorded,
with the vast majority in government-controlled territory.
Note It is important to recall that even before
the current military campaign, 1.1 million people were in need of
food and livelihood assistance in eastern Ukraine.
21. The scale of displacement caused by this conflict is staggering.
In just the first five weeks of the war, a quarter of the population
of Ukraine has been forced to flee their homes. Six and a half million
people have been displaced internally within Ukraine, with an additional
13 million estimated to be stranded in affected areas or unable
to leave due to heightened security risks.
Note
22. It is shocking to think that, one month after the beginning
of the war, 4.3 million children – more than half of Ukraine’s children
– have been displaced. This includes 2.5 million who are now internally
displaced inside Ukraine.
Note Over 450 000 children aged 6 to
23 months need complementary food support. UNICEF has already observed
a reduction in vaccination coverage for routine and childhood immunisations,
including measles and polio. This could quickly lead to outbreaks
of vaccine-preventable diseases, especially in overcrowded areas
where people are sheltering from the violence. Speaking on the occasion
of the launch of the new Council of Europe Strategy for the Rights
of the Child at a high-level conference in Rome, Tiny Kox, President
of the Assembly, highlighted the importance of supporting children
affected by the war in Ukraine.
Note
23. More than 1.8 million children have crossed into neighbouring
countries. Amongst them, many are unaccompanied or have been separated
from their parents or family members, which exposes them to a high risk
of human trafficking and exploitation.
24. Local authorities have played a significant role in organising
evacuations, co-ordinating relief, and adapting to the influx of
displaced persons. They have also called for a more streamlined
approach to humanitarian donations in order to ensure that support
actually reaches those in need.
Note
25. During its first visit to Ukraine since the beginning of this
aggression, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly met with
the Mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovyy, and the head of the regional
civil-military administration, Maxim Kozycky. It visited the local
Humanitarian Aid Co-ordination centre, praising the efforts made
by local authorities to help the huge number of internally displaced
persons who reached the city in search for safety. Lviv is estimated
to be hosting approximately 200 000 internally displaced persons
– more than a quarter of its normal population – with the mayor
warning that the city is facing a breaking point.
Note
26. It is a matter of grave concern that, since the beginning
of the conflict, humanitarian corridors have been difficult to establish
and, when set up, they have not been respected. While representatives
of Ukraine and the Russian Federation have had exchanges at various
levels and agreed on the need to establish humanitarian corridors,
Note few concrete workable solutions
have been announced. A proposal by Moscow to create humanitarian
corridors from six heavily bombed Ukrainian cities was rejected
by Kyiv, and condemned by international leaders, after it turned
out that most of the safe routes would lead to the Russian Federation
and Belarus.
NoteNote
27. In late March 2022, the Russian and Ukrainian Governments
announced that Russian forces would allow three humanitarian corridors
to be established in the region.
NoteNote On 30 and 31 March, nearly 2 990
people arrived in Zaporizhzhia in private cars, including more than
1 440 from Mariupol. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), however, was prevented from reaching Mariupol on 1 April
to facilitate the safe passage of civilians
Note, and evacuation buses from the nearby
cities of Berdiansk and Melitopol were also not allowed to progress.
Note
28. The Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine has triggered
the biggest refugee exodus in Europe since the Second World War,
and one of the fastest-growing refugee emergencies on record, according to
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Over four million people
have sought refuge outside the country as of 3 April, with more
than a million fleeing in the first week of the conflict alone.
Note 90% of the refugees resulting from
this conflict are women and children.
Note
29. Neighbouring countries have taken in the largest share of
refugees, with Poland alone receiving 2.4 million people. Romania
is hosting 640 000, the Republic of Moldova and Hungary upwards
of 390 000, and the Slovak Republic 300 000.
30. In order to face these enormous challenges, neighbouring countries
have gone to considerable lengths to quickly adopt tailored measures
to provide housing, food, cash, and schooling for refugees, in addition
to aid for local families hosting them.
NoteNote Their efforts should be commended
and further supported by the international community, including
the Council of Europe. There is a need for financial assistance,
medical and other aid, and also expert programmes to meet the needs
of those who are in a vulnerable situation, such as victims of gender-based
violence, victims of trauma, children, persons with disabilities
and the elderly. At the same time, all those concerned should avoid
discriminating against people fleeing from the conflict, on any
grounds.
31. As emphasised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights on 24 March 2022, all member States, whether neighbouring
Ukraine or not, should strengthen their efforts to co-ordinate and
scale up support for the response to the humanitarian and human
rights needs of people fleeing the war in Ukraine.
Note
32. A European Commission index showed that Austria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, and Estonia were among the countries not bordering Ukraine
under the greatest pressure from the refugee intake.
Note The Russian Federation and Belarus
also report hosting 350 000 and 15 000 Ukrainian refugees, respectively.
Note However, there have been reports
of forced relocations of civilians to the Russian Federation, including
thousands from Mariupol. The Government of Ukraine claims 40 000
people have been moved to Russian-held territory without any co-ordination
with Kyiv.
Note
33. As highlighted by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), public officials
and civil society organisations in countries receiving Ukrainian
refugees must be alerted to the risks of human trafficking and exploitation.
Note
4 The
global consequences of the aggression
34. The consequences of the continued
Russian Federation’s invasion against Ukraine are already being felt
in Europe and worldwide.
35. At geopolitical level, the unleashing of a war of aggression
by a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council poses a daunting
challenge to global governance, undermining the ability of this
body to shoulder its responsibility to maintain peace and security
and destabilising the multilateral system which was established following
the Second World War.
36. At economic level, the conflict will worsen the economic crisis
linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), global economic growth will
be more than 1% lower in 2022 as a result of the war while inflation,
which was already high at the start of the year, may rise by about
a further 2.5% points across the world.
Note
37. With the Russian Federation supplying around 19% of the world’s
natural gas and 11% of oil, energy prices will be rising steeply.
The increase of energy costs will disrupt the production of goods
and services worldwide and will have far-reaching consequences on
economic growth as well as political and social stability.
38. One of the most alarming consequences of the war will be food
insecurity. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are important producers
of wheat and fertilisers, which used to be shipped through the Black
Sea and the Bosphorus. As the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
has said, “Food prices were already high due to unpredictable weather,
in part because of climate change, and the Covid-19 pandemic. Now
with the invasion of Ukraine, the world’s food systems could be
tipped into disaster”.
