B Explanatory
memorandum, by Mr Roland Blum
1 Introduction
1. There is no general consensus
on the definition of what constitutes a riot, and the term “urban
unrest” is sometimes preferred. Some people perceive riots as uprisings,
a form of urban rebellion against injustice. Others prefer to view
them as a series of offences perpetrated by individuals often with
antecedents, if not a police record. In any event, riots are a more
or less violent means of expression for certain sections of the population
who have no other means of making their voices heard.
2. The term “riot” has often been applied to many different kinds
of violent events. It is used to describe collective violence in
public places targeting ethnic groups (race riots) and/or the police,
together with vandalism (setting fire to buildings or vehicles)
and looting (of shops and car salesrooms, for instance).
3. Here we propose a basic definition, which constitutes a starting
point for a debate, rather than an end in itself. A riot is the
concentration in space and time of aggressive, destructive behaviour.
Participants’ motives (racial tensions, social discrimination, conflicts
with the police, commitment to a political or religious cause) are varied
and poorly known, since few studies, if any, are devoted to them.
2 Stocktaking in Europe
4. The difficulty of defining
riots and the fact that they take so many different forms partly
account for the slow progress in trying to understand them. According
to the European Forum for Urban Safety, “these situations are often
the source of misunderstandings, fears, violence and turning in
on oneself, as well as a loss of confidence in institutions and
their ability to provide answers”.
Note Each
country has a different way of recording the offences which constitute
the basic components, the “building blocks”, of a riot (thefts,
arson, destruction of vehicles, attacks on the police, physical
assaults, etc.). Above all, adopting a criminal justice approach
to the problem (via the police and the courts) results in a situation
where the focus is on determining a specific individual’s liability
for the commission of a given offence. The collective aspect of
rioting is accordingly disregarded, although it is crucial to any
attempt to take stock of the phenomenon.
5. It should be remembered that every riot takes place in a highly
specific national context and that any uniform approach to the phenomenon
must be eschewed. It is, however, possible to distinguish two types
of riots, “race” or “ethnic” riots, which involve conflict between
ethnic, linguistic or religious communities, and social and political
riots, where confrontation focuses on social demands or disparities
or on contesting the government. It is possible for the two types
of riot to be combined, and for the causes of one to underpin those of
the other.
2.1 Race riots
6. A “race riot” is defined as
a violent outbreak of civil unrest in which race or ethnicity is
a key factor. Often these riots reflect anger among socio-economically
deprived racial minority groups in regards to police brutality, racial
profiling, institutional racism, and urban decay. Race riots usually
occur in deprived urban quarters with large ethnic minority communities
and in a context of tensions with the police.
7. Britain was the first country in Europe to be confronted with
race riots: it experienced them twice in the early 1980s, in Bristol
in 1980 and, in particular, in Brixton in 1981. That year, 30 towns
were affected, followed by another four in 1982, and there were
serious outbreaks in 1985 (particularly in the Tottenham district
of London). In 2001 there were “mini-riots” in Bradford, and then
in Oldham and Burnley. In 2005, there were violent clashes in Birmingham
between rioters and the police.
8. In 1981 in Brixton, these riots resulted in 300 police injuries,
65 serious civilian injuries, over 100 vehicles burned, nearly 150
buildings damaged, and 82 arrests and were followed by the Scarman
report. It identified the lack of trust and communication between
police and communities in multiracial inner cities to be a major cause
of the riots. In addition, it highlighted frustrations stemming
from endemic racial disadvantage in British society. The parliamentary
report recommended a new emphasis on community policing and for
increased representation of ethnic minorities in the police force.
In addition, Lord Scarman strongly advised the government to combat
racial disadvantage and the disproportionately high level of unemployment
Note among young
black men in Brixton though positive discrimination.
9. Britain was not the only European country to be affected by
ethnic rights. Spain (El Ejido in February 2000, clashes between
young Spaniards and Latin Americans in Alcorcón in October 2007),
the Netherlands (Utrecht in March 2007 and Amsterdam in October
2007), Denmark (February 2008), Belgium (Anderlecht in May 2008)
and the Russian Federation (clashes between Caucasians and Russians
in Kondopoga in Karelia in September 2007) also experienced riots
of this kind. Despite the complexity of the various factors involved in
such riots, where immigration and religion, in particular Islam,
can play a more or less important part, depending on the situation,
outbreaks of violence of this kind can be described as ethnic riots.
