B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Paul Galles, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. The number of Belarusians forced
to flee their country as a result of the repression unleashed in
the context of the rigged presidential election of 9 August 2020
remains uncertain. Figures vary between 300 000 and 500 000, undoubtedly
the largest migration movement in the history of Belarus since Second
World War. While most of them have a common wish – to return as
rapidly as possible to a democratic Belarus – they do not necessarily
describe themselves in the same way. However, whether they are migrants,
diaspora, or refugees, these Belarusians now living abroad face
common challenges stemming precisely from the very reasons which
led them to leave their country. This is the reason why I use the
notion of “exile” in my report, as the Belarusians who left their
country did so against their will, and because staying in Belarus
would have led to their life, safety and security being seriously
put at risk.
Note
2. All Belarusians in exile are not necessarily human rights
defenders. The situation of the latter has already been well documented,
notably by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in
a recent Comment, in which she proposes a number of measures as
the way forward.
Note However, the situation of other categories
of persons; such as journalists and media workers, political opponents,
lawyers, writers and artists, relatives of political prisoners,
students and academics, businesspeople and athletes; who also face challenges
preventing them from living a normal life, is less known and acknowledged.
3. The first hurdle which Belarusians in exile must clear is
to gain acceptance that being Belarusian does not make them representatives
or supporters of the Lukashenka regime. Perception has been a key
factor contributing to the violation of the rights of the Belarusians
in exile. Applying a generic treatment to Belarusians is illustrative
of the absence of an individualised understanding – and therefore
assessment – of their situation, making the entire group face risks
of discrimination and other human rights violations because of their
mere nationality and presumed political affiliations.
4. Recent developments in Belarus – notably the regime’s involvement
in the war against Ukraine, but also the signature on 6 February
2023 by Aliaksandr Lukashenka of Decree No. 25, creating a special
commission to work with “political” emigrants who want to return
to their homeland – are clear indicators that those who found safety
abroad are unlikely to be able to return home in the near future.
Note
5. The plight of Belarusians in exile and a severe humanitarian
crisis in Belarus have been somewhat overshadowed by the terrible
consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. My report
aims at highlighting the challenges which they face, the specific
needs they have in the host countries, and more importantly, at
proposing ways to address these, based wherever possible on already
existing good practices. I believe that our Assembly is well placed
to propose concrete solutions to Council of Europe member States so
as to ensure that those seeking shelter can stay legally in the
country of asylum/exile and are hosted in dignified conditions respectful
of their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), pending the establishment of a democratic
regime in Belarus.
6. During the preparation of this report, I have been impressed
by the courage, determination, creativity and resilience of the
Belarusians in exile I met, starting with the leader of the democratic
forces, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. I have no doubt that the Belarus
people’s aspiration to democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
of which they have been deprived for far too long, will one day
soon be realised. I consider that it is our duty, as fellow Europeans,
to help them on this path, and I hope that my report will contribute
to this.
7. In order to prepare this report, the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons held a number of exchanges of views
and authorised me to carry out a fact-finding mission to Warsaw
and Vilnius (27-30 March 2023). I am very grateful to all my interlocutors
among the Lithuanian and Polish authorities as well as the Belarusians
in exile themselves, who shared with both precision and passion
their worries and hopes with me. I hope that my report not only
reflects their views, but also provides concrete solutions to help
them rebuild their lives in Europe while the regime, which has destroyed
all civil and political institutions, is still in place. I have
taken every precaution not to include information which could endanger
them or their relatives.
8. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, whom I met in Vilnius underlined
the importance of this report, stressing that the challenges faced
by the Belarusians in exile is an overlooked issue. Addressing it
might help clarify the fact that the Belarusian people are not to
be confused with the Minsk regime. She expressed her concern that
since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Belarusians in exile
have faced higher risks of discrimination if not threats to their
security, as they are identified with the regime, ally to the Russian
Federation. She hoped that the report will contribute to alleviate
the hurdles her compatriots face by enlightening the Council of
Europe member States on ways to remedy existing shortcomings in
law and practice in the welcoming of Belarusian people who did not
choose to leave their country but were obliged to do so by a violent,
dangerous and unpredictable regime.
2 General context
9. Estimates on the number of
Belarusians living abroad
Note vary depending on the
sources. While Belsat gives a figure of 177 000 Belarusians who
left the country between 1995 and 2016, other sources estimate this figure
between 1,5 million and 3, 5 million for a total population of 9
349 645 as of 1 January 2021.
Note
10. Most of those who left their country in the context of the
2020 presidential elections have chosen to stay in neighbouring
countries, Lithuania and Poland. While it is difficult to know with
certainty their number, because of the high fluidity of arrivals
and the absence of clear migration data, it is estimated that there
are about 49 000 Belarusians in Lithuania at present and well above
100 000 in Poland.
Note
11. As Belarusians do not need any visa to enter Georgia, this
country has become a haven for a huge inflow of Belarusians escaping
the 2020 State repressions and the 2022 Russian aggression against
Ukraine. Thus, in March 2022, 19 898 Belarusians entered Georgia
from Ukraine, of which 14 030 remained. In March 2022, compared
to March 2019, the rate of entry of Belarusian citizens to Georgia
had increased by 555%.
Note
12. Many Belarusians in exile had to leave their first country
of destination due to visa issues, personal security reasons or
the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. In other words, they experienced
a double or triple displacement. According to a recent quantitative
and qualitative analysis carried out by Vałdzis Fuhaš, one of the
founders of the human rights organisation “Human Constanta” and
speaker at the meeting of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Displaced persons on 24 January 2023, the average amount of displacements
per country per group was 2.1.
13. The moment Aliaksandr Lukashenka refused to admit his defeat
at the presidential elections of 9 August 2020 marked the beginning
of profound changes among Belarus society and the country itself.
His support and participation in the war in Ukraine has only exacerbated
the fact that the Minsk regime is not in place to serve the people
of Belarus, but to protect its own position and privileges. At the
same time, it is putting the independence and sovereignty of Belarus
in jeopardy. Meanwhile, the most likely winner of the election, Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya, who was forced out of Belarus, has taken her role
as leader of the democratic forces with all the commitment and competence
appropriate for such a position. More than two years after the elections,
while in exile in Lithuania, she has turned her Office and the United
Transitional Cabinet into a de facto government
in exile, and with the limited means available, she carries out
the functions which the Lukashenka regime fails to perform, for
the sake of her compatriots who live abroad. In practice, modern technologies
are helping her to build a parallel State pending the establishment
of a democratic regime in Belarus. On 6 March 2023, a court in Minsk
sentenced Ms Tsikhanouskaya in absentia to
15 years of imprisonment.