Note
39. This problem will be particularly serious in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), which in 2020 received more than 50% of
Ukraine’s wheat exports. Extensive conflict or a blockade of the
Black Sea would limit the agricultural products available to MENA
countries, giving rise to a potential food crisis. Food prices are already
at a 10-year high, reaching levels comparable to those during the
Arab Spring.
Note
40. A report just published by the World Food Programme (WFP)
warns that the costs of its global operations look set to increase
by $29 million a month. When added to pre-existing increases of
$42 million (since 2019), the total additional costs facing the
World Food Programme are $71 million per month.
Note 44 million people in 38 countries
around the world would be at risk of famine.
41. It goes without saying that this war is also the biggest security
threat since the end of the Second World War. As the aggression
continues and the evidence of atrocities surfaces, the risk of an
enlargement of the conflict cannot be excluded. Similarly, President
Putin’s decision to put nuclear forces on high alert, Russian statements
which do not categorically exclude the recourse to nuclear weapons
and the move to order Russian troops to take control of some of
Ukraine’s nuclear facilities have fuelled fears of a nuclear escalation.
The United States has also warned the Russian Federation against
the use of chemical weapons.
42. At European level, an evident consequence of this aggression
is the re-emergence of a dividing line in Europe, including in the
area of defence. In consideration of the Russian Federation’s hostile
actions and rhetoric, the NATO Response Force has been activated
with 40 000 troops being positioned in the eastern flank of the
Alliance, along with significant air and naval assets, under direct
NATO command. NATO has also established four multinational battle
groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, in addition
to the existing battle groups already stationed in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland. NATO Allies are also working to increase the
resilience of their societies and infrastructure to counter the
Russian Federation’s malign influence by enhancing cyber capabilities
and defences and providing support to each other in the event of
cyberattacks.
43. In addition to these immediate responses, NATO is strengthening
its deterrence and defence posture for the longer term, in the face
of a more dangerous strategic reality in Europe. A number of European
countries have announced increases in their defence budget, while
Finland and Sweden have expressed their wish to join NATO,
Note despite threats by the Russian Federation.
Note
44. The war is also affecting the European multilateral architecture.
Amongst European organisations, the European Union has taken up
a leadership role in the face of the Russian Federation’s aggression,
through a complex response which has highlighted its potential as
a global player. Its response has been articulated through:
- a clear and unequivocal message
at the highest political level, epitomised by the visits to Kyiv
by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and
the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen;
- the adoption of measures aimed at providing humanitarian
assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainians;
- the prompt setting up of a team to collect evidence and
investigate, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Public Prosecutor,
war crimes committed on the territory of Ukraine;
- the adoption of a wide range of sanctions against the
Russian Federation;
- the willingness to explore alternatives to energy dependency
from the Russian Federation;
- the willingness to step up the development of a European
defence policy.
45. The European Union has also increased its political attraction
for a number of Council of Europe member States who are particularly
weary of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy ambitions: in addition
to Ukraine, also Georgia and the Republic of Moldova have requested
to join the European Union, asking for their applications to be
swiftly considered in the light of the rapidly changing security
landscape in Europe.
46. As observed by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Building and Political Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, the
war in Ukraine is the most severe test that the OSCE has faced since
its creation in 1975.
Note Addressing the UN Security Council,
Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo warned that the Russian Federation’s
invasion of Ukraine risks dismantling long-standing confidence-building
measures, arms control treaties and other frameworks in Europe that
were designed and agreed to sustain regional security. This may result
in OSCE-led processes now being openly questioned by parties involved
in them.
47. It is also deeply regrettable that, in March 2022, the OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was not renewed, because of
lack of consensus.
Note The OSCE had been deployed since
2014 to observe and report in an impartial and objective way on
the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate dialogue among all parties
to the crisis.
Note
48. On the other hand, on 3 March 2022 the Moscow Mechanism of
the human dimension of the OSCE was invoked by Ukraine supported
by 45 participating States. Consequently, a Mission of three experts
was appointed on 14 March 2022. Its mandate covered establishing
the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions
of OSCE commitments, and violations and abuses of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law; and establishing
the facts and circumstances of possible cases of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate
attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; and to collect,
consolidate, and analyse this information with a view to presenting
it to relevant accountability mechanisms, as well as national, regional,
or international courts or tribunals that have, or may in future
have, jurisdiction.
49. The report was delivered on 5 April 2022 and represents an
important contribution towards establishing accountability.
Note The mission deployed under the Moscow
mechanism found clear patterns of international humanitarian law
violations by the Russian forces in their conduct of hostilities.
Furthermore, much of the conduct of Russian forces displayed in
the parts of Ukraine it occupied before and after 24 February 2022, including
through its proxies, the self-proclaimed “republics” of Donetsk
and Luhansk, violates international humanitarian law of military
occupation. The mission has considered the impact of the current
conflict on human rights and concluded that the impact of the conflict
on the enjoyment of human rights has gone beyond the direct violations
of these rights.
5 The
response of the international community
5.1 Exerting
diplomatic, economic and financial pressure on the Russian Federation
to cease its aggression
50. The United Nations Security
Council has no possibility to take action against this serious threat
to peace and security because of the Russian Federation’s veto right.
In these circumstances, the leadership role in this crisis has been
taken by the United Nations General Assembly.
51. On 2 March 2022, the United Nations General Assembly approved
a resolution labelling the invasion as an aggression and asking
the Russian Federation to “immediately, completely and unconditionally
withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine
within its internationally recognized borders.” Five countries – Belarus,
Eritrea, North Korea, Syria and the Russian Federation voted against
it; 35 abstained while the remaining 141 voted in favour.
52. On 7 April 2022, the suspension of the Russian Federation
from the Human Rights Council gave an additional blow to the Russian
Federation’s international standing. Led by the United States following
the discovery of atrocities in Bucha, the suspension was decided
by the UN General Assembly with 93 votes in favour, 24 against and
58 abstentions. It is the first time in the history of the United
Nations that such a measure has been taken against a permanent member
of the UN Security Council. Following the vote, the Russian Federation
announced that it had decided to quit.
53. In addition to the Council of Europe, since the outbreak of
this offensive also other international organisations have taken
measures to suspend or bring to an end their relations with the
Russian Federation: the International Labour Organization (ILO)
has temporarily suspended technical co-operation assistance to the
Russian Federation, except for humanitarian aspects,
Note while the OECD has decided to formally
terminate the Russian Federation’s accession process, which had
been postponed since 2014.
Note
54. Some countries are considering whether to exclude the Russian
Federation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and other development lenders as
a sanction for its invasion of Ukraine. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) has suspended its work with the Russian Federation.
