B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr George Loucaides, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
and origin of the report
1. On 26 January 2016, the Parliamentary
Assembly granted the Parliament of Jordan partner for democracy
status.
Note After
the parliaments of Morocco, Palestine and Kyrgyzstan, the Parliament
of Jordan thus became the fourth parliament to be granted this status,
which the Assembly had introduced in 2009 to develop “institutional
co-operation with parliaments of non-member States in neighbouring
regions wishing to benefit from the Assembly’s experience in democracy
building and to participate in the political debate on common challenges
which transcend European boundaries”.
Note
2. Upon making its official request for the status, the Parliament
of Jordan declared that it shared the same values as those upheld
by the Council of Europe and undertook substantive political commitments.
When granting the status, the Assembly stressed that Jordan needed
to continue and deepen the constitutional, institutional, political
and legal reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions,
the rule of law and respect for human rights. It singled out benchmarks
which are of key importance in this context.
3. On 10 October 2017, when evaluating the partnership for democracy
in respect of the Parliament of Jordan for the first time, the Assembly
concluded that “even though the reforms [were] advancing more slowly than
planned, some vital reforms [had] been carried out, as regards both
democracy and the elections scheduled, and decentralisation or social
affairs (legislation favourable to women)”. Considering that Jordan was
moving in the right direction, the Assembly resolved to “support
Jordan at this difficult time and continue and expand its support
as part of a progressive and trusting approach leading towards greater
democracy and greater rights.” For the Assembly, “Jordan and Europe
[had] everything to gain from this partnership.”
Note
4. As a follow-up to this first evaluation, the Committee on
Political Affairs and Democracy was instructed to review the progress
achieved in implementing the political commitments undertaken by
the Jordanian Parliament and the recommendations addressed to it
by the Assembly.
Note Mr Mogens Jensen
(Denmark, SOC) was appointed rapporteur and carried out a fact-finding
visit to Jordan on 27-28 November 2018. Reporting back to the committee
from this visit, he noted that due to internal and external circumstances,
not much had changed in Jordan in 2018. Mr Jensen left the Assembly
in June 2019 following his appointment to a ministerial post.
5. On 2 October 2019, following the expiry of the above-mentioned
reference, the committee tabled a motion for a resolution on the
“Evaluation of the partnership for democracy in respect of the Parliament
of Jordan” and I was appointed rapporteur on 29 January 2020.
1.2 Fact-finding
visit to Amman, 25-27 September 2022
6. On 25-27 September 2022, nearly
five years after the last evaluation of the partnership for democracy in
respect of the Parliament of Jordan, I carried out a fact-finding
visit to Amman. The visit allowed me to assess the state of progress
achieved in implementing the political commitments undertaken by
the Jordanian Parliament and moving reforms forward in the areas
mentioned in the previous two resolutions. It also allowed me to
grasp the complexity in which Jordan – which is caught in the middle
of the region’s problems and has for decades suffered all the consequences
of the regional conflicts, including a constant influx of refugees which
it has dealt with exemplarity – operates.
7. I would like to thank the Parliament of Jordan, particularly
Mr Abdel Haleem Alhumood, member of the partner for democracy delegation,
for organising the visit and the great hospitality we received.
I would also like to thank the Cypriot Ambassador, Mr Michalis Ioannou,
for organising the meetings with the representatives of civil society
and the diplomatic community in Amman.
8. In Amman, I met Mr Abdel-Karim Deghmi, Speaker of the House
of Representatives; Mr Faisal Al Fayez, President of the Senate;
Mr Khaled Al Bakkar, member of the Royal Committee to Modernise
the Political System and former Chairperson of the Jordanian partner
for democracy delegation; Mr Mousa Al Maaitah, President of the
Independent Election Commission; Mr Rahiel Garaibeh, President of
the National Centre for Human Rights; Ms Maha Ali, Secretary General
of the Jordanian National Commission for Women; and the chairpersons
of parliamentary blocks at the House of Representatives.
9. I also had a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Expatriates with representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, including Ambassador
Fayez Khouri, Director of the European Affairs Department; Ambassador
Motaz Hyasat, Director of the Legal Affairs Department; and Ambassador
Raghad Alsaqqa, Director of the Human Rights Department.