14. The expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of
Europe following the aggression of Ukraine led the Committee of
Ministers also to suspend all relations with Belarus on 17 March
2022.
Note This decision has opened the door
to discuss co-operation with the democratic forces. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
was then invited to address a high-level panel discussion organised
by the Assembly on 21 June 2022, and several weeks later, on 7 July,
to address the Committee of Ministers. On this occasion, she encouraged
the Committee of Ministers to think outside the box by establishing
a formal channel of communication between the Organisation and the
democratic forces of Belarus with the aim to “bring more Belarus
into Europe and more Europe into Belarus”.
Note This has resulted in the establishment
by the Committee of Ministers of a Contact Group on co-operation
between the Council of Europe and the Belarusian democratic forces
and civil society, whose aim is to provide the Organisation’s support
and expertise to strengthen Belarusian democratic society in line
with Council of Europe core values. The work of the Contact Group
has already resulted in the launching on 1 February 2023 of a 15-point
action plan to support civil society and democracy representatives
working towards a future free and democratic Belarus.
Note
15. Since October 2020, the European Union has progressively imposed
restrictive measures against Belarus. The measures were adopted
in response to the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections.
A total of 195 individuals and 34 entities have been designated
under the sanctions regime on Belarus, including key figures of
the political leadership and of the government, high-level members
of the judicial system and several prominent economic actors.
Note The European Union has also imposed
restrictive measures on Belarus following its involvement in Russia's
military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Not only were
prominent Belarusians hit by the freezing of their assets and travel
bans, but the European Union also restricted financial, trade and
technological flows with Belarus.
Note On 27 February 2023, the Council
of the European Union decided to extend the application of sanctions
so far imposed for an additional year, due to the “persistent gravity of
the domestic situation in the country and Belarus’ ongoing involvement
in the Russian aggression against Ukraine”.
Note Also, as of 28 June 2021, Belarus
has suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnership.
16. On 24 November 2022, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution
on “the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil
society in Belarus”, which
inter alia highlighted
the continued need “to continue assisting the democratic opposition,
civil society and human rights defenders, trade union representatives
and independent media in Belarus and abroad”. It also reiterated
its call on the Commission and the Member States “to prepare rules
and procedures to deal with cases where human rights defenders and
other civil society activists are stripped of their citizenship
in Belarus, as well as to provide support to those Belarusians residing
in the EU whose identity documents are about to expire and who have
no means of renewing them, since they cannot return to Belarus“.
Note
17. For many years, the only international protection mechanism
afforded to Belarusians was through communications to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. This avenue is no longer possible
following Belarus’ withdrawal from that procedure in November 2022.
Note However, those Belarusians who find themselves
under the jurisdiction of any of the 46 Council of Europe member
States, are protected under Article 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
18. In her last report to the UN General Assembly, the UN’s Special
Rapporteur on Belarus, Anaïs Marin, has focused on “the situation
of human rights of Belarusian nationals compelled to leave their
country and unable to safely return home due to human rights violations”.
Note As she provided a thorough analysis
of the targeted persons and groups who were forced to leave their
homeland by the regime in place, I invite interested readers to
read her thorough report. I also had the pleasure of meeting her
during my mission and am very grateful for the additional insight
this provided.
3 The
situation of the Belarusians in exile
19. The nature of the Belarus diaspora
is diverse. While until 2020, diaspora organisations of various orientations
existed, some promoting a democratic agenda and others being loyal
to the Minsk regime, the vast majority of those who fled in the
context of the 2020 elections are democratically oriented and many
of them – without necessarily having been engaged in civil society
movements in Belarus – have become de
facto activists.
20. The poet in exile Dmitri Strotsev visited the Assembly Secretariat
on the occasion of a trip to Strasbourg to present the French translation
of his latest poetry book.
Note Prior
to this, he launched an appeal on his Facebook page calling for
testimonies from Belarusians in exile. In only few hours, he received
more than 50 messages relating to individual experiences, which
capture the issues that are outlined in this respect.
21. His own experience is illustrative of some of the “Kafkaesque”
situations faced by exiled Belarusians. Dmitri Strotsev currently
lives in Germany. He was unable to extend his visa there or receive
a new one, as Germany required that he return to the first country
of visa issuance, namely Sweden. However, to get a Swedish visa,
he would have been required to leave the European Union. Eventually,
Mr Strotsev received a visa in Lithuania thanks to the organisation
Freedom House, which vouchsafed for him. Such a guarantee provided
by a non-governmental organisation is feasible in Lithuania, where
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically delegated the task
of vouching to this organisation, and where Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s
Office is based, but not in other Council of Europe member States.
This individual example reflects well what I heard in my exchanges
with Belarusians in exile, be it in exchanges of views held with
the committee or during my fact-finding mission.
22. Other forms of discrimination may occur though insults and
threats, denials of services, difficulties in accessing healthcare
assistance, obtaining proper accommodation, getting a job contract
or opening a bank account. According to a recent quantitative analysis,
39% of the surveyed exiled Belarusians in Georgia, 31% of those
in Poland and 16% of those in Lithuania affirmed to have experienced
various forms of discrimination in their countries of destination,
especially since the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Such cases
have also been registered in other member States of the Council
of Europe.
Note
23. An array of challenges is facing this diaspora, both in legal
and practical terms stemming from legislation, administrative procedures
or practice in the host countries. These problems may start from
birth, like in the case of children born from parents under a temporary
visa regime: because they cannot obtain Belarusian documents, they
are actually undocumented minors and at a risk of statelessness.
Other challenges are related to important milestones in life such
as birth, marriage, or divorce, but also to everyday hassles such
as changing a Belarusian driver’s license with an expired expiry
date.
24. Belarusian women in exile may experience more forms of discrimination
and barriers to integration than Belarusian men abroad. These mainly
revolve around difficulties in finding jobs, legalising their status,
learning the local language or accessing healthcare services. At
times, their financial dependence on their husbands further magnifies
these obstacles.
