C Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Constantinos Efstathiou, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. In 2006, a former Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) officer and defector, Alexander Litvinenko, was
poisoned with polonium in London and subsequently died. In its judgment
in the case of
Carter v. Russia,
Note the
European Court of Human Rights found that the Russian Federation
was responsible for his death. This is perhaps the best-known example
of transnational repression together with the assassination of Saudi
dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered and dismembered
by Saudi agents inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, in October 2018.
Note Unfortunately, there are many more
similar examples. Extraterritorial persecution of political opponents,
dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders has become a
routine tactic for authoritarian regimes. Their methods have also
become increasingly sophisticated. While “classic” transnational
repression methods – that is, those involving the threat or use
of violence – still remain prevalent, authoritarian States continue
to find new ways to spread fear and repress their critics, typically
through the misuse of lawful international co-operation tools.
2. The present report is not intended to be an exhaustive documentation
of all instances or forms of transnational repression. Although
some cases described herein concern particular individuals or States,
my main goal is to identify trends, key legislative and policy gaps,
as well as best practices in countering transnational repression,
building upon the Assembly’s past work on this subject, namely
Resolution 2509 (2023). I believe that democratic States should work more closely
with one another in responding to transnational repression, including
through co-ordinated actions at both the bilateral and multilateral
levels.
3. During the preparation of this report, the committee held
a hearing with the participation of experts: Mr Alex Tinsley, a
barrister at Doughty Street Chambers and member of Lawyers Against
Transnational Repression; Mr Stephen Reimer, Associate Fellow at
the Royal United Services Institute and Adjunct Professor at the
Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po Paris; and Dr
Shaipira Furstenberg, an independent consultant. I am grateful for
their valuable contributions.
4. I also conducted two fact-finding visits. In March 2026, I
visited INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon, France, where I had the pleasure
of meeting with the Notices and Diffusions Task Force and the Secretariat
of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files. It was a
highly productive meeting, conducted in the spirit of mutual understanding,
which enabled me to learn more about the factors that allow some
States to attempt to misuse the INTERPOL system. In May 2026, I
visited Washington, D.C., where I discussed possible responses to
transnational repression with representatives of the US Department
of State, the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, the National
Endowment for Democracy, the Free Russia Foundation, and Freedom
House. I am grateful to the Government of the United States of America
for its invitation and assistance. I also recommend excellent recent
reports published by the New Lines Institute
Note and Freedom House,
Note which inspired many of my proposals
and constitute a valuable resource for creating policy responses to
transnational repression.
2 Recent practices and cases of transnational
repression in Europe
5. As of April 2026, Freedom House,
a renowned American non-governmental organisation focusing on the promotion
of democracy, political freedom, and human rights, reported 1,375 cases
of transnational repression perpetrated since 2014, by 54 governments
in 107 States.
Note According to Freedom House, the
most prolific perpetrator of transnational repression is the Government
of China, followed by Türkiye, Russia, Tajikistan, Egypt and Turkmenistan.
This latest data demonstrates a significant increase in cases compared
to April 2023, when Freedom House reported 854 cases.
Note In the following chapters I will
present some recent examples of transnational repression.
2.1 The
power of fear – transnational repression through harassment and
the threat or use of violence
2.1.1 The
Russian Federation
6. In Chechnya (Russian Federation),
there is a long-standing record of violent repression, often resorting to
collective punishment, torture and targeting of the families of
perceived opponents of Ramzan Kadyrov.
7. In December 2021, some fifty relatives of activists and human
rights defenders living abroad, including those of Tumsu Abdurakhmanov,
an opposition blogger residing in Sweden, were abducted in Chechnya.
Note On 23 December 2021, Mr Abdurakhmanov
published a screenshot of an anonymous message threatening violence
against his kidnapped family members unless he apologised to Ramzan
Kadyrov and stopped publicly criticising the Chechen regime. The
message was sent from a WhatsApp account with a profile picture
of a young man in a black uniform bearing a SOBR (Chechnya’s Special
Rapid Response Unit) patch, standing in front of a poster of Akhmat
Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov's father.
Note
8. Khasan Khalitov, another Chechen human rights defender based
in Türkiye, informed that his relatives, including his sister and
brother-in-law, were also abducted around the same time as those
of Mr Abdurakhmanov.
Note In June 2023, his father and two
brothers were arbitrarily detained and reportedly disappeared by
the Chechen authorities.
Note These abductions align with a persistent
pattern of collective punishment, in which the Chechen leadership
targets entire families, including distant relatives, to punish dissent
of a single person.
9. In January 2022, Zarema Musayeva, wife of a former Chechen
Supreme Court judge and mother of a prominent lawyer associated
with the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (an NGO which has
recently been renamed the Crew Against Torture), Abubakar Yangulbaev,
was forcibly removed from her home in Nizhniy Novgorod by a group
of police officers – claiming to be from Chechnya – and taken 2,000 km
away to Grozny. High-ranking Chechen officials, including Mr Kadyrov,
had publicly threatened Ms Musayeva and her family, proposing to
"hunt them down" and "cut their heads off". In a recent judgment,
the European Court of Human Rights held that Ms Musayeva's arrest
and detention had been arbitrary and intended as retaliation against
her family, who were involved in human rights work and opposition
activities in Chechnya. Consequently, the Court found that the Russian
Federation had violated Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
Note While
this case technically occurred within the Russian Federation, the
involvement of local Chechen officials travelling far beyond the
boundaries of Chechnya justifies, in my view, its inclusion in this
report.
10. On 13 February 2024, Maxim Kuzminov, a Russian military pilot
who in 2023 escaped to Ukraine in a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, delivering
the aircraft and sensitive military equipment to Ukrainian forces,
was found dead in Villajoyosa, Spain. Following his defection, Mr Kuzminov
became a vocal critic of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
stating that he opposed the war and did not want to be complicit
in what he described as a genocide against the Ukrainian people.
