Observation of the early parliamentary elections in Bulgaria (9 June and 27 October 2024)
Election observation report
| Doc. 16077
| 26 November 2024
1 Introduction
1. The Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE) has observed all national elections
in Bulgaria since 1990. This includes the recent cycle of seven
early parliamentary elections held since 2021, following the successive
failures to form stable governments.
Note This
report covers the two most recent early parliamentary elections
held on 9 June and 27 October 2024.
2. For thirty years, the Assembly has been committed to supporting
Bulgaria’s democratic development. Bulgaria joined the Council of
Europe on 7 May 1992. It was subject to the full monitoring procedure
from 1994 to 2000 and since then it has been under a post-monitoring
dialogue
Note on a number of outstanding
concerns arising from the obligations incumbent upon every member
State of the Council of Europe under Article 3 of the Statute of
the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) with regard to democracy, the
rule of law and human rights. The latter commits the Bulgarian authorities
to invite the Assembly to observe national elections and referendums.
3. At its meeting in Strasbourg on 19 April 2024, the Bureau
of the Assembly decided to set up a 20-member cross-party ad hoc
committee in accordance with the d’Hondt system, plus the two co-rapporteurs
of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments
by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee),
to observe the early parliamentary elections of 9 June 2024 in Bulgaria.
Furthermore, the Bureau appointed Mr Oleksii Goncharenko (Ukraine,
EC/DA) as Chairperson of the ad hoc committee (see the composition
of the delegation in Appendix 1).
4. After another series of failed attempts to form a government
over the summer of 2024, President Rumen Radev called for new parliamentary
elections to be held on 27 October 2024. The Bureau of the Assembly decided
at its meeting on 6 September 2024 to observe these early elections.
Given the very short timeframe since the previous early parliamentary
elections of 9 June, it agreed to maintain the same list of members. Mr Goncharenko
not being available on the new dates, the Bureau agreed to appoint
Mr Alfred Heer (Switzerland, ALDE) as the new Chairperson of the
ad hoc committee
Note (see the composition of the
delegation in Appendix 4).
5. In line with the co-operation agreement signed on 4 October
2004 between the Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), Ms Katharina Pabel (Austria) and Mr Richard
Barrett (Ireland) represented the Venice Commission respectively
as its legal experts on these two election observation missions.
6. In both contexts, the PACE delegation was the only international
parliamentary organisation observing these elections. Of the usual
partner organisations, only a limited expert team of the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights fo the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) was present
in the country for these elections (see the programmes of the meetings
in Appendices 2 and 5). At the end of both missions, the delegation
held a press briefing and issued a statement (Appendices 3 and 6).
7. The PACE delegation would like to extend its appreciation
to the Bulgarian authorities for the invitations, and in particular
the staff of the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the PACE delegation for their assistance to the success
of its missions.
2 Political crisis leading to the successive
early elections
8. Since July 2020, Bulgaria has
been confronted with a major political crisis which has resulted
in seven consecutive early parliamentary elections. For most of
this period, the country has been governed by technical caretaker
governments with limited mandates.
9. The period between July 2020 and April 2023 was marked by
a political crisis and instability following mass demonstrations.
These were triggered by numerous corruption scandals surrounding, inter alia, the allocation of EU
funds, infrastructure projects and government subsidies. Only two
of the last six elections (14 November 2021 and 2 April 2023) resulted
in the formation of a government, but both coalitions failed after reform-oriented
leaders tried to tackle corruption and end the country’s dependence
on the Russian Federation for energy and security.
10. The 5th round of early elections on 2 April 2023 produced
a government coalition between the two biggest political groups,
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) and We Continue
the Change – Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB), with a rotational premiership:
Mr Nikolay Denkov from the PP-DB as Prime Minister for the first
nine months and then Ms Mariya Gabriel from GERB who until then
was to serve as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
11. On 5 March 2024, Prime Minister Denkov resigned in line with
the rotation agreement. However, the planned government rotation
and formation of a new administration failed on 20 March. Despite
negotiations under the first mandate continuing through late March,
no workable government emerged. After two more unsuccessful negotiation
rounds, new elections were announced on 26 March, scheduled for
9 June 2024 to coincide with the European Parliament elections.
12. Under Article 99 of the Constitution, if no agreement on forming
a government is reached after all three negotiation mandates, the
President, in consultation with parliamentary groups and on the
proposal of a candidate for caretaker prime minister, appoints a
caretaker government and schedules new early elections within two
months of its inauguration. On 29 March 2024, President Radev appointed
the Chairman of the National Audit Office, Dimitar Glavchev, as
a candidate for caretaker prime minister.
13. The early parliamentary elections on 9 June 2024 – the sixth
in three years – were marked by unprecedented political disengagement.
Voter turnout hit a historic low of 34.41%, reflecting deepening
apathy and frustration among the electorate. This record low made
non-voters the most significant “force”, highlighting widespread
disengagement. Over the past three years, mainstream parties have
lost over 1.2 million voters. The seven parties that entered the
50th National Assembly fell short to represent 70% of Bulgaria’s
population.
14. The former coalition partners faced backlash from their voters.
Although the GERB-Union of Democratic Forces (GERB-SDS) emerged
as the winner with 24.7% of the vote and secured 68 seats, it actually
lost 21% of its supporters, dropping from 670 000 votes in April
2023 to 526 000. PP-DB saw its support halved, plummeting from 621 000
to 308 000 voters. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), one of the
country’s oldest political forces, continued its steep decline,
with its electorate shrinking to just 151 000 votes (19 seats). Conversely,
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF (DPS)) and There Is Such
a People (ITN) improved their performances by 5% and 22% respectively,
with MRF (DPS) achieving significant gains by adding 11 seats in
the 50th National Assembly. Without the record low turnout, the
party “Velichie” would not have entered parliament with its 4.65%
of the vote.
15. This outcome set the stage for further political deadlock,
as no single party or bloc secured a majority in the 240-seat National
Assembly, perpetuating Bulgaria’s ongoing political fragmentation
and instability. Despite winning the most votes, GERB-SDS found
itself 53 seats short of the 121 needed to form a government, with
few potential coalition partners. The PP-DB alliance categorically
rejected any co-operation with GERB-SDS after their previous failed
coalition. The MRF (DPS), traditionally a pivotal player in coalition politics
and holding 47 seats – enough to form a majority coalition – remained
a polarising force. In July 2024, the MRF itself split over whether
to join a new coalition government.
16. The inability of the top vote-getting parties to bridge ideological
divides, coupled with the continued rise of nationalist-populist
movements like Revival, which refused to co-operate with any mainstream
party, effectively paralysed the post-election political process.
Despite multiple rounds of negotiations and after GERB, PP-DB and
ITN exhausted their attempts to form a government, no stable coalition
could be formed, leaving Bulgaria without a functioning government
in the aftermath of the elections.
