memorandum, by Mr Murat Mercan
1.1 Background to the report
1 The states of central Asia
which became independent when the Soviet Union was dissolved were
little known to international public opinion generally – though
known to some human rights NGOs and pressure groups – until May
2 The February-April 2005 “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan,
and in particular the tragic events at Andijan (Uzbekistan) in May
2005 when the authorities violently suppressed a popular uprising,
triggered a wave of criticism in Europe and a sudden interest in
those countries. It became clear that stability in the region was more
apparent than real, and that the actual situation might quickly
3 Reacting to the Andijan events, the Assembly held a current
affairs debate in June 2005 on the situation in the central Asian
republics. Following that debate the Political Affairs Committee
was instructed to prepare a report on the subject.
4 In addition, the Council of Europe heads of state and government,
meeting for the Warsaw Summit in May 2005, expressed commitment
to new intercultural and inter-religious dialogue with neighbouring
regions, including central Asia, based on universal human rights.
1.2 Twofold objective of the
5 Firstly, to understand the
situation in the central Asian states, identify the causes of instability
in the region, ascertain the threats and opportunities for Europe
and consider possible responses aimed at keeping the threats to
a minimum and taking advantage of opportunities.
6 Secondly, to consider the possibility of the Council of Europe
playing a role in promoting reforms in central Asia, to identify
the areas where a Council of Europe contribution could bring about
practical results, and to put forward proposals as to how, in practice,
to set about possible co-operation.
2 Why should Europe take an
interest in central Asia?
2.1 Short presentation of the
7 The term “central Asia” generally
refers to the five central Asian republics of the former Soviet
Union which became independent when the Union was dissolved in 1991.
They are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
8 This report will not deal with Kazakhstan, which is the subject
of a separate recent report by Mr Iwiński.
9 Kyrgyzstan covers an area of 198 500 square kilometres and
the population is estimated at 5.2 million, of whom 66% are Kirghiz,
14% Uzbek and 12% Russian. Around 75% of the population are Muslim
(Sunni) and 20% Orthodox Christian.
10 Under the 1993 constitution, revised in 2003, Kyrgyzstan is
a republic adhering to democratic values. The legislative power
is a single-chamber parliament, the executive being headed by the
president, who appoints the government.
11 Kyrgyzstan is the only one of our four central Asian countries
to have relations with the Council of Europe. It is a member of
the Venice Commission and co-operated with it in connection with
its constitutional reform.
12 Until 2005 the president was Askar Akayev, who was elected
as head of state in 1990, before the proclamation of independence.
In April 2005 he was forced to resign following the “tulip revolution”
sparked by fraud in the February-March 2005 general election. Since
then the country, with Kurmanbek Bakiyev at its head, has experienced
a series of political confrontations and crises and the situation
remains highly unstable. A new constitution, prepared after a long
political turmoil, will be submitted to a referendum on 21 October 2007.
13 Uzbekistan covers an area of 446 400 square kilometres and
has a population of 26.8 million (80% are Uzbek, 6% Russian, 4%
Tajik, 4% Kazakh, 4% Tatar, and 1.9% Karakalpak). Of the four countries,
it has the largest population. The population is 90% Muslim (Sunni)
and 9% Orthodox Christian.
14 The 1992 constitution introduced a system which was strongly
presidential, the two-chamber parliament having only a subordinate
role. Islam Karimov, who has been president since 1990, is an authoritarian
leader. All the institutions of state are under presidential control
and political opposition is not tolerated.
15 In 1999 and 2004, Uzbekistan experienced outbreaks of terrorist
attacks which were attributed to radical Islamic elements. In May
2005 a popular uprising in the city of Andijan – which the authorities
described as an Islamic rebellion – was brutally suppressed by the
armed forces. The European Union called for an international enquiry
into the events. When the Uzbek authorities refused permission the
EU introduced sanctions against Uzbekistan, prohibited the issue
of visas to the chief figures in the regime and considerably reduced
its co-operation programmes. Since a certain softening of the Uzbek
authorities’ stance, the EU has given to understand that the sanctions
might be reviewed.
