Observation of the extraordinary presidential elections in Georgia (5 January 2008)
Election observation report
| Doc. 11496
| 21 January 2008
- Author(s):
- Bureau of the Assembly
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Mátyás EÖRSI,
Hungary, ALDE
- Thesaurus
The extraordinary presidential elections in Georgia on 5 January
2008 were in essence consistent with most Council of Europe commitments
and standards for democratic elections. These were the first genuinely competitive
presidential elections in Georgia since its independence and in
general enabled the Georgian people to express their political will.
The shortcomings revealed during these elections form significant challenges
that need to be urgently addressed. Regrettably, the problems and
violations encountered, some of them serious, especially during
the vote count and tabulation, taint the overall election process.
1 Introduction
1. Following an invitation by
the Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia, the Bureau of the
Assembly decided, at its meeting on 27 November 2007, to set up
an ad hoc committee to observe the extraordinary presidential elections
scheduled for 5 January 2008, and appointed me as the chairperson
and rapporteur of the ad hoc committee.
2. On 4 October 2004, a co-operation agreement was signed between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission). In conformity with Article 15 of
the agreement,
Notethe
Bureau of the Assembly invited an expert from the Venice Commission
to join the ad hoc committee as adviser.
3. Based on the proposals by the political groups in the Assembly,
the ad hoc committee was composed as follows:
- Socialist Group (SOC)
- Mrs Meritxell
Batet, Spain
- Mr Jaime Blanco, Spain
- Mr Andreas Gross, Switzerland
- Mr Kastriot Islami, Albania
- Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Poland
- Mr Maximiano Martins, Portugal
- Mrs Carina Ohlsson, Sweden
- Mrs Gaby Vermot-Mangold, Switzerland
- Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Andres Herkel, Estonia
- Mrs Danuta Jazłowiecka, Poland
- Mrs Corien Jonker, Netherlands
- Mr Dariusz Lipiński, Poland
- Mr Vjačeslavs Stepanenko, Latvia
- Mr Piotr Wach, Poland
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Hungary
- Mr Andrea Rigoni, Italy
- European Democrat Group (EDG)
- Mr Ruhi Acikgöz, Turkey
- Mr Karol Karski, Poland
- Ms Ganira Pashayeva, Azerbaijan
- Mr David Wilshire, United Kingdom
- Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
- Venice Commission
- Mr Aivars
Endzins, Latvia
- Mr Gaël Martin-Micallef, Secretariat
- Secretariat of the Council of Europe
- Mr Bas Klein, Deputy Head of
Secretariat, Interparliamentary Co-operation and Election Observation
- Mr Bogdan Torcătoriu, co-Secretary, Committee on the Environment,
Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs
- Mrs Daniele Gastl, Assistant, Interparliamentary Co-operation
and Election Observation
4. The ad hoc committee acted
as part of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM),
which also included delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE-PA), the European Parliament (EP) and the Election Observation
Mission of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe’s
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).
5. The ad hoc committee met in Tbilisi from 3 to 6 January 2008
and held meetings with, inter alia, candidates
competing in these elections, the Chairman of the Central Election
Commission (CEC), the Head of the Election Observation Mission of
the OSCE/ODIHR and his staff, as well as representatives of civil
society and the mass media.
6. On election day, the ad hoc committee was split into 11 teams
which observed the elections in and around Batumi, Gori, Kakheti,
Kazreti, Rustavi, Tbilisi and Telavi.
7. In order to draw up an assessment of the electoral campaign,
as well as the political climate in the run-up to the elections,
the Bureau sent a pre-electoral mission to Georgia from 5 to 7 December
2007. The cross-party preelectoral delegation consisted of Mr Mátyás
Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE), Chairman of the ad hoc committee and head
of delegation, Mr Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC), Mr Andres Herkel
(Estonia, EPP/CD) and Ms Ganira Pashayeva (Azerbaijan, EDG). In
Tbilisi, the pre-electoral delegation met with, inter alia, the acting President
of Georgia, the acting Chairperson of the Parliament, the Chairman
of the Central Election Commission, the Chairmen of the Supreme
and Constitutional Courts, the Deputy Minister of the Interior,
the General Prosecutor, a cross-section of candidates running in
the elections, representatives of opposition and governing parties,
representatives of the international community in Georgia, as well
as representatives of the mass media and civil society. The statement
issued by the pre-electoral delegation at the end of their visit appears
in Appendix I.
