Russian democratic forces
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly debate on 1 October 2025
(33rd sitting) (see Doc. 16247,
report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur:
Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross). Text adopted
by the Assembly on 1 October 2025 (33rd sitting).
1. On 16 March 2022, the Russian Federation
was expelled from the Council of Europe as a result of its war of
aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and escalated into
a large-scale invasion. In its
Opinion 300 (2022) “Consequences
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, adopted
the day before, the Parliamentary Assembly, while calling on the
Committee of Ministers to request that the Russian Federation immediately
withdraw from the Council of Europe, added that “the Council of
Europe should envisage initiatives to be able to continue to support
and engage with human rights defenders, democratic forces, free
media and independent civil society in the Russian Federation”.
Subsequently, in its
Resolution 2433
(2022) “Consequences of the Russian Federation’s continued
aggression against Ukraine: role and response of the Council of
Europe”, the Assembly resolved “to intensify its engagement with Belarusian
and Russian civil society, human rights defenders, independent journalists,
academia and democratic forces respecting the values and principles
of the Organisation, including the territorial integrity of sovereign
member States”. Similarly, meeting in Reykjavik in May 2023, the
Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe agreed to
“find ways to strengthen co-operation with Russian and Belarusian
human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent
civil society”. In its
Resolutions 2540
(2024) “Alexei Navalny’s death and the need to counter
Vladimir Putin’s totalitarian regime and its war on democracy” and
2588 (2025) “European commitment to a just and lasting peace in
Ukraine”, the Assembly noted the ongoing forced russification and
repression of, and discrimination against, Indigenous peoples and
minorities in the Russian Federation, in breach of the United Nations
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. It concluded that genuine democracy in Russia is
impossible without decolonisation, underlined that lasting peace
requires the Russian Federation to abandon its imperial ambitions
and called for the implementation of United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960) “Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples”.
2. On the strength of these texts, and as the outcome of a long-standing
process of dialogue and engagement, the Assembly decided to set
up a representative delegation of Belarusian democratic forces.
As far as Russian democratic forces are concerned, some were invited
to participate in hearings organised by Assembly committees. Furthermore,
an informal platform for dialogue was set up, bringing together
members of the Assembly holding specific functions and members of
Russian democratic forces, to discuss topics of common concern.
Among these were the role of Russian democratic forces in bringing
the Russian Federation’s war of aggression to an end and ways to
strengthen sanctions against the Russian regime, ensure that Russians
can have access to free and independent media and counter Russian
disinformation, as well as the situation of Russian democratic forces
in exile. The situation of Russian political prisoners was also addressed.
Over this period, the Assembly condemned the murder of Alexei Navalny,
repeatedly demanded the release of Vladimir Kara-Murza, winner of
the 2022 Václav Havel Human Rights Prize, and called for sanctions
against the Russian officials involved in his illegal detention.
3. The Assembly reiterates its strong condemnation of the systematic
repression of Russians opposing the regime and attempts to silence
them, inside and outside the Russian Federation. It honours the
commitment of those Russian human rights defenders, democratic forces,
free media and independent civil society that oppose the totalitarian
and neo-imperialistic Russian regime, fight for democracy, human
rights and the rule of law and support Ukraine, sometimes at the
risk of their lives and freedom, and emphasises that this fight
must continue. The Assembly notes that, unlike Belarusian democratic
forces, Russian democratic forces do not have a single, unified
political structure. The Assembly encourages Russian groups and
initiatives in exile to join forces with the aim of countering disinformation
by the totalitarian and neo-imperialistic Russian regime, advocating
for democratic change in the Russian Federation, exposing all international
crimes committed by Russian actors in Georgia, the Republic of Moldova
and Ukraine, and supporting Ukrainians in their struggle against
the aggressor State in a variety of ways.
4. The Assembly recalls that in 2024 a General Rapporteur on
Russian democratic forces was appointed with the mandate to promote
the coherence of the Assembly’s action aimed at building dialogue
with Russian democratic forces that respect the values and principles
of the Council of Europe, including the territorial integrity of
sovereign member States. Also, as a result of the work of the general
rapporteur, the Assembly believes that the time has come for ad
hoc and informal initiatives to give way to more structured engagement with
Russian democratic forces. This would help strengthen the capacity
of Russian democratic forces to bring about sustainable democratic
change in Russia and help achieve a lasting and just peace in Ukraine,
while ensuring the responsibility of Russian actors for the international
crimes committed and providing the Assembly with insight into developments
in the Russian Federation and among Russian democratic forces. If
an organisation or movement among the Russian democratic forces
undermines these efforts, the Assembly will discontinue its engagement
with that organisation.
5. In light of these considerations, the Assembly decides to
establish the Platform for Dialogue with Russian democratic forces
(“the Platform”), as a forum for two-way engagement between the
Assembly and Russian democratic forces to address issues of common
concern through exchanges in the context of the Platform, to be
chaired by the President of the Assembly or a member of the Assembly
delegated by the President. Participation in the Platform would
also enable Russian democratic forces to attend meetings of the
Assembly’s committees, sub-committees and networks during part-sessions,
and to take the floor when authorised by the respective chairpersons.
6. The list of “Participants of the Russian democratic forces”
in the Platform shall be approved by the Bureau of the Assembly
upon the proposal made by the President of the Assembly and shall
be valid for the ordinary session. The list of potential candidates
should be submitted to the President of the Assembly by common decision
of Russian democratic forces organisations, members of which meet
the criteria set out in paragraph 8. The specific modalities for
the implementation of this Resolution, in particular the composition
and functioning of the Platform and the participation of Russian
democratic forces therein, shall be approved by the Bureau based
on a memorandum to be prepared by the Secretary General of the Assembly
together with the General Rapporteur on Russian democratic forces.
