B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Laima Andrikiené, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1.1 Origin
and reference points
1. Already in 2017, the Parliamentary
Assembly called for a Council of Europe summit with the aim of reaffirming
European unity and of defending and promoting democratic security
in Europe (
Resolution
2186 (2017)). The Assembly then referred to the profound
changes in Europe and numerous political challenges, both within
and outside Europe’s borders, that were threatening the continent
and its unity. Against this background, the Assembly expressed its
belief that the Council of Europe and the values it upholds were
now more necessary than ever. It also called for the preservation
and further strengthening of the unparalleled pan-European project,
that was currently threatened by divisions and a weakening of the
commitment of member States.
Note
3. On 4 November 2021 the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy considered a revised outline for report, when Mr Andreas
Nick (Germany, EPPCD) was still rapporteur.
4. On 1st February 2022, the Committee
appointed me as rapporteur.
1.2 Purpose
and scope
5. The report focuses on the following
objectives: 1) to underline the unique profile, characteristics
and strategic priorities of the Council of Europe; 2) to consider
the role of the Council of Europe through three pillars – thematic
focus, geographic scope, institutional governance – by underscoring
the need to make an even progress on all these pillars; 3) to present
the potential co-operation and synergies with, and the need to take into
account and refer to the work of, other European institutions, such
as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), both being proactive in the traditional domains of
the Council of Europe.
6. The report is based on the premise that the Council of Europe
and other European institutions should not be more of the same and
should not compete between themselves. Therefore, the report seeks
to define a clear profile of the Council of Europe and to provide
a vision on a clear division of responsibilities between the Council
of Europe and other European institutions along the dimensions of
law, security and economic prosperity. For this purpose, the focus
for the Council of Europe, including a better definition of its
role and key advantages in comparison with the EU and the OSCE,
should be clarified, in order to maintain a very specific profile
of the Council of Europe in the concert of European organisations
and to avoid overlapping and double standards.
7. Although many of the new challenges, issues and tasks for
the Council of Europe are accurately defined in the above-mentioned
reference documents (in particular in Mr Tiny Kox’s report of 2021),
this report takes account of the developments of an unprecedented
nature brought about by the large-scale war of aggression launched
by the Russian Federation, with the assistance of the Belarus regime,
against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. As a consequence, the Russian
Federation was excluded from the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022.
Note In
addition, the Council of Europe suspended relations with the Belarus
authorities on 17 March 2022.
Note These
developments constitute an impetus for reconsidering the current
mission of the Council of Europe and adapting it to the new reality,
including the need to evaluate and acknowledge the lessons learned.
1.3 General
context
8. The Council of Europe is the
oldest organisation of the European political architecture, established
in 1949. The mission of the Council of Europe, as enshrined in its
Statute, is “to achieve a greater unity between its members for
the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles
which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic
and social progress” (Article 1). This aim “shall be pursued through
the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern
and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural,
scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance
and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
(Article 1.b). “Every member of the Council of Europe must accept
the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms
and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of
the aim of the Council” (Article 3).
9. Thus, the uniqueness of the Council of Europe, being a natural
guardian of “unity within diversity”, lies in its statutory mandate
to bring together European States in order to promote their progress
on the basis of common values and principles, such as the rule of
law, pluralistic democracy and human rights.
10. Over the course of more than 70 years of its activities, the
Council of Europe has become the largest European treaty-based organisation
and has achieved remarkable progress in pursuing its aim by promoting co-operation
on social, cultural, scientific and legal matters. It succeeded
in establishing the legal acquis as the basis of the European democratic
public order and a common legal space, which consists of more than
220 legally binding instruments. Some of these instruments have
encouraged global standard-setting, as many conventions belonging
to the unique European conventional system are open to non-member
States and are also used as an inspiration in drafting other conventions
and national legislation. The core of the European legal acquis
is the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and the European
Social Charter (ETS No. 35).
11. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the most effective
system for human rights protection, with the European Court of Human
Rights at its core, has been established. The uniqueness of the European
conventional system is also that implementation of several other
conventions is monitored, including by independent experts, and
States parties are supported in overcoming any shortcomings. In
addition, an authoritative expert body such as the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) provides advice
and guidelines for constitutional and legal reforms in member States
and those non-member States who are willing to participate in these
bodies.
