B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Georgios Stamatis, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. “People are the most important
and valuable resource of any nation”.
Note Yet, there are growing worries across
Europe about the continent’s demographic future. As the motion for
a resolution (Doc. 16121) tabled by Ms Anna Záborská and other members
of the Assembly points out, Europe faces severe demographic challenges
of declining birth rates, ageing and rural depopulation, with effects
on “society, the economy, regional development, pensions, health
care and the labour market” that taken as a whole threaten the continent’s
social cohesion and economic stability. This demographic decline
moreover affects life expectancy across Europe and leads to brain
drain, as many European governments are too slowin adopting family-friendly policies
which would help foster both human and socio-economic development.
Demographic renewal has become a critical policy issue in Europe
for the coming decades.
2. The motion in question therefore proposes to examine the situation
and social policy commitments in member States in light of relevant
Council of Europe standards with a view to improving the existing
social welfare systems and providing more adequate support to families.
It envisages specific policy recommendations that could foster resilience
of member States by investing in health and long-term care services,
providing for more family-friendly policies in all spheres of society
(including housing, child-care programmes, working conditions and
fiscal policies) and fostering a better work-private life balance,
protecting parents and ensuring equality in employment policies,
as well as “closing (or at least narrowing) the persisting wage
differences between the core States and the periphery” and “rethinking
the organisation of the entire life-course perspective of work,
parenthood and retirement”.
3. The European Social Charter (ETS No. 35) is, in this respect,
one of the main normative foundations for family policies. As interpreted
by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), Articles 7, 8,
16, 17, 19§6, 30 and 31, read in particular in the light of the
non-discrimination clause set out in Article E, cover a large part of
the measures examined in my report. Any demographic renewal strategy
should therefore be grounded in a human rights-based approach and
designed and assessed in the light of the obligations arising from
the Charter and the interpretation given to it by the ECSR. Such
an approach ensures that family policies primarily seek to create
the conditions that enable everyone to freely pursue their family
plans, while respecting dignity, autonomy, family diversity, equal
treatment and individual choice.
4. It is therefore important that member States that have not
yet done so ratify the Revised European Social Charter and accept
the provisions that directly protect families, in particular Article
16 on their social, legal and economic protection. Acceptance of
the Additional Protocol providing for a system of collective complaints
is particularly relevant in this regard: by enabling social partners
and authorised organisations to bring before the ECSR situations
affecting families collectively, this procedure helps to identify
structural shortcomings in public policies. It also provides States
with a tool to assess and improve the effectiveness of their family
policies, prevent persistent inequalities and steer their reforms
in line with a human rights-based approach.
5. As rapporteur for this matter, I intend to take a closer look
at the demographic situation in Europe based on the analysis of
available data and trends. Considering research insights, I will
seek to assess the root-causes and impacts of demographic changes
on the various aspects of our society, in particular the sustainability
of socio-economic rights of the population. I will then highlight
possible policy responses to address the causes and mitigate the
key problems through public authorities’ intervention in the short,
medium and long term with regard to different categories of the
population.
6. With expert insights and guidance by the International Conference
on Population and Development (ICPD) Programme of Action and the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), this report pleads for responses
to demographic change that focus on people’s rights, choices and
empowerment rather than on numerical population targets, with the
aim of building more fair, sustainable and resilient societies.
In the context of my work on this report, the Committee on Social
Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development held several hearings
(notably on 23 April 2026
Note in Strasbourg, on 4
June 2026
Note in Athens and on 24 June 2026 in Strasbourg),
Note and
I held a number of online meetings with experts
Note to explore the multiple facets
of demographic challenges. I have also carried out a fact-finding
visit to Bocconi University in Milan
Note to discuss demographic
strategy options and policy recommendations, and reviewed several
written contributions by civil society organisations.
Note My report
draws on the valuable comments and proposals made on these occasions regarding
the demographic policy measures and strategies that our member States
should consider for the enhanced prosperity of present and future
generations.
2 A brief overview of demographic trends
and challenges
7. After decades of vivid growth,
Europe’s total population of about 751 million is flattening and
is set to slowly fall during the 21st century unless dramatic policy
changes occur. In 2024, the population of 29 European countries
was beyond the peak level and shrinking.
Note Due to low
birth rates, a rapidly ageing population and rural depopulation,
Europe is experiencing profound demographic changes with far-reaching consequences
for its society, economy and social systems. However, to put Europe
into the global context, the United Nations (UN) observe similar
developments also in other regions (North America, Australia, Latin America,
Oceania, much of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa), which reflects a
global trend.
Note
8. Across the European Union (EU) countries, the median age of
the population increased from 38.7 years in 2002 to 44.7 years in
2024. While the total EU population will rise in the short term
– from 449 million persons in 2022 to 453 million in 2026, in the
longer-term perspective it is projected to fall to 432 million in
2070.