The continuation of the Russian Federation's membership in the G20
is in question and Ukraine has called for the Russian Federation's
expulsion from the United Nations.
55. In response to the Russian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States
of America, and several other countries have, in a coordinated effort,
introduced a range of economic and financial sanctions of unprecedented
magnitude.
56. These measures are aimed at weakening the Russian Federation’s
capacity to finance the war and to impose clear economic and political
costs on the leadership of the Russian Federation, who is responsible
for the aggression. They include:
- targeted
restrictive measures against Russian individuals or entities;
- economic and financial sanctions;
- diplomatic measures, such as the expulsion of Russian
diplomatic staff;
- the suspension of broadcasting of state-owned Russian
media Sputnik and RT;
- restrictions on economic relations and trade.
57. Since 23 February 2022, the European Union has adopted five
packages of sanctions,
Note which add up to the measures which
had already been introduced against the Russian Federation as a
result of its illegal annexation of Crimea. Despite them being the
farthest-reaching sanctions ever adopted in the history of the European
Union, they have been criticised by the Ukrainian authorities and
others for not going far enough, and in particular for being too
gradual and largely excluding the energy sector, with only the most
recent package including a ban on importing coal.
58. Amongst Council of Europe member States who are not EU member
States, the United Kingdom has adopted the most stringent package
of sanctions, amending its Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations
2019, which is its key legal act setting out United Kingdom’s financial,
trade, aircraft, shipping and immigration sanctions against the
Russian Federation.
Note In addition, Albania, Andorra, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Norway, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland
and Ukraine have aligned with the international sanctions, while
Montenegro joined the EU sanctions without implementing them. Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova,
Serbia, and Turkey refrained from introducing sanctions against
the Russian Federation.
5.2 Ending
energy dependency on the Russian Federation
59. Several Council of Europe member
States rely heavily on Russian gas. Despite differences between member
States, the European Union imports 41% of its gas and 25% of its
oil from the Russian Federation. This war has emphasised the importance
of minimizing dependence on the Russian Federation for key imports, diversifying
energy sources, as well as accelerating the transition away from
fossil fuel by increasing investments in renewable energy. In this
new international context, it is evident that continuing to buy
Russian energy helps the Russian Federation finance this war while
creating a dangerous strategic dependency on an aggressor State.
60. On 8 March 2022, the European Commission published an outline
of a plan to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two thirds in 2022
and end all Russian fossil fuel imports well before 2030, starting
with gas. To do so, the Commission proposed to develop a REPowerEU
plan that will increase the resilience of the EU-wide energy system
based on two pillars: diversifying gas supplies, via higher liquefied
natural gas and pipeline imports from non-Russian suppliers, and
larger volumes of biomethane and renewable hydrogen production and
imports; and, reducing faster the use of fossil fuels in homes,
buildings, industry, and power system, by boosting energy efficiency, increasing
renewables and electrification, and addressing infrastructure bottlenecks.
Note
61. This plan has been criticised as too slow by some countries
Note and yet, according to some experts,
the EU target is unrealistic in the short term and “Europe is rather
looking at a slow divorce from the Russian Federation over the next
ten years.”
Note The EU target also exceeds what
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and analysts estimate as feasible,
not only because of the high level of dependence on Russian gas
but also because the European Union has committed to limit its greenhouse
gas emissions.
62. The IEA has put together a 10-part plan to help the region
reduce its dependence on the Russian energy source by a third in
one year while still adhering to the European Green Deal. The plan
which is a collection of actions designed to diversify Europe’s
energy supply, accelerate its move toward renewables and focus on energy
efficiency, includes not renewing expired contracts, ramping up
renewable sources, keeping open existing nuclear power plants and
asking the public to turn down the heat inside buildings.
Note
5.3 Ensuring
accountability for war crimes, international human rights and humanitarian
law violations
63. In the face of mounting and
conclusive evidence of war crimes, human rights and international humanitarian
law violations, the international community should take co-ordinated
action towards ensuring the accountability of the perpetrators,
from whichever side they are.
64. Several international bodies have jurisdiction and have already
initiated proceedings or investigations. It is important to support
these efforts by making available resources and expertise to contribute
to the collection of evidence. In its Opinion 300 (2022), the Assembly
decided to evaluate proposals to establish a special international
criminal tribunal for war crimes committed during the aggression.
While this assessment will be carried out by the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights through its report, I believe that there are
strong grounds to argue in support of the creation of a special
tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression, which
is not covered by the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.
5.3.1 Proceedings before the International Criminal
Court
65. On 28 February 2022, Karim
Khan, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, confirmed
that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with opening an investigation
on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine.
Subsequently, his Office received referrals on the situation in
Ukraine from 41 ICC States Parties – out of which 35 are Council
of Europe member States – under article 14 of the Rome Statute.
66. On the strength of this unprecedented collective call for
action by State Parties, the ICC Prosecutor has opened an investigation
into the situation in Ukraine, encompassing within its scope any
past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity
or genocide committed in any part of the territory of Ukraine by
any person from 21 November 2013 onwards.
67. In early March 2022, an ICC investigative team was deployed
to the region to collect evidence. As the Prosecutor said in a statement,
“International criminal investigations require the engagement of
all those who may hold information relevant to our work. Witnesses,
survivors and affected communities in particular must be empowered
to actively contribute to our investigations. There can be no bystanders
in our effort to establish the truth and pursue those allegedly
responsible for international crimes”.
Note To facilitate this process, the ICC has
set up a dedicated portal through which any person that may hold
information relevant to the Ukraine situation can contact their
investigators.
68. The collective support of all States Parties and the international
community more broadly will also continue to be essential to accelerate
the investigation work. To this end, the ICC has extended an invitation to
all States Parties to provide assistance including through voluntary
financial contributions and the provision of national experts on
a secondment basis.
5.3.2 Proceedings before the International Court of
Justice
69. On 26 February 2022, Ukraine
filed an application before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting
proceedings against the Russian Federation concerning a dispute
relating to the interpretation, application, and fulfilment of the
1948 Convention or the United Nations Genocide Convention. The application aims
to show that claims that Ukraine is responsible for genocide in
the Luhansk and Donetsk regions are unfounded and establishing that
the Russian Federation thus has no lawful basis to take military
action based on these false claims. Ukraine has also requested the
ICJ to indicate provisional measures to prevent irreparable prejudice
to the rights of Ukraine and its people.