8. In its statement of preliminary findings and conclusions delivered
the day after the elections, when the tabulation process was yet
to be completed, the IEOM unanimously concluded that the 5 January
2008 presidential election was in essence consistent with Council
of Europe and OSCE commitment and standards for democratic elections,
but that they revealed significant challenges that need to be urgently
addressed. This election was the first genuinely competitive presidential
election which enabled the Georgian people to express their political
choice. The joint IEOM press release appears in Appendix II.
9. The ad hoc committee wishes to thank the Parliament of Georgia,
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in Tbilisi for
their co-operation and the support provided to the ad hoc committee.
2 Political and legal context
10. After several days of tense
political protests in which early elections were demanded, President Saakashvili
declared, on 7 November 2007, the state of emergency in Georgia,
citing threats to the stability of the country. Subsequently, on
8 November 2007, the president announced that he would call for
early presidential elections, on 5 January 2008, as a means to resolve
the political crisis in the country. In addition, he decreed that
a non-binding referendum would be held on the same day, asking the
Georgian public whether they wished to have parliamentary elections
in the spring of 2008, as demanded by the opposition, or in autumn 2008,
as foreseen in the recently amended constitution. On 25 November
2007, President Saakashvili formally resigned, after which extraordinary
presidential elections were formally called for 5 January 2008,
in conformity with constitutional provisions. On 24 November 2007,
the day before he resigned, President Saakashvili announced that
an additional plebiscite, on NATO membership, would also be organised
on 5 January 2008.
11. The political climate in Georgia is dominated by the schism
between government and opposition and the resulting highly charged
polarised political debate and atmosphere of mutual mistrust. This
has been compounded by the effects of the events in November 2007.
In addition, since independence, changes of power in Georgia have
been initiated by revolutionary means rather than by elections,
which has had an impact on the political strategies of both opposition
and governmental forces.
12. These elections were governed by the Unified Election Code
of Georgia, the constitution and relevant provisions in other laws.
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe concluded in an opinion
that the Election Code of Georgia forms an adequate basis for the
organisation of democratic elections, if implemented in good faith.
However, as part of the dialogue initiated between the government
and opposition in the wake of the calling of elections, amendments
to the Election Code were adopted respectively on 22 November and
on 12 December 2007. While the Venice Commission has not yet been
able to give an opinion on the amendments to the electoral law,
the amendments mostly seem to address previous recommendations from
the international community, including the Assembly, Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR. However, it should be noted that amending the
election law so close to the elections in general runs counter to
the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission.
13. The amendments to the electoral law, inter
alia, changed the composition of the Central Election Commission
(CEC) and precinct election commissions (PECs); lowered the number
of signatures needed to nominate a candidate for the presidential
elections; lowered the maximum number of voters per polling station; introduced
the possibility for voters to be added to the voters’ lists on election
day; improved the provisions for allocation of free airtime and
campaign finances; changed the election system for parliamentary
elections and lowered the threshold to enter parliament from 7%
to 5%.
14. The introduction of the possibility for voters to be added
to the voters’ lists in the polling stations on election day is
an issue of concern. While this can be explained in the context
of the current state of the voters’ lists in Georgia and the redrawing
of polling station boundaries as a result of the reduction of the
maximum number of voters per polling station, same-day registration
in the polling station can be used as an avenue for electoral fraud
especially in the absence of fully adequate mechanisms to prevent
multiple registration and voting. In addition, in a recent opinion,
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe stated that the registration
of voters in the polling stations on election day runs counter to
Council of Europe standards.
15. The Election Code stipulates that the votes of persons that
are added to the voters’ list on election day are cast using special
envelopes. If more than 15 persons are added to the voters’ lists,
these ballots are sent to the CEC for counting. If fewer than 15
persons are added to the lists, the precinct election commissions
can decide to count these ballots themselves or to send them to
the CEC. However, the Election Code leaves it to the discretion
of the CEC to count these ballots or to set them aside, without
giving any legal conditions for such a decision by the CEC. This
arbitrary power of the CEC runs counter to the principle of the
universality of the vote and Council of Europe standards.
16. Also as a result of the recent amendments, the Election Code
contains inconsistencies and ambiguities and is open to wide and
varying interpretations. This affected both the administration of
the election, as well as the handling of election-related complaints
and appeals.
