Observation of the early parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic (30 November 2025)
Election observation report
| Doc. 16319
| 19 January 2026
- Author(s):
- Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Georgios STAMATIS,
Greece, EPP/CD
- Origin
- The report
is drawn up under the responsibility of the rapporteur. 2026 - First part-session
1 Introduction
1. On 30 September 2025, the President
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Japarov, announced early parliamentary
elections to be held on 30 November 2025, following the parliament’s
self-dissolution on 25 September.
2. The Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic (“Jogorku Kenesh”) has
the status of “partner for democracy” with the Parliamentary Assembly
since 2014. In its
Resolution 1984 (2014), the Assembly underlined that progress in taking forward
reforms was the prime aim of this partnership and should constitute
the benchmark for assessing its efficiency. It accordingly resolved
to review the state of progress achieved in implementing the political
commitments undertaken by the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic
which, by signing this partnership status, also undertook to invite
the Assembly to observe future parliamentary and presidential elections.
3. On 2 October 2025, Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, Speaker of the
Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, invited the Assembly to observe
the early parliamentary elections. On 3 October, the Bureau of the
Assembly decided to set up an ad hoc committee to observe these
elections, composed of 11 members (SOC: 3; EPP/CD: 3; ECPA: 2; ALDE:
2; UEL:1) and of the rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy on the “Review of the partnership for democracy in
respect of the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic”. Mr Georgios Stamatis
(Greece, EPP/CD) was appointed as chairperson (see the list of the
members of the delegation in Appendix 1).
4. In line with the 2004 cooperation agreement between the Assembly
and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Mr Srdjan Darmanović, member of the Venice Commission, provided
legal assistance to the PACE delegation.
5. The Assembly ad hoc committee (“PACE delegation”) operated
from 28 November to 1 December 2025 as part of an International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) together with a delegation from
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE PA) and the Election Observation Mission
of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR EOM). The programme of the PACE delegation’s meetings is
set out in Appendix 2.
6. The IEOM concluded that Kyrgyzstan’s early parliamentary elections
were efficiently run but the restrictive campaign environment stifled
candidate and voter engagement. It noted that while the fundamental freedoms
are protected by the Constitution, they are increasingly limited
in practice and that recent changes to the legal framework weakened
the involvement of political parties in the elections. Although
the election administration enjoyed public trust in its technical
ability to prepare the elections and made efforts to increase transparency,
these were insufficient in some key aspects (see joint press release
set out in Appendix 3).
2 Political
context
7. The parliamentary initiative
to self-dissolve on 25 September 2025 was described by the authorities
as an attempt to lessen the administrative and social pressures
of consecutive parliamentary (previously scheduled for November
2026) and presidential election (January 2027) campaigns under a
new electoral system. However, there were voices inside and outside
the country that saw the elections as a further step in consolidating
presidential power.
8. The outgoing parliament was elected in November 2021,following
the cancellation of the October 2020 elections in response to extensive
and violent public protests. Women held 20 out of 90 seats in the
outgoing parliament, 1 out of 23 ministerial positions, and none
of the seven governor positions. The under-representation of women
in politics results from ingrained patriarchal stereotypes, financial
barriers, social stigma, and intolerant language, as well as a lack
of capacity building measures to encourage greater participation
as called for according to international standards.
9. The period after the 2021 referendum reintroducing the presidential
system was characterised by a shift in the balance of powers. A
centralised governance model was enabled through the restructuring
of State institutions and the redistribution of their functions,
including those related to the judiciary and to anti-corruption efforts,
as well as the strengthening of State security structures, re-enforcing
the president’s central role in political life (Mr Japarov was elected
in the January 2021 presidential election, held simultaneously with
the referendum that introduced the presidential system). Consequently,
the political landscape underwent major fragmentation and diminished
the influence of political parties.
10. New legislation has introduced restrictions on the constitutionally
protected fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly. These restrictions and the manner in which they are enforced have
been criticised by international human rights organisations, along
with the recent prosecutions and detentions of activists, journalists,
and politicians.
3 Electoral system
and legal framework
3.1 Legal electoral
framework
11. The 2021 Constitution abolished
the proportional electoral system used under the 2010 Constitution
but did not establish a replacement, entrusting the new system to
the Electoral Law. The 2021 amendments to the Electoral Law (before
the last (early) parliamentary elections in November 2021) introduced
a mixed electoral system consisting of 54 deputies elected proportionally
in a single national constituency and 36 deputies elected in single-mandate
districts. This electoral model lasted less than a full term of
the parliament.
12. The practice of frequent changes of the electoral system continued.
In 2025, the electoral system underwent further changes: on 9 June
2025 President Japarov signed the law on amendments to the procedures
on electing members of parliament. There are some positive changes
and some controversial ones.
13. One of the most controversial changes is the decision concerning
the change of the electoral system (leading to a diminished role
for political parties). Kyrgyzstan elected all its deputies via
the single-mandate system in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 parliamentary
elections. The system was majoritarian, parties ran candidates,
but the number of independent candidates elected was high: in the
1995 elections, 67 of the 105 seats went to independents, in 2000,
73 of the 105, and in 2005, after changes to parliament’s structure,
47 of the 75 seats in parliament went to independents. In 2007 the
system was changed and deputies were elected by party lists. This
led to the first-ever ruling party in independent Kyrgyzstan’s history,
the Ak Jol party of then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which took
71 of the 90 seats in parliament in the 2007 elections. Party lists were
used also in the parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2020.
14. The Electoral Law was amended no less than seven times in
2025, most recently in October, fundamentally altering most aspects
of the electoral framework, without addressing key previous ODIHR recommendations.
The amendments introduced a new electoral system with a new gender
representation quota and electoral districts delineation, further
restricted candidate eligibility, introduced a non-refundable candidate
registration fee, changed the rules on campaign financing and campaign
regulations, and excluded some decisions of the Central Commission
on Elections and Referenda (or Central Electoral Commission, CEC)
from judicial review. The Venice Commission repeatedly emphasised
– in its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, as well as
in many opinions related to elections and electoral legislation
– that changes to the key elements of the electoral system shortly
prior to the elections undermine stability of the law and limit the
opportunities for informed voters’ choice. Additionally, in the
Kyrgyz case, amendments were adopted in a condensed timeframe, limiting
opportunities for meaningful public consultation and raising concerns
about the inclusiveness of the legislative process.
15. The very last change is the one reverting to the majoritarian
system, but in the form of “single non-transferable vote”. Under
the new system, voters may vote for only one candidate or against
all. The three top candidates in a district are elected, one of
which shall be a candidate of the under-represented gender (“women quota”).
Moreover, political parties may nominate only one candidate for
the Jogorku Kenesh for each multi-member electoral district (Article
60, paragraph 6, of the Electoral Law). This is a rather peculiar
system, as it combines a majoritarian, first-past-the-post element
with a rule preventing any party from obtaining an absolute majority
of seats in a constituency or at national level: while the system
is technically majoritarian, in practice it has effects contrary
to those which are expected from a majoritarian system, that is
the establishment of a (clear) majority. It might be practical for
elections in smaller communities (city councils for example), while
in a larger political landscape it retains most of the problems
of first-past-the-post voting on the one side and of a proportional
system on the other side. As local patronage networks might find
their way under the newly introduced electoral method there might
be concerns on how it will affect political parties, in particular
whether political parties could be weakened by the new system.