17. Following weeks of failed coalition negotiations, Bulgaria
was forced to call a new round of early parliamentary elections
and to continue with a caretaker government. On 9 August 2024, the
Bulgarian President as a consequence appointed the Vice-President
of the National Audit Office, Goritsa Grancharova-Kozhareva, as
the next caretaker prime minister. She was granted 10 days to form
a proposal for the caretaker government to be appointed on 20 August.
On 19 August 2024, Ms Grancharova-Kozhareva fulfilled the mandate,
but President Rumen Radev refused to sign the decree appointing
her cabinet. The key reason for his refusal was her decision to
keep Kalin Stoyanov as Minister of Interior.
Note President
Radev requested a new candidate for the position, citing political
tensions surrounding Mr Stoyanov, but Ms Grancharova-Kozhareva declined
to make changes. As a result, President Radev rejected her cabinet
and re-appointed Dimitar Glavchev as prime minister.
18. The “Glavchev II” caretaker government was finally sworn in
on 27 August 2024, after
President Radev accepted a revised cabinet with changes in the ministries
of interior, foreign affairs, and transport. The next round of early
elections was called for 27 October 2024.
19. Meanwhile, following the general elections of 9 June, the
MRF (DPS) experienced significant internal strife. Supporters of
one of the party’s leaders, the media tycoon Delyan Peevski sanctioned
under the US Magnitsky Act for corruption, initiated efforts to
expel members aligned with the former leader and co-founder of the
party, Ahmed Doğan. The conflict stemmed from opposing views on
forming a GERB-led government: Ahmed Doğan was against it, while
Delyan Peevski was in favour. In parliament, this division was evident
as 30 MRF (DPS) deputies voted for the government and 15 voted against
it.
20. On August 27, Delyan Peevski was ousted as party chairman,
and seven of his closest deputies were expelled, leading to a split
within the DPS. Mr Peevski’s supporters formed a new faction called
DPS-New Beginning, joining forces with the Bulgarian Voice Party
and the New Leaders Party. Those loyal to Ahmed Doğan initially
took the name Democracy, Rights and Freedoms and later allied with
the United Patriots (SBOR) and the National Agrarian Union. Both
groups sought to keep the DPS acronym, but following a decision
of the Supreme Administrative Court to consider Mr Peevski’s electronic
registration as the first one, his faction was allowed to retain
the name, while Mr Doğan’s group ultimately adopted the name Alliance
for Rights and Freedoms.
3 Constitutional and legal framework
21. The National Assembly of Bulgaria
is a unicameral body composed of 240 members. Members of Parliament
are elected through an open-list proportional system from 31 multi-mandate
constituencies. One extra constituency is for voters abroad.
22. The Election Code of 2014 is the main piece of legislation
governing parliamentary elections and has been amended many times
since then. The most recent amendments occurred in December 2023
and concern voting via machines, following a decision by the Constitutional
Court which declared parts of the relevant regulation unconstitutional.
The authorities did not consult the Venice Commission on the different
electoral amendments adopted since the last opinion on electoral
matters issued in June 2017.
Note
23. Article 99 of the Constitution is the relevant provision dealing
with early elections and the formation of a caretaker government.
According to this provision, if no agreement on the formation of
a government is reached after all three negotiation mandates, the
president, in consultation with the parliamentary groups and on
the proposal of a candidate for caretaker prime minister, appoints
a caretaker government and schedules new early elections within
two months of its inauguration.
24. The constitutional reform of December 2023 mainly dealt with
provisions concerning the Bulgarian judiciary and the prosecution
service. However it is also significant in the context of repeated
early parliamentary elections.
Note Aimed
at reducing the president’s powers, the reform limited the latter’s
discretion in appointing a caretaker prime minister to a restricted
group of high-ranking officials. It also stipulated that the incumbent
National Assembly’s mandate would terminate only when the newly
elected Assembly takes office and that elections for a new National
Assembly must take place no later than one month before the current Assembly’s
term expires. Additionally, the reform granted citizens with dual
citizenship the right to be elected as members of Parliament and
ministers, provided they meet an 18-month residency requirement.
Note
25. President Radev opposed these changes and challenged them
before the Constitutional Court in January 2024. Prior to their
adoption, the Venice Commission had issued an opinion welcoming,
with certain reservations, certain elements of the constitutional
reform.
Note On 26 July, the Court annulled
provisions related to the division of the Judicial Council, changes
in the distribution and election of members in different chambers,
limitations on the powers of the Prosecutor General, and the reduction
of mandates for both the Prosecutor General and the Judicial Council.
26. However, the constitutional judges were split 6-6 on the above-mentioned
elections-related amendments, namely the procedure for appointing
a caretaker prime minister, the rules on the term of the National
Assembly and the passive suffrage rights of Bulgarian citizens holding
dual nationality. Since no majority decision was reached on these
provisions, they remained in force.
27. The Central Election Commission (CEC) is a permanent body
of 15 members appointed for a five-year term, with its current composition
established in May 2021. Since its appointment, this CEC has already organised
elections eight times – six for the National Assembly, one presidential
and one local election. By law, the CEC should proportionally reflect
the composition in the parliament. However, due to a series of early elections,
some parties represented in the outgoing parliament were either
not represented in the CEC, or their representation did not correspond
to their number of seats in the parliament.
28. The first chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court is the
relevant body in charge of dealing in last instance with electoral
complaints. The PACE delegation covering the 27 October elections
met on 25 October the first chamber, composed of 14 judges, and
the Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court. The latter
explained that the Court received about 50 election-related cases
this year, all settled by then.
29. The electoral threshold to access parliament is 4% of valid
votes at national level, while independent candidates must pass
the electoral quota calculated based on the Hare-Niemeyer method.
Voters can therefore express preferences within a list.
Note A candidate benefits from the preference
vote if the number of received votes is at least 7% of the votes
cast for the candidate list.
30. There were 6 138 050 eligible voters for the 19 June elections,
and 6 601 262 for the 27 October elections, which are unusually
high figures compared to the official population, estimated at 6 445 481 in
2024 (European Union data).
Note
31. Regarding voting abroad and the 27 October early elections,
719 polling stations were installed abroad, in 57 countries, and
about 30 000 voters were registered in advance to vote abroad. It
is also possible to vote simply by presenting an identity document,
despite not being registered in advance. Most of the polling stations abroad
were hosted on diplomatic and consular premises, and some on private
premises provided by diasporic communities.
