Foreign interference a threat to democratic security in Europe
Resolution 2593
(2025)
| Provisional version
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 8 April 2025 (12th and 13th sittings) (see Doc. 16131, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy,
rapporteur: Ms Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica). Text
adopted by the Assembly on 8 April 2025 (13th sitting).See
also Recommendation 2292
(2025).
1. Intentional,
covert and manipulative interference by foreign powers, their proxies
or private actors jeopardises security, democratic values, and governance
across Europe. This foreign interference aims to undermine sovereignty,
destabilise political systems, weaken public trust, and distort
democratic processes. These orchestrated efforts continue to increase
in volume and velocity, targeting the foundations of European societies
and attempting to exploit democratic principles as systemic vulnerabilities.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly recognises foreign interference,
in its many forms, as a substantial and persistent threat to democratic
security. It condemns deliberate and systematic efforts by foreign
actors to undermine electoral and democratic processes and institutions.
3. The Assembly notes the escalation in hostile interference
originating from the Russian Federation following the beginning
of its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. This has been
underlined by the extensive efforts to spread disinformation, covertly
fund political campaigns, and buy votes in the Republic of Moldova’s
presidential election and constitutional referendum of 20 October
2024. Furthermore, the disruption of Romania’s presidential election
of 24 November 2024 due to the manipulation of digital technology
and artificial intelligence conducted from abroad highlights the
urgent need to fortify democratic processes against hostile threats
and co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour online.
4. This activity forms part of a wider pattern that has included
attempts by the Russian Federation to interfere in electoral processes
and referenda across the continent over the past decade, with evidence
of covert interference during the 2016 Brexit referendum in the
United Kingdom, the 2016 United States presidential election, the
2017 coup d’etat from Catalonian regional government leaders against
the Spanish constitutional order, the 2017 French presidential election,
the 2024 Romanian and Moldovan presidential elections, and in German
politics.
5. Social media serves as a key instrument for authoritarian
regimes to disseminate false and misleading information as part
of State policy. Among those engaged in such activities are so-called
“journalists”, “bloggers”, and “influencers” who spread covert propaganda
while being financed by Russian authorities. Presented as “independent
journalists”, and having a large audience, they systematically promote
Russian propaganda to divide European society and destabilise European
countries from the inside, to justify the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine, and to manipulate public opinion in favour of the
Russian Federation.
6. In addition to interfering in electoral processes and referenda,
the Russian Federation actively intervenes in the political and
social life of Europe through hybrid methods, including the systematic dissemination
of disinformation and propaganda. This is carried out via Russian
State-funded media such as RT and Sputnik, as well as media outlets
affiliated with or financed by the Russian Federation, alongside
co-ordinated efforts on social media platforms.
7. Another form of foreign interference involves Russian oligarchs
and influential figures who reside in Europe and use their assets
to exert political and financial pressure on member States.
8. The Assembly recognises that the Russian Federation is using
all the tools available to it to influence the foreign and domestic
policies of European countries, including through the development
of new technologies and new methods of deception, and it can use
representatives of so-called anti-war movements in information and
other special operations.
9. Democracies must defend themselves against the threat posed
by foreign interference as part of an adaptation to this increasingly
hostile international environment where the principles of sovereignty,
self-determination and democracy are under attack. The resilience
of democratic institutions is crucial in countering these dangers
and ensuring that the values of human rights, democracy and the
rule of law prevail.
10. At the same time, addressing foreign interference requires
a delicate balance. Measures to counter undue influence or to enhance
transparency must align with human rights standards, particularly
those safeguarding freedom of expression, association, assembly,
and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Overly restrictive
laws designed without adequate attention to this balance risk stifling
legitimate democratic activity and freedom of expression, chilling
civil society engagement, or being misused for political purposes.
11. The Assembly underscores that building resilient societies
with strong democratic institutions, an active and informed civil
society, and transparent governance is the most effective way to
counter foreign interference and ensure democratic security.
12. Measures to enhance the transparency in public life to combat
foreign interference must be implemented in a manner that respects
and upholds the freedoms and autonomy of civil society organisations.
While safeguarding national interests is crucial, transparency measures
should not be used as a pretext for imposing undue restrictions
on civil society actors, who play a fundamental role in fostering
democratic values, public accountability, and social cohesion.
13. The Assembly notes that the Council of Europe has a wide range
of international standards and guidelines aimed at strengthening
democratic resilience that are relevant for combating foreign interference. These
include measures to ensure transparency and accountability in public
life, international standards and guidelines for political party
funding and elections, and strategies to combat disinformation.
These tools are further strengthened by the Council of Europe Framework
Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy
and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225, “the Vilnius Convention”) which
aims to fill legal gaps that may result from rapid technological
advances.
14. The Assembly recalls that, at their 4th Summit in Reykjavik
in 2023, the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe
reiterated their commitment to countering disinformation that poses
a threat to democracy and peace, in a manner compatible with international
law and the right to freedom of expression and freedom of opinion,
as well as their commitment to take appropriate measures against
interference in electoral systems and processes.
15. The Assembly stresses the need for comprehensive and holistic
strategies to combat the use of multiform foreign interference tactics.
A whole-of-society approach that includes parliaments, governments, government
agencies, local authorities, private enterprises, journalists, civil
society and citizens is encouraged to foster societal resilience
and counter foreign interference operations.