10. Beyond Europe, notably in the United States, in Los Angeles,
race riots had led to the death of several people in what we called
the “Rodney King” riots, named after the defenceless black motorist
Rodney King. Smaller riots were sparked in other American cities,
notably Las Vegas, Atlanta, and San Francisco, and to a lesser extent
in Oakland, New York, Seattle, Chicago, Phoenix, Madison, and Toronto
(Canada).
2.2 Social and political riots
11. Social and political riots
are very often a response to discrimination and social, economic,
human and/or geographical exclusion. They take the form of violent
reactions against the police or representatives of the government,
who are held responsible for the social problems. As immigrants
and foreigners are more affected by social discrimination, these
riots may look like race riots, but the transition from a social
riot to a race riot is never automatic and often depends on features
specific to a particular country or region. In addition, as is borne out
by the example of Denmark, social exclusion, even though it is a
major factor, is not systematically responsible for triggering riots.
In Denmark the employment rate of immigrants has increased by 50%
over the last fifteen years, and it is discrimination and stigmatisation
that tend to be the main causes of rioting.
12. France has been the country hardest hit by social riots, in
what has been called the crisis in the suburbs, which is the result
of several decades of unsuccessful urban policy, which has led to
the establishment of “ghettos” in the suburbs where the working
classes, impoverished workers and, among them, the various generations
of immigrant workers, particularly from North Africa, have gradually
settled. The lack of a social mix has exacerbated poverty and insecurity
and, in particular, turned these suburbs into targets for discrimination.
By association, new forms of discrimination and a form of racism
against children of immigrants are taking place against a background
of housing and labour problems, among others.
13. Whereas several riots tried to alert public authorities (Vénissieux
in 1981, Vaulx-en-Velin in 1990), in October 2005 France had known
an unprecedented wave of urban violence.
14. On the night of 25 October 2005, in the Parisian banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois, two
French youths of immigrant origin were electrocuted and another
seriously injured when they hid in an electricity substation, allegedly
fleeing police. That evening, cars were burnt in protest and local
youth attacked police and public buildings; the rioting soon spread
to neighbouring towns and départements,
increasing in severity. Tensions rose when a tear-gas grenade was
rumoured to have been used on a mosque in Clichy on 30 October, although
this was later disproved, and on 2 November a disabled woman was
badly burned when a bus was set on fire in Sevran, Seine-Saint-Denis.
15. A rallying point for rioters were recent statements made by
the French Minister of the Interior, who described some
banlieue residents as “racaille”
(scum)
Note and expressed the wish to “nettoyer
au Karcher” (clean with a power hose)
Note these areas. From
3 November 2005, the riots spread across France and to other countries,
with rapidly increasing numbers of vehicles burned and arrests made;
schools, nurseries, police stations, public buildings, and some
religious centres were also targeted.
16. Levels of violence began to diminish after the declaration
of a state of emergency for a period of twelve days (later extended
to three months) on 8 November and were declared to have returned
to normal on 17 November. In total, approximately 8 973 vehicles
were burned, 2 888 people arrested (the youngest being 10 years
old), and 126 police officers injured. A preliminary estimate by
the French Federation of Insurance Companies valued the damage at
over €200 million.
17. Recent violence in Montfermeil at the end of May and beginning
of June 2006 and in Villiers-le-Bel in November 2007 has renewed
fears that further violence could erupt at any time.
18. There have also been clashes between the police and rioters
in Italy. On each occasion, the target was representatives of the
government, who were accused of acting against the will of the people.
This was the case in the Genoa on the occasion of the G8 Summit
in 2001, which led to one death and in Naples in December 2007 and
January 2008 during the refuse crisis, when the people of Naples
violently objected to an open-air rubbish dump that was polluting
their environment. The violence spread through Italy: the transfer
of rubbish to other provinces sparked off numerous clashes with
the police in Sardinia, Puglia and the Abruzzi. There were also
youth riots in Finland in 2006 and Sweden and Greece in 2007.
3 Causes
19. The various factors that spark
off urban riots are a response, in each case, to a particular situation
in which one or more of the factors described above act as triggers.