16. The CEC is mandated to delineate the electoral districts prior
to parliamentary elections. This delineation was completed on 1
October 2025, within the legal deadline but very near to election
day. The Election Law provides that districts should preferably
respect administrative boundaries, and have approximately equal numbers
of voters, with a tolerable deviation of up to 20% from the national
average (Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Electoral Law). The Venice
Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters provides
that deviations should not exceed 10% and certainly not more than
15% from the national average, except in special circumstances.
17. It is also not quite clear how the new district boundaries
affect electoral prospects of national minorities. While the CEC
and the representatives of several District and Precinct Election
Commissions (DECs and PECs) claim that new system could enhance
the electoral prospects of national minority candidates, there are other,
critical voices pointing out that the size and configuration of
some electoral districts could reduce the overall share of minority
seats.
3.2 Gender equality
18. The 90-member parliament is
elected for a five-year term under the new majoritarian single non-transferable
vote (SNTV) system across 30 three-member districts. The three top
candidates are elected, one of which shall be of the under-represented
gender.
19. The 30 mandates reserved for candidates of the under-represented
gender are presented by the authorities as a “women quota” (if there
are no candidates elected of the required gender, the mandate of
the third placed candidate is reserved for the candidate of the
opposite gender with the most votes in that district). While the
measures to strengthen political participation are laudable, many
IEOM interlocutors expressed concerns that the quota system might
actually undermine the legitimacy of women parliamentarians.
20. The law does not provide other measures to enhance the capabilities
and representation of women in politics, such as capacity building
trainings or financial subsidies.
4 Election administration,
voter lists and registration of candidates
4.1 Election administration
21. Parliamentary elections were
administered by a hierarchical, three-tier system of election commissions, with
the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CEC), 30 District
Election Commissions (DECs), and some 2 500 Precinct Election Commissions
(PECs).
22. The CEC is a permanent institution, appointed by the parliament
based on parliamentary and presidential nominations, with only the
Chairperson and the two Deputy Chairpersons working on a permanent basis.
23. For these elections, the CEC established 100 polling stations
in 34 countries, including 40 in the Russian Federation, 8 in Türkiye,
7 in Kazakhstan, 6 each in the United States of America and Canada,
and 4 in the Republic of Korea for out-of-country voting. The CEC
also established 27 polling stations exclusively for remote voting,
which are regulated by CEC resolutions on remote voting and are
not tied to any specific electoral district.
24. The CEC forms 12-member DECs in each district from the Territorial
Election Commissions (TEC) membership. There are no legal criteria
for the selection of DEC members, but the CEC must take election-related
experience into account for the chairperson and secretary. PECs
are composed from nominees proposed by political parties and local
self-government bodies in equal numbers. Political parties did not exercise
this right, reducing the intended level of political pluralism in
the commissions.
25. Women were well represented in DECs and PECs, with 57 and
70.5% respectively, unlike the CEC, which has only 2 women among
11 members. National minority groups or persons with disabilities
do not benefit from any legally guaranteed quota in the election
administration.
26. The CEC carried out technical preparations efficiently and
within the expedited deadlines for early elections. It held regular
sessions, and improved transparency in the decision-making process
by streaming and publishing the recording of its sessions online.
However, these efforts were diminished by agendas, regulations and
decisions not always being published in a timely manner. The DECs
were sufficiently resourced and carried out their duties professionally,
often with the active involvement of CEC representatives in their
administrative duties. Some DECs convened on an ad hoc basis, often
at short notice, and agendas and minutes of the sessions were frequently
not published, limiting transparency and the opportunity for observation.
The work of some DECs was affected by the vast territory of their
electoral districts and problematic communication. The election
administration enjoyed most stakeholders’ confidence in its technical capacity
to conduct the elections.
27. The late adoption of the new election day procedures, including
on remote voting (voting at a polling station outside the electoral
district), approximately two weeks before election day, did not
provide sufficient time for trainers to fully understand the process
and effectively communicate the information to DEC and PEC members.
Some PEC trainings were cancelled, some were conducted on short
notice. The quality of the PEC trainings varied from structured
and practical sessions with quality presentations to lectures with
no supplementary materials. Extensive media voter information campaigns
in Kyrgyz and Russian were conducted through televised spots, social
media platforms, and public gatherings, covering various aspects
of the electoral process. Voter information, including on candidates,
was not accessible in the languages of national minorities.
4.2 New voting technologies
28. The elections were conducted
using new voting equipment that integrates most voting procedures
into one system and enables the electronic tabulation of preliminary
results. The Voter Identification Device with Ballot Printing (VID-BP)
combined ID verification, biometric authentication, including fingerprint
and facial scanning, and the printing of both voter identification
slip and the ballot paper. The device also enables the regular transmission
of turnout data to the CEC during voting. Ballots are completed
manually by voters and inserted into the ballot scanner while upholding
the secrecy of the vote. After the polls close, the scanner is connected
to the internet to immediately transmit the preliminary results
and subsequently forward the scanned paper protocols. The electronically
generated results are to serve as preliminary, while manual counting remains
mandatory, and only manually counted results are to be considered
legally valid.
29. CEC trainings sufficiently prepared election officials for
the use of the new equipment and trainings were reinforced with
ample practice exercising. The authorities undertook measures to
address the instability of electricity and Internet connection,
which was the most commonly identified challenge; however, a few
delays in the delivery of the additional equipment were noted in
remote areas. The election administration assessed positively the
introduction of the new equipment, underlining its overall user-friendliness
and the positive effect on the facilitation of election day procedures,
expressing trust in its technical aspects. However, contrary to international
good practice, the contract to supply the electronic voting systems
and provide support services was granted without an open public
tender process, which does not ensure transparency and accountability and
along with the lack of access to scrutinise the technology affected
the perception of its integrity.
30. The ballot paper, issued by the VID-BP incorporates a unique
Quick Response (QR) code. The simultaneous processing of the identified
voter’s data and the generation of a QR code linked to the corresponding
ballot creates a significant potential vulnerability, which may
compromise the secrecy of the vote. The QR code enables the ballot
scanner to validate the locality and time origin of the ballot paper
and facilitates the secure issuance of replacement ballots for voters
surrendering spoiled ones.
31. The absence of publicly available source code and comprehensive
technical documentation prevents assessment regarding the potential
link or assignment between QR codes and individual voters. The law
does not provide for the independent verification and certification
of electronic technologies, limiting public scrutiny of the systems.
According to the CEC, the last system audit was carried out in 2020
by the State enterprise “Infocom”, but the findings remain unpublished,
limiting transparency and public accountability. Key stakeholders,
such as political parties and observers, were not granted access
to the relevant documentation and equipment setup procedures, at
odds with international good practice, and some expressed concerns about
the integrity of its use.