17. According to the electoral framework, the President of Georgia
is elected for a five-year term by an absolute majority of valid
votes cast. If no candidate receives an absolute majority of votes,
a second round of elections is organised between the two candidates
who gained the highest number of votes. In the second round, the
candidate that receives the greatest number of votes is considered
elected.
3 Election administration
18. These elections were administered
by a three-tiered election administration consisting of the CEC,
76 district election commissions (DECs) and 3 511 PECs. The CEC
and DECs are permanent commissions whose members are appointed for
a five-year term. PECs are set up specifically for an election and
are disbanded after the elections have been completed.
19. The recent amendments to the Election Code changed the composition
of the CEC and PECs. In line with these amendments, political parties
are now represented on these commissions. In addition to the six members
nominated by the president and appointed by the parliament, each
faction in parliament or party that received more than 4% of the
votes in the recent nationwide elections had one representative
on the CEC and PECs. In practice this meant that the CEC and PECs
were composed of 13 members, six of whom represented the opposition.
The composition of the DECs was not affected by the recent amendments,
but their role and powers are significantly reduced in the amended
election law. In line with the Election Code, the DECs consisted
of five members selected in an open competition and appointed by
the CEC.
20. The CEC worked in a transparent manner but on most decisions
split along party lines, highlighting the inconsistencies in the
Election Code and its openness for multiple interpretations. While
CEC decrees need a twothirds majority to be adopted, decisions were
often made in the form of orders, which only need a simple majority
to be adopted. In that manner, the CEC avoided a possible blockage
of its work as a result of the split between pro-government and
opposition representatives, but the legal basis for this appeared
at times questionable. The opposition parties were under-represented
in leadership positions in the PECs, with only two of the PEC chairpersons
being appointees of the opposition. The ruling United National Movement
held a de facto majority on the PECs.
21. In dealing with election-related complaints, the CEC failed
to follow provisions provided by the Election Code and international
standards. In its decisions it often split along party lines with
its members placing narrow party political interest before a sound
interpretation of the law. This was compounded by the inconsistencies and
ambiguities in the Unified Election Code, which allowed the CEC
to stretch the law beyond reasonable interpretation. The courts
heard election-related appeals in a professional manner, but their
decisions often lacked sufficient reasoning and sound legal basis,
raising some questions with regard to the independence of the judicial
system.
22. The late adoption of the amendments to the Election Code had
an impact on the training of, and delayed the publication of the
CEC manual for, PEC members. In a welcome development, the CEC conducted
an extensive voter education campaign through the national media.
4 Candidate and voter registration
23. Candidate registration was
open, transparent and inclusive, allowing for a genuinely competitive presidential
election.
24. In total, 22 persons applied for registration as a presidential
candidate. The CEC accepted the preliminary registration of 19 of
these prospective candidates, who were then asked to provide the
CEC with the legally required 50 000 supporting signatures in order
to be registered as a candidate for the presidential election. This
information was supplied to the CEC within the legal deadline by
13 prospective candidates. In line with the recent amendments to
the Election Code, candidates then had two days to correct errors
in their registration, including the possibility of providing additional
supporting signatures if necessary. After the conclusion of that
period, the CEC registered seven candidates for the presidential
election. Four candidates who were not registered appealed the CEC
decision at the court, which upheld the CEC decisions.
25. The seven registered candidates were: Mr Mikheil Saakashvili
of the ruling United National Movement, Mr Levan Chachechiladze
of the United Public Movement – the united opposition bloc, Mr David
Gamkrelidze of the New Rights Party, Mr Shalva Natelashvili of the
Labour Party of Georgia, Mr Giorgi Maisashvili of the Party of the
Future, Ms Irina Sarishvili of the Hope Party and independent candidate
Mr Arkadi Patarkatsishvili.
26. The accuracy of the voters’ lists has historically been problematic
in Georgia. The responsibility for the maintenance of the voters’
lists in Georgia lies with the CEC, who made a commendable effort
to increase their accuracy by a door-to-door verification of the
lists. As a result, a substantial number of records were revised. Following
the verification process, the voters’ lists were published for public
inspection. Voters could check the lists, and request corrections,
at the PECs, DECs and via the Internet and a CEC hotline. In total,
some 2 000 persons were added to the list and some 3 000 records
removed during the public scrutiny period. The deadline for public
scrutiny expired on 13 December 2007. However, as a result of the
recent amendments to the Election Code, citizens could be added
to the voters’ lists in the polling stations on election day.