Sometimes, one cause can lead to another, and there are examples
where all the causes are present, in which case the violence is
greatly exacerbated. This was true, for example, in 1981 in Brixton,
which was faced with a large number of social problems identical to
those in the French suburbs: high unemployment, widespread crime,
housing unfit for habitation, a lack of amenities and a highly visible
minority population. This was compounded by hostility towards the
police, who, the young black people felt, were unjustly targeting
them.
3.1 Poverty and unemployment
20. In all of the recent European
incidents and historic examples cited, rioting occurred in poor, disadvantaged
areas. In the French
banlieues for
example, the unemployment rate is double the national average, as
is the school drop-out rate, household incomes are generally 40%
lower, medical centres are half as numerous, and delinquency rates
50% higher. The low-wage, unskilled labour jobs and temporary postings
Note that
characterise much of the employment in the
banlieues are
extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the national economy. This
precariousness and poverty feeds frustration and resentment, as
well as a “nothing to lose” mentality that lowers inhibitions to
violence. According to Alain Bertho, “young people, immigrants and those
eking out a precarious existence are to the international city what
workers used to be to the factory: the underdogs in a fragmented
society”.
Note
3.2 Dilapidated housing
21. Banlieues are
often defined as declining peripheral areas with high densities
of degraded public housing, also described as suburban ghettos.
Most of Europe’s massive housing projects were well-intentioned initiatives
of the 1950s-1970s for housing impoverished people and immigrant
workers.
Note This
policy of grouping immigrant workers together in the same districts
has not been conducive to a social mix and, with rising unemployment,
they have been the target of xenophobic sentiment. In the Netherlands,
for instance, districts where immigrant workers and foreigners are
grouped together are known as black neighbourhoods, and not because
of the pollution.
22. These rapidly constructed buildings, however, were not well
maintained and many have deteriorated to the point of being inhumane,
unsanitary and dangerous. Most families who can afford to leave
the areas do so, thereby contributing to the concentration and ever-widening
segregation of the most economically disadvantaged sections of society.
Political concern for improving conditions is generally reactive
rather than preventative. These nationwide policies, being rough-and-ready
and improvised, have been generally ineffective.
23. France and Great Britain have invested to the greatest extent
in this genre of large-scale social housing, and have also, perhaps
consequently, suffered the greatest amounts of urban violence in
these areas. Most of the incidents have involved the youth of poor,
segregated and dilapidated urban neighbourhoods and appear to have
been fuelled by growing racial tensions in and around these areas.
Representatives of Belgium, Denmark, and Germany have all cited
the relative lack of large social housing projects in their countries
as a reason why they did not suffer the severity of rioting experienced
in France. But the problem is not whether or not a social housing
policy is needed, but how to ensure more effective implementation
of a social housing policy that provides for a social mix and town
planning on a human scale, with two- or three-storey blocks or individual
dwellings.
3.3 Discrimination and social
marginalisation
24. Although most people who participated
in the rioting are European citizens, often the second or third generation
of immigrant families who have lived their entire lives on the continent,
they are often cited as feeling isolated from European society and
victims of stigmatisation and discrimination in terms of employment. “Young
people want to smash everything up, because they have had enough
of being called ‘foreigners’ and being turned down for jobs on the
pretext that they don’t speak Dutch well enough, when they were
born here and have grown up here,” says Aicha Azzough, a social
worker in Slotervaart, a district of Amsterdam where violent riots
took place in October 2007.
Note
25. In political discourse and the media, banlieue teenagers
are regularly portrayed as threats, ranging from petty thieves and
sexist fundamentalists to rapists and budding terrorists. According
to studies in France, among candidates with identical credentials,
a Maghreb-sounding name or an address in a “sensitive” neighbourhood
is sufficient to render a job applicant five times less likely to
receive an interview. This discrimination in employment, housing
and education further handicaps a section of the population who
are already excluded from society and subjected to social discrimination,
and for whom violence is the only means of expressing themselves
and making their demands heard. It is symptomatic that Slotervaart
school had one of the worst records for underachievement.