70. On 16 March, the ICJ indicated interim measures, asking the
Russian Federation to immediately suspend the military operations
that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine,
and to ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may
be directed or supported by it, as well as any organisations and
persons which may be subject to its control or direction, take no
steps in furtherance of the military operations. It also asked both
Parties to refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend
the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.
71. The Russian authorities have indicated that, in their view,
the Court lacked jurisdiction in the case and that the question
of the participation of the Russian Federation in the proceedings
is still under consideration.
5.3.3 United Nations Human Rights Council: Commission
of Inquiry on Ukraine
72. On 3-4 March 2022, the UN Human
Rights Council held an urgent debate on the situation of human rights
in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression. The debate resulted
in the adoption of a resolution which establishes an Independent
International Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations
of human rights in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine.
73. The Commission is constituted by three human rights experts,
appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council for an initial
duration of one year, with the mandate to, among other things, investigate
all alleged violations and abuses of human rights and violations
of international humanitarian law, and related crimes, in the context
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, and to establish
the facts, circumstances, and root causes of any such violations
and abuses; and to make recommendations, in particular on accountability
measures, all with a view to ending impunity and ensuring accountability.
74. On 30 March, the President of the Human Rights Council announced
the appointment of Erik Møse of Norway, Jasminka Džumhur of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Pablo de Greiff of Colombia to serve as the
three independent members of the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.
Mr Møse will serve as chairperson of the Commission.
5.4 Supporting
the humanitarian effort
75. The international community
has mobilised in different ways to support the humanitarian effort necessary
to alleviate the plight of Ukrainians affected by the war. This
has taken different forms, from the introduction of special protection
schemes to the organisation of large-scale funding initiatives.
Given the extent of destruction and damage, the needs are immense.
76. The United Nations have launched a flash appeal to fund humanitarian
operations, announced the release of $20 million from the Central
Emergency Response Fund to help meet these urgent needs, and appointed
a Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine to lead the co-ordination of efforts.
Similarly, other humanitarian organisations, such as the ICRC, have
asked for support to meet the needs of those affected.
77. International financial institutions are also mobilised. At
European level, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) has approved a “War on Ukraine – EBRD Resilience Package”, initially
sized at €2 billion, to respond to the immediate needs of the people
affected by the war and – when conditions permit – support the substantial
reconstruction of Ukraine.
Note The European Investment Bank (EIB) has
prepared an emergency solidarity package for Ukraine of €2 billion,
including the provision of €668 million in immediate liquidity assistance
to the Ukrainian authorities. In parallel, the Bank is developing
a multi-billion-euro package for the EU Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood,
the EU Enlargement Region and Central Asia to mitigate the consequences
of the refugee crisis and help address the social and economic fallout
caused by the war.
Note
78. As regards global institutions, the IMF disbursed emergency
assistance of $1.4 billion to Ukraine on 9 March 2022 under the
Rapid Financing Instrument to help meet urgent financing needs including
to mitigate the economic impact of the war. The World Bank Group
has already mobilised more than $925 million for Ukraine, including
fast-disbursing budget support to help the government provide critical
services to Ukrainian people, of which $350 million has been disbursed.
Note
79. The European Union is playing a major role in supporting the
humanitarian effort. On 4 March 2022, the European Council adopted
the Commission’s proposal to trigger, for the first time, the Temporary
Protection Directive, allowing those fleeing the war in Ukraine
to obtain temporary residence permits and access to education and
the labour market in EU member States.
Note In the following weeks, the Commission
issued Operational Guidelines to help with practical implementation
of the Directive.
Note
80. Following a request from the Government of the Republic of
Moldova, the European Union deployed Frontex staff to the country
to conduct border management tasks including screening, registration
and information collection.
Note Working alongside the Moldovan authorities,
this operation also aims to support the transfer of refugees to
EU Member States.
81. On 21 March 2022, the European Commission launched a special
call under the Technical Support Instrument to support member States
with welcoming refugees from Ukraine and with the phasing out of
their reliance on fossil fuels from the Russian Federation.
Note This instrument will provide no-cost
technical support to the authorities who request it in order to
address these two challenges emerging from the war. Further, on
28 March, the Home Affairs Council released a 10-point plan for
stronger European co-ordination on welcoming people fleeing the
war against Ukraine, which includes a joint platform for registration,
the development of national contingency plans and a common anti-trafficking
strategy.
Note
82. On the financial side, the President of the European Commission,
Ursula von der Leyen, announced an emergency package of €500 million
to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the crisis, including
€93 million specifically for aid programmes to help civilians affected.
Note The European Commission contributed
$80 million to the United Nations’ humanitarian Flash Appeal for
Ukraine, representing 13% of total funding received so far.
Note
83. Together with the Government of Canada, the European Commission
has launched the Stand Up for Ukraine, an online pledging event
in partnership with Global Citizen. The campaign answers a call
for support launched by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The aim of the campaign is to raise funding and other types of support
to cater for the needs of the people fleeing the invasion inside
and outside Ukraine. The “Stand Up for Ukraine” global pledging
event and campaign has raised €9.1 billion to date for people fleeing the
Russian invasion, inside Ukraine and abroad, including €1 billion
from the European Commission. On top of that, the EBRD has announced
an additional €1 billion in loans to cover the needs of the people
displaced by the invasion.
Note
5.5 Providing
military support to Ukraine
84. Addressing the meeting of NATO
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the G7 on 7 April 2022, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba reiterated his strong
pleas to provide military support to Ukraine, because “no matter
how strange it may sound, today weapons serve the purpose of peace”.
Note
85. Since the beginning of the full-fledged invasion by the Russian
Federation, more than 25 countries have responded to this call by
sending weapons and military equipment to Ukraine.
Note The United States has sent billions
of dollars in missiles, ammunition, and other items. In an unprecedented
development, the European Union has decided to finance and purchase
the delivery of weapons to Ukraine for a total of €450 million.
Note Both Finland and Germany have revised
their long-standing policy that barred exporting weapons into war zones.
86. Some countries, such as Hungary, have been more reticent,
not allowing for any lethal equipment to cross from its territory
into Ukraine.
87. The repeated requests by the Ukrainian authorities for a no-fly
zone to be established in Ukraine so far have gone unanswered. NATO
and its members fear that enforcing a no-fly zone would bring their
forces into direct contact with the Russian Federation’s military,
which would heighten the risk of an enlargement of the conflict
and lead to more human suffering and destruction.
88. As explicitly indicated in its Statute, the Council of Europe
has not competence in relation to defence issues. While I have decided
to include this information to give an exhaustive picture of the
international response, the Assembly should not enter into defence
issues in its resolutions and recommendations.
