C Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Christos
Pourgourides
1 Introduction
1.1 Proceedings to date
1. The motion on abuse of the criminal justice system
in Belarus was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights on 25 November 2005 (
Doc. 10619,
Reference No. 3155). The committee appointed me as rapporteur on
26 January 2006.
2. At the committee’s meeting on 14 May 2007, I presented an
introductory memorandum (AS/Jur(2007)32, dated 10 May 2007) and
obtained the committee’s support for carrying out a fact-finding
visit to Minsk. The Bureau of the Assembly subsequently granted
the required authorisation, and the Secretary General of the Parliamentary
Assembly informed the Belarusian authorities of my wish to visit
Minsk.
3. In a letter dated 1 August 2007, the Belarusian authorities
informed the Secretary General of the Assembly that they doubted
my competence and objectivity as rapporteur, referring to my earlier
report on disappearances in Belarus. They therefore did not see
any point in such a visit.
4. At its meeting on 11 September 2007, the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights took note of the letter from the Belarusian
authorities to the Secretary General of the Assembly declining to
co-operate with me, and authorised me to finalise the report on
the basis of information obtained from diplomatic and non-governmental
sources, without carrying out an on-the-spot visit.
5. On 3 October 2007, the Secretary General of the Assembly wrote
to the ambassadors of all Council of Europe member states having
diplomatic representations in Minsk inviting them to convey any
information to me which they deemed relevant for the report.
6. During the October 2007 part-session of the Assembly, I met
with a delegation of civil society actors from Belarus who had been
invited to Strasbourg by the Council of Europe.
1.2 The political context in Belarus as a backdrop
to the abuse of the criminal justice system
7. The reasons prompting the motion for a resolution
at the end of 2005, which led up to this report, are unfortu nately
still valid today.
8. On the occasion of the debate under urgent procedure on the
situation in Belarus on the eve of the presidential elections, the
Assembly adopted
Resolution
1482 (2006) and
Recommendation
1734 (2006), in which the Assembly expressed its “extreme
concern” that the Lukashenko regime has undertaken a series of measures
to prevent any expression of political dissent and to obstruct the
activities of democratic forces.
9. The Assembly was particularly critical of the socalled “anti-revolution
law”, which criminalises many legitimate activities of civil society
organisations.
10. Likewise, the Assembly denounced the detention of a number
of opposition figures as a result of trials based on questionable
charges, confirming the abuse of the criminal justice system for
political purposes and the lack of a truly independent judiciary,
which has been further undermined by the decree enabling President Lukashenko
to suspend judges’ powers and dismiss them from office. The Assembly
specifically asked for the release of political prisoners Andrei
Klimau, Mikhail Marinich, Paval Seviaynets, Siarhey Skrebets and
Nikolai Statkevich.
11. In the opinion I presented on behalf of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, I concluded that the elements presented
in the report add up to a characterisation of Mr Lukashenko’s regime
as a fully-fledged dictatorship. I regret having to say that this
has unfortunately not changed over the last two years.
12. In
Resolution 1496
(2006) on Belarus in the aftermath of the presidential
election of 19 March 2006, the Assembly was once again obliged to
call for the release of political prisoners, including those detained
in connection with the elections, and the disclosure of information
on all those who were arrested or who received medical treatment
after the dispersal of peaceful demonstrations, as well as the conduct
of a transparent investigation into the acts of violence committed
by police and security forces against peaceful demonstrators.
13. Even the bold gesture of President van der Linden, who had
hoped to provoke a softening of the regime’s attitude by paying
a visit to Belarus in January 2007, as an exception from the Assembly’s
policy of refusing contact at political level with Belarusian officialdom
until significant progress is made in the investigation of the high-profile
“disappearances” (see
Resolution
1371 (2004) and
Recommendation
1657 (2004)), has not produced the desired results. The
President of the Assembly was not even allowed to visit political
prisoners in their places of detention, much less to obtain their
liberation, as he had requested ahead of his visit.
14. Andrea Rigoni (Italy/ALDE), Rapporteur of the Political Affairs
Committee on the situation in Belarus, was able to carry out a visit
to Minsk at the end of October 2007. I look forward to hearing about
his findings in due course.
15. In a letter to President van der Linden dated 16 April 2007,
Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the Belarusian opposition,
informed the Assembly of fresh oppression against young activists.
