C Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. The Russian Federation’s full-scale
war of aggression against Ukraine is a watershed moment for European
security, with profound implications for democratic security both
in Europe and globally. The military aggression is part of a wider
systematic attempt to weaken democratic security far beyond Ukraine.
2. The tactics employed by Russia to undermine democracies are
well-documented. They include cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns,
political subversion, threats to journalists, acts of sabotage, instrumentalised
migration, economic coercion, and corruption, all designed to weaken
the internal cohesion and resilience of democratic States.
Note
3. These efforts target the very fabric of democracies, seeking
to corrode the institutions and principles that have underpinned
peace, stability and prosperity in Europe since the end of the Second
World War.
4. This playbook of foreign interference is similarly used by
other State and non-State actors seeking to challenge systems of
liberal democratic governance. These threats have not only grown
in scale by exploiting the use of new technologies, but have also
diversified, adapting to the unique vulnerabilities of different countries,
communities and regions.
5. In response to these evolving threats, member States of the
Council of Europe have developed and implemented measures to safeguard
their democracies. However, the challenge of foreign interference continues
to evolve, requiring constant vigilance, innovation, co-ordination
and co-operation at both national and international levels.
6. Democracies must defend themselves against the threat posed
by foreign interference as part of an adaptation to an increasingly
hostile international environment where the principles of sovereignty,
self-determination and democracy are under attack. This need to
defend against the threat is reflected by the European public with
81% of respondents to a Eurobarometer survey agreeing that foreign
interference in European democratic system is a serious problem
that should be addressed, and 74% responding that such interference
can affect citizens’ voting behaviour.
Note The
resilience of democratic institutions is crucial in countering these
dangers and ensuring that the values of human rights, democracy
and the rule of law prevail. At the same time, responses to foreign
interference must be guided by the very principles that they seek
to defend.
7. This report will outline the threat of foreign interference
to democratic security, and examine approaches taken to counter
and to build resilience against foreign interference activities.
2 What is foreign interference?
8. Foreign interference can be
described as intentional, covert and manipulative, mostly illegitimate interference
by foreign powers, their proxies or private actors with the aim
of advancing their political, economic or military goals. It threatens
or negatively impacts other States’ security, values, democratic
procedures, political processes, and their capacity to cope with
exceptional situations.
9. This interference targets the foundations of our societies,
trying to transform democratic pillars into systemic vulnerabilities,
and to turn democracies against themselves.
10. This poses a profound strategic challenge to democratic nations.
In an era where the rules-based order is under strain, authoritarian
regimes are capitalising on both digital and non-digital arenas
with hostile intent. Their primary objective is to internally weaken
democracies, eroding the integrity of decision-making processes and
undermining public trust in institutions.
11. These malign actions have been accelerated by the systemic
and societal challenge of the transformation of the media and information
ecosystems and the weakened role of traditional gatekeepers of the
public conversation, with the weaponisation of social media for
propagating sophisticated information operations posing a potentially
existential national security threat to all European democracies.
12. Foreign interference may take different forms, often used
in combination, including:
- elite
capture;
- covert financing of political life;
- electoral interference;
- disinformation and foreign information manipulation;
- economic coercion;
- transnational control, surveillance and repression of
diasporas;
- corruption.Note
13. Foreign interference is a critical component of the broader
universe of hybrid threats, which encompass a blend of military
and non-military tactics that are designed to destabilise and exert
influence over targeted States.
Note
14. The present report excludes kinetic operations, such as sabotage
attacks, assassinations and terrorist actions from its conception
of foreign interference.
15. The term “foreign interference” should be distinguished from
“foreign influence”, as the two concepts, while related, involve
different levels of engagement and intention. While there are on
occasions grey areas between the two, foreign interference can largely
be distinguished by its covert nature and intention to harm the
collective interest of the State in question in order to promote
the interests of a foreign government.
Note
16. “Foreign influence” typically refers to overt and often legitimate
efforts by a foreign government or entity to sway the opinions,
policies, or actions of another country. This can take many forms,
such as diplomatic engagements, public diplomacy, cultural exchanges,
lobbying, and can also include transparent and legal funding of
organisations and media organisations.
Note Legitimate, overt foreign
influence is a natural part of international relations, with the
influencing party generally openly pursuing its interests while
engaging with the host country in a manner that respects its sovereignty
and legal frameworks.
3 Main
foreign interference actors
17. Attribution for foreign interference
is complex due to the sophisticated methods used to obscure the source
of the activity, and further complicated by the use of local proxies
or front organisations. The political risk of false attribution
and the blurred lines between legitimate influence and covert interference
add to the challenge posed.
18. Online platforms have been able to track the most frequent
sources of foreign interference, with Meta reporting that Russia
was the number one source of such operations on their internet infrastructure
since 2017, followed by Iran, and China.
Note
19. Studies by European parliaments and institutions such as those
carried out in France,
Note Czechia,
Note Estonia,
Note Latvia,
Note and the Netherlands,
Note have identified Russia and
China as key foreign interference threats to democracies, with tactics
that seek to subvert and destabilise societies including long-term disinformation
campaigns, information warfare, cyberattacks, and a range of efforts
to control narratives abroad, including via influencing university
research, and via infiltration in companies.
