Observation of the presidential election in Poland (18 May and 1 June 2025)
Election observation report
| Doc. 16258
| 16 September 2025
- Author(s):
- Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
- Rapporteur :
- Mr Iulian BULAI,
Romania, ALDE
1 Introduction
1. On 25 January 2025, the Speaker
of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland announced that the presidential election
would be held on 18 May 2025, with a possible run-off on 1 June
2025. On 30 January 2025, the Polish authorities formally invited
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to observe these
elections.
2. At its meeting on 7 March 2025, the Bureau of the Assembly
decided to set up a cross-party ad hoc committee, composed of 31
members and the two co-rapporteurs of the Committee on the Honouring
of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee), to observe the presidential election
in Poland. The Bureau appointed me as Chairperson of the ad hoc
committee; however, due to colliding dates with elections in Romania,
Ms Liliana Tanguy (France, ALDE) replaced me for the first round.
The list of members of the ad hoc committee (PACE delegation) is
set out in Appendix 1. For the second round, the Assembly deployed
a reduced delegation of eight members, which I led.
3. The Assembly was invited to observe this election as Poland
remains under the monitoring procedure. In line with the 2004 co-operation
agreement between the Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), a representative of the Venice
Commission joined the ad hoc committee as legal adviser. Mr Óscar
Sánchez Muñoz provided a detailed legal analysis of the constitutional tensions,
the independence of electoral oversight bodies, the functioning
of the media and digital environment, campaign finance transparency,
and inclusivity of persons with disabilities.
4. The PACE delegation recalls that Poland has signed and ratified
the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and its Additional
Protocol (ETS No. 9), which enshrine fundamental principles crucial
for democratic elections, including the right to free elections,
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and
prohibition of discrimination.
5. A two-day pre-electoral mission took place on 14-15 April
2025 in Warsaw (see Appendices 2 and 3). It concluded that the presidential
election was taking place in a deeply polarised environment, marked
by tensions between the president and the government, concerns over
the independence of the judiciary, and risks of disinformation and
foreign interference. The delegation emphasised the significance
of this election for the stability of Poland’s democratic institutions.
6. For the election itself, the PACE delegation worked from 16
to 20 May for the first round (Appendix 4) and from 30 May to 2
June for the second round (Appendix 6). It operated as part of an
International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) in close collaboration
with a limited mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), headed by Ms Dunja Mijatović, which did
not deploy any short-term observers. No other international parliamentary
organisation participated in this process.
7. The IEOM concluded that the presidential election in Poland
was competitive and well managed, but deeply affected by long-standing
political polarisation, media bias, and continuing controversies
regarding the independence of key oversight institutions. Both rounds
respected fundamental freedoms, and election day was calm and professionally
organised. However, ballot secrecy was not always ensured, campaign
finance lacked transparency, and disinformation and foreign interference
posed serious risks (see Appendices 5 and 7).
8. I convey our delegation’s appreciation to the Polish delegation
to the Assembly and its secretariat for assisting us in the preparation
of this EOM and notably the pre-election mission, and to ODIHR’s
Head of Mission, Ms Dunja Mijatović, and her team for their constructive
partnership.
2 Political
landscape
9. The presidency in Poland is
not merely symbolic. Although Poland is formally a parliamentary
republic, the head of State wields significant powers, including
the right to veto legislation and refer laws to the Constitutional
Tribunal. In practice, this makes Poland’s system closer to semi-presidentialism
and gives the office of the president a central role in shaping
the political balance. In recent years, outgoing President Andrzej Duda,
aligned with the Law and Justice party (PiS), made extensive use
of his veto powers to block reforms by the new Civic Coalition (KO)-led
government, particularly efforts to restore judicial independence.
10. Poland’s 2025 presidential election thus once again took place
against a backdrop of deep political polarisation and unresolved
institutional disputes that have defined the country since 2015.
After nearly a decade of PiS rule, the parliamentary elections of
December 2023 brought to power a new coalition led by Donald Tusk’s
Civic Platform (PO), together with Polish People’s Party (PSL),
Poland 2050, and New Left. This coalition promised to restore democratic
standards and rebuild Poland’s strained relations with the European Union
(EU).
11. Central to this polarisation has been the rule-of-law crisis,
which began in 2015 when PiS sought to reshape Poland’s judiciary,
including the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court. The
PiS majority appointed judges in defiance of constitutional procedures,
including three judges later found by the European Court of Human
Rights to have been unlawfully appointed. The Tribunal subsequently
became a political instrument, delivering rulings aligned with PiS
priorities – among them the near-total abortion ban of 2020 and a
2021 judgment challenging the primacy of EU law. Its activity diminished
sharply in later years, but the body continued to suffer from a
lack of public trust, with surveys in 2024 showing confidence levels
of barely 20%.
12. The crisis extended to the Supreme Court, where PiS-engineered
changes politicised the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS),
transferring appointment powers from judges to parliament. This
allowed for the creation of a group of so-called “neo-judges,” whose
status has cast a shadow over thousands of judicial decisions, including
sensitive electoral rulings. The establishment of new chambers within
the Supreme Court, notably the disciplinary chamber, was used to
intimidate judges critical of government policies. Although this chamber
was formally abolished under EU pressure, concerns remain about
judicial independence and the legitimacy of appointments made since
2018. The legitimacy of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public
Affairs of the Supreme Court (also declared “not a tribunal established
by law” by the European Court of Human Rights)
Note created further uncertainty over
how potential disputes surrounding election results might be resolved.
13. The current government has questioned the legitimacy of several
institutions and announced an action plan to restore the rule of
law in Poland, including by reviewing the status of judicial nominations
made between 2018 and 2023.
Note In
the last two years, the Venice Commission issued several opinions
on draft legislative reforms regarding the Polish judicial system.
Note
14. In January 2025, the Sejm passed a bill to transfer the authority
of validating election results from the controversial Chamber of
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court to
a new body composed of the 15 most senior justices. On 10 March
2025, President Duda vetoed the bill, citing concerns about judicial
independence and the potential impact on established appointments.
15. Many interlocutors at our pre-electoral and electoral missions
emphasised the serious risk of a constitutional crisis if the election
outcome came close and was contested, given the lack of a credible
and independent judicial mechanism for resolving electoral disputes
domestically.
16. Unable to pass comprehensive reforms, the government resorted
to piecemeal measures: refusing to publish certain Constitutional
Tribunal judgments, declining to recognise some “neo-judges,” and
issuing executive guidelines in areas such as abortion. This selective
approach, while pragmatic, created inconsistencies that further
undermined public confidence. A particularly visible example was
the government’s refusal to accept a tribunal ruling that would
have increased pensions for 200 000 citizens, while simultaneously
enforcing other decisions that bolstered its political position.