12. Apart from the main achievements, one cannot escape from mentioning
the failure of the Council of Europe to create a Europe without
dividing lines, which may challenge the very vision of the Council
of Europe as the pan-European project. Recently, new dividing lines
have appeared due to the unprecedented attack on European values
by Russia, which is the main challenge to European and global security.
Thus, the Council of Europe has to take its part of political responsibility
for not being able to respond timely and effectively to the rise
of aggressive policy and authoritarianism in Russia, in particular
for the inability to monitor the development of the imperialistic,
anti-European and anti-humanistic ideology of the “Russian world”,
based on ideas of national superiority and national hatred. In parallel,
this ideology is also rooted in discrimination on the grounds of
gender, sexual orientation and identity, regardless of the 26 years-long
Russian membership in the Council of Europe.
13. In order to restore and maintain its credibility, the Council
of Europe should learn lessons from this failure. It should return
to its core values, with an understanding that they cannot be undermined
by a less-than-principled stance towards aggressive and authoritarian
regimes for the sake of multilateralism and the settlement of financial
problems. The values, principles and standards of the Council of
Europe are more relevant than ever in the current historic context
when they are openly flouted. Member States should recommit, at
the highest political level, to these values, principles and standards,
and give the Organisation the legal, political and moral authority
to effectively promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
They should also give the Council of Europe the budgetary means
to carry out its mandate and protect it against financial blackmailing.
14. Thus, the statutory mission of the Council of Europe is far
from complete. It faces such key inter-related challenges to its
core objectives, as large-scale aggression on the European continent,
growing authoritarianism and political populism, hybrid attacks
using illegal migration and disinformation campaigns, rise of hostility
towards pluralistic democracy as well as pandemics and other crises.
In order to respond effectively to these challenges and to remain
the guardian of the common European values, the Council of Europe
has to be strengthened as one of the pillars of the European political
architecture.
2 Strengths and pillars of the Council
of Europe
2.1 Thematic
focus
15. The Council of Europe has a
unique profile in the core dimensions of the rule of law, pluralistic democracy
and human rights. Therefore, the Council of Europe’s overall priority
is to remain the pillar of democratic security and successful and
effective co-operation on these issues in Europe and worldwide.
16. The implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights
in all member States must remain the top priority for the Council
of Europe, as the Convention embodies the founding values of the
Organisation. This priority requires the continuous engagement of
all member States at national level and the preservation of the
authority of the European Court of Human Rights as a remedy of last
resort for the majority of Europeans. The unconditional execution
of all the Court’s judgments, as well as of its interim measures
under Rule 39 of its Rules, must be ensured.
17. The next priority of the Council of Europe is the promotion
of the further ratification of (accession to) the Revised European
Social Charter (ETS No. 163) and its Additional Protocol Providing
for a System of Collective Complaints (ETS No. 158). Already in
2005 at the Warsaw Summit, the Heads of State and Government considered
that the Revised European Social Charter should be regarded as the
minimum core of social rights which all member States should guarantee.
18. No less an important priority for the Council of Europe is
the promotion of genuine equality and respect for human dignity
and combating discrimination on any grounds. The Organisation must
continue to contribute actively to achieving these goals, as this
effort would be one of the best responses to the rise of political populism
and ideas based on hostility towards the European values. Ground-breaking
conventions, such as the Council of Europe Convention on preventing
and combating violence against women and domestic violence (CETS
No. 210, “the Istanbul Convention”), the Council of Europe Convention
on Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse (CETS No. 201, “the Lanzarote Convention”) and the Council
of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
(CETS No. 197) have become global “gold” standards and their efficient
implementation must remain a key priority.
19. The Council of Europe must be more proactive in facing and
addressing existing and emerging threats to democratic societies
and democratic security, which are related to the rise of political
populism and the authoritarian trends in some member States, both
old and new democracies. Not only the strengthening of the monitoring
system, but also the studies on the identification of the root causes
for and prevention of unhealthy political populism, democratic backsliding
and authoritarianism should be encouraged.
20. As a recognised international standard-setter in the field
of human rights protection, the Council of Europe should keep pace
with the speed and scale of societal change and focus on devising
common replies and establishing new standards to protect human rights
vis-à-vis new and evolving challenges. In particular, the Council
of Europe is the appropriate framework for providing adequate responses
to challenges related to the emergence of new technologies, especially
artificial intelligence, as well as the challenges related to the spread
of organised disinformation. The Council of Europe should also focus
on the new generation of human rights and notably on making the
right to a safe, healthy and sustainable environment become a principle,
not just a policy. Last but not least, the Council of Europe must
continue to keep high on its strategic agenda the search for common
responses to societal problems challenging the rule of law, such
as corruption, money laundering, terrorism and violent extremism.