4 Foreign
interference as a threat to democratic security
20. Democratic security is underpinned
by the protection and reinforcement of the essential principles, institutions
and processes that uphold democratic governance, such as the rule
of law, human rights, and free and fair elections. It includes safeguarding
electoral integrity, protecting civil liberties, and promoting an informed
and engaged citizenry.
Note
21. Authoritarian regimes have increasingly sought, and with increasing
effectiveness, to diminish the integrity of norms and institutions
safeguarding fundamental liberties. The tools of foreign interference
– such as corruption, disinformation, elite capture, and electoral
interference – aim to erode each of the pillars of democratic security.
22. These regimes have actively fuelled and exploited polarisation
within Council of Europe member States through these forms of interference.
This has included providing financial support to extremist groups
that amplify divisive, radical and sometimes violent narratives,
as well as through funding political movements and politicians in
order to sabotage united opposition to hostile actors, while weakening
democratic projects and influence.
Note
23. The pattern of destabilisation strategies to erode democratic
norms and amplify polarisation seek to weaken trust in the political
system, which in turn harms the ability to effectively respond to
wider challenges.
24. Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of democratic societies.
Independent and transparent electoral processes are necessary for
both citizen’s trust in our public institutions, and for the competitiveness
of the electoral environment. Foreign interference operations are
a continuing risk as regards their efforts to manipulate information
and voter sentiment, cyberattacks on infrastructure, as well as
accessing and leaking sensitive information from governments, political
parties and members of parliament.
25. This continually evolving and adapting threat remains difficult
to measure, and the cumulative effect of its manifestations on our
democracies is not yet fully understood. The rapid advancements
and widespread adoption of artificial intelligence have the potential
to significantly exacerbate the challenges faced by democracies
in confronting foreign interference, and responses will have to
adapt in line with these advances.
5 Multiple
targets and multiform tactics
26. There are numerous high-profile
examples of foreign interference activities threatening democratic security
and stability. These activities can be largely grouped into the
three main categories of disinformation, cyberattacks and hacking,
and financial and political interference.
27. These activities are often employed simultaneously to have
a compounding negative effect by systematically targeting the pillars
of democratic security. Disinformation undermines the public commons,
faith in the credibility of the media, the government and even facts
themselves. Cyberattacks compromise sensitive data, disrupt essential
services, and bolster disinformation by the selective leaking of
materials that feed divisive narratives. Financial and political
interference erodes institutional integrity and increases public cynicism
about governance.
28. Together, this creates a feedback loop. Cyberattacks provide
material for disinformation and leverage over personalities who
have had their data compromised, while financial and political interference
amplifies distrust created by cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
The cumulative effect of these can expose systemic vulnerabilities,
creating openings for hostile actors to manipulate and destabilise
target societies.
5.1 Disinformation
29. Disinformation has been defined
by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers as verifiably
false, inaccurate or misleading information deliberately created
and disseminated to cause harm or pursue economic or political gain
by deceiving the public.
Note
30. While disinformation is no novelty in the conduct of international
relations, the advent of digital technologies has increased its
scope to unprecedented levels. Disinformation campaigns involve
spreading false or misleading information – typically launched through
state-controlled media, social media, or covert channels – to shape
public opinion, amplify domestic political divisions on sensitive
topics, or damage the credibility of specific institutions, processes,
or individuals.
31. Disinformation campaigns have become a regular phenomenon,
especially during election or referendum campaigns. Irregularities
in electoral processes stemming from foreign interference reflect
the transformative impact of digital threats to elections. In December
2024, the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the result of the
presidential election first round and ordered that the elections
should be reorganised from the start by the Government on a future
date after the Court found that there had been a breach of the “essential
principles of free democratic elections”.
Note The
Court's decision came after intelligence documents were declassified
that suggested that one of the candidates benefitted from a mass
influence operation – conducted from abroad – that manipulated the
votes and distorted equal opportunities of electoral competitors through
the use of digital technology and artificial intelligence.
32. In coming to this decision, the Constitutional Court found
that States must be resilient in the face of challenges and risks
generated by organised disinformation campaigns that affect the
integrity of electoral processes, and reasoned that the freedom
of voters to form an opinion includes the right to have access to accurate
information about candidates and the electoral process as well as
a protection against unjustified influence on their voting behaviour
through unlawful and disproportionate acts or facts. It stated that
electoral online publicity must always be identified as such and
be transparent, both with regard to the identity of the sponsor,
as well as with regard to the technical means of dissemination.
Note
33. State-funded media outlets are a key vector for disinformation,
with prominent examples being Russia’s Sputnik and RT, as well as
China’s Global Television Network. These outlets are under the permanent
direct or indirect control of State authorities and are instrumental
in the systematic propagation of disinformation.