17. This unresolved rule-of-law crisis shaped the electoral climate
in 2025 in two main ways. First, it sustained public mistrust in
institutions: polls indicated that a majority of citizens believed
the situation in the judiciary had worsened since 2023. This climate
of disillusionment weakened support for the governing coalition
and contributed to perceptions of broken promises. Second, it elevated
judicial reform into a central dividing line of the presidential
race. For many voters, the contest between Rafał Trzaskowski and
Karol Nawrocki was as much about the future of Poland’s courts and
its relationship with the EU as about socio-economic policy. Karol
Nawrocki’s victory therefore reflected not only partisan dynamics
but also widespread frustration with the slow pace of restoring
the rule of law.
18. The stakes of the election were also shaped by a broader national
security context. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has
transformed Poland into a frontline State, hosting millions of refugees
and facing heightened security threats. At the same time, the election
process was also subject to multiple attempts at foreign interference,
disinformation and cyberattacks before and during the electoral
period.
19. Internally, this presidential election also marked the culmination
of an intense electoral cycle in Poland, encompassing four separate
elections within just eighteen months. During this period, approximately
30 million Polish voters repeatedly reshaped the country's political
landscape, empowering liberal-leaning forces without completely
side-lining the significance of the PiS and its coalition, the United
Right. The local elections in April 2024 demonstrated that PiS remained
the single largest political force, although the combined support
of the three liberal coalitions backing Tusk secured overall victory.
The European elections held in June 2024 marked a shift, as Tusk's
PO overtook PiS, emerging as Poland's leading party in a nationwide
poll for the first time in over a decade.
20. Yet far from inducing fatigue, this sequence of national,
local and European elections produced strong democratic mobilisation:
turnout reached 67.3% in the first round and 71.6% in the run-off,
among the highest in recent decades. This underlined the strong
civic commitment of the Polish people and their determination to shape
their country’s democratic future, despite the polarised environment
and systemic challenges.
21. Furthermore, on 1 January 2025, Poland assumed the 6-month
rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Security,
Europe” was the motto of the Polish Presidency, motivated by the
geopolitical reality of the erosion of the rules-based international
order. It aimed to enhance Europe's external security by increasing
defence readiness, raising military spending, and strengthening
NATO co-operation, especially with the US, to reinforce transatlantic
ties. Supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression was a priority,
with efforts focused on maximising military, economic, and political
assistance, advancing sanctions on Russia, and utilising frozen
Russian assets. Poland also worked to advance EU enlargement, supporting
candidate countries, alongside pursuing reforms on EU values, policies,
budget, and governance. Internally, the presidency sought improved
border protection and innovative migration solutions, addressing
hybrid threats like migration instrumentalisation. It focused on
information security, combating disinformation and foreign interference,
particularly regarding democracy, climate, and environmental policies.
Economically, Poland aimed for greater EU competitiveness, reduced
bureaucracy, and an incentivised clean energy transition without
Russian fossil fuels.
3 Key findings
of the PACE delegation
3.1 Legal framework
22. The legal framework for presidential
elections, built around the 1997 Constitution and the 2011 Election Code,
is broadly consistent with democratic standards, but suffers from
important deficiencies. Several key reforms long recommended by
ODIHR and the Venice Commission remain unimplemented. These include measures
to ensure full transparency of campaign finance, regulate third-party
campaigning, strengthen safeguards against misuse of administrative
resources, and improve inclusivity for voters with disabilities.
23. A central concern raised by many of our interlocutors was
the unresolved conflict between the executive and the legislature.
As already described in the previous chapter, the president’s extensive
use of veto powers has paralysed legislative reform, including reforms
directly aimed at electoral safeguards. The result is that certification
remained in the hands of a body – the Chamber of Extraordinary Control
and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court – whose legality is disputed,
perpetuating public distrust.
24. Poland’s legal framework provides for competitive elections,
but persistent controversies surrounding the judiciary undermine
public trust. The Constitutional Tribunal’s legitimacy remains disputed
after the 2021 European Court of Human Rights judgment in Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland,
which found that judges unlawfully appointed by PiS sat on the bench.
Nevertheless, President Duda continued to refer legislation to this
Tribunal, including electoral reform bills. This has paralysed attempts
to broaden access to postal voting and clarify run-off procedures.
The result is a legal environment in which critical reforms are
stymied and public confidence in institutions eroded.
25. Efforts to transfer responsibility for validating election
results away from the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public
Affairs of the Supreme Court, which the European Court of Human
Rights also declared unlawful, were blocked by presidential veto.
As a consequence, the body remained in place to adjudicate disputes,
casting doubt over the impartiality of result validation. This perpetuated
public concerns, especially in the tightly contested second round.
26. The Election Code regulates voter registration, candidate
nomination, campaign conduct and dispute adjudication, but important
gaps persist. These include inadequate safeguards for the secrecy
of the ballot, insufficient transparency of campaign finance, and
a lack of regulation on online campaigning. The Election Code lacks
explicit articles as to the timeframes for the official second round
campaign period and the ability to challenge the results of the
first-round results in case of irregularities or offences affecting
the outcome as complaints can only be filed after the announcement
of the final election results. The Venice Commission expert stressed
that these weaknesses, while not calling into question the democratic
nature of the election, posed significant risks to its credibility.
3.2 Institutional
framework
27. The institutional framework
was marked by disputes over the composition and role of key bodies.
The National Electoral Commission (NEC), reconstituted in March
2025, combined two judges (from the Constitutional Tribunal and
Supreme Administrative Court) and seven parliamentary appointees,
creating a balance that nonetheless reflected political influence.
Five of these seven are from the governing coalition and two from
PiS. This structure has been criticised as overly politicised, particularly
after controversial NEC decisions on the allocation of public funds
to PiS.
28. The National Broadcasting Council also remained politicised,
with its composition unchanged since 2022 despite parliamentary
rejection of its activity report. The Sejm voted in 2024 to reject
its annual report, a decision which by law should have led to the
dismissal of its members. President Duda refused, and the Council remained
intact, further undermining its credibility
29. The administration of the election was technically professional.
The NEC and its executive office met legal deadlines and provided
prompt publication of detailed polling-station level results. This
transparency was widely welcomed. However, the NEC’s public communication
was limited and non-systematic. Between the two rounds, it held
only one in-person session.