Note
32. Over the past decade, machine voting has been a contentious
issue in Bulgaria’s electoral process, creating significant divisions
among political parties. Initially introduced experimentally in
2014 to reduce electoral fraud by minimising invalid ballots and
human error, machine voting was mandated in larger polling stations
starting from 2021. However, from 2021 to 2024, frequent policy
shifts occurred due to changing political alliances, with parties
alternately supporting and opposing machine voting based on their
own interests. By late 2022, a coalition of GERB-SDS, MRF and BSP
reintroduced mixed voting, arguing that voters should have the choice
between machines and paper ballots. This move reduced voting machines
to mere ballot printers, with paper ballots counted manually, sparking
criticism from parties like PP-DB that advocated for machine voting
to prevent electoral manipulation. In the June 2024 parliamentary
elections, machine voting usage sharply declined from 59.12% in
2022 to 39.02% in 2024, partly due to confusion following the CEC’s suspension
of machine use during the 2023 local elections and political messaging
favouring paper ballots.
33. The return to mixed voting reignited concerns about election
fraud, particularly the resurgence of controlled and bought votes
that machine voting had helped to limit. The Minister of E-Governance
explained to us on 26 October 2024, that dedicated experts had authenticated
3 306 machines and their related algorithms. He reported that the
contractor, Ciela Norma AD, had refused to co-operate in updating
the operating system of the machine voting system (version 2023)
and in particularly the kernel (which dates from 2019), and had
not installed the machines according to the agreed schedule. This
resulted in a delay in the inspection phase. As Bulgaria moves forward,
the debate over machine versus paper voting remains central to discussions
on ensuring free and fair elections. 157 polling stations abroad
were equipped with voting machines.
Note
4 Candidate registration and major campaign
issues
34. A total of 24 parties and 9
coalitions registered for the seventh round of early parliamentary
elections, with one coalition unable to compete due to insufficient
signatures. Compared to previous elections – 20 parties and 11 coalitions
in June 2024, and 14 parties and 7 coalitions in April 2023 – the
increase in political actors raised concerns among observers. Many
interlocutors were worried that as voters moved away from mainstream
parties, the resulting fragmented parliament would struggle even
more to form a stable government.
35. The 9 June elections, held alongside the European elections,
focused largely on European issues. Key topics included whether
Bulgaria would receive €5.69 billion from the EU’s recovery plan
and join the eurozone on 1 January 2025. Other significant issues
were the general economic situation, unemployment, cost of living, healthcare
availability, and the education system.
36. Interlocutors described the 27 October election campaign as
low-key for mainstream parties, mainly consisting of smear campaigns
against opponents. The campaign was conducted primarily on social
media and through traditional methods in rural areas. The Ministry
of Interior reported 415 pre-election events with 63 840 participants.
Media representatives and the CEC noted the absence of leadership
debates and traditional interviews, with politicians favouring communication
through platforms and declarations rather than face-to-face interactions
with journalists or the public. GERB representatives highlighted
their extensive rural campaign, while other political forces accused
GERB of misusing administrative resources and engaging in controlled
voting.
37. The split within the MRF (DPS) camp generated significant
political debate, bringing into focus issues like the independence
of law enforcement and the judiciary, corruption, Delyan Peevski’s
dominance over local media, and suspicions of extensive vote-buying
in favour of MRF-New Beginning.
38. While controlled and bought votes have long been a feature
of Bulgarian elections, interlocutors emphasised the high stakes
of these elections and allegations of widespread vote-buying schemes.
They estimated that controlled voting could account for 8-10% of
votes and vote-buying for about 3-4%. The Ministry of Interior was
perceived as inefficient in addressing these issues, selectively
targeting certain neighbourhoods.
39. In a meeting with three ministers of the caretaker government
responsible for organising the elections,
Note we
were informed about the measures that the interim government had
taken to protect citizens’ political rights. A national interdepartmental
unit comprising the Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Interior, and
State Agency for National Security was established. By 25 October,
police had received 512 reports of electoral violations, 408 related
to vote-buying for political parties or coalitions. Authorities
had executed 1 450 warning protocols, initiated over 110 pre-trial
proceedings, and detained 51 individuals. Compared to the same period
in previous elections, this represented an increase of 65.7% in
reports, 21% in pre-trial proceedings, and 36% in warning protocols.
A hotline was also set up to receive alerts on election day.
40. Major issues leading up to the elections included the election
of the Prosecutor General, amendments to the Preschool and School
Education Act, and attempts to introduce a “foreign agents” bill.
41. The Bulgarian Prosecutor General holds extensive constitutional
powers, making this position pivotal in the country’s political
landscape. The Supreme Judicial Council decided without debate to
restart the process of electing a new Prosecutor General following
a call by MRF (DPS) co-chairman Delyan Peevski possibly to maintain
his influence. The election process, initially delayed in 2023 due
to pressure from GERB, PP-DB, and MRF, was paused pending a Constitutional
Court ruling, which ultimately overturned proposed judicial reforms in
mid-2024. Despite long-standing demands for justice reform, the
Prosecutor General remains largely unchecked, wielding substantial
control over the judiciary.
42. In August, the Revival party initiated a parliamentary amendment
banning LGBTQ+ “propaganda” in schools, inspired by similar legislation
in the Russian Federation. This amendment is discriminatory and
in direct contradiction with the Bulgarian Constitution, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Adopted by a large majority,
Note the
amendment prohibits the promotion of or incitement to ideas related
to “non-traditional sexual orientation” or any definition of gender identity
other than biological. Starting from the 2024/2025 school year,
students, parents, or teachers could face prosecution and public
shaming for allegedly promoting different sexual orientations. The
law’s vague wording allows broad interpretation, making it a tool
for exerting pressure on individuals and civil society organisations.
By October 2024, many schools had cut ties with non-governmental
organisations to avoid legal risks. The Revival party appears to
have gained voter support after proposing this legislation.
43. The Revival party also introduced a “foreign agents” bill
targeting individuals and organisations receiving over €1 000 from
abroad within a year. It would strip them of certain civil rights,
bar them from teaching or carrying out political activities, and
require them to label themselves as “foreign agents.” The bill’s
authors claim it aims to promote transparency and protect national
interests. This was Revival’s third attempt since 2022 to pass such
legislation, so far without success.
44. Before the closing of the 50th National Assembly, the adoption
of the updated Climate Neutrality Roadmap was significant, potentially
securing over €500 million for the reclamation of coal mine sites
in Bulgaria. The final working day of parliament presented a critical
opportunity to preserve more than BGN 2 billion under the Recovery
Plan. Two draft decisions, tabled by GERB-SDS and MRF PP deputies
and negotiated with trade unions who had organised a protest in
Sofia, were proposed to ensure access to these funds. However, the
session was derailed when deputies from ITN and Revival blocked
the parliamentary rostrum. After three failed attempts to gather
a quorum, the parliament was dissolved. As a result, Bulgaria risks losing
hundreds of millions in EU funding tied to the Recovery Plan and
the European Green Deal, leaving miners protesting for a fair transition
and against unfulfilled promises.
