Fake 'elections' in Russia and its destabilising attacks on Europe
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 30 September 2026 (33rd sitting) (see Doc. 16498, report
of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur:
Ms Alicia Kearns). Text adopted by the Assembly on
30 September 2026 (33rd sitting).Provisional version
subject to editorial review.
1. The Parliamentary
Assembly unequivocably condemns Russia’s campaign of unprovoked
attacks on member States. Against the backdrop of a failure to achieve
its military and strategic objectives in its war of aggression against
Ukraine despite immense human costs, over the last few months Russia’s
hostile actions against the rest of Europe have intensified, entering
a more dangerous phase. While such activities are not new, they
have recently expanded in scale and frequency, becoming more sophisticated
and increasingly aggressive.
2. Cyberattacks, sabotage and arson, attempted assassinations,
interference in democratic elections, attacks on critical infrastructure
and navigation systems, industrialisation of disinformation, airspace
violations and drone incursions are multiplying across the continent.
Far from being isolated incidents, these actions form part of a
broader co-ordinated pattern of Russian hostilities, interference
and attempts at destabilisation. The goal of Kremlin activities
is to marginally increase the threshold that could trigger a response,
thus testing the resilience of European States, seeking to undermine
democratic security and weaken European democracies and their resolve
in supporting Ukraine.
3. Recent developments underscore the scale and gravity of this
escalation. In Germany, Russian operatives attempted to carry out
a drone attack using military-grade material at Leipzig Airport.
Denmark, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Poland and Romania
have likewise faced a range of serious provocative acts. More broadly,
sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference and other hostile
operations directed against public authorities and critical infrastructure
have been reported in numerous Council of Europe member States,
with States bordering Russia particularly exposed. Reports have
also warned of possible hybrid attacks using drones against countries
supporting Ukraine, which Russia could present as accidental to
weaken North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s willingness to
respond under its collective-defence commitments.
4. The Assembly notes that these attacks are increasingly carried
out not by Russian intelligence officers acting in person but through
proxies: criminals, extremists and so-called “disposable agents”.
This is a State outsourcing terrorism, and the use of proxies does
not dilute the responsibility of Russia. The Assembly also notes
efforts by the Russian State to present attacks as accidents and
affirms that Russia’s recklessness is not an accident; the responses
of member States must compel the Russian State to operate with more
caution.
5. The escalation of attacks is particularly alarming at a time
when Europe is in an intense electoral period. Electoral processes
in Europe are enduring increased hostilities, notably through foreign
information manipulation and interference involving Russian State-controlled
media, covert and proxy networks, attempts to co-opt political actors,
co-ordinated online campaigns and deceptive information outlets.
With a succession of elections taking place across Europe in the
months ahead, the risk of such interference is especially acute. These
operations seek not only to influence public debate and electoral
processes, but more fundamentally to distort the information environment
in which citizens make democratic choices, amplify divisions and polarisation,
erode trust in elections and democratic institutions, and weaken
European democracies. The Assembly also recognises this escalation
as a symptom of the failure of the Russian State to achieve its
military and strategic objectives in Ukraine, and to export instability
abroad to distract from domestic instability.
6. The Assembly utterly condemns the continuing escalation of
Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression
against Ukraine, with relentless strikes on populated areas, notably
in Kyiv, and on civilian infrastructure, including railway networks,
food production and storage facilities, causing mounting civilian
casualties and compounding the hardship faced by millions of civilians
as another winter approaches. The Assembly is particularly appalled
by the use of ever more advanced attack drones, including high-speed jet-powered
drones and AI-enabled systems with autonomous targeting capabilities.
The Assembly also expresses its deep concern over the dire humanitarian
situation in Oleshky, in the temporarily occupied part of the Kherson
region of Ukraine, where civilians are trapped by drone attacks
and landmines and are deprived of access to basic necessities. It
considers that such actions are in breach of Russia’s obligations,
as the occupying power, under international humanitarian law, including
the Geneva Conventions.
7. The Assembly is alarmed that, during the summer of 2026, Russia’s
systematic attacks have effectively blocked safe and uninterrupted
navigation in the Black Sea and severely disrupted maritime access
to and from Ukrainian ports. In July alone, 67 attacks on port infrastructure,
35 on civilian vessels in ports and 22 on vessels navigating the
Ukrainian Maritime Corridor were recorded. As around 80% of Ukraine’s
exports of grain, oilseeds and related agricultural products pass
through Black Sea ports, the continued blockade threatens not only
Ukraine but global food security and international food supplies.
The Assembly therefore calls for the earliest possible restoration
of a safe, open and fully accessible Black Sea.