5.6 Providing
a platform for dialogue
89. Since 28 February 2022, there
have been several rounds of negotiations between representatives
of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Some of them were held online
while others were hosted by Belarus and, more recently, Turkey.
While the initial talks focused on a cease-fire and the opening
of humanitarian corridors, later discussions also addressed issues
such as neutrality status, denuclearisation, NATO membership, international
security guarantees and the status of Crimea.
90. Diplomatic efforts should be encouraged for the sake of saving
human lives and avoiding human suffering and devastation. The efforts
by States that are not involved in this conflict to provide a platform
for dialogue should be praised. Any decision concerning negotiations
and their possible outcomes, however, lies with the Ukrainian authorities,
who are sovereign in their decisions.
6 The
Council of Europe response
6.1 Priority
areas, relevance and timeliness
91. The Council of Europe has responded
to the unfolding aggression by firmly showing its support for Ukraine
and condemning the Russian Federation. The two statutory bodies
of the Organisation – the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee
of Ministers – have acted in a spirit of consultation and collaboration,
reaching the same unanimous conclusion: that the Russian Federation
could no longer be a member of the Council of Europe. Following
the adoption of its Opinion 300 (2022) by the Assembly on 15 March
2022, the Committee of Ministers decided, on 16 March, to exclude
the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe.
92. This unprecedented decision, and the way it was reached, are
important political messages. Now, faced with the magnitude of the
catastrophe ravaging Ukraine, the Council of Europe should give
proof of the same unity and resolve in being on the front line to
provide support and assistance to its member State which is the victim
of a foreign aggression.
93. If the Council of Europe wants to continue to be a relevant
player, its priority should be helping Ukraine right now, listening
attentively to the needs expressed by the Ukrainian authorities;
responding positively and in a timely manner to their demands, if
necessary thinking outside the box; and co-ordinating with other international
and national actors who are mobilised to provide support. This unprecedented
challenge requires unprecedented vision, enterprise, and effectiveness.
94. In light of its Statute, the Council of Europe should not
be involved in any defence issue. It can and should, however, be
involved in all issues relating to the protection of human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law, in line with its mandate.
95. During the debate on Opinion 300 (2022), the Assembly considered
a proposal for a Task Force to be set up to co-ordinate the Council
of Europe response. This proposal has the merits of highlighting
the need for a swift, structured, and co-ordinated response by the
Organisation. It should also be recalled, however, that the Council
of Europe has an Office in Ukraine, which is responsible for facilitating
the implementation of the Council of Europe's mission in the country
as well as co-ordinating and implementing co-operation projects
and programmes. There is no need, therefore, for the Assembly to
recommend the creation of a new structure. The Secretary General
and the Committee of Ministers will decide which administrative
structures will co-ordinate and preside over the implementation
of the co-operation activities. What is important is that the Assembly
and the Committee of Ministers continue to act in synergy in supporting
an active and decisive role for the Organisation in supporting Ukraine
and tackling the consequences of this aggression.
96. At the request of the Secretary General, the Council of Europe
Secretariat is currently preparing two packages of measures:
- one to be implemented immediately,
which is based on adaptations to the 2019-2022 Action Plan for Ukraine;
- one to be implemented once the conflict is over.
97. It is clear that the post-war package of measures is speculative
right now, in light of the uncertainty of the situation and the
slim chances that the war will come to an end in the very near future.
With this consideration in mind, it would be advisable to give priority
to providing immediate assistance, focusing on the key Council of
Europe’s areas of expertise and taking into account that, despite
the war, Ukrainian public institutions, including central, regional
and local authorities, parliament and the judiciary continue to
be operational, providing a remarkable example of institutional
resilience. Similarly, civil society is active in many contexts,
especially in the humanitarian field, and journalists continue to
report, although in difficult conditions.
98. To this end, the main priority areas for the Council of Europe’s
immediate assistance to Ukraine should include:
- providing specialised support
programmes to cater for those who are in a situation of vulnerability
in a war situation, including children, women, the elderly, persons
with disabilities, having due regard to the situation of separated
or unaccompanied children and the need to prevent trafficking and
protect its victims;
- strengthening Ukraine’s institutional capacity and resilience,
by supporting the continuity of the work of public institutions,
including parliament, the judiciary and the authorities at central,
regional and local levels, as well as civil society, including young
people;
- contributing to strengthening human rights protection
in Ukraine, including in a war situation;
- strengthening the capacity of Ukrainian authorities, NGOs,
journalists, legal professionals and civil society to document and
collect evidence of international human rights and humanitarian
law violations, with a view to ensuring accountability of the perpetrators;
- contributing to ensuring freedom of information, freedom
of the media and the protection of journalists in Ukraine.
99. In this last regard, the office of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General,
Iryna Venediktova, is investigating roughly 5 800 allegations of
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russian forces
in Ukraine. She has asked for the support of the international community,
including the Council of Europe, in carrying out this work. The
Council of Europe should promptly accept this request.
100. While it is important to prioritise support for Ukraine, the
Council of Europe should also seek to assist its member States who
are on the front line in providing support to Ukraine and Ukrainians,
namely neighbouring countries.
6.2 The
added value of specific Council of Europe bodies
6.2.1 The Assembly
101. During an extraordinary session
organised at the initiative of its President, Tiny Kox, the Assembly adopted
Opinion 300 (2022), in which it took a strong stance in support
of Ukraine and in favour of the Russian Federation’s exclusion from
the Council of Europe. This text was adopted unanimously, with a
large number of Assembly members participating in the debate and
the vote. Whether in the past they expressed themselves in favour
or against the return of the Russian delegation to the Assembly,
members of the Assembly from across Europe and across the political
spectrum have now reached the same view: the gravity of the actions committed
by the Russian Federation is such that membership in the Council
of Europe would equal complacency.
102. This unanimous position should be the starting point to develop
a coherent action of the Assembly in support of Ukraine and the
Ukrainian Parliament. The Assembly has several ways to achieve this
objective:
- through its deliberative
work, leading to resolutions, it can raise awareness and formulate recommendations
addressed to a wide range of interlocutors, on issues that are high
amongst the preoccupations of the Ukrainian authorities. It can
also address recommendations for action to the Committee of Ministers;
- through its co-operation activities, it can help strengthen
the institutional resilience of the Ukrainian Parliament and enable
it to perform its tasks and responsibilities despite the war conditions;
- through its formal and informal networks, it can facilitate
contacts and the provision of expertise on specific thematic issues,
such as violence against women or the protection of children;
- through its national delegations, it can mobilise national
parliaments and facilitate dialogue between them and the Ukrainian
Parliament. It can also promote joint statements and actions by
committees of different national parliaments;
- through its inter-parliamentary relations, it can promote
common positions and actions by international parliamentary assemblies.