Note
9. From 2016 to 2025, deaths outnumbered births in the EU (natural
population change), with population remaining stable or growing
slightly only thanks to net immigration. Eurostat figures show a
particularly sharp drop over the three years of the Covid-19 pandemic
(2020 to 2022) and the strongest negative rates for 2024 in Latvia
(-7.4), Bulgaria (-7.3), Lithuania (-6.4), Greece (-5.5) and Romania
(-5.3) compared with the EU average of -2.8 per 1000 persons. The
same year, negative natural population change outside the EU was recorded
in Serbia (-5.7), Moldova (-4.1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (-3.2),
North Macedonia (-2.3), Georgia (-1.2) and Monaco (-1.4) among the
countries for which Eurostat data is available.
Note
10. One of the most critical elements of this demographic shift
is the decline in fertility. According to Eurostat data, the average
fertility rate in the EU was only 1.38 live births per woman in
2023 (1.4 for the all-European average), well below the replacement
rate of 2.1 required to sustain population in the long run. Across
the Council of Europe member States, the fertility rates in 2024
ranged from 1.8 in Montenegro and 2.1 in Monaco to 1.1 in Malta,
1.09 in Andorra and 0.99 in Ukraine.
Note The number of children
born in the EU has decreased from 4.68 million in 2008 to just 3.67
million in 2023.
11. Furthermore, only around 12% of families in the EU have three
or more children, a figure that continues to decline annually. At
the same time, the average age of first birth moves between 26-30
years in most European countries (up from 28.9 years on average
in 2014 to 29.5 years in 2020 in the EU) given relatively high youth
unemployment, income uncertainty and the tendency to postpone marriages
and/or first births.
Note
12. Across Europe, childlessness has been increasing steadily.
Although it varies a lot by country, around one in seven women is
childless by the end of her reproductive age; for men, the proportion
is often somewhat higher. German-speaking countries have the highest
levels of childlessness (with one in five women concerned) closely
followed by Finland, the Netherlands and Italy, while other Southern
Europe countries are rapidly moving in the same direction.
Note Surveys also reveal
a gap between people’s aspirations to found a family with children
and the child-free reality. Experts describe this as a ‘fertility
gap’ whereby delaying parenthood eventually becomes voluntary or
involuntary childlessness.
13. As the number of people of childbearing age decreases, births
decline even further, intensifying population shrinkage. This demographic
transformation is profound because smaller households lead to lower population
growth, an increased dependency ratio (the number of people over
65 relative to those 15-64) and a reduced number of people at work
to support ageing populations. Prospects for generational renewal
dim with every passing decade, creating compounding effects that
threaten future sustainability of the workforce, healthcare, social
security systems and pension schemes. Indeed, even if European countries
were to increase fertility rates to 2.1 children per woman, it would
take about 25 years for these children to become active contributors
to the social security systems and labour markets.
14. Europe’s population is ageing faster than in any other continent,
with the share of those aged 65 and older set to rise from 20% in
2019 to 31% by 2100. In some countries, the old-age dependency ratio
is expected to double from today’s 24% to nearly 50% by mid-century.
At the same time, by 2050, 22 out of 27 EU countries will face declines
in their working-age populations (20 to 64), deeply affecting social
systems and intergenerational solidarity.
3 Understanding
the root causes of the demographic decline
15. Europe’s demographic decline
is driven by a complex web of root causes, which span social, economic, psychological,
cultural and environmental factors. In addition to well-known drivers
such as persistent low birth rates and ageing, concerns about the
daily life and future are increasingly influential and shape contemporary attitudes
toward family formation. In particular, young people’s attitudes
towards family formation and parenthood need to be analysed carefully
to be addressed.
16. The observed trends in demography reflect economic and social
pressures, including the high cost of raising children, limited
access to affordable housing and childcare, and work-life balance
challenges. The mental load and unequal share of domestic work can
also be considered as a root cause of the demographic decline. Young
women especially often anticipate that parenthood will still be
unequally shared, despite social progress, and a risk of sacrificing
their career or personal balance. Moreover, certain population groups
such as persons with disabilities (about 100 million in Europe)
face particular barriers to enjoying family life and parenthood
because of insufficient or inaccessible public services and unaffordable
private care services, which lays excessive burden on family carers,
with mostly women bearing the brunt.
17. All over Europe, we see the growing diversity of household
and relationship forms beyond the traditional married-couple family.
The main examples are cohabiting couples, lone-parent families,
reconstituted or blended families, same-sex couples raising children
and families where care is shared across several households or across
generations, often with full-time working parents. Greater family
diversity thus reflects the long-term transformation in society
and generates new needs for the organisation of care, social support services
and public policy adaptation.
18. There is no doubt that concerns about the future (climate
change, wars, crises, instability) also impact the desire to have
children. A rising share of Europeans, especially youth, experience
“eco-anxiety” – a deep-seated fear about the environmental and climate
future, which affects mental health, daily functioning and major
life decisions. Climate change and the prospect of climate disasters
are seen as a threat not only to personal well-being, but also to
the stability of future generations. This anxiety is amplified by
real and perceived risks, including extreme weather events, environmental
degradation, resource scarcity and the possibility of forced migration
due to adverse living conditions.