30. At the operational level, election boards carried out their
responsibilities professionally and efficiently. Polling station
officials demonstrated commitment and competence, but their ability
to address systemic issues, such as ballot secrecy or campaign finance
transparency, was limited. The PACE delegation observed with appreciation
the strong presence of women in election commissions, which reflects
progress in inclusivity. Training, however, was reported to have
been uneven, and last-minute replacements were sometimes insufficiently
prepared.
3.3 Registration
of voters and candidates
31. Voter registration in Poland
is automatic and inclusive, with 28.8 million citizens eligible
to vote in the run-off. Individuals could check and correct their
entries, although voter lists were not made public. Voter lists were
updated after the first round.
32. Voters who wished to be added to the voter list of a polling
station abroad or on a ship or platform under the Polish flag could
request to do so until 27 May 2025. A record number of some 695 000
voters registered to vote abroad. They could vote in the 511 polling
stations in 91 countries.
33. The registration of candidates was also inclusive, with 44
committees established and 13 candidates approved for the first
round. Four were rejected for failing to secure sufficient support
signatures; one of these rejections was appealed unsuccessfully.
While the process worked, verification mechanisms for signatures were
not robust, leaving scope for abuse.
3.4 Electoral campaign
34. The campaign ahead of both
rounds of the election was vibrant, competitive, and highly polarised, marked
by rallies, televised debates, extensive social media activity,
and strong grassroots mobilisation. While inflammatory rhetoric,
including xenophobic and anti-Ukrainian messaging, was particularly
pronounced during the first round, the overall tone softened somewhat
ahead of the run-off. Nonetheless, divisive narratives targeting
migrants, LGBTI people, and ethnic and religious minorities continued
to feature in the discourse of parts of the right-wing supporters.
35. A major concern identified by all interlocutors was the blurring
of lines between State functions and campaigning. Public officials,
including ministers, governors and mayors, openly campaigned while
in office, without attempts to enforce separation. This practice,
seen across both major political camps, undermined equal opportunities
for candidates and contravened international good practice. Shortly
after the first round, President Andrzej Duda endorsed Karol Nawrocki,
while Prime Minister Donald Tusk gave his backing to Rafał Trzaskowski.
Almost all government ministers (24 out of 27) actively campaigned
for Mr Trzaskowski, including on social media. At the local level,
numerous mayors openly endorsed candidates, while opposition-controlled regions
such as Podkarpackie provided official backing to Mr Nawrocki.
36. The campaign environment was further shaped by unequal media
coverage, with public broadcasters accused of bias against one candidate,
particularly in rural areas where public television remains the
dominant source of information. While reforms were initiated by
the new government to restore editorial independence at TVP and
Polskie Radio, their impact was uneven and contested by the president
as unconstitutional. This left many voters with limited access to
balanced perspectives.
37. One of the most notable episodes of the campaign occurred
a fortnight before the first round, when media revealed that Karol
Nawrocki owned a second apartment, despite publicly presenting himself
as an “ordinary Pole with one flat”. His campaign initially defended
the arrangement as part of support for a disabled man residing there,
but further reporting showed the beneficiary had been placed in
a public care home by court order. The episode sparked criticism
across the political spectrum, with rivals denouncing his actions
as unethical. Karol Nawrocki announced he would donate the disputed
flat to charity, but the gesture failed to restore public trust,
with polls showing a decline in support. While his camp alleged
a smear campaign by the secret services, journalists demonstrated
that the information was publicly accessible through land registries.
38. Beyond scandals, the campaign was marked by high visibility
in public spaces. Both candidates relied on banners, billboards,
and large-scale rallies to mobilise supporters. One week before
election day, Warsaw witnessed two massive parallel marches, reflecting
the polarisation of the electorate. Campaign events were peaceful
overall, though reports of destruction of campaign materials were
widespread. Observers noted strong youth participation, with nearly
27% of attendees under 30, and women were actively involved both
as organisers and voters.
39. Foreign officials and public figures also entered the campaign
scene. Romania’s president-elect Nicușor Dan endorsed Rafał Trzaskowski,
while George Simion, a prominent Romanian nationalist politician, expressed
support for Karol Nawrocki. In addition, US Secretary of Homeland
Security Kristi Noem voiced support for Karol Nawrocki during the
Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Rzeszów, demonstrating
the international dimension of the campaign.
40. Social networks emerged as decisive tools for voter outreach.
Both leading candidates doubled their online engagement between
the first and second rounds, with weekly interactions on their posts
reaching nearly half a million users. Online campaigning, however,
was accompanied by disinformation, including third-party paid advertisements
of unclear origin. The delayed designation of a Digital Services
Coordinator limited institutional capacity to monitor and counter
these threats. Despite some progress with EU-supported rapid response
mechanisms, the lack of transparency in public reporting weakened
public trust in institutions tasked with safeguarding electoral
integrity.
3.5 Foreign interference
41. Despite frequent warnings about
Russian interference in the Polish elections, experts and observers concluded
that actual foreign interference had been less impactful than feared
thanks to Poland’s media diversity and recent legal/technical improvements.
In addition, the unique historical context of Poland makes pro-Russian
political stances deeply unpopular and practically impossible for
credible political candidates. Russia’s interference would therefore
aim at creating chaos rather than supporting any specific candidate
due to the unfeasibility of openly pro-Russian politics in Poland.
42. Nonetheless, foreign interference and information manipulation
were persistent risks. The Polish authorities deployed significant
resources to counter disinformation, cyberattacks, and co-ordinated
campaigns from abroad, notably from Russia and Belarus. Systems
were established for rapid response, including digital flagging
and collaboration with social networks, though the effectiveness
of these measures was uneven.
43. Observers identified delayed and inconsistent co-ordination
between national bodies, civil society, and platforms. The late
appointment of a Digital Services Coordinator hindered timely action
under new EU rules. The PACE delegation noted the high-profile investigation
into two third-party Facebook campaigns outspending official candidates
with funds of unclear origin. Allegations of foreign backing, particularly
for online ads supporting Rafał Trzaskowski, remain under review
and contributed to tensions around transparency and trust.
44. Despite these efforts, the overall impact of foreign attempts
appeared limited, with no credible evidence of outcome manipulation.
However, the escalation of digital threats and the institutional
sluggishness in response remain causes for concern, particularly
as media and online mobilisation become ever more central in European
elections.
3.6 Media landscape
45. Poland’s media were highly
polarised in both rounds of the presidential election, mirroring
and amplifying political divisions. Public broadcasters and major
private channels provided partisan coverage: TVP and TVN often criticised
Karol Nawrocki and avoided negative reporting on Rafał Trzaskowski,
while TV Republika adopted a strongly negative line against Rafał
Trzaskowski. The regulatory body KRRiT, meanwhile, was widely perceived
as politicised, reacting selectively to complaints and subject to
audit criticism for failures in enforcement and impartiality.