103. In order to start this work, it would be important to set
up a structured and permanent dialogue between the Assembly and
the Ukrainian delegation, to improve the communication flow and
to enable the Assembly to be promptly responsive to the needs expressed
by Ukrainian parliamentarians. It is also crucial for the Assembly
to take all the practical measures that can facilitate the active
participation of the Ukrainian delegation into the work of the Assembly.
104. On 6 April 2022, at the invitation of the Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, the President of the Assembly visited Ukraine,
accompanied by the leaders of the Assembly’s five political groups and
the Secretary General of the Assembly. In Lviv they discussed the
consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine
and the best ways that the Council of Europe can support this member
State and its citizens. Part of the discussion was how to help the
Ukrainian authorities to investigate the massacre in Bucha and other
areas previously occupied by the Russian army. The President and
group leaders also met, among others, with members of the Ukrainian
delegation to the Assembly and the Mayor of Lviv Andriy Sadoviy.
105. This visit gives an important political message of support
and solidarity and should be followed by regular contacts and visits
by Assembly Rapporteurs who are preparing reports on specific aspects
of the situation in Ukraine on behalf of the Assembly’s committees.
6.2.2 Local democracy
106. Mayors, local and regional
authorities in Ukraine are on the frontline in this war, showing
leadership, providing for the needs of their communities, and being
the target of attacks by the Russian troops. The Council of Europe
has a key role to play in supporting Ukrainian local authorities
in shouldering their responsibilities and has already started to
do so through its Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.
107. During the 42nd session, its President,
Leedert Verbeek, reiterated the Congress’ condemnation of Russian
actions and called for the resolution of the conflict. The Congress
also adopted a Declaration “condemning the Russian Federation’s
war against Ukraine as a blatant breach of international law”, expressing
full support for Ukraine and its people.
Note The
Ukrainian Minister for the Development of Communities and Territories,
Oleksiy Chernyshov, addressed the Congress and was supported by
the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, and the Mayor of Mykolaiv,
Oleksandr Senkevych. In his speech, Mr Chernyshov called for direct
partnerships with local authorities in Ukraine to “help overcome
the difficulties Ukrainian communities are faced with”.
Note
108. Besides statements of solidarity, the Congress President condemned
the abduction and killing of mayors as well as the shelling of town
halls and council buildings, which are the symbols of democratic
institutions. A new online platform, Cities4Cities, was developed
and launched on 29 March 2022 to help Ukrainian municipalities.
This platform is a free online exchange tool: it allows municipalities,
cities and regions in Ukraine and in the rest of Europe to share
their needs and offers related to local infrastructure, humanitarian
aid and business continuity in a war situation and get in direct
contact to receive help. This platform was launched at the initiative
of the President of the Chamber of Local Authorities of the Congress,
Bernd Vöhringer.
Note
109. Furthermore, in the intergovernmental sector of the Council
of Europe, its Centre of Expertise for Good Governance held a series
of online conferences “Local governments unite for welfare and peace”
from 18 March to 7 April 2022. Amid the ongoing aggression from
the Russian Federation, local authorities in Ukraine continue to
provide public services, including in the areas currently occupied
or encircled by Russian troops.
110. The goal of the “online marathon” was for the Ukrainian local
leaders to explain, discuss and gain support for their efforts to
continue to offer essential services to local people and to internally
displaced persons in crisis times, and for their counterparts in
Europe and elsewhere to be aware of their needs and offer advice
and support. Oleksiy Chernyshov, Minister for Communities and Territories
Development of Ukraine, and Mayors of Kyiv, Lviv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv,
Mariupol, Bucha, Trostianets (Sumy region), Melitopol and other
Ukrainian cities took part in the marathon.
111. Their international counterparts joined them from Hungary,
the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic
– Ukraine’s closest neighbours that have received the largest number
of refugees fleeing the war. They also came from Austria, France,
Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Baltic and
Nordic countries, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain,
Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and the Western Balkans. The concluding
session of the marathon on 7 April 2022 brought together representatives from
Israel, Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
6.2.3 The Council of Europe Development Bank
112. The Council of Europe Development
Bank (CEB) – which is based on a Council of Europe partial agreement
– has been the first multilateral development bank to disburse grants
to help its members to meet the immediate needs of Ukrainian refugees,
including transport, shelter, food, and medical care, through a special
trust fund called Migrants and Refugee Fund (MRF), set up in 2015.
As part of the immediate response to the war in Ukraine, the CEB
has approved up to €5 million worth of grants to support Hungary,
the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic
to cope with the refugee inflow. To pre-empt potential exploitation
of displaced persons, the grants will also support the systematic
collection and analysis of migration flow data by the IOM and allow
safe pathway for return to third-country nationals.
113. Beyond the immediate response, the CEB is looking at two main
lines of action to support neighbouring countries hosting high numbers
of Ukrainians displaced by the war: fast-tracking emergency loans
to strengthen accommodation capacity and seeking co-operation with
the European Union to provide emergency relief and scale up social
infrastructures in the area of housing and health care. In April
2022, it issued a new €1 billion seven-year Social Inclusion Bond
to bolster its response to the unfolding social crisis due to the
war in Ukraine and help its member States assist millions of refugees
seeking safety. The proceeds of the new bond could be used, in part
or in full, by the CEB member countries to support longer term needs
of refugees and their host communities.
114. On 13 March 2022, the Ministry for Communities and Territories
Development of Ukraine initiated the establishment, at the government
level, of an interdepartmental working group on Ukraine's membership
in the Council of Europe Development Bank and sent a letter to the
Bank to initiate a dialogue on Ukraine's accession. This application
should be looked at with the utmost urgency.
6.2.4 The Commissioner for Human Rights
115. Since the outbreak of this
large-scale aggression, the Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja
Mijatović, and her office carried out monitoring missions to the
Republic of Moldova, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic
and the Czech Republic. By visiting numerous border crossing points,
reception centres and transit hubs, and holding talks with people
fleeing Ukraine, volunteers, non-governmental organisations, as well
as officials at different levels of government, Ombudsman institutions
and national human rights institutions and international organisations,
the Commissioner was able to review efforts made in assisting people
fleeing the war in Ukraine and assessing their human rights needs.
