B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Emanuelis Zingeris, rapporteur
1 Origin
of the report, scope and procedure
1. The present report has been
prepared for a debate under urgent procedure, according to Rule
51 of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Rules of Procedure. Because of
the short time available for its preparation, it covers only a few,
but very significant recent developments of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine. A number of other reports which are
currently under preparation in different Assembly committees under
the ordinary procedure will delve in-depth into subject matters
which I could only mention briefly in this work but deserve attentive
consideration.
2 Introduction
2. More than eight months since
the beginning of the brutal, illegal, unjustified and unjustifiable
large-scale aggression by the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian
people stand firm in their resolve to defend themselves and liberate
their country from the invader.
3. At the same time, confronted with a major threat to peace
and security, the other European States are putting up a common
front, united by their common values, and stand firm in their resolve
not to let the aggressor prevail. They are supporting Ukraine in
its right to defend itself; welcoming Ukrainians fleeing for their
safety; and pledging to invest in the reconstruction of the country.
They are showing their commitment to rules-based multilateralism.
They are also taking steps to secure their independence from the
Russian Federation in the strategic sector of energy and to ensure
that it is held accountable for its crimes and violations of international
law.
4. As the war of aggression continues, the Russian Federation
is taking rhetorical, military and political steps which lead to
a recrudescence of violence and risk an enlargement of the conflict.
The Russian Federation’s attempt to illegally annex four regions
of Ukraine through so-called referendums represents yet another
serious breach of the Charter of the United Nations. While announcing
a partial military mobilisation and increasing repression domestically,
on the international scene the Russian leadership is sharpening
its confrontational rhetoric towards what it calls “the West”, hinting
at the possibility of using nuclear weapons, calling for a new international
order and trying to consolidate ties with countries such as Belarus,
China, Iran, North Korea and Syria.
5. The Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine has political
consequences of global proportions. Unfortunately, being a veto-holder
in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the aggressor can
also block any action of the UNSC that tries to preserve peace and
security. The unity of like-minded States who cherish peace and
support rules-based multilateralism is more than ever necessary
at this dangerous juncture in history.
3 The
situation on the ground
3.1 Military
developments
6. While the late spring and early
summer was a period of relative military stalemate, things have
changed significantly over the last two months. Ukraine launched
counteroffensive operations in the south of the country in late
August, and in the northeast in early September. By 13 September,
President Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian forces had retaken roughly
8 000 square kilometres from Russian forces.
7. In October, Russian troops withdrew from the strategic eastern
city of Lyman, which had been turned by them into a logistical base,
and Ukrainian troops liberated numerous villages throughout Kherson,
Donetsk and Luhansk; the latter had, until recently, been almost
entirely under Russian control. Russian war correspondents spoke
of “catastrophic retreats” in the east, and journalists received
testimonies of Chechen militias shooting at Russian soldiers fleeing
the front.
8. As Russian forces lose ground, they have increased use of
long-range artillery to cause death and panic in Ukrainian towns
and cities, sometimes far from the battlefield. Nikopol, Zaporizhzhia,
Mykolaiv and Berislav in particular were the scenes of multiple
rocket attacks targeting residential areas over the first weeks
of October, with the Ukrainian military citing the use of Iranian-made
kamikaze drones in addition to more traditional artillery. Retreating
Russian troops have also been attempting to destroy bridges and
crossings in order to slow the Ukrainian advance.
9. In another major military blow for Moscow, the illegally occupied
Crimean peninsula suffered several attacks over the past few months.
Blasts destroyed several fighter jets at a Russian base in Crimea
in August, and a week later huge explosions rocked an ammunition
depot, with Ukrainian officials claiming that an elite military
unit operating behind enemy lines was responsible. On 8 October,
an explosion damaged part of the heavily guarded bridge connecting
Russia to Crimea, which, in addition to being an important symbol
of the Russian occupation, has been a key logistics link for Russian
troops in southern Ukraine.
10. On 10 October, in the most widespread, indiscriminate and
barbaric set of Russian missile attacks since the early weeks of
the aggression, explosions hit the capital Kyiv as well as numerous
other cities across the country, including Lviv, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia,
killing score of civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.
3.2 Human
suffering and material devastation
11. The United Nations have corroborated
14 059 civilian casualties to date since the beginning of the latest aggression
in February, with 5 767 people killed and 8 292 injured, but the
actual numbers are likely considerably higher.
Note One third of Ukrainians have been forced
from their homes, with almost seven million people internally displaced
and a similar amount seeking shelter abroad.