16. In light of the threat to democratic security posed by foreign
interference, the Assembly calls on the member States of the Council
of Europe to:
16.1 integrate foreign
interference threats into national security frameworks that recognise
the interconnected nature of hostile cyber, economic, political
and information activities;
16.2 secure democratic institutions, critical infrastructure,
and electoral systems against cyber threats;
16.3 enhance co-ordination between security agencies both nationally
and internationally to detect and counter foreign interference activities;
16.4 consider updating laws and regulations to incorporate
foreign interference offences for covert conduct on behalf of foreign
actors aimed at having a manipulative effect.
17. As part of a whole-of-society approach to enhance resilience,
reinforce public trust, and safeguard institutional integrity, the
Assembly calls on member States to:
17.1 promote digital and media literacy initiatives aimed at
countering disinformation and building resilience among citizens
to empower them against manipulation;
17.2 introduce media literacy into national curricula from
an early age to develop essential critical thinking skills for exercising
judgment, evaluating the credibility of information sources, identifying
biased or misleading content, and for critically and effectively
engaging with information online;
17.3 in line with its
Resolution
2192 (2017) “Youth against corruption”, devise appropriate empowerment
strategies to raise young people’s awareness and understanding of
corruption and the ways it undermines democratic societies;
17.4 encourage and support pre-bunking and fact-checking systems,
and partnerships with independent media organisations and civil
society to counteract false narratives without undermining freedom
of expression;
17.5 intensify actions to better protect journalists, safeguard
press freedom, and to fund and promote media pluralism and independence,
including by working with the European Union and other international
stakeholders to ensure the continued funding of Radio Free Europe
/ Radio Liberty and other independent media;
17.6 in line with its
Resolution
2552 (2024) “Strengthening democracy through participatory and deliberative
processes”, foster more robust civic engagement with deliberative
technologies and participatory processes.
18. In light of the risks presented by disinformation as a strategic
foreign interference tool to distort realities, divide societies,
and weaken democracies, the Assembly:
18.1 welcomes the United Nations Global Principles for Information
Integrity as a global initiative to foster healthier and safer information
spaces, and calls for consultations with the public and with private industry
on steps that may be taken to implement them;
18.2 calls on Council of Europe member and observer States
who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy
and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225, “the Vilnius Convention”) and
ensure its implementation with due regard to the impact of artificial
intelligence technologies on the production and dissemination of
disinformation and illegal propaganda;
18.3 encourages the use of artificial intelligence as a tool
for democratic innovation, including for strengthening public participation,
improving transparency and accountability in governance, supporting fact-checking
and electoral integrity, and fostering inclusive, efficient, and
resilient public services;
18.4 calls on member States to increase expertise and technical
capabilities for combating disinformation online and to address
emerging threats posed by artificial intelligence;
18.5 calls on member States to explore the development of information
verification systems to safeguard online communities against deceptive
artificial intelligence election content;
18.6 calls on online platforms to provide clear policies on
political advertising, algorithmic amplification, and the removal
of harmful content or disinformation, while safeguarding the freedom
of expression and refraining from censorship;
18.7 considers that any measures in support of so-called anti-war
movements should be applied only in exceptional cases and to persons
who have genuine and substantiated evidence of persecution and pressure
from the Russian authorities for their true and sincere anti-war
beliefs.
19. In light of hostile actor attempts to interfere improperly
or illicitly in democratic decision-making processes, the Assembly:
19.1 reiterates its condemnation
of massive covert Russian funding of political parties and politicians in
democratic countries that attempts to interfere in their democratic
processes;
19.2 calls on member States to ensure legislative and policy
frameworks that protect against interference in electoral systems,
and to carry out comprehensive investigations into allegations of interference
in elections and referenda;
19.3 calls on member States to review and enhance national
frameworks governing financial contributions to political parties,
advertising and electoral campaigns to mitigate the risk of inappropriate or
illicit foreign financial interference;
19.4 in line with its
Resolution
2406 (2021) “Fighting corruption – General principles of political responsibility”,
calls on national governments to enhance measures for preventing
corruption and, in line with recommendations of the Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO), adopt and update codes of conduct for
all holders of public office;
19.5 encourages member States to explore measures that increase
the transparency and integrity of legitimate foreign influence activities;
19.6 encourages member States to consult at an early stage
with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
when developing public governance tools to strengthen the transparency
and integrity of foreign influence activities.
20. In light of the need for collective action to respond to the
global challenge posed by foreign interference, the Assembly:
20.1 stresses the importance of co-operation
among Council of Europe member States to address foreign interference
as a shared threat. In this regard, it advocates for closer collaboration
with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), relevant expertise of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other international organisations in developing
co-ordinated responses;
20.2 encourages support to multi-partner rapid response initiatives
to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to democracies,
including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities
for co-ordinated responses;
20.3 supports the use of targeted and co-ordinated sanctions
against individuals, entities and State actors engaged in foreign
interference including election meddling, media manipulation, illicit
funding and cyberattacks;
20.4 calls for strengthened legal avenues to hold foreign and
domestic actors accountable for facilitating interference in democratic
processes;
20.5 encourages member States to assess the feasibility of
developing a broad-based, operational, non-binding definition of
foreign interference to enhance co-ordination in countering related
threats and to strengthen clarity on legitimate influence activities
of member States;
20.6 welcomes the establishment, on its initiative, of the
Parliamentary Alliance for Free and Fair Elections as an important
step for addressing emerging challenges that threaten electoral
integrity, enhancing co-operation with national and international
partners on electoral matters, and promoting Council of Europe reference
standards in this field.