10. Furthermore, I had a working dinner hosted by the Cypriot
Ambassador, Mr Michalis Ioannou, with the following representatives
of the diplomatic community: Mr Oskar Wüstinger, Ambassador of Austria;
Mr Dimitar Mihaylov, Ambassador of Bulgaria; Ms Maria Hadjitheodosiou,
Ambassador of the European Union; Ms Eleftheria Galathianaki, Ambassador
of Greece; Mr Attila Kali, Ambassador of Hungary; and Mr Harry Verweij,
Ambassador of the Netherlands.
11. Lastly, I had meetings with representatives of civil society:
Mr Nidal Mansour, Executive Director of the Center for Defending
Freedom of Journalists, and Mr Basem Subaih from the same organisation;
Ms Linda Alkalash, Director of Tamkeen for legal aid and human rights;
Ms Abeer Mdanat, Director of Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency;
Ms Amenah Al Zubi, President of the Jordanian Women’s Union; Ms
Randa Qsous, President of Arab Women Organization of Jordan; and
Mr Amer Bani Amer, General Director of Al Hayat Center for Civil
Society Development.
12. At the beginning of all my meetings, I explained the purpose
of my visit and reminded my interlocutors about Jordan’s commitments.
Everyone I met was open and co-operative and were supportive of
the Jordanian Parliament’s partner for democracy status with the
Assembly. The officials stressed that Jordan remained committed
to the objectives of the partnership and was continuing to make
reforms in the right direction. Political change was taking place
but had to be gradual and would take time in a country with a conservative tribal
society. Some acknowledged that more could be done, while underlining
the challenges the country faced due to its geopolitical situation.
2 General
context
13. Jordan is one of the countries
most affected by the Syrian conflict and hosts a very high number
of Syrian refugees, with 672 000 registered and the total number
estimated to be around 1.3 million.
Note These are to
be added to the 2.3 million long-term Palestinian refugees registered
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East as of March 2018,
Note and refugees from Iraq,
Sudan, Yemen and other countries (roughly 88 000 people), thus amounting
to approximately 3.6 million refugees in a country of 10.2 million
inhabitants (which is over 36% of the population).
14. While Jordan demonstrates exemplarity in the way it deals
with such influx, for which the Assembly congratulated the country
on several occasions, the situation of these refugees remains an
area of concern. Their needs are considerable and constitute a permanent
challenge. To support Jordan as well as the surrounding countries
also affected by the Syrian crisis, a Regional Refugee and Resilience
Plan was set up in 2015 by the UN agencies, NGO partners and several
governments, granting them US$5.8 billion for 2021.
Note On a positive
note, the Government of Jordan included refugees in the National
Health Response Plan and its Covid-19 vaccination programme.
15. Jordan’s already fragile economy
Note was
hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic,
Note which had particularly profound
effects on the service sector, travel receipts, and tourism – all
key sectors of growth for the Jordanian economy. The World Bank
estimated the Jordanian economy to have contracted by 1.6% in 2020,
with unemployment rising to 24.7% in the fourth quarter of 2020
and youth unemployment reaching an unprecedented 50%. Female unemployment,
which had been declining between 2017 (31.2%) and 2019 (27%), rose
sharply to 32.8%.
Note
16. In 2022, Jordan began its recovery from the Covid‑19 shock.
However, the Covid‑19 crisis exacerbated Jordan’s jobs challenge:
unemployment stood at 23.3% in the last quarter of 2021, youth unemployment stagnating
at 50% and the women’s labour force participation rate is 14%, one
of the lowest in the world.
Note
3 The implementation of Jordan’s political
commitments
3.1 Elections
17. In its request for the partner
for democracy status, the Jordanian Parliament undertook to “keep
the electoral process in compliance with international standards
for parliamentary elections.”
18. During its first evaluation in 2017, the Assembly welcomed
the passage of the new electoral law and the holding of early parliamentary
elections in September 2016, which it was invited to observe. While
it was disappointed by the low turnout, the Assembly noted with
satisfaction that the elections were free and well organised, even
though tribal or financial powers remained influential. At the same
time, the representation of women in parliament had increased substantially.
19. Likewise, the Assembly welcomed the holding of local elections
in August 2017, according to the new legislation on decentralisation.
It considered that these elections were also free and well organised
(despite the dominance of tribal or financial forces) but regretted
the low participation. It also noted that the representation of
women had made strong progress.
20. On 10 November 2020, despite an adverse pandemic situation,
Note Jordan
held parliamentary elections as scheduled, within their constitutional
deadline of four years. Upon the invitation of the Independent Election Commission,
the Bureau of the Assembly decided to observe the elections and
constituted an
ad hoc committee
for this purpose. However, due to the global sanitary situation
and the travel restrictions enacted by a number of member States
regarding travel to Jordan, the observation mission had to be cancelled.