32. For the first time nationwide, remote voting was implemented.
Voters could vote at any polling station outside their electoral
district of registration, potentially opening voting to more students
and labour migrants. While voting remotely, the voter is identified
using centrally stored personal data and receives a ballot paper listing
the candidates from the voter’s original electoral district. To
prevent multiple voting, remote identification can only be used
once. The CEC organised several mock exercises of remote voting,
aiming to ensure voters’ familiarity with the process and improve
public trust, along with three nationwide tests in October. The
testing sessions did not gain wide attendance but allowed the election
administration to identify some operational risks related to connectivity
and data transfer. The lack of clear procedures on the tabulation
of remotely cast votes and on the verification of its results undermines
legal certainty.
4.3 Voter lists
33. Citizens of at least 18 years
of age on election day are eligible to vote, except those serving
a prison sentence, regardless of the gravity of the crime committed,
and those declared legally incompetent by a court, which is contrary
to international standards.
34. Voter registration is passive, based on permanent civil registration,
and requires biometric data. Voter lists are generated from the
Unified State Population Register administered by the State Registration
Agency “Kyzmat”, based on voter addresses and eligibility criteria.
Voter lists are updated daily during electoral periods. They were
publicly displayed at all polling stations visited and were generally
accessible for voters. Voters had the opportunity to request corrections
before 19 November. The final voter list, published on 23 November, included
4 294 243 voters, of whom 51.5% were women. The planned voter registration
database audit looking at the safety of the processing of biometric
information was postponed until after the elections.
35. The voter list scrutiny and the verification process did not
raise concerns as to the accuracy of the voter register, and most
IEOM interlocutors expressed high confidence in its accuracy and
inclusiveness. However, the legal requirement for PECs to display
lists of voters who have voted at polling stations and the publication of
these lists on the CEC website undermines secrecy of the vote.
4.4 Registration
of candidates
36. Voters who are at least 25
years old by election day, have a higher education, and have resided permanently
in the country for at least five years prior to the elections may
stand as candidates. The Election Law establishes undue limitations
on the right to stand, contrary to international standards and national legislation.
The Constitution maintains the prohibition on holders of dual citizenship
from holding public or civil service positions, despite recommendations
by the Venice Commission and ODIHR.
37. Recent legal amendments further expanded the restrictions
on candidacy by adding a requirement for proficiency in the Kyrgyz
language (which was subsequently suspended from implementation in
this campaign due to the lack of necessary standards because of
the late introduction of the requirement), and providing for ineligibility
based on criminal record, including expunged convictions and some
terminated criminal proceedings. A lifetime blanket ban due to any
conviction, especially those expunged, or a terminated criminal prosecution,
raises concerns about proportionality and denies the right to rehabilitation.
Furthermore, individuals included in preventive administrative registers
for links to criminal or armed groups are ineligible even in the
absence of a court decision, undermining the presumption of innocence
and legal certainty. There is also a ban on participation for former
clergy for a limited time, contrary to international standards.
The candidate eligibility requirements include undue limitations
on the right to stand and do not provide for equal opportunities
38. Candidates could be nominated by registered political parties
and by self-nomination until 30 October, subject to a non-refundable
electoral fee of KGS 300 000 (that is approximately 3 000 euros).
The electoral fee constituted a barrier for participation, particularly
given the limited time for fundraising in early elections. The 2025
amendments to the Election Law removed quotas for participation
of persons with disabilities, youth, and national minorities, weakening
opportunities for inclusive representation.
39. The registration process was overall transparent. The CEC
efficiently conducted compliance checks through inter-agency data
exchange and held several sessions to decide on nominations. It
verified submissions on a rolling basis, registering candidates
or issuing motivated rejections. The IEOM found that the denial
of registration close to the registration deadline rendered appeals
ineffective. By the legal deadline, the CEC registered 465 candidates,
of whom 189 were women (41%) and 10 self-identified to national
minorities (2%); 67 candidates had withdrawn, and 57 had been denied
registration. The number of registered candidates varies significantly
across districts. Nearly all candidates were self-nominated (98%);
only one political party fielded nine candidates, demonstrating
how the new electoral system may have impacted the participation
of political parties. Of the 90-member outgoing parliament, 79 MPs
stood in the elections.
5 Election campaign
and financing
5.1 Election campaign
40. The election campaign was short,
lasting from 10 to 29 November 2025, which effectively hindered
many candidates’ ability to reach voters. The legal framework ensures
equal campaigning opportunities for all contestants and grants citizens
the right to participate in campaigns. However, regulations include
strict definitions of what can and cannot be said in a campaign
and prescribe specific forms of campaigning for candidates and voters
which together with the election administration’s formalistic interpretation
of these rules and extensive sanctioning, unduly limited the candidates’
opportunities and hampered free public political discourse. In some
regions, the judiciary restricted the right to assembly. The week
prior to the elections was marked by arrests of prominent political
figures on suspicion of organising mass riots. On 22 November, a number
of politicians and journalists, including representatives of two
opposition parties, two former MPs and the former Chief of the Financial
Police were detained for questioning and ten of them (including
the leader of Social Democrats party) were further detained until
1 January (under Article 278 of the Criminal Code, that provides
a sanction of up to a 10- year imprisonment). Multiple searches
and interrogations were conducted, including of family members of
the detained individuals.
41. The law prohibits the misuse of administrative resources and
public office, vote-buying, preferential media access, dissemination
of false information, and criticism of other contestants during
free time on State media. Public authorities, including the president,
repeatedly addressed voters, discouraging unlawful practices and
calling for fair campaign. Contestants signed a non-binding memorandum
pledging not to misuse administrative resources or engage in vote-buying.
The IEOM received information on allegations of vote-buying that
remained widespread across numerous districts throughout the campaign,
but only three criminal cases were initiated. Some noted that the
new election campaign rule, which enabled contestants to hire up
to 1 000 people to campaign for them, disproportionately favoured
affluent candidates, and some considered its reintroduction to be
legitimised vote-buying.
42. The President announced his intention to personally oversee
the election campaign to ensure its fair conduct. The law mandates
the CEC to ensure compliance with campaign requirements. Its working
group on campaigning reviewed over 220 cases related to the campaign,
many of which concerned materials posted or mentioned on social
networks or in closed messaging groups, both before and during the
official campaign.
43. While the intensity of the campaign gained momentum in the
week before election day, it generally unfolded in a subdued atmosphere,
with largely low-key activities. Observation of campaign activities demonstrated
a level of caution in campaign narratives and voter engagement and
an apparent acceptance by voters and candidates alike of a certain
degree of control of the campaign environment along with a fear
of repercussions for any activities or statements that could be
considered as criticism. This was a concern also raised by several
IEOM interlocutors, some of them noting also a high level of voter
apathy, which they attributed to a lack of trust and disillusionment
in the political process.