Note
12. The Russian military has continued using long-range artillery
in order to hit inhabited residential centres in towns and cities
across Ukraine, even far from the battlefield, causing destruction
and countless deaths among civilians. The destruction brought on
by the Russian aggression will have enormous financial consequences
as well. According to a study from the Kyiv School of Economics,
the aggression had caused $108.3 billion in damage to the country’s
infrastructure as of August.
Note Other reports based on public evidence estimate
the total at $114.5 billion.
Note
13. The discovery of mass graves in liberated cities and towns
raised outrage about war crimes committed by occupying Russian forces.
Most recently, a mass burial site containing around 440 bodies was
found in Izyum after it was liberated in late September, and upon
liberating Lyman in early October Ukrainian forces found two mass
graves, with one of them believed to contain around 200 civilians.
14. In her recent “memorandum on the human rights consequences
of the war in Ukraine,”
Note the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights paints a bleak picture
of the wide-ranging and devastating effects of the conflict. The
aggression “resulted in serious and massive violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law, with disastrous effects
on the enjoyment of virtually all human rights by people in Ukraine.” The
Commissioner writes of being confronted with compelling evidence
of patterns of violations of the right to life committed by Russian
troops, including arbitrary killings and enforced disappearances;
violations of the right to property, including massive destruction
of civilian infrastructure; cases of torture and ill-treatment, gender-based
violence and war-related sexual violence; and violations of the
right to liberty and security, including abductions and arbitrary
or incommunicado detention.
15. This grim overview is confirmed by the second Moscow Mechanism
report on Ukraine, published on 14 July 2022, which highlighted
“the magnitude and frequency of the indiscriminate attacks carried
out against civilians and civilian objects, including sites where
no military facility was identified.” The report pointed to “credible
evidence that hostilities were conducted by Russian armed forces
disregarding their fundamental obligation to comply with the basic
principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that constitute
the fundamental basis of International Humanitarian Law”.
Note
16. Further contributing to the despicable humanitarian situation
is the use of paid mercenaries by the Russian authorities to fight
in Ukraine, including from the Wagner Group, which have already
been widely used in proxy conflicts in Africa and the Middle East
to spread terror among civilian populations. Akhmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov’s
Chechen paramilitary organisation is also being deployed to Ukraine.
17. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has documented
a range of violations against prisoners of war held by the Russian
Federation’s armed forces or by affiliated armed groups, including
torture and ill-treatment as well as lack of adequate food, water,
healthcare and sanitation. Regrettably, while human rights monitors
have been granted unimpeded access to places of internment and detention
in Ukrainian-controlled territory, Russia has not provided access
to prisoners of war held on its territory or in territory under occupation.
Note In late July, dozens of Ukrainian prisoners
of war were massacred in a missile strike that hit a detention centre
in Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine, in what President Zelenskyy
characterised as a false flag attack by Russia.
18. Prisoners of war in Russian-controlled areas are being tried,
prosecuted, and even given death sentences for the mere participation
in hostilities as combatants, in contravention of Additional Protocol
I of the Geneva Conventions. There have also been reports of Russian-backed
armed groups setting up trials for Ukrainian prisoners of war in
a so-called ‘international tribunal’ in Mariupol. International
humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of courts solely to
try prisoners of war.
Note Further,
Russian forces have attempted to argue that non-Ukrainian nationals
who are fighting within Ukrainian armed forces are not protected
by international humanitarian law, which is untrue.
19. The destruction of Ukraine’s cultural heritage is also used
as a weapon of war. As Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Culture and
Information Policy Kateryna Chueva recently reminded the UN Security
Council, "the President of Russia, Mr Putin, announced that Ukrainian
culture and identity is a target of this war."
Note Her ministry has verified damage and
destruction to at least 423 objects and institutions of cultural
heritage since the invasion began in February, and UNESCO has also
condemned the repeated attacks on Ukrainian cultural sites such
as religious buildings, historical buildings, cultural centres,
monuments, museums and libraries.
Note
4 The
illegal “referendums”
4.1 A
travesty
20. Between 23 and 27 September
2022, Russian-backed authorities conducted so-called referendums across
four partially occupied regions of Ukraine: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia
and Kherson. The vote had been announced only three days before,
on 20 September.
21. The motive of the hastily organised sham referendums was clear
to all: to create a pretext for their annexation by Moscow. While
Russian troops were failing to maintain occupied areas militarily,
the Russian leadership tried to cement its illegal occupation through
a falsified and unlawful electoral process.
22. The process was marred by blatant intimidation tactics by
Russian troops. Ukrainians have described armed soldiers going door
to door to solicit votes, and even making people say their vote
out loud for the soldiers to write down.