21. The elections saw the lowest turnout in more than a decade:
only 29.9% of eligible voters cast their ballot, down from 36% in
2016. Despite a significant participation of political parties (41
out of 48 political parties ran for elections), only 12 party members
won a seat, with the vast majority of winners being – once again
– affiliated with tribal and financial powers.
Note While there was an increase
in women candidates, they still represented less than one fourth
of all candidates, and only 15 women were elected (down from 20
in the previous parliament), which corresponded to the legal quota.
Nevertheless, the increase of women candidates was commented as
a reflection of women’s enthusiasm to have a voice and more confidence
in their capability to serve.
Note
22. It has been claimed that Jordan’s 2020 elections were the
least democratic and transparent that the country ever witnessed,
due mainly to the Covid-19 pandemic and its consequences.
Note However, according to a case
study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, “while the pandemic did have certain adverse effects
on the integrity of the elections (…) the weakness in Jordan’s 2020
elections cannot be solely attributed to the public health emergency”.
Note It is argued that the lack of a level
playing field was due to a number of factors that impact on the
elections, including an electoral system that weakens political parties,
and a growing trend of restrictions on freedom of expression. While
the case study acknowledges that concerns about the coronavirus
transmission also contributed to the very low voter turnout, it
considers the latter as an element indicating voter apathy and mistrust
in the parliament’s effectiveness and its actual authority to legislate.
23. I believe that the mere fact that, despite the pandemic, the
elections were organised and conducted according to schedule and
without any major problems is to be welcomed. It is proof that the
democratic institutions and processes in Jordan have reached a certain
level of resilience and maturity.
24. Two months after the elections, King Abdullah II called for
a political reform expressing the need to “revisit laws regulating
political life, such as the elections, political parties, and local
administration laws”.To this end, he
ordered the formation of an appointed body, the Royal Committee
to Modernise the Political System, with the mission of putting forward
new draft election and political parties laws, looking into the
necessary constitutional amendments connected to the two laws and
the mechanisms of parliamentary work, providing recommendations
on developing legislation regulating local administration, expanding
participation in decision-making, and creating a political and legislative
environment conducive to the active engagement of youth and women
in public life.
Note On
4 October 2021, the Royal Committee submitted its final report.
25. As a follow-up to the Royal Committee’s report, a new Political
Parties Law and a new Election Law for the House of Representatives
were adopted by the parliament, as well as a number of constitutional amendments.
The new law on political parties prohibits “to harass” Jordanians
(…) because of their or any of their relatives’ participation in
a political party.It also prohibits exposing
students of higher education institutions because of their affiliation
and party and political activity.
Note The
new law also requires 20% of founding members of political parties
to be women and young people aged between 18 and 35.
Note
26. Under the new Election Law, political parties will witness
a gradual increase in seats in the upcoming House of Representatives,
starting from 30% (41 seats) for the next elections, which will
increase to 50% in the following elections, until finally reaching
65%. The law requires having at least one woman among the first three
candidates on the general list and within the next three candidates,
in addition to having a young man or woman (35 years old or younger)
within the first five candidates.
Note The law also
reduces the number of constituencies down to 18 (previously 45),
and increases the legal quota for women from 15 to 18 seats, the same
as the number of constituencies.
Note It reduces the age of eligibility
to 25 years (previously 30).
27. Clearly, these new laws aim at encouraging the formation of
political parties, which are the pillars of a democracy, rising
above tribal allegiances, and guaranteeing greater role for youth
Note and women in political life. My
interlocutors were confident that these objectives would materialise,
stressing however that activating political life and increasing
political participation would take time. Some noted that the long-standing
fear of creating or joining political parties due to the historically
harsh repression on them would have to be overcome, as well as low
voter turnout and voter apathy, in particular amongst the youth
which, in Jordan, is critically absent from the political arena.
In this context, they stressed the role of democratic education
for changing citizens’ and especially young people’s attitudes.
Note
28. The new law will require alliances and mergers within the
parliament, especially if blocs are to transform themselves into
“parties” and put forward winning lists based on party programmes.
I was informed that some of the parliamentary blocs in the parliament
had already started to move in this direction.