44. Despite this campaign environment, competitive electoral activities
were observed in many districts and included gatherings, a number
of which were co-organised by the CEC and the DECs, door-to-door canvassing,
and activity on the social media. While the campaign was mostly
personality-driven, candidates addressed a range of primary local
issues, such as rising living costs, social development, including
education and healthcare, local infrastructure and women’s rights.
45. Most candidates largely relied on social media platforms such
as Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, and messaging apps as their main
campaigning tools. Ten candidates had over 100 000 followers on
their Instagram accounts. The campaign-related posts generally presented
the candidates’ campaign activities and were personality-focused,
rarely featuring programmatic issues, including those that generated
higher interactions. The social media platforms monitored did not
contain posts with discrediting or derogatory content against other
candidates or authorities. There is no specific regulation of the
online campaign and general campaign regulations apply.
46. Some IEOM interlocutors reported a pattern of concern and
caution towards participating in the election among candidates and
potential candidates belonging to national minorities and communities.
Discussions on minority-specific topics were almost absent from
public campaigning. Moreover, the availability of electoral information
and campaigning in minority languages is severely limited. The campaign
environment for ethnic minority communities is further challenged
by the overall lack of media in languages other than Kyrgyz and Russian.
5.2 Campaign financing
47. The legal framework for campaign
finance provides a sufficiently structured basis for financial regulation during
the campaign. However, candidates can be deregistered for nominally
exceeding spending limits, which is disproportionate. Recent amendments inter alia restricted the methods
by which candidates can receive donations, made possible deregistration
of candidates for the overspending of their nominating political
party (a disproportionate sanction depending on the gravity of the
case) and incorporated social network advertising as a permitted
campaign expense.
48. Campaigns may be financed from the candidate’s or political
party’s own resources and voluntary donations from citizens and
legal entities, subject to limitations on amounts and sources. In-kind
donations are still not permitted, despite prior Venice Commission
and ODIHR recommendations. The total campaign fund per candidate
is limited to approximately KGS 20 000 000. As per published financial
data, the main sources of campaign financing are the candidates'
personal assets, followed by donations from individuals. Financial disparities
affected the ability of candidates to campaign on a level playing
field.
49. All contestants opened a dedicated campaign account at one
of two authorised State-owned banks. Some IEOM interlocutors regretted
the lack of simplified online donation tools, such as QR codes or
e-wallets, which discouraged small contributions. Some also expressed
concern about the exclusive use of State-owned banks and reported
delays in transaction processing and limited branch access in rural
areas.
50. The CEC published income, expenditure, and financial statements
for each contestant throughout the campaign on its website, but
donor identities are not disclosed, which falls short of the international
standards for transparency. In the absence of an online campaign
finance report submission system, the interim reports due on 22
November were submitted in hard copies and were not published due
to the lack of technical capacity. The CEC could not account for
the exact number of the received reports, as some of them were submitted
to the DECs. The CEC explained that due to limited human resources
and short timeframe, the verification of the reports was limited,
and that it primarily relied on the banks servicing the campaign
accounts to have rejected unlawful or excessive donations.
51. The CEC oversees compliance with campaign finance rules, acts
on violations, verifies financial transactions, reports on campaign
finances during the campaign, and conducts inspections and audits.
The absence of clear procedures for audits and limited public disclosure
diminishes the effectiveness of campaign finance oversight. The
CEC also expressed its concern that electronic payment applications
or cash could be used to bypass the requirements for electoral funds.
Several IEOM interlocutors referred to possible unreported volunteer
labour and operational expenses that could fall under prohibited
in-kind contributions and noted the limited verification capacity
at the district level, together indicating gaps in the oversight
system. The law requires an ex-post audit, but it does not regulate
the audit methodology or require publication of its results.
52. Sanctions for violations of campaign finance rules are predominantly
criminal, while the administrative measures remain limited and unclear
and do not provide a proportionate, graduated system to address omissions
during the campaign. The Election Law grants the CEC the mandate
to allow or prohibit prosecution of candidates for campaign finance
violations. In the absence of sufficient administrative measures,
this framework leaves moderate violations either subject to potentially
severe consequences or not pursued, limiting proportionate and predictable
enforcement, despite prior Venice Commission and ODIHR recommendations,
and at odds with international good practice. In particular, the
provision for the deregistration of candidates for exceeding spending
limits by 0.5% is disproportionate.
6 Media environment
53. The media landscape has changed
significantly since 2021, and, although some plurality remains,
it is rapidly narrowing. Social networks have become the primary
source of political information, followed by television. In 2022,
the public broadcaster was nationalised, contrary to international
good practice, and rebranded as the National Television and Radio
Broadcasting Corporation of Kyrgyzstan (NTRK).
54. While the Constitution provides for freedom of expression
and prohibits censorship, it also includes unduly broad or vague
grounds for restricting these freedoms. Further, the Criminal Code
provides a broad basis for prosecution on vague grounds and journalists
are increasingly being prosecuted under them. The 2025 Law on Mass
Media requires mandatory registration for all media, including online
media, and limits foreign ownership to 35%. The new fines introduced
in 2025 into the Code of Administrative Offences for libel, defamation
and distribution of false information are disproportionately high.
There is no independent media regulator in Kyrgyzstan, and the Ministry
of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy is mandated to license
and de-license media outlets. Contrary to international standards,
the Law on Protection of Inaccurate (False) Information allows the
ministry to remove content or block websites without prior court
decision. Overall, the legal framework for the media falls short
of meeting international obligations.
55. The prosecution of media workers, the closure of independent
media outlets, and an overly restrictive legal framework have collectively
produced a pronounced chilling effect on media freedom, resulting
in widespread self-censorship and a substantial curtailment of independent
journalism.
56. Campaign-related news must be presented in a separate block,
without commentary. The media bears liability for the publication
of information that disgraces or discredits the honour, dignity,
or reputation of candidates and political parties, which is prohibited.
This led to the lack of news and editorial coverage of contestants’
campaigns. As a result, beyond coverage of procedural aspects and
election-related violations, the campaign was mainly or solely paid
coverage of candidates in news segments, limiting voters’ ability
to make an informed choice.
57. The State-funded broadcasters provided free airtime for registered
candidates, in line with the law, but the candidates, in particular
the most affluent ones, opted not to use it, allegedly due to limited
viewership and impact. Due to the high number of candidates, the
airtime was shared between two State broadcasters and their regional
branches. The media still had to be accredited in order to provide
paid advertising, which must be supplied to contestants under equal
conditions. Due to the absence of a media regulatory body, the CEC oversees
the legality of the campaign in the media and has the right to revoke
media accreditation for violations.
58. The candidates were not covered in news and current affairs
programmes, except for the limited coverage of campaign violations.
The broadcasters extensively covered the State authorities, predominantly the
President and his administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, the
State Committee for National Security, as well as the activities
of the CEC, in a positive or neutral tone. Similarly, online portals
mainly covered the authorities and the CEC on procedural aspects
of the process, either in a positive or neutral tone. The CEC’s voter
information campaign was extensively disseminated in the media.