Note The legitimate governor of Luhansk,
Serhiy Haidai, said Russian occupying forces organised armed groups
to surround homes and force people to participate in the vote. According
to reports, residents were threatened that they would lose their
jobs if they did not participate and were even prohibited from leaving
the city between 23 and 27 September.
Note
23. The broader context in which the vote took place cannot be
ignored: all four regions were on the front line and witnessing
heavy fighting. Only about 60% of Donetsk was under the control
of Russian troops at the time of the so-called vote, and the capital
of one of the four regions, Zaporizhzhia, was firmly in Ukrainian
hands during the vote, making claims that the region chose to join
Russia all the more absurd. Ivan Fedorov, the forcibly deposed Ukrainian
mayor of Russian-occupied Melitopol, said that as voting started
on 23 September, residents heard a loud explosion in the city centre
and were afraid to leave their homes.
Note
24. Ukrainian officials have also pointed out that the numbers
for the referendum results released by the Russian-backed occupying
officials do not make sense, given the number of people who have
fled due to the armed conflict. The legitimate Luhansk governor,
Serhiy Haidai, for example, wrote that voting numbers claimed by
the Russian-backed authorities matched the number of people who
had the right to vote in the region in 2012, before the mass displacement
caused by the conflict that started in 2014 and by the subsequent full-scale
invasion of earlier this year.
Note
25. To no one’s surprise, the Russian-backed governments of the
four regions announced resounding “victories”, with support for
annexation ranging from 84% to 99.2%.
Note On 30 September 2022, President Putin announced
the annexation by the Russian Federation of the four Ukrainian regions
at a Kremlin event, full of nationalistic fervour and aggressive
rhetoric towards “the West”, claiming the inhabitants of the regions
would be Russian citizens “forever”. Adding to the farce, on 3 October
the Kremlin spokesperson admitted that it was not yet clear which
exact territory Russia had annexed.
Note
4.2 A
violation of international law
26. The attempted annexation by
Russia of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, preceded
by the so-called referendums held in these territories to justify
the annexation, violates Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. It constitutes a grave breach of international
law, including the UN Charter (Article 2.4) and of the principles
and commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.
27. The annexation is also contrary to the principles contained
in UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970,
Note which
includes the principle that “the territory of a State shall not
be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the
threat or use of force” and that “no territorial acquisition resulting from
the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal”. States
have an obligation not to recognise as lawful such a situation and
not to render aid or assistance in maintaining it. The principle
of non-recognition has been applied in different contexts by the
UN Security Council
Note and by
the European Court of Human Rights with regard to several unrecognised
de facto situations/entities.
Note Furthermore,
under international humanitarian law, the Russian Federation, as
an occupying power, has the obligation to respect Ukrainian law.
Annexation of the occupied territory is forbidden and unlawful.
4.3 A
violation of electoral law, standards and practice
28. The so-called referendums were
in clear contradiction with international law and Ukrainian (constitutional)
law.
Note In addition, they
did not comply with the Venice Commission revised guidelines on referendums,
according to which: “the use of referendums must comply with the
legal system as a whole. In particular, referendums cannot be held
if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution
does not provide for them (…)”.
Note
29. A vote held under military presence, during an active armed
conflict and in the absence of independent electoral observation
lacks all the substantive and procedural guarantees for it to be
validly expressed.
4.4 International
reactions
30. Notwithstanding the Kremlin’s
narrative, its attempt at portraying a genuine electoral process,
and the pompous nationalistic events that followed in Moscow, the
referendums and the illegal annexations were condemned by the international
community.
31. The Chairperson of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers,
Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney, the President
of the Parliamentary Assembly, Tiny Kox, and the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejčinović Burić, condemned the
decision of the Russian Federation to illegally annex the territories,
pointing out that the Council of Europe would continue to stand
with the people and authorities of its member State Ukraine.
Note
32. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres,
said that a decision to annex the four Ukrainian regions “would
have no legal value and deserves to be condemned,” adding that it
stood “against everything the international community is meant to
stand for.”
Note
33. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew
Rau, along with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President and OSCE Secretary
General, issued a statement unanimously and categorically condemning
the illegal annexation as well as the continued occupation of Crimea.
The annexation “is unacceptable”, and “eviscerates the principle
of territorial integrity, which is at the core of the OSCE’s founding
principles and the international order”. This action by the Russian
Federation “which includes military mobilization and irresponsible
nuclear threats, will only lead to greater escalation of the conflict,”
they added.
Note The Director
of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media also issued
a joint statement emphasising that, “in addition to having no validity
under international law, such conduct further aggravates the already
abysmal human rights situation”.