Note His body was discovered in a parking
garage, bearing multiple gunshot wounds. Spanish intelligence services
believed Mr Kuzminov's assassination to be a targeted killing ordered
by Russian intelligence.
Note
11. In March 2024, Leonid Volkov, a key aide to the late Russian
opposition leader Alexei Navalny, was attacked with a hammer outside
his home in Vilnius. Mr Volkov was briefly hospitalised for a broken
arm and trauma to his head. Throughout 2024, eight suspects were
identified by Polish prosecutors, including six Poles, one Belarusian
and one Russian. The latter is believed to be the attack's mastermind,
which investigators believed was motivated by Mr Volkov's opposition
work.
Note
12. Russian indigenous activists are also subjected to transnational
repression. Pavel Sulyandziga, a member of the Udege people, obtained
political asylum in the United States in 2017 due to threats and persecution
by the Russian FSB. Despite relocating to Maine with his family,
the Russian Government continues to harass him through pressing
criminal charges and targeting his remaining family members in Russia.
13. In 2023, Natalia Arno, President of the Free Russia Foundation
and currently a member of the Assembly’s Platform for Dialogue with
Russian Democratic Forces, was poisoned while on a trip to Berlin
and Prague, presumably by Russian intelligence services using a
nerve agent similar to that previously used against another Russian
dissident and former political prisoner, Vladimir Kara-Murza.
Note
14. On 3 March 2025, the Russian Prosecutor General decided to
label ALDE, one of five political groups in the Assembly, as an
“undesirable” organisation.
Note Russian citizens who participate
in the activities of an “undesirable” organisation face fines and
potential imprisonment of up to six years. Even sharing hyperlinks
or co-operating with such organisations can lead to legal consequences.
Note
2.1.2 Belarus
15. The Belarusian regime also
employs various measures, both within Belarus and extraterritorially,
to pressure, intimidate, and repress exiled dissidents. These tactics
include actions targeting the families, loved ones, and business
partners of those who have left and include opening criminal investigations,
holding trials in absentia, expropriating property in Belarus and
expelling some released political prisoners without any documents.
On 31 January 2022, the police detained Anatol Latushka, a cousin
of a prominent opposition figure in exile and member of the delegation
of Democratic Belarusian Forces, Pavel Latushka, and reportedly tortured
him to extract information. Anatol Latushka was later sentenced
to six years in prison on politically motivated charges. Similarly,
relatives of Belarusian volunteers supporting Ukraine in its defence
against Russian aggression faced imprisonment on trumped-up charges.
Note
16. Belarusian authorities have a history of publicly threatening
activists abroad with passport cancellations, arrests, kidnappings,
and forced repatriation. In 2021, Aleh Haidukevich, Deputy Chairman
of the Standing Committee on International Affairs in the House
of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus, stated that
dissidents could be detained in other countries and returned to
Belarus “in the trunk”.
Note On 25 April 2024, at the National Assembly
of Belarus, Lukashenko warned that those opposing the regime could
endanger their relatives in Belarus, escalating fear among critics
in exile.
Note
17. The Lukashenko regime has also intensified its use of surveillance
technology to monitor and punish dissenters abroad. Reports indicate
that emigrants began receiving electronic messages from security
forces in April 2024, with officers extracting information from
private chats. One such message came from a Telegram account linked
to the General Directorate for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption
(GUBOPiK), warning a dissident to remove comments from chat rooms
if he intended to return. Another individual reported receiving threats
about potential harm in exile, illustrating the regime's willingness
to extend its reach beyond Belarusian borders.
Note
2.1.3 China
18. There are also disturbing reports
of intimidation and surveillance by the Chinese authorities of Chinese students
studying in Europe and the US. Amnesty International found that
the Chinese authorities created a climate of fear which has had
a chilling effect on the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression,
association and peaceful assembly. This has been done by harassing
Chinese students abroad or their family members in China, taking
photographs of the students at protests abroad or tracking their
social media activities.
NoteNoteNote
19. In February 2024, the Swiss Government adopted a report on
the situation of Tibetans and Uyghurs living in Switzerland, also
addressing the issue of transnational repression. Tibetan and Uyghur
activists encounter malware infections, hacking attempts, blocked
social media accounts and disrupted websites aimed at obtaining
personal data and hindering their activities. Individuals report
being followed, photographed, and monitored during political gatherings
and everyday activities such as visiting cafes or shops. Attempts
to recruit diaspora members as informants are made through threats
to their families in China or promises of economic benefits if they
co-operate. Activists receive intimidating phone calls, often at
unusual hours, along with messages showing images of injured people
to scare them into ceasing their criticism of the Chinese Government.
Political activities can lead to visa denials, with the Chinese
authorities potentially requiring co-operation and spying as conditions
for issuing a visa. Pressure is applied on families in China through
threats of arrest, house searches, and other forms of harassment
if family members abroad engage in political activities. An incident
in Basel involved Chinese diplomats forcefully disrupting a Tibetan
protest, with physical confrontations reported. The government noted
that both federal technical universities (ETH Zurich and EPFL) are
aware that foreign intelligence services are monitoring certain
students and researchers.
Note
20. The so-called Chinese “informal police stations” also deserve
mention as possible conduits for carrying out acts of transnational
repression. In 2022, Dutch media obtained evidence indicating that
the “overseas service stations”, which promise to provide diplomatic
services to Chinese travellers, are being used to repress Chinese
dissidents in Europe. According to the Spain-based NGO Safeguard
Defenders, the public security bureaus from two Chinese provinces
had established 54 “overseas police service centres” across five continents
and 21 countries, including in Europe.