Note
25. Belarusians are determined to help themselves in the first
place. As I write this report, the foundations are being laid to
build a Digital State for Belarus though which medical doctors,
lawyers, schoolteachers etc. who were fired by the regime could
be hired to provide online services. This would also allow for better
access to independent media within Belarus and for the development
of tools for small businesses to increase their services. These
initiatives will allow remote jobs for people in and outside Belarus
to be created.
26. An amendment to the Law on “Citizenship of the Republic of
Belarus” of 10 January 2023 signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka, which
will enter into force on 10 June 2023, introduces the possibility
of revoking the citizenship of a person residing abroad and convicted
by a final judgment by a Belarus court for “extremist” activities
or other acts threatening the security of the State. Lukashenka
himself will decide personally about such matters. When this legislation
is applied, many Belarusians in exile will face the risk of becoming stateless.
This will be a particular problem for Belarusians living in countries
such as Poland, which have not ratified the 1954 Convention on the
Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness.
Note In its observations of December
2022, UNHCR’s key recommendations were that deprivation of nationality
should not lead to statelessness and that even if the country (as
is the case for Belarus) is not State party to the UN Statelessness
Conventions, these are principles of international law and human
rights law, which should be observed by States.
Note It should be noted however that Belarus
pledged to accede to both UN statelessness conventions at the High-Level
Segment on Statelessness in 2019.
Note
27. On 21 May 2021, International Partnership for Human Rights
(IPHR), Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Global Diligence LPP and Truth
Hounds filed a Communication under Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) entitled “The Situation
in Belarus/Lithuania/Poland/Latvia and Ukraine: Crimes Against Humanity
of Deportation and Persecution”.
Note The communication requested the ICC Prosecutor
to launch an investigation into the situation in Belarus, notably
regarding the fact that the regime has forcibly displaced thousands
of civilians beyond its borders, through violence, intimidation
and other forms of coercion. Whilst Belarus is not a State party
to the ICC, the ICC has jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes that
take place – at least in part – on the territory of its neighbours.
The Communication requests the ICC Prosecutor to open a preliminary
examination into the situation in Belarus (and in Lithuania, Poland,
Latvia and Ukraine) with a view to investigating and prosecuting
the alleged crimes. This request has remained unanswered so far.
28. National parliaments in Europe and beyond have played a significant
role in supporting the democratic forces of Belarus. Many parliamentarians,
including members of our Assembly, have become godparents of political
prisoners. Furthermore, an increasing number of national parliaments,
17 to date, such as Belgium, Estonia, Georgia, France, Latvia, Lithuania
and Ukraine, have established friendship groups with the democratic
forces of Belarus. A network is being built to unite them and co-ordinate
their efforts.
3.1 Legal
entry and stay
3.1.1 Access
to visa
29. Obtaining a visa to travel
to EU member States has always been a challenge for Belarusians.
The mass repressions after the fraudulent 2020 elections impaired
diplomatic relations between the European Union and the regime.
This has led to the downsizing of the staff of some embassies of
EU member States, affecting their capacities to process visa applications.
30. When the massive repressions started after the elections,
some neighbouring countries opened their borders to those fleeing,
regardless of the Covid-19 pandemics still going on and sometimes
in the absence of a valid visa. Thus, a humanitarian corridor was
opened by Lithuania, where people were admitted without a visa,
after the US-funded organisation Freedom House provided a guarantee
voucher for the persons concerned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which in turn informed the respective border control points. On behalf
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Freedom House continues to vouch
for those seeking visas and temporary permits.
Note Verifications are carried out in
co-operation with Belarus NGOs, such as Human Constanta, the Belarus
Helsinki Committee and Viasna. Not all requesting a voucher from
Freedom House receive it. The issuance of visas by Lithuania will
be significantly reduced after the entry into force of the laws on
restrictive measures, aiming to safeguard Lithuanian national security
and foreign policy interest (see
infra).
31. Poland’s aim is still to keep its border open for Belarusians.
The authorities make the distinction between the Minsk regime and
the people who do not support Lukashenka. However, after the expulsion
of Polish diplomats, there is objectively a lesser capacity to issue
visas in Minsk and the two Polish consulates in Brest and Grodno.
According to statistics provided by the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, between 10 August 2020 and 31 December 2022, Poland issued
509 701 visas to Belarusians. In 2022, of the 278 181 visas issued, 259 427
were of type D (domestic visas) et 18 754 of type C (Schengen visas).
The repression against Belarusians belonging to the Polish minority
has exacerbated the tension between the two countries and has led
to only one border crossing, at Tiraspol, remaining open for individuals,
while freight crossings have been closed by Poland.
Note
32. For other European countries, most of them had already reduced
their consulate capacities by June 2021.
Note Council
of Europe countries which do not require a visa for entry are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye and Ukraine. This explains why many
Belarusians went to Georgia and Ukraine, along with the quasi-absence
of a language barrier (see
infra).
33. According to the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, since
the start of the war against Ukraine, some member States have introduced
new restrictions against Belarusian citizens. In Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Finland, Poland, Norway and Sweden, Schengen visas are
not issued or eligibility is limited, including to close relatives
living in the European Union. No visas are issued for Denmark and
the Czech Republic. Visas for Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden can only be obtained in Moscow. France, Germany, Greece
and Italy issue visas after a long wait (up to 6-8 months), with
excessive fees to be paid to officially assigned intermediaries
(up to 450 Euros) and for a short duration, such as 15 days.
Note
34. Some countries still consider Belarus as a safe country. For
example, Sweden has not updated its Belarus country report since
2019 and considers Belarus as a safe country. As a result, people
can be returned there, or can have their refugee status denied.
Belarusians in Germany also report that they are told that they can
return safely to Belarus.
35. Finally, the stringent visa regime applicable to Belarus citizens
is detrimental to family reunification as there are no specific
arrangements to facilitate it, even less the possibility for relatives
to visit their family members who live abroad on a short-term basis.
A number of my interlocutors complained that no family reunification
was possible on the basis of a humanitarian visa but only on the
basis of a Schengen visa, which is difficult to obtain, and then
only for a 90-day duration. In some countries, such as Germany,
the authorisation of landlords is needed to be able to request a
visa. People feel that they are hostages of chance situations preventing
them from enjoying their right to family life.
36. All in all, Belarusians’ chances to relocate outside of Belarus
and to freely circulate within the European Union have significantly
decreased since 2020, while the need to do so is more important
than ever.