Note
34. The heads of government of all EU member States issued a statement
firmly rejecting and unequivocally condemning the illegal annexation,
emphasising that they will never recognise it. This was followed
by individual statements of condemnation by the presidents of the
European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.
Note
35. Furthermore, as a response to the illegal annexations, on
28 September the European Commission announced a new package of
sanctions against Russia. The new set includes an expansion of individuals
and entities targeted with sanctions, to include people involved
in the occupation and illegal annexation of areas of Ukraine, involved
in the Russian defence sector, and who spread disinformation about
the war. The package also included sweeping new import bans on Russian
products and an expansion of the list of products that cannot be
exported to Russia anymore, specifically key technologies.
Note
36. The United Kingdom also announced new sanctions as a result
of the referendums, targeting top Russian officials enforcing the
illegal votes, the public relations agency involved in the referendum’s
promotion, oligarchs, and board executives from major State-owned
banks.
Note President Joe Biden said the
United States “will never recognize Ukrainian territory as anything
other than part of Ukraine,” calling the referendums “a false pretext
to try to annex parts of Ukraine by force in flagrant violation
of international law.”
Note
37. Reacting to the referendums, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
emphasised that “the sovereign and territorial integrity of all
countries should be respected […] and the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter should be abided by.”
Note Türkiye voiced support for the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and emphasised it would not recognise the results
of the referendums, as did Kazakhstan.
4.5 Increased
risk of escalation
38. In addition to being an illegal
move and a further infringement of a neighbouring State’s sovereignty,
the so-called referendums might have another grave consequence:
they could contribute to escalating the war even further, by allowing
the Russian Government to claim that its territory is under attack
from Western weapons supplied to Ukraine.
39. President Putin alluded to this threat already in the days
leading up to the referendums, saying “we will certainly use all
the means at our disposal” “when the territorial integrity of our
country is threatened.”
Note Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairperson
of the Russian Security Council, said on 22 October 2022 while discussing
the referendums that “encroachment on Russian territory is a crime
which allows you to use all the forces of self-defence.”
Note
5 The
nuclear threat
40. The Russian Federation’s political
leadership brandishes nuclear weapons as a threat in its public discourse.
Already a few days into the current large-scale invasion, on 27
February 2022, President Putin put nuclear forces into “special
combat readiness”, ratcheting up tensions globally and irresponsibly
escalating the conflict. Russia also conducted high-profile nuclear
military drills.
Note
41. On 22 September 2022, while announcing the partial mobilisation,
President Putin said that Russia had many different types of nuclear
weapons, and that his claim that he would use them if Russia were
threatened was not a bluff.
42. On 27 September, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairperson of the
Russian Security Council, said Russia had the right to defend itself
with nuclear weapons if it faced an act of aggression by Ukraine
“that is dangerous for the very existence of our State.”
Note This statement directly references
one of the conditions in Russia's nuclear strike doctrine which
would justify the use of nuclear weapons: “aggression against the
Russian Federation with conventional weapons when the very existence
of the State is threatened.”
Note
43. The insistent recourse to this rhetoric coincides with the
Russian Federation’s attempt to annex swathes of Ukrainian territories.
This, combined with President Putin’s claims that “the West” is
seeking to destroy Russia, may point to the intention to paint a
situation which would justify the use of nuclear weapons in the
eyes of Russian public opinion.
44. This is an extremely reckless narrative, which is incompatible
with the responsibilities of a nuclear power holding a permanent
seat in the United Nations Security Council. And while Russia also
has tactical – as opposed to strategic – nuclear weapons at its
disposal, it is important to note that the former have never been used
in conflict before.
Note Given that modern conventional
weapons have become just as effective in destroying targets on the
battlefield, it is clear that the Russian leadership is trying to
use the terror caused by the potential use of nuclear weapons to
achieve its imperialistic objectives of territorial expansion.
45. In addition to being abhorrent and dangerous, such nuclear
threats are in breach of international law. First, they violate
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter on the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity of any State. Any such strike would also
violate international humanitarian law, in particular the principles
of distinction and of proportionality, by impacting civilians in
a significant manner. These threats also violate Russia’s own commitments
and assurances towards Ukraine in the context of the latter’s accession
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
46. While threatening the use of nuclear weapons, Russia obstructs
multilateral co-operation in this field. On 26 August, Russia blocked
the adoption of a substantive outcome document at the tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference due to paragraphs referring to the nuclear power
plant in Zaporizhzhia. The outcome document would have assessed
implementation of the landmark treaty and identified actions to advance
its core goals surrounding disarmament and non-proliferation.