26. In addition to the problem of inequality of opportunity and
under-representation of visible minorities in business management
and government, youth in certain countries lack role models of success
outside of entertainers and sports stars. While some reforms have
been undertaken to facilitate access to higher education, most European
governments have been hostile to the idea of positive discrimination
or affirmative action in order to increase hiring and representation
of visible minorities. Schemes like that introduced by Richard Descoings,
Director of the Institute of Political Studies (IEP) in Paris, who
introduced special arrangements to provide access to the IEP for
pupils from secondary schools in the suburbs, need to become widespread.
3.4 Resentment against the police
27. The large majority of the recent
and historic incidents of rioting cited in this report have involved resentment
of perceived targeting of visible minorities by police and/or excessive
use of force and were most often sparked by a clash with police
forces. Hard-line policing tactics to repress rioting have been
frequently criticised as aggravating tensions and provoking further
violence. In addition, the state of emergency decreed by the cabinet
and proclaimed, after a vote, by the French National Assembly has
been criticised by different organisations as they considered it
as a repressive reminder of the colonial era.
28. To quote the French Strategic Analysis Centre, “The inhabitants’
hostility towards the presence of the police in their neighbourhood
is palpable, as is their lack of confidence in the government and
the authorities generally.”
Note The police, for instance,
are seen as representing the government – the state – and, in particular, as
its armed component, and are no longer considered by those who live
in these neighbourhoods to be playing their role as independent
arbiters in the resolution of conflicts. Resentment against the
police is all the stronger as they not only symbolise a state that
is considered unjust but also, as the rioters see it, perpetrate
new injustices by carrying out repeated spot checks and, in some
cases, committing serious blunders.
29. The conflict-ridden relations that often exist between visible
minorities and the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods can
also be put down to the inexperience and lack of training of some
police officers. Police forces in these sensitive areas are often
made up of young police officers with no experience and, in particular,
no training in the situations and problems that occur in these suburbs.
More experienced, better-trained police could come up with more
appropriate solutions, particularly in terms of preventive measures.
3.5 Media coverage
30. The role of the media in fuelling
the violence has also been debated. Media tallies of car burnings
had previously been accused of encouraging destruction of property
by creating competition between different urban centres; certain
news sources had therefore decided to refrain from publishing daily
statistics. During the rioting of October and November 2005, most
French media sources provided daily updates on levels of violence,
as opposed to Belgium, where the government attempted to restrict
publication of events in order to reduce the incentive for copycat
crimes.
31. Some sources noted that the rioting provided an opportunity
to attract public and government attention to often conveniently
ignored neighbourhoods and populations suffering from a lack of
effective legitimate communication channels; others warned that
this type of negative media attention could result in further stigmatisation.
In particular, foreign coverage of events tended to sensationalise
the causes and extent of rioting, especially developments within
France.
3.6 Others
32. Various politicians and media
sources have, when talking about immigrant communities, in particular Muslims,
who live on housing estates in these suburbs, made dangerous bids
to win popularity by claiming that the rioting was fuelled by Islamic
extremism and terrorism, polygamy and certain rap artists. In response, several
NGOs and social groups launched accusations of racism, scapegoating,
and attempting to divert public attention away from the existing
economic and social problems.
Note
4 Contrasting European responses
4.1 Law enforcement
33. The degree of police response
and repression in European countries varied according to the severity and
perception of violence. In France, which experienced the most widespread
and severe rioting, a national state of emergency extended police
powers, authorised house searches without warrants and empowered local
prefects to impose curfews and prohibit assembly of large groups.
This act was criticised by many social groups and academics as extreme
and an unwarranted limitation of individual rights, and several
sources predicted that police militarisation would aggravate the
situation; levels of violence, however, did steadily decline following
its imposition.
34. In contrast, most other European governments treated events
in their countries as isolated crimes lacking widespread social
mobilisation and organisation; increased police powers or deployment
was therefore judged unnecessary. City officials in Belgium, the
second most affected country, preferred to reinforce existing preventative
measures and methods of social controls rather than employ hard-line
police tactics. The German Minister of the Interior described events
of violence as isolated copycat crimes and was more concerned with challenges
of integration rather than law enforcement. Similarly, the Danish
Prime Minister referred to events in Århus as “pranks”, dismissing
claims by the Danish People’s Party that disturbances should be
treated as terrorist acts under new anti-terrorism legislation and
also rejecting demands by some local politicians for tougher policing
and zero-tolerance measures.