29. The local elections, initially scheduled for August 2021,
finally took place on 22 March 2022, after the adoption of the new
Law on Municipalities and Decentralisation which reduced the age
of eligibility to 25 and introduced a 25% quota for the representation
of women in municipality and governate councils. The voter turnout
remained very low, at 29.6%.
3.2 Gender
equality
30. In its request for the partner
for democracy status, the Jordanian Parliament undertook to support
“the balanced participation of women and men in public and political
life”. When granting the status, the Assembly called on the Jordanian
Parliament to constitutionally guarantee equality between men and
women by revising Article 6.1. of the Constitution which prohibits
discrimination but does not enumerate “gender” or “sex” in the list
of prohibited grounds of discrimination;
Note to
combat all forms of gender discrimination (in law and in practice),
particularly in family law; to abolish all legislation that discriminates
against women and actively promote equal opportunities for all;
to fight all forms of gender-based violence, and ensure adequate
funding for prevention measures, assistance and protection services
for the victims.
31. At the time of the 2017 evaluation, Article 6.1 had not been
revised, but some welcoming developments had taken place: Article
308, which provided that a rapist shall not be prosecuted if he
marries his victim, had been abolished from the Criminal Code and
its Article 98, which reduced the sentence for honour crimes if
the crime was “impulsive”, had been revised.
32. To date, Article 6.1 of the Jordanian Constitution has still
not been revised to make a reference to gender-based discrimination.
However, the title of the Constitution’s second chapter under which
this article falls has recently been amended to read as follows:
“Rights and duties of Jordanian men and Jordanian women” (previously,
“rights and duties of Jordanians”).
Note While it can be considered
as a first step to raise public awareness around gender equality
and set the basis for further changes in the constitution, this
symbolic change is far from enough.
33. The current writing of Article 6.1 renders gender-based discrimination
invisible. The Jordanian Parliament should take a clear stand against
this scourge, thereby promoting a change in mentalities in Jordanian
society, rather than waiting for mentalities to change first. Moreover,
the failure of the Constitution to prohibit gender discrimination
means that none of the laws perpetuating this discrimination – for
example, the Inheritance Law, according to which women inherit less
than men or the Nationality Law according to which Jordanian women
cannot pass their nationality to their children – can be challenged
as unconstitutional. Regarding this last point, I was told during
my visit that giving Jordanian nationality to children born from Palestinian
fathers would jeopardise their right to return to Palestine. It
would also change the demography of Jordan. While I can understand
this from a political standpoint, it cannot be a pretext to justify
discrimination against women.
34. Women and men have equal political rights in Jordan. According
to the 2021 report of the non-governmental organisation Freedom
House, in the past, female candidates won some seats beyond the
legal quotas set for the parliament and local councils, but cultural
prejudices remain an obstacle to women’s full participation in practice.
Note As
pointed out above, no women won parliamentary seats beyond the 15
seat quota in November 2020 poll. The new Election law is clearly
a step forward in terms of women’s political rights and should be
welcomed (see paragraph 26 above).
35. Regarding equal rights between men and women in the private
sphere, some progress has been made but areas of concern remain,
including discrimination resulting from the provisions of inheritance
and nationality laws mentioned above, but also from the Personal
Status Law which contains a number of discriminatory provisions,
for example in terms of marriage and the ability to travel alone
with children.
36. During my visit, it was told that the numerous forms of differential
treatment on grounds of gender present in Jordanian law are deeply
rooted in the culture and mentalities and are difficult to amend
overnight. I was also reminded that Sharia Law is part of the Jordanian
legal system. I understand this is a delicate matter and recognise
that Jordan has already overcome many obstacles in this field. Yet,
such provisions are not in compliance with international human rights
standards and the values of gender parity-based democracy which the
Jordanian Parliament has declared to share when it requested the
partnership for democracy status. The Jordanian authorities should
therefore endeavour to achieve progress by initiating a public debate
on the necessary reforms.
37. As far as progress is concerned, Jordan’s Parliament amended
the Personal Status Law in April 2019 to raise the “exceptional
marriage” age from 15 to 16 years old. The said law sets a minimum
marriage age at 18, but exceptions are foreseen which allow younger
ones to get married with the consent of Sharia Court judges. While
it is undoubtedly a step forward in the reduction of child marriages,
Jordan should remove the exception from its law to comply with its
international commitments, including the Convention on the Elimination of
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which considers
children to inherently lack the ability to give their full, free
and informed consent to their marriage.