34. Internal foreign policy concept documents from hostile actors
have made clear that this disinformation is a strategic action,
such as the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs calling for an “offensive
information campaign” across the “military-political, economic and
trade and informational psychological spheres”.
Note
35. In 2017, a report commissioned by the Council of Europe called
the increased use of disinformation one of the elements of wider
information disorder.
Note Even when specific disinformation
campaigns are successfully revealed and debunked, the cumulative
effect of persistent false information has been to erode trust in
the information environment, with research from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showing that on
average only 39% of people have high or moderately high trust in
news media, while 44% report low to no trust in the media.
Note
36. Disinformation networks have proliferated following the full-scale
war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine to amplify
pro-Kremlin narratives on social media platforms, both in Europe
and globally.
37. Russian-based influence operations include tactics such as
used in the “DoppelGänger” case, where hostile actors developed
websites that impersonated established news organisations or government
websites in Council of Europe member States. Disinformation stories
were then placed on these spoof sites to give an appearance of authenticity
and disseminated on social media sites through a network of false
accounts.
Note
38. Between 24 February 2022 and October 2023, monitoring conducted
across six countries (Germany, Italy, Poland, Czechia, the Slovak
Republic and Hungary), found the dissemination of over 13 000 disinformation
messages clustered around key pro-Russian narratives.
Note
39. The rapid amplification of disinformation narratives by hostile
States is facilitated by bots and artificial intelligence in order
to increase external pressure on the policy makers by local populations
and spread false narratives about the illegal actions being undertaken
by Russia in Ukraine.
40. Research by the French agency VIGINUM showed that between
September and December 2023, a network of 200 disinformation portals
was detected that converted disinformation content into target audience languages.
Note
41. Chinese-affiliated disinformation and propaganda have, according
to data from Microsoft, been deployed on a “scale unmatched by other
malign influence actors”, through the use of thousands of accounts across
a range of internet platforms spreading memes, videos, and articles
in multiple languages.
Note
42. Disinformation operations have also sought to exploit sensitive
issues in target countries to exacerbate social divides. Referred
to as “parasitic” operations, these operations opportunistically
amplify existing inflammatory content or domestic misinformation
via bots to exacerbate tensions on certain issues and promote extreme
views. The dynamic between foreign disinformation and domestic misinformation
can have a catalysing effect on domestic groups. This has been seen
during the Covid-19 pandemic to exacerbate vaccine hesitancy and
pandemic conspiracy theories,
Note and in accelerating
domestic tension related to migration or electoral security.
43. These disinformation campaigns have on occasion been carried
out in concert with further hybrid actions. This has particularly
been the case with regard to the weaponisation of migration flows
with the intent of destabilising European democracies. Hybrid foreign
interference strategies have included the transportation of migrants
and asylum seekers by Belarus and by Russia to the borders of Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. Migrants, minorities, and diasporas
are then exploited for the purpose of malign disinformation campaigns.
The aim is to amplify and exploit existing negative perceptions
of migration, thereby fostering heightened tensions within European
societies.
5.2 Cyberattacks
and hacking
44. As digital technologies have
become pervasive in all aspects of life – including administration,
defence, critical infrastructure and the economy, there has been
growing convergence between foreign interference operations driven
by disinformation campaigns and State or State-sponsored cyberattacks
as a vector for interference.
45. Cyberattacks and hacking attempts directed at State institutions
disrupt access to government websites, obstruct governmental bodies,
and compromise officials’ email accounts. As well as posing a threat
to the provision of essential services and public safety, such activity
exposes government networks and government officials’ communications
to hostile actors, and influences democratic processes. In 2024
alone, hostile cyber operations in Europe were publicly attributed
to pro-Kremlin hackers, including in Czechia, Germany, Greece, Poland
and Switzerland.
Note
46. The threats to elections from foreign interference have included
the hacking of emails of candidates, such as in the American presidential
election in 2016,
Note and the French presidential
election of 2017, and attempts to affect the electoral infrastructure
itself, such as cyberattacks in Ukraine in 2014, in North Macedonia in
2019, and in the Republic of Moldova in 2019.
Note
47. In December 2023, the United Kingdom exposed attempted Russian
cyber interference in political processes. These operations targeted
parliamentarians through spear-phishing campaigns, hacking and leaking
UK-US trade documents, and interference against UK think tanks on
defending democracy against disinformation.
Note
5.3 Financial
and political interference
48. Elite capture and corruption
are insidious forms of foreign interference that can undermine democratic security.
The co-opting of key political, business or media elites to advance
the interests of a foreign State comes at the expense of national
sovereignty and democratic norms. It diminishes the effectiveness
and legitimacy of institutions and erodes the rule of law.
49. Alleged attempts by foreign countries such as Qatar to influence
members, former members, and staff of the European Parliament through
acts of corruption would represent a serious interference in European democratic
processes.
Note The
European Parliament also noted in a 2024 resolution that credible
allegations have been made that Members of the European Parliament
were paid to disseminate Russian propaganda.