5 Media landscape
45. Bulgaria’s media landscape
is diverse, with numerous broadcasting and print outlets. Television
remains the main news source, followed by online media. Traditional
media have expanded online and are active on platforms like Facebook,
Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok. The Bulgarian National Television
(BNT) and Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) are the most trusted news
sources. However, concerns have arisen due to the Council for Electronic
Media’s (CEM) inability to appoint a director for BNT for over two
years, potentially affecting governance and public trust.
46. Media ownership concentration is a significant issue. Two
major groups – the PPF Group and United Group – dominate about two-thirds
of the media market. In February 2024, United Group further consolidated its
position by acquiring Bulsatcom, raising concerns about media pluralism
and compliance with Council of Europe recommendations. While laws
protect freedom of expression and the right to information, defamation remains
criminalised, contrary to international standards, leaving journalists
investigating corruption vulnerable to litigation.
47. Election coverage on public media is regulated by law and
agreements approved by the CEC. Media outlets must disclose any
contracts with political parties on their websites. The Election
Code mandates equal participation for all political contestants
in public media. Critics argue this can hinder meaningful coverage
by diluting debates and giving a platform to fringe parties that
may use hostile speech, reducing the quality of public discourse.
48. The CEM monitors media content during campaigns and reports
violations to the CEC, which can impose sanctions. During the June
and October elections, numerous violations were reported, including
the premature release of exit polls, failure to disclose media-party
contracts, misuse of national symbols, and lack of mandatory messages
about the illegality of vote-buying. While protections against offensive
language exist, the online media environment is largely unregulated,
with widespread negative messaging against the LGBTI community,
migrants, and Roma people.
49. Initiatives like the partnership between Google News Initiative,
the Association of European Journalists Bulgaria (AEJ), and FactCheck.bg
were launched to combat election disinformation. Despite these efforts, journalists
faced intimidation and violence during the elections. The AEJ documented
four incidents where journalists were threatened or assaulted while
covering the October elections. In three cases, the aggression came
from representatives of MRF-New Beginning. Another incident involved
threats from a person posing as a GERB-SDS representative and a
mayor affiliated with the coalition.
Note
50. The AEJ condemned these attacks, calling on political parties
to ensure professional communication and avoid intimidation. It
urged authorities to protect journalists. Our delegation echoes
this sentiment, emphasising that violence and threats against journalists
are unacceptable and undermine democratic processes. Such actions
threaten press freedom and should not be tolerated.
51. Another disturbing element is the dramatic decrease in women
participating in the campaign and having access to the airwaves,
as pointed out by the acting chairwoman of the CEM in a press statement
on 14 November 2024.
6 Election day observations
52. On 9 June 2024, the PACE delegation
was composed of five teams, which observed the electoral process
in Blagoevgrad, Breznik, Kyustendil, Pernik, Pleven, Plovdiv and
Sofia. On 27 October 2024, the PACE delegation was composed of seven
teams, which observed the process in Barzia, Blagoevgrad, Breznik, Dupnitsa,
Etropole, Komarevo, Lovech, Montana, Pazardzhik, Pernik, Plovdiv,
Rila, Sofia, Sredets and Vraca.
53. Our observers noted several consistent findings across both
polling days. Overall, the elections were technically well-administered,
with Precinct Election Commissions demonstrating commendable professionalism.
Voters were generally familiar with the voting procedures, though
the process remained somewhat bureaucratic and cumbersome.
54. Despite the smooth administration, the delegations identified
issues that warrant attention. There were instances where the secrecy
of the vote was compromised, particularly with machine voting. Technical problems
with voting machines, such as bugs and the need to reboot devices,
were reported, potentially causing delays and voter frustration.
In areas with significant Roma populations, observers noted cases
of electoral infringements. Additionally, suspicions of voter intimidation
arose due to the presence of groups of men, recognised as party
officials, outside polling stations.
55. A persistent concern was the low voter turnout in both elections,
reflecting significant voter fatigue, a lack of enthusiasm, and
disillusionment with the country’s governance. The delegations highlighted
a deep-seated mistrust among the electorate toward the main political
actors and scepticism about the possibility of meaningful political
change.
56. The delegations also expressed serious concerns about persistent
allegations of vote-buying, as well as corporate and controlled
voting. Such practices undermine the integrity of the electoral
process and erode public confidence in democratic institutions.
Addressing these issues is crucial for restoring faith in both the political
leadership and the electoral system.
57. Regarding the use of technology, the observers noted the potential
benefits of increased technological integration on election day.
However, they questioned the effectiveness of using voting machines
merely as printers alongside paper ballots, which could lead to
additional errors within polling stations. The delegations emphasised
that while information and communication technologies alone cannot
restore trust or eliminate corrupt practices, they can boost voter
confidence if coupled with legal safeguards and transparent electoral practices.
58. PACE observers also highlighted other “chronic” concerns,
such as low participation of women in politics and the lack of legal
provisions to foster the participation of minorities; the limitations
of voting rights of people placed under judicial interdiction or
serving a prison sentence or the unaddressed recommendations of
the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on campaign finance,
including those related to reporting on expenditures before election
day.
59. Our respective delegations reiterated that the responsibility
for overcoming the current political impasse rests with Bulgaria’s
political forces. The Bulgarian people deserve leaders committed
to providing a functioning democratic government. It is imperative
for political actors to address the highlighted issues – such as
electoral irregularities, voter intimidation, and public disillusionment
– to strengthen democracy and ensure that future elections are conducted
fairly and transparently.
7 Election results and post-electoral
developments
60. Beyond the low turnout, the
results of both the 9 June and 27 October early parliamentary elections revealed
a continuation of Bulgaria’s fragmented political landscape, as
shown in this comparative table of the seven rounds of parliamentary
elections held between 2021 and 2024:
|
Party
|
April 2021
|
July 2021
|
Nov. 2021
|
Oct. 2022
|
April 2023
|
June 2024
|
Oct. 2024
|
|
GERB-SDS
|
75
|
63
|
59
|
67
|
69
|
68
|
69
|
|
We Continue the Change (PP)
|
-
|
-
|
67
|
53
|
64
|
39
|
37
|
|
Democratic BG
|
27
|
34
|
16
|
20
|
|
Revival
|
-
|
-
|
13
|
27
|
37
|
38
|
35
|
|
MRF (DPS)
|
30
|
29
|
34
|
36
|
36
|
47
|
-
|
|
MRF-New Beginning
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
30
|
|
ARF
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
19
|
|
BSP for Bulgaria
|
43
|
36
|
26
|
25
|
23
|
19
|
20
|
|
Bulgarian Rise
|
|
|
-
|
12
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
|
ITN
|
51
|
65
|
25
|
-
|
11
|
16
|
18
|
|
Velichie
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
13
|
-
|
|
MECh
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
12
|
|
Nr of parties in parliament
|
5
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
6
|
7
|
8
|
|
Turnout in %
|
50,61
|
42,19
|
40,23
|
39,42
|
40,69
|
34,41
|
38,94
|
61. As the turnout was at 38.94%,
higher than the unprecedented low turnout recorded in the previous
early elections of 9 June (34.41%), in numerical terms, all parliamentary
parties to be represented in the 51st National Assembly gained (back)
votes compared to the previous polls. The MRF-New Beginning faction outperformed
the pre-election polls, winning 4% more of the vote share than predicted.
