B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Max Lucks, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. Since the outbreak of nationwide
protests on 28 December 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at
the centre of a rapidly deteriorating international and regional
environment. The subsequent escalation into armed conflict in February
2026, involving military action by Israel and the United States
of America against Iran, has further destabilised the region, with
wide-reaching global repercussions.
2. Iranian attacks against the territories of Gulf States, on
unarmed commercial shipping, and against critical civilian infrastructure
have demonstrated the widening reach of the conflict, further underscored
by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the entry of Iranian
drones and ballistic missiles into the airspace of several Council
of Europe member States.
3. The ramifications of the conflict have illustrated the extent
to which actions outside of the framework of international rules
and norms entails contributing to wider global instability, including
heightened geopolitical tensions, economic disruption and increased
uncertainty in global energy, pharmaceutical, and fertiliser markets.
4. While this conflict has significantly affected the broader
international situation, attention must be maintained on developments
within Iran itself. The situation of the Iranian population, and
in particular the plight of those militating for the respect of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, remains a matter of urgent concern
that requires sustained international scrutiny.
5. The nationwide protests that began in late December 2025,
initially driven by profound socio-economic grievances, rapidly
evolved into a mass movement expressing widespread dissatisfaction
with the political system. Demonstrations mobilised diverse segments
of society, with demands extending beyond economic reform to encompass
calls for regime change.
6. These demonstrations have been met with a level of repression
characterised by grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations.
Reports from multiple international sources indicated that the authorities have
resorted to excessive and lethal force, mass arrests, torture, and
other coercive measures in an effort to suppress dissent.
7. The internal situation saw a marked acceleration following
the imposition of a total internet, mobile and landline communications
shutdown on 8 January 2026. This was accompanied by reports that
the Iranian Supreme National Security Council instructed security
forces to carry out a decisive crackdown aimed at bringing the protests
to an end.
8. The restriction of communications has significant consequences,
both in limiting the ability of individuals to organise and express
dissent, and in obstructing the documentation and verification of
human rights violations.
9. Credible reports have estimated that the human cost of the
crackdown has been extremely high, with thousands of protesters
reportedly killed, and many more injured or arbitrarily detained.
10. The pretext of heightened security tensions in the context
of the conflict with Israel and the United States has been used
by Iranian authorities to justify further restrictions on fundamental
freedoms and the intensification of coercive measures, including
the use of capital punishment by hanging, torture and limitations on
communication, assembly and expression.
11. The tighter repression since the beginning of the conflict
is consistent with the shifts in the internal balance of power within
Iran since airstrikes killed Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei in February 2026. These airstrikes triggered elite consolidation
and a shift towards security-centric decision-making, resulting
in increased governing dominance by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.
12. These developments are consistent with a broader pattern whereby
periods of protest in Iran have been met by increased internal repression.
The convergence of mass internal unrest and external conflict has amplified
this dynamic, and demonstrates a system that silences dissent, shields
perpetrators from responsibility, and denies victims and their families
their rights to truth, justice and reparations.
2 Scope of the report
13. The Parliamentary Assembly
has strengthened its focus on the internal situation in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in response to the repression that accompanied
mass anti-government protests that began in 2022 following the death
of Jina Mahsa Amini. Those events marked a significant moment of
mobilisation within Iranian society and highlighted longstanding
structural violations of human rights standards.
14. In 2024, in its
Resolution
2570 (2024) “The situation in Iran and the protection of Iranian
human rights defenders in Council of Europe member States”, the
Assembly emphasised the importance of solidarity with the people
of Iran in the face of systematic repression.
Note In my accompanying explanatory memorandum,
I examined both the internal dynamics of repression within Iran
and the implications beyond its borders, including transnational
repression faced by Iranians living in exile in Europe and European
citizens of Iranian origin or descent who are critical of the Iranian
regime.
15. The Assembly has further stressed in its
Resolution 2642 (2026) “Political crisis in the broader Middle East: the need
to protect human rights and the rights of all minority groups” that
the rapid escalation of internal political crises in the Islamic
Republic of Iran has raised urgent questions on the protection of
human rights.