8. The Assembly recalls that, under international humanitarian
law, occupation is temporary in nature and does not transfer sovereignty
over the occupied territory to the occupying power. The occupying
power must respect the existing legal order of the occupied territory,
unless it is an obstacle to the international law of occupation,
and may not use its temporary control to alter the legal status
of that territory. The Assembly stresses that measures imposed by
an occupying power, including changes to political, legal or institutional arrangements,
cannot create any lawful title over the occupied territory or affect
the sovereignty of the State to which that territory belongs.
9. At this critical juncture, the Assembly urges all Council
of Europe member States to recognise the full extent of the threat
posed by Russia’s attacks against member States, and to take co-ordinated
and effective measures in response. These reckless acts should not
be dismissed as accidents or “grey-zone” activities, they are attacks
on member States. The Assembly stresses that such hostile acts must
be attributed to the aggressor, as attribution is the first act
of deterrence. Every unattributed attack allows the Russian State
to believe that further aggression, or continued recklessness, carries
no cost, increasing the likelihood of war by miscalculation rather
than by decision. Russia’s actions therefore require a firm, co-ordinated
and proportionate response, which should not be regarded as an act
of revenge, but as a means of deterring further aggression while
preventing unintended escalation. Activities deliberately designed
to remain below the threshold of conventional armed conflict must
not be allowed to weaken Europe’s resolve.
10. Member States should therefore strengthen, individually and
collectively, their preparedness, deterrence and resilience, educate
their domestic populations on the risks faced, and improve their
capacity to detect, attribute and respond effectively to hybrid
attacks. Supporting Ukraine and strengthening the resilience of European
democracies are inseparable components of safeguarding Europe’s
security and peaceful future.
11. Russia’s destabilising attacks on Europe go hand in hand with
the intensification of authoritarian repression within Russia. The
so-called “elections” to the State Duma held from 18 to 20 September
2026 took place in an environment characterised by the systematic
and institutionalised suppression of political opposition, the criminalisation
of dissent, multiple incidents of voter intimidation and electoral
irregularities, severe restrictions on access to independent information
and the absence of conditions for genuine political competition.
The Assembly recalls the murder of Alexei Navalny by the Russian
State, as well as the mass incarceration of political prisoners
and activists, and the chilling effect these actions have had on
Russian opposition forces and the Russian citizens. The exclusion
of candidates from the Yabloko party, one of the last remaining
opposition forces in Russia standing on an anti-war platform, further
deprived Russian voters of genuine political choice. Russia’s decision
not to invite observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), for the third occasion of a nationwide vote, also
deprived the electoral process of independent and impartial international
observation, in disregard for binding commitments undertaken by
all OSCE participating States.
12. The Assembly condemns the fake observers deployed to Russia
in an attempt to counterfeit legitimacy and election-wash. The Assembly
is particularly concerned about the participation of nationals of
Council of Europe member States and the deployment of fake observers
in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.
13. The Assembly recalls that free and fair elections are the
foundation of representative democracy and require genuine political
pluralism, freedom of expression, association and assembly, access
to independent information and meaningful competition between political
alternatives. It also considers that the process held from 18 to
20 September 2026 did not meet these fundamental conditions and
cannot be regarded as a genuine expression of the will of the Russian
citizens. In the light of generally recognised European and international
standards governing the status of parliamentarians, including the
principles of a free representative mandate, the separation of powers
and legal certainty, the persons thus designated cannot be considered
to exercise a representative mandate or to perform official functions.
The Assembly considers that the resulting State Duma cannot be recognised
as democratically elected or as the legitimate representative of
the Russian citizens, just as the Assembly declared Vladimir Putin
an illegitimate President of Russia.
14. Furthermore, the Assembly unequivocally condemns Russia's
illegal conduct of so-called elections in the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine, namely in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the City of Sevastopol and in parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk,
Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine. These acts constitute
yet another flagrant violation of international law and of Ukraine’s
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and form part
of Russia’s policy of attempted illegal annexation. Conducted under
wartime repression, by an occupying power, the elections have no
legitimacy or legal effect and must not be recognised. The Assembly
reiterates that all those responsible for organising and facilitating
such illegal electoral processes should be held accountable.
15. The Assembly further condemns the coercion of Ukrainian citizens
in the temporarily occupied territories into participating in Russia’s
so-called electoral processes. It stresses that any participation
obtained under occupation, coercion or pressure cannot be interpreted
as an expression of free political will, nor used to legitimise
Russia’s attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories.