Note According to Safeguard Defenders,
tackling transnational crime and providing assistance to Chinese
citizens abroad serve as a cover to threaten critics of the Chinese Government
and coerce them into returning to China.
21. In October 2022, a violent altercation broke out during a
pro-democracy protest outside the Chinese Consulate in Manchester,
United Kingdom. Video footage captured several men from the consulate
tearing down banners before dragging a peaceful protester, Bob Chan,
inside the gates and assaulting him. The Chinese Consul-General,
Zheng Xiyuan, later admitted on camera to being involved, claiming
it was his "duty" to respond to insults against his country's leader.
The incident sparked a diplomatic dispute, leading the UK Government
to demand that the officials involved have their immunity lifted
for police questioning. Instead of complying, the Chinese Government
recalled six diplomats, including the Consul-General, effectively
removing them from the country and thus avoiding criminal prosecution.
Note
22. On 7 May 2026, a court in London convicted two men, including
a UK immigration officer, of spying on behalf of China, targeting
prominent Hong Kong’s pro-democracy dissidents living in Britain.
Note
2.1.4 Iran
23. Since the Islamic revolution
of 1979, the Ayatollah regime has carried out multiple deadly attacks
beyond its borders, continuing in a more systematic and more extensive
way the “legacy of terror” once perfected by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret
police. One recent example was the 2024 stabbing of journalist Pouria
Zeraati outside his home in London. Mr Zeraati, a presenter for
the Persian-language news channel Iran International, survived the
attack, but investigators later characterised the stabbing as a
"warning shot" from the regime intended to silence critical media
coverage. Following the assault, the suspects fled the country within
hours, and the ongoing threat to his life eventually forced Mr Zeraati
to leave the United Kingdom entirely.
Note This incident followed several warnings
from UK intelligence services about credible plots by Iran to kidnap
or kill individuals deemed enemies of the State residing in London.
24. Across the Atlantic, the United States has disrupted multiple
high-profile plots targeting Iranian American journalist Masih Alinejad
at her home in Brooklyn. In 2021, federal prosecutors unsealed an
indictment revealing a complex Iranian intelligence scheme to kidnap
Ms Alinejad via the New York waterfront and forcibly rendition her
to Iran by boat. When that plan was foiled, the efforts shifted
toward an assassination plot in 2022 involving a hired gunman who
was arrested outside her residence with a loaded assault rifle.
Several individuals involved in the plots were recently sentenced
to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.
Note
2.1.5 Türkiye
25. In 2021, Orhan İnandı, the
founder and director of the Sapat school network in Kyrgyzstan,
was abducted by the Turkish MİT (
Milli
İstihbarat Teşkilatı – the National Intelligence Organisation
of Türkiye) in Kyrgyzstan and unlawfully renditioned to Türkiye,
where he faced terrorism-related charges owing to his alleged ties
to the “Gülen movement”. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
had acknowledged in a statement that Mr İnandı was indeed abducted
by MİT, lauding the agency’s efforts in the rendition.
Note In 2023, Mr İnandı was sentenced
to 21 years’ imprisonment for "establishing an armed terrorist group".
Note His wife claimed that her husband
had been tortured in Turkish custody and deprived of access to adequate
medical treatment.
Note
26. In 2021, Erk Acarer, a Turkish journalist living in Germany,
was attacked with a knife outside his Berlin home by three men.
The assault occurred late in the evening in his apartment courtyard,
resulting in head swelling that required hospitalisation. Mr Acarer,
a columnist for Türkiye's independent BirGün newspaper, linked the
attack to his criticism of the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) and its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). German
police confirmed the attack, stating that it could be related to
Mr Acarer’s journalism. In a video, he recounted that one attacker
warned him that he should stop his criticism of Türkiye’s government.
Note
27. On 21 March 2022, the Committee to Protect Journalists called
for a thorough investigation by the Swedish authorities into the
attack on Ahmet Dönmez – a Turkish journalist. He was assaulted
two days earlier by unknown perpetrators after his car was hit from
behind. He sustained head trauma and was hospitalised. Mr Dönmez,
who covers Turkish politics and reports on allegations of corruption,
was targeted while driving home with his young daughter. He moved
to Sweden in 2015 due to "political pressure" in Türkiye. Since
then, the Turkish authorities accused his former media outlet (Zeman)
of ties to the “Gülen movement”.
Note
28. A leaked Turkish Government document, dated 18 January 2024,
revealed that Turkish intelligence services, operating from the
embassy in Stockholm, have been spying on journalists in Sweden,
including those of Turkish origin and enjoying political asylum.
The alleged surveillance operation, reportedly supervised by the
Turkish ambassador, involved collaboration between multiple intelligence
agencies. The intelligence collected was shared with Turkish authorities,
including MİT and the Security General Directorate, in an apparent
attempt to suppress independent journalism. The European Federation
of Journalists condemned these actions, calling them a threat to
press freedom and freedom of expression.
Note
29. In July 2025, two Turkmen dissident bloggers, Alisher Sakhatov
and Abdulla Orusov, went missing after being released from a Turkish
detention centre, raising suspicions that they had been unlawfully
deported to Turkmenistan or subjected to enforced disappearance.
Note
2.1.6 Azerbaijan
30. In December 2023, Azerbaijani
journalist Elmaddin Shamilzade was reportedly harassed by three
men at a bar in Tbilisi. One man threatened him with a knife and
asked questions about Azerbaijan. Mr Shamilzade, who is the editor-in-chief
of an independent media outlet Avasor TV, believed that his attackers
acted at the behest of the Azerbaijani Government and were sending
a warning that he could be tracked down even abroad.
Note
31. On 18 February 2026, Emin Huseynov, an independent Azerbaijani
journalist, stated that he had been followed by unknown persons
in Geneva, Switzerland, after asking a question about crackdown
on political opponents and independent media in Azerbaijan to President
Ilham Aliyev during the Munich Security Conference in Germany.