19. A new UNFPA study
Note reveals
a major disconnect between young people’s aspirations and demographic
realities. While young people of Eastern European countries
Note are
more optimistic about their future than their peers in Western Europe
(despite greater anxiety about conflict, economic crises and unemployment),
strongly value family, marriage and parenthood, and desire to have
more than two children, the number of children they actually have
in their late 30s is just about one. This is because the conditions needed
to achieve their aspirations are missing: this reflects especially
the lack of financial security and adequate housing, as well as
health issues, difficulties finding the right partner and concerns
about an uneven sharing of childcare and housework. Life decisions
are seen as a chain – employment, housing, partnership, then parenthood
– so when one step fails, the rest is delayed. The study clearly
shows that governments should focus less on incentives or pressure
to have children and more on removing earlier the barriers that
prevent young adults from building stable lives. Moreover, other
studies and surveys show that younger generations do not necessarily
consider partnership and parenthood as a norm. Life paths are less
predetermined than they used to be, reflecting profound changes
in values and in what is perceived as a life milestone.
20. Crises have become a near-constant feature of the European
outlook: from pandemics to war, and from economic shocks to natural
disasters. Each new episode of uncertainty increases hesitation
of young couples around long-term commitments such as childbearing,
home-buying, or setting down roots, feeding a cycle where doubts
about the future become a self-fulfilling demographic trend. Moreover,
more and more young people deliberately choose not to have children
by putting individual interests and personal projects (such as career,
volunteering and leisure) at the centre of their lives.
21. Last but not least, there are growing fertility problems –
across Europe and globally. The World Health Organisation estimates
that up to 17.5% of the world's adult population or roughly one
person in six experience infertility.
Note Lifestyle
factors, age and the population’s chronic exposure to toxins and
chemicals, in particular endocrinal disruptors, largely contribute
to the worsening of female and male reproductive health. Harmful substances
are massively and increasingly present in our food, drinking water,
cosmetics, at workplaces and air pollution, which calls for more
determined action to both protect public health and the environment,
and to facilitate the population’s access to fertility treatments.
Note
4 Multifaceted
impacts and policy implications
22. Demographic changes impact
all European countries, but present challenges in different ways.
Some southern and eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Greece,
Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Ukraine, face sharper
demographic shocks given declining populations, high emigration
of youth and accelerated ageing; their rural regions are emptying
as population flocks to urban areas for opportunities, compounding
public services provision challenges (notably to sustain schools
and healthcare) and economic stagnation in the countryside (“demographic
deserts”).
23. Western and northern countries, while also ageing, benefit
from comparatively higher immigration inflows, somewhat cushioning
the effects and allowing their populations to remain stable or even
grow modestly.
Note The
recent arrival of large numbers of Ukrainians seeking protection
– estimated at 5.1 million in Europe – has temporarily boosted demographic
numbers in some countries such as Germany, Poland, Czechia, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Romania, Italy, Slovak Republic and Moldova.
Note
24. Labour force participation is declining as the working-age
population shrinks. The decreasing supply of labour may in turn
slow down economic development, erode competitiveness and lead to
labour shortages in critical sectors such as healthcare, construction
and technology. With fewer workers supporting a growing elderly
population, pension, long-term care and healthcare systems are under
mounting financial pressure. The sustainability of the European
welfare model is increasingly stretched by demographic imbalances.
The projected doubling of the old-age dependency ratio will require
either substantial increases in pension contributions, reductions
in benefits, later retirement ages, or new sources of funding to
remain solvent. Moreover, countries relying on pay-as-you-go retirement
systems should consider introducing a tier of capitalisation so
as to preserve their sustainability given the shrinking workforce
and number of contributors in a context where the retired population
keeps growing as longevity increases.
25. An older population entails increased demand for healthcare,
particularly for chronic and age-related conditions. The European
Commission's 2024 Ageing Report forecasts a sharp increase in age-related expenditures,
rising by 6.1% of GDP annually by 2070, driven primarily by pension
costs and escalating needs for health and long-term care.
Note Health
systems across Europe should prepare for higher expenditures and
a need for more geriatric specialists and long-term care infrastructure.
Large generational imbalances increase the risk of social fragmentation
as young people stay longer in education and older people stay longer
in employment, pitting younger and older groups against each other
in the competition for scarce public resources and undermining the
stability of existing social contracts.
26. Young people should not be excluded from homeownership simply
because labour markets increasingly rely on temporary, part-time,
or otherwise precarious contracts. Mortgage rules that assume a
single, stable, long-term employment trajectory no longer reflect
the reality of many workers, especially those entering the labour
market after years of uncertainty or moving between short contracts
and periods of training. Reviewing conservative lending conditions
is therefore necessary to ensure that access to housing is based
on realistic assessments of repayment capacity rather than outdated
employment models, while still maintaining responsible lending standards.