Note
50. Further concerns about the funding of political parties in
democratic countries by Russia in attempts to interfere in domestic
processes have seen the European Parliament call for a comprehensive
investigation into potential foreign interference support to secessionist
movements, such as in Catalonia after it was alleged that Russian-affiliated
envoys met with Catalan independence leaders in 2017 to offer massive
financial aid in exchange for favourable cryptocurrency legislation.
Note
51. These concerns have also led to calls for greater transparency
into funding for political parties, with an investigation showing
that populist, far-right and far-left political parties received
a quarter of all private funding to political parties in the European
Union between 2019 and 2022,
Note while intelligence cables
stated that Russia provided US$300 million to influence politicians
and officials across 24 countries between 2014 and 2022.
Note
52. In March 2024, Czechia sanctioned the Prague-based news site
Voice of Europe after allegations that it had paid politicians in
several European countries to spread anti-Ukraine sentiment and
influence the June European Parliament elections as part of a Russian
influence operation.
Note
53. Financial foreign interference has also targeted voters in
advance of elections. Moldovan authorities consistently raised alarms
about attempts of the Russian Federation to interfere in the domestic
politics and electoral processes of the Republic of Moldova in 2024,
with a large influx of Russian money into the Republic of Moldova
reported with the aim of buying votes and subverting the democratic
process.
Note
54. The General Police Inspectorate of the Republic of Moldova
documented cases of bribery that involved 130 000 citizens and over
US$15 million in illicit transfers from Russia in September 2024
alone.
Note The scale of vote-buying
schemes was estimated to be higher overall, with funds dispersed
through a range of schemes such as “social” allowances for pensioners,
and salary “bonuses” for employees of local government structures.
Note
6 The
response
55. The Council of Europe, its
member States and international organisations have developed a range
of tools to prevent, detect, counter and sanction the multifaceted
threat posed by foreign interference.
6.1 Updating
security concepts
56. The Russian Federation’s large-scale
aggression against Ukraine, and its hybrid character, have highlighted
the urgency for democracies to update their national security concepts.
57. Member States have consequently sought to amend strategies
that incorporate actions to confront the risk from accelerated foreign
interference operations. Germany, for instance, has adopted its
first ever national security strategy.
Note Based on a broad concept of security,
this document aims to provide comprehensive answers to the diverse
security challenges of our time. This goes far beyond traditional
defence political issues and includes matters ranging from development
of co-operation to the defence against cyber risks.
58. Entities have been created to adapt to the activities of hostile
actors, such as the establishment in France in 2021 of the national
agency VIGINUM, the service for vigilance and protection against
foreign digital interference. Its role is to detect online threats
that seek to undermine France’s fundamental interests.
59. In 2023, France and Slovenia, in partnership with Montenegro,
founded the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre in order to build
long-term cyber capacity to confront cyberattacks and online disinformation by
foreign actors seeking to provoke instability in the region.
Note
60. One month into the Russian Federation’s war of aggression
against Ukraine, the Council of the European Union approved the
Strategic Compass to set out a common strategic vision for European
Union security and defence policy over the next 5-10 years.
Note Tellingly, its full title is “For
a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests
and contributes to international peace and security”. Assessing
the shared strategic environment, the document describes the complex
security threats confronting the European Union, including:
- hybrid threats growing in frequency
and impact;
- soft power being weaponised, with vaccines, data and technology
being used as instruments of political competition;
- increasing attempts of economic and energy coercion.
61. Amongst the instruments foreseen by the Strategic Compass
is a European Union Hybrid Toolbox to detect and respond to a broad
range of hybrid threats, which includes dedicated actions to address
foreign information manipulation and interference. The European
Union already has a range of options for the European Union Hybrid
Toolbox implementation, such as the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox,
Note and the added value of the Hybrid
Toolbox is to enable a fast, coherent and co-ordinated response,
gathering a combination of civilian and military instruments.
Note. The Council of the European Union
approved the guiding framework for the practical establishment of
European Union Hybrid Rapid Response Teams in May 2024 that can
be deployed upon request to prepare against and counter hybrid threats.
Note
62. In June 2022 in Madrid, NATO adopted a New Strategic Concept,
which recalled that “strategic competitors test our resilience and
seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation
of our nations […] These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate
effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote
authoritarian models of governance.”
Note It called for efforts
to develop resilience against and counter foreign interference and
hybrid threats being levelled against NATO Allies and countries aspiring
to become members of the Alliance.
6.2 Developing
societal resilience
63. With hybrid threats set to
continue to affect the security landscape, developing societal resilience
against foreign interference needs a comprehensive, whole-of-society
approach. Efforts to influence elections from abroad have been shown
to be more likely to take place through voter manipulation over
the long term rather than through direct attacks on the election
system. Protective measures therefore require a strong focus on
the overall resilience of the population to foreign influence.
Note
64. Developing societal resilience against foreign interference
is imperative for safeguarding democratic institutions and ensuring
the integrity of electoral processes. This involves multifaceted
strategies encompassing education, media literacy, and the cultivation
of critical thinking skills among citizens to discern and counter
disinformation. Strengthening public awareness of the tactics used
by foreign actors in spreading false narratives, especially through
social media platforms, is crucial.