2.2 Under
the guise of justice – weaponising legitimate tools to punish dissent
32. In its
Resolution 2509 (2023), the Assembly already expressed its concern that INTERPOL
Red Notices, extradition proceedings, and other forms of interstate
legal assistance, such as anti-money laundering and anti-terror
financing measures, were being misused to carry out transnational
repression. It appears that very little progress has been made in
preventing such abuses.
33. It appears that the INTERPOL system continues to be misused
to punish activists for their work. An example of its misuse might
be the case of an environmental activist, Paul Watson, a devoted
anti-whaling activist. Mr Watson was arrested on 21 July 2024 in
Nuuk, Greenland, based on an INTERPOL Red Notice issued by Japan,
which was seeking his extradition on charges relating to the alleged
boarding of a Japanese whaling ship Shōnan Maru 2 in the Southern
Ocean in February 2010. The charges, including one of assault, carried
a sentence of up to 15 years’ imprisonment. In December 2024, the
Danish Government decided not to extradite Mr Watson, who was then
released from custody.
Note
34. In 2024, the Assembly also considered the case of Julian Assange,
whose legal battle against a possible extradition to the United
States lasted for more than a decade. In its
Resolution 2571 (2024), the Assembly observed that Mr Assange's prosecution
in the United States and the resulting detention in the United Kingdom with
a view to extradition were a form of punishment for engaging in
activities that journalists perform on a daily basis. It further
noted that the disproportionately severe charges brought by the
United States against Julian Assange under the Espionage Act, exposing
him to a risk of de facto life imprisonment, combined with his conviction
and sentencing under the Espionage Act for what was, in essence,
news gathering and publishing, warranted the designation of Mr Assange
as a political prisoner, within the meaning of
Resolution 1900 (2012).
35. A blue notice (an alert seeking information on someone) was
used in 2019 by the Russian Federation to alert the American immigration
authorities about a Russian dissident, Vitaly Bogomazov, who was
living in Florida. Immigration officials arrested him for overstaying
his visa. Mr Bogomazov was awaiting a decision on his asylum application,
claiming that he would face risks in Russia because he had a company
that published a newspaper critical of Vladimir Putin and Russia's
war on Ukraine. The blue notice claimed he was wanted for the assault
and homicide of a man who, according to Russian court records, was
still alive. Mr Bogomazov was awaiting a decision on whether he
could be deported to Russia.
Note
36. On 30 October 2023, Andriy Hniot, a Belarusian filmmaker,
was arrested at Belgrade airport upon arrival from Bangkok based
on an INTERPOL Red Notice issued at Belarus' request for alleged
tax evasion. Mr Hniot gained international prominence for his involvement
in documenting the 2020 protests against Mr Lukashenko's forged
re-election. Initially, a Serbian court ruled in favour of extradition,
but an appeals court later overturned this decision, citing procedural
violations and remitting his case for re-examination.
Note After spending a year in detention,
on 31 October 2024, Mr Hniot was released by Serbian authorities,
as detention with a view to extradition cannot exceed one year under
Serbian law, and promptly departed the country.
Note
37. Belarus and Russia have a close relationship in the area of
extradition, with over 80% of requests being granted. Those Belarusians
who fled to Russia after participating in protests against the falsified
elections of 2020 were promptly deported back to Belarus despite
their well-founded fears of potential torture upon their return.
Media reports and human rights activists indicate that in 2021,
Russian authorities detained and extradited approximately 20 protesters
to Minsk, where they faced the risk of unfair trials and probable
torture. This occurred despite interim measures prohibiting their
removal being issued by the European Court of Human Rights. Despite
the clearly trumped-up nature of charges pressed by the Belarusian
authorities, the Russian judicial authorities proceeded with the
"forced expulsion" of opposition figures to Belarus, citing violations
of registration requirements.
NoteNote
38. In April 2024, a delegation from Belarus' Criminal Investigation
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs visited Kazakhstan.
During this visit, they discussed exchanging information about wanted
individuals, the procedures for processing requests, and the mechanisms
for implementing these actions.
Note The number of requests for international
legal assistance from Belarus to Kazakhstan has significantly increased,
from 65 in 2021 to 1,080 in 2024, possibly exposing dissidents from
both States under the guise of prosecuting criminal activity.
Note
39. In recent years, Kazakhstan has heavily relied on the case
of BTA Bank to conduct surveillance, harassment, and defamation
campaigns against dissidents in Europe.
Note The case involves allegations of embezzlement
and money laundering during Mukhtar Ablyazov's tenure as the bank's
chairman from 2005 to 2009. Mr Ablyazov, a vocal critic of the Kazakh
Government, is accused of embezzling approximately USD 6 billion
from the bank, leading to its nationalisation in 2009. Mr Ablyazov
claims that the charges are politically motivated, aimed at silencing
him as an opposition figure.
Note Kazakhstan used this case to harass government's
critics, under the guise of mutual legal assistance agreements.
It has also initiated civil and criminal proceedings in multiple
countries, including the United Kingdom, United States, Ukraine,
and Russia, often using BTA Bank as a purported victim to justify
these actions. Kazakhstan has also sought extradition of individuals
linked to Mr Ablyazov, claiming they are involved in financial crimes.
At the same time, critics argue these efforts are politically driven
and aimed at silencing critics.
40. The case of Botagoz Jardemalie seems to perfectly illustrate
the interplay of various forms of transnational repression used
by Kazakhstan. Ms Jardemalie, a Kazakh human rights lawyer who defended opposition
members and activists, fled Kazakhstan and was granted political
asylum in Belgium in 2013. The same year, at the request of Kazakhstan,
INTERPOL published a Red Notice targeting Ms Jardemalie for arrest
on criminal charges. However, the Red Notice was later cancelled
for non-compliance with INTERPOL rules against political abuses.