Delyan Peevski thus won the contest with Ahmed Doğan whose ARF performed
in line with the pre-election polls, winning heavily among the biggest
community of voters abroad in Türkiye. Allegations of vote-buying
are common in Bulgaria, but there are certainly reasons to question
MRF-New Beginning’s result.
|
Party
|
April 2023
|
June 2024
|
October 2024
|
Trends
|
|
GERB-SDS
|
669 924
|
530 658
|
642 931
|
+112
273
|
|
PP-DB
|
621 069
|
307 849
|
346 063
|
+38 214
|
|
Revival
|
358 174
|
295 915
|
325 468
|
+29 553
|
|
MRF (DPS)
|
347 700
|
366 310
|
-
|
(+97
319)
|
|
MRF-New Beginning
|
-
|
-
|
281 366
|
|
|
ARF
|
-
|
-
|
182 263
|
|
|
BSP for Bulgaria
|
225 914
|
151 560
|
184 403
|
+32 843
|
|
ITN
|
193 971
|
128 007
|
165 160
|
+37 153
|
|
Velichie
|
-
|
99 862
|
-
|
-
|
|
MECh
|
-
|
-
|
111 946
|
+111
946
|
|
“Nobody”
|
109 095
|
63 913
|
82 618
|
+18 705
|
62. Following the announcement
of the 27 October election results on 30 October, protests erupted
in Sofia organised by the anti-corruption movement BOEC, calling
for the elections to be cancelled due to alleged ballot-rigging.
Several leading parties, including PP-DB, announced plans to submit
a request for a full recount to the Constitutional Court. They cited
concerns such as up to 5% of votes being invalid, significant discrepancies
between paper receipts from machine voting and the digital records,
and irregular voter turnout ranging from low percentages in some
regions to as high as 80% in others.
63. Additional parties like the ARF and the nationalist “Velichie”
party, which narrowly missed the 4% threshold to enter parliament
by just 21 votes, are also disputing the results. Pro-Russian party
Revival and nationalist parties ITN and MECh have joined the call
for an investigation. In contrast, GERB – the election winner –
dismissed these claims as distractions, despite long-standing accusations
by opponents of exerting undue influence over votes in municipalities
where it governs.
64. The newly convened 51st National Assembly met on 11 November
2024 but failed in three attempts to elect a chairperson, reflecting
the continuing deep political impasse. With eight parties represented
in parliament, forming a majority is theoretically possible but
complicated. Several parties have stated they will not work with
Delyan Peevski, and PP-DB has called for a cordon
sanitaire against him. Excluding Peevski’s 30 seats from
coalition calculations makes reaching the required 121 seats for
a majority significantly more challenging.
65. While GERB has expressed willingness to negotiate with all
parties except Revival, potential coalition partners remain hesitant.
Most viable paths to a majority would require a deal between GERB
and PP-DB, but past conflicts and ongoing distrust hinder this possibility.
PP-DB’s conditions for any coalition include radical anti-corruption
reforms and appointing an independent, non-partisan prime minister
– not GERB’s leader Boyko Borissov. Even if an agreement was reached,
their combined 106 seats would fall short of a majority, requiring
additional support and potentially leading parties to break previous
commitments.
66. Revival invited four other parliamentary forces – BSP-United
Left, ITN, PP-DB and MECh – to talks on 20 November 2024. Its leader,
Kostadin Kostadinov stated explicitly that GERB, MRF-New Beginning,
and ARF are not invited. Revival and the four entities invited to
the talks control a majority of 122 seats in the new 240-seat National
Assembly.
67. The political stalemate in Bulgaria mirrors broader European
trends of increasing support for radical right and anti-establishment
parties, which poses challenges to democratic governance. In Bulgaria,
support for the radical right has grown from 10-12% to over 20%
in the latest election. This shift not only reflects rising nationalism
but also enhances potential Russian influence in domestic and European
politics, as some radical-right parties are sympathetic to the Russian
Federation. If the Constitutional Court deems the election results illegitimate
– a decision that requires a petition signed by 1/5 of MPs – new
elections would be organised within two months, possibly leading
to an eighth election since 2021.
8 The ways forward
68. Following these two early electoral
processes – part of a total of seven early parliamentary elections
– the political future of Bulgaria remains more uncertain than ever.
Both observed election cycles led to an even more fragmented parliament,
offering no clear solution to the political gridlock.
69. Several long-standing recommendations from previous election
rounds remain relevant. The country needs some improvements in its
electoral legislation and practices. However, undertaking amendments
to the Election Code amid the current political crisis, with the
possibility of another election looming, could be like opening Pandora’s
box. Therefore, any further changes to the Election Code, aside
from essential one-off measures to help resolve the crisis, should
be put on hold for now.
70. Nevertheless, based on its observations during the last two
elections and recommendations from previous election observation
missions, the ad hoc committee has compiled a “roadmap” of electoral
reforms. These issues need to be addressed immediately after a new
government is formed, and the roadmap presented to the forthcoming
government coalition once it is established.
8.1 Addressing electoral malpractices
71. Persistent practices of intimidation,
vote buying, and controlled voting undermine the integrity of electoral processes.
The Bulgarian authorities should tackle these issues decisively.
A competent and independent judiciary must promptly and effectively
investigate all allegations of such malpractices, holding those responsible
accountable. Encouraging the reporting of unlawful activities and
launching awareness campaigns to educate voters on their rights
and the safeguards in place will contribute to fairer elections.
8.2 Combating corrupt practices
72. To address corruption effectively,
Bulgaria should implement the outstanding recommendations from GRECO
regarding campaign finance, including those related to reporting
on expenditures before election day. Strengthening the anti-corruption
framework involves enhancing the independence, competence, and oversight
capacity of the National Audit Office, particularly by increasing
transparency in campaign financing. This also means enforcing rules
on conflicts of interest rigorously. Officials, especially members
of Parliament, should have their declared assets regularly and substantively
checked by an independent oversight body within a reasonable time-frame,
ensuring accountability and integrity in public office.
8.3 Electoral legislation and system reform
73. Political leaders and lawmakers
are encouraged to consider changes to the electoral system that
foster stable governments while ensuring that votes cast are truly
representative. Any substantial amendments to the electoral legislation
should be adopted through an inclusive and consultative process,
effectively implemented, and adhere to the Venice Commission’s guidelines
for successful electoral reform. This approach emphasises the importance
of broad consensus and public consultation to enhance the legitimacy
of electoral changes.
