- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 28 January 2004 (4th Sitting) (see Doc.10028, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur:
Mr Eörsi). Text adopted by the Assembly on
28 January 2004 (4th Sitting).
- Thesaurus
1. The problem
of Cyprus, which has now been divided for several decades, has seen
some major developments since the adoption of Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 1267 (2002) on the situation in Cyprus, but Nicosia is the last
and only capital city in Europe which is divided not only politically
but also by military forces. Positive momentum has been generated
by the direct negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities
in the framework of the good offices of Kofi Annan, United Nations
Secretary General, the magnet effect of European Union enlargement,
Turkey’s more constructive attitude and the changes in public opinion
in the northern part of Cyprus, leading to hopes that a just and
lasting solution will at last be found to the Cyprus problem.
2. However, despite the efforts of the international community
and the rallying of Cypriot political forces, the Cyprus problem
remains unresolved and Cypriots divided.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly particularly deplores the failure,
in March 2003, of negotiations on the settlement of the Cyprus problem
on the basis of the plan presented by Kofi Annan, when Mr Denktash,
the Turkish Cypriot leader, rejected the plan while Mr Papadopoulos,
President of the Republic of Cyprus, appeared willing to sign it.
The Assembly welcomes the recent statements by leaders of the Cypriot communities
and by the governments of Greece and Turkey that they are prepared
to resume negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan, and calls
on all the parties concerned to resume negotiations without delay,
to conduct them in good faith and to be prepared to take into account
each other’s concerns and to make compromises in order to reach
a settlement before European Union enlargement.
4. If no settlement is reached, a divided Cyprus will join the
European Union on 1 May 2004. The Assembly fears this may result
in a hardening of the two communities’ leaders’ positions and perpetuate
the current deadlock.
5. While the Greek Cypriots will benefit from the advantages
attendant on Cyprus’ accession to the European Union, the Turkish
Cypriots will be deprived of them, as the implementation of the
acquis communautaire in the northern part of Cyprus will be suspended
in accordance with Protocol No. 10 to the Treaty on Accession of
the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. There is a real danger
that the Turkish Cypriot community will be increasingly sidelined,
the economy will decline still further and tensions will increase.
In this respect, the Assembly welcomes the set of measures adopted
by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in order to give the
Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to enjoy several rights and benefits
that the Republic of Cyprus offers to its citizens.
6. Furthermore, if a de facto divided Cyprus joins the European
Union, this is likely to undermine the prospects for Turkey’s accession
and consequently destabilise the situation throughout this region
of Europe. In this respect, the Assembly stresses that Turkey has
a key role to play in the search for a settlement leading to the
reunification of Cyprus. Although the question of Cyprus is not
an explicit part of the Copenhagen criteria as such, the Assembly
believes that if Turkey does not normalise its relations with Cyprus,
this might be perceived by the European Union as a lack of readiness,
on the part of Turkey, to fully remove obstacles to accession negotiations.
The Assembly welcomes the Turkish Government’s more open-minded
and pragmatic approach to the Cyprus problem and invites it to exert
all its influence in support of the United Nations Secretary General’s
efforts to achieve a settlement. Moreover, while being aware of
Turkey’s concerns with respect to the security of Turkish Cypriots,
the Assembly is confident that these concerns will be addressed
once the settlement is reached. At the same time, the Assembly believes
that Turkey should be given clearer guarantees that negotiations
on European Union membership will start once the fulfilment of the
Copenhagen criteria is confirmed by the European Union.
7. The elections held in the northern part of Cyprus on 14 December
2003 have shown that the Turkish Cypriot community is very divided
with regard to the choices concerning its future.
8. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that a substantial proportion
of the Turkish Cypriot community is now in favour of a settlement
based on the Annan Plan and of a reunified Cyprus joining the European
Union. Accession is seen increasingly as a source of hope rather
than a threat, and division as an obstacle to the Turkish Cypriots’
future in Europe rather than a means of protecting their rights.
The Assembly welcomes the fact that Turkish Cypriot political leaders
sharing these views have growing support from the population of
the northern part of Cyprus. The Assembly is concerned, however,
that some Turkish Cypriot political leaders perceive certain concessions
as preconditions to the negotiation, while most, if not all, of
those concessions can be achieved as a result of successful negotiations.
9. At the same time the Assembly is aware that many other Turkish
Cypriots still perceive the Greek Cypriot community as a security
threat and Turkey as the best guarantee that the tragic events of
the past will not happen again. Consequently, reunification of the
two parts of Cyprus and accession to the European Union without
Turkey being a member still inspire mistrust. Some Turkish Cypriot
leaders still use these feelings of mistrust to justify their uncompromising
position. Recalling that one of the greatest achievements of the European
Union has been its ability to resolve centuries-long conflicts among
nations and ethnic groups, the Assembly believes that there are
no grounds for these feelings. Noting with satisfaction that no
incidents have occurred between Greek and Turkish Cypriots since
the re-opening of the “Green Line”, the Assembly believes that the
persistence of such fears is a clear indication that Greek Cypriot
authorities must do more to rebuild confidence between the two communities.
Certain attitudes and statements on the part of the Greek Cypriot authorities
would unfortunately seem to have substantiated these feelings.
10. It is for the leaders of the two communities to overcome the
pattern of confrontation based on past fears and on efforts to secure
unilateral advantages and to turn to the future of their communities,
which share the same island and will hopefully have a common future
within the European Union.