27. Despite the verification efforts, the accuracy of the voters’
lists remained a point of concern for many stakeholders. As a result,
the inaccuracies, both real and perceived, became a campaign issue
during the pre-electoral period.
5 Pre-election period and
the media
28. The pre-electoral period was
characterised by a highly polarised campaign environment and a climate of
mutual distrust between opposition and governmental parties. A number
of opposition candidates focused their campaigns on allegations
that the elections would be rigged instead of on policy issues.
The pervasiveness of allegations by opposition candidates of election
violations on the one hand, and speculations and allegations by
government forces about post-election violence and preparations
for a coup d’état on the other hand, were not conducive to an issue-based
election campaign.
29. The electoral campaign was marred by allegations of abuse
of administrative resources by the campaign of the government candidate,
including the use of governmental welfare programmes for campaign
purposes and the active involvement of state officials on all levels
of his campaign. Even if within the limits of the law, this clearly
blurred the distinction between state and party resources and is
of concern to the ad hoc committee. When deciding on the few official
complaints which were filed in relation to this, the courts and
the CEC tended to stretch the law beyond reasonable interpretation
in favour of the ruling party candidate and government officials,
which resulted in all complaints being dismissed.
30. Allegations and reports of cases of intimidation, pressure
and violence against campaign activists, mostly from opposition
candidates, overshadowed the election campaign. A number of cases
of intimidation and violence, including kidnapping, could be verified
by the IEOM. The authorities generally seemed to investigate the
cases reported to it and, when allegations were substantiated, intervened.
The ruling party was reported to have reprimanded some of its supporters
in a number of cases. In a welcome development, the acting president
and the Minister of the Interior made several strong appeals to
United National Movement activists, as well as police and state
officials, to uphold the law and to refrain from any actions that
might undermine the integrity of the elections. However, a more
proactive approach from the authorities in investigating allegations
of intimidation and abuse may have lessened the pervasiveness of
the allegations and would have strengthened public confidence in
the election process. Although the cases reported were isolated, and
no organised patterns could be detected, it is clear that intimidation
and pressure on campaign activists, as well as other election-related
violence, have no place in a democratic society.
31. In general, all candidates were able to campaign freely around
the country. The campaign was active and mostly focused on large
public rallies. The campaign was more extensive in the capital than
in the regions. One candidate, Mr Patarkatsishvili, remained abroad
during the campaign period, citing that he feared arrest after being
accused of trying to overthrow the government by the authorities.
It should be noted that all candidates have immunity from arrest
during the campaign period, but this can be lifted by the CEC upon request
of the public prosecutor.
32. The ad hoc committee welcomed the establishment of an Inter-Agency
Task Force by the acting president to liaise with international
and domestic observers. In a number of cases, the acting president intervened
personally to address opposition concerns.
33. Georgia has a generally free and diverse media environment,
which offers the citizens access to a wide range of political views.
The closure by the authorities of Imedi, a broadcaster that openly
supports the opposition, and the subsequent declaration of a state
of emergency, affected the media environment in the run-up to these
elections, with some journalists seemingly more willing to apply
self-censorship than before.
34. Both print and broadcast media offered a wide and diverse
coverage of the election campaign, enabling the voters to become
familiar with the platforms of the different candidates. However,
private media generally showed a bias in favour of the ruling party
candidate in both the extent and the tone of coverage. While the public
broadcaster was more balanced in its coverage, its tone of reporting
equally favoured the ruling party candidate. Regrettably, a televised
debate between the leading candidates did not take place as a result
of Mr Saakashvili’s decision not to participate in reaction to the
negative campaigning and personal attacks on him by the opposition
candidates.
35. The amended electoral law contains extensive provisions for
the allocation of free airtime and equal conditions for paid advertising
on both private and public broadcasters. The electoral law makes
a differentiation between qualified (e.g. supported by parties that
won at least 4% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections
and at least 3% of the vote in the last local elections) and unqualified
candidates. While this may be understandable in the context of the
relatively low barriers for the nomination of a candidate, it can hinder
media access for the so-called unqualified candidates, especially
to the private broadcast media. The ad hoc committee therefore welcomed
the decision by the public television to offer free airtime to all
– qualified and unqualified – candidates.
6 Election day – vote count
and tabulation
36. On election day, voting was
generally peaceful, despite widespread allegations beforehand that
violent incidents would take place. IEOM observers in general assessed
the voting positively, although the process was often chaotic and
disorganised. A number of polling stations opened with a delay,
which seemed mostly to be the result of unfamiliarity of the PECs
with the legally prescribed procedures.