46. The only official televised debate for the second round was
poorly moderated, devolving into mutual accusations rather than
substantive policy discussion. Both candidates benefited from additional
airtime, but scheduling outside primetime restricted audience reach.
Print and digital media tracked similar patterns, with editorial
stances shaped by ownership and political affiliations.
47. Changes in public media management, triggered by parliamentary
intervention, marginally improved reporting quality. However, unresolved
questions related to funding, appointments, and statutory safeguards continued
to expose public broadcasters to political influence. The proliferation
of online news sources and social networks diversified information
flows but increased exposure to disinformation and unregulated partisan campaigning.
3.7 Campaign financing
48. Campaign financing remains
a critical weakness in Poland’s electoral landscape. The cumulative expenditure
limit for both rounds, set at PLN 24.6 million, created an uneven
playing field for frontrunners needing to reserve resources. While
donations above PLN 4 660 had to be disclosed, the bulk of funding
– smaller donations and party transfers – escaped pre-election scrutiny
or reporting.
49. Third-party campaigning, particularly online and through civil
society organisations, operated outside regulatory requirements.
Some non-party actors outspent official candidates, and allegations
of foreign funding emerged as prominent issues. Investigations into
suspicious advertisements remain ongoing, but the NEC has no authority
to halt or sanction violations before the conclusion of the process.
50. Financial reports from candidates are only required several
months after the election, and the format for publication limits
accessibility and review. These delays prevent real-time accountability,
undermining public scrutiny and trust. Parties continue to seek
loopholes in disclosure rules, making transparency and integrity
in campaign financing an urgent area for reform.
3.8 Women and inclusivity
in the electoral process
51. The 2025 presidential election
highlighted persistent gender imbalances in political participation.
Unlike the 2023 parliamentary elections, which saw a surge of female
candidates and strong mobilisation of women voters, this contest
featured only two female presidential candidates. Civil society
organisations and observers widely regretted this, noting the persistent
gender imbalance in political leadership, underlining that it limited political
pluralism and deprived the electorate of perspectives crucial for
debates on equality and social rights. The composition of the NEC
reflected similar disparities, having an all-male composition.
52. Women were, however, central to the organisation of election
day. They constituted a large proportion of polling station commission
members, ensuring orderly procedures and contributing to voter confidence
in the process. Our observers commended their professionalism and
noted the vital role women played at grassroots levels of electoral
administration. At the same time, civic actors highlighted that
those younger women, who had been highly mobilised in the 2023 parliamentary
elections around issues of reproductive rights and societal liberalisation,
appeared less engaged in this presidential race. Frustration with
the Tusk government’s cautious pace on gender equality reforms contributed
to this disillusionment.
53. The inclusivity of the electoral process also depended on
measures to ensure access for people with disabilities. The Election
Code foresees free transport for voters with disabilities and those
over 60, as well as assisted voting. While some polling stations
were well adapted, accessibility remained uneven, with architectural
barriers and inconsistent availability of information in accessible
formats. Civil society and the Ombudsperson’s office ran a campaign
under the motto “Elections accessible to all,” which raised awareness but
did not fully address structural shortcomings. ODIHR observers noted
that much more remains to be done to guarantee equal, independent,
and secret voting rights for persons with disabilities.
4 Election Day
54. On election day, the Assembly’s
observers were deployed across a wide geographical spread. In the first
round, 15 teams visited 153 polling stations across regions including
Gdańsk, Kraków, Białystok, Lublin, Pułtusk, Ostrołęka, Siedlce,
Ostrów Mazowiecki, Ciechanów, Płońsk, Radom, Łódź and Warsaw. In
the second round, teams visited polling stations in Warsaw, Łowicz–Kutno,
Białystok, Puławy and Lublin. This coverage gave the delegation
a broad overview of the process across urban and rural Poland.
55. The Assembly observers congratulated the Polish electorate
on the exceptionally high turnout, both within the country and among
citizens voting abroad (67.31% in the first round and 71.63% in
the second round). Despite a deeply polarised political climate,
voters demonstrated their commitment to democratic principles and
contributed to a calm and orderly electoral process. The conduct
of polling station staff was widely praised, with some 31 000 polling
stations operating nationwide in a generally professional and transparent
manner. A notable feature of the process was the very strong participation
of women, who were present in significant numbers on electoral boards
and contributed actively to the smooth administration of the vote.
56. Election day in both rounds was calm, efficiently and professionally
managed across observed polling stations. The technical aspects
of voting, counting, and tabulation were implemented effectively,
and no major irregularities were reported.
57. A recurring challenge was the secrecy of the vote. Observers
found repeated instances of family voting, picture-taking of ballots,
and group voting, raising concerns about privacy and individual
autonomy. While understandable in cultural terms, international
standards underscore that secrecy of the vote is a cornerstone of
democratic elections. The Polish authorities therefore have a duty
to provide conditions that enable every voter to exercise their
franchise in privacy and free from undue social or political pressure,
regardless of whether they live in urban centres or rural areas.
58. Long lines for absentee certificates reflected heavy use of
this mobilisation tool, but the process generally worked as intended.
No intimidation or forced voting was observed, and election officials
respected both the spirit and letter of procedures.
5 Election results
59. The first round on 18 May confirmed
a fragmented, high-stakes contest that concentrated the field around
two sharply defined alternatives. Rafał Trzaskowski led with 31.36%, Karol Nawrocki placed second with
29.54%, and the third and
fourth places went to Sławomir Mentzen (14.81%) and Grzegorz Braun
(6.34%), with the remaining candidates receiving each below 5% of
the votes. These figures underscored how decisively the electorate
had split between a liberal-centrist platform focused on institutional
reform and European alignment and a conservative-national platform
emphasising sovereignty and social traditionalism.
60. The run-off on 1 June was decided by a razor-thin national
margin. Karol Nawrocki won
the presidency with 50.89% (10 606 877 votes) to 49.11% (10 237 286
votes) for Rafał Trzaskowski – a difference of 369 591 votes out
of more than 20.8 million valid ballots. This outcome, reached amid
very high participation (71.63% turnout), confirmed the depth of
Poland’s two-camp politics while producing a clear, if narrow, mandate
for the president-elect.