Note
16. Since the protests began in December 2025, the level and intensity
of repression in Iran have entered a phase on heightened severity.
Widespread demonstrations that called for freedom, dignity, and
democracy were met with the use of excessive and lethal force.
17. In this context, I introduced a motion for a resolution in
January 2026 to ensure that the Assembly maintains a sustained focus
on the internal human rights situation in Iran. It is essential
that the plight of individuals seeking to exercise their fundamental
rights is not overshadowed or forgotten amid wider geopolitical
developments in the region. This work looks to complement the ongoing
work of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy under the
report “Situation in the Middle East”.
18. The report will look at international responses to the heightened
repression, as well as avenues for strengthening European solidarity
with Iranian citizens while countering efforts of the Iranian authorities
to extend the reach of their repression to European soil.
19. The report further aims to contribute to a consistent, values-based
European approach, reaffirming the central importance of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, while supporting international efforts
to ensure accountability for violations and justice for victims.
20. In the preparation of this report, the committee held a hearing
with the participation of Ms Mina Khani, Board Member of Hengaw
Organization for Human Rights, and Ms Mahnaz Shirali, political
analyst, as well as with Mr Luigi Di Maio, EU Special Representative
for the Gulf region, and Mr David Khalfa, Co-director of the Observatory
for North Africa and the Middle East at the Foundation Jean-Jaurès
to exchange on the dynamics of the region.
3 Human
rights, democracy and the rule of law in Iran
21. Deliberate obstruction by the
Iranian authorities has significantly hindered independent reporting
and internation scrutiny. The Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, established by the United
Nations Human Rights Council, has been denied access throughout
its mandate. Viewed in conjunction with recurring internet shutdowns
and restrictions on communications, this has created an environment
in which a fully verified account of the scale of repression in
the country remains difficult to establish.
Note
22. Prior to the protests that began in December 2025, the human
rights situation in Iran was characterised by systemic repression
affecting a broad range of fundamental rights. These included freedom
of expression, assembly and association, limitation on political
participation, and the use of legal and judicial mechanisms to control
dissent. The absence of effective safeguards or due process in the
court system has contributed to a climate in which violations are
carried out with impunity.
23. The widespread use of the death penalty, of arbitrary detention,
the targeting of civil society actors and the application of punitive
measures, including torture and ill-treatment, against individuals
perceived as opposing the authorities are all prominent features
of this system of control. These practices have had a disproportionate
impact on ethnic and religious minorities in the country, while
groups such as women and girls have continued to face structural
discrimination and heightened vulnerability to repressive practices.
24. These longstanding gross human rights violations were further
intensified in the context of the protests that began in December
2025. The developments that followed indicate a marked escalation
both in the scale of violations and in the range of measures employed
by the authorities to suppress dissent.
3.1 December
2025 protests
25. Following a severe economic
crisis and the collapse of the Iranian rial to its lowest historical
level against the US dollar in late December 2025, pressure on merchants
to price goods led to their closure of various commercial hubs in
Tehran by shopkeepers in protest at soaring prices.
Note
26. Longstanding economic challenges of high inflation, stagnant
wages and the rising cost of living contributed to the rapid spread
of protests across the country. Within days, demonstrations were
reported in multiple provinces, reflecting the depth of public discontent.
27. This protest movement constituted the fifth nationwide protest
cycle in Iran in less than a decade. The demands of the protesters
were wide-ranging and not uniform. They included calls for economic
reforms and more political rights, while some protesters called
for fundamental political change, the end of the current regime,
and the cessation of Iranian support for armed groups in the Middle
East.
Note
28. The response of the Iranian authorities reflected methods
observed in previous cycles of unrest, but with a level of intensity
and scale that raises particularly serious concern.
29. Initial responses from the authorities combined administrative
measures, political communication and repression. Across the country,
government offices, schools, universities, banks and administrative
agencies were closed under the pretext of energy saving measures
during cold weather. Security forces utilised counterinsurgency
measures in violently dispersing demonstrations and beginning mass
arrests.
30. As the protests spread across the country, Iranian authorities
intensified this repression. Reaching its peak between 8-10 January
2026, security forces used live ammunition in shotguns, rifles and
heavy machine guns to shoot at crowds of protesters.