A more flexible approach could help young adults secure stable housing
earlier, support family formation and reduce the widening gap between
employment insecurity and the ability to build an independent life.
27. While migration has been proposed as one of the tools to balance
demographic trends, it presents complex challenges, including integration
needs, cultural tensions and public resistance.
Note Immigration
alone cannot fully neutralise the effect of ageing since migrants
also age and birth rates among migrants tends to converge to host-country
levels over time. At the same time, pro-family policies and incentive-based
social policies (such as enhanced allowances, parental leave, support
for childbearing and social safety nets for young parents), have
demonstrated their effectiveness in encouraging parenthood. For
example, countries like Denmark, France and Sweden, which have implemented
generous parental leave, subsidised childcare and family tax benefits,
maintain some of the highest birth rates in the EU. These policies
not only encourage larger families but also help mitigate economic
barriers that deter young couples from having children.
28. More effective gender mainstreaming is a structural prerequisite
for successful demographic and family policies. A growing body of
evidence demonstrates that gender inequality directly affects economic performance,
demographic trends and models of care services. Policies that are
not designed through a gender lens risk falling short, as women
continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of care responsibilities and
encounter systemic barriers to participation in the labour market.
In this respect, the link between gender equality and sustainable,
inclusive, economic development should be built in more robustly
through relevant policies. Targeted policies should furthermore
be developed to support single parent families, rainbow families and
other new family configurations.
29. The prevention of violence against women also constitutes
a critical parameter in protecting the formation of families, relationship
stability, and shaping long-term demographic prospects. The Council
of Europe, in the work around its Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul
Convention”), has repeatedly stressed that combating gender-based violence
is not merely a human rights imperative, but also a structural condition
for social cohesion. Insufficient support to women having suffered
violence and lack of programmes aimed at preventing future violence
on the part of offenders threaten the stability of families and
perpetuate cycles of violence, affecting subsequent relationships
and undermining the creation or expansion of families, a reality
further aggravated by evidence of perinatal violence across Europe.
A comprehensive approach, including psychosocial support for young couples,
is increasingly recognised as essential for enabling safe family
environments in which children can be raised.
30. The demographic trends and structural imbalance they entail
exacerbate financial pressures on both national budgets and the
population across Europe, while military spending is increasing
(from 1.6% in 2023 to 1.9% of GDP in 2024 in EU countries, rising
to an estimated 2.1% in 2025)
Note and
the cost-of-living is growing in most countries (with Switzerland
scoring highest consumer price levels of 184% and Turkey scoring
lowest with 47% compared to the EU average)
Note faster
than incomes.
Note Moreover, as the OECD
studies show, age-related spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term
care is mostly publicly funded, representing respectively about
8%, 7% and 1% of GDP in OECD countries.
Note As
a result, “debt sustainability challenges might arise from mounting
ageing-related public spending” according to the European Central
Bank.
Note
31. Addressing Europe’s demographic challenges requires comprehensive
co-ordinated responses at national and European levels, involving
a mix of interventions across socio-economic dimensions and integrated
cross-sectoral strategies that cover education and life-long learning,
health, workplace flexibility, urban planning, migration management,
investment in public services and regulatory measures, as well as drawing
on good practice and expert advice. The experts I have consulted
for this report unanimously plead for policy coherence and adaptation
to people’s needs across their lifetime so that family-friendly
perspectives are mainstreamed and work in synergy.
32. The establishment of national-level demographic committees,
as demonstrated by successful models in Finland, Iceland, Lithuania
and the Netherlands, national demographic action plans (such as
in Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Slovakia and North Macedonia),
national (Germany) or regional (Spain) demographic strategies, strong
family policies and measures (France, Italy and Poland) offers a
promising path for the future. Demographic committees, actions plans
and strategies enable governments to map demographic outlook and
shape policies that transcend electoral cycles, ensuring a comprehensive,
long-term approach to managing demographic change. Nordic countries
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) address demographic change through
mainstream social and labour policies rather than dedicated demographic
plans.
33. According to the UN, depending on “the specific circumstances
and priorities of each country, population stabilization or limited
decline may bring additional opportunities to eradicate poverty,
expand access to health care and education, promote gender equality,
improve social protection systems, move towards more sustainable
patterns of production and consumption, and enact measures to protect
the environment and mitigate the negative effects of climate change”.
Note
34. As the conclusions of the Regional Ministerial Conference
held in Skopje on 7-8 May 2026 under the UNFPA auspices show, “demographic
change is […] a megatrend fundamentally altering socio-economic landscapes
that requires a paradigm shift toward demographic resilience – the
capacity of countries to thrive by centering policy on people’s
aspirations and evidence-based planning”. Policy makers’ task is
therefore to “bridge the gap between demographic trends and policy
frameworks” in a way that contributes to democratic security and
stability.