11. In this connection, the Assembly welcomes the steps taken
by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and
the Turkish Cypriot administration, on the other, to build confidence
between the two communities, and encourages them to make further
efforts and show greater openness in this respect.
12. The Assembly therefore:
12.1 calls
on the leaders of the two communities:
12.1.1 to resume negotiations without delay, and in good faith,
on the basis of the Annan Plan, with a view to reaching a political
settlement of the Cyprus problem by 1 May 2004;
12.1.2 to make further efforts to build confidence between the
two communities;
12.1.3 to respond in a constructive manner to steps taken in
that direction with special regard to the concerns of the other
community;
12.2 calls on the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus:
12.2.1 to continue to confirm their
willingness to resume negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan,
with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus
problem by 1 May 2004, and to be ready to start negotiations as
soon as the United Nations Secretary General resumes his mission
of good offices;
12.2.2 during these negotiations, to show understanding of, and
good will to address, the Turkish Cypriots’ concerns, including
those relating to the resettlement of the population, the use of
property, the viability of the solution to be reached, and the perceived
political and economic dominance of the Greek Cypriots;
12.2.3 to refrain from any attitudes, acts or statements that
might be interpreted as designed to assert the dominant position
of the Greek Cypriot community, or might be perceived as a threat by
the Turkish Cypriot community, or might revive and fuel the mistrust
and suspicion of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey;
12.2.4 to eliminate any remaining obstacles to contact and exchange
between the two communities, including prosecution of those staying
overnight in the northern part of Cyprus and confiscation of personal
items bought there;
12.2.5 to facilitate the Turkish Cypriot community’s commercial
exchanges with other countries;
12.2.6 to develop relations with Turkey;
12.2.7 to continue to confirm their commitment, after the enlargement
of the European Union, not to oppose Turkey’s application for membership;
12.3 calls on the Turkish Cypriot authorities:
12.3.1 to demonstrate their willingness
to accept the Annan Plan as the basis of negotiations aimed at reaching
a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 1 May 2004,
and to be ready to start negotiations as soon as the United Nations
Secretary General resumes his mission of good offices;
12.3.2 during these negotiations, to show understanding of, and
good will to address, the Greek Cypriots’ concerns, including those
relating to the resettlement of the population, the use of property,
the viability of the solution to be reached, and the viability and
the functionality of a reunified Cyprus in terms of decision making
and its responsibilities vis-à-vis the European Union;
12.3.3 to refrain from pursuing the policy of establishing a
separate sovereign “state” in Cyprus;
12.3.4 to abstain from exploiting fears originating from the
near or remote past in order to revive and fuel the mistrust and
suspicion of the Greek Cypriot community and Greece;
12.3.5 to further contribute to the freedom of movement across
the “Green Line”, including by cancelling the obligation for Greek
Cypriots to present their passports and to obtain “entry permits”
12.3.6 to adopt a more positive approach to the European Union;
12.3.7 to take further measures to ensure freedom of expression
and freedom of the media;
12.3.8 to respect human rights, including the right to property
and its peaceful enjoyment, and to respect the fundamental freedoms
of all lawful Cypriot citizens throughout the territory of Cyprus,
in particular those of the displaced and enclaved Greek Cypriots;
12.3.9 to co-operate in the efforts for establishing the fate
of missing persons and to respond positively to the latest appeal
by the United Nations Secretary General of 3 December 2003, for the
reactivation of the Committee on Missing Persons, which the President
of the Republic of Cyprus accepted in his letter of 14 December
2003;
12.4 calls on Turkey:
12.4.1 to
use its influence to assist the resumption and smooth conduct of
the negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan in good faith;
12.4.2 to show good will for restoring confidence with the Republic
of Cyprus by withdrawing, prior to reaching a comprehensive solution
of the Cyprus issue, a considerable number of its troops deployed
in the northern part of Cyprus;
12.4.3 to develop relations with the Republic of Cyprus, including
lifting the ban against entering ports in Turkey imposed on vessels
registered in the Republic of Cyprus and on vessels sailing under
other flags which enter the ports of the Republic of Cyprus, and
to sign a trade agreement with the Republic of Cyprus in accordance
with the commitment made by Turkey to the World Trade Organization
and its obligations under its Customs Union Agreement with the European
Union;
12.4.4 to co-operate effectively in the efforts to ascertain
the fate of the missing persons in Cyprus and to fully implement
the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) pertaining to the tragic problem of the
missing persons and their families and abide by and fulfil, without
any further delay, its obligations and duties stemming from the
aforementioned judgment;
12.5 calls on Greece:
12.5.1 to
contribute to the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the
Annan Plan in good faith and encourage the authorities of the Republic
of Cyprus to continue to confirm their willingness to accept the
plan as the basis for a settlement;
12.6 calls on the European Union:
12.6.1 to reconsider how it could encourage Turkey’s positive
involvement in the search for a settlement of the Cyprus problem
by giving the Turkish authorities clearer guarantees for the opening
of accession negotiations, once the appropriate criteria are fulfilled
and this is confirmed by the European Union;
12.6.2 to increase efforts to bring the northern part of Cyprus
closer to the European Union;
12.6.3 to ease conditions for the access of products from the
northern part of Cyprus to the single market;
12.7 encourages the United Nations Secretary General to resume
his efforts as soon as an opportunity arises and urges him to pay
special attention to security issues on the island, which are the
main source of mutual mistrust, and to embark on negotiations with
the flexibility required for the purpose;
12.8 decides to reconsider the issue after the enlargement
of the European Union.