35. These varied reactions reflect the lack of an overall perception
of a situation that is deeper-rooted and underestimated in its complexity.
Politicians are still somewhat ill-equipped to grasp the problem.
Despite the work of the European Forum for Urban Safety, the subject
has still not been investigated, particularly as politicians often
deny its seriousness in order to avoid bringing to light their own
failures on this front.
4.2 Social dialogue
36. Many governments planned to
renew efforts of social dialogue in order to understand and address
the underlying frustrations and motivations to violence. Danish
police officials pronounced the intention of addressing the disturbances
though fostering dialogue involving the young people and their parents,
social workers, the police, teachers, and housing association members.
Likewise, the Belgian police force wished to prevent as much as
possible the opposition of police and youth by opening a dialogue
with youth in sensitive neighbourhoods. Many governments of minimally
affected countries, such as Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
Netherlands and Greece, acknowledged the rioting as a warning of
what could erupt in their own countries without the undertaking
of preventative social outreach to address segregation, unemployment,
and social alienation.
4.3 Urban renewal
37. The concentration of rioting
in deteriorated
banlieues across
France renewed that government’s attention on revitalising “sensitive”
urban areas under the 2003 National Urban Renewal Programme;
Note emphasis
has been placed on addressing architectural, economic, and social
concerns through the improvement of living conditions.
Note
38. Disadvantaged sections of society and visible minorities very
often live in remote districts that have been opened up on the outskirts
of cities (near railway lines or airports), where one encounters
a succession of dilapidated, badly maintained tower blocks 20 or
so floors high. This situation is compounded by the fact that local
shops have closed down and there are no social amenities (community
centres, libraries, cafés or playgrounds). This is hardly an ideal
setting for young people, who are also subjected to numerous forms
of discrimination. As the President of a Colombian NGO in Madrid
said in connection with the riots in Alcorcón, “There is a shortage
of public spaces and sports facilities for all these young people...
Let us try and find out why these young people, both Spaniards and
foreigners, spend so much time in the street. The fact that they tend
to be left to their own devices by their families is a serious cause
for concern.”
Note
39. In Denmark, a government panel responsible for finding strategies
to prevent the formation of ghettos recommended offering economic
incentives such as housing credits or tax breaks to people with
full-time employment living in at-risk areas.
Note The
European Union is also employing an urban development strategy that
prioritises local involvement in decision making and national/ regional
partnerships in order to combat ghettoisation, discrimination, and
the social exclusion of immigrants in the outskirts of large European
cities.
Note
4.4 Education and employment
opportunities
40. The social response to the
rioting by the French Government was mainly concentrated on reducing unemployment
in banlieue areas, especially
among youth, combating hiring discrimination, and fostering equality
of opportunity. In terms of education, 5 000 extra teachers and
assistants will be recruited for the areas concerned, 250 “education
success teams” established, and public careers guidance offered
at all universities.
41. As part of an employment strategy to create a more inclusive
European labour market, the European Commission has designed the
EQUAL initiative to test different ways of tackling discrimination
and overcoming barriers to employment; innovative techniques, such
as community-based micro-credit financing in the informal economy,
have achieved high sustainability rates and have effectively reached
traditionally marginalised populations.
4.5 Immigration and integration
debates
42. Currently, most European countries
have very restrictive immigration policies but continue to suffer
from illegal immigration and rising racial tensions. As a result
of ageing demographic and declining birth rates, most of these countries
are projected to become increasingly dependent on immigration in
order to maintain an economically viable ratio of active workers
to total population.
Note Spain, for instance,
regularised nearly 700 000 undocumented immigrants in 2005. The
problems and limitations of national immigration and integration strategies
that were revealed by the recent urban violence have consequently
renewed discussion of the effectiveness of European immigration
policies and triggered varied proposals for change.
43. The Amsterdam-based Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Migration
and Development (EMCEMO) is conducting several schemes to improve
the integration of migrants in western societies. One of them, entitled “Multicultural
migration, development and integration”, is designed, inter alia, to highlight the contribution
made by people of immigrant origin to the development of any society
and to bring about a change in attitude to people of immigrant origin,
so that the public are more receptive to foreigners and all they
have to offer.