5 Towards
greater demographic resilience: empowering people, upholding their
rights and supporting their well-being
35. Demographic change is reshaping
societies across the world, and Europe is no exception. Population ageing,
low fertility, changing family patterns, increased work-related
mobility and shifting dependency ratios are altering public budgets,
labour markets, care systems, social protection, housing and community
life. A policy response towards greater “demographic resilience”
does not attempt to reverse these trends through numerical targets
alone; instead, it focuses on strengthening people’s capacities,
protecting their rights and improving the conditions in which they
can live, work, care for their families and age with dignity. A
meaningful demographic strategy should aim to promote family setting
as a safe-haven and a shield against external uncertainties.
36. While policy making for decades relied on socio-economic and
demographic expansion which was taken for granted, the ongoing demographic
shift calls for a more sober approach building on a better understanding of
human needs, planetary limits and socio-economic dynamics. The United
Nations agencies (such as the UNFPA, the UN DESA, the UNECE, the
ILO, etc.) and various European think-tanks recommend an approach that
can be adapted to regional, national and local realities. This reflects
a broader shift away from one-size-fits-all policy toward differentiated
responses for areas facing depopulation, ageing, changing family
structures, strain of social protection system or labour shortages.
Good governance here means anticipating patterns early, co-ordinating
across sectors, and avoiding simplistic narratives that treat demography
as either crisis or destiny.
37. Changing demographic outlook is one of Europe’s major long-term
challenges, alongside the green and digital transitions, – a genuine
structural shift that requires both adaptation and mitigation, not
a narrow attempt to “fix” fertility rates or offset ageing through
one policy lever alone. The social conditions that sustained the fertility
levels of the 1960s have been fundamentally transformed in the last
decades. If higher fertility emerges in the future, it will have
to be generated by a fundamentally different social configuration.
A holistic public strategy could therefore build around five broad
priorities: supporting parents, empowering younger generations,
improving the well-being of older people, managing migration effectively
and laying greater emphasis on sustainable development (based on
a balanced consideration of social, economic and environmental needs).
This means treating demographic resilience as a question of life-long
social capability (whether people can form families if they wish,
invest in children, work securely, care for relatives, and age well) and
an overarching public interest (that is mainstreamed across a full
range of policies).
5.1 Supporting
families and parenthood
38. A first element of this strategy
is support for families and parenthood. As research shows, low birth
rates and delayed childbearing are closely linked to housing costs,
job insecurity, weak childcare provision and the difficulty of combining
work and care, as well as securing access to fertility treatment
as necessary and tackling environmental factors that can lead to
infertility across a population. The policy implication is not to
pressure people into having children, but to remove barriers that
prevent them from realising their preferences, especially through
affordable childcare, parental leave, early childhood services and
better work-life balance through flexible work, reflecting also
the UN recommendations which insist that governments should support choice
and rights rather than treat people as instruments of population
policy. It is essential to ensure that parental leave provisions
cover in a fair manner both mothers and fathers, including adoptive
parents and foster parents, regardless of their employment status
(including self-employed persons and those engaged in seasonal work).
39. In this context, policy makers must consider the full range
of new family configurations and ensure a reality-check of existing
policy measures. During committee hearings, our attention was drawn
to issues arising for families which include persons with physical
and mental disabilities – either as parents or children. Their full social
integration is impossible without strong rights-based public policies
that support the family, provide the right services and facilitate
life in the community. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities guarantees the right to live independently, participate
in the community, and enjoy family life on an equal basis for persons
with disabilities who must be treated as equal citizens and holders
of rights, not passive recipients of care.
40. In practice, families in such situations are often forced
to fill gaps left by weak public services, with parents reducing
their employment, siblings becoming carers, and women bearing a
disproportionate unpaid burden of care. Family-friendly disability
policy should be piloted by the state and provide accessible services, inclusive
education, affordable personalised support, income protection, community-based
services, personal assistance, accessible housing, and inclusive
local infrastructure. Children with disabilities should be able
to grow up in their families and communities rather than in segregated
settings, and should benefit from early adequate intervention policies,
while persons with disabilities should be directly involved in policy
design, monitoring and implementation under the principle of “nothing
about us without us”.
Note
41. The principles of inclusion and non-discrimination should
also guide policies towards rainbow families. As we have learned
during the committee hearing with ILGA-Europe, the legal landscape
varies across Europe: 15 member states still offer no form of legal
recognition for same-sex couples although the caselaw at supra-national
level establishes clear obligations on all Council of Europe member
states.
Note The cross-border recognition
of family ties established in one member State is important for
framing parenthood and upholding the best interest of the child,
as well as eliminating discriminatory barriers in terms of adoption,
recognition of co-parenthood and medically assisted reproduction.