3.1.2 Legalisation
of stay
37. When they left in the aftermath
of the elections, most of the Belarusians thought that they would
be back in a couple of weeks, believing that reason would dictate
that democracy prevail. This was without counting on Lukashenka’s
determination to stay in power at any cost and Vladimir Putin’s
help to him do so (at the cost of losing the country’s sovereignty).
However, after some time, it was clear their exile might last for
some time and that they needed to legalise their stay abroad. I
can draw two clear conclusions from my work on this report. First,
the more time passes, the further away the prospects of Belarusians
returning to their home country become, especially since 24 February
2022. Second, the closer countries are to Belarus, the better they understand
the issues at stake and are ready to adapt their legislation and
practice to welcome those who try to escape the violence of Lukashenka’s
regime.
38. Thus, some good practices of legalisation can be found in
Lithuania and Poland, where the largest numbers of Belarusians in
exile live, and which authorities have a deep understanding of “what
a headache it is to have such an unpredictable neighbour” as one
of my Lithuanian interlocutors told me. Let’s remember that Belarus
is situated less than 40 km from Vilnius.
39. Lithuania adopted favourable visa conditions after the 2020
elections granting 6-month visas for free, humanitarian permits
for those politically repressed, as well as national visas giving
right to a temporary residence permit. The procedure for transferring
businesses (mostly IT) was also eased, allowing for the transfer
to Lithuania for all employees.
40. The number of Belarusians living in Lithuania has steadily
increased in the last years: there were 18 000 in 2020, 31 000 in
2021 and 49 000 in 2022. There are three grounds for regularisation:
with a work permit; on humanitarian grounds; or with a refugee status.
Different rights are attached to each status. Very few Belarusians
have asked for refugee status; 160 only because of a lengthy procedure,
lasting from 12 to 15 months during which working is not permitted.
The temporary residence permit needs to be renewed every year, a
cumbersome and costly procedure, which effectively prevents freedom
of movement as the foreigner’s passport is attached to it.
41. My Belarusian interlocutors underlined how Lithuania had demonstrated
huge solidarity towards their people, who had fled in standing for
democracy and human rights, by welcoming them after the rigged elections.
However, the new draft legislation which was being discussed at
the time of my visit in Vilnius, concerning restrictive measures
to be adopted as a consequence of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, triggered
deep concerns among them, because it was seen as “putting the Belarus
people and the Minsk regime in the same basket”. Belarusians in
Lithuania were worried because they took it literally as a reaction to
them being in Lithuania. One of them formulated it with this question:
"why is Lithuania punishing us, what did we do wrong?"
42. The representatives of the Ministry of Interior I met in Vilnius
reassured me that the authorities do not aim to negatively affect
the lives of those people who are resisting the Minsk regime, who
have found shelter in Lithuania, living, learning and working there,
but that they had to take measures to preserve their national security
after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. For them, the Russian
and Belarusian regimes are equally responsible for the war in Ukraine.
43. On 20 April 2023, rejecting a veto by the President, the Lithuanian
Parliament adopted the Law on restrictive measures, aiming to safeguard
Lithuanian national security and foreign policy interest.
Note A previous draft established serious
restrictions on Belarusians as regards the possibility of obtaining
visas, applying for residence permits, citizenships, e-residency
statuses and obtaining electronic signatures.
44. The law, as amended by the parliament, in the end does not
affect those Belarusians already living in Lithuania. Rather, it
introduced limitations for Belarus citizens who do not reside in
Lithuania. Thus, it no longer provides for: visa applications at
Lithuanian visa services abroad, unless the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs mediates; national visa applications through an external
service provider abroad (this restriction will enter into force
on 1 July 2023); and applications for electronic resident status
(except those who have Lithuanian permanent or temporary residence
permit). This new legislation thus will affect possible newcomers,
including relatives of those already residing in Lithuania.
45. In a meeting held on 5 April 2023, the Ministry of Interior
and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office agreed to form a working group
to simplify procedures and address other practical issues of Belarusians
in Lithuania. This physical proximity is undoubtedly conducive to
solving potential problems at their source.
46. Such an ad hoc team
for solving the problems of Belarusians in exile in Poland has already
been in place since March 2022. During my visit to Warsaw, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs provided me with detailed information and statistical
data. Legislation and practice have been amended to allow Belarusians
fleeing the regime to stay and work legally in Poland. Since January
2023, Belarusians who came to Poland on the basis of a humanitarian
visa have been allowed to legalise their continuing stay on the
basis of a temporary residence permit.
47. This has opened up the possibility of granting them a Polish
foreigner’s travel document, usually issued to foreigners staying
in Poland on the basis of indefinite residence permits in a situation
when they have lost their travel document or it has been destroyed
or has expired, and it is not possible to obtain a new travel document.
Note
48. Moreover, pursuant to the Act of 9 March 2023 amending the
Act on Foreigners and Certain Other Acts, as of 1 June 2023, the
possibility of issuing this document will also be open to Belarusians
staying in Poland on the basis of any temporary residence permit,
subsidiary protection or a residence permit for humanitarian reasons.
The document, valid for one year, will be issued by the
voivodeNote free
of charge.
49. Poland and Lithuania are the two only countries, which have
adopted specific provisions to address the large number of arrivals
of Belarusians. Their efforts and good will have not, however, removed
all the worries and hurdles which Belarusians have to endure. What
to say then, about those who live in other Council of Europe member
States, where there is no deep understanding of the situation in
Belarus? Most of them lack favourable legislation to legalise Belarusians
on the humanitarian grounds on which they entered the European Union
or to provide for the possibility to obtain legal grounds of stay
on the basis of studies or work, including for highly qualified
specialists.
50. Let us never forget that if these persons left, it is because
they had no other choice. Many faced imprisonment, torture and threats.
They have one wish: return to their homeland to build a new democratic State.
Their life, while they are obliged to live abroad, should be facilitated
as much as possible by the host countries. There are numerous examples
when delayed departure of experts, activists, journalists, human rights
defenders, reluctant to leave their native country, resulted in
arrests and lengthy imprisonment terms.
3.1.3 Asking
for refugee status or not?
51. Very few Belarusians in exile
have requested refugee status as they do not wish to sever their
links with their home country which they did not leave by choice.
Getting refugee status also has practical consequences, such as
making it impossible to sell real estate in Belarus.
52. In Poland, for example, which has a very liberal regime for
granting international protection, between 9 August 2020 and 31
December 2022, 5 775 Belarusians applied for international protection.