In 2014-2015, she was illegally surveilled by a Russian citizen
and two former East German Stasi agents, who were sentenced by a
Belgian court in 2019 to imprisonment for their actions. According
to the criminal case, the men searched for information about her
contacts and travels and tried to bribe Ms Jardemalie's lawyer in
Brussels to access her documents and obtain her residence address.
Note The federal prosecutor suspected
that they were planning to forcibly return her to Kazakhstan, as
their activities succeeded a failed attempt by Kazakhstan to have
her extradited. In 2017, Ms Jardemalie’s brother, Iskander Yerimbetov,
was detained on seemingly arbitrary charges. The UN Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention, in its opinion No. 67/2018, considered his
detention to be arbitrary and aimed at forcing Ms Jardemalie to
return to Kazakhstan.
Note
41. Despite all these concerning developments, in 2019, Belgium
granted a mutual legal assistance request issued by Kazakhstan in
a criminal case involving money laundering allegations against Ms Jardemalie
and her brother. This allowed Belgian police, accompanied by two
unidentified Kazakh officers, to search through her apartment and
access sensitive documents.
Note The Belgian Constitutional Court
granted Ms Jardemalie the right to challenge the legality of mutual
legal assistance provided to Kazakhstan and to access the case file. Although
the Belgian authorities had given assurances that co-operation with
Kazakhstan would be suspended while her case was pending, Kazakhstan
reportedly received a copy of the documents used to execute the Kazakh
request and was invited to participate in the proceedings by a Belgian
prosecutor.
NoteNote Fair Trials, a reputed NGO, expressed
its concern that Belgium allowed its judicial system to be misused
to repress a Kazakh political dissident.
Note
42. Sadly, the case of Ms Jardemalie is not the only example of
Kazakhstan misusing the mutual legal assistance framework for the
purpose of persecuting the opponents of its government. In fact,
in 2022, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment
in the case of
Shorazova v. Malta,
which concerned the freezing of the applicant’s assets pursuant
to a mutual legal assistance request by Kazakhstan. The Court found
a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and
held that Ms Shorazova was deprived of relevant procedural safeguards
against an arbitrary or disproportionate interference. Importantly,
it also held that the applicant’s deceased husband was an established
political adversary to the Kazakh regime and could have been the
subject of reprisals on their part, including trumped up charges
which could have extended to the applicant. The Court further expressed
doubts as to whether fighting crime was the general interest at
stake in this case.
Note
43. In early 2026, Kazakhstan deported several Russian anti-war
activists. Alexander Kachkurkin, an IT specialist accused of treason,
was handed over to Russian security forces in February after being
detained on seemingly fabricated misdemeanour charges. During the
same period, Kazakh authorities approved the extradition of several
high-profile figures, including anti-war activist Yulia Yemelyanova
and military deserter Semyon Bazhukov, often while their asylum
applications or legal appeals were still technically pending. These incidents
seemed to mark an end to Kazakhstan’s status as a relatively safe
haven for those fleeing mobilisation and political persecution,
as the government has begun prioritising its bilateral security
obligations over international human rights norms. This sudden policy
reversal has left thousands of Russian exiles in the region vulnerable
to State-sponsored kidnapping and forced return, reflecting a broader
trend of narrowing sanctuary for the Kremlin’s opponents across
Central Asia.
Note
44. Sir William Browder’s grim experience, as presented in his
brilliant books “Red Notice” and “Freezing Order”, sheds light on
the misuse of the Red Notice framework by the Russian authorities,
seemingly under the guise of justice. Unfortunately, such practices
are not limited to the Russian Federation. Many other States make
use of issuing a large number of extradition requests (often unjustified)
to punish political opponents.
45. I am also concerned by the increasing trend of misusing anti-corruption
measures as a method of transnational repression. In 2025, I twice
attended the in absentia trial
in Kyiv of a former Ukrainian Member of Parliament, now living in
the United Kingdom and facing extradition to Ukraine on corruption
charges. I regret to say that the judicial proceedings against him
in Ukraine raise serious concerns regarding the impartiality of the
judges and the authenticity of the charges.
46. Another troubling example of weaponising legitimate tools
to punish dissent is the misuse of anti-money laundering measures.
Authoritarian governments can exploit AML regulations to target
political opponents by filing false reports, leading financial institutions
to flag these individuals as suspicious. The secretive nature of AML
procedures and the “no tipping” rule can make it difficult for dissidents
to understand why they are being targeted or to challenge false
accusations. The “no tipping” rule restricts financial institutions
from disclosing information about suspicious activity reports (SARs)
or similar filings. Being flagged as high-risk can lead to financial
exclusion, making it difficult for dissidents to access financial
services necessary for their basic subsistence and legal defence.
47. In December 2021, Ismail Sezgin, the director of the Centre
for Hizmet Studies in London, was blacklisted as a terrorist financier
by Türkiye for his alleged membership in what the Turkish authorities
call the “Fethullah Terrorist Organisation” (FETÖ/PDY”), commonly
known as the “Gülen movement”, a designation he denies. In consequence,
his name was automatically added to World-Check (now LSEG), a database
used by financial institutions for due diligence, under the category
"non-conviction terror." Although World-Check later noted that the
allegations against him were baseless and recategorised his entry,
they refused to remove it entirely, citing the need for financial
institutions to be aware of his designation by Türkiye to comply
with legal obligations. As a result of his account being flagged
by World-Check, Western Union began blocking his transactions and
other financial institutions denied his applications for banking
services.