42. Family-friendly demographic strategies are most effective
when they recognise the diverse circumstances of different population
groups and ensure that no families are left behind. Across Europe,
Roma and Travellers communities (about 12 million persons) continue
to experience disproportionately high levels of poverty, inadequate
housing, barriers to healthcare, lower educational attainment and
discrimination, all of which can limit families' ability to realise
their aspirations. Targeted measures that address these structural inequalities
are therefore an important complement to universal family policies,
helping to ensure that demographic strategies promote inclusion
and population resilience. Supporting Roma families and other vulnerable
communities such as migrants and ethnic minorities should not be
understood as an objective separate from broader demographic policy,
but as an integral component of it.
43. Investments in early childhood education and care, maternal
and child health services, quality housing, employment opportunities
and equal access to social protection can strengthen family well-being
while contributing to long-term social cohesion, reduced inequalities
and human capital development. By combining universal family support
with targeted interventions for disadvantaged communities, European
countries can develop demographic strategies that are more equitable,
effective and responsive to the needs of all families.
44. In this respect, we should note a persistent weakness in European
family policy: the period between the end of adequately compensated
parental leave and the point at which children become entitled to
a publicly supported full-time early childhood education and care
place. During this interval, the so-called “childcare gap”, many
families are left without affordable formal childcare while also
lacking sufficient income replacement through parental leave. This
childcare gap is a major structural barrier affecting parents' employment,
family well-being and decisions about having children, making it
a critical issue for both social and demographic policy.
45. As the COFACE Families Europe study shows,
Note only five EU countries (Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Slovenia and Sweden) provide a seamless transition
from well-paid parental leave to guaranteed access to state-supported
childcare, thereby avoiding a childcare gap. Some countries provide
financial support to families with children aged from two months
to two-and-a-half years to access certified home-based childcare either
in the family’s home or in the care-giver’s home. By offering flexible,
community-based care, such services help parents, particularly mothers,
to reconcile family responsibilities with employment and contributes to
reducing the childcare gap. In most other states, parents experience
a period ranging from several months to well over a year during
which they must rely on informal care arrangements, purchase private
childcare, reduce working hours or temporarily withdraw from the
labour market. Comprehensive family support systems should thus
comprise co-ordinated parental leave and childcare policies to avoid
disproportional negative effects on mothers, whose labour market
participation, earnings and long-term career prospects are more
likely to be interrupted by caregiving responsibilities.
46. We cannot speak about demographics and equal opportunities
without looking at the condition of working parents and in particular
the maternal mobbing phenomenon, i.e. discriminatory, hostile or
abusive treatment women may face at work because they are pregnant,
mothers, or are perceived as likely to have children. It is commonly
described as a mix of career penalties, exclusion, pressure and
psychological harassment linked to motherhood and pregnancy. The
issue matters because it can push women out of the labour market,
slow promotions, reduce income thus exacerbating the gender pay
gap, create stress at a moment when work-life balance is already
under strain and perpetuate the expectation that women will carry the
higher burden of unpaid care responsibilities at home. Demographic
resilience strategies should therefore start by recognising the
great value of unpaid care work which families render to society
at large and putting in place, or reinforcing, safeguards to protect
gender equality for working parents.
47. To ensure that families receive targeted support as close
to home as possible, local authorities must be involved to complement
the role of the state by delivering family-friendly services and
environment in both urban and rural areas. To this end, the
European Network
of Family-Friendly Municipalities which aims to foster local family-friendly cultures
across Europe can provide relevant support through shared resources,
exchanges of good practice and guidance for planning and self-evaluation.
5.2 Empowering
younger generations
48. A second important element
is to empower younger generations. As young adults face prolonged transitions
into stable work, family formation and independent living because
of labour-market segmentation, the rise of temporary and gig work
and rising housing costs, demographic strategies and measures should
aim to help young people remain and build their future in their
home regions. In this perspective, demographic resilience depends
on whether younger people can see a viable future and opportunities
for a meaningful life locally, not only in metropolitan centres,
while retaining freedom of movement. Indeed, it makes no sense to increase
birth rates if young people ultimately leave their country because
they see no perspectives for a decent standard of living.
49. Territorial cohesion is therefore central at national and
European levels to offset depopulation and talent drain from rural
and peripheral areas (including island regions) given the particular
challenges and structural disadvantages they face. The policy response
should favour cohesion funding for infrastructure and quality public
services (universal access and affordability) enabling youth to
put down roots knowing that they have real options and opportunities
to build good life for themselves and the next generations. This
territorial dimension matters because demographic decline is often
strongest where jobs, housing and public services are weakest, making
family formation and long-term settlement less attractive. This
is why local development and innovation are among the five priorities
under the National Demographic Action Plan 2025-2035 in Greece.
50. A comprehensive approach begins with strengthening young people's
economic independence. Policies that facilitate access to quality
jobs, reduce labour market precarity, support fair wages and promote
skills development enable young adults to achieve financial stability
at an earlier stage of life. At the same time, addressing the affordability
of housing is increasingly recognised as a demographic priority
across Europe, as high housing costs and limited availability often
delay leaving the parental home, partnership formation and the decision
to have children. Investments in affordable housing, together with
measures to improve access to credit and support for first-time
homebuyers or tenants, can therefore contribute both to social inclusion
and demographic resilience.