This represents only 5% of the Belarusians applying for different
types of residence permits in Poland. More than 99% of the requests
were accepted, while those dismissed were based on security concerns.
Poland has registered around 70% of applications for protection
in Europe from Belarusian citizens. Lithuania and Germany have accepted
each about 10% of the other requests.
53. But for those who wish to seek international protection, national
internal rules and procedures often make it a lengthy journey during
which working is not allowed. In Lithuania, a country expensive
for Belarusians, some are obliged to use illegal ways to earn money
to survive during the procedure of obtaining refugee status, which
takes more than a year, despite their wish to respect the law and
pay taxes.
54. In countries such as France, Spain and Portugal, it is almost
impossible to receive refugee status because the respective authorities
are not aware of the situation in Belarus. A migration officer once
asked an applicant “what is the problem with Belarus?”.
Note As long as national authorities
and civil servants dealing with immigration files from Belarus applicants
are not aware of the dire situation in Belarus, the situation is
unlikely to improve.
3.2 Threats
to freedom of movement
55. A very sensitive issue affecting
many Belarusians abroad is their freedom of movement. Even those
who fulfil the necessary requirements to travel abroad face after
some time a practical challenge: either their passport is expiring
or does not contain sufficient pages for stamping. We who are citizens
from the Schengen area have almost forgotten what it is to have
your passport stamped at each border crossing, but if we remember
what it means, we realise how important blank pages can be in a
valid passport.
56. This situation does not concern the beneficiaries of international
protection who have a Geneva travel document and those with a temporary
residence permit accompanied by a foreigner’s passport of the same duration,
like in Lithuania and Poland. However, they constitute a minority.
57. There is significant anecdotal evidence that Belarusian consulates
abroad decline requests to prolong the validity of the passports
of their citizens. Instead, they require that they return to Belarus
to get a new travel document. This is of course not feasible for
all those who escaped the regime in place. There have already been
too many examples of Belarusians arrested upon their return, despite
Lukashenka’s siren song to lure them back home. For the regime,
keeping control of the passports is clearly used as a leverage to
control the lives of those who live abroad. This practice also constitutes
a de facto refusal by Lukashenka’s
regime to provide one of the fundamental services of the State –
documenting its citizens.
58. This dependence is detrimental to Belarusians living abroad,
who have shown that they do not want to lose their citizenship.
Their passports should not be used as an instrument by the authorities
to control their lives.
59. A possibility could be to allow Belarusian citizens to continue
to use their travel documents even when expired. However, the European
Union treats the issuing of travel documents and their credibility
with extreme caution. The documents must also comply with the strict
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
for travel safety. Also, extending the period of validity of a travel
document is an extremely time-consuming and delicate task to carry
out in the European Union. This would be against the rules of ICAO, which
are applied world-wide and foresee no derogations.
60. In order to respond to the people’s demand not to be held
hostage by an illegitimate regime preventing them from enjoying
freedom of movement, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and the United
Transitional Cabinet of Belarus have come up with the idea of creating
a new Belarusian passport which would be issued by them. Many political,
practical, financial, and security difficulties are attached to
such an initiative, but the current situation where a de facto Belarus State in exile
is being created, is unique. It therefore requires a solution outside
the box and I believe that Council of Europe member States, as well
as the European Union, could find original ways to support these
efforts.
3.3 Denial
of consular services
61. Consular services are also
denied when an apostille is needed, notably for the legalization
process. I was told that after waiting in long queues, people are
either told that they need to return to Belarus, which is of course
not feasible since, as already noted, they would risk immediate
arrest, or their request is never answered.
62. There is a particular concern regarding children born abroad
who cannot obtain documents because consulates cannot deal with
this issue. As their parents are not in a position to go back to
Belarus to ensure proper documentation, there is a risk that these
children born abroad become stateless.
63. Because the regime continues to use this leverage against
its citizens and because the host countries require documentation
that is effectively impossible to obtain, Belarusians in exile find
themselves either forced to return and risk being arrested for political
reasons, or are unable to legalise their stay, or have their diplomas recognised
and are denied access to social and healthcare services. There is
a contradiction in demanding an apostille from a non-recognised
regime, and solutions should be found to avoid having to have recourse
to consular services.
3.4 Threats
to safety and security
64. Crossing the border is not
always sufficient to ensure safety and security to those Belarusians
who have fled the regime, but the bigger security risks remain for
those who stayed behind. Clearly, Belarus has become an immense
open-air prison, where anyone could become the target of the regime,
except for those who remain loyal to it. Maintaining relationship
with relatives and friends who stayed behind is difficult, precisely, because
contact may put them in danger. Many of my interlocutors underlined
how one of the challenges is to reconnect Belarusians outside the
country with those still in it.
65. Simple communication becomes a real challenge. The French
sociologist Roman Hervouet tells a wonderful and touching example
in his latest book, where he recounts his correspondence with an
old friend who still lives in Minsk, and who feels like Charles
Baudelaire’s Albatross, “exiled on earth”.
Note
66. All Belarusians in exile fear trying to return back home,
as any public statement or personal message could be used as evidence
for their detention. Every day, in Belarus, around 15-20 people
get arrested, and, in 2022 alone, 5 000 politically motivated detentions
were registered. However, Belarusians in exile not only fear for
their own lives, but also for any possible State reprisals against
their relatives who are still inside the Belarusian territory. Once
Belarusians in exile are sentenced
in
absentia to imprisonment or civil sanctions, the authorities
undertake whatever action they consider necessary to force them
to return to Belarus for immediate arrest. For instance, there have
been cases of the relatives of Belarusians in exile being kidnapped
or detained.
Note Sometimes,
relatives are tortured to force them to give information on the
Belarusians abroad. In other cases, the houses of Belarusians in
exile were destroyed or searched for any evidence that could be
used in their trials, while NGOs’ offices were raided as a threatening
message.
Note
67. The organisations that support activists and political prisoners’
families by providing them with financial support in the country
have to operate very carefully to avoid the risk of the recipients
getting arrested. Some were recognised as “extremist organisations”
and when Belarus banks leaked the list of people who have been donating
through this channel, they were proclaimed extremists as well, resulting
in arrests and blackmail.
68. There are sufficient high-profile cases indicating that digital
security is not addressed properly. For example, the content of
the computer and phone of the journalist Raman Pratasevich was used
as evidence to arrest him and prosecute him after the hijacking
of the Athens-Vilnius Ryanair flight in April 2021.