16 Tajikistan covers an area of 143 000 square kilometres and
has a population of over 7.3 million. Tajiks, a people closely related
to the Iranians, account for 80% of the population, Uzbeks for 15%,
and other minorities (Russian and Kirghiz) for an insignificant
proportion. Islam is the dominant religion, being 85% Sunni and
The political system in place is a presidential republic with
a two-chamber parliament. The president, Emomali Rakhmon,Note
that position since 1992.
18 Tajikistan’s post-Soviet history has been marked by civil
war (1992-97) between the ruling elite and members of various regional
clans, some of them supported by pro-Iranian Islamists. After peace
was restored, elections were held in 1999 and the opposition has
seats in parliament.
19 Turkmenistan covers an area of 488 000 square kilometres and
has a population of 4.8 million (85% Turkmen, 5% Uzbek, 4% Russian).
The population is 90% Muslim (Sunni) and 9% Orthodox Christian.
20 Officially a presidential republic with representative institutions,
Turkmenistan, from 1992 to 2006, came under the authoritarian rule
of President Saparmurat Niyazov, who had been head of the republic’s
Communist Party from 1985 to 1992. Niyazov, who brooked no opposition,
established a personality cult notorious for abuse of power, political
persecution and a decline in general living standards. Since his
death in December 2006 and the election of a new president, Gurbanguly
Berdimuhammedov, there have been some promising signs of change.
2.2 Importance of the region
21 As its name indicates, the
central Asian region is strategically placed at the crossroads of
that vast continent. As a result, the countries of the region have
access to the great traditional international trade routes such
as the Silk Road. Throughout its history, central Asia has seen
civilisations pass through or come into contact, and has also been
the object of rivalries and battles for influence between foreign
powers. Central Asia itself was also home to various civilisations
throughout history whose impact and values extended beyond the geographical
borders of the region. These predominantly Muslim-Turkish cultures
are in a way still a source of inspiration and practice to the peoples
of central Asia today.
22 The region’s strategic importance is all the greater on account
of its immediate proximity to countries or areas affected by international
or internal tensions and instability: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan
and the regions of north-west China. Only a little further off are
Iraq and the Middle East. As well as being geographical, this proximity
has historical, cultural, ethnic and religious aspects. Tensions
or conflicts in those regions affect central Asia, and vice versa.
23 Political stability in central Asia would help reduce tension
in these neighbouring regions, while conflict in central Asia would
pose an additional threat to them. In an increasingly globalised
world, and particularly given the Middle East’s influence on the
international situation, stability in central Asia, with its large
Muslim majority, is of particular importance.
24 The war which the United States and its allies are conducting
against the Taliban in Afghanistan has highlighted central Asia’s
importance in the fight against international terrorism – an importance
which can only increase on account of the still fragile situation
25 As a crossroads of international trade, central Asia is a
transit area for various types of illegal trafficking, notably drugs
from Afghanistan, and in human beings and weapons. There is also
local production of drugs. The countries of the region are themselves
a source of migration and human trafficking, with Europe one of
the main destinations. Europe thus has an interest in a reliable,
effective partnership with the countries of the region in action
to combat trafficking.
26 Mention should also be made of the abundant natural and energy
resources of the central Asian countries. Harnessing these resources,
which are of key importance to the world economy, requires large investment
and consequently political stability and good governance.
2.3 Co-operation with European
27 All four central Asian countries
participate in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe. As OSCE participating states, they are politically bound
by commitments in the area of the human dimension, including, inter alia, to guarantee full respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to abide by the rule of
law; and to promote the principles of democracy by building, strengthening
and protecting democratic institutions. However, the authorities
of central Asian states clearly give priority to the OSCE activities
related to security. The OSCE has a network of field offices across
the region. Its co-operation programmes with the central Asian countries
cover various fields ranging from security issues to environmental
protection, and include the human dimension.
28 The European Union has been engaged in various programmes
of technical assistance to the central Asian states since the early
1990s, through individual partnership and co-operation agreements
and the TACIS programme. The results achieved so far are, however,
rather limited. In June 2007, the Union adopted a new regional strategy
for assistance to central Asia for the period 2007-13, which aims
to ensure the stability and the security of the countries of the
region, to help eradicate poverty, and to promote closer regional
co-operation both within the region and between central Asia and
the EU. One of the priorities of the strategy is to promote democratisation,
human rights and good governance.