51. Empowerment also requires enabling young people to reconcile
education, personal development, employment and family aspirations.
Accessible and affordable early childhood education and care, adequate parental
leave for both mothers and fathers, flexible working arrangements
and family-friendly workplaces reduce the costs associated with
parenthood and promote greater gender equality in both caregiving
and employment. Such measures help ensure that having children does
not require young adults, particularly women, to sacrifice educational
or professional opportunities, nor contribute further to the existing
gender pay gap. Equally important are investments in mental health
services, preventive healthcare and social protection, which strengthen
individual well-being and resilience during key life transitions.
52. Young people should also be recognised as active partners
in shaping demographic policy. Their participation in public decision-making,
youth organisations, local communities and social dialogue helps ensure
that demographic strategies respond to the realities and aspirations
of younger generations. Policies should pay particular attention
to young people facing structural disadvantages, including those
from rural areas, disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, migrant
communities, Roma and Traveller communities, and persons with disabilities,
ensuring that opportunities are accessible to all. Inclusive demographic
strategies that reduce inequalities and expand opportunities are
more likely to foster social cohesion and strengthen confidence
in the future.
5.3 Building
age-friendly societies
53. A third pillar is supporting
older generations and building age-friendly societies. With Europe’s
population ageing, experts warn not only of growing pressure on
pensions, health systems and long-term care, but also stress that
older people are a valuable resource which can be enhanced by policies
promoting healthy ageing, participation and autonomy. A resilient
demographic strategy thus avoids framing ageing as a burden and instead
focuses on prevention measures in healthcare, accessible services,
lifelong learning, support for family carers and environments that
allow older people to remain active, healthy, connected and respected.
Note This is consistent
with the UN calls which plead for inclusive health systems and age-friendly
policy responses that protect dignity over the entire life course.
54. Building age-friendly societies goes hand-in-hand with unlocking
the potential of the silver economy. As longevity reshapes European
societies, demographic change expands opportunities for innovation, employment
and sustainable economic growth. Age-friendly policies that promote
accessible infrastructure, digital inclusion, flexible work arrangements
and lifelong participation enable older people to remain active
as workers, consumers, volunteers and caregivers. At the same time,
the silver economy – encompassing goods, services and technologies
tailored to the needs and preferences of older populations – can
drive innovation across sectors such as healthcare, housing, mobility,
tourism and digital solutions, as well as family policies. A forward-looking
demographic strategy therefore integrates ageing into economic and
social policy, recognising older people not only as beneficiaries
of support but also as contributors to prosperity, resilience and intergenerational
solidarity.
5.4 Managing
migration: between brain-drain and brain-gain
55. Migration is the fourth major
policy lever, but experts are clear that it should be treated as
a managed complement, not a substitute, for broader demographic
adaptation. The European Parliament’s work on labour migration and
demographic change notes that legal migration can help address labour
shortages, yet it will not reverse population ageing on its own.
Figures, for instance, show that healthcare systems in certain European countries
depend increasingly on immigrants’ work: in Norway, Ireland, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and Sweden, respectively 43.6%, 40.6%, 39.5%, 32%
and 30% of doctors were foreign-trained in 2022.
Note
56. Some European countries put emphasis on re-migration of their
nationals such as Greece whose National Demographic Action Plan
encourages return migration through “Rebrain Greece” and related programmes.
The latter had helped to facilitate the return of 473 000 citizens
out of 747 000 who had left the country during the years of economic
crisis.
57. Several UN agencies advocate for expanding and diversifying
labour force participation (including more young and older workers,
persons with disabilities and migrants) to ease social and economic
pressures. I believe that Europe needs coherent migration governance
which is rights-based, skills-aware and linked with labour market,
integration and regional development policies. This also requires
respect for the rights of both migrants and the communities that
receive them, so that inward mobility would strengthen resilience
rather than deepen social strain.
5.5 Sustaining
well-being and prosperity through sustainable development
58. Europe’s demographic resilience
strategy should place sustainable development at its core by balancing social,
economic and environmental needs in a way that makes everyday life
more secure and livable. This means ensuring affordable housing,
childcare, healthcare, education, mobility, long-term care and support
for older persons so that people can form families, work and age
with dignity, while also supporting decent jobs, lifelong learning,
gender equality and adaptable labour markets so that ageing and
changing family patterns do not lead to exclusion or poverty.
59. There is also a need to invest in climate-resilient infrastructure,
clean transport, greener housing and protection against pollution
and environmental stress so that people feel confident about the
future and can settle fully in their communities. Demographic resilience
is ultimately about creating conditions in which people can choose
their lives freely and Europe can renew itself without compromising
the well-being of current or future generations.