61. Who voted for whom exhibits the now-familiar urban–rural and
education gradients. Late-poll demographic data show Karol Nawrocki
winning rural areas by 64.2% to 35.8%, while Rafał Trzaskowski took the
biggest cities (>500,000 residents) by 66.8% to 33.2% and also led
across medium-sized urban centres. By education, Karol Nawrocki
led among voters with elementary (73-27) and vocational (70-30)
education, while Rafał Trzaskowski led among higher-education voters
(61-39); secondary-education voters were more evenly split. Gender
patterns were also visible: men leaned toward Karol Nawrocki (55.5-44.5),
while women leaned toward Rafał Trzaskowski (52.8-47.2). These cleavages,
widely visualised in the post-election “run-off in charts” analyses,
map closely onto Poland’s broader social geography.
62. Voting abroad reached exceptional levels and differed markedly
from the domestic pattern. According to official tallies, the second-round
abroad electorate counted 721 608 registered voters, with 608 043
valid ballots and 84.26% turnout. Across 511 overseas polling stations,
Rafał Trzaskowski won the diaspora by 63.49% to 36.51%, receiving
approximately 383 700 votes to 220 600 for Karol Nawrocki – significant
margins in the UK, Germany, the US and Western Europe that, while
substantial, were insufficient to outweigh Karol Nawrocki’s rural
and south-eastern strength at home.
63. The political implications of such a close and polarised result
are considerable, notably as in Poland’s political system, the president
wields significant powers, including the power to initiate legislation,
appoint senior officials and, above all, the power to exercise a
legislative veto and the ability to refer laws to the Constitutional
Tribunal. International observers had already warned that the election
outcome could affect the government’s capacity to implement its
rule-of-law agenda. The result confirms those concerns and signals
a period of protracted bargaining between the executive and legislature,
with consensus-building becoming a necessity.
64. On 6 August 2025, Karol Nawrocki was sworn in as president
for a five-year term. Although formally independent, his campaign
was openly backed by PiS, and his victory gives the party a powerful
ally at the apex of the State, notably through his power to exercise
a suspensive veto. Given the coalition arithmetic in the Sejm, where
the government lacks the majority needed to override vetoes, his
election represents a formidable constraint on Tusk’s ambitions.
6 Conclusions and
recommendations
65. The International Election
Observation Mission (representing the Assembly and ODIHR) concluded
that the 2025 presidential election in Poland was competitive, well
managed and gave voters a genuine choice. Election day was calm
and professional, and the very high turnout confirmed the strong
democratic commitment of Polish citizens. At the same time, long-standing
political polarisation, biased media coverage, misuse of official
resources, insufficient transparency of campaign finance, and persistent
concerns over judicial independence limited the overall confidence
in the process.
66. The PACE delegation underlined that the Polish people deserve
full trust in their democratic institutions. It stressed that political
leaders should engage in inclusive dialogue to overcome divisions
and strengthen the trustworthiness of the system.
67. Based on its findings, the delegation encourages the Polish
authorities to implement in full the recommendations of the Venice
Commission and ODIHR, particularly concerning judicial independence, transparency
of campaign financing, and the regulation of third-party campaigning.
68. The PACE delegation encourages the Polish authorities to,
as regards:
- legal framework:
- clarify procedures for run-off
campaigns, including timelines and complaint mechanisms;
- reform the process for validating election results to
remove it from bodies deemed illegitimate by the European Court
of Human Rights;
- address contested appointments to the Constitutional Tribunal
to restore confidence;
- implement the judgement of the European Court of Human
Rights with regard to the independence of the judiciary, including
with regard to the contested chambers of the Supreme Court and appointments
to the Constitutional Tribunal in order to restore confidence in
the independence and impartiality of the justice system;
- institutional framework:
- reform the composition of the National Electoral Commission
to reduce politicisation and enhance independence;
- ensure consistent, comprehensive training of election
commissions across the country;
- guarantee judicial independence in electoral matters through
systemic reform;
- media:
- safeguard
editorial independence of public broadcasters and ensure balanced
coverage;
- reform the National Broadcasting Council to ensure impartiality
and accountability;
- ensure fair, substantive debates with impartial moderators;
- campaign finance:
- introduce
real-time disclosure of income, expenditures and party transfers;
- establish effective sanctions for illegal third-party
campaigning;
- publish full donor information and audits in accessible
formats;
- misuse of administrative resources:
- enforce a strict separation between public office and
campaigning;
- prohibit the use of public resources, events and staff
for campaign purposes;
- foreign interference and digital realm:
- fully implement the EU Digital
Services Act and strengthen co-operation with platforms;
- expand the “Election Umbrella” initiative with clear enforcement
mechanisms;
- improve co-ordination and timely public communication
to counter disinformation;
- election day:
- safeguard
ballot secrecy with envelopes or redesigned boxes, and voter education;
- ensure universal accessibility for persons with disabilities;
- monitor potential intimidation linked to volunteer “protection”
groups;
- participation and inclusivity:
- remove restrictions on suffrage for persons with intellectual
or psychosocial disabilities;
- promote gender balance in the National Electoral Commission
and electoral commissions;
- support citizen observation consistent with international
standards.
69. The Assembly encourages the authorities of Poland to address
these shortcomings in the spirit of the Reykjavik Principles for
Democracy adopted at the Council of Europe Summit in 2023, which
reaffirm the importance of free and fair elections for democratic
resilience. It stands ready to assist Poland in pursuing these reforms
through its monitoring procedure and in close co-operation with
the Venice Commission.
Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee
Chairperson: Mr Iulian
BULAI, Romania, replaced by Ms Liliana TANGUY, France, for the observation
of the first round of the presidential election in May.
Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
(SOC)
- Ms Zita GURMAI, Hungary
- Mr Antonio GUTIÉRREZ LIMONES, Spain
- Ms Bisera KOSTADINOVSKA-STOJCHEVSKA, North Macedonia *
**
- Ms Annick LAMBRECHT, Belgium
- Mr Perran MOON, United Kingdom
- Ms Sandra REGOL, France
- Mr Axel SCHÄFER, Germany
- Mr Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria
- Mr Roberto SPERANZA, Italy
Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Deborah BERGAMINI,
Italy
- Mr Pablo HISPÁN, Spain
- Ms Arusyak JULHAKYAN, Armenia
- Mr Joseph O’REILLY, Ireland *
- Mr Georgios STAMATIS, Greece
European Conservatives, Patriots &
Affiliates (ECPA)
- Mr Simone BILLI, Italy
- Ms Elisabetta GARDINI, Italy *
- Mr Armen GEVORGYAN, Armenia **
- Mr Malte KAUFMANN, Germany
- Ms Jessica STEGRUD, Sweden
- Ms Victoria TIBLOM, Sweden
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Iulian BULAI, Romania
* **
- Mr Alfred HEER, Switzerland
- Ms Yuliia OVCHYNNYKOVA, Ukraine
- Ms Lucia PLAVÁKOVÁ, Slovak Republic
- Ms Liliana TANGUY, France
- Ms Lesia ZABURANNA, Ukraine
Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
- Ms Laura CASTEL, Spain
*
- Ms Sevim DAĞDELEN, Germany ** (replaced Ms Castel for
the second round)
Co-rapporteur AS/MON (ex officio)
- Mr Pieter OMTZIGT, Netherlands,
EPP/CD
Venice Commission
- Mr Oscar SÁNCHEZ MUÑOZ,
Spain, member of the Venice Commission **
- Mr Michael JANSSEN, secretariat of the Venice Commission
**
Secretariat
- Ms Sylvie AFFHOLDER,
Head of the Elections Division **
- Ms Ivi-Triin ODRATS, Deputy Head of the Elections Division
*
- Ms Carine ROLLER-KAUFMAN, Assistant, Elections Division
* **
- Ms Agata MASELKO-SOKOL, Expert Consultant * **
*Participants to the pre-electoral mission
**Participants to the second round
Appendix 2 – Programme of the pre-electoral
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
Monday, 14 April 2025
09:00-10:00 Delegation meeting with introductory words by:
- Mr Iulian Bulai, Head of Delegation
- Ms Karina Wegrzynowska, Head of the Council of Europe
Liaison Office in Warsaw
10:00-11:30 Meeting with representatives of civil society
organisations:
- Ms Zofia Lutkiewicz,
Political Accountability Foundation
- Mr Marcin Wolny, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
- Mr Michał Leśniak, Committee for the Defence of Democracy
- Mr Krzysztof Izdebski, Stefan Batory Foundation
- Ms Sonia Horonziak, Institute of Public Affairs
- Mr Marcin Skubiszewski, Election Observatory
11:30-12:30 Meeting with Prof. Wojciech Brzozowski, Deputy
Human Rights Commissioner
13:00-14:15 Working lunch with Mr Stanisław Zakroczymski, Director General of the Office
of the Speaker of the Sejm
14:30-16:00 Meeting with:
- Ms Dunja
Mijatović, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission (LEOM)
- Mr Stefan Krause, Deputy Head of the OSCE/ODIHR LEOM
- Ms Martina Barker-Ciganikova, ODIHR Election Adviser responsible
for Poland
16:15-17:15 Meeting with a representative of media outlet,
Mr Andrzej Krajewski, Journalists’ Association
17:30-18:30 Meeting with:
- Ms Henryka
Mościcka - Dendys, Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland
- Ms Justyna Chrzanowska, Director of the Department of
Consular Affairs, Plenipotentiary of the Ministry for the 2025 presidential
election
- Ms Agata Duda-Płonka, Deputy Director of the Department
of Global Affairs;
- Mr Piotr Chmiel, Deputy Director of the Department of
Consular Affairs
- Mr Michal Zawisza, Head of the Legal Department of the
Consular Department
- Mr Pawel Wierdak, advisor (former Head of the Council
of Europe Liaison Office in Warsaw)
Tuesday, 15 April 2025
10:00-10:45 Meeting with:
- Mr Sylwester
Marciniak, Chairperson of the National Electoral Commission (NEC)
- Mr Paweł Gieras and Mr Arkadiusz Pikulik, members of the
NEC
- Mr Rafał Tkacz, Chairperson of the National Electoral
Office
11:15-12:00 Meeting with:
- Mr
Krzysztof Wiak, Judge, President of the Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court
- Mr Oktawian Nawrot, Judge at the Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court
- Mr Aleksander Stępkowski, Judge, Spokesperson of the Supreme
Court
- Mr Marcin Stębelski, member of the Supreme Court Studies
and Analysis Office
- Mr Przemysław Szuty, assistant to Judge at the Chamber
of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court
12:30-13:15 Meeting with Mr Rafał Rosiński, Undersecretary
of State, Ministry of Digital Affairs
13:30-14:30 Working lunch with Mr Robert Kwiatkowski, member
of the National Media Council
15:00-17:45 Meeting with representatives of the presidential
candidates:
- 15:00-15:30 Mr Gregory
Woztowicz, member of the campaign team of Mr Rafał Trzaskowski (KO),
Chairperson of the Polish Delegation to PACE
- 15:45-16:15 Mr Marcin Przydacz, MP, former MFA Undersecretary
of State, member of the campaign team of Mr Karol Nawrocki (PiS)
- 16:30-17:00 Mr Arkadiusz Waszkiewicz, representative of
the electoral campaign of Ms Magdalena Biejat (The Left)
- 17:15-17:45 Mr Jacek Cichocki, Head of the electoral team
of Mr Szymon Hołownia
18:00-19:30 Debriefing meeting of the pre-electoral delegation
and preparation of the statement
Appendix 3 – Statement of the pre-electoral
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
PACE pre-election mission to Poland: Wide
voter choice amid concerns over polarisation, electoral integrity
and security
Warsaw, 15 April 2025 – A five-member delegation of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), led by Iulian Bulai (Romania,
ALDE), concluded a two-day pre-election visit to Warsaw ahead of
the presidential election scheduled for 18 May 2025.
The delegation acknowledged significant positive developments
since the parliamentary elections in 2023, notably the expectation
of a professionally administered electoral process, active engagement
from civil society – including extensive domestic observation –
and increased public scrutiny, demonstrating robust democratic engagement.
However, the mission also noted a degree of voter fatigue, as this
election concludes an intensive cycle of four consecutive electoral
contests.
Despite these encouraging developments, several challenges
remain. Political polarisation continues to impede essential electoral
reforms, notably concerning judicial independence, transparency
in campaign financing, and impartial media coverage. The delegation
particularly highlighted concerns over the politicised composition
of election administration bodies and questioned judicial institutions'
capacity to impartially manage electoral disputes, both inherited
from the previous government.
Further concerns include intense and divisive campaign rhetoric,
inadequate oversight of campaign financing, and the potential for
biased reporting by public broadcasters. Additionally, interlocutors
underscored the challenges of potential cyberattacks and possible
foreign interference, emphasising the necessity of continued vigilance
against hybrid threats that could affect the electoral process.
While welcoming the planned opening of over 500 polling stations
worldwide to facilitate out of country voting, concerns were raised
about delays in the reintroduction of postal voting, which might
disenfranche some members of the electorate.