29 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) established in December 1991 after the
dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Turkmenistan, which was
a full member of that organisation from the beginning, changed its
status to an associate member in 2005. The CIS aims at co-ordinating
the policies of its member states in the fields of trade, finance,
law-making and security. The most significant issue for the CIS
is the establishment of a free trade zone between member states.
It has also promoted co-operation on democratisation, and cross-border
crime prevention. The CIS has a parliamentary dimension, the Inter-Parliamentary
Assembly, which has a co-operation agreement with our Assembly.
3 Present situation
3.1 Shared problems
30 Fifteen years on from independence,
these four central Asian countries are faced with a number of existing
or potential problems which endanger their stability. Even though
the situation varies considerably from country to country, it is
possible to identify some common factors. After seven decades of
a repressive regime, central Asian countries inherited an authoritarian
legacy. With the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union they all faced
waves of instability, violent clashes, and ethnic-religious and
3.2 Democracy, human rights
and the rule of law
31 Despite these countries’ professed
commitment to democratic principles, including in connection with their
OSCE undertakings, the central Asian countries’ democratic development
is extremely embryonic, not to say purely imitative. Democratic
traditions are absent among both the elites and the general population.
The ruling elites are wary of democracy, which they regard as a
threat to their political future. Democratic institutions are weak
or only exist for show. The power remains highly centralised within
the executive, while the legislative branch does not play a counterbalancing
role. Mechanisms of democratic accountability are almost non-existent.
To varying degrees, the political regimes are authoritarian.
32 The authorities certainly profess commitment to human rights
but in no way build them into their political practice, and may
even blatantly ignore them. Consequently, central Asia’s human rights
performance is disastrous and human rights NGOs routinely report
grave violations. Civil society on the whole is extremely weak,
and the few remaining human rights activists are under growing pressure
from, or openly persecuted by, the authorities. Following the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, the central Asian authorities have
broadly used the pretext of the fight against Islamic extremism
to strengthen pressure on all forms of opposition, to tighten control
over civil society and the media, and to further limit civil and
33 Lastly, the principle of the rule of law receives mere lip
service. The judiciary is weak and fully subordinate to political
authority, and is often misused for achieving political purposes
or to repress dissent. Though some countries of the region have
engaged in judicial and legal reforms aimed at strengthening the independence
and administrative capacity of the judiciary, these are yet to bring
about results. Corruption and abuse of power are widespread, particularly
in the law-enforcement services, and torture and ill-treatment of detainees
and prisoners is commonplace. On the positive side, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan abolished the death penalty, Uzbekistan announced its
intention to abolish it in 2008, and Kyrgyzstan introduced a moratorium.
3.3 Structural problems
34 Over and above the large differences
between the countries in the region as regards natural assets and level
of industrial development, the economic systems are observably inefficient.
The wealth generated is distributed for the benefit of the ruling
classes, resulting in general hardship and a yawning gap between
the average standard of living and the opulence of the elites who
hold power. Popular discontent is a factor of instability that is
regularly activated, as demonstrated by the Andijan events and the
35 Education and public health systems have greatly deteriorated
since the end of the Soviet era. The younger generations have no
access to modern, balanced education, which makes them vulnerable
to the doctrines of the various extremist movements. The public
health systems are inadequate in preventing the spread of disease.
36 The police and other law-enforcement bodies, which suffer
from widespread corruption and ineffectiveness, are powerless to
check the growth of crime and drug dealing, use and trafficking.
In some cases, there is what amounts to a parallel authority in
the hands of criminal clans.
37 The harsh economic and social conditions, the difficulty of
finding steady work, and more generally the lack of prospects of
a decent life prompt a substantial proportion of the population,
particularly the young, to go abroad in search of better opportunities.
Wages sent back home from abroad are in fact an important source of
income for the population.
38 In short, there is ill-governance. The countries in question
fail to provide their peoples with the services they would be entitled
to expect from a normal state. The clans wielding power use the
machinery of state for their own purposes with little heed to the
well-being of their “subjects”. The lack of a tradition and effective means
of democratic control over authority, together with lack of accountability,
result in deep popular suspicion of state institutions.