37. A number of shortcomings and violations were witnessed, including
the presence of unauthorised persons in the polling stations, attempted
agitation, as well as four cases of ballot stuffing and one case
of carousel voting. In addition, a few cases of multiple and proxy
voting were noted as well as seemingly identical signatures on the
voters’ lists, which could be an indication that multiple voting
had taken place.
38. A considerable number of persons, around 85 000, were added
to the voters’ lists in the polling stations on election day. This
seemed to confirm the concerns of the ad hoc committee with regard
to the accuracy of the voters’ lists and is especially of concern
in relation to the fact that the inking of voters’ fingers, introduced as
a mechanism to avoid multiple voting, was not, or was inconsistently,
applied, diminishing its effectiveness as a safeguard against electoral
fraud.
39. The vote count was less positively evaluated, with a number
of procedural shortcomings observed. The counting process was generally
slow and a significant number of PECs had problems following the
legally prescribed counting procedures, which highlighted the impact
of the last-minute changes to the election procedures and the late
publication of the PEC handbook. Regrettably, results protocols
were often not posted on the PECs for public scrutiny, in contravention
of the Election Code.
40. Owing to protracted counting procedures, the tabulation process
could not be evaluated in time for the joint IEOM press conference
the day after the elections. However, the finalisation of the vote
count and the tabulation process was observed by the IEOM through
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission observers and their
findings are therefore an integral part of this report.
41. In general, it appeared that PECs had problems with completing,
or were unaware of how to complete, the results protocols. In a
considerable number of PECs observed (21%), IEOM observers noted
significant procedural errors and omissions in the completion of
the results protocols. In addition, tampering with the results protocols
was witnessed in a significant number of PECs observed (8%), which
is of considerable concern to your rapporteur.
42. In a welcome development, in order to enhance the transparency
of the tabulation process, the CEC started posting the results protocols
on its website in the early morning following the elections.
43. The latest amendments to the Election Code stipulate that
the results protocols should be sent directly from the PECs to the
CEC, in order to increase the transparency of the process and to
avoid any manipulations with the protocols at DEC level. However,
as a considerable number of PECs lacked the necessary equipment and
infrastructure to do this, the DECs were tasked to send the results
protocols of the PECs under their authority to the CEC directly
upon receipt. Regrettably, it appeared that, in some instances,
DECs corrected the PEC results protocols, in contravention of the
law. In a few cases, the PEC protocols in possession of the IEOM
showed different results from those provided by the DEC.
44. The overall turnout reported by the CEC was 56.19%. However,
a significant number of PECs reported an unrealistically high turnout
in the last three hours of the elections, which could be an indication
of possible misconduct. For example, in some PECs, the increase
in turnout would indicate that a voter was processed every thirteen
seconds during this period.
45. In line with legal provisions, some 930 PECs sent the ballots
that were cast by voters on the additional lists to the CEC to be
counted. The counting of these ballots at the CEC took place in
often chaotic circumstances and counting procedures were not uniformly
applied, especially with regard to ballot validity. The validity
of ballots was considered on the basis of a CEC ordinance, which
was only adopted after election day and which was more permissive
than the relevant provisions in the Election Code. IEOM observers
noted that, for some PECs, significant numbers of ballots were filled
out identically, which could be an indication of tampering. However,
all these ballots were declared valid.
46. Your rapporteur is considerably concerned by the fact that
the election commissions – including the CEC – and the courts appeared
not to adequately consider, or investigate, the majority of complaints
of irregularities that were filed with them. Almost all complaints
lodged with the election commissions were rejected on technical
grounds, or without sound legal justification, which would appear
to demonstrate an apparent unwillingness to consider the subject
matter of the complaints. In addition, the courts rejected the vast
majority of the 50 appeals lodged with them, mostly on technical
grounds. In a welcome development, the authorities are reported
to have started a number of criminal investigations related to violations
on election day. At the time of writing, four complaints against
the final results announced by the CEC, as well as 19 appeals against
court decisions, were still pending. The deadline for the court
decisions is 21 January 2008.