IEOM interlocutors stated that the media received instructions to
avoid negative news on the country’s development and certain other controversial
issues, including in newscasts.
59. Candidates were covered within free and paid airtime, including
paid coverage in news segments, despite previous ODIHR recommendations
to prohibit paid news coverage. Debate programmes on two State broadcasters
and their local branches were the only platforms where candidates
could present themselves and interact with each other, however,
some candidates considered the format ineffective, leading to a
general reluctance to participate. Women candidates received 33%
of the free airtime. Sign language translation was not provided
during the debates. Paid content on websites amounted to less than
1%.
7 Complaints and
appeals
60. Decisions, actions, or inaction
by the election administration, public agencies, and candidates
may be challenged by candidates, political parties, observers, and
voters. Complaints against the election administration are subject
to a hierarchical review and may be appealed to the Administrative
Court of Bishkek, with further cassation available before the Supreme
Court. Complaints and appeals must be filed and examined under expedited
early election deadlines and immediately on election day. These
deadlines are insufficient for submission of a complaint and run
contrary to international good practice. While complaints to the
CEC can be submitted online via its website, there is no online
system to initiate judicial review.
61. The 2025 amendments further limited access to effective remedy,
as the standing of political parties to challenge election results
was abolished, leaving such challenges to candidates, their representatives
and observers. Voters cannot contest results, not even with a reasonable
quorum, contrary to international good practice that supports broad
standing in electoral disputes.
62. The CEC maintained an online register of complaints and incident
reports, which contributed to transparency; however, some decisions
were uploaded with a delay. Of the 142 complaints registered as
of 29 November, 102 were resolved by the CEC. The CEC imposed administrative
fines in 48 cases. While the CEC sessions on disputes provided transparency
and opportunity for the parties to present their cases, procedural
guarantees were diminished as the high number of cases were examined
in camera, in particular those not resulting in sanctions.
63. The CEC’s interpretation of campaign rules in decisions on
complaints was not uniform and – in some instances – narrow, restrictive
and formalistic, particularly in cases concerning the freedom of
expression on election-related matters, including in private correspondence.
The CEC decisions mainly relied on its dispute resolution working
group’s recommendations, offering limited factual and legal reasoning
and omitting substantiation on the relevance of cited legal provisions
to the merits of the case, which undermined legal clarity and the
possibility of an effective appeal. Overall, the CEC applied campaign
rules in a manner that expanded the scope of prohibited conduct
and did not consistently reflect the need to balance campaign regulation
with protection of fundamental freedoms, contrary to international
standards. No CEC decisions on campaign violations referenced the
avenues for appeals.
64. The Administrative Court received 12 appeals on candidate
registration, 9 of them were dismissed on merits and 2 were deemed
inadmissible. The 8 challenged judgments were upheld by the Supreme
Court. Hearing schedules were often not updated, and the election-related
decisions by the Administrative Court were not timely published,
while those by the Supreme Court remained unpublished before election
day, limiting transparency.
65. The Criminal Code outlines five election-related criminal
offences, which fall under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor General.
To date, law enforcement agencies have initiated nine criminal procedures
regarding alleged vote-buying.
8 Citizen and international
observers
66. The law provides for citizen
and international election observation. Civil society organisations
(CSO) with a statutory mandate in electoral matters or human rights
may receive accreditation to observe the elections. Candidates and
political parties are also entitled to deploy their representatives
and observers.
67. Several IEOM interlocutors raised concerns about the feasibility
of citizen observation for these elections, mainly due to funding
limitations and recent legislative changes that define domestic
election observation as political activity and require CSOs receiving
foreign funding to register as “foreign representatives”. Some interlocutors
also informed the IEOM that CSOs may fear retribution for engaging
in observation activities. As a result, citizen observation was
largely absent from these elections, and civil society’s capacity
to participate in public life has substantially diminished. The
CEC accredited 788 international observers and only 2 citizen organisations,
each appointing 1 observer.
9 Election day
68. On election day the PACE delegation
split into 8 teams and observed the voting in Bishkek and its surroundings,
as well as in Chunkurchak, Kant, Kara Balta, Kayyngdy, Sokoluk,
Tokmok, Syk Ata, Dzhar Bashy, Al Archa and Kamyshanovka.
69. Election day was generally calm and orderly. The IEOM observed
the opening process in 142 polling stations, voting in 1 199 polling
stations, and counting in 118. Women were well represented in the
PECs observed and chaired 79% of them. Despite constitutional guarantees
to equal rights, regrettably, 42% of the polling stations observed
did not provide independent access for voters with physical disabilities,
while in 21%, the layout was not suitable for such voters. Additionally,
21% of polling stations observed were not equipped with assistive
tools for visually impaired voters.
70. The opening was assessed positively in 131 of the 142 polling
stations observed. Delays, which occurred in more than a third of
the polling stations observed, were attributed to difficulties in
preparing the new voting equipment; in 3 cases, the delay was over
half an hour. Procedural errors were noted, including 13 instances where
the ballot boxes were not shown to be empty before being sealed,
45 cases where lots were not drawn for PEC assignments and 6 instances
where the PECs did not print a zero-count protocol. Difficulties
in setting up the voter identification device and the ballot scanner
were reported in 16 and 37 cases, respectively, while in 13 instances,
the ballot scanner was not operational at the opening of the polls.
71. IEOM observers assessed voting overall positively in 96% of
the 1 323 observations, describing the voting process as transparent.
Negative assessments were largely due to issues of secrecy of the
vote and procedural issues related to the use of technology. Observers
nominated by contestants were present in 95% of the polling stations
observed. In 40% of polling stations observed, unauthorised persons
(mainly police and local officials) were present and in 4% of the
cases they interfered with the work of PECs.
72. Procedures were mostly followed in the majority of the polling
stations observed. However, IEOM observers reported that in 18%
of the polling stations observed, the ballot box was not sealed
properly. When identification devices failed to identify a voter,
in 78% of these instances PEC members did not fill in the correct form.
IEOM observers reported that in 27% of the polling stations observed,
some voters were not allowed to vote, mainly because they were not
on the voter list. Serious procedural shortcomings reported by IEOM observers
included 16 cases of group voting, 13 cases of multiple voting,
and 7 cases of proxy voting. IEOM observers noted indications of
vote-buying in 9 cases around polling stations.
73. Voting technologies were fully operational and functioning
properly in almost all polling stations observed. However, connectivity
issues were noted in 8% of the polling stations observed, while
in 2% the ballot scanner was not operational. The operators and
PEC members consistently checked voter’s biometric data, this being
sufficient to identify voters in the vast majority of observations.
74. IEOM observers reported some issues related to the secrecy
of the vote. In 36% of the polling stations observed, the design
and positioning of booths compromised the secrecy of the vote, and
in 5% the layout was not adequate to conduct voting. In 4%, not
all voters marked their ballots in secret and overcrowding was noted in
5%. Campaign materials were seen in around 2% of the observed polling
stations.
75. Also, as stated above, the printing of an individual QR code
on each ballot has been seen as potentially paving the way to the
identification of the voter.