39 Conditions are therefore ripe for tension between the state
and the population and for rapid ascendancy of extremist militant
groups akin to the Taliban. It is no coincidence that for several
years now the radical underground group Hizb ut-Tahrir, with its
avowed objective of setting up a “Grand Caliphate” uniting all the Islamic
countries and peoples, has been strengthening its position. Given
corrupt and inefficient public authorities, the vision of a just
society based on Islamic law is increasingly attractive to the common
40 In short, to avoid central Asia’s increasing the number of
failed states and becoming a hotbed of international terrorism,
we urgently need to encourage deep reform capable of democratising
society in all these central Asian countries.
4 Reform strategy: promoting
change while avoiding destabilisation
41 To the authorities and peoples
of central Asia, Europe has the appearance of a stable and prosperous society.
Consequently, European experience interests those countries and
has the potential to influence them, despite the growing appeal
of China and its model of authoritarian economic modernisation.
42 In the long term, it would be in Europe’s interest if, like
it, the central Asian countries practised – and not just professed
– the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the
rule of law. However, it is unrealistic to expect such an ambitious
objective to be achieved speedily.
43 We also need to be aware that the European democratic model,
if there is one, is incapable of direct transplantation without
acclimatisation to central Asian conditions. To take root in the
societies of the central Asian countries, democracy – short of completely
changing those societies – must adapt to their realities, cultures
and traditions. After all, it should be remembered that these countries
and peoples are not primitive tribes nor newly emerging nations
on the map but direct descendants of very rich civilisations and
44 Because of the central Asian countries’ vulnerability, too
rapid political reform and radical restructuring of elites would
run the risk of destroying fragile balances and plunging the countries
into chaos. The consequences would be the opposite of what was intended.
Kyrgyzstan, which has still not emerged from political crisis two
years on from the “tulip revolution”, provides a very telling example.
Fortunately, the crisis there has not degenerated into violent confrontation.
A much more violent outcome is highly likely in some other countries
in the region.
45 To avert that, it is advisable to seek gradual change avoiding
destabilisation. The overall goal should be to encourage reform
aimed at bringing in good governance and developing the elements
of democratic society.
46 Unfortunately, many of the political elites in the region,
particularly those close to the seat of power, are extremely mistrustful
of talk about the need for reform, particularly when it comes from
abroad. It is essential to rehabilitate the concepts of “reform”
and “democracy” in the eyes of the ruling elites and counter their tendency
to see these as devices for overthrowing the regime.
47 For that purpose we need to establish dialogue with the authorities
and seek to build relationships of trust with them. I am sure that
it is possible and necessary to voice criticisms and fully uphold
democratic values while staying constructive and avoiding giving
the impression of preaching. To win trust, we need to avoid being seen
as “pointing the finger”. The mode of interaction and dialogue should
rather be understood as an exchange of views where all sides have
experiences to share and learn.
48 We need to get across the message that criticisms of abuses
and shortcomings are aimed at preventing destabilisation in the
region, which would be disastrous not only for the regimes in place
but also for Europeans. Good governance and democratisation are
in the authorities’ interest because they would make it possible
to create much more flexible and much more open societies.
49 The aim of dialogue would be to encourage the kind of reform
that would promote accountability, transparency and access to information
and generally would lay down the foundations of good governance. This
kind of reform would strengthen popular confidence in the authorities
and make it possible to build stable, lasting political systems.
50 What we have to avoid is presenting reform as antithetical
to the heritage of central Asian civilisations. Local traditions
and clan-based social structure still play an important part in
people’s lives and in the machinery of government. The reform strategy
needs to take that into account, base itself on traditions where possible,
and take care not to clash with them needlessly so as not to forfeit
support or cause actual resistance within society.
51 Democratic, reform-oriented ideas have been extensively devalued
in people’s eyes in a good many former Soviet republics, including
the countries of central Asia, by the transition years’ crushing
failure to improve people’s lives. Pessimism and social apathy have
replaced the optimism and expectancy of the 1990s. It would therefore
be difficult to gain popular support for a sloganising reform project
which ignored people’s vital, day-to-day concerns.