44. In response to the rioting, the French Government tightened
existing legislation regarding family reunification and the acquisition
of French nationality. The Interior Minister also reiterated his
proposal of a quota-based immigration system, which has met with
considerable political resistance. An alternative proposition, inspired
by the Canadian system, was immigration based on the principal of
human capital, with a points system determining eligibility based
on a variety of qualities, such as level of education, trade skills,
and language capacity.
Note On 20 June
2006, the Danish Government announced the introduction of a green
card permit to attract skilled foreign workers that would similarly
allocate points to potential skilled immigrants; the new system
has widespread support, including the traditionally anti-immigration
Danish People’s Party.
45. In addition, the events may speed the trend in certain countries
in Europe towards formal integration programmes of a mandatory nature.
The German Ministry for Internal Affairs was particularly concerned
with incidents of violence being symptomatic of current integration
challenges, especially in terms of educational under-achievement
and language capacity.
46. In Britain, after the 1981 Brixton riots, several measures
recommended in the Scarman, Denham and Cantle reports were taken,
in particular to promote dialogue between communities at local level
through mediation and take more account of the community dimension
in public policy (education, employment, social mix, etc.).
47. Lastly, in the Netherlands, which the rapporteur visited on
29 and 30 May 2008, they have a minister with specific responsibility
for integration and improving urban neighbourhoods. The minister,
Ms Elle Vogelaar, has opted for a geographical approach under which
40 “problem” neighbourhoods are covered by cross-sectoral policies
(housing, employment, education, security, fight against alcoholism,
etc.). The various measures are taken in consultation with local
stakeholders (school heads, police, neighbourhood associations and
ordinary citizens), leading to more effective implementation on
the ground.
5 Lessons and responses of
the Council of Europe
5.1 European Resource Centre
for Urban Security
48. Considering the contagious
nature of rioting and its spread across national borders, an inter-European institution
is essential to facilitate co-operation and the sharing of information.
The European Resource Centre for Urban Security could act as a key
co-ordinator between national agencies to compare effective policing tactics
for addressing urban violence and social initiatives for preventing
further outbreaks of rioting.
49. It was to this end that the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe, through one of its rapporteurs,
Mr Jean-Marie Bockel, suggested setting up a such a centre, on the
grounds that “there seemed to be an urgent need to set up a permanent
structure for the development of a common methodology for collecting
data, exchanging information on trends in national situations, innovative
initiatives and examples of good practice”.
Note The
centre could help the agencies addressing various aspects of urban
security to pool their efforts. In addition, it should make it possible
to devise and oversee comprehensive, cross-sectoral policies and
foster awareness of this major problem.
5.2 Reinforcement of local authorities
50. The effectiveness of prevention
and response tactics to social unrest and rioting depends on their relevance
to local conditions. Local authorities have the greatest knowledge
and sensitivity to the specific challenges and needs of their neighbourhoods
and residents; the Council of Europe should therefore concentrate
on reinforcing the capacity of these officials to prevent and respond
to rioting. The role of inter-European agencies and national bodies
should be the supporting and co-ordinating of local initiatives, promoting
the integration of security, urban and youth policies into a mutually
reinforcing framework, and helping to tailor and adapt global policies
in response to local demands. That is the case, for example, in
the district of Slotervaart in Amsterdam, where the mayor, Ahmed
Marcouch, has initiated joint co-ordination arrangements for involving
both the local (district and city) and national (state) levels in
preventing new unrest. This shows how local approaches can defuse
the escalation of violence.
51. This mutually reinforcing framework will enable local authorities
to take appropriate action to get to the root of the problems that
trigger riots. Towns need additional resources for preventive ends
(security, effectiveness of local public services, town planning,
sustainable development) and educational purposes (youth policies),
in order to transform the violence and fear that so often underlie
such riots into an open attitude to others.
5.3 Anti-discrimination tactics
52. As a human-rights organisation,
the Council of Europe has an important role to play in the area
of combating racism and discrimination. The European Urban Charter
II adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities provides
that “our towns and cities must also be rid of all forms of stigmatisation
of particular groups, which are seriously detrimental to the sense
of belonging to an urban community and which, more often than not,
are the root of the urban violence, antisocial behaviour and insecurity
that is painfully felt by our urban citizens, particularly the most
vulnerable among them”.