47. On 13 January 2008, the CEC announced the results of the extraordinary
presidential elections. These results were adopted by the CEC by
a simple majority of its members, with all six opposition representatives voting
against the decision. With a turnout of 56.19%, Mikheil Saakashvili
was elected with an absolute majority of 53.47% of the vote, avoiding
the need for a second round. Mr Levan Chachechiladze won 25.69%
of the vote, Mr Arkadi Patarkatishvili 7.10%, Mr David Gamkrelidze
4.01%, Mr Shalva Natelashvili 6.49%, Mr Giorgi Maisashvili 0.77%
and Ms Irina Sarishvili 0.16% of the vote. In total, the results
of six PECs were corrected by the CEC and the results in 12 PECs
were invalidated due to irregularities, five of them by the CEC
and seven of them by court order. The total number of ballots invalidated
was 33 129.
48. It should be noted that the political atmosphere in Georgia
remained highly polarised after the elections and was characterised
by widespread allegations by the opposition that the results of
the election would be falsified. However, the allegations of widespread
fraud, at the time of writing, could not be independently verified,
or backed up by conclusive evidence.
7 Conclusions
and recommendations
49. The extraordinary presidential
elections in Georgia on 5 January 2008 were in essence consistent
with most Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic
elections. These were the first genuinely competitive presidential
elections in Georgia since its independence and in general enabled
the Georgian people to express their political will. The shortcomings
revealed during these elections form significant challenges that
need to be urgently addressed. Regrettably, the problems and violations
encountered, some of them serious, especially during the vote count
and tabulation, taint the overall election process.
50. It is beyond doubt that the violations and irregularities
raise questions regarding the credibility of these elections in
the eyes of the Georgian people. This is the main challenge that
the Georgian authorities need to address without delay. The authorities
should therefore fully, and transparently, investigate all election violations
and complaints that are brought to their attention and provide full
openness with regard to the grounds on which these complaints are
rejected or declared admissible.
51. The Georgian authorities are requested to provide the Monitoring
Committee of the Assembly with a complete list of all official election
complaints, jointly with the decisions, and the underlying argumentation,
that were taken on them. The ad hoc committee would suggest that
the two co-rapporteurs for Georgia include in their future work
the scrutiny of the manner in which elections complaints and appeals
were handled.
52. The manner in which the courts adjudicated on election-related
complaints raises some questions regarding the independence of the
judiciary in Georgia.
53. The electoral framework in general provides an adequate basis
for the organisation of democratic elections. However, the Election
Code contains inconsistencies and ambiguities and is open to wide
and varying interpretations. In addition, the last-minute changes
to the Election Code, while generally addressing long-standing recommendations
of the Assembly, have not been subject to an opinion of the Venice Commission
of the Council of Europe. The ad hoc committee therefore recommends
that the Georgian authorities request an opinion of the Venice Commission
on the Election Code, and, with its co-operation, work to eliminate
any shortcomings and inconsistencies encountered before the next
elections take place.
54. The accuracy of the voters’ lists remains a point of concern.
The authorities should pursue unabated their efforts to improve
the accuracy of the voters’ lists, taking into account the additions
made to the voters’ lists on election day.
55. The possibility for persons to be added to the voters’ lists
in the polling stations on election day is of concern, especially
in the context of the inconsistent application of the provisions
for inking voters’ fingers as a mechanism to prevent multiple voting
by the same persons. Furthermore, the addition of voters to the
voters’ lists in the polling stations by the election commissions
on election day runs counter to Council of Europe standards. The
possibility to be added in the polling stations by the election
commissions on election day should therefore be abolished for future
elections, including the upcoming parliamentary elections in the
spring of 2008.
56. The allegations of abuse of administrative resources dominated
the election campaign. To a certain extent, this was also the result
of inconsistent and unclear regulations in the Election Code, which
allow the blurring of state and party functions during the election
period. This should be remedied for future elections. In addition,
proper regulations regarding the transparency and disclosure of
campaign financing should be adopted in order to bolster the legitimacy
of the election process in the eyes of the Georgian public.
57. Pressure and intimidation on citizens and campaign activists
have no place in a democratic society. The Georgian authorities
should therefore fully investigate any such cases brought to their
attention, and if substantiated, perpetrators should be prosecuted
and sanctioned to the fullest extent of the law. For the sake of
public confidence in the electoral process, a climate of impunity
for election offences should not be allowed to exist.
Appendix
Georgia:
restoring confidence in democratic elections is the joint responsibility
of all political forcesNote
(Strasbourg, 7 December 2007)
International
Election Observation Mission – Georgian election in essence consistent
with most commitments but challenges must be addressed urgentlyNote
(Strasbourg, 6 January 2008)