16. The Assembly underlines that the State Duma has endorsed Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine and its neighbours, the illegal temporary
occupation of Ukrainian territories and the attempt to annex them.
The new composition of the State Duma should be considered in the
context of this institutional responsibility for the war crimes
committed in and against Ukraine. The Assembly believes that the
process held from 18 to 20 September 2026 cannot restore democratic
legitimacy to that institution that has been instrumental in consolidating
Russia’s aggression abroad and authoritarian rule at home, and that
the resulting State Duma cannot be considered as a legitimate, democratic,
representative body, independent of the Russian executive.
17. The Assembly likewise condemns the organisation of elections
in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova without the
consent of the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova
and the opening and operation of Russian Government polling stations
without the consent of the Government of Georgia, in the Georgian
regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. The Assembly
reiterates its strongest support for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine within
their internationally recognised borders and regrets the continued
mistreatment and repression of the peoples in those occupied territories.
18. The Assembly considers that the sham electoral process within
Russia, the holding of illegal “elections” in the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, and the escalating
attacks against European democracies form part of the same broader
strategy: suppressing democratic choice in Russia, denying it in
territories under its illegal occupation and seeking to undermine
it in other European States. Fake elections and hybrid attacks are
the same project: manufacturing consent inside Russia and manufacturing fear
and instability outside its borders. Referring to its
Resolution 2593 (2025) “Foreign interference: a threat to democratic security
in Europe” and
Resolution
2622 (2025) “Russia: new threats to European democracies”, the Assembly
recalls that, through foreign interference, Russia seeks to manipulate
democratic processes in European States, bolster political forces
aligned with its interests and influence political decisions and
strategic choices, including by eroding support for Ukraine. Against
the backdrop of mounting threats and hostile actions, the Assembly
firmly reiterates that attempts to destabilise European democracies
through force, fear and foreign influence must be resolutely opposed
and defeated. Russia must end its aggression and provocations and
be held accountable for its crimes and violations of international
law.
19. Referring to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, in particular
Resolution 2637 (2026) “Supporting the commitment to a comprehensive, just
and lasting peace for Ukraine and the security of the European continent”,
the Assembly commends the comprehensive activities undertaken by
the Council of Europe in support of Ukraine and accountability,
encompassing the establishment of the Register of Damage Caused
by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the
steps taken to establish an International Claims Commission for
Ukraine and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against
Ukraine. It further welcomes the Organisation’s sustained efforts
to protect the rights of the children of Ukraine, including through the
Consultation Group on the Children of Ukraine and the Special Envoy
of the Secretary General, as well as the legal, policy and institutional
support provided under the Action Plan for Ukraine.
20. The Assembly further recalls its
Resolution 2463 (2022), in which it called on member States to declare the
current Russian regime a terrorist one. It considers that these
findings provide the legal basis for treating sabotage, arson and
assassination plots on the territory of member States as acts of
State terrorism rather than as “hybrid activity”; that hybrid operations
conducted in support of the war of aggression against Ukraine are candidate
cases for the Special Tribunal; and that the damage they cause should
be recorded on the model of the Register of Damage.
21. In light of these considerations, with respect to Russia’s
full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and attacks aimed at
destabilising European democracies, the Assembly, referring to its
previous relevant resolutions, urges Council of Europe member and
observer States, relevant European institutions and international
partners to:
21.1 reaffirm their
unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and for
a just and lasting peace that fully respects Ukraine’s right to
determine its own future, including its sovereign right to pursue
its integration into the European Union and membership of other
international organisations, including NATO;
21.2 provide strengthened military, political, financial and
practical support to Ukraine, recognising that Ukraine’s security
and democratic resilience are inseparable from the security and
democratic stability of Europe, and continue efforts to ensure accountability
of Russia for crimes committed in the context of its war of aggression
against Ukraine;
21.3 make full use of immobilised Russian sovereign assets
for the defence and reconstruction of Ukraine;
21.4 pursue pressure on the Russian State to secure renewed
diplomatic efforts towards possible de-escalation steps, such as
a moratorium by Russia on strikes against energy infrastructure,
a comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire, withdrawal of Russian
troops from Ukrainian territories, return of Ukrainian territories
to Ukrainian control and genuine negotiations aimed at achieving
a just and lasting peace, in full respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity, and in accordance with the
principles set out in
Resolution
2637 (2026), including as regards humanitarian issues; in this context,
to intensify support for international humanitarian mechanisms and
co-ordinated diplomatic initiatives aimed at securing safe humanitarian
access, medical assistance and the evacuation of civilians from
temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, in accordance with international humanitarian
law;
21.5 strengthen national and international capacities to detect,
attribute and respond to Russian sabotage, espionage, covert interference,
cyberattacks, acts of violence, and other hostile activities, including
through enhanced co-operation between intelligence, law-enforcement
and cybersecurity authorities;
21.6 consider sabotage, arson, assassination plots, attacks
on critical national infrastructure on the territory of member States
attributable to Russia as acts of State terrorism.