Note Efforts
made to improve equality of opportunity will enhance social mobility
and increase the relative costs of engaging in violent activity
for individuals who feel that they have “nothing to lose”. Further
studies should be conducted as to the effectiveness of positive
discrimination and other potential policies for decreasing hiring
discrimination against groups disadvantaged by ethnicity, age or
place of residence.
53. Campaigns could be waged against social discrimination and
discrimination in housing, work and education. They could, for example,
be modelled on those conducted by the Council of Europe to combat discrimination
against Roma and domestic violence.
5.4 Empowerment and participation
in urban renewal
54. Political efforts for urban
renewal are dramatically more successful when coupled with grass-roots
desire and determination for change. By replacing state paternalism
and repression with strategic empowerment and involvement of disadvantaged
communities, these populations will regain a sense of control over
their own destinies.
55. The Council of Europe should make a concerned effort to encourage
the economic and social empowerment of local populations and foster
their involvement in strategies for change and the maintenance of
security, such as encouraging the formation of community policing
co-operatives and renewing partnerships with police of proximity.
The Council of Europe should additionally help these local bodies
in persuading national governments to prioritise renovation of housing
conditions and the construction of affordable and humanly viable
housing spread more widely throughout cities, with an emphasis on
public transport, access to educational facilities, job creation
and attractive surroundings. The policies carried out in recent
years to link urban renewal with the use of public spaces to foster
encounters, social contacts and interaction between generations
and cultures should continue.
5.5 Reforge the link between
the government and the public
56. The Council of Europe should
make a concerted effort to encourage the economic and social empowerment
of local populations and foster their involvement in strategies
for change and the maintenance of security, such as encouraging
the formation of community policing co-operatives and renewing partnerships with
police of proximity.
57. A local police force composed of public servants living in
disadvantaged neighbourhoods and of experienced staff would make
it possible to attenuate this feeling of distrust or violence towards
what is, after all, a public service. A preventive policy of this
kind should therefore seek to forge a new relationship between police
officers and the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and
redefine the place of the police in 21st-century towns and cities,
in particular by spreading units throughout the territory.
58. A priority of public policy must therefore be to rebuild the
confidence which used to exist between the government and the public,
and which mobilises voters and ensures personal security. As the
sociologists Michel Kokoreff, Odile Steinauer and Pierre Barron
put it, “We all too frequently forget that these neighbourhoods
suffer not only from a lack of social cohesion and a dilapidated
environment, but also from a democratic and political deficit.”
Note
59. We therefore need to return to a preventive approach, for,
according to the European Forum for Urban Safety, “recourse to conciliation,
mediation and arbitration heals relationships in the framework of
rules and standards which are rooted in our customs and traditions,
thereby strengthening bonds of conviviality, neighbourliness and
community, as well as the feeling of belonging to a communitarian
and multicultural city”.
Note
5.6 Immigration and integration
strategies
60. Considering the projected continual
rise in the need for immigrant workers in Europe, the existing tensions
and challenges of integration are likely to intensify in the future
and could possibly result in an even more dramatic and widespread
outbreak of violence. The Council of Europe should encourage the
comparative research of effective immigration and integration strategies
both within and outside of Europe and promote the diffusion and
implementation of findings. In particular, there is a need of effective
tools for forecasting labour needs, which could potentially be addressed
by the establishment of employment and migration observatories for
particular professional sectors and regions.
6 Proposals aimed at preventing
new riots and improving crisis management
61. Three factors (poverty, ethnic
and social segregation and mutual resentment between minorities
and the police) appear to be at the origin of urban riots in different
European countries. Knowledge of this phenomenon throughout the
European Union must gradually be improved.
62. An initial qualitative survey should be performed to determine
the types of riots that occur in the member states, if any. This
survey should concentrate on major conurbations, which are the main
scene of rioting. A working group on quantitative measurement of
the phenomenon should then be set up, with the aim of eventually
allowing comparisons, or at least terms of comparison, at city level.
The underlying social, demographic, economic and ethnic data should
be collected and analysed in a cross-sectoral manner.