Note
48. A similar ordeal was faced by Mehmet Baltaci, a London-based
businessman, who in 2020 was marked by World-Check under the “non
conviction terror” category. He was also designated by Türkiye as
an "alleged associate" of two suspected members of the Gülen movement,
an allegation he denies. As a result thereof, more than 10 bank
accounts across three countries were closed, and another bank refused
to provide services to Mr Baltaci, severely hampering his business
activity. Mr Baltaci sued World-Check and his claim was settled in
April 2023 with World-Check removing his profile from its database,
retracing the claims and agreeing not to publish the inaccurate
information again.
Note
49. In 2024, the Royal United Services Institute, a British think-tank,
published a policy brief analysing how the Financial Action Task
Force’s (FATF) standards have been abused or misused by authoritarian
regimes. Its brief describes how, for instance, the FATF Recommendation 4
on asset freezing provisions, when misapplied for malicious purposes,
can disrupt civil society organisations’ access to funds and operations, causing
long-term incapacitation. The misuse of these provisional measures
without proper judicial review triggers unjust and extended asset
freezes. FATF Recommendations 37, 38, and 39 concerning mutual legal assistance
and extradition enable States to carry out transnational repression,
granting home countries access to privileged information on dissidents
in host countries to sustain campaigns against them. The Royal United Services
Institute correctly, in my view, concluded that these abuses represent
a double threat: they reduce civil society’s impact on democracy
and further expose societies to the harms of illicit finance, crime
and corruption by discrediting anti-money laundering tools.
Note
2.3 Mobility
restrictions
50. Transnational repression through
passport denial has emerged as a strategic tool in Turkmenistan
and Belarus, exacerbating the vulnerability of dissidents abroad.
Turkmenistan's refusal to renew passports at consulates forces Turkmen
citizens living abroad, including human rights activists, to return
home, risking persecution, arrest, and even torture.
Note Similarly, Belarus implemented a
decree in September 2023 requiring citizens staying abroad to renew
their passports in Belarus, effectively isolating those unable or
unwilling to return due to fear of persecution.
Note Such a policy creates significant
obstacles in managing property, obtaining education credentials,
and securing inheritance. Furthermore, it puts citizens at risk
of deportation, as they may face obstacles in obtaining residence
permits without valid identity documents. The denial of essential documents,
such as birth certificates for children born abroad, indeed leaves
many citizens undocumented and unable to access basic services.
Note Similarly, obtaining basic paperwork,
such as duplicates of civil registry records, university degree
authentications or issuing a power of attorney, now requires the
applicant to be physically present in Belarus.
Note
51. In August 2018, the head of the Open Dialogue Foundation,
Lyudmyla Kozlovska, a Ukrainian national residing in Poland and
married to a Polish citizen, Bartosz Kramek, a civic activist, was
denied entry to Belgium following an alert introduced to the Schengen
Information System by the Polish authorities. The alert was based
on grounds of national security. Ms Kozlovska argued that the introduction
of an alert was a form of political repression used by Poland because
of her and her husband's criticism of the then-Polish Government. Following
a series of appeals, in 2024, her name was finally removed from
the register of persons whose stay in Poland was considered undesirable.
Note In March 2025, Mr Kramek informed
that the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor had opened an investigation
into possible abuse of power by the former Minister-Co-ordinator
of Special Services, his deputy, officers of the Internal Security
Agency (
Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego)
and the Head of the Aliens Office, who are alleged to have intentionally
produced unreliable documents to falsely accuse Ms Kozlovska of
constituting a threat to the national security of Poland.
Note
3 Fighting
back against transnational repression
52. In its
Resolution 2509 (2023), the Assembly called on States to protect individuals
within their jurisdiction from transnational repression, and refrain
from rendering, transferring, deporting or extraditing those facing
it. It further called for an official definition of the practice,
a mechanism to report and track it, as well as a series of steps
to prevent it, including: additional vetting of extradition requests,
Red Notices and other forms of international legal assistance from
countries known to engage in transnational repression; expelling
or declining to accredit diplomats involved in transnational repression;
sanctions on perpetrators and enablers of the practice; restricting
the export of surveillance technology to countries which engage
in it. In its
Recommendation
2257 (2023), the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers
review and update its 2011 Guidelines on “Eradicating impunity for
serious human rights violations”, with a view to including transnational
repression techniques, and consider drawing up a recommendation
to member States on the fight against transnational repression,
including a common definition of transnational repression.
53. In its written comments on
Recommendation 2257 (2023), the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) noted
that phenomena of the type described in
Resolution 2509 (2023) are a matter of serious concern, inconsistent with the
values and principles of the Council of Europe, and may contravene
its member States' legal obligations, notably under the European
Convention on Human Rights. The CDDH considered that rather than
revising the Committee of Ministers’ 2011 Guidelines on eradicating
impunity for serious human rights violations, a more feasible and
flexible approach would be to draw up a recommendation to member States
on the fight against transnational repression, as also proposed
by the Assembly.
54. Indeed, in its
Reply to
Recommendation
2257 (2023), the Committee of Ministers explained that its existing
Guidelines on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations
of 2011 already cover those transnational repression methods or
techniques that can be considered as “acts in respect of which States have
an obligation under the Convention, and in the light of the Court’s
case law, to enact criminal law provisions”. Other techniques mentioned
by the Assembly, such as passport cancellation and denial of consular
services, which do not engage criminal law, fall outside the scope
of the current Guidelines. It further informed that it had given
terms of reference to the CDDH to prepare a study on the need for
and feasibility of (an) additional non-binding instrument(s) to
complement the current Guidelines, and that it invited the CDDH to
bear in mind
Recommendation
2257 (2023) in this work, where appropriate.