69. I heard two different stories about the book “I am going out”
containing pictures of the demonstrations held after the 9 August
2020 election
Note: that the pictures are used by the
authorities to identify opponents to the regime and to arrest them,
using the photos as evidence that they participated in anti-Lukashenka demonstrations,
and on the contrary, that Freedom House uses the photos to find
evidence that those seeking to enter Lithuania are genuine opponents
to the regime, and not infiltrated agents.
70. How much Belarusian special services are active abroad is
difficult to say but I was told in different contexts that the use
of false and discrediting narratives against activists is on the
rise, which contributes inter alia to
creating a feeling of distrust among different organisations.
71. In one case, a Lithuanian lawyer was accused of being recruited
by the KGB to spy on a organisation based in Vilnius.
Note I was also told
there are cases of Belarusians in exile being recruited by the Belarusian
KGB in exchange for a safe return to Belarus and acquittal of any
possible charges against them. According to one source, in December
2022 alone, 58 Belarusians in exile were arrested once they entered
Belarus despite having been promised a safe return by the authorities.
Note
72. The criminal procedures instigated in Belarus against political
opponents can have huge repercussions for the lives of Belarusians
in exile if Interpol issues a Red Notice at the request of the Lukashenka
regime. There have been already many cases where criminal proceedings
were started as a pretext for political persecution. For example,
the prosecution of alleged economic crimes such as failure to pay
taxes, giving or taking bribes, fraud, and money laundering is used
to persecute political opponents both inside Belarus (at least 15
political prisoners were convicted under these respective provisions
of the Criminal Code, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski)
and outside Belarus (Dmitri Glazer was accused of taking bribes
but was released by a Slovenian court).
Note Furthermore,
criminal cases alleging threats to national security, extremism, high
treason, inciting national hatred, disturbing public order, etc.
are filed against political opponents and journalists protesting
against the war in Ukraine.
NoteNote
73. Following legislative amendments, since May 2022, the death
penalty can be imposed not only for committing a terrorist act but
also for preparing one. The list of so-called terrorists in Belarus
includes participants in the 2020 protests, including Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya and Paval Latushka. In 2022, people were detained
for sabotaging the railway to prevent Russian military trains from
traveling to Ukraine. Most of those detained were charged with either
an act of terrorism or preparation for it.
74. Belarusians in exile can only feel safe if they know with
certainty that they do not risk extradition as a result of an Interpol
Red Notice. Providing adequate information to the respective national
authorities to which these Red Notices are addressed is therefore
key. Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs should systematically
be acquainted with relevant reports, which will justify a negative
reply to an Interpol Red Notice or a request for extradition.
NoteIn
this connection, it should be noted that Belarus is the only European
country where a request to Interpol does not require a court decision;
the Prosecutor's Office uses this loophole to pursue political opponents.
3.5 Solidarity
with Belarus
75. The links between the Belarusians
in exile and their compatriots who have not left the country remain very
tight even in the absence of physical contacts. Social media and
modern technologies have been instrumental in that respect. There
are many initiatives aiming at supporting different groups in Belarus,
of which I will not compile a catalogue, they deserve a report in
themselves.
Note
76. Valentin Stefanovic, Viasna deputy chair, vice-president of
the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and long-term
partner of the Council of Europe on the abolition of the death penalty,
sentenced to 9 years in a colony, wrote in April 2023, “[i]mprisonment
is like death … You’re maybe not dead, but you’re erased from life
for a long time, and life goes on; it goes on but without you. But
I firmly intend to endure it all and return to this world”.
Note
77. With the daily increasing number of political prisoners, it
has become of paramount importance to support them as well as their
relatives. Apart from the mere horror of being imprisoned, there
are also many difficulties to endure after release. The list of
the different types of material support needed is endless, from food
to money (to pay the bills of gas and electricity accumulated during
the period of imprisonment), clothes, medicines etc. A regular influx
of donations is needed to be able to support all those in need,
bearing also in mind that some 300 to 400 political prisoners who
were sentenced in the aftermath of the elections to 2 or 3 years
of prison should be released in 2023 - 2024.
78. After release, the mental and physical health of the political
prisoners is often broken, and huge efforts are made to ensure their
resocialisation. I was told that because of their poor detention
conditions, many have lost their teeth, and replacing them is seen
as an important step towards resocialisation.
Note
79. Another category of persons who need support from their compatriots
abroad are those who were dismissed from employment and find themselves
without any source of regular income, such as doctors and teachers.
80. Secure and safe alternatives are being put in place to transfer
money to Belarus to overcome obstacles linked to security concerns,
bank regulations and sanctions. The volume of money involved, divergent
priorities and competing initiatives have caused some tensions between
some of the Belarusian non-governmental organisations in exile.
3.6 Access
to education
81. Forced to flee the country
without previously organising their departures, many Belarusians
often left behind their diplomas and did not apostille their professional
certificates. The lack of official documentation thus represents
an important barrier for Belarusians in exile to access qualified
labour market or educational programmes. In addition, not knowing
local language(s) or needing to adapt to new contexts, Belarusians
in exile often encounter difficulties in finding suitable schools
for their children.
82. Cases of discrimination have been registered in schools and
academia, as well. In particular, European universities have sometimes
denied the possibility to Belarusians to enrol on their university
courses, for instance by advancing security reasons. Others are
discussing the possible expulsion of Belarusians students in exile
already enrolled in them.
Note
83. The pupils of the Pranciskaus Skorinos Gymnasium have the
privilege to study in the only 10-class school where teaching is
carried out in Belarusian outside Belarus. They follow the Lithuanian
curriculum but in their language. First opened in 1919, closed in
1944 and reopened in 1994, it has for this academic year 381 pupils,
half of them having arrived after the 2020 elections. Apart from
their native language and Lithuanian, they learn English and Russian.
Note Some of their teachers are themselves
Belarusians in exile. Integration is not an issue there, contrary
to other schools where Belarusian pupils have to adapt to a new language
and a new curriculum. In Poland, for the current academic year,
some Belarusians have studied in adaptation classes together with
Ukrainian children, which has caused tensions and bullying episodes
in a number of cases. I was also told that the classes for the Belarusian
minority in Poland are not opened to the newcomers.