Note
116. The Commissioner’s role is crucial to continue to raise awareness
on the situation of those fleeing Ukraine and those who remain in
the country, to monitor and assess patterns of human rights violations
in accordance with her mandate, and to support initiatives and efforts
aimed at establishing accountability for serious human rights violations
and grave breaches of international humanitarian law in Ukraine,
including through regular contact with the authorities, the institutions
and her networks of human rights defenders and civil society in
the country.
6.2.5 The Special Representative of the Secretary General
on Migration and Refugees
117. On 9 March 2022, the Special
Representative on Migration and Refugees, Leyla Kayacık, convened
an extraordinary online meeting of the Council of Europe Network
of Focal Points on Migration to gather information on the situation
of the civilian population fleeing Ukraine to neighbouring countries,
and the challenges faced by the relevant authorities. The meeting
provided an overview of the fast-changing developments in member
States, including the need
to protect women and children from abuse, exploitation and trafficking,
and in particular unaccompanied children.
118. On 8 April 2022, the Special Representative organised an online
meeting with representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the IOM, UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA), the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA) and the OSCE/ODIHR
to exchange information on the actions carried out in the context
of the current crisis. The aim of the meeting was to enhance synergies
and to determine how best the Council of Europe, within its mandate,
can complement the ongoing efforts.
Note The Special Representative
is currently liaising with member States, notably with those neighbouring
Ukraine, with the aim of providing possible support and assistance
based on the Council of Europe standards, also in the framework
of the Action Plan on Protecting Vulnerable Persons in the Context
of Migration and Asylum in Europe (2021-2025).
6.2.6 Media freedom and protection of journalists
119. The free flow of independent
and accurate news and information is essential in conflict situations.
The war in Ukraine is also an information war, in which the Russian
Federation stifles freedom of expression in the occupied territories,
threatens independent journalists and spreads its propaganda. The
Council of Europe has a number of bodies whose expertise can be
crucial in protecting the safety of journalists, countering disinformation
and debunking fake news.
120. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of
journalism and safety of journalists is a Europe-wide monitoring
and reporting mechanism aimed at countering all forms of attacks
on journalists' physical safety and legal protection. Its role in
documenting all attacks on journalists and other attempts to restrict
journalists' abilities to report on the war has become even more
necessary in the present circumstances.
121. There is also need, however, for practical help to enable
independent media and journalists to continue to do their job safely
and reach out to the public. This includes providing grants and
financial support, providing safety equipment, financing the relocation
of premises to safe areas, ensuring access to Ukrainian media channels
for European viewers and Ukrainian refugees in Europe and enhancing
the capacity of Ukraine’s Public Broadcaster to fulfil its remit
under the present circumstances. The Council of Europe has expertise
in these areas and should respond to the requests for assistance
it has received from Ukraine.
7 The role of the Council of Europe
in the new international context
7.1 A 4th Summit with an emphasis on democratic
security in Europe
122. The Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine has been defined in many ways. Whether we call it
a watershed moment or a point of no-return, it is widely understood
that this is a time of great historical significance.
123. For the Council of Europe, it concludes a stage of its history
in which the Organisation progressively enlarged its membership,
so as to bring together 47 European States spanning from Lisbon
to Vladivostok and 830 million Europeans under the roof of one common
European home. The momentum for the enlargement was given, in 1993,
by the First Summit of Heads of State and Government of Council
of Europe member States in Vienna.
124. In the words of the European leaders of that time
“The end of the division of Europe
offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability
on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary
democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights,
the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity.
Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security. This Europe
is a source of immense hope which must in no event be destroyed
by territorial ambitions, the resurgence of aggressive nationalism,
the perpetuation of spheres of influence, intolerance or totalitarian ideologies.
We condemn all such aberrations. We intend to render the Council
of Europe fully capable of thus contributing to democratic security
as well as meeting the challenges of society in the 21st century,
giving expression in the legal field to the values that define our
European identity, and to fostering an improvement in the quality
of life”.
Note
125. Thirty years later, a division is back in Europe. By its deeds,
the Russian Federation has stepped out the common European home.
Confronted with a challenge of global magnitude, European leaders
should, once again, give proof of “clear vision and strong determination”
Note to
reiterate, in the strongest terms, their attachment to the values
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; formulate a new
vision for Europe; and define the role and mission of the Council
of Europe for the years to come.
126. The Council of Europe, like any intergovernmental organisation,
is vested with the powers and political clout which is given by
its member States. In the new chapter of European history, in which
peace and security cannot be taken for granted, the Council of Europe
should be given a new impetus and new tools to face the present
challenges, as identified by the current and the previous Secretaries
General of the Council of Europe in their annual reports, namely:
- promoting democratic security
also as a precondition of peace and stability;
- addressing the backsliding of democracy by tackling its
root causes;
- revitalising democracy through innovations and greater
citizen involvement.
127. Experience has shown the need for early warning mechanisms,
to enable the Council of Europe to take prompt, decisive and collective
action in the face of threats to the rule of law, democratic standards
and human rights protection in its member States.
128. The 4th Summit will be of special importance for the history
of Europe, and several member States should participate in its preparation
and organisation, beyond the responsibilities of a single presidency
of the Committee of Ministers. The Assembly should stand ready to
provide its political input, also at the level of the preparatory
work. Furthermore, the European Union and the OSCE should be associated
in the event.
7.2 Deepening the strategic partnership
with the European Union
129. The Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine and the ensuing exclusion of the Russian Federation
from the Council of Europe has cast the co-operation between the
Council of Europe and the European Union into a new perspective.
In light of the epochal changes that Europe is experiencing, there should
be a renewed impetus towards strengthening the strategic partnership
between the Council of Europe and the European Union, in the respect
of their different roles and areas of excellence and on the basis
of their shared values and commitment to promoting peace, security
and stability on the European continent and supporting multilateralism
worldwide.
130. The perspective accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights will be an important step in this direction.
In addition, in the new geopolitical context, the successful enlargement
of the European Union becomes a factor of security and stability
not only for the candidate countries but for Europe as a whole.
At the same time, the Council of Europe should redouble its efforts
to help its member States wishing to join the European Union to
make tangible and measurable progress towards meeting the necessary
criteria.
7.3 Ensuring the financial sustainability
of the Council of Europe
131. The Russian Federation’s exclusion
from the Council of Europe deprives the Council of Europe of nearly 7%
of its annual budget. It is urgent to start looking into how to
ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the Organisation,
taking into account the important mission it should accomplish.