Note
47. Another aspect of Russia’s nuclear blackmail involves the
illegal occupation of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, in Ukraine’s
Zaporizhzhia region. Following its August 2022 mission, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said there was an “urgent need for interim
measures to prevent a nuclear accident”, including the “establishment
of a nuclear safety and security protection zone”.
Note The continued occupation and militarisation
of a civilian nuclear plant continues to put at grave risk countless
innocent people and the surrounding natural environment.
48. In a testament to the fragility of the situation, on 8 October
2022 the IAEA announced the power plant had lost its last remaining
external power source and was relying on emergency diesel generators
for the electricity it needed for reactor cooling and other essential
safety and security functions.
Note
6 Opposition
to the war and mounting repression in the Russian Federation
6.1 Crackdown
on civil liberties
49. Since the beginning of the
large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities
have further strengthened the already vast legal panoply aimed at
curtailing freedom of expression, assembly and association and silencing
independent media. According to OVD-Info, over this period, parliament
has adopted 16 new repressive laws or amendments to existing documents.
Note Amongst, them:
- in March 2022, new legislation established penalties of
up to 15 years for criticising the Russian armed forces;
- in July 2022, the definition of a “foreign agent” in the
relevant law was amended to include “anyone deemed to have fallen
under influence”;
- in August 2022, amendments were introduced to the law
on undesirable organisations, with a view to expanding criminal
liability for involvement with “undesirable organisations” beyond
Russia’s borders, including for making donations to such organisations.
50. Despite these draconian measures, anti-war demonstrations
and protests have been breaking out across the Russian Federation.
Scores of people have been arrested, amidst reports of police brutality
and alleged cases of inhuman treatment and torture in detention.
According to OVD-Info, in the first six months of the aggression
there had been at least 16 437 detentions related to anti-war protests.
Note OVD-Info
also reports that, in addition to detentions at rallies and after
them, the authorities practice preventive detentions using a facial
recognition system.
51. Amongst the most prominent public figures being persecuted
for voicing criticism against the war is Vladimir Kara-Murza who,
on 10 October 2022, was awarded the Václav Havel Prize. Having been
detained since April 2022, he is currently being investigated for
high treason and risks a 20-year prison sentence. The former mayor
of Yekaterinburg, Yevgeny Roizman, has been fined and detained several
times for discrediting the armed forces and may face criminal prosecution
for a repeated offence. Ilya Yashin, opposition activist and former
municipal deputy in Moscow, is detained for spreading false information
about the Russian armed forces. By the end of August 2022, 74 additional
“foreign agents” had been added to the register held by the Ministry
of Justice and the total number of “undesirable organisations” amounted
to 65.
Note As a result, several civil society
organisations, such as Memorial International, have been closed
down.
52. The authorities’ effort to implement a “one-truth policy”
has led not only to the closure of virtually all independent media
outlets, but also to the blocking of internet websites and social
media. Children’s indoctrination around the war in schools is widespread
practice, while artists expressing anti-war views are prevented
from performing. The Group for Research on Anti-Russian Activities
in the Sphere of Culture and Art (GRAD), set up by the Russian Duma,
has been very active in asking for the resignation of prominent
artists and personalities, and in seeking further investigation
by the Federal Security Service.
53. The report of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism on Russia’s Legal
and Administrative Practice in light of its OSCE Human Dimension
Commitments, published on 22 September 2022, provides a detailed
description of this state of affairs, concluding that “the authorities'
actions against civil society show that the ultimate goal is to
create a monolithic society based on a certain pre-modern understanding
of “Russian-ness”. Those who oppose it are seen as nails sticking
out of the wall; they must be hammered into the wall and disappear.
The President's speeches about a “fifth column” and “insects to
be spat out” reveal an attitude of deep-seated hatred. The main
strategy of the Russian authorities is based on intimidation. Persecution
is not hidden, but visible for all, especially when it is directed
against public figures. The main aim seems to be to get people to give
up or leave the country”.
Note
54. Both abroad and domestically, the leadership of the Russian
Federation has been pushing for an anti-European and anti-humanistic
ideology of the “Russian world”, based on ideas of national superiority
and national hatred as well as discrimination on the ground of gender,
sexual orientation and identity. This is a serious concern particularly
because of how it might affect the younger generations in Russia.
55. Complementing this gloomy scenario is the fact that all justice
institutions in Russia are subdued to the Kremlin, leaving the people
of Russia without a real, credible recourse to justice and to the
rule of law.