84. Because the Belarus science and academic world has existed
in isolation for years, functioning with its own criteria, Belarusian
scholars could almost never take part in international scientific
projects. As a result, they have no connections with their peers
internationally, their CVs are irrelevant for the requirement of academic
institutions outside of Belarus, and the recognition of their diplomas
is problematic. This has caused difficulties in relocating and working
for the academics in exile.
85. Deferment from military service will not be possible from
this year for young men who study abroad. Consequently, either the
students will go to the army at the age of 18 and return to study
two years later or, if they remain in their university, be considered
as having evaded their military service. The European Humanities University,
the unique Belarusian university able to operate on the basis of
academic freedom and adherence to European values, in exile in Vilnius
since 2005, is particularly worried that the visas and residence
permits of these young men will expire once they graduate.
3.7 Pursuing
a professional career in exile
86. Apart from structural barriers,
Belarusian exiles often experience discrimination at work on account
of their nationality. They report cases of increased workload, false
information being spread about them and their applications for work
being rejected.
Note According to a recent quantitative
analysis, 17% of surveyed Belarusians in exile in Poland experienced
being refused employment.
Note
3.7.1 Businesses
87. More than 80 % of Belarus companies
in exile are based in Poland thanks to the Poland Business Harbour.
Another 10% are based in Lithuania and the remainder, elsewhere
in the world, particularly in Georgia with a large number of small
businesses and self-employed persons.
88. Relocating IT companies has usually been a success story.
For example, among the top three IT companies in Lithuania, two
are Belarusian. However, the majority of the relocated Belarusian
businesses are in the retail sector, logistics and transport, small
services, as well as construction.
89. International sanctions against the regime of Lukashenka have
been welcomed by the democratic forces. However, they have also
impacted on the operation of businesses run by Belarusians not affiliated
with the Minsk regime who have moved out of the country.
Note
90. Opening a bank account is the biggest challenge faced by these
businesses. Although two Polish banks are prepared to open accounts
for these businesses, should an application be rejected, the business
would be placed on a blacklist, and a new application will in effect
require a new company to be created. Moreover, temporary addresses
are not accepted, which is a particular challenge for IT companies
that often function in a nomad mode. The limitation on deposits
is also problematic, affecting those who want to repatriate funds
from the sale of property in Belarus to their host country. This
not only affects businesses but also those political prisoners who
have been released and left the country.
91. Belarus companies are less competitive because it is difficult
for them to obtain a credit or accounting services. Furthermore,
in some countries such as Estonia or Latvia, local shareholders
become the main shareholders because it is practically impossible
for Belarusians to own a company there.
92. The Association of Belarus Businesses Abroad, established
in 2021, provides support to Belarus businesses who wish to relocate
or already have relocated.
Note A system of accreditation has been
developed, where companies who wish to join need to sign a code
of ethics, confirming that they are against the war in Ukraine and
support democratic values. Three of their members are part of Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya’s economic team and participated in the 2023 Davos
Forum to present the needs of the Belarus private sector in exile.
While the association fully supports the EU sanctions against Belarus,
it believes that those who are against the Lukashenka regime should
be supported and allowed to pay taxes in their host countries.
3.7.2 Journalists
93. The Belarusian Association
of Journalists (BAJ) is a professional association of journalists
from independent media, created in 1995 to protect freedom of speech,
freedom of information, promote the professional standards of journalism,
conduct monitoring of Belarusian press, and offer legal support
to all media workers.
Note Some 400 to 500 out of 1 300 of its
members left the country after the BAJ offices were searched in
February 2021. In August 2021, the Supreme Court of Belarus accepted
the claim of the Ministry of Justice that it should be liquidated,
but the association, of course, continues to function in exile.
In March 2023, BAJ and staff were designated as an “extremist formation”
by the authorities.
Note
94. Most of the journalists in exile are in Georgia (some 50),
Germany (between 20 and 30), Lithuania (some 150) and Poland (more
than 200). They work for Belarus media, their main aim being to
provide objective and verified information within Belarus in order
to break the propaganda machine. For those who are not already imprisoned
– 33 are political prisoners – working as an independent journalist
in Belarus has become impossible, the risks are too high.
Note
95. The journalists face the same challenges as their other compatriots
in terms of legalisation, access to bank accounts etc. There are
frequent instances when their salaries are blocked until anti-money
laundering checks are done. During that time, they have no access
to their salary.
96. What would undoubtedly help their endeavours to keep their
compatriots informed would be that search engines, such as Google,
ensure that their news, rather than that from official sources,
come at the top of searches. The fact that Belarus is a small market
should not deter the big IT companies from contributing to ensuring
a fair and safe internet in Belarus itself by allowing independent
and objective information to circulate.
3.7.3 Lawyers
97. Lawyers are a professional
category particularly under threat in Belarus. They are being subjected
to a wide range of attacks by the regime: misuse of disciplinary
proceedings; arbitrary detention and criminal prosecution; treating
their Telegram chats as “extremist”; interference with the confidential
lawyer-client communications; and stripping them of their licence
to practice.
98. As a result, many of them have been forced to leave Belarus
and now find themselves in exile. Apart from the legalisation issue,
their main challenge is to have their licence to practice recognised
in their host country. While there is no obvious simple solution,
the recognition of the Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers,
a new type of bar association established in the territory of other
States, could allow lawyers in exile to continue to provide legal
services to their clients in Belarus. Its main goal is to promote
and protect the human rights of lawyers deprived of the right to
exercise their profession in Belarus, as well as to raise the standards
of legal assistance.
99. The report “The Crisis of the Legal Profession in Belarus:
How to Return the Right to Defense” initiated by the Center for
Constitutionalism and Human Rights of the European Humanities University
in partnership with the “Right to Defense” project (defenders.by),
the human rights organisation “Human Constanta”, and the Polish
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights contains an interesting “Action
Program for the Restoration of the Institute of Advocacy in Belarus”
and is thus a valuable road map for the future.
Note
3.8 Preserving
Belarusian identity and culture
100. For many years, Belarus language
and culture have been in the shadow of Russia’s. Even its name was not
properly transliterated into foreign languages, since there was
no distinction made between «руський / рускі», which designates
the people, languages, cultures and religion of the Eastern Slavs
at the time of Rus’, and «російський / расейскі», which designates
today the people, language, culture and Russian State. Thus, many
countries still erroneously refer to Belarus as “Belorussia” or
“White Russia” instead of Belarus/Belarusian which is the correct
transliteration of Беларусь/ Беларускі in English.