2.2 Geographic
scope
21. The Council of Europe provides
a unique forum for co-operation on equal footing between all European States,
whether or not they wish to become members of the European Union,
which is based on the commitment to common values and serves as
a tool for finding responses to common challenges. Currently, the
Council of Europe can explore its full potential for an inclusive
and meaningful dialogue of 46 member States. First and foremost,
in this sphere the Council of Europe must accordingly adapt its
understanding of the existing threats to democratic security, following
the Russian Federation’s large-scale war of aggression as well as
other international crimes attributable to the authoritarian regimes
of Russia and Belarus.
22. Against this background, the Council of Europe has to be ready
to provide all possible assistance within its mandate to Ukraine
and other countries affected by the aggression, as well as for the
eventual reintegration of the Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldovan territories
that are currently under Russian occupation.
23. Regardless of the failure in the search for an inclusive and
meaningful dialogue with the Russian Federation and its exclusion
from the Council of Europe, the ambition to become a true pan-European organisation
that brings together all the European States cannot be left aside.
The strategic vision of the Council of Europe should remain the
common European space of democratic public order with no black holes. Therefore,
one of the key priorities of the Council of Europe should be new
initiatives in order to continue the support for the future democratic
Russia, in particular the engagement with human rights defenders, democratic
forces, free media and independent civil society.
24. It is no less important to support the democratic and civil
society forces, human rights defenders and free media in Belarus
whose authoritarian regime has become an accomplice in Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine and European democratic values. In particular,
assistance should continue to be given to help the efforts of the
democratic Belarus forces to develop a vision of constitutional
and other legal reforms aimed at the restoration of the rule of
law and democratic constitutional order. In this field the expertise
of the Venice Commission would be particularly welcomed.
25. Ensuring accountability for all international crimes, and
the crime of aggression in particular, is an essential precondition
for peace based on the respect to the rule of law, pluralistic democracy
and human rights. Therefore, the Council of Europe should support
the establishment of a special international tribunal for the crime
of aggression against Ukraine, in line with Assembly
Resolution 2436 (2022).
Note The jurisdiction of the special
international tribunal should support and complement the work of
the International Criminal Court (ICC), avoiding any duplication
of jurisdiction, since the latter has the jurisdiction in respect
of war crimes, crimes against humanity and possibly a crime of genocide
committed on the territory of Ukraine. It should assess the planning,
preparation, initiation and execution of the crime of aggression
committed against Ukraine, including its ideological origins and
roots, and taking into account previous acts of aggression against
other countries. Those primarily responsible – the highest political
and military leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as the
highest political and military leadership of the Belarus regime,
who have provided logistical and other assistance to Russia for
perpetrating acts of aggression against Ukraine – should be held
to account by the proposed Tribunal. Upon a request from Ukraine,
the Council of Europe could take a lead in drafting and opening
for signature a multilateral treaty establishing the Special International
Tribunal.
26. In addition, the Council of Europe should support public initiatives
and, if necessary, take a lead in establishing a special international
tribunal for the crimes against humanity committed by the Belarussian authoritarian
regime against the people of Belarus, including widespread and systematic
torture, imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of the fundamental rules of international law, persecution
of identifiable groups and collectivities on political, national
and ethnic grounds. Currently, no international tribunal has jurisdiction
in respect of these crimes and, due to the absence of independence,
the Belarusian judiciary and law enforcement authorities are not
able to investigate the crimes committed by Lukashenko's regime.
On the contrary, they are used as a tool for the committal of these
crimes.
27. In the pursuit of the pan-European vision, the Council of
Europe should continue to co-operate with Kosovo*
Note with a view to consolidating
the rule of law, human rights and democracy in line with Council
of Europe standards. Kosovo’s application for membership in the
Council of Europe of 12 May 2022 is a clear sign of its willingness
to move forward with resolve on the European integration path and
should be considered with an open spirit.
28. The unique conventional system of the Council of Europe and
the experience of such authoritative expert bodies as the Venice
Commission allow for the Council of Europe to strengthen its role
at global level as the leading standard-setter in the fields of
the rule of law, democracy and human rights. The Council of Europe should
engage more actively in promoting the global outreach of its legal
instruments, many of which have played a pioneering role, for instance
on the relevant international platforms such as the United Nations.