65. Finland has incorporated media literacy into its national
curriculum from an early age, equipping students with essential
skills to navigate today's complex information landscape. Finnish
schools teach children how to evaluate the credibility of various
information sources, identify biased or misleading content, and
understand the motivations behind disinformation campaigns.
Note Estonia and Latvia
have sought to enhance media literacy by respectively working to
strengthen the resilience of their Russian-speaking populations
against information manipulation, offering alternatives to Russian
media and engaging with its Russian-speaking minority,
Note and supporting and training
independent journalism at institutes such as the Riga-based Baltic
Centre for Media Excellence.
66. Additionally, fostering a diverse and independent media landscape
that upholds journalistic integrity and fact-checking practices
can mitigate the spread of disinformation. Collaboration between
governments, civil society organisations, and tech platforms is
pivotal in implementing effective strategies to identify, counter,
and raise awareness about foreign interference. Empowering communities,
including minorities and vulnerable groups often targeted by disinformation
campaigns, through inclusive and informative initiatives will contribute significantly
to fortifying societal resilience against external manipulation
and preserving the democratic fabric of nations.
67. The European Commission Joint Research Centre with the Hybrid
Centre of Excellence have proposed a methodology for a comprehensive
resilience mechanism, which seeks to provide a system for the detection of
early signals, help analysis of hybrid threats, and identify potential
response trajectories.
Note
68. The Nordic and Baltic States apply the concept of “total defence”,
on the basis of which the whole society – the armed forces and civil
society – is involved in preventing, deterring and countering an
attack. In 2018, the Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a
booklet to all households with guidelines on how citizens should protect
themselves from false information and cyberattacks as well as many
other threats.
Note
6.3 Countering
disinformation
69. Enhancing societal resilience
to combat foreign interference is part of a wider toolkit for effective
and successful counter-disinformation capability. While efforts
to combat disinformation need to protect freedom of expression and
access to information, States have enhanced efforts to counter disinformation
by disrupting foreign interference actors, such as by pre-bunking
and via content correction.
70. As part of disruption methods, State authorities have identified
and dismantled bot farms spreading disinformation, such as Russian-based
disinformation networks operating in the United States of America being
shut down in July 2024,
Note and the cyber police
in Ukraine suspending the activities of 13 bot farms with more than
1.5 million fake social media accounts that were registered for
spreading disinformation and propaganda.
Note Online platforms
have also taken measures against co-ordinated efforts to manipulate
public debate for strategic goals where fake accounts are central
to the operation, with Meta identifying 39 covert influence operations
from Russia between 2017 and 2024, and with the next most frequent
sources of covert influence operations emanating from Iran and China.
Note
71. To address the risks of artificial intelligence technology
generating false information or exacerbating manipulative content
curation to undermine information integrity, the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights,
Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225, “the Vilnius Convention”)
provides that signatories shall maintain measures that ensure artificial
intelligence systems are not used to undermine the integrity, independence
and effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes, and
that protect democratic processes including the ability to freely
form opinions.
Note
72. Governments have increasingly used strategic communications
to “pre-bunk” disinformation by declassifying intelligence. The
United States notably employed this approach to expose Russian decision making
in the lead-up to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and
to meaningfully undercut Russian narratives.
73. Several European countries have improved intergovernmental
co-ordination. Germany established an inter-ministerial taskforce
led by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community to foster
close co-operation on responses to hybrid threats, especially disinformation.
This taskforce co-ordinates all activities against the deliberate
spread of false and misleading information in the context of the
war against Ukraine, including strengthening proactive and transparent
communication and enhancing societal resilience against threats
in the information space.
Note
74. Efforts to counter disinformation via content correction have
seen a growing network of independent, non-partisan, fact-checking
organisations, often working in collaboration with media outlets
and digital platforms to identify and correct false information.
These fact-checkers often publish corrected information prominently
and work to ensure that misinformation is not only debunked but
also replaced with factual narratives.
75. The Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on Media and Information
Society adopted in December 2023 a Guidance Note on countering the
spread of online mis- and disinformation through fact-checking and platform
design solutions in a human rights compliant manner. This note stressed
the centrality of fact-checking as a key institution of public debate
and called for the independence of fact-checking organisations vis-à-vis States.
Note
76. Globally, the United Nations launched the United Nations Global
Principles for Information Integrity in 2024, which aim to combat
misinformation, disinformation and hate speech while upholding human
rights, including the freedom of expression.
Note The principles are addressed
to a range of stakeholders, and are centred around societal trust
and resilience, public empowerment, independent, free and pluralistic
media, as well as transparency.
77. At the European Union level, a comprehensive approach has
been taken, which includes the Digital Services Act which obliges
digital platforms to take more responsibility for the content that
appears on their services. The strictest obligations of the Act
are applicable to very large online platforms and search engines, defined
as online platforms and intermediaries that have more than 45 million
users per month in the European Union. Such platforms have to identify
and address any systemic risks their platforms pose, such as those related
to fundamental rights, public security, and elections.