55. I submitted an intervention to the CDDH, recommending that
a direct reference to transnational repression be added to the draft
Study on complementing the 2011 Guidelines against impunity for
serious human rights violations. I noted that transnational repression
encompasses a variety of methods, including physical attacks abroad,
misuse of legal co-operation tools, restrictions on mobility, and
remote intimidation or surveillance. These actions pose complex
legal and practical challenges, as the existing Guidelines focus
only on domestic issues. Since transnational repression involves
extraterritorial violations and State misuse of international mechanisms,
I also recommended conducting a study on a separate, comprehensive
non-binding instrument. This would provide tailored guidance on
prevention, investigation, protection, and improved international
co-operation, addressing the broader scope of State responsibility.
Regrettably, my proposal was not included in the Study adopted.
Note
3.2 Selected
State practice
56. The report prepared by the
Swiss Government contains several recommendations for countering transnational
repression in Switzerland. It suggests engaging in diplomatic dialogue
with States responsible for transnational repression to make it
clear that such actions are not tolerated by Switzerland. At the
national level, the report calls for the exploration and definition
of responsibilities, procedures, communication channels, and effectiveness
of current instruments in dealing with transnational repression
cases. It emphasises the need to sensitise and train federal, cantonal,
and municipal authorities to better identify, handle, and report
cases of transnational repression. The report also recommends promoting
and institutionalising communication with affected diaspora groups.
Furthermore, it suggests evaluating the necessity and relevance
of potential low-threshold advisory services for victims and witnesses
of transnational repression. The overall goal is to enhance the
authorities' understanding and ability to effectively manage and
mitigate the impacts while ensuring the protection of fundamental
rights and sovereignty.
57. At the end of 2024, the French General Directorate for Internal
Security (
Direction générale de la Sécurité
intérieure, DGSI) created a website (in French, English,
Arabic, Chinese and Russian) informing about measures undertaken
by the French authorities to combat transnational repression. It
contains information about the phenomenon itself, examples thereof,
and a dedicated contact channel which allows victims and witnesses
of a transnational repression operation to report it to the authorities.
Note
58. The report on Transnational Repression in the United Kingdom,
published in July 2025 by the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on
Human Rights
Note identifies transnational repression
as a significant and under-recognised threat that undermines the
UK's ability to protect the rights of both citizens and those seeking safety
within its borders. One of its key findings is that the UK currently
lacks a formal, legal definition for this phenomenon, what has hindered
effective data collection, monitoring, and the development of a
coherent national strategy. The Joint Committee notes that while
China, Russia, and Iran are the most flagrant perpetrators, other
States – most notably Eritrea – frequently use tactics such as digital
surveillance, intimidation of families abroad, and the misuse of
international mechanisms like INTERPOL to silence dissidents on
UK soil. Furthermore, the report highlights that existing protections
against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)
are currently limited to economic crimes, leaving journalists and
activists vulnerable to State-aligned legal harassment. To combat
these evolving threats, the Joint Committee recommends that the
UK Government urgently adopt a formal definition of transnational
repression and require all police forces to collect specific data
on State-linked harassment and coercion. A key proposal is the establishment
of a dedicated national reporting hotline staffed by trained personnel
to build trust with affected communities and standardise the current
inconsistent police response. Additionally, the government is urged to
work with “Five Eyes” partners to reform INTERPOL's processes and
introduce a mechanism to alert individuals to politically motivated
Red Notices, while also reviewing the national sanctions framework
to specifically capture the full range of transnational repression
tactics.
59. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has increasingly prioritised the fight against transnational repression
by treating these extraterritorial threats as direct violations
of federal law and American sovereignty. The FBI has established
a dedicated Transnational Repression Cell to co-ordinate intelligence
and investigations, while also implementing specialised training
for field agents to help them distinguish State-sponsored harassment
from routine criminal activity. Public outreach is a central pillar
of their strategy, involving the launch of a dedicated tipline and
the distribution of educational resources to diaspora communities
(in several languages) to encourage the reporting of stalking, digital
threats, and coercion. Furthermore, the FBI works closely with the
Department of Justice to secure indictments against foreign operatives
and uses the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) to expose and
prosecute individuals working covertly for hostile governments.
Note
60. The Transnational Repression Policy Act (TRPA), a draft bill
tabled in the US Congress in 2025, aims to codify a “whole-of-government”
approach to protecting dissidents and activists on US soil. The
TRPA mandates the creation of a comprehensive interagency strategy
to identify and counter the tactics of authoritarian regimes, including
the use of commercial spyware and the misuse of INTERPOL notices.
Key provisions include the definition of “transnational repression”,
potential criminalisation of gathering information on diaspora communities
for foreign powers and the expansion of the legal definition of
foreign agents to better capture modern repressive tactics. Additionally,
the draft legislation proposes mandatory training for all government
personnel and diplomatic staff to recognise the signs of transnational
repression, while also authorising targeted sanctions and visa bans
against foreign officials who orchestrate such abuses.
Note
61. In Germany, the government’s response to transnational repression
has evolved through a combination of diplomatic measures and heightened
domestic surveillance of foreign intelligence activities. Following
high-profile incidents like the 2019 Tiergarten assassination and
repeated threats against Iranian and Egyptian dissidents in Berlin,
German authorities have intensified the surveillance of “community
monitoring” tactics used by authoritarian regimes to intimidate
exiles. In 2025 and early 2026, the Federal Ministry of the Interior introduced
a strategy of “defensive architecture”, which includes the use of
the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)
to identify and expel foreign operatives operating under diplomatic
cover. While Germany has traditionally relied on existing criminal
statutes and the expulsion of diplomats to signal its “red lines”,
there has been increasing legislative pressure in 2026 to establish
a dedicated national co-ordination office.
Note
3.3 INTERPOL
62. In May 2024, the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights held a follow-up hearing on the
topic of transnational repression. During that hearing, in particular,
representatives of INTERPOL explained what measures had been undertaken
in the past several years to limit the scope for abuse of its system.