8.4 Voter registration and disenfranchisement
74. It is crucial to remove any
legal restrictions on voting rights based on intellectual or physical
disabilities. Additionally, the blanket disenfranchisement of prisoners
should be abolished to align with Article 3 of the Additional Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ETS No. 9). Ensuring that all citizens have the right
to vote strengthens the democratic process and promotes inclusivity.
8.5 Enhancing ethical standards
75. Political parties and coalitions
should adopt and enforce codes of ethics concerning their internal structures
and representatives, including their members of Parliament. Promoting
awareness of ethical standards is essential and can be achieved
through designated guidance, training, and confidential counselling on
issues such as conflicts of interest, limits on contacts with third
parties, and the acceptance of gifts. Consistent enforcement of
ethical principles and clarification of sanctions for infringements
will reinforce the commitment to ethical governance.
8.6 Preventing misuse of administrative
resources
76. To uphold a level playing field
and ensure equality of opportunity during elections, legislation
covering the conduct of all public officials, including members
of Parliament, during election campaigns should be introduced and
effectively enforced. This legislation should prevent the misuse
of administrative resources and impose timely and effective sanctions
for violations. Adherence to GRECO’s recommendations and the Venice Commission’s
guidelines will provide a robust framework for these measures.
8.7 Voting methods and technology
77. An independent evaluation of
the different voting methods used in previous elections, including electronic
voting procedures, should be undertaken with the assistance of the
Council of Europe’s expertise. Any introduction of or change to
election technologies must allow sufficient time for piloting, auditing,
and certification of equipment and its functioning. Transparency
can be increased by involving independent external auditors, reinforcing
public confidence in the process. Investing in voter education on
new technologies, especially among disadvantaged groups, and providing
special training for polling station staff will enhance the effectiveness
of these technologies.
8.8 Enhancing voter participation
78. Re-establishing trust in institutions
is essential to enhance voter participation. Political leaders should consider
adopting courageous electoral reforms aimed at ending the cycle
of early elections. Such reforms require a united, trans-partisan
approach to regain the electorate’s trust and re-engage citizens
in democratic processes. The responsibility rests with Bulgaria’s
political forces to demonstrate strong political will in this endeavour.
8.9 Inclusion of women and minorities
79. Immediate legislative and policy
actions are needed to achieve greater representation of women in elected
offices. This could involve introducing temporary special measures,
positive discrimination in placing women in electable positions,
and implementing training and capacity-building programs. Similarly,
legislative incentives should be introduced to promote minority
participation within party leadership and as candidates, ensuring
that the diversity of Bulgarian society is reflected in its governance
structures.
8.10 Media freedom and election coverage
80. Media freedom in Bulgaria has
been assessed as fragile and unstable. New legislative measures
should be adopted to protect journalists and media workers from
abusive court proceedings on defamation grounds. The authorities
should foster the editorial freedom of public service media, granting
it greater independence in covering election campaigns in regular
news and information programmes. Additionally, the distinction between
journalism and political advertising must be maintained by avoiding
the use of journalists in paid campaign material for electoral contestants,
such as paid interviews and campaign reports.
8.11 Transparency in parliamentary work
81. A transparent legislative process
is fundamental to a functioning democracy. The effective enforcement of
provisions regulating the parliament’s interaction with civil society,
commercial and non-commercial entities, and citizens in the law-making
process is necessary. Establishing adequate timelines for considering
bills will secure meaningful and effective engagement by all interested
parties, enhancing the quality and legitimacy of legislation.
8.12 Stability of institutions
82. Frequent changes in voting
policies from 2021 to 2024, driven by shifting alliances among major
political parties, have led to a lack of consistency and trust in
electoral processes. Legal certainty is a precondition for effective
and long-term policies, and as GRECO has noted, frequent amendments
and poor enforcement undermine the stability of legislation and
erode legal certainty. Bulgarian authorities are urged to show strong and
genuine political will to establish stable institutions and address
all observed shortcomings. This commitment aligns with the Reykjavik
Principles for Democracy, aiming to secure and strengthen democracy and
good governance, and to encourage democratic participation through
free and fair elections.
83. By implementing these recommendations, Bulgaria can enhance
the integrity of its electoral processes, strengthen democratic
institutions, and rebuild public trust in its governance systems.
The collective effort of political leaders, lawmakers, and civil
society is essential in achieving these goals and ensuring the country’s democratic
future.
9 Conclusions
84. The PACE delegation acknowledges
the significant challenges of conducting seven elections within three
years. We commend the successive caretaker governments and the Bulgarian
electoral management authorities for successfully organising free,
competitive, and well-administered elections under these circumstances.
However, the ongoing cycle of elections has plunged Bulgaria into
near-constant campaign mode, intensifying political challenges and
leading to entrenched instability. The latest elections on 27 October 2024
failed again to resolve the prolonged political crisis, offering
little hope for the formation of a stable and durable government.
Our observations reveal a troubling erosion of traditional parties,
increased political fragmentation, a surge in populism, and widespread
public disillusionment. This deepening crisis of representation
makes it increasingly difficult for moderate forces to unite the
dissatisfied electorate and break the current impasse.
85. Moreover, the paralysis of parliamentary functions – evidenced
by the failure to elect a president – and the inability of competent
institutions to appoint key judicial positions such as the prosecutor
peneral and the president of the Supreme Administrative Court raise
concerns about a potential institutional crisis affecting the functioning
of democratic institutions.
86. While calls for a referendum to shift to a presidential system
have emerged, such significant constitutional changes require careful
consideration and extensive public consultation, not decisions made under
political duress. The fundamental issue lies not with parliamentary
democracy but with persistent high-level corruption and the electorate’s
continued support for corrupt leadership.
87. The difficulties in forming a workable government are exacerbated
by a stark divide between pro-European Union and pro-Russian stances.
GERB and PP-DB’s pro-European orientation contrasts sharply with
the strong pro-Russian lobby represented by the BSP, the radical
right Revival, and newcomer MECh, which together secured about 25%
of the votes. Echoing recent elections in Georgia and in the Republic
of Moldova, Revival’s success underscores how elections in the region
have become battlegrounds for Russian influence. However, Bulgaria’s
political deadlock highlights not only external pressures but also
the significance of anti-corruption efforts, personality clashes,
and challenges in coalition-building.
88. If the recently elected political forces cannot reach a stable
coalition under the current circumstances, they should remain open
to innovative and possibly temporary solutions, such as forming
a government of technocrats or experts or other workable measures
that could help break the cycle of repeated elections yielding the
same outcomes. However, any such solution should be achieved through
broad-based consensus, ensuring it reflects the will of the electorate
and adheres to democratic principles.