5.6 Overcoming
the fertility gap and involuntary childlessness
60. As we have learned during the
hearings with experts, Europe’s birth rate is not only a demographic
issue but also a broader health, environmental and social policy
challenge. The ESHRE (European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology) factsheets link reduced human fertility to environmental
pollutants (present in the air, water and food), in particular endocrine
disrupting chemicals, and effects of climate change, while the Coalition
for Fertility stresses that involuntary childlessness can significantly
affect individual’s and couples’ mental health and quality of life.
Birth rates are also falling due to a rising age at first childbirth
and socio-financial uncertainties that delay decisions (by persons
or couples) to have children: whereas childbirth used to be mostly
completed in women’s twenties, it is now often delayed beyond 30
and even closer to the age of 40.
61. One way to narrow the fertility gap is to reduce preventable
environmental harms. Experts warn that global heat and air pollution
are associated with lowered fertility and adverse pregnancy outcomes
while exposure to multiple environmental pollutants correlates with
infertility, miscarriage, ovulatory disorders and earlier menopause.
This means that policy solutions should extend beyond clinic-based
care and include stronger action on air quality, climate mitigation
and exposure reduction to pollutants in workplaces, homes and consumer
products.
62. Another major area of policy action is tighter control of
endocrine disrupting chemicals which experts call a hidden threat
because they interfere with humans’ hormonal system, harm reproductive
cells (sperm and egg quality) and ovarian function, as well as increasing
the risk of miscarriage. In fact, nearly 100% of the population has
these endocrine disrupting chemicals in their bodies. In practical
terms, that requires stricter chemical regulation, clearer product
labelling and public health campaigns that help people understand
environmental risks and reduce exposure before conception of children
and throughout their whole lifetime.
63. Involuntary childlessness has a mental health dimension that
often goes under-addressed, with complex long-term consequences
– for individuals, families and society at large. Experts therefore
call for improved access to accurate information and mental health
support. Policies that normalise fertility counselling, psychosocial
care, and relationship support can help reduce distress while people
navigate treatment decisions, delays or childlessness.
64. The
European Atlas
of Fertility Treatment Policies 2024 shows how uneven access to treatment remains across
Europe and highlights the need for more equitable fertility care.
When treatment access depends too much on where someone lives, their
income or local eligibility rules, the fertility gap keeps widening
even if medical solutions exist. As it were, in countries where
fertility treatment is fully covered by the health system, births
through IVF (in vitro fertilisation) are more common. For example,
in Denmark about 8% to 9% of births each year were achieved through
IVF. Other countries such as Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain also have a strong public coverage
of fertility treatment procedures. A stronger European response
should combine prevention, access to care and comprehensive support
to those facing involuntary childlessness rather than dismissing
fertility issues only as an individual problem. In some countries,
such as Azerbaijan, Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Cyprus, Switzerland,
Slovakia, Georgia and Armenia, there is as yet little or no public
funding for medically assisted reproduction support, and this gap should
be filled.
6 Way
forward: the need for coherent, comprehensive and inclusive demographic
strategies
65. Europe’s demographic changes
are not a curse but a megatrend that calls for a coherent structural
policy response rather than a fragmented set of measures. Demographic
resilience requires a dual strategy: removing the obstacles that
discourage family formation and constrain the life choices across
generations, while adapting institutions, labour markets and social
protection systems to sustain economic prosperity and social cohesion
in societies where population growth can no longer be taken for
granted. That means prioritising affordable housing, accessible
childcare, adequate parental leave, stable employment and stronger
work-life balance measures, while also reducing the economic and
social penalties associated with parenthood. Public policy should
be designed to make family life compatible with professional development
and personal autonomy, not to impose demographic targets from above,
nor to roll back human rights in the areas of reproduction, sexuality
and gender equality.
66. A credible response also requires more inclusive and better
targeted family policies. Governments should adapt their frameworks
to the diversity of family forms and ensure that single-parent families,
rainbow families, families including persons with disabilities,
Roma and Traveller families, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged
groups have equal access to support, services and rights. This implies
stronger anti-discrimination safeguards, more accessible public
services, and a broader understanding of care as a shared social
responsibility. In parallel, policies must correct the persistent
gender imbalance in unpaid care and promote equal participation
in the labour market.
67. Demographic resilience also depends on improving the conditions
under which young people can build their future. Policy makers should
focus on youth employment, income security, access to adequate housing and
territorial cohesion, especially in regions affected by depopulation
and brain drain. If young adults can see realistic prospects in
their home regions, they are more likely to settle, form households
and invest in long-term life projects. This requires not only social
policy, but also investment in infrastructure, public services and regional
development.
68. Finally, ageing societies should be treated as an opportunity
for adaptation, not as a crisis to be managed only through cost
containment. Age-friendly policies, preventive health care, lifelong
learning and the recognition of older people as active contributors
should be central to public strategy. At the same time, migration
policy should be managed as a complementary instrument within a
broader demographic framework, not as a substitute for family support
and social reform. A coherent response must therefore combine social investment,
gender equality, territorial cohesion and sustainable development
in order to strengthen social cohesion and long-term stability.