31. Figures to establish the scale of the repression remain difficult
to verify due to the combination of a communications blackout and
steps such as prohibiting bereaved families from organising funerals.
Note
32. Despite the difficulties in establishing precise estimates
for those killed or injured in the protests by Iranian security
forces, the preliminary investigations of the United Nations independent
international fact-finding mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran
have suggested that killing took place on a staggering scale.
Note
33. Iranian authorities acknowledge that at least 3 000 people
were killed,
Note while the Human
Rights Activists News Agency was able to confirm on 23 February
2026 the deaths of 6 488 protesters, with an additional 11 744 cases
under review and not included in confirmed totals. Separate to the
number of protesters killed, 236 children were killed by security
forces.
Note Reports have suggested
that the final death toll could be as high as 30 000.
Note
34. The magnitude of the violence was also reflected in the number
of injured civilians, with some 25 000 civilians estimated to have
been injured in the course of the suppression of the protests.
Note
35. Over 53 000 arrests were made by Iranian authorities, while
11 053 summonses were documented as a further mechanism for exerting
legal pressure beyond those formally detained.
3.2 Death
penalty
36. Prior to the December 2025
protest movement, the continued and extensive use of the death penalty remained
a matter of the most serious concern. For many years, Iran has remained
first worldwide in executions per capita. This trend continued in
2025 with at least 1 639 people executed, a 68% increase compared
to 2024, and the highest number of executions recorded in the country
since 1989.
Note
37. The continued increase in executions follows the “Woman, Life,
Freedom” protests of 2022 and has been a systematic tool by the
Iranian authorities for instilling fear and deterring further dissent,
and with many sentences passed after grossly unfair trials absent
of due process guarantees.
38. Trials are routinely marked by the denial to defendants, their
lawyers or their families access to court documents, a denial to
the right to meaningful appeal, to a choice of lawyer, while sentences
are reported to be passed on the basis of “confessions” obtained
under torture.
Note
39. The June 2025 Twelve-day war between Iran and Israel led to
the accelerated use of the death penalty and led to expedited emergency
legislation that was passed by Iran’s parliament in October 2025
that expanded the application of the death penalty further again,
automatically classifying espionage and “co-operation with a foreign
government” as offences that lead to the death penalty.
40. This trend of widening and expediting death penalty sentences
at times where Iranian national security interests were threatened
has been demonstrated following the December protest movement and
the renewal of conflict with Israel and the United States in February
2026.
41. Accelerated procedures under grossly unfair trials have been
applied to political prisoners arrested in January 2026 following
the protests. Reports suggest that at least 22 political prisoners
were executed by hanging between 17 March and 27 April 2026, with
ten of the executed prisoners those arrested following the protests.
Note Two individuals were
hanged during this period for alleged espionage-related charges,
including Kourosh Kivani, an Iranian-Swedish citizen.
3.3 Arbitrary
detention and torture
42. The effective criminalisation
of dissent in Iran has been recorded in previous waves of protest.
The renewal of this practice with the arrest of 53 000 protesters
has confirmed the astonishing scale that this method is used by
the Iranian security apparatus. These arrests have been accompanied
by allegations of torture and gender-based violence by security
forces.
43. Similar to the acceleration of the use of the death penalty
in times of conflict, the Twelve-Day war and conflict with Israel
and the United States in February 2026 have aggravated the use of
arbitrary detention and torture.
44. Since 28 February 2026, over 4 000 individuals are estimated
to have been arrested on national security related charges in Iran.
Speaking on 29 April, United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Volker Türk, called for the respect of non-derogable rights
after detainees had been forcible disappeared, tortured, or subjected
to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
Note
45. This followed co-ordinated action to suppress dissent in June
2025, with statements made by the spokesperson of the Police Command
of the Islamic Republic of Iran suggesting that 21 000 individuals
were arrested between the start of the Twelve-day war and 12 August
2025.
Note
3.4 Freedom
of assembly and association
46. The widespread repression has
sought to stifle dissent. These efforts have created particularly
intense pressure on Iranian civil society which has only intensified
in 2026.