132. Exploratory contacts at different levels, including through
the involvement of Tiny Kox, President of the Parliamentary Assembly,
indicate the willingness of some member States to ensure that the
Council of Europe does not suffer financially because of the exclusion
of the Russian Federation.
133. The Assembly should call on the governments of Council of
Europe member States, and the Committee of Ministers as a whole,
to mobilise and show their continued trust in the Council of Europe
by ensuring that it has the necessary resources to carry out its
mandate. The Assembly should also encourage stepping up voluntary
contributions to ensure that the Council of Europe can provide assistance
and support to Ukraine, both immediately and after the war.
7.4 The Council of Europe approach to
the Russian Federation as a non-member State
134. Although it is no longer a
member State of the Council of Europe, there are a number of reasons
why the Council of Europe will continue to be concerned with the
Russian Federation. As from 16 March 2022 – the date on which its
membership in the Organisation was terminated – the Russian Federation
ceased to be a Contracting Party to conventions and protocols that
are open only to member States of the Organisation. In its decision
taken on 23 March 2022, the Committee of Ministers also decided
to end Russian membership in the Organisation’s partial and enlarged
agreements.
Note
135. The Russian Federation, however, continues to be a High Contracting
Party to the European Convention on Human Rights until 16 September
2022, with the Court remaining competent to deal with applications directed
against the Russian Federation, provided the violations occurred
prior to this date. In addition, the Committee of Ministers will
continue to supervise the execution of judgments by the Russian
Federation, which is required to implement them. The Russian Federation
will be able to be represented in the Committee of Ministers’ meetings
when the execution of judgements by the Russian Federation is discussed.
It also remains a party to conventions that are open to non-Council
of Europe member States.
136. Furthermore, the Russian Federation shares borders with a
number of Council of Europe member States, has significant political
relations with some of them and exercises de facto control
in several territories that are subjected to the sovereignty of
Council of Europe member States.
137. Despite these considerations, and in light of the volatility
of the present situation, it is premature to formulate recommendations
concerning the Council of Europe’s policy towards the authorities
of the Russian Federation. This matter will have to be revisited
at a later stage, also in response to the events on the ground and
the attitude of the Russian authorities towards the Council of Europe.
7.5 Reaching out to Russian and Belarusian
civil society
138. As already mentioned in Assembly
Opinion 300 (2022), however, a distinction should be made between the
policy towards the authorities and the policy towards Russian society.
The Council of Europe should continue to reach out to the Russian
people, many of whom do not support this war and do not have access
to independent and objective information about it. It should continue
to support Russian human rights defenders, democratic forces, free
media and independent civil society, whether they are in the Russian
Federation or abroad.
139. To this end, there are a number of measures that the Council
of Europe can take immediately. They include:
- ensuring that key Council of Europe documents, webpages
and information are available in Russian, as this language is used
as a lingua franca in a number of member States,
and also to allow Russian citizens and civil society to have easier
access to the work of the Council of Europe,
- continuing to invite and engage representatives of Russian
civil society, independent media and human rights defenders in Council
of Europe events,
- encouraging the Commissioner for Human Rights to continue
to reach out to Russian civil society and human rights defenders
in her activities,
- ensuring that the Platform of the Council of Europe to
promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists continues
to monitor the situation of freedom of the media and the safety
of journalists in the Russian Federation
- keeping channels open for Russian legal professionals
to continue to be informed and trained on Council of Europe standards
and instruments, having access to Council of Europe material, courses
and training opportunities.
140. This open and flexible approach towards Russian civil society
and non-governmental actors would give an important political signal
and could be developed into a policy and mechanisms at a later stage.
While it is important to continue to project the universal values
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law beyond the Council
of Europe membership, it is of the utmost importance to avoid putting
at risk the lives, safety and well-being of people and shield them
from retaliation. This element will also have to be taken into account.
141. Although Belarus is in a different situation as it has never
been a member State of the Council of Europe, this open and flexible
approach should apply also to Belarusian civil society and non-governmental
actors, including the Belarusian democratic forces abroad. In fact,
the Assembly should explore ways to intensify its engagement with
Belarusian democratic forces.
142. The Committee of Ministers should also consider the feasibility
of setting up a Programme to enable Belarusian and Russian human
rights defenders, democratic forces, independent journalists and
civil society to be involved in the activities of the Council of
Europe. This Programme could be based on a partial agreement or
be funded by voluntary contributions and should be inspired by the
Elisabeth-Selbert-Initiative, a protection programme for human rights
defenders which has the legal status of a foundation in Germany.
Note Human rights and democracy need to
be protected, but it not uncommon for people advocating for these
fundamental values upheld by the Council of Europe to face risks
and need protection themselves.
8 Conclusions
143. It has been said that the Russian
Federation’s aggression marks the start of a new era, which will
be defined not just by the outcome of the war but also our response
to it. In its response, the Council of Europe should be true to
its mission and values. It has already started to do so by excluding
the Russian Federation from membership in the Organisation. This
important decision, however, is only a part of the Council of Europe’s
engagement.
144. The Council of Europe should join the international community’s
effort to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation to cease
the hostilities, withdraw its troops from the sovereign territory
of Ukraine and be held accountable for the crimes and damages it
has inflicted during this continued aggression.
145. The Council of Europe should also deploy all available means
to support and assist Ukraine, immediately and in the future. It
should respond promptly and swiftly to the needs expressed by the
Ukrainian authorities in its areas of expertise, relying on the
knowledge, experience and networks of its bodies and structures.
This unprecedented challenge requires unprecedented vision, adaptability
and effectiveness.
146. While the war is raging, Ukrainian institutions work around
the clock to deliver governance, basic services and assistance to
people in Ukraine. The Council of Europe should contribute to strengthening Ukraine’s
institutional capacity and resilience, by supporting the continuity
of the work of public institutions.
147. In this regard, the Assembly should offer its support to help
the Ukrainian Parliament fulfil its responsibilities. Through its
national delegations and its inter-parliamentary relations, it should
also raise awareness, help mobilise support and build bridges amongst
parliamentarians from all over Europe.
148. An evident consequence of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine is the re-emergence of a dividing line in Europe.
This line has been drawn by the Russian authorities by their own
choice. It has resulted in a major challenge to the continent’s
security environment and shaken Europe’s post-war multilateral architecture.
149. In this new international context, through a 4th Summit of
Council of Europe Heads of State and Government, European leaders
should articulate a new vision for how to enhance the role and impact
of the Council of Europe as a guardian of the values which Europeans
cherish and want to preserve as the preconditions of peace: democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