The Council of Europe should bypass the “geographical neighbourhood”
logic by seeking partnerships with States and organisations sharing
the same or similar values and principles. The opportunity to involve
more observers also must be considered.
2.3 Institutional
governance
29. The further development of
a regular, meaningful and effective ‘trialogue’ between the two
statutory organs, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary
Assembly, and the Secretary General should be considered as a means
of ensuring the strategic relevance and the effectiveness of the
Organisation.
30. The unique nature of the Council of Europe stems also from
its parliamentary statutory organ composed of members from national
parliaments, reflecting the whole spectrum of political views, including
the opposition. This must be used to the benefit of the whole Organisation
when identifying priorities for the years ahead, as the Assembly
can provide a significant contribution to all the priority areas
of the Organisation. The Assembly is capable of serving as an effective
instrument for the promotion of the key conventions of the Council
of Europe in national parliaments with a view to increasing the
impact of these instruments on national legislative and political
processes. Its role as a political platform for parliamentary diplomacy
can be further enhanced; similarly, the Assembly can play a more
significant role in promoting and strengthening the efforts of the Committee
of Ministers on the execution of judgements of the European Court
of Human Rights. In addition, the functions of the Assembly in electing
judges of the European Court of Human Rights and the Secretary General
gives a higher level of legitimacy for these institutions.
31. A no less significant field of inter-institutional co-operation
is the monitoring of member States’ obligations and commitments,
as it constitutes an extremely important means of ensuring, through
co-operative action, that all member States comply with their obligations
willingly agreed to when joining the Council of Europe. However,
there is a need for stronger and more structured co-ordination between
the monitoring activities of the Assembly, the activities of the
Committee of Ministers, the Secretary General and the Commissioner
for Human Rights, as well as of the various specialised monitoring
and advisory bodies and mechanisms of the Organisation, without
prejudice to their independence. The number of countries which, decades
after joining the Council of Europe, are still under the Assembly’s
monitoring procedure and the evident failure to have an impact on
the Russian Federation show that the current system must be reviewed. More
broadly, it is worth considering ways of co-ordinating monitoring
activities more efficiently with other international organisations,
including the United Nations, in order to achieve more synergy,
avoid unnecessary duplication and alleviate the reporting burden
for member States.
32. The need to bring the Organisation closer to the people should
be placed among the outstanding priorities of the Council of Europe,
including strengthening the role and meaningful participation of
civil society organisations and national human rights institutions
in the work of our Organisation and engaging with young people and
children. These measures would be also helpful in facing such challenges
as the rise of political populism and hostile attitudes towards
democracy, as they would increase the visibility of what membership
of the Organisation means, both in terms of advantages for the member
States and their citizens, as well as the obligations of all member
States. In this field the Council of Europe can rely on the recent
experience of the European Union with regard to the Conference on
the Future of Europe.
3 Council
of Europe in the European institutional landscape
3.1 European
Union
33. The European Union and the
Council of Europe share, and are built upon, the same values of
the rule of law, pluralistic democracy and human rights. Although
the post-Lisbon expansion of the European Union’s activities into
areas covered by the statutory mandate of the Council of Europe
and touching upon democracy, human rights and the rule of law can
create risks of overlapping and unnecessary duplication of work,
the EU is unlikely to cover the whole geographic area of the activities
of the Council of Europe (currently 19 members of the Council of
Europe do not belong to the European Union). Nor is it the purpose
of the European Union, which aims, inter
alia, at deeper integration in developing a common area
of freedom, security, justice and free movement of persons as well
as of an internal market. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the EU member States, are considered
to be the general principles of the Union's law (Article 6.3 of
the Treaty on European Union).
34. This provides the basis of synergy between the two European
organisations. The Council of Europe’s unique conventional system
is one of the main strengths and a comparative advantage of the
Organisation. It can serve as a point of departure for the European
Union in enhancing the human rights protection in the overlapping
areas. However, in order to complete the common European legal space,
the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights (as well as to the European Social Charter system) has to
remain among the strategic priorities of the Council of Europe.
As a result of the European Union’s accession, individuals will
be able to lodge applications with the European Court of Human Rights
also in respect of acts attributable to the European Union, not
only to its member States.
35. In addition, the experience and expertise of the Council of
Europe can be further utilised in strengthening the rule of law
in the EU member States. The Venice Commission’s opinions, the Group
of States against Corruption (GRECO) reports, the judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers’ decisions
have been regularly used by various EU bodies, particularly the
European Parliament and the European Commission. The role of the
Venice Commission must be highlighted in coping with the rule of law
issues in accordance with Article 7 of the Treaty on the European
Union and in assessing the progress made in the field by the candidate
countries during the EU enlargement process.