21.7 strengthen the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure,
including energy, telecommunications, transport, digital and satellite
infrastructure, against physical and cyber threats and communicate
to their populations the importance of domestic resilience and preparedness;
21.8 work to protect exiled Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian
citizens, journalists, human rights defenders and civil society
on their territory from transnational repression, surveillance and
intimidation;
21.9 adopt Schengen-wide restrictions on the movement of accredited
Russian diplomats and officials, together with standing expulsion
arrangements in place of one-off, case-by-case expulsions; and restrict
the issuance of tourist visas to Russian nationals in the light
of their documented abuse for hostile purposes;
21.10 legislate, where member States have not already done so,
for a foreign interference offence and a public registration scheme
for those acting at the direction of a foreign power, drawing on
models such as the United Kingdom’s National Security Act 2023,
which created offences of assisting a foreign intelligence service
and of foreign interference, its Foreign Influence Registration
Scheme, under which the Russian Federation is specified on the enhanced
tier, and its rules prohibiting foreign money in politics;
21.11 co-operate closely with and provide support to States
targeted by Russian interference and other hybrid threats, with
a view to strengthening their capacity to safeguard national sovereignty,
protect elections and democratic institutions, and reinforce societal
resilience;
21.12 reinforce international co-operation and co-ordinated
responses to Russian hybrid threats, with a view to enabling rapid
and effective attribution and responses to hostile activities and
countering attempts to divide European societies and undermine democratic
institutions;
21.13 in view of current and forthcoming democratic elections
in Europe, strengthen the resilience of democratic institutions
and electoral processes and urgently develop effective responses
to foreign information manipulation and interference, including
through effective safeguards for electoral infrastructure, political
financing and political parties, media pluralism, use of artificial
intelligence, and independent election observation, while ensuring
that measures to counter foreign information manipulation and interference
fully respect freedom of expression and other rights guaranteed
by the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5);
21.14 develop and implement whole-of-society strategies to strengthen
democratic resilience, including through civic education, institutional
preparedness, support for independent media and civil society, and enhanced
co-operation among public authorities, democratic institutions and
other relevant actors in addressing hybrid threats;
21.15 explore the possibility to devise a mechanism tracking
Russian hybrid attacks including all Council of Europe member States
which would complement the co-ordination mechanism currently being
drawn up by the European Union.
22. Beyond the need to hold Russia accountable, with respect to
the need for increased pressure on Russia, the Assembly calls on
Council of Europe member and observer States as well as relevant
European institutions and international partners to:
22.1 reject the sham elections to
the State Duma held from 18 to 20 September 2026, and refuse to recognise
any legal or political consequences deriving from the illegal organisation
of so-called “elections” by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine;
22.2 refrain from interacting with the new Russian State Duma
and review the arrangements for its participation in international
parliamentary co-operation such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
while preserving strictly necessary channels to facilitate a genuine
peace negotiations process to end Russia`s war of aggression against
Ukraine and humanitarian arrangements, including the exchange of prisoners
of war and release of illegally detained Ukrainian civilians and
the return of forcibly transferred and unlawfully deported Ukrainian
children and displaced persons;
22.3 continue, for as long as necessary, the political and
diplomatic isolation of the Russian authorities, including through
co-ordinated efforts to exclude their representatives from key international forums
and to prevent any normalisation of Russia’s participation in international
sporting and cultural events;
22.4 impose sanctions against the Central Election Commission
of the Russian Federation, its chairperson and members, the regional
election commissions, and all those who organised, administered,
stood for election, claim to represent the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine in the State Duma or acted as “observers”
in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;
22.5 reinforce targeted sanctions and other restrictive measures
against the Russian authorities, individuals and financial and industrial
entities directly or indirectly involved in the war of aggression against
Ukraine, violations of international and international humanitarian
law and also hostile activities against European States, and strengthen
measures to prevent sanctions circumvention;
22.6 continue to support Russian democratic forces, independent
journalists, human rights defenders and civil society actors working
for a democratic future for Russia and opposing Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine and Russian hybrid warfare against European democracies,
including through the Platform for Dialogue with Russian democratic
forces established pursuant to
Resolution 2621 (2025).