47. Targeting a wide range of activists, journalists, lawyers,
academics, and independent organisations, as well as their families,
security and intelligence bodies conducted systematic efforts to
suppress dissent through 2025. This has included arbitrary detention,
enforced disappearance, torture, unfair trials, flogging, fines, surveillance,
harassment, interrogations, travel bans, asset freezes, property
confiscation or suspension from education or employment against
those seeking to exercise their rights to freedom of expression,
association and peaceful assembly.
Note
48. The arrests of prominent human rights defenders such as Nobel
Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi are prime examples of this.
Arrested on 12 December 2025, Ms Mohammadi has been sentenced to
seven and a half years of imprisonment for offences including “assembly
and collusion against national security”.
Note
49. Overall, a clear and concerning trend has been firmly established.
Iranian civil society is not only being controlled but systematically
fragmented, intimidated, and isolated from the international public.
Despite a continuing willingness to protest and sporadic mobilisation,
many actors are now operating under conditions that increasingly
hinder long-term engagement and intimidate new generations.
3.5 Structural
dynamics
50. This generalised repression
has been shaped and intensified by a number of structural dynamics.
These relate both to the impact of State measures on specific groups
and to the methods employed by the authorities to reinforce control
and limit accountability.
51. Ethnic and religious minorities remain particularly exposed
to repressive practices. Reports indicate that members of minority
communities, including Kurds, Baluchis, Baha’is and Christians,
have been disproportionately affected in the context of protest-related
repression and security operations. In several instances, the use
of force by State authorities has been reported to be especially
severe in regions predominantly inhabited by minority populations,
reflecting longstanding patterns of marginalisation and discrimination.
52. Women and girls continue to face systemic discrimination under
the legal and political framework of the Islamic Republic. Their
prominent role in protest movements, particularly since the “Woman,
Life, Freedom” protests of 2022, has been met with targeted forms
of repression. These have included arrests, harassment and the enforcement
of restrictive legal provisions, further limiting their participation
in public life and their enjoyment of fundamental rights. Efforts
continue to implement the “Hijab and Chastity” law, with over 97 500 public
warnings issued during Iran’s New Year in 2025 for non-compliance.
Note
53. In parallel, the suppression of dissent and the commission
of serious human rights violations have been facilitated by strict
control over communications. The imposition of a near-total internet
blackout in response to the protests has left large parts of the
population digitally isolated. While such measures hinder the ability
of individuals to organise and communicate, they also obstruct the
documentation of violations and limit independent verification by
international observers. The use of communication shutdowns as a
tool of repression has therefore contributed to the creation of
an information vacuum and reinforced impunity.
54. This widespread repression operates beyond the borders of
Iran. Iranians continue to be subjected to threats, harassment,
intimidation, assassination and other forms of repression outside
of the country. This transnational repression poses a continuing
and serious security threat to Europe. These operations conducted by
Iranian State agents and their proxies has targeted the Iranian
diaspora as well as wider targets, including in particular the Jewish
community.
Note
55. This policy of transnational repression was made clear by
the Office of the Iranian Prosecutor General in March 2026, who
released a statement to say that threatened the Iranian diaspora
with the confiscation of their property and other punishments, including
possible execution if found to have “co-operated with the enemy”,
including alleged support for Israel, the United States or other
actors hostile to the interests of Iran.
Note
4 Continued
regional destabilisation
56. As noted in the Assembly’s
Resolution 2570 (2024) on “The situation in Iran and the protection of Iranian human
rights defenders in Council of Europe member States”, Iran is both
one of the most influential stakeholders in the Middle East, and
is a major actor contributing to the destabilisation of the region.
This includes via its support to Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon,
the Houthis in Yemen, and its fierce stance against Israel and its
denial of that country’s right to exist.
57. This destabilising role has been demonstrated further in its
actions in response to the conflict with Israel and the United States.
In response to joint attacks launched by Israel and the United States
on 28 February 2026, Iran attacked States not party to the conflict
in the Gulf as well as launching attacks on unarmed commercial shipping,
and against critical civilian infrastructure.