52 I am convinced that the concept of “manageable crisis” as
a way of tipping a country into the democratic camp is anything
but a responsible policy. Not only would such a strategy fail to
achieve lasting results, it might gravely compromise the very idea
of democracy. Any action must therefore be avoided which might wreck
the existing fragile equilibrium or endanger civil peace.
53 The risk of reinforcing fundamentalist influence in these
countries, which at present have secular systems, is not to be underestimated.
True, the “fundamentalist factor” is often an easy excuse which
the authorities use to justify restrictions on freedoms and human
rights violations. The factor nonetheless exists. To pretend otherwise
would be political wishful thinking. What we need to do is assure
the authorities in the central Asian countries of our support in
the face of the fundamentalist threat, while reminding them of the
need for observance of universal human rights.
54 Lastly, the aim of modernisation and democratic change for
the central Asian states should be regarded as an objective shared
by those countries and the international community. To present it
in terms of competition for dominant influence between the various
outside powers would be to repeat past errors.
55 Historically, culturally, linguistically, economically and
in other ways, the central Asian countries have paramount links
with the Russian Federation and Turkey. Those two countries are
in a prime position as partners both of the authorities and societies
of the central Asian countries. They could play a key role in promoting
5 The possible Council of
5.1 Two preliminary observations
56 Firstly, my preliminary contacts
with representatives of central Asian countries have shown that
there is genuine interest, at different levels of society, in establishing
relations and multiplying channels of dialogue with Europe, and
a hope that their countries will gradually move towards the European
model of democracy. Therefore, the commitment to new dialogue with
neighbouring regions, including central Asia, based on universal
human rights, which was made at the Warsaw Summit of the Council
of Europe, responds to a real need. The Council of Europe can and
should be part of the process of democratic transformation in central Asia.
57 Secondly, taking into account the fact that central Asia is
outside Europe and, accordingly, not within the Council of Europe
geographical area, as well as the limited resources at the disposal
of our Organisation and the need to focus on core activities, it
is difficult to argue in favour of a separate Council of Europe
policy towards central Asian countries. However, the Council could
contribute, through its expertise and experience in the field of
democratic transition, to various activities led by our main institutional
partners, namely the European Union and the OSCE, which are engaged
in programmes of assistance to central Asia. Modalities of such
a contribution should be defined by common agreement between the
Council of Europe and the partner organisations. However, I am convinced
that this effort is worth making, and that Council of Europe participation
in joint programmes with the EU and the OSCE in central Asia would
raise their effectiveness.
5.2 Establishing political dialogue
58 In the present situation political
reforms in the central Asian countries can succeed only if supported
by the authorities. It is thus of prime importance to convince the
authorities that good governance and democracy will strengthen,
not weaken, their countries’ stability.
59 To win the confidence of the political elites, regular dialogue
needs establishing. The parliamentary level has the advantage of
bringing together office-holders who are able to discuss the wide
range of political issues without being bound by any pre-established
negotiation mandate. This level is therefore especially appropriate for
establishing contact and creating confidence. Additionally, involving
parliaments in international contacts would provide them with more
60 Questions do of course arise as to the democratic nature,
representativeness and real powers of the parliaments in question,
but that is no reason not to use this channel of political communication.
In addition, the parliamentary representatives of the central Asian
countries have experience of taking part in the OSCE Parliamentary
61 Political dialogue could focus firstly on common or shared
threats to Europe and central Asia, such as drug trafficking, illegal
migration, terrorism and extremism, and on opportunities (for example,
the mutual advantages of economic co-operation, intercultural dialogue,
and comparing notes on good governance).
62 It would also be a chance to raise issues of principle such
as defence of democratic values and respect for universal and European
human rights standards, and to share experience and good practice
in these areas. Obviously, human rights issues are broadly viewed,
among political elites of these countries, as bargaining chips designed
to put pressure on them. Special attention should therefore be paid
to explaining that these values are essential elements of internal
stability in modern societies, and that ignoring them puts at risk
the stability of their own regimes.