63. At the same time, police practices identified in official
reports and sociological research as potentially sparking problems
should be better explained and show greater respect for the law,
human dignity and human rights. As the Saragossa Manifesto (November
2006) states, the police “must integrate parameters of code of ethics
and quality evaluation in their acts, upholding high standards of
ethics and effectiveness in the provision of the social service
of safety within the community and for the community”. The issue
of relations between the police and minorities should therefore
be addressed by the political authorities and means of improving
their relations should be sought, in particular through the widespread
introduction of preventive policies.
64. Better forecasting of riots could be achieved through improved
statistical knowledge of local contexts and information about the
lines along which cities are developing. Scales of risks (for example,
a sort of “Richter scale” of the probability of rioting) could be
envisaged.
Reporting committee: Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee.
Reference to committee: Doc. 10782 and Reference No. 3166 of 23 November 2007.
Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 26 June 2008.
Members of the committee: Mrs Christine McCafferty, (Chairperson), Mr Denis Jacquat (1st Vice-Chairperson),
Mrs Minodora Cliveti (2nd
Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Darinka Stantcheva (3rd
Vice-Chairperson), Mr Francis Agius, Mr Konstantinos Aivaliotis,
Mr Farkhad Akhmedov, Mr Vicenç Alay
Ferrer, Mrs Sirpa Asko-Seljavaara,
Mr Jorodd Asphjell, Mr Lokman Ayva, Mr Zigmantas Balčytis, Mr Miguel
Barceló Pérez, Mr Andris Berzinš, Mr Jaime Blanco García, Mr Roland Blum, Mrs Olena Bondarenko, Mrs Monika
Brüning, Mrs Bożenna Bukiewicz,
Mrs Karmela Caparin, Mr Igor
Chernyshenko (alternate: Mrs Tatiana Volozhinskaya),
Mr Imre Czinege, Mr Karl Donabauer, Mrs Daniela Filipiová,
Mr Ilija Filipović, Mr André Flahaut, Mr Paul Flynn, Mrs Pernille Frahm, Mrs Doris
Frommelt, Mr Renato Galeazzi (alternate: Mr Manfred Pinzger), Mr Henk van Gerven, Mrs Sophia
Giannaka, Mr Stepan Glăvan, Mr Marcel Glesener,
Mr Luc Goutry, Mrs Claude Greff (alternate: Mr Laurent Béteille), Mr Michael Hancock, Mrs Olha Herasym’yuk,
Mr Ali Huseynov, Mr Fazail İbrahimli, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mrs Marietta
Karamanli, Mr András Kelemen, Mr Peter Kelly, Baroness Knight of
Collingtree (alternate: Mr Tim Boswell),
Mr Haluk Koç, Mr Andrija
Mandić, Mr Michal Marcinkiewicz (alternate: Mr Marek Wikiński), Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Ruzhdi Matoshi, Mrs Liliane Maury Pasquier, Mr Donato Mosella,
Mr Felix Müri (alternate: Mrs Doris Stump),
Mrs Maia Nadiradzé, Mrs Carina Ohlsson,
Mr Peter Omtzigt, Mrs Lajla Pernaska, Mrs Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin,
Mr Cezar Florin Preda, Mrs Adoración Quesada Bravo (alternate: Mrs Blanca Fernández-Capel), Mrs Vjerica Radeta,
Mr Walter Riester, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Ricardo Rodrigues, Mrs Maria
de Belém Roseira, Mr Alessandro Rossi, Mrs Marlene Rupprecht, Mr Indrek Saar, Mr Fidias Sarikas, Mr Andreas Schieder, Mr Ellert
B. Schram (alternate: Mrs Kristinn H. Gunnarsson),
Mr Gianpaolo Silvestri, Mrs Anna Sobecka,
Mrs Michaela Šojdrová, Mr Oleg
Ţulea, Mr Alexander Ulrich, Mr Mustafa Ünal,
Mr Milan Urbáni, Mrs Nataša Vučković, Mr Dimitry Vyatkin (alternate:
Mrs Svetlana Goryacheva),
Mr Victor Yanukovych (alternate: Mr Ivan Popescu), Mrs Barbara
Žgajner-Tavš, Mr Vladimir Zhidkikh, Ms Naira Zohrabyan.
NB: The names of the members present at the meeting are printed
in bold.
The draft resolution will be discussed at a later sitting.