36. Among the recent challenges, the need for further synergy
of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the context of
a new Pact on Asylum and Migration should be mentioned, in particular
coping with such a hybrid threat caused by the authoritarian regimes
as the artificial migration flows to neighbouring democratic States.
The purpose of the co-operation in this sphere is to preserve the
standards developed by the system of the European Convention on
Human Rights as well as to develop humane, more resilient and more
effective national systems of migration and asylum. Furthermore,
the European Union and the Council of Europe should engage in a
dialogue with a view to maximising synergies and complementarities
between the Council of Europe and the newly established European
Political Community, which brings together 43 out of the 46 Council
of Europe member States.
37. On 21 May 2021, at its 131st session,
the Committee of Ministers adopted the Report on co-operation between
the Council of Europe and the European Union, thereby underlining
that both sides have stressed their commitment to consolidating
their relationship for better safeguarding democratic security on
the continent and a coherent and efficient human rights protection
system in Europe. The strategic partnership with the European Union
based on complementarity and mutual respect for each organisation’s
unique characteristics and mandates was reinforced through its three
pillars – political dialogue, legal co-operation, and programmatic
co-operation. As provided by the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Council of Europe and the European Union already in 2007, “legal
co-operation should be developed with a view to ensuring coherence
between EU law and Council of Europe standards”. Meanwhile, fruitful
operational co-operation of the Council of Europe with the EU Agency
for Fundamental Rights, on the basis of their respective mandates,
strengths and skills, remains of the utmost importance.
38. In addition, the need to establish an effective strategic
partnership between the Parliamentary Assembly and the European
Parliament should be underlined. To this end, in its
Resolution 2430 (2022) “Beyond the Lisbon Treaty: strengthening the strategic
partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Union” the
Assembly indicated a number of concrete ways to implement closer
co-operation. The need to rely on the Assembly’s expertise in the
field of Magnitsky sanctions should also be underscored.
3.2 OSCE
39. The Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is another important partner of
the Council of Europe. This Organisation has been and still is deemed
to be a forum of dialogue between East and West on the issues of
common security, which is built upon consensus. The OSCE focuses
on the wider scope of co-operative security, including hard security,
confidence-building and armaments control, while the Council of
Europe focuses on the narrower spectrum of security issues, but
to a deeper extent, including the emphasis on the rule of law. In
addition, the OSCE comprises not only member States of the Council
of Europe, but also has the transatlantic dimension (the Northern
American member States) and includes the Central Asian member States,
Belarus and the Russian Federation.
40. This provides a good basis for the delimitation of competences
between the two organisations as well as for their synergy in the
common focus on democracy and human rights. On the one hand, the
Council of Europe’s standards may continue to serve as guidelines
for the less stringent OSCE standards. In addition, the OSCE can
serve as the bridge to the Central Asian States with a view to the
gradual implementation of the Council of Europe’s standards. On
the other hand, the Council of Europe can rely on the internationally recognised
OSCE expertise in the field of electoral observation (conducted
under the guidance of the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR)) and the OSCE special monitoring missions
in crisis regions.
41. In the light of the current context, the OSCE is confronted
with daunting challenges, due to its membership which includes Belarus
and the Russian Federation – two countries pursuing aggressive policies and
committing international crimes – and its consensus-based decision-making
processes.
42. The OSCE mechanisms for the control of armaments and conventional
forces failed more than a decade ago. Recently, the mandate of the
OSCE special monitoring mission to Ukraine was not extended. There
is no guarantee of the further smooth deployment of the electoral
observation missions, namely the OSCE activities in the common field
with the Council of Europe. The adoption of the operational budget
has also become an issue.
3.3 Other
organisations
43. Among other organisations,
with whom the Council of Europe should extend the co-operation in promoting
social and economic progress and fighting corruption and money-laundering,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
has a special place. The updated Memorandum of Understanding of
2020 aims to give new impetus to the long-standing co-operation
between the two organisations. The close working relationship between
the Council of Europe and the OECD has notably resulted in the joint
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (ETS
No. 127), a legally binding international treaty which now covers
111 countries around the world.