89. Members of the PACE delegation are deeply concerned by persistent
allegations of vote-buying and controlled voting, which were particularly
intense ahead of these elections. While measures such as hotlines implemented
by the Ministry of the Interior are positive steps, the significant
increase in alerts and higher turnout in certain sensitive areas
underscore the urgent need for more effective action against these unacceptable
criminal practices. It is crucial for State institutions to thoroughly
investigate these claims and bring the perpetrators to justice.
90. These elections do not seem to have produced a breakthrough
in the political deadlock. The fact that seven consecutive elections
have yielded similar outcomes raises concerns that some influential
political leaders may prefer to maintain the status
quo. The responsibility now rests with these political
actors to move beyond partisan divisions and break this cycle of
stalemate. The Bulgarian people deserve leaders committed to providing
a functioning democratic government that addresses their needs and
restores public trust.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee – 9 June 2024
Chairperson:
Mr Oleksii Goncharenko, Ukraine
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Saša Magazinović,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Mr Yunus Emre, Türkiye
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Corneliu-Mugurel
Cozmanciuc, Romania
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Mehmet Akalın, Türkiye
European Conservatives
Group and Democratic Alliance (EC/DA)
- Mr Oleksii Goncharenko,
Ukraine
- Mr Morten Wold, Norway
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
- Ms Sevilay Çelenk Özen,
Türkiye
Venice Commission
- Ms Katharina Pabel,
representative of the Venice Commission
- Mr Michael Janssen, legal advisor, Secretariat of the
Venice Commission
Secretariat
- Ms Ivi-Triin Odrats,
Deputy Head of the Elections Division, Secretary of the ad hoc committee
- Ms Carine Roller-Kaufman, Assistant, Elections Division
Appendix 2 – Programme
of the meetings of the Election Observation Mission – 9 June 2024
Friday,
7 June 2024
15:00-15:30 Meeting of the delegation
- Welcome remarks by Oleksii Goncharenko, Head of Delegation
- Presentation on legal aspects by Katharina Pabel, member
of the Venice Commission
- Briefing on practicalities by the Secretariat
15:30-17:00 Meeting with the OSCE/ODIHR Election Expert Team
- Political context, campaign
environment – Lusine Badalyan, Team Leader
- Election administration (also focus on the machine voting)
– Oleksii Lychkovakh
- Legal aspects and campaign financing – Renata Tardioli
- Media environment – Ágnes Dóka Magdolna
17:15-18:15 Exchange of views with representatives of NGOs
active in the field of election observation
- Vanya Nusheva – Transparency International
- Daniel Stefanov – NBU, top analyst, Electoral lab
- Rumyana Dencheva – ex-head of the Civic Consultation Council
of CEC
Saturday, 8 June 2024
08:30-11:30: Consecutive meetings
with leaders and representatives of political parties and coalitions
08:30-09:00 GERB + SDS
09:00-09:30 PP-DB
- Nadejda
Yordanova
- Lena Borislavova
- Stoju Stoev
- Vasil Pandov
09:30-10:00 DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms)
- Stanislav Anastasov
- Hamid Hamid
- Valentin Tonchev
11:00-11:30 ITN
11:45-12:45 Exchange of views with media representatives
- Mediapool.bg- Tzvetelina Sokolova
- Offnews.bg – Vladimir Yonchev
- Bulgarian National Radio – Milen Mitev
- Bulgarian Telegraph Agency – Genka Ivanova
- Association of European Journalists, Horizon – Irena Nedeva
13:00-14:00 Meeting with the Chairperson and members of the
Central Election Commission
16:00 Meeting with ministers of the caretaker government responsible
for running the elections
- Georgi
Gvozdeykov, Minister of Transport and Communication
- Valentin Mundrov, Minister of E-Governance
- Kalin Stoyanov, Minister of Interior
- Svetlan Stoev, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Sunday, 9 June 2024
07:00-20:00 Election Day – observation in polling stations
20:00-23:00 Observing the closing and counting in polling
stations
Monday, 10 June 2024
09:00-10:00 Debriefing meeting of the delegation and adoption
of a statement
13:00 Press briefing by the Head of Delegation
Appendix 3 – Press
release of the Election Observation Mission – 9 June 2024
Despite free
and competitive voting, Bulgaria’s elections marred by voter fatigue,
record low turnout
The 9 June simultaneous early parliamentary and European elections
in Bulgaria were free and competitive, offering voters a pluralistic
range of choices. While the electoral procedures were well-managed,
voter turnout reflected a significant lack of enthusiasm, with only
a third of voters participating in the national elections. This indicates
a growing voter fatigue and skepticism about political change, a
delegation of observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (PACE) has concluded.
The eleven-member delegation, led by Oleksii Goncharenko (Ukraine,
EC/DA), observed the early parliamentary elections over four days,
with five teams deployed in Sofia, Plovdiv, Blagoevgrad, Kyustendil, Pleven,
Pernik and Breznik. A full report on the observation will be presented
to the PACE Standing Committee in November 2024.
“All recent elections in Bulgaria have been professionally
organised and well-implemented,” said Mr Goncharenko. “Minor irregularities
and technical problems with the voting machines aside, these elections were
no exception. The simultaneous European elections did not pose significant
challenges. However, the Bulgarian electorate is exhausted from
being called to vote for the sixth time in three years, leading
to disillusionment with the country's governance. Mistrust in the
main political actors and uncertain prospects for political stability
risk pushing voters towards extremes. The newly elected parliament
must therefore strive to regain the electorate's trust and re-engage
with them.”
The constitutional reform in December 2023, which inter alia granted citizens with
dual citizenship the right to be elected as MPs and ministers, is
a welcome development in line with previous recommendations from
the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR. However, some other long-standing
recommendations, particularly regarding the voting rights of individuals
under judicial interdiction or serving prison sentences, remain
unaddressed.
The PACE delegation is particularly concerned about persistent
issues of vote-buying and corporate and controlled vote – both explicit
and implicit, allegations of which were frequently raised by interlocutors
and confirmed by the caretaker Minister of Interior. These issues
need thorough investigation to restore public trust.
The tone of the campaigns, both online and offline, was predominantly
negative and did not improve during the parliamentary campaign period.
The PACE delegation was also informed of a number of abusive court proceedings
on defamation grounds and reiterates its long-standing recommendation
to adopt new legislative measures for the protection of journalists.
On Election Day, voters seemed familiar with the voting procedures,
choosing between paper ballots and voting machines. A significant
number of voters preferred paper ballots. The process in the polling
station was somewhat bureaucratic, involving multiple stamps and
identification checks. Despite the professionalism of the members
of the Precinct Election Commissions, this would probably lead to
delays and long queues if participation was higher.