58. It has also been shown by the persistent cross-border operations
carried out against the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with over 695
Iranian drone and missile attacks on the bases of Kurdish opposition
groups between 28 February and 29 April 2026.
Note In addition to military
strikes, Iran also uses indirect channels of influence through proxy
militias in Iraq to exert pressure on the Kurdish Regional Government,
placing a lasting strain on the security situation in the border
region.
59. Beyond the immediate region, the security risks posed by Iran
have also been underlined by abetting Russia in its war of aggression
against Ukraine via the provision of drones, missiles and ammunition,
by its hybrid threats and malign cyber activities in Europe, and
in its support that had been provided to the Venezuelan dictatorship.
5 International
engagement and the place of human rights in negotiations
60. The outbreak of the conflict
on 28 February 2026 has added a further layer of complexity to the
situation. While the military objectives of the parties to the conflict
fall outside the scope of this report, the consequences for the
civilian population are significant. The combined effects of State
repression followed by conflict have further deteriorated living
conditions, including through damage to critical infrastructure
and essential services. This has accelerated internal displacement,
and has cascading impacts on health, education, and economic participation.
61. Attempts to consolidate internal control during the conflict
has seen Iranian authorities resort to the wider use of coercive
means, further restricting civic space and undermining fundamental
rights.
62. The diplomatic efforts to draw an end to the conflict have
included within the framework of the Pakistan-mediated Islamabad
Talks of 11-12 April. The focus of these negotiations has been dominated
by the pressing security concerns on issues related to nuclear activity,
regional security and conflict de-escalation, including sanctions,
maritime security and the regional situation.
63. In this context, the place accorded to human rights and democracy
in Iran has remained limited. While concerns related to the human
rights situation in Iran have been raised by a number of participating
actors, they do not constitute a central component of the negotiation
framework.
64. The separation of security considerations from human rights
risks overlooking the interdependence between peace, stability and
the protection of fundamental rights. As repeatedly affirmed by
the Assembly, lasting security cannot be achieved in the absence
of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Conversely,
the systematic violation of these principles constitutes, in itself,
a source of instability.
65. Ensuring that human rights considerations are meaningfully
integrated into international engagement with Iran is therefore
not only a normative imperative, but also a necessary condition
for sustainable peace and security.
6 Call
for action
66. The gross human rights violations
and continuing crisis in Iran has had a devastating impact upon
Iranian citizens. There are three main avenues for engagement that
Council of Europe member States should consider for supporting a
democratic future for the people of Iran.
6.1 Solidarity
with the people of Iran
67. The situation of the population
in Iran requires sustained and increased international attention.
Despite recurring protest movements, severe repression and persistent
human rights violations, public and political attention in many
European States has remained uneven and reactive. This limited visibility
risks further exacerbating the imbalance between State authorities
and civil society actors in Iran.
68. A key element of any effective international approach lies
in the strengthening of independent documentation and accountability
mechanisms. Continued support for initiatives within the United
Nations Human Rights Council, including investigative and evidence-preservation
mandates, remains essential to ensure that violations are properly
recorded and may, in due course, give rise to accountability.
69. At the same time, greater attention should be given to the
protection of individuals at risk, in particular human rights defenders,
journalists and civil society actors. Ensuring access to protection
mechanisms, including safe pathways and support structures for those
forced to leave the country, is an important component of a broader
response.
70. The ability of civil society actors in Iran to communicate
and organise remains a critical issue. Restrictions on digital access,
including internet shutdowns and surveillance, significantly limit
the exercise of fundamental rights. In this context, efforts aimed
at supporting secure access to information and communication tools
are of particular importance.
71. More broadly, the development of sustained links between European
and Iranian civil society actors, including through academic, cultural
and professional exchanges, may contribute to strengthening resilience and
fostering longer-term engagement.
72. Finally, it is important that human rights considerations
are not treated as secondary to short-term security or geopolitical
concerns. As reflected in the principle of democratic security,
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law constitute
an essential component of sustainable peace and stability and should therefore
remain central to international engagement with Iran.