One year after the establishment of the Platform, the Bureau shall
review the implementation of this Resolution and consider possible
amendments or other measures to be taken. The Bureau’s decisions
require ratification by the Assembly.
7. In case of a substantiated complaint about the non-compliance
of a participant with the criteria set out in paragraph 8, the President
of the Assembly shall immediately suspend the participation of the
person concerned until the Bureau takes a decision, which shall
be published together with the reasoning no later than ten days
after the Bureau takes the decision on suspension.
8. The “Participants of the Russian democratic forces” must be
persons of the highest moral standing who are currently in exile
and who meet the requirements listed below, to be verified by the
Bureau of the Assembly at the time of approval of the list, or at
any other time following a decision to that effect by the Bureau
(the criteria set out in paragraph 8.8 shall not apply to representatives
of Indigenous peoples and national minorities, or to those on active
duty fighting in the Ukrainian military). These persons must fulfil
the following criteria:
8.1 be
Russian political leaders, civil society representatives, human
rights defenders, independent journalists, scholars and/or other
members of the Russian resistance against the totalitarian and neo-imperialistic
regime in the Russian Federation;
8.2 share the values of the Council of Europe and be willing
to promote them;
8.3 unconditionally recognise and respect the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally
recognised borders, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and Sevastopol City, and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and
Kherson regions;
8.4 have a record of publicly opposing the totalitarian and
neo-imperialistic regime in the Russian Federation and work towards
regime change with the goal of establishing a democratic political
system in the Russian Federation that adheres to international law
and principles of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations;
8.5 respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and other States;
8.6 have not advocated non-democratic policies in the Russian
Federation or neo-imperialistic policies towards Georgia, the Republic
of Moldova, Ukraine or other sovereign States; or have denounced
previous statements in a credible and convincing manner; have not
justified international crimes committed by Russian actors either
abroad or within the Russian Federation, nor encouraged to commit
violations of international law;
8.7 clearly denounce all international crimes committed by
Russian actors and support international mechanisms for accountability
and justice;
8.8 have signed the Berlin Declaration of Russian Democratic
Forces before agreeing to participate in the Platform, and continue
to uphold the principles it sets forth;
8.9 submit a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest
and accept verification by the Assembly secretariat;
8.10 have not held, after 2014, any position in the State bodies
of the Russian Federation or, if they have, have publicly and convincingly
renounced these bodies’ activities and contributed to their accountability;
8.11 have not held, after 2014, any position in Russian occupation
administrations in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;
8.12 have never disseminated or publicly rejected narratives
that deny the Russian Federation’s crime of aggression against Ukraine
or other international crimes committed there;
8.13 recognise and respect unconditionally the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Belarus,
as well as the Belarusian nation’s aspiration for a democratic future
and European choice;
8.14 have not received funding or material support from State
or State-controlled entities of the Russian Federation or Belarus,
or related persons or foundations, and shall submit annual declarations of
sources of funding;
8.15 publicly support the establishment of the Special Tribunal
for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, as well as an international
compensation mechanism, including the Register of Damage Caused
by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and
an international claims commission for Ukraine.
9. The “Participants of the Russian democratic forces” shall
not use, display or reproduce State symbols of the Russian Federation,
including its flag, coat of arms, anthem or other official insignia,
at the Assembly’s premises or events. The white-blue-white colours
are recognised by the Russian democratic forces as a symbol of resistance.
10. The question of the rights of the Indigenous peoples and national
minorities of the Russian Federation and the preparedness to engage
in a meaningful dialogue with their representatives and representatives
of Russia’s national and ethnic groups, will play a critical role
in shaping a democratic political system that adheres to international
law and the principles of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations.
The issue of overcoming the colonial legacy of the Russian Federation
would have to be addressed, including the concerns and interests
of Indigenous and colonised peoples residing in the territories
of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The Assembly
is committed to establishing a platform for dialogue with the representatives of
Indigenous peoples and national minorities of the Russian Federation.
Until a platform for dialogue with the representatives of Indigenous
peoples and national minorities is established, one third of the
seats for the Platform shall be reserved for the representatives
of Indigenous peoples and national minorities of the Russian Federation,
reflecting their share of the population of the Russian Federation.
When a platform for dialogue with the representatives of Indigenous
peoples and national minorities of the Russian Federation is established,
this quota will be terminated.
11. The Assembly refers particularly to its
Resolution 2605 (2025) “Legal and
human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine” and reiterates that, in violation of international humanitarian law,
the Russian Federation continues the colonisation of the temporarily
occupied territories of Ukraine by encouraging hundreds of thousands
of its own citizens to settle there, including through federal programmes. These
initiatives form part of the aggressor State’s policy aimed at the
forcible alteration of the demographic composition of the population,
thereby significantly complicating the processes of de-occupation
and the restoration of peace. Such actions constitute a violation
of the Russian Federation’s international obligations, amount to
crimes under international law and should entail appropriate legal
consequences.
12. The Assembly welcomes other parliamentary initiatives supporting
Russian democratic forces and encourages synergies between its Platform
and other initiatives, in particular those undertaken by the European
Parliament.
13. The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to:
13.1 provide administrative, legal
and logistical support to facilitate the functioning of the Platform, including
assistance with travel, visas, temporary residence issues and digital
engagement;
13.2 support the functioning of the Platform, notably through
voluntary contributions, by developing training programmes and workshops;
13.3 strengthen the visibility and impact of the Platform,
and encourage partnerships with other international organisations
and democratic institutions.