In 2017, its General Assembly adopted a policy on refugee cases,
according to which INTERPOL may not issue Red Notices for individuals
who obtained refugee status. Similarly, INTERPOL would not issue
a Red Notice against an individual who was wanted for using freedom
of expression in their State, against political opposition and/or
dissidents. We were told that INTERPOL cannot instruct countries
how to act upon a notice or any other request: each State bears
full responsibility for its actions. Under the relevant rules, it
was up to each State to flag to INTERPOL any compliance issues identified
in notices issued by other States. If a determination was made that
a Red Notice did not comply with the Constitution or the Rules on
the Processing of Data, the data would be deleted from the INTERPOL’s
system. In cases of repeated non-compliance, corrective measures could
be applied, starting with enhanced supervision to a full suspension
of a member State’s access to the system. They were not designed
as punitive measures, but INTERPOL considered them effective to
deter non-compliance and prevent any attempts at misuse of its system.
As of May 2024, there were six States subjected to various levels
of corrective measures. INTERPOL’s public website included statistics
on non-compliance, and the basis upon which the decision was made
to either refuse or cancel a notice/diffusion request.
4 Conclusions
and recommendations
63. While preparing my report,
I asked several known or suspected victims of transnational repression
to reply to a questionnaire concerning their experiences of being
affected by this phenomenon, including impacts on their personal
safety, well-being, and travel restrictions. As some of them requested
anonymity, I will not list their identities. Many of their contributions
helped me to identify gaps in existing policy or legislation. Despite living
under different jurisdictions and being exposed to various methods
of transnational repression, the responses were strikingly similar.
Almost everyone noted that being the subject of an INTERPOL notice,
an extradition request, or a similar measure created reputational
stigma (despite the political nature of the request), resulted in
significant legal costs, and had a seriously negative effect on
their personal well-being, causing constant fear of arrest, resignation
from international travel, loss of assets, or missed professional opportunities.
Female victims were subjected to sexist and/or sexually explicit
attacks, for example, being accused of engaging in sex work or threatened
with sexual violence. Those affected also experienced social isolation,
with friends distancing themselves in order to avoid possible personal
risks. Several responses indicated that, despite having reported
in-person surveillance or attacks in their State of residence, the
host authorities were unwilling to take decisive action, apparently
for fear of jeopardising their relationship with the perpetrator
State.
64. The examples of acts of transnational repression presented
herein clearly demonstrate that there is a significant legal and
policy gap which must be filled in order to effectively combat transnational
repression. I am particularly concerned about the apparent ease
with which authoritarian regimes are able to repress dissidents on
European soil. The marked increase in acts of transnational repression
warrants a unified European response and enhanced co-operation.
This is particularly pressing given that authoritarian regimes appear
to inspire one another to develop new and increasingly sophisticated
methods of transnational repression with which they harass opponents
and silence dissent.
65. Over the course of preparing this report, it became clear
to me that the lack of a unified definition of “transnational repression”
constitutes the most significant gap that must be urgently bridged.
While most States have already enacted provisions enabling them
to prosecute perpetrators of the most prevalent acts of transnational
repression, many instances continue to go under-reported, as the
absence of a universally accepted definition obstructs reliable
data collection. My proposal for such a definition is inspired by
the draft US Transnational Repression Policy Act, as well as by
input from Freedom House and the New Lines Institute for Strategy
and Policy. I am opposed to limiting the definition solely to acts
of transnational repression committed by a State against its own
citizens. I believe that cases such as those of Paul Watson and
Sir William Browder (mentioned above) should be classified as transnational
repression, regardless of the fact that neither individual was a
citizen of the country seeking his extradition (Japan and the Russian
Federation, respectively). Given the evolving nature of transnational
repression, I also consider that any catalogue of its methods must remain
open-ended rather than exhaustive.
66. As regards data collection, I believe that the most straightforward
solution to ensure reliability is to consider a transnational repression
context as an aggravating circumstance under criminal law. Separately, I have
proposed that States consider specifically criminalising transnational
repression as a distinct offence. At present, certain transnational
repression methods might be prosecuted as espionage- or stalking-related offences;
however, some acts will not meet the necessary threshold and remain
unpunished. I am referring particularly to acts such as photographing
participants at a demonstration and subsequently providing their images
to their State of origin or reporting on students discussing sensitive
topics at foreign universities, thereby exposing them or their relatives
to harassment.
67. My proposals for the creation of dedicated reporting avenues
and outreach programmes are inspired by best practices in Council
of Europe member and observer States, as presented in greater detail
above. While certain basic measures, such as staffing by specifically
trained personnel and publishing information in various languages,
will be common to each State, tailored measures will be required
according to the specific nature and origin of the risks faced.
68. Turning to INTERPOL reform, it appears to me that there is
a significant lack of co-ordination among democratic States in ensuring
transparency and governance motivated by human rights considerations. Considering
the broad composition of INTERPOL – of which, as of 2022, approximately
58% of members were regarded as “partly free” or “not free” by the
Freedom House – only through close co-ordination can those States
sharing the values of the Council of Europe ensure that the system
does not become increasingly susceptible to misuse. Regard must
be had to the fact that the National Central Bureaus (NCBs) representing States
within INTERPOL are, in essence, police authorities. I believe that
enhanced domestic co-ordination is required to ensure that the bodies
responsible for the protection and promotion of human rights have
a greater impact on INTERPOL’s governance and reform efforts.
69. Finally, I would like to add that I remain extremely concerned
about the recent imposition of completely unjustified sanctions
against officials of the United Nations and judges of the International
Criminal Court. Some of these could potentially be described as
transnational repression and appear to seriously undermine the functioning
of international courts and organisations, as well as the international
legal order more generally. Considering that the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights is preparing a dedicated report on this issue
(under the rapporteurship of my colleague, Mr Tekke Panman, Netherlands,
EPP/CD), I have decided not to address this situation in the context
of this report.