78. Specialised task forces have been established, such as the
East StratCom Task Force, to expose and debunk disinformation narratives,
while projects to improve media literacy have supplemented these
efforts in order to enhance long-term resilience to disinformation.
79. At the national level, the establishment of agencies and institutions
to combat the threat has accelerated. The Swedish Psychological
Defence Agency, established in 2022, plays a crucial role in safeguarding Sweden's
information environment. The Agency has both an operational role
and a mandate to strengthen societal resilience against foreign
interference. It identifies, analyses and provides support in countering
malign information influence and other misleading information that
is directed at Sweden or Swedish interests by antagonistic foreign
powers. This can concern disinformation aimed at weakening Sweden’s
resilience and the willingness of the population to defend itself,
or unduly influencing people’s perceptions, behaviours and decision
making.
80. Several European countries have launched special investigative
committees devoted to countering Russian influence. For example,
in May 2024, the Commission for Investigating Russian and Belarusian Influence
was established in Poland by order of the Prime Minister. The Commission
is hosted by the Minister of Justice and will investigate cases
of Russia and Belarus exerting influence on Poland’s politics since
2004.
81. Increased efforts to build partnerships between government,
online platforms and law enforcement have been noted in recent years.
The 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation, developed by the European
Union with major online platforms, emerging and specialised platforms,
players in the advertising industry, fact-checkers, research and
civil society organisations, seeks to expand fact-checking, cut
financial incentives for spreading disinformation, and combat manipulative
behaviours such as fake accounts, bots or malicious deep fakes.
82. In efforts to disrupt the Russian disinformation ecosystem,
the European Union has suspended the broadcasting activities and
licences of several Kremlin-backed disinformation outlets. These
outlets have been used by the Russian Government as instruments
to manipulate information and promote disinformation about the military
aggression against Ukraine, including propaganda aimed at destabilising
the countries neighbouring Russia, the European Union and its member
States.
83. Observing that Sputnik and Russia Today were under the permanent
direct or indirect control of the authorities of the Russian Federation
and essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting
the military aggression against Ukraine, the Council of the European
Union explained its decision on the grounds that “[t]he Russian
Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of
disinformation, information manipulation and distortion of facts
in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation of its neighbouring
countries, the European Union and its member states. (…) In order
to justify and support its military aggression of Ukraine, the Russian
Federation has engaged in continuous and concerted disinformation
and information manipulation actions targeted at the European Union
and neighbouring civil society members, gravely distorting and manipulating
facts”.
Note
84. Individuals involved in the dissemination of propaganda and
disinformation have also been sanctioned. For example, the Editor-in-chief
of RT, Margarita Simonyan, was sanctioned by the
European
Union as a central figure of the Russian Government propaganda
responsible for actions and policies that undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
85. The effect of the suspension of the broadcasting activities
in the first six months since their initial announcement in 2022
saw visits via search engines to the sanctioned outlets reduced
by 100%, visits via social media by 70%, and web traffic from the
European Union by 74%.
Note Court appeals against
the ban by outlets of RT were rejected, as the suspension was a
proportionate measure against active support to a wider destabilisation
policy capable of constituting a significant and direct threat to
public order and security.
Note
6.4 Ensuring
transparency of foreign influence
86. The effective management of
conflicts of interest, lobbying, and political financing are particularly important
for confronting vulnerabilities to the risks of foreign interference
and its destabilising effect on democracy.
Note Concerns about foreign influence
on domestic affairs and public opinion have led a number of countries
around the world to adopt legislation aimed at ensuring greater
transparency as a first step to preventing threats.
87. Regarding the transparency and regulation of donations to
political parties and electoral campaigns, the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe called in 2003 for member States to specifically
limit, prohibit or otherwise regulate donations from foreign donors.
Note
88. The Parliamentary Assembly has condemned all attempts to interfere
improperly or illicitly in democratic decision-making processes
in other States through financial contributions to political parties
and electoral campaigns. It called on member States to review their
regulations governing financial contributions to political parties
and electoral campaigns from foreign sources to mitigate the risk
of inappropriate or illicit foreign financial interference.
Note
89. The Assembly has also called on national governments to enhance
measures for preventing corruption and called on national governments
to adopt and update codes of ethics for all holders of public office.
Note
90. In 2023, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) launched a follow-up procedure to the theme of transparency
of party funding to improve the legal framework in this area and
to ensure that all its member States now have related legislation.
Recommendations of GRECO from its 4th evaluation round deal with
the prevention of corruption in respect of members of parliament,
judges and prosecutors. They include ensuring codes of conduct for
parliamentarians to ensure enforceable, publicly available standards
for professional conduct, improving transparency, and reducing the
vulnerability of parliamentarians to undue influence.
91. On 22 March 2022, the Council of the European Union reached
political agreement on the recast of the regulation on the statute
and funding of European political parties and European political
foundations. This revision aims to enhance the transparency of European
political parties and bolster the framework for their funding, in
particular to counter the risks of foreign interference and manipulation.