6.2 Mobilisation
56. Following weeks of military
setbacks, on 21 September 2022 President Putin announced a partial mobilisation,
the first since the Second World War, ostensibly due to what he
described as the West’s intention to “destroy Russia”.
Note He claimed that only reservists with previous
training would be called up to military service, and Defence Minister
Shoigu later clarified that it would involve 300 000 Russians. The
day prior to the mobilisation announcement, the Duma passed a law
imposing penalties for refusing to fight, surrender and desertion,
without any public debate or discussion.
Note
57. This consequential policy decision directly contradicted the
narrative that President Putin himself had been pushing since the
large-scale aggression against Ukraine started in February 2022,
namely that Russia was merely conducting a “special military operation”.
58. Notwithstanding President Putin’s assurances that the partial
mobilisation involved only those with previous training, the mobilisation
decree itself has much broader terms, and the wide spectrum of people being
called up by enlistment officers – including many who have not served
in the forces or are beyond drafting age – have been called on to
fight. This has caused much controversy across the country, leading
Putin himself to publicly admit that the mobilisation had not gone
smoothly and to claim that there had been “mistakes”.
59. Tensions soon rose across the Russian Federation, with angry
showdowns at draft centres that sometimes turned violent. A draft
officer in Siberia was shot after giving a speech about the war
in Ukraine, and a man set himself on fire in protest in a city south
of Moscow. In cities across Russia, police dispersed peaceful demonstrations
against the mobilisation and arrested over 2 000 protesters.
60. Of particular concern, the authorities have been disproportionately
focusing its mobilisation on ethnic minority regions, impoverished
areas, occupied territories and indigenous people. The mobilisation
caused significant unrest in Dagestan, where protests in multiple
cities led to clashes with police and shots being fired. Research
from the BBC's Russian service showed that at least 301 soldiers
from Dagestan had died in the war, more than from any other Russian
region and more than ten times as many as from Moscow, which has
a population five times higher.
Note
61. Another element of concern is the Kremlin’s policy to send
detained persons from prisons across Russia to fight in Ukraine.
62. According to human rights monitoring groups, Crimean Tatars
have also been receiving high numbers of draft notices since the
announcement of the partial mobilisation.
Note In addition to being a violation
of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit an occupying power from
compelling occupied populations to serve in its armed forces,
Note the targeting of the Turkish Muslim
minority group raises questions as regards the real aims of mobilisation.
This is of particular concern given the practice of “passportisation”
applied by the occupying Russian authorities in Crimea since 2014,
already examined by the Assembly, which compelled residents of Crimea,
including Crimean Tatars, to adopt Russian citizenship in order
not to be treated as foreigners or not to be deported.
Note
63. Amidst these worrying developments, President Zelenskyy has
called on Ukrainians in occupied territories to dodge the draft,
or if they are not able to, to avoid fighting fellow Ukrainians
and instead sabotage Russian operations.
64. The partial mobilisation announced by President Putin ignited
a massive exodus of Russian men who attempted to flee the country
to avoid a potential callup. Reports estimate hundreds of thousands
had done so already by the first week of October, with some Russian
media claiming upwards of 700 000.
Note
65. European governments have reacted differently to the possibility
of welcoming Russian deserters. Germany indicated that Russians
fleeing the mobilisation would be able to apply for asylum, in line
with international law, and France said that while it would be selective
and evaluate a person's situation and security risk, it would ensure
that those who needed to could still come to the country.
66. Finland, which shares a 1 300-kilometre border with Russia,
indicated it will significantly restrict entry to Russians, with
political figures there calling the fleeing reservists an obvious
security risk. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have also started
to restrict entry for Russian citizens traveling with tourist visas. Lithuania’s
Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, tweeted that “Russians
should stay and fight against Putin,” and his Latvian counterpart
Edgars Rinkēvičs argued that those fleeing now cannot be considered conscientious
objectors since they did not act when Russia started this latest
aggression in February.
Note
67. European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 30
September 2022 urged member States to beef up border staff and tighten
security checks, saying countries should assess whether to let in
Russians trying to enter Europe on a “case-by-case” basis.
Note
7 Multilateralism
and global security concerns
68. The UN Security Council, the
guardian of international peace and security, by its own design
is incapacitated to act when one of its permanent members uses its
veto right. It is the case this time, when Europe is experiencing
the largest war and threat to its overall security since the creation
of the United Nations in 1945. In fact, the threat goes well beyond
the European continent.
69. On 30 September 2022, notwithstanding 10 votes in favour,
a draft resolution proposed by the United States and Albania condemning
the illegal “referendums” and attempted annexation of four Ukrainian
regions as a threat to international peace and security was defeated
with the sole opposition of the Russian Federation. Even if the
text was rejected, the voting result showed the isolation of Russia,
with Brazil, China, Gabon and India abstaining.