Transparency in campaign financing emerged as another area
requiring attention. Many interlocutors voiced concerns about inadequate
oversight mechanisms and unresolved issues regarding public funding
allocation for campaigns. The lack of interim reporting prior to
election day and limited regulation of third-party campaigning were
identified as gaps that could hinder accountability and transparency.
The media environment also reflects broader political polarisation.
Interlocutors emphasised ongoing reforms aimed at protecting editorial
independence and promoting media pluralism but noted that public
broadcasters remain under scrutiny for potential bias in their reporting.
While provisions exist for debates among presidential candidates
and free airtime for campaign spots, systematic monitoring of media
compliance with electoral obligations is lacking, which could affect
balanced coverage during the campaign period.
The PACE delegation underscored that a transparent and inclusive
electoral process is essential for maintaining public trust in democratic
institutions. It called on all stakeholders to address these concerns proactively
and ensure that Polish citizens can exercise their democratic rights
freely and fairly during this pivotal election.
The cross-party delegation met with high-ranking state officials,
members of the judiciary, electoral authorities, representatives
of political parties, civil society organisations and independent
media monitors to thoroughly assess the electoral environment and
broader political climate.
A full PACE observation mission will return to Poland in mid-May
to monitor developments on election day and beyond.
PACE – which represents parliamentarians from 46 European
nations – is observing elections in Poland with a full-scale delegation
for the second time since the Parliamentary Assembly decided to
open a procedure in January 2020 to monitor Poland’s honouring of
its statutory obligations in respect of the Council of Europe.
* Composition of the delegation: Iulian BULAI (Romania, ALDE)
Head of Delegation, Bisera KOSTADINOVSKA-STOJCHEVSKA, (North Macedonia,
SOC), Joseph O’REILLY (Ireland, EPP/CD), Elisabetta GARDINI, (Italy,
ECPA), Laura CASTEL, (Spain, UEL)
Appendix 4 – Programme of the meetings of
the PACE electoral observation mission (1st round)
Friday, 16 May 2025
09:00-10:20 PACE delegation meeting
- Welcome by Mr Iulian Bulai, Head of delegation
- Presentation of the political and electoral environment,
Ms Agata Masełko-Sokoł, expert-consultant assisting the PACE election
observation missions (EOM)
- Presentation on electoral legislation and legal challenges,
Mr Óscar Sánchez Muñoz, representative of the Venice Commission
- Presentation by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, PACE monitoring committee
co-rapporteur on Poland
- Practical information from the secretariat
10:30-12:30 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation
Mission (LEOM)
- Mr Stefan Krause,
Deputy Head of Mission
Political overview, the contestants and the election campaign
- Ms Tatyana Hilscher Bogussevich,
Political Analyst
- Ms Elissavet Karagiannidou, Campaign Finance Analyst
- Mr Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst
Legal Framework, Electoral dispute resolutions
- Mr Donald Bisson, Legal Analyst
- Ms Desislava Hristova, Election Analyst
- Mr Noah Lane, Security Expert
14:00-15:30 Political and Social Context – representatives
of the civil society
- Ms Zofia
Lutkiewicz, Political Accountability Foundation
- Mr Michał Leśniak, Committee for the Defence of Democracy
- Mr Krzysztof Izdebski, Stefan Batory Foundation
- Ms Sonia Horonziak, Institute of Public Affairs
16:00-17:00 Election Administration
- Ms Henryka Mościcka-Dendys, Deputy Foreign Minister of
Poland
- Mr Rafał Rosiński, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of
Digital Affairs
- Mr Sylwester Marciniak, Chairperson, National Electoral
Commission
- Mr Rafał Tkacz, Chairperson, National Electoral Office
17:15-18:15 Election Campaign and Media Coverage
- Ms Dominika Sitnicka, OKO Press
- Mr Juliusz Kaszynski, Editor-in-chief, Polish Radio
- Mr Jakub Szymik, CEE Digital Democracy Watch
Saturday, 17 May 2025
09:30-11:30 Representatives of the presidential candidates
- 09:30-10:10 Mr Paweł Jabłoński,
representative of the electoral campaign of Mr Karol Nawrocki (PiS)
- 10:10-10:50 Mr Arkadiusz Waszkiewicz, representative
of the electoral campaign of Ms Magdalena Biejat (The Left)
- 10:50-11:30 Ms Zofia Malisz, representative of the electoral
campaign of Mr Adrian Zandberg (Together)
11:45-12:30 Representatives of the presidential candidates
(continued)
- Ms Wioletta Paprocka-Ślusarska
and, Ms Dorota Łoboda, representatives of the electoral campaign
of Mr Rafał Trzaskowski (KO)
12:30-13:15 OSCE/ODIHR EOM briefing continuation
- Ms Ivana Stanojev, long-term
observer co-ordinator deployed in Warsaw
Sunday, 18 May 2025, Election Day – Observation
in polling stations
(polling stations open at 7:00 and close at 21:00)
Monday, 19 May 2025
08:00-09:00 Debriefing for the PACE delegation
15:00 Joint ODIHR/PACE press conference
Appendix 5 – Press release of the international
election observation mission (first round)
Poland’s presidential election was competitive
but affected by deep polarization, international observers say
WARSAW, 19 May 2025 – The first round of Poland’s presidential
election offered voters a genuine choice between political options,
but it took place against a background of deep political polarization
that also impacted some key state institutions involved in the electoral
process, international observers said in a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE) found that the electoral legal framework
is adequate to hold democratic elections. However, some aspects
would benefit from further revision as many prior recommendations
remain unaddressed. Concerns were raised about the independence
of the judiciary, including the court chamber responsible for validating
election results, potentially weakening public trust.
“The election campaign so far has demonstrated Poland’s strength
as a dynamic democracy, but to strengthen it further the deep trenches
of political polarization must be addressed through inclusive dialogue
that bridges political and ideological divides,” said Dunja Mijatović,
who headed the ODIHR observation mission. “At the same time, the
inflammatory messaging by some candidates that targeted migrants,
the LGBTI community, and ethnic and religious groups, including
xenophobic and anti-Ukrainian overtones, raised serious concern.”
The authorities took largescale and proactive efforts to protect
the election process from multiple attempts at foreign interference,
disinformation, and cyberattacks, but the co-ordination between
the institutions working in this area as well as public communication
about the protective measures used require further strengthening. While
attempted cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns surged in the
run-up to the election, state institutions said they had identified
and mitigated these threats.