The secrecy of the vote was not fully guaranteed. The transparency
of machine-printed ballots allowed others to potentially see the
votes cast. The PACE delegation calls on the new Bulgarian authorities
to rethink the current system of electronic voting in use to secure
its reliability while making the best use of modern technologies.
Whereas it is clear that ICT technologies alone cannot restore Bulgarians’
trust in the electoral process or uproot corruptive practices, nevertheless
if coupled with legal safeguards and transparent electoral practices,
they could gradually boost voter confidence.
Appendix 4 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee – 27 October 2024
Revised list of
members
Chairperson: Mr Alfred
Heer, Switzerland
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Yunus Emre, Türkiye
- Ms Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska, North Macedonia
- Mr Saša Magazinović, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Andrea Eder-Gitschthaler,
Austria
- Ms Maria Syrengela, Greece
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Mehmet Akalın, Türkiye
- Mr Alfred Heer, Switzerland
European Conservatives
Group and Democratic Alliance (EC/DA)
- Mr José María Sánchez
García, Spain
- Ms Heather Wheeler, United Kingdom
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
- Ms Sevilay Çelenk Özen,
Türkiye
Venice Commission
- Mr Richard Barrett,
member of the Venice Commission
- Mr Domenico Vallario, legal advisor, Secretariat of the
Venice Commission
Secretariat
- Ms Ivi-Triin Odrats,
Deputy Head of the Elections Division, Secretary of the ad hoc committee
- Mr Gaël Martin-Micallef, Committee Secretary
Appendix 5 – Programme
of the meetings of the Election Observation Mission – 27 October
2024
Friday,
25 October 2024
14:00-14:45 Meeting of the delegation
- Welcome remarks by Alfred Heer, Head of Delegation
- Presentation on legal aspects by Richard Barrett, member
of the Venice Commission
- Briefing by the Secretariat
15:00-16:15 Exchange of views with representatives of NGOs
active in the field of election observation
- Ruzha Smilova, Centre for Liberal Strategies
- Vanya Nusheva, Transparency International
- Lilian Nikoforova, Institute for development of public
environment
16:30-18:00 Exchange of views with media representatives
- Assen Yordanov, director – online
Bivol
- Evgeniya Drumeva, vice general director – BTA
- Viktoria Spasova – newspaper Kapital
- Lubcho Neshkov – bnesbg.bg
- Dimitar Ruskov – dnesbg.bg
- Newspaper Dnevnik
16:15-17:00 Meeting of the Head of Delegation with Judge Cherneva,
Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) and members
of the First Chamber of SAC
Saturday, 26 October 2024
08:00-08:45 Meeting with ministers of the caretaker government
responsible for running the elections
- Ivan Kondov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Rosen Karadimov, Minister of Innovation and Growth
- Valentin Mundrov, Minister of E-Governance
09:00-12:00: Consecutive meetings
with leaders and representatives of political parties and coalitions competing
in the elections
09:00-09:30 Coalition We Continue the Change – Democratic
Bulgaria (PP-DB)
09:30-10:00 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)-New Beginning
- Iskra Mihaylova
- Stanislav Anastasov
- Atidje Alieva-Veli
10:00-10:30 Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria
– Union of Democratic Forces (GERB – SDS)
- Georg Georgiev
- Elena Naydenova
10:30-11:00 Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (ARF)
- Valentin Tonchev
- Ahmed Haku
- Neriman Mustafa
11:00-11:30 Revival
11:30-12:00 Bulgarian Socialist Party for Bulgaria (BSP)
- Yoan Ivanov
- Kamen Todorov
- Alexander Simov
12:00-12:30 There is such a People (ITN)
15:00-15:45 Meeting with the Chairperson and members of the
Central Election Commission
Sunday, 27 October 2024
07:00-20:00 Election Day – observation in polling stations
20:00-23:00 Observing the closing and counting in polling
stations
Monday, 28 October 2024
09:00-10:00 Debriefing meeting of the delegation and adoption
of a statement
13:00 Press briefing by the Head of Delegation
Appendix 6 – Press
release of the Election Observation Mission – 27 October 2024
Well-organised
but ineffective elections maintain the status quo in Bulgaria, say
PACE observers
SOFIA, 28 October 2024: The early parliamentary elections
held on 27 October in Bulgaria were competitive and professionally
managed by the election administration. The persistently low voter
turnout underscored however a deep-seated lack of trust among the
electorate in the country’s political leadership.
“We once again commend the good organisation of the elections
and the continuing efforts of an electorate exhausted by endless
cycles of repeated elections”, said Alfred Heer, Head of the PACE
Delegation, at the conclusion of the four-day election observation
mission. “After this seventh round of elections held in three years,
political leaders from all parties and coalitions should consider
the reality of the disengagement of the Bulgarian people and tackle
it. The country is going through a recurrent political crisis –
not an institutional one – but that leads to institutionalising
the political crisis. There is no functioning democracy without
active voter participation.”
While some Venice Commission recommendations remain outstanding,
the Election Code and related legislation provide for an overall
adequate framework for the conduct of fair elections.
The frequent reliance on short-term and caretaker governments
has de facto replaced the
ordinary relationship between elections and the formation of stable
governments. This reliance is itself an admission of failure to establish
lasting political solutions. Political leaders and lawmakers should
consider introducing changes to the electoral system that might
be more conducive to stable governments.
The delegation reiterates its concerns over persistent allegations
of vote-buying and controlled voting. While the hotline and other
measures implemented by the Ministry of the Interior to report such
violations are welcome developments, the significant increase in
alerts and notably higher turnout in certain sensitive areas demonstrate
the urgent need to further address these issues, which by law are
a crime.
The lacklustre election campaign was conducted primarily on
social media and, to some extent, through traditional means in rural
areas. An increasing number of candidates are managing their own
political communication, partially bypassing professional journalism,
which raises concerns about the quality of information reaching
voters.
On Election Day, despite the benefits to be obtained from
increased technology, the current combination of voting machines
used as printers, along with paper ballots, has resulted in more
bureaucratic and procedural steps, increasing the possibility of
errors within polling stations.
“These elections have not produced a breakthrough in the political
impasse”, Mr Heer concluded. “The responsibility now rests with
Bulgaria's political forces. They must move beyond partisan divisions
to break this cycle of deadlock. The Bulgarian people deserve leaders
committed to providing a functioning democratic government.”
A 14-member delegation, led by
Alfred Heer (Switzerland, ALDE), observed the early parliamentary
elections on 27 October. On Election Day, its seven teams were deployed
in Sofia, Pazardzhik, Plovdiv, Pernik, Breznik, Blagoevgrad, Dupnitsa,
Rila, Montana, Lovech, Vraca, Etropole, Komarevo, Barzia and Sredets.
A report on the observation of elections will be presented at the
PACE Standing Committee on 29 November 2024 in Luxembourg.