70. Following the vote, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United Nations
described the Security Council as a “broken pillar” of the United
Nations.
Note On several occasions, Ukraine has mentioned
Russia’s legitimacy to sit in the UNSC as the successor State of
the Soviet Union. Calls for a reform of the UNSC are gaining support. As
President Zelenskyy has said, “a State that is implementing a policy
of genocide right now, keeping the world one step away from a radiation
disaster, and at the same time threatening nuclear strikes cannot
remain a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power.”
Note
71. In this context of stalemate in the Security Council, the
relevance and authority of the UN General Assembly increases substantially.
The Emergency Special Session dedicated to the Russian aggression against
Ukraine, initially convened in February 2022, reopened on 10 October
with a debate in which numerous governments from around the world
clearly and loudly stated that illegal annexations of territories
are contrary to what the United Nations stands for and will never
be recognised.
72. Previously, on 7 April 2022, the UN General Assembly had adopted
a resolution suspending Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights
Council over the "grave concern at the ongoing
human rights and
humanitarian
crisis in Ukraine.”
Note
73. Furthermore, on 21 September 2022, President Zelenskyy used
his speech at the 77th session of the UN
General Assembly to present the Ukrainian peace formula, anchored
on five key points: punishing aggression, protecting life, restoring
security and territorial integrity, guaranteeing security, and highlighting
the importance of determination. He also called on the international
community to recognise Russia as a State sponsor of terrorism.
Note
74. The Russian aggression against Ukraine should be analysed
also from the point of view of its broader geopolitical repercussions.
Russia and China have taken steps to solidify their partnership,
jointly promoting, particularly after a February 2022 meeting between
the two presidents, a rhetoric of a “new era” in international affairs
in which the two authoritarian States share a friendship with “no
limits”. The tones were milder in the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) Summit in Samarkand in early September 2022 but while
reiterating its support for the principle of territorial integrity,
China has consistently refrained from open criticism of Russia.
75. Some countries have supported the Russian Federation in UN
General Assembly votes to condemn the aggression and to expel Russia
from the UN Human Rights Council. These countries, which include
Belarus, China, Cuba, Iran and Syria, should be condemned. Some
of these counties have been engaged in disinformation campaigns
in Africa, Asia and Latin America that help the Russian Federation.
76. While war is ravaging Ukraine, Asia has become the theatre
of rising tensions. A confrontational display of diplomatic and
military might around the issue of Taiwan came to the forefront.
North Korea fired ballistic missiles on seven occasions over two
weeks in October 2022, including one which flew over Japan, while South
Korea and the United States conducted joint naval drills. In September
Iran joined the SCO, with Putin noting that relations between Russia
and Iran were “developing positively”.
Note
77. In Europe, the Russian Federation is trying to strengthen
its influence in the Western Balkans. In September, on the sidelines
of the UN General Assembly, the foreign ministers of Serbia and
Russia signed an agreement on relations between the two ministries.
Several members of the European Parliament denounced the deal, even
calling for suspension of the EU accession talks with Serbia, and
Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selaković subsequently downplayed
the importance of the deal, claiming it to be technical and not
relating to security matters.
Note
78. In the hard security sphere, the war of aggression has led
to the further enlargement of NATO to Finland and Sweden. Ukraine
has applied to be admitted to NATO with an accelerated procedure.
NATO military forces in Europe remain on high alert. The apparent
sabotage of a gas pipeline connecting Russia to Europe in early October
2022 was yet another demonstration of the multifaceted security
threats that characterise the current geopolitical environment.
79. One of the most alarming consequences of the war has been
food insecurity, both in Ukraine and around the world. The ongoing
aggression poses a major problem for countries dependent on imports
from Russia and Ukraine, both important producers of wheat and fertilisers.
It endangers food security for millions of people worldwide, especially
in low-income countries.
80. On 22 July 2022, with the facilitation of Türkiye and the
United Nations, Russian and Ukrainian representatives reached an
agreement on the export of grain, related food items, and fertilizers,
covering Ukraine’s Odessa, Yuzhny, and Chernomorsk ports. The deal
has already allowed the export of millions of tonnes of wheat. The
Russian Federation has however been hesitant to appoint more inspectors
to meet the growing volume of exports, thereby causing a backlog
at ports, and in early September President Putin had threatened
to revisit the agreement due to what he described as inappropriate
destinations for the exports.