76. There was no clear indication that ballots should have been
put in the ballot box face down and putting it face up compromised
the secrecy (as the voter then often asked for help from a member
of the PEC). Also, the construction of the voting booths was not
optimal in terms of secrecy as the opening was towards the interior
of the room not towards a wall; the – understandable – reason being
preventing voters to take photos of their ballots.
77. It was noted that in rural areas the demand for mobile voting
was low to inexistent.
78. The vote count was assessed negatively in 44 of the 118 polling
stations observed, mainly due to non-compliance with established
procedures and substantial procedural errors and omissions that
negatively impacted the transparency of the process. Unauthorised
persons (mostly police officers and local officials) were present
in 73 polling stations, while in 14 cases they were observed interfering
with or even directing the commission's work. In 13 polling stations
they were directly participating in the count.
79. IEOM observers noted that key procedural safeguards before
and during the manual count were often not fully implemented. Concerningly,
in 30 cases the manual count was not conducted, and the results
were entered based solely on the electronically generated protocol.
In 26 cases, the number of voters who voted was not determined by
counting voter signatures on the voter list. In 13 cases, the number
of voter signatures did not match the number of confirmation slips.
In 23 cases, the PECs did not produce and sign the act recording
the number of ballot papers issued to voters. All persons present
were not shown the ballot box seals before they were opened or the
control sheets in 27 and 29 observations respectively.
80. During the manual count, ballots were not counted one by one
and the choice on each ballot was not announced and shown to all
present in 73 polling stations. The protocols were not completed
based on the manual count in 30 polling stations observed. The invalid
ballots were not determined in a reasonable manner in 26 cases,
and in 17 cases PECs were not consistent in their determination.
IEOM observers reported discrepancies between the manual count and
printed results slips in 21 polling stations, and in 5 cases the figures
in the protocols did not reconcile. In 55 cases, the protocols were
not posted for public display, as required by law. In 21 cases,
the official protocols were found to have been pre-signed by PEC
members. However, observers did not report indications of intentional
falsification of voter list entries, results or protocols.
81. By law, tabulation is conducted at the 30 DECs. Ahead of election
day, the CEC informed the IEOM that there would be a two-tiered
reception system, using TEC premises as sub-DEC hubs, to facilitate
the delivery of election materials from PECs. However, contrary
to the CEC’s explanation, IEOM observers reported that in nearly
half of the sub-DECs, DEC members performed a range of tabulation-related
tasks in addition to receiving materials, including checking figures
in the protocols and entering and aggregating data in the electronic
system.
82. The IEOM observed all 30 DECs and 26 sub-DEC hubs assessing
the initial stages of tabulation negatively in almost half of the
cases, mainly due to procedural shortcomings and inadequate conditions,
such as insufficient space and poor organisation for receiving and
tabulating PEC protocols, which negatively impacted the transparency
of the tabulation process. IEOM observers reported being able to
follow the process without restriction in most DECs; however, in
roughly half of the observations, not all those present had a clear view
of the tabulation procedures.
83. On election day, the CEC received 67 notifications and complaints.
Of these 28 concerned alleged breaches of campaigning rules, such
as campaigning during the silence period and candidate representatives wearing
clothing displaying candidate names or images. 4 related to the
malfunctioning of vote count technology and 18 concerned alleged
vote buying. According to the CEC, all of these were forwarded to
law enforcement agencies for further verification through the Rapid
Response mechanism.
84. Immediately after the end of voting, the CEC announced the
preliminary turnout at 34.31% and started posting the electronically
generated preliminary results disaggregated by polling station on
its website, this contributing to transparency.
85. The CEC recognised the elections as valid in 30 multi-member
constituencies. Based on the results of voting in 29 constituencies,
87 candidates were elected to the Jogorku Kenesh. The results of
the elections in multi-member constituency No. 13 were declared
invalid due to violations of Electoral Law.
86. Out of the 4 294 243 citizens included in the voter lists,
a total of 1 584 446 voters took part in the election, representing
36.90% of the total number of voters.
10 Conclusions and recommendations
87. The IEOM concluded that the
early parliamentary elections were administered efficiently but
that the restrictive campaign environment stifled candidate and
voter engagement. Fundamental freedoms of expression, association,
and peaceful assembly, while constitutionally protected, are increasingly
limited in practice by new restrictive legislation and its enforcement.
Recent fundamental changes to the legal framework introduced a new
majoritarian electoral system and new constituency delineation as
well as additional restrictions on candidate eligibility, resulting
in significantly diminished political party involvement.
88. Positively, the new system provides for 30 mandates, one per
district, reserved for the under-represented gender, and 41% of
the candidates were women. The election administration enjoyed confidence in
its technical capacity and introduced measures to enhance transparency
of its decision making, but for other key aspects of the process,
transparency was insufficient, particularly on the new voting technologies, campaign
finances and its decisions on election-related cases. The nationwide
new remote voting option provided greater opportunities for voter
participation.
89. While there were competitive campaign activities in some districts,
significant financial disparities between candidates affected their
ability to compete on a level playing field. Numerous allegations
of vote-buying continued throughout the campaign. Media refrained
from covering candidates in their news coverage or editorial programmes,
citing strict interpretation of the requirements for equal coverage
and liability for content, limiting voters’ ability to make an informed
choice. Funding limitations and recent legal amendments impacting
CSO have significantly restricted participation in public life and
election observation. Election day was assessed overall positively,
new voting technologies functioned reliably and voting procedures
were largely followed; however, widespread issues with adherence
to counting and tabulation procedures were observed.
90. The PACE delegation recalls that an election and its observation
involve more than just polling day; they constitute a multi-stage
process that needs to be analysed and evaluated in order to assess
the entire electoral process.
91. It concluded in particular that:
- The electoral fundamentally reformed legal framework,
while providing a technical basis for conducting elections, falls
short of a number of international standards for democratic elections.
The 2025 legal amendments inter alia created
a new majoritarian electoral system with new electoral district
delineation and changed candidate eligibility requirements.
- The short time-frame between the adoption of the amendments
to the law and the early elections limited opportunities for meaningful
public consultation, raised concerns about the inclusiveness of
the legislative process, hindered implementation of some provisions,
and undermined the stability of the electoral law.
- The CEC conducted the candidate registration transparently
and efficiently. It managed technical preparations efficiently and
within the expedited deadlines for early elections, and enhanced transparency
in its decision making, but the work of lower-level election commissions
was less transparent.
- Voter information campaigns were extensive but not accessible
in the languages of national minorities.
- Electronic devices were used at all polling stations for
voter biometric identification and for the establishment and transmission
of preliminary results. For the first time, voters had the opportunity
to vote remotely at any polling station outside their electoral
district of registration.
- Due to the short campaign period, candidates’ opportunities
to reach voters were limited and they were further restricted by
strict campaign regulations and their enforcement. The campaign
was generally low-key and generated limited voter engagement; this
was linked to fears of retribution for political activity. Despite
this campaign environment, competitive activities were observed
in many districts.