Note
92. States have taken a range of further measures to improve transparency
of the links between natural or legal persons operating in the public
arena and carrying out influence activities on behalf of foreign
State interests. These can strengthen the integrity of foreign influence
activities, allow decision makers and citizens to know whose interests
are being defended, and demarcate more clearly between legitimate
influence activities, and illegitimate interference attempts.
Note
93. An early example of these efforts was the Foreign Agents Registration
Act (FARA), which was introduced in the United States in 1938 to
counter Nazi propaganda. With significant changes, this law is still in
force, with the purpose to identify foreign influence in the United
States and address threats to national security. The act requires
“agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political
capacity to make periodic public disclosure” of that relationship.
Activities taken as a result of it must also be disclosed.
Note
94. In March 2023, Canada announced the opening of consultations
to lay the groundwork for a foreign agent registry, amidst media
reports detailing alleged Chinese meddling in the country's past
two elections.
Note
95. Australia had already done so in 2018, after
intelligence
reports described extensive influence operations by China at
all levels of government for the previous decade, including millions
of Australian dollars in political donations and concerns about
the Chinese Communist Party
monitoring
and manipulating Chinese nationals in Australia.
Note
96. In 2023, the UK Government presented the Foreign Influence
Registration Scheme (FIRS), which aims to strengthen the resilience
of the UK political system against covert foreign influence and
provides greater assurance around the activities of certain foreign
powers or entities that are a national security risk. FIRS requires
the registration of arrangements to carry out political influence
activities in the UK at the direction of a foreign power. The enhanced
tier of FIRS gives the Secretary of State the power to require registration
of a broader range of activities for specified countries, parts
of countries or foreign government-controlled entities where this
is necessary to protect the safety of interests of the UK.
Note
97. The European Commission, as part of its Defence of Democracy
package proposed a new directive on the transparency of interest
representation on behalf of third countries in December 2023,
Note and held
public consultations on a proposal which sought to harmonise requirement
in relation to economic activities of interest representation carried
out on behalf of third country entities.
Note This
proposal would enhance the already existing Transparency Register.
Note
98. Human rights standards must guide the elaboration and implementation
of transparency laws related to foreign influence in order to protect
fundamental freedoms including the freedom of expression, freedom
of association and privacy. The Council of Europe Venice Commission
has accepted that the foreign funding of associations “may give
rise to some legitimate concerns”,
Note but restrictive measures on funding must
be strictly necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim. Freedom
of association is a fundamental human right that is crucial to the
functioning of a democracy, and associations such as interest groups,
trade unions, and political parties are all crucial elements of
a democratic State.
99. The full respect of international standards in the elaboration
of transparency instruments is key to avoiding undue restrictions
on civil society and adverse effects on open, informed public debate,
pluralism and democracy. It is of the utmost importance that these
laws are drafted based on an inclusive consultation process, include
precise definitions and foresee clear obligations and proportionate
sanctions. The overall democratic, human rights and rule of law
environment and discourse are also key elements to be taken into consideration
when assessing these pieces of legislation.
100. The Assembly has recalled that non-governmental organisations
are a key component of an open and democratic society and make an
essential contribution to the development and realisation of democracy,
the rule of law and human rights. It has expressed its concern that
member States have used legislation imposing excessive reporting
and public disclosure obligations on NGOs receiving funding from
abroad, in order to stigmatise these organisations, and therefore
called on member States to comply with international legal standards
with regards to the rights to freedom of assembly, association and
expression.
Note
101. The risk of abuse of such legislation has been shown by Russia’s
“foreign agent” law, enacted in 2012 and later expanded. It has
been used as a tool of repression to curtail freedom of expression,
persecute opposition figures, and clamp down on human rights organisations.
200 organisations were registered as foreign agents between 2012
and February 2021. As of February 2022, there were still 73 organisations
on the list, the remainder having either closed down or been delisted.
The overly broad and discriminatory scope of the legal regime could
not be found to be necessary in a democratic society.
Note
7 International co-operation
102. Foreign interference often
transcends national borders, with State and non-State actors leveraging digital
platforms, financial networks and transnational alliances to disrupt
democratic processes. Collaboration is needed at international level
in order to enhance capabilities to detect, deter and respond to
foreign interference consistently, robustly and in a way that is
aligned with international standards. A number of initiatives between
like-minded States to respond to the threat have been launched that
provide a platform for this collaboration.
7.1 The European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki
103. The European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)
Note is an autonomous, network-based international
organisation promoting a whole-of-government and whole-of-society
approach to countering hybrid threats.
104. Participation in the Centre’s activities is open to all European
Union and NATO countries, and the number of Participating States
had grown to include 36 States by November 2024. Its mission is
to strengthen its Participating States’ and organisations’ security
by providing expertise and training for countering hybrid threats.
The Centre’s vision is a world in which our open, democratic societies
operate free of malign outside interference.
105. The Centre’s key task is to build its Participating States’
capabilities to prevent and counter hybrid threats. This is achieved
by sharing best practice, providing recommendations, as well as
testing new ideas and approaches. The Centre also builds the operational
capacities of the Participating States by training practitioners
and organising hands-on exercises.