81. In addition to several countries’ humanitarian, operational
and military support to Ukraine, the international community has
continued its strong support for the country’s recovery. At the
Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland, heads of government
and ministers representing 41 countries from across the globe agreed
to a common framework for the political process of Ukraine’s reconstruction
and to a set of principles to serve as benchmarks for the future.
Note
82. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted
in May 2022 the adjusted Action Plan for Ukraine, in order to provide
the most adequate and helpful short- and medium-term support to
the country.
83. The transatlantic unity in favour of Ukraine is to be noted
and commended. Europe should be especially grateful for the United
States’ strong military and economic support to Ukraine.
8 Accountability
of the Russian Federation
84. It is of the utmost importance
that the Russian Federation and its leadership are held accountable
for the crimes it is committing on European soil, against a neighbouring
sovereign State and its citizens, and in violation of international
law. This issue should be looked at in a comprehensive manner, with
a view to avoiding impunity while respecting the remit and responsibilities
of different jurisdictions.
85. Amongst other recommendations, the Assembly has called on
member and observer States of the Council of Europe to set up an
ad hoc international criminal tribunal
to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by
the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation.
Note This proposal is in line with the
initiative launched by Ukraine and recently reiterated by President
Zelenskyy when addressing the UN General Assembly. If the fourth
Summit of the Council of Europe member States Heads of State and Government
should give its unequivocal political support to this initiative,
this gesture would have a strong political significance.
86. International jurisdictions currently working on Ukraine include:
- the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, who has opened an investigation on present allegations
of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on
any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person from 21 November
2013 onwards;
- on the basis of an application filed by Ukraine, the International
Court of Justice, which is looking into the interpretation, application
and fulfilment of the 1948 Convention or United Nations Genocide
Convention. The application aims at showing that claims that Ukraine
is responsible for genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions are
unfounded and establishing that the Russian Federation thus has
no lawful basis to take military action based on those false claims.
87. In the area of human rights, six months after its expulsion
from the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation ceased to be
party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September
2022. The European Court of Human Rights remains competent to deal
with applications against Russia concerning actions or omissions
occurring up until 16 September 2022. Amongst them is the inter-state
case
Ukraine v. Russia (X) (No.
11055/22) lodged by Ukraine and concerning allegations of mass and
gross human rights violations committed by the Russian Federation
on the territory of Ukraine since 24 February 2022. It is also to be
welcomed, as a sign of support for Ukraine but also to the Convention
system as a whole for holding Russia accountable, that 23 Council
of Europe member States have requested leave to intervene as third
parties in these proceedings.
Note
88. Within the UN system, an Independent International Commission
of Inquiry was set up by the Human Rights Council on 3-4 March 2022
to investigate alleged violations of human rights in the context
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition,
as already mentioned, on 8 October 2022 the Human Rights Council
set up the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia.
89. The Council of Europe should be in the front line to support
Ukrainian prosecutors and any hybrid courts (with national and international
judges) which may be established to investigate and prosecute such
serious international crimes. The setting up of a register of the
damage caused by the Russian aggression should also be supported
and the Russian Federation should be held accountable for compensating
the damage it has inflicted.
9 Conclusions
90. The Russian Federation’s unprovoked,
unjustified and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine is a tragedy
of immense proportions. It is causing enormous pain, human suffering
and material devastation in Ukraine. It is the largest war in Europe
since the Second World War. Through its global repercussions as regards
military, energy and food security, it poses a serious threat to
international peace and global governance.
91. As the aggression continues, reaching new levels of violence
and destruction, the Russian regime confirms its real terrorist
nature, through its reckless and hateful narrative and spiteful
contempt of the most basic human rights and rules of international
law.
92. Council of Europe member States should condemn the latest
further escalation in the Russian Federation’s aggression. They
should not recognise any effect of the sham “referendums” organised
by the Russian Federation as a pretext to try to annex swathes of
Ukrainian territories in violation of international law. They should
step up their support to Ukraine by all available means, supporting
its right to defend itself and contributing to its reconstruction.
93. In this critical moment, Council of Europe member States should
stand by their principles and values and spare no efforts to ensure
that the Russian Federation is held accountable, legally and politically,
for this aggression and all the suffering and damage it is provoking.
94. The Assembly has already adopted a number of texts on the
Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, which I have listed
in the Appendix to the present report and whose recommendations
should be fully reiterated. These texts reflect the conscience of
Europe. It is of the utmost importance that the Heads of State and
Government of Council of Europe member States, united in a fourth
Summit, endorse the Assembly’s proposals, reaffirming not only their
commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but also
to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine
and to avoid impunity for the Russian Federation.