- The week before the elections was marked by arrests of
prominent politicians on charges of organising mass riots.
- The legal framework for campaign finance provides a sufficiently
structured basis for financial regulation during the campaign. However,
candidates can be de-registered for exceeding spending limits, which
is disproportionate. Under-staffing, technical difficulties, insufficient
regulation of the audit and the lack of capacity to investigate
actual spending make campaign finance oversight ineffective. There
were significant financial disparities between candidates that affected
their ability to compete on a level playing field.
- Numerous allegations of vote-buying continued throughout
the campaign but only nine cases were officially initiated.
- Women were well represented among election officials in
the polling stations observed. However, they remain under-represented
in political life.
- While the Constitution provides for freedom of expression,
it also includes unduly broad and vague grounds for restricting
these rights, which, along with the increase in prosecution of journalists,
has led to widespread self-censorship.
- Legislation provides for election dispute resolution with
judicial review and expedited deadlines. However, recent amendments
have limited political parties’ access to this remedy when challenging election
results, and the early election time-lines do not provide sufficient
time for the submission and adjudication of complaints.
- The law provides for citizen and international election
observation. Funding limitations, along with the recent amendments
which define observation as a political activity (meaning that CSOs
with foreign funding have to register as “foreign representatives”)
have substantially diminished civil society’s ability to participate
in public life and even led to fear of retribution among civil society
for engaging in election observation activities.
- Election day was calm, orderly, and procedures were largely
followed. There were, however, procedural shortcomings, including
issues related to the secrecy of the vote, and unauthorised persons
(mainly police and local officials) were frequently present and
at times interfering with the work of the commissions.
- A limited number of serious procedural shortcomings were
observed, including group voting, multiple voting and proxy voting.
In a few cases, observers saw indications of vote-buying around
polling stations.
- The new voting technologies were fully operational and
functioning properly in almost all polling stations observed, despite
some connectivity issues.
- Significant procedural errors and omissions during the
counting and tabulation processes were observed; and there were
some instances of unauthorised persons interfering in the count.
- Almost half of the polling stations observed did not provide
independent access for voters with physical disabilities.
92. Based on its findings, the PACE delegation reiterates that
the following specific issues are of key importance for strengthening
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
in Kyrgyzstan:
- holding free
and fair elections in accordance with relevant international standards,
and improving the electoral legal framework in co-operation with
the Venice Commission;
- enhancing public interest in, and awareness of, the democratic
process, as well as ensuring a higher level of participation in
elections and involvement of citizens in political life;
- strengthening public monitoring of elections by independent
observers, including strengthening the capacities of domestic observer
networks.
93. The Assembly notes with concern that a number of irregularities
and shortcomings need to be dealt with by the country’s authorities
as soon as possible. The delegation therefore encourages the authorities
of Kyrgyzstan to:
- show strong
and genuine political will to address the problematic aspects of
the electoral process and to ensure proper implementation of the
existing legislation;
- implement the recommendations for further improvement
of the legal framework governing elections issued by the Venice
Commission and ODIHR;
- ensure that key elements of the electoral system are not
revised shortly prior to the elections, in line with the Venice
Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters;
- increase the duration of electoral campaigns;
- take measures to eliminate reasons for fears of retribution
for political activity during the campaign;
- ensure that there are no significant financial disparities
between candidates during the campaign leading to unequal or unjust
campaign conditions;
- take strong measures to deter vote-buying;
- refrain from using criminal-justice procedures or State
administrative powers in a manner that could distort the electoral
process or influence its outcome;
- take measures to further increase the participation of
women in political life;
- eliminate unduly broad and vague grounds restricting freedom
of expression;
- restore civil society’s ability to participate in public
life without fear of retribution for engaging in election observation
activities;
- pay special attention to ensuring the meaningful participation
of youth in political life;
- ensure that all remaining barriers for the participation
of people with disabilities in the electoral process are eliminated.
94. The Assembly stands ready to work with the authorities of
Kyrgyzstan to address the issues highlighted, guided by the Reykjavík
Principles of Democracy adopted at the Summit of Heads of State
and Government of the Council of Europe. It reiterates its appeal
to the newly elected Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic to step up
its co-operation with the Assembly, to reaffirm its commitment to
the aims of the partner for democracy status and to take full advantage
of the opportunities offered by this status in order to ensure compliance
with the political commitments, as set out in Resolution 1984 (2014).
It strongly encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to boost co-operation
with the Venice Commission in order to bring the country’s laws
closer to international standards and to implement the previous
recommendations, in particular with regard to elections, and those included
in the Joint Opinion (No. 1021/2021) on the draft constitution of
the Kyrgyz Republic.
Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly, the ad hoc committee was composed as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Georgios
STAMATIS (Greece, EPP/CD)
Vice-Chairperson: Mr Mehmet
AKALIN (Türkiye, ALDE)
Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
(SOC)
- Ms Aurora FLORIDIA,
Italy
- Mr Gerardo GIOVAGNOLI, San Marino
- Ms Wanda NOWICKA, Poland
- Mr Ivan RAČAN, Croatia
Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Garret AHEARN, Ireland
- Mr Paul GALLES, Luxembourg
- Mr Georgios STAMATIS, Greece
European Conservatives, Patriots &
Affiliates (ECPA)
- Ms Elisabetta GARDINI,
Italy
- Mr Fabio PIETRELLA, Italy
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Mehmet AKALIN, Türkiye
- Mr Manu DIERICX, Belgium
Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
Venice Commission
- Mr Srdjan DARMANOVIĆ,
Member of the Venice Commission
- Mr Pierre GARRONE, Head of Division, Venice Commission
secretariat
- Mr Khagani GULIYEV, Legal Advisor, Venice Commission secretariat
Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan TORCĂTORIU,
Senior Election Officer, Elections Division
- Ms Carine ROLLER-KAUFMAN, Assistant, Elections Division
- Ms Amila BERKOVIC, Assistant, Elections Division
- Mr Eugen SCHOENFELD, Secretary of the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy
Appendix 2 – Programme of the meetings of
the PACE delegation
Friday, 28 November 2025
10:45-11:45 Internal meeting of the PACE delegation
12:00-12:30 Welcome and introductory remarks
- Claude Haagen, Special Co-ordinator
and leader of the OSCE short term observers
- Georgios Stamatis, Head of the PACE Observer Delegation
- Monika Zajkova, Head of the OSCE PA Observer Delegation
12:30-14:30 Briefing by the ODIHR EOM
- Welcome and overview of the EOM's work – Tamás Meszerics,
Head of Mission
- Political overview, the Contestants and the Election Campaign
– Ivan Godarsky, Political Analyst
- Media – Ruzica Jovanovic, Media Analyst
- Legal Framework, Electoral dispute resolutions – Zeliha
Aydin, Legal Analyst
- Election Administration – Giovanni Dibiase, Election Analyst
- Security – Davor Corluka, Security Expert
- Questions and Answers
14:45-16:30 Candidates Panel