5.3 Sharing European experience
63 With successive enlargements,
the Council of Europe has built up invaluable experience of assisting democratic
transition and institutional reform. Even though central Asian countries
undoubtedly have their special features, we must not forget that
they were part of the former Soviet Union. The problems which they face
today are, at least in part, linked to that heritage.
64 In that context, the experience of other former Soviet republics
should be particularly relevant to the reforms which need carrying
through in central Asia. The Council of Europe, having assisted
the transition in east European countries and with its continuing
assistance to former Soviet Union republics, could offer central Asia
65 The Council of Europe could therefore offer central Asian
countries advice and help as regards good governance and reinforcement
of administrative systems. That assistance could be focused on the
institutions of key importance to the functioning of democratic
government – parliaments, courts, law-enforcement bodies and local
66 The less “politically sensitive” areas of Council of Europe
activity, such as culture, sport, youth, environment protection
and sustainable development, might present opportunities for co-operation
with central Asia as well.
5.4 Consolidating civil society
67 In addition to making contact
with official institutions, the Council of Europe, particularly
the Assembly, should pay special attention to contact with civil
society in those countries.
68 Maintaining regular dialogue with the active elements of society
in the broad sense would have a positive effect on their activities
in their own countries and would help build them up into civil society.
Such dialogue might also place them in a stronger position in their
dealings with national government.
69 Lastly, the importance which the Council of Europe attaches
to civil society would send a message to the authorities in those
countries that they have everything to gain by treating those elements
as necessary partners in carrying through social change aimed at
better governance and greater democracy.
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee. Reference
to committee: Reference No. 3113 of 24 June 2005.
Draft resolution and draft recommendation adopted unanimously
by the committee on 13 November 2007.
Members of the committee: Mr Abdülkadir Ateş (Chairperson), Mr Konstantin
Kosachev (Vice-Chairperson) (alternate: Mr Victor Kolesnikov), Mr Zsolt Németh (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Giorgi Bokeria (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mr Claudio Azzolini,
Mr Denis Badré, Mr Radu Mircea Berceanu,
Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mr Alexandër Biberaj, Mrs Guðfinna Bjarnadóttir,
Ms Raisa Bohatyryova, Mr Predrag Bošković, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Lorenzo Cesa,
Mr Mauro Chiaruzzi, Ms Elvira Cortajarena, Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Noel Davern, Mr Dumitru
Diacov, Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Ms Josette Durrieu, Mr Joan Albert
Farré Santuré, Mr Pietro Fassino (alternate: Mr Pietro Marcenaro), Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Ms Doris Frommelt, Mr Jean-Charles
Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross,
Mr Davit Harutiunyan, Mr Jean-Pol Henry, Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Mr Joachim
Hörster, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen,
Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Bakir
Izetbegović, Mrs Corien W.A. Jonker, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Tomasz Markowski,
Mr Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Murat Mercan,
Mr Mircea Mereută, Mr Dragoljub
Mićunović (alternate: Mr Željko Ivanji),
Mr Jean-Claude Mignon (Mr Laurent Béteille), Ms Nadezhda
Mikhailova, Mr Aydin Mirzazada, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Ms Natalia Narochnitskaya, Mrs Miroslava Němcová, Mr Hryhoriy Nemyrya, Mr Fritz
Neugebauer, Mrs Kristiina Ojuland (alternate: Mr Andres Herkel), Mr Theodoros Pangalos
(alternate: Mr Konstantinos Vrettos),
Ms Elsa Papadimitriou, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Gabino Puche (alternate:
Mr Pedro Agramunt), Mr Lluís Maria de Puig, Mr Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando,
Mr Andrea Rigoni, Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Ingo Schmitt, Ms Hanne Severinsen, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid
Slutsky, Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Baroness Taylor
of Bolton (alternate: Mr John Austin),
Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Mihai
Tudose, Mr José Vera Jardim, Ms Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Björn Von Sydow,
Mr Harm Evert Waalkens, Mr David Wilshire,
Mr Wolfgang Wodarg, Ms Gisela Wurm, Mr Boris Zala, Mr Krzysztof
Ex officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Tiny Kox.
NB: The names of those members present at the meeting are
printed in bold.
See 6th Sitting, 23 January 2008 (adoption of the draft resolution,
as amended, and the draft recommendation); and Resolution 1599 and Recommendation