38. Steps were also taken to empower women, including by introducing
in the Labour Law, provisions regarding care services for children
and flexible hours.
39. Violence against women continues to be a serious problem.
Note Jordanian law fails to criminalise
all forms of violence against women. Although rape and sexual harassment
are criminalised, marital rape is not considered a criminal offence.
Moreover, Article 340 of the criminal code, which allows perpetrators
to get lenient sentences in case of crimes committed because of
adultery, has still not been repealed. Although it is applicable
to both men and women, men are less likely to face adultery charges,
as pointed out by Amnesty International.
Note In
addition, despite the revision of Article 98 of the Criminal Code
which no longer allows mitigated sentences for perpetrators of crimes
“against women”, judges continue to impose mitigated sentences under
article 99 if family members of victims do not support prosecutions
of their male family members.
Note
40. On the positive side, the Jordanian National Commission for
Women has developed a strategy for women for the period of 2020-2025,
one of the strategic goals of which is to end gender-based violence,
with a particular focus on “honour killings”. The Commission is
also promoting the opening of more shelters for women at risk of
family violence in the name of honour.
41. The Council of Europe Convention on combating violence against
women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”)
is widely recognised as a reference in this matter and is open to
accession by non-member States. It would be advisable for the Jordanian
authorities to take inspiration from the standards set out in the
Convention. I also encourage the Jordanian delegation to consider
designating a representative with the Parliamentary Network Women
Free from Violence.
3.3 Administrative
detention
42. Both when granting the partnership
for democracy status in 2016 and evaluating it in 2017, the Assembly called
on the Parliament of Jordan to take steps towards the abolition
of the practice of administrative detention which allows local governors
to detain persons who are “about to commit a crime or assist in
its commission, those who ‘habitually’ steal, shelter thieves, or
fence stolen goods, and anyone who, if remaining at liberty, would
constitute a ‘danger to the people’”. The last category has been
used to hold women who are at risk of violence and of so-called
honour crimes for their “own protection” (even though the 1954 Crime
Prevention Act which provides for administrative detention does
not cover such situations). The governors also place men in administrative
detention for their “own protection” when there have been threats
of tribal vengeance.
43. This seems to be an evolving problem. First and foremost,
I was assured that women at risk of violence or so-called honour
crimes are now being transferred or referred to government shelters.
Secondly, after a stark increase in the number of such detentions
(around 38 000 in 2018 and 2019), there now seems to be an opposite
trend with around 21 000 administrative detentions registered in
the last two years. Thirdly, women and men in administrative or
“preventive” detention can now challenge their detention before
administrative courts and there is a possibility to be released
on bail. And finally, I was told that the authorities are planning to
limit the scope of the law.
44. During the visit, some people we spoke to were clearly in
favour of a possible repeal of the relevant provision of the 1954
Crime Prevention Act. Others seemed to sincerely believe that administrative
detention was necessary to prevent tribal revenge, and thus justified.
I was pleased to hear that a parliamentary memorandum requesting
the abolition of administrative detention had been signed and submitted
by 82 MPs on 17 March 2021. I sincerely hope that this initiative
will lead to a positive outcome.
45. Indeed, the practice of administrative detention is inconsistent
with Council of Europe values in several respects: a person should
not be kept in prison without a judicial decision; a person should
not be kept in prison on the pretext of protecting them; and, lastly,
a person should not be imprisoned for a crime they have not yet committed.
Concerning in particular the situation of women and men on “protective
custody”, instead of depriving them from their liberty, the authorities
should rather prosecute those who pose such a threat to them.
3.4 Death
penalty
46. In its request for the partner
for democracy status, the Jordanian Parliament undertook to continue
with “endeavours to raise the awareness of public authorities and
civil society as regards abolishing the death penalty and the introduction
of a moratorium on executions”. At the same time, the Assembly called
on the Jordanian Parliament to “apply consistently the moratorium
on executions that was established in 2006 and go a step further
by abolishing the death penalty set out in the Criminal Code”.
47. In its 2017 evaluation, the Assembly regretted the fact that,
while a de facto moratorium
on executions was purportedly introduced in 2006, courts continued
to hand down death sentences. It also noted that executions had
resumed and that 28 people had been executed between December 2014
and March 2017. Condemning all forms of capital punishment, the
Assembly urged the Jordanian Parliament to intervene with the authorities
to stop executions and reinstate the moratorium pending the abolition
of death penalty, in line with the expectations it indicated upon
granting partner for democracy status.