- Seid Atambaev, Candidate, Electoral district #20
- Ilim Karypbekov, Candidate, Electoral district #23
- Mavlyan Askarbekov, Candidate, Electoral district #23
- Erzhan Kaipov, Candidate, Electoral district #24
16:45-18:30 Socio-Political Context
- Emil Dzhuraev, PhD, Lecturer, OSCE Academy
- Baken Dosalieva, Women Support Centre
- Medet Tiulegenov, Director, Silk Road Research Center,
International Alatoo University
- Nurbek Toktakunov, Lawyer
Saturday, 29 November 2025
09:30-11:15 Media Freedom, Campaign and Election Coverage
Panel
- Gladis Temirchieva, Chair,
Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan
- Aida Suyundueva, Chairperson of the Board, Common Cause
Public Foundation
- Semetey Karypkulov, Editor-in-chief, Exclusive.kg, Working
Group on Voter Information, Other Electoral Process Participants,
and Campaigning Rules
- Assel Sooronbaeva, Editor, CheckIt Media
11:30-12:30 Election Administration and Legislation
- Zhylkybaev Uzarbek Kazievich,
Member of the CEC
- Sheripbaev Bakytbek Abdyldabekovich, CEC Anti-Corruption
Directorate
- Altynbek Meshkenov, Producer, TV Channel "Ala-Too 24"
- Baktiyar Tukeev, Producer, Radio "Birinchi Radio"
12:30-13:30 ODIHR EOM Briefing continuation – Election Day
procedures
- Giovanni Dibiase,
Election Analyst
- Tarvi Martens, New Voting Technologies Analyst
- Short term observers Reporting, Andreas Roth, Statistical
Analyst
13:30-13:45 ODIHR EOM Briefing continuation
- Briefing by Long Term Observers
deployed in Bishkek and surroundings
- Chris Taylor, Parliamentary Liaison Officer
Sunday, 30 November 2025
Election Day: observation in polling stations
(polling station open at 08:00 and close at 20:00)
Monday, 1 December 2025
08:00-09:00 PACE Delegation Debriefing
15:00 Joint Press Conference
Appendix 3 – Press release of the IEOM
Kyrgyzstan’s
parliamentary elections efficiently run but a restrictive campaign
environment stifled public engagement, international observers say
BISHKEK, 1 December 2025 – Kyrgyzstan’s early parliamentary
elections were efficiently run but the restrictive campaign environment
stifled candidate and voter engagement, and while the fundamental
freedoms are protected by the constitution, they are increasingly
limited in practice and recent changes to the legal framework weakened
the involvement of political parties in the elections. Although
the election administration enjoyed public trust in its technical
ability to prepare the elections and made efforts to increase transparency, these
were insufficient in some key aspects, international observers said
in a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),
found that the legal framework provided a technical basis for holding
elections, but fell short on a number of international standards
for democratic elections. In addition, the limited opportunities
for public consultation on the fundamental changes to the legal
framework ahead of the elections raised concerns.
“These elections were conducted under a fundamentally reformed
framework that was amended repeatedly throughout 2025, introducing
changes to almost all core components of the process and falling
short of a number of international standards,” said Claude Haagen,
Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term observer mission.
“Such far-reaching reforms, adopted shortly before election day
and without addressing almost all previous recommendations, created
challenges for transparency, stability, and voters’ ability to make fully
informed choices. Our strong presence here, with more than 350 parliamentary
and ODIHR observers, testifies to our deep support for Kyrgyzstan’s
democratic path.”
Candidates had limited opportunity to reach out to voters
due to the short campaign period, as well as the restrictive space
for public debate and the overly strict campaign regulations. The
campaign was generally low-key and generated limited voter engagement,
linked to fears of retribution for political activity. Election legislation
provides equal campaign opportunities for all candidates and gives
citizens the right to participate in campaigning, but while some
competitive activities were observed, the significant financial
disparities between candidates meant they could not compete on a
level playing field. At the same time, numerous allegations of vote-buying
continued throughout the campaign.
“Being a PACE Partner for Democracy is not just a title —
it is an ongoing commitment. The PACE delegation is here to support
Kyrgyzstan in making every vote count. The assessment we are making
here today on these elections will be taken into account by PACE
in its future dialogue with the Kyrgyz parliament,” said Georgios Stamatis,
Head of the PACE delegation. “Special attention will be paid to
ensuring the meaningful participation of youth and women in political
life as well as people with disabilities. While they enjoy equal
electoral rights in Kyrgyzstan, in practice significant barriers
persist.”
Some 4.3 million voters were registered to vote in yesterday’s
elections. The election authorities managed technical preparations
efficiently, and also prepared election officials for the use of
the new electronic devices used at all polling stations for biometric
voter identification and voting. While the new equipment was generally assessed
positively, trust in the new voting technology was affected by a
lack of transparency. The new nationwide option for remote voting
provided greater opportunities for voter participation. Observers
assessed election day itself as positive overall with procedures
largely followed, but widespread issues with adhering to counting
and tabulation procedures after polling stations closed were observed.
The introduction of one reserved seat per district for the
underrepresented gender was a welcome measure in increasing the
representation of women in politics. This measure is commendable,
but nonetheless additional efforts to support their meaningful participation
are necessary.
“The introduction of a gender quota in these elections is
a welcome and important first step toward improving the position
of the underrepresented gender and strengthening women's participation
in political life,” said Monika Zajkova, Head of the OSCE PA delegation.
“Meaningful representation is achieved through sustained support,
an enabling environment, and equal access to public life. We encourage
the authorities to build on this initial measure and to advance
genuine gender equality, as well as fair representation of all groups,
including national minorities and persons with disabilities, throughout
the political process.”
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression,
it also includes unduly broad and vague grounds for restricting
this right. Together with an increase in the prosecution of journalists,
this has led to widespread self-censorship in the media. Media pluralism
has suffered from new legislation that requires media registration,
limits foreign ownership, and provides a wide basis for media outlets
to be deregistered, as well as the recent nationalization of the
public broadcaster. During the election campaign, although state-funded broadcasters
provided free airtime in line with the law, their news coverage
focused almost entirely on procedural issues, limiting voters’ ability
to make an informed choice on election day.
Funding limitations, together with the recent legal amendments
that define election observation as a political activity making
it mandatory for organizations with foreign funding to register
as “foreign representatives”, and fears of retribution for these
activities, have greatly weakened the ability of civil society to
participate in public life. While the election authorities accredited
almost 800 international observers, only two domestic observers from
two organizations were accredited.
“The ability to voice a political opinion and the availability
of accurate and relevant information are vital for voters to make
an informed choice on election day. Unfortunately, despite being
efficiently prepared, there were shortcomings with both elements
in yesterday’s elections,” said Tamás Meszerics, head of ODIHR’s election
observation mission. “To move forward Kyrgyzstan needs to work on
creating a more inclusive system both for candidates and voters,
which would help increase voter engagement and also public trust.”
The international election observation totalled 359 observers,
composed of 269 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term
observers, 72 from the OSCE PA, and 18 from PACE.