101. The political crisis born after the 2020 elections has led
to a renaissance of the interest for Belarusian language and culture
among Belarusians in exile, while at the same time, it has been
repressed in Belarus itself. Thus, many artists and writers who
joined the mass protests after the elections were detained on administrative
charges or criminally prosecuted. The regime has censored and prohibited
the publishing of specific books considered as extremists, such
as those of Sviatlana Aleksievich, Nobel Laureate for literature.
Note
102. A number of initiatives have been launched to promote the
learning of Belarusian language, history and culture, notably in
the Belarus Youth Club, whose aim is to ensure that the Belarusians
who will return to Belarus will do so with increased knowledge and
competences.
Note The Hub’s priority is to preserve
and strengthen the Belarusian identity among the Belarusians in
exile and their children. Apart from languages and music classes,
the production of cartoons in Belarusian available on YouTube is
one of its successful initiatives.
103. The Belarusian Council for Culture is a non-governmental organisation
that unites cultural actors forming the sustainable infrastructure
of the free Belarusian culture. Its activities focus on the promotion
of Belarusian culture (patronage of artists, performers, and art
managers), development of new cultural projects, unification of
the culture community, and promotion of Belarusian culture across
the globe. It is preparing a roadmap for the European Commission
on the preservation of Belarusian culture, created to outline the
needs of Belarusian civil society in the sphere of culture, to explain
why this demand corresponds to the interests of European citizens,
and to recommend to the donors how to act – how much money to allocate
to this sphere, how to structure the aid and what results to expect.
The aim is that this proposal will be taken into consideration in
the programming period of the European Commission for the next three
years.
Note
104. Meanwhile, Belarusian literature and books in Belarusian have
been practically erased in Belarus. Efforts are being made to establish
an Institute of the Belarusian Book abroad with the aim of making
known Belarus literature and of translating more books into Belarusian.
A number of authors, illustrators and publishers are discussing
the status of such an organisation, which would in the initial stage
take the form of a platform. Practical problems are facing the initiators
of the Institute, such as the lack of space to store the books,
but the first one is a financial one: which investors would be interested
in investing in the very small Belarus book market?
105. Culture should not be market-driven; it cannot be translated
into figures on an Excel sheet. It is crucial that support is given
to allow theatre troops to perform their plays, musicians to play,
books to be published and read, so that art becomes the cement of
Belarusian identity, and that Belarusian language and culture again
find their place in the sun, as they are key to Belarusian statehood.
3.9 Double
exile after fleeing Ukraine
106. Ukraine was one of the countries
which welcomed a large number of Belarusians, notably because of its
visa free regime and of the absence of a serious language barrier.
It is estimated that 20 to 30 000 Belarusians crossed the border
monthly from Belarus after the 2020 elections and that some 171 000 Belarusians
lived there in 2021. I was told that some 50 000 went to Poland
after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, a large number to
Georgia and Lithuania, and that perhaps 5 000 still remain in Ukraine.
107. Initially, Belarusians were allowed to stay in Ukraine for
90 days, but after some campaigning by civil society organisations,
this duration was extended to 180 days, and then extended again,
a year later.
Note Despite a complicated
legalisation process, most of the Belarusians who lived in Ukraine
before the war integrated well and had no intention to leave. They
were forced to do so as a result of the Russian attack.
108. Like other third country nationals who fled Ukraine, these
Belarusians did not get access to the same protection and reception
scheme as provided to Ukrainian citizens by the EU Directive 2001/55/EC
(Temporary Protection Directive) and found themselves in a situation
of double exile.
109. However, some Belarusians stayed in Ukraine to help the Ukrainians
resist the Russian aggression, notably the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment
and others.
110. There were about 100 Belarusian journalists in exile in Ukraine
when the war started. Most of them have left but a number of correspondents
remain, covering the war for Belarusian media in exile, such as
Belsat, Nasha Niva and Zerkalo. I was alerted to a very specific
problem affecting those journalists who live in Ukraine; their bank
accounts were blocked by the Ukrainian security services, the SBU,
and they could not access their money. About half of these accounts
have since been deblocked, but some 50 others continue to be inaccessible
to their owners. Different attempts have been made to reach out
to the Ukrainian authorities on their behalf but so far without
success. I trust that if the accounts are properly checked and that
there are no irregularities, they will be made accessible to their
owners, whose situation of double exile makes access to their own
resources even more crucial.
111. The participation of Lukashenka’s regime in the war in Ukraine,
the security threat he poses to Ukraine and beyond, with his agreement
to host Russian nuclear tactical weapons, should not be seen as
a justification to impose discriminatory measures on Belarusians,
especially those who left the country for political reasons, in
response to a situation for which they are not responsible. The
Belarusians have not spared their efforts to provide support to
the Ukrainians, notably through fund-raising carried out by organisations
in exile.
Note While Ukraine understandably fears
the opening of a northern front, it should acknowledge that the
majority of Belarusians do not support Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine.
Note
4 Conclusions
and recommendations
112. Belarusians who left their
country after the rigged presidential elections of August 2020 were
forced to do so by the Lukashenka regime. This imposed exile has
led them to becoming victims of human rights violations in the host
countries where they have found shelter, sometimes as the involuntary
consequence of the sanctions imposed on the Lukashenka regime.
113. While their main wish is to return to a democratic Belarus,
the more time passes, the more distant this prospect seems. Removing
the legal, administrative and practical obstacles they face and
providing support to Belarusians in exile should be a priority for
the Council of Europe member states because a democratic and safe
Belarus is part of the solution to security in Europe.
114. One cannot ignore the fact that the democratic forces are
seeking to create “a new Belarus” in exile. Their efforts to alleviate
the challenges their compatriots face should be supported. At the
same time, integration of Belarusians in exile in the host societies
remains key to avoid ghettoization and psychological alienation.
115. This report offers pragmatic and practical proposals to member
States where Belarusians fleeing the Lukashenka regime have found
refuge so that they can live as normally as possible, at least without
any obstacles to the enjoyment of their fundamental rights. It should
be seen as a basis for the national parliaments of the States concerned
and the competent authorities so that all 46 Council of Europe member
States provide an equivalent, if not harmonised, level of protection
to Belarusians in exile, enabling them to integrate while preserving
and strengthening their national identity.