106. The Hybrid CoE develops new strategic concepts and helps to
implement them through its cross-governmental, cross-sectoral networks,
which consist of over 1 500 practitioners and experts working variously in
the Participating States, the European Union and NATO, the private
sector, and academia.
7.2 NATO Centres of Excellence
107. There are two NATO-accredited
Centres of Excellence that are of relevance in combating foreign interference.
These centres are supported by groups of international experts from
military, government, academia and interest groups.
108. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD
COE) in Tallinn was established following the 2007 cyberattack against
Estonia. It is a knowledge hub which offers a unique interdisciplinary approach
to the most relevant issues in cyber defence. It conducts research,
trainings, and exercises in four core areas: technology, strategy,
operations and law.
109. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (Stratcom
COE) in Riga was established in 2014. It is a research and information
hub on the subject of strategic communications, encompassing countering
disinformation, digital security, and the methodologies of hostile
actors.
7.3 The G7
110. In the Capri communiqué of
April 2024, G7 Ministers of Foreign Affairs committed to protecting
the information environment and democratic values against any attempt
at foreign manipulation. This included strengthening public resilience
to and awareness about foreign information manipulation.
Note
111. A platform for addressing these threats, the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism (RRM) was established in the “Charlevoix Commitment on
Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats” issued by the leaders
of the G7 –
United States,
Canada,
Japan,
United
Kingdom,
France,
Germany, and
Italy – in June 2018, during their summit in
Charlevoix,
Quebec. The mandate of this mechanism is to strengthen the
co-ordination of G7 member countries “to identify and respond to
diverse and evolving foreign threats to G7 democracies, including through
sharing information and analyses, and identifying opportunities
for co-ordinated responses”.
Note It publishes an annual report
identifying challenges and trends in the area of disinformation
affecting the G7.
8 Conclusions
112. Council of Europe member States
are confronted with a deteriorating security environment in which hybrid
threats and foreign interference are increasingly significant. These
challenges extend beyond traditional security concerns and have
evolved to exploit societal vulnerabilities, undermining the values
that are fundamental to our way of life such as democracy, the rule
of law, and human rights. As a result, foreign interference represents
a direct threat not only to the democratic security of individual
member States, but also to the preservation of peace and stability.
113. Countering malicious foreign interference is an inherently
complex task for several reasons. First, foreign interference is
an evolving threat which manifests in different ways and changes
with technological advancements. The diverse range of tactics make
it a challenge to recognise and define such interference in a consistent
manner.
114. Additionally, accurately identifying and attributing interference
is difficult. Covert tactics and the use of proxy actors make it
a challenge to discern whether activities are locally driven or
orchestrated from hostile foreign actors. Domestic actors participate
in the spread of disinformation narratives either organically or
in collaboration with foreign entities, further blurring the lines
of responsibility. Measuring the true impact of such interference
is a delicate task, as the effects can be subtle, gradual, and difficult
to quantify, yet they erode public trust and social cohesion over
time.
115. Given these intricacies, effective responses must be multifaceted,
drawing on a range of measures to bolster resilience and safeguard
democratic values. Facilitating a whole-of-society response by building societal
resilience is essential, beginning with widespread digital education
and awareness campaigns that help citizens identify and counter
disinformation. Strengthening protections for fact-checkers, civil
society, and investigative journalists, who are vital in exposing
disinformation and foreign influence, is also critical.
116. In many States, there is no legislation or legal definition
of hybrid threats or disinformation, which means that there are
no specific laws or regulations in place to combat them effectively.
As a result, there is a significant gap between the nature of the
threat and the ability of governments to effectively counter it
through legal means.
Note
117. The European University Institute's Media Pluralism Monitor
2022 found that 15 of 32 countries analysed (including the European
Union's 27 member States) had some form of regulatory framework
within which to fight disinformation. However, only the frameworks
in Finland, Germany and Lithuania were deemed efficient.
Note
118. In developing policy responses to foreign interference, it
is vital that all measures taken align with established human rights
standards. While the threat posed by foreign interference is real
and pressing, it is crucial that responses do not undermine the
very principles they aim to protect. Human rights, the rule of law, and
democratic freedoms must remain at the forefront of any strategy
to counteract interference. This approach not only reinforces the
legitimacy of countermeasures, but also distinguishes democratic
responses from the covert, often repressive tactics used by hostile
actors.
119. Measures that disregard human rights risk creating a counterproductive
effect, as they may erode public trust and fuel perceptions of government
overreach. For instance, while digital monitoring or restrictions
on information channels might seem effective in the short term,
such actions must be carefully calibrated to avoid infringing on
freedom of expression, privacy, and the right to access information.
Transparent procedures, adherence to due process, and respect for
individual rights must guide any enforcement actions taken against disinformation
or destabilisation efforts.
120. By ensuring these measures are guided by human rights standards,
Council of Europe member States can foster a balanced, effective
approach that secures both national security and the democratic
rights of their citizens.