“The first round of Poland’s presidential election was professionally
managed, but deep political divisions, unresolved constitutional
crises, weak safeguards against campaign abuses and foreign interference
from Russia and others threaten the integrity of the process,” said
Liliana Tanguy, Acting Head of the PACE Delegation. “As the country
heads into the second round, it is a pivotal moment for all stakeholders
to strengthen transparency and uphold democratic standards, and
for all Polish citizens to make their voices heard in shaping the
nation’s democratic future.”
The election administration managed the election efficiently
at all levels, but its decision-making process was not always transparent.
Election day itself was calm and the process was professional and
well organized, but the secrecy of the vote was often not ensured.
The freedoms of expression, assembly and association were
respected in a vibrant campaign. While the interaction between candidates
was mostly respectful, at times the campaign tone turned personal
and confrontational. Intolerant messaging targeting vulnerable communities
was also observed, including online. In the absence of sufficient
regulation, public officials at various levels and across the political
spectrum frequently campaigned on behalf of candidates, and the
line between official duties and campaign activities often appeared
blurred. Women remain underrepresented in public and political life
and their involvement as speakers at campaign events and in campaign
leadership remained limited. Only two out of the 13 presidential candidates
were women.
While there have been some recent improvements to media freedom,
including a reduction in litigation against journalists, the media
landscape remains highly polarized, limiting voters’ access to impartial
information. ODIHR’s media monitoring found clear patterns of biased
coverage across both public and private outlets. Overall, the limited
access of voters to comprehensive information needed for making
a fully informed choice highlighted the need for systematic media
reforms.
The international election observation to the Polish presidential
election totalled 67 observers from 30 countries, consisting of
34 ODIHR-deployed experts and long-term observers, and 33 parliamentarians
and staff from PACE.
Appendix 6 – Programme of the meetings of
the of the PACE electoral observation mission (second round)
Saturday, 31 May 2025
09:00-10:00 PACE delegation meeting
- Welcome by the Head of delegation, Mr Iulian Bulai
- Presentation of the political and electoral environment
after the 1st round, Ms Agata Masełko-Sokoł, expert-consultant assisting
the PACE electoral observation mission (EOM)
- Presentation on electoral legislation and election dispute
resolution, Mr Óscar Sánchez Muñoz, representative of the Venice
Commission
- Practical information from the secretariat
10:00-11:30 Briefing by the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation
Mission (LEOM)
- Welcome and
overview of the LEOM's work between the two rounds, Dunja Mijatović,
Head of Mission and Stefan Krause, Deputy Head
- Political overview, the contestants and the election campaign,
Ms Tatyana Hilscher Bogussevich, Political Analyst
- Media monitoring, Mr Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst
- Election Administration and E-Day, Ms Desislava Hristova,
Election Analyst
11:30-12:15 Media and campaign monitoring
- Ms Alexandra Wojtowicz, disinformation
expert, CEE Digital Democracy Watch
14:00-15:00 Election administration
- Mr Sylwester Marciniak, Chairperson, National Electoral
Commission
- Mr Rafał Tkacz, Chairperson, National Electoral Office
15:10-16:30 Representatives of the presidential candidates
15:10-15:50 Ms Wioletta Paprocka-Ślusarska and Ms Dorota
Loboda, representatives of the electoral campaign of Mr Rafał Trzaskowski
(KO)
15:50-16:30 Mr Paweł Jabłoński, representative of the electoral
campaign of Mr Karol Nawrocki (PiS)
Sunday, 1st June
2025, Election Day – Observation in polling stations
(polling stations open at 7:00 and close at 21:00)
Monday, 2 June 2025
08:00-09:00 Debriefing for the PACE delegation
15:00 Joint ODIHR/PACE press conference
Appendix 7 – Press release of the international
election observation mission (second round)
Poland’s presidential run-off well run
and intensely contested amid increased polarization including in media
and online, international observers say
WARSAW, 2 June 2025 – Yesterday’s presidential run-off in
Poland was competitive and well managed, but the longstanding polarization
between the country’s two main political camps and media bias contributed
to an intensely contested campaign amidst ongoing controversies
over the independence of some key electoral oversight institutions,
international observers said in a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE) concluded that as in the first round,
the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly were
respected ahead of the presidential run-off. While the campaign
became increasingly confrontational as both candidates competed
for the votes of a divided and ideologically fragmented electorate,
the use of inflammatory and intolerant messaging declined noticeably
ahead of the second round. In the absence of explicit rules or legislation,
there was no clear separation between campaigning and the activities
of public officials, and no efforts were made to prevent or stop
such practices.
“The entire campaign exposed the depth of Poland’s political
polarization and societal divisions, underscoring the need for an
inclusive dialogue that involves the whole society,” said Dunja
Mijatović, head of the ODIHR observation mission. “Political leaders
must now further strengthen the trustworthiness and accountability
of Poland’s democratic institutions for the benefit of all citizens.
Genuine democracy should not be a zero-sum game, it is a shared
responsibility.”
While the authorities maintained their efforts to protect
the election process from disinformation and foreign interference,
these efforts were weakened by insufficient coordination as well
as limited and contradictory public communication about the measures
taken. The effectiveness of responses by the social networks continued
to vary significantly, resulting in a high share of flagged content
remaining unaddressed on some platforms.
“The high voter turnout in the second round of the presidential
election, both domestically and abroad, reflects the strong commitment
of Polish citizens to the strength and quality of their democracy,”
said Iulian Bulai, head of the PACE delegation. “Voters were presented
with a real choice between political alternatives in an open environment.
They were able to make informed decisions despite a highly polarised
media landscape, manipulative rhetoric and existing vulnerabilities,
which should be addressed to further strengthen the integrity of
the electoral process.”
Inadequate campaign finance regulations enabled the frequent
involvement of third parties, reducing accountability and the integrity
of the process. Overall, the election administration managed the
election professionally and efficiently. Election day itself was
calm and the process was well organized and professional, but as
for the first round, the secrecy of the vote was often not ensured.
Media polarisation together with biased coverage by the majority
of media outlets, including the public broadcaster, limited voters’
access to impartial information. The only televised debate between
the two candidates ahead of the second round was characterised by
an absence of any effective moderation, allowing it to be used as
a platform for mutual accusations rather than offering a meaningful
comparison of political programmes.
At the same time, concerns continued about the lack of independence
of the supreme court chamber established in 2018 that is responsible
for validating election results. This controversy has lowered public
trust in the judiciary.
The international election observation to the Polish presidential
election totalled 42 observers from 24 countries, consisting of
34 ODIHR-deployed experts and long-term observers, and 8 parliamentarians
and staff from PACE.