4 Way
Forward
44. The Council of Europe, as the
oldest European organisation based on the common values of the rule
of law, pluralistic democracy and human rights, inevitably has to
remain a cornerstone of the European political architecture and
a recognised international standard-setter in the field of democratic
security. This unique role can ensure synergy with another European
organisations, including the EU and the OSCE, and global actors with
a clear delimitation of competences and without duplication.
45. However, due to the new reality that emerged following the
large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, there is a need to
reaffirm and strengthen the role of the Council of Europe as a unique
platform for constructive and stronger political dialogue and co-operation,
to adapt to the new situation and to find innovative ways to achieve
its statutory goals and maximise its contribution to European unity,
equality, stability and security.
46. The Council of Europe should be strengthened as a global actor
and the leading institution aimed at safeguarding and upholding
the values and principles of the rule of law, pluralistic democracy
and human rights. Based on its unique human rights protection and
conventional system, its member States should strengthen the role
of the Council of Europe as a reference for other European and international
institutions.
47. In the current global and regional security environment, there
is also the need for renewed commitment to the common values on
the part of member States. This can be done inter
alia by means of the effective implementation of relevant
legal instruments and mechanisms or by establishing new ones, if
appropriate.
48. The Council of Europe’s overall monitoring system should be
reviewed with the perspective of avoiding duplication between the
various bodies of the Council of Europe and with other regional
and global institutions and to enhance its effectiveness. In any
monitoring system the genuine equality of member States has to be guaranteed,
by avoiding double standards and ensuring that the commitments to
European unity are not overshadowed by political cleavages.
5 Conclusions
and proposals
49. In order to further strengthen
the Council of Europe and maintain its status as an unparalleled
pan-European project, a fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government
should be convened. Among other possibilities, the Summit would
offer a fresh and timely opportunity to respond effectively to the
current challenges, by adapting the Organisation to the new political
and security situation and clarifying its role in the overall European
political architecture.
50. The Council of Europe should develop an effective response
to the most urgent threats to democratic societies and democratic
security, such as unhealthy political populism, democratic backsliding
and authoritarianism. It should do so by considering the adoption
of new binding instruments and recommendations, while improving
existing ones, as well as by enhancing the monitoring and sanction mechanisms.
The organisation should consider the organisation of public, Europe-wide
campaigns on these instruments and recommendations. Similar efforts
should be undertaken to address challenges related to the emergence
of new technologies, especially artificial intelligence and the
spread of organised disinformation. The Venice Commission should
also be supported to continue to progressively develop common constitutional and
democratic standards, which will help address current and future
challenges to democracies in Europe.
51. Playing to one of its strengths, the Council of Europe should
continue leading the way in human rights standard-setting and reinforce
its unique convention system, including the most authoritative international human
rights court, the European Court of Human Rights. In this respect,
with a view to achieving a single common European legal space, the
Council of Europe should remain engaged in a constructive dialogue
with regard to the accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights. European Union accession to the European
Social Charter system should also be promoted.
52. Further progress on putting an end to gender-based discrimination,
including through the widest possible ratification and implementation
of the Istanbul Convention, and to discrimination based on sexual
orientation and identity, in particular in the field of protection
of private and family life, are also potential areas of focus.
53. To increase efficiency in its activities, the Council of Europe
should promote a constructive dialogue between its institutions
as well as with other European and global organisations, in particular
in the field of monitoring activities, so as to avoid unnecessary
duplication and overlapping.
54. Following the latest aggression, the Council of Europe acted
swiftly to ensure that the Russian Federation would no longer be
a member State. This important change in its membership gives the Organisation
more coherence. In this vein, the Council of Europe should stand
ready to undertake a greater share of responsibilities if other
international organisations are no longer able to carry them forward
due to the political fracture caused by the aggression, including
in areas such as soft security, democratic security and election
observation.
55. The Council of Europe should develop clear plans and mechanisms
to support democratic civil society, independent non-governmental
organisations, human rights defenders and free media in Russia and
Belarus. The Assembly should undertake a special report, and develop
targeted recommendations on this topic.
56. Finally, the Council of Europe should do its utmost to ensure
punishment for international crimes committed against Ukraine and
its people as well as against the Belarusian people. In this respect,
the Organisation should unconditionally support the ongoing investigations
on war crimes, crimes against humanity and possibly genocide committed
against the Ukrainian people. The Council of Europe should also support,
contribute to and, when necessary, take the lead in establishing
a special international tribunal for the crime of aggression against
Ukraine and a special international tribunal for crimes against
humanity committed against the Belarusian people.