48. While no executions have been reported since March 2017 and
that in 2020 Jordan supported the United Nations resolution concerning
a moratorium on the use of death penalty for the first time
Note – both of which are a step forward
– courts still continue to hand down death sentences (30 in total
in 2021 according to the authorities). Among these sentences, one
was pronounced by the State Security Court on 12 January 2021, concerning
a terrorist attack which took place against tourists in Jerash in
2019.
Note In March 2021, the State Security
Court sentenced six men to death after convicting them of
maiming
a 16-year-old boy in a case that triggered public outrage.
Note
49. Based on my discussions with different interlocutors, my understanding
is that the abolition of death penalty is not considered a priority.
Some of those whom we spoke to said that Jordanian society is not
ready for the abolition of death penalty for “heinous” crimes such
as terrorism, and others consider it even necessary to increase
security. When I asked them about a possible moratorium on executions,
which in reality would simply give a legal basis to an already de facto situation, I was told that
the issue needed to be discussed thoroughly by the Jordanian Parliament.
I explained to my interlocutors, based on actual experience in many countries,
that the death penalty does not increase security and does not have
a deterrent effect on the most dangerous criminals, including terrorists,
many of whom are in any event prepared to die for their cause. In
any case, the fact that Jordanian society is not ready for the abolition
of death penalty cannot serve as a justification. Not all members
of the public in Europe welcomed the abolition of the death penalty
either. It is up to the authorities to drive such change, to change
public opinion rather than follow it.
3.5 General
commitment to promote the core values of the rule of law and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms
50. According to Human Rights Watch,
the civic space in
Jordan has shrunk over the past four years and authorities
are using vague and overly broad criminal provisions including under
the Criminal Code of 1960, the Cybercrime Law of 2015, the Anti-Terrorism
Law of 2006, and the Crime Prevention Law of 1954 to suppress free
speech, association and assembly.
Note These various laws penalise,
inter alia, defamation, criticism
of the King or state institutions, harming Jordan’s relations with
foreign States, blasphemy, and any content considered to lack objectivity.
51. The increasing interferences with freedom of speech, association
and assembly were also raised by civil society representatives we
met in Amman. In addition, they stressed the following issues: a
vast majority of journalists practice self-censorship to avoid prosecution;
the justice system is not totally independent; corruption is a problem;
NGO activities are not recognised by the public authorities; NGOs
are being accused of corruption, and encounter problems in accessing
funding; lack of accountability and transparency on behalf of the
authorities.
52. Officials were particularly reactive to these allegations.
They stressed that they attach great importance to freedom of expression,
assembly and association, noting however that these freedoms are
not absolute. They also stressed that 98% of requests for funding
were approved. Some argued that NGOs needed to organise better,
consolidate their programme, and be more transparent and accountable.
3.6 Co-operation
with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe
53. During its first evaluation
in 2017, the Assembly welcomed the Jordanian parliamentary delegation’s active
participation in its work and that of its committees, while strongly
regretting that, since being granted partner for democracy status,
Jordan had not become party to any Council of Europe conventions
or partial agreements, nor acceded to any relevant international
instrument relating to human rights as requested by the Assembly.
54. While the Jordanian delegation continued to maintain a high
attendance at our committee meetings and part-sessions for the 2018-2019
period, the 2020-2021 period witnessed an inverse tendency. Indeed,
the Jordanian delegation attended only two of our meetings in 2020
and was absent from the Assembly for the first six months of 2021,
likely due to the difficulty of remote participation imposed by
the Covid-19 pandemic, and the pre- and post-election periods which
meant a heavy workload for parliamentarians. A new delegation was appointed
in January 2022 and has been regularly participating in our meetings
since March 2022.
55. During my meetings in Amman, I raised the issue of the composition
of the Jordanian partner for democracy delegation, the members of
which are currently appointed from among the “democratically elected members”
of the parliament, thus from among the members of the House of Representatives,
in accordance with Resolution 2086 (2016). I stressed that there
was nothing in the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure that prevents the
Jordanian Senate to be part of the delegation. Representatives of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate welcomed a possible
participation of the Senate in the delegation.