6.2 Supporting
Iranian democratic voices
73. It should be up to the people
of Iran to determine their future. The targeting of protesters,
human rights activists, political dissidents, minority communities
and women through brutal repression aims to crush dissent both within
Iran and beyond its border.
74. In this context, ensuring that such voices are not silenced
remains an important consideration for Council of Europe member
States The perspectives of those directly affected by repression,
including individuals in exile, can contribute to a more sustained
and informed engagement with the situation in Iran.
75. In this regard, consideration may be given to facilitating
dialogue with representatives of Iranian civil society and democratic
opposition, as well as to exploring avenues for supporting their
activities, including through technical and institutional co-operation.
Governments should actively promote civil society networks between
Iran and Europe, which could include scholarship programmes, exchange
initiatives, cultural co-operation and support for independent media
projects.
76. The Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly have
extensive experience in supporting democratic development and transition
processes. This includes the promotion of legal standards, institutional co-operation
and the strengthening of frameworks based on human rights, democracy
and the rule of law.
77. Such experience may provide a useful reference point in supporting
the aspirations of Iranian citizens, particularly in relation to
the development of inclusive, rights-based and democratic processes.
78. As a platform for dialogue, the Parliamentary Assembly may
also contribute by providing opportunities for exchange among the
representatives of Iranian civil society and democratic actors,
thereby helping to sustain engagement beyond periods of crisis.
79. The institutional expertise of the Council of Europe can and
should serve democratic aspirations of Iranian citizens as they
seek to pave the way for just, inclusive and democratic processes
that bring freedom and dignity to all Iranian citizens.
6.3 Ensuring
the safety of the Iranian diaspora in Europe
80. Activities linked to the Iranian
authorities have raised serious concerns regarding security within
Europe, including incidents involving intimidation, surveillance
and violence targeting Iranian dissidents and other individuals
perceived as critical of the regime. Such incidents, together with
threats against certain communities and institutions, point to a
pattern of transnational repression rather than isolated events.
81. These actions require an urgent and decisive approach. Continued
transnational threats have underlined the importance of effective
co-operation among Council of Europe member States in addressing security
challenges. Enhanced information-sharing and co-ordination between
relevant authorities may contribute to the identification and disruption
of networks and activities associated with such forms of repression.
82. Particular attention should be given to the protection of
individuals at risk, including members of the Iranian diaspora,
journalists, human rights defenders and others engaged in public
or political activity. Ensuring that such individuals can exercise
their rights safely within Europe remains an important consideration.
83. European States must take the threat to Jewish and Iranian
diaspora political institutions seriously as a related security
issue. Synagogues, media outlets, and meeting places of diaspora
groups require enhanced protection and closely co-ordinated security
measures by police and intelligence services.
84. Legal frameworks available within member States, including
those allowing for the prosecution of serious crimes under international
law, may also play a role in addressing impunity. The principle
of universal jurisdiction should be used to contribute to reinforcing
accountability and deterrence.
85. More broadly, security in Europe and human rights violations
in Iran are not separate policy areas. Addressing human rights globally
and protecting democratic space within Europe are mutually reinforcing objectives.
7 Conclusion
86. The developments examined in
this report highlight the gravity and persistence of gross human
rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as their
broader implications for regional stability and for Europe. The
people of Iran are the key to a secure world, a secure Middle East,
and a secure Europe.
87. In this context, the importance of a coherent and values-based
approach among member States becomes evident. Ensuring that human
rights, democracy and the rule of law remain central to engagement with
Iran is consistent with the principle of democratic security, which
underlines the interdependence between the protection of fundamental
rights and lasting stability.
88. Sustained engagement with Iranian civil society, with democratic
opposition, human rights defenders and activists is key for solidarity,
as well as for the preparation of a democratic future for Iran.
89. This highlights the need for strategic foresight. The Council
of Europe should develop a structured platform for Iran’s future
that is not limited to current government structures but explicitly
includes Iranian civil society and exile communities. The goal would
not be direct intervention, but rather the preparation of institutional
and legal foundations for potential transformation processes.
90. This structured platform for dialogue would give visibility
to Iranian voices without reducing them to moments of crisis. The
Council of Europe could thus become a place where scenarios for
political transformation are considered over the long term.