56. Co-operation between Jordan and the Council of Europe is implemented
in line with the Organisation’s policy towards neighbouring regions,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers in May 2011. Since 2018, co-operation
with Jordan has been framed as part of regional co-operation within
the
EU/CoE
South Programme,
Note in areas such as the fight against trafficking
in human beings, the fight against corruption and money laundering,
the fight against violence against women or the reform of public
administration in the Southern Mediterranean region. In this context,
Jordanian authorities have, amongst others, participated in several
meetings relating to fight against trafficking in human beings with
representatives of public institutions in charge of combating trafficking
in human beings in the region, as well as in two regional seminars
on Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings and on the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights in this field.
57. In August 2021, Jordan ratified the Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters as amended by the 2010 Protocol (
ETS
No. 127), a widely ratified Council of Europe Convention aimed
at combating tax evasion. While it is not one of the most relevant
conventions in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule
of law, the mere fact that Jordan became party to one of the Council
of Europe conventions is to be welcomed and should be seen as an
encouraging sign for future signatures and ratifications. In particular,
Jordan could accede to the following Council of Europe conventions:
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No.
197); Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201); Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210).
58. The latest interparliamentary co-operation activity with the
Parliament of Jordan dates back to February 2020: an information
seminar on the Council of Europe for the staff members of the Parliaments
of Jordan and Morocco was held in Strasbourg.
3.7 Continuing
reforms
59. A new law for children’s rights
was adopted by the Jordanian Parliament in September 2022. The law codifies
a host of protections for children, including the right to education,
the ability for teachers and other responsible adults to report
abuse, health coverage for all children in Jordan, protection from
forced labour, beggary and addiction. The adoption of this new law,
despite a resistance from conservative spheres who presented it
as an attempt to degrade the Jordanian family unit, should be welcomed.
60. The civil society representatives whom I spoke to also recognised
that the law was a positive step to promote children’s rights but
regretted that it did not include dissuasive penalties to prevent
abuse.
NoteThey
also criticised the amendment introduced by the House of Representatives
concerning the right to make decisions related to a child’s education,
which removed the word “parents” from the article, replacing it
with the words “father or guardian”.
61. As mentioned above, unlike fathers, mothers in Jordan cannot
pass their nationality on to their children or their spouse. This
previously prevented children of Jordanian mothers and foreign fathers
from having access to free health care or education. In 2015, the
possibility to apply for a special identity card enabling them to
use subsidised government services such as secondary schooling and
health care was introduced. However, for children to qualify for
these benefits, the mother must have lived in Jordan for at least
five years, which created difficulties for those whose mothers resided
outside Jordan or had no evidence of their date of entry into the
country or had passed away.
62. During my visit, I was pleased to learn that having lived
in Jordan for five years was no longer required to qualify for these
benefits. Moreover, adult children of Jordanian mothers and non-Jordanian
fathers are no longer obliged to obtain a work permit (thanks to
an amendment to the labour law introduced in May 2019) and have
second priority for jobs after Jordanian citizens. They are also
able to own property and obtain driving licences.
63. As previously mentioned, the parliament recently adopted constitutional
amendments some of which were controversial, as they allowed the
King to,
inter alia, make
significant appointments by royal decree without consulting the
Council of Ministers. The Jordanian monarch can now appoint and
dismiss the Chief Justice, head of the Sharia Judicial Council,
Grand Mufti, Chief of the Royal Court, Minister of the Court, and the
King’s advisors.
Note Although,
in practice, the King has always had the final say in all of these
decisions, opposition groups see these new changes as “only expanding
the authority of the King”.
64. Another amendment that provoked criticism is the formation
of the National Security Council, which is headed by the King. The
new council holds wide-ranging political and security powers and
includes the prime minister, army chief, directors of the security
forces, foreign and interior ministers, as well as two other members
that the King will appoint. A major concern regarding this amendment
is that the new Council represents a direct infraction on the executive
and legislative branches: it is described as “a fourth Branch of government”
which can bypass the Council of Ministers or Parliament. These developments
which may weaken the role of parliament will have to be watched
carefully.
4 Conclusions
65. Since the first evaluation
of the partnership in 2017, it seems that Jordan has made advances
in some areas whereas it has stagnated in others. By granting the
Parliament of Jordan partner for democracy status, the Assembly
initiated a process the key aim of which is to help Jordan take
reforms forward by openly discussing and overcoming deficiencies.
The process will, admittedly, be gradual and necessarily lengthy. Democracy
is the only way forward, and I believe Jordan’s authorities aspire
to democracy and are determined to make the necessary progress for
the future. The Assembly should continue to support Jordan in this endeavour,
while accompanying the process with both rigour and patience.