In addition to about 1 000 people being punished under administrative
law
Note for
such “revolutionary” acts as simply speaking the Belarusian language
or distributing leaflets, several student leaders and other activists
were sentenced to long forced labour or prison terms, including
Paval Seviaynets, Artur Finkevich, Zmitier Dashkevich, Alyaxandr Kozakov
and Dmitry Zubro. Most shockingly, fresh criminal cases were being
prepared against five young members of “Malady Front” aged between
16 and 20 years – Zmitier Fedaruk, Aleh Korban, Anastasia Palazhanka,
Barys Harecki, and Aliaxey Ianusheuski. I can only agree with Mr Milinkevich
that it is odd that the state is afraid of such young people: “When
these young people walk in the centre of Minsk with candles in their
hands the authorities call for help from the Special Forces Unit.”
16. Against this background, reputable international human rights
groups, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the
International Federation for Human Rights, have voiced concern that
the Belarusian authorities were abusing the Criminal Code to discourage
political opposition.
Note
17. In order to cover up the situation as much as possible, the
Belarusian authorities are also systematically refusing to co-operate
with international human rights organisations. Our former Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe colleague Adrian Severin, appointed
in 2005 as the UN Human Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur on
the Human Rights Situation in Belarus, was consistently refused
authorisation for planned visits. The UN Special Rapporteurs on
Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilam, and on Torture, Manfred Novak,
were also refused visits they had requested, as was I, as mentioned
above.
NoteStandards
for free and fair elections were not met despite numerous Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) recommendations.
18. Not surprisingly, Belarus’ bid to join the newly established
UN Human Rights Council failed in the General Assembly in view of
the regime’s dismal human rights record and its failure to uphold
democratic standards.
2 Abuses of the criminal justice system
in Belarus
19. On the basis of materials made available by non-governmental
and diplomatic sources, three types of abuses of the criminal justice
system in Belarus can be distinguished:
i the enactment and arbitrary application of specific criminal
or administrative legislation designed to criminalise, or subject
to quasi-criminal administrative sanctions, the legitimate, peaceful
activities of the political opposition, civil society groups and
independent media;
ii politically motivated prosecutions against opposition
activists under general criminal provisions (tax evasion, fraud,
corruption, etc.);
iii other politically motivated abuses of the criminal justice
system, in particular the failure to properly investigate crimes
against persons linked to the opposition, civil society or independent
media, and the horrendous death penalty practice in Belarus.
2.1 Specific criminal and administrative provisions
targeting the political opposition, civil society and independent
media
2.1.1 Criminal and administrative provisions open to
abuse
20. A complex set of legislation affecting the freedom
of action of democratic forces was adopted by parliament days before
the announcement of the date of the 2006 elections. Law No. 71-3
of 15 December 2005 on Making Changes and Additions to Certain Legislative
Acts of the Republic of Belarus on the Issue of Strengthening Responsibility
for the Actions Directed against the Person and Public Safety, dubbed
the “anti-revolution law”, amended the Criminal Code, in particular
by reformulating its Article 193 and introducing the new Article
193-1.
NoteNoteNoteNoteNoteNoteThis
law establishes prison sentences,
inter
alia, for:
- organising
or taking part in the activities of a suspended or closed non-governmental
organisation or foundation (six months to two years, Article 193-1,
Criminal Code);
- training or financing the training of persons to take
part in street protests (from six months to three years, Article
293, Criminal Code);Note
- “misrepresenting” the situation in Belarus to foreign
countries or international organisations (Article 369-1, Criminal
Code) and asking them to act against the country’s security, sovereignty
and territorial integrity, or distributing material or information
containing such appeals (from two to five years, Article 361, Criminal
Code).Note
21. The new Article 193-1 criminalising the activities of non-registered
groups must be read in conjunction with Statement No. 49 of 13 September
2005 of the Ministry of Justice of Belarus, which effectively extends registration
requirements (as enforced by Article 193-1) to different types of
citizens’ groups which had previously been allowed to function without
registration as legal persons.
Note
22. The type of actions criminalised in this way is illustrated
by the following citation from the statement opening the criminal
case brought by the KGB for Minsk and the Minsk Region under Article
193-1 of the Criminal Code against Zmitier Fedaruk and Aleh Korban,
young activists of the “Malady Front”. According to this statement,
the young men were to be held criminally responsible “for the actions
pursuing the following aims and methods: uniting and training young
people on the basis of the Belarus national idea, erection of the civil
society on the basis of democracy, free market and other aims, as
well as the methods of attaining the aims, including holding mass
actions, conducting enlightenment work and sociological studies,
publishing newspapers and other information materials, during the
time period from September 2006 to the present time”.
Note
23. This is a quotation from an accusatory document, not from
an application for a human rights prize. The activities of Mr Fedaruk
and Mr Korban, as described by the KGB, are perfectly legitimate
in view of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution
of Belarus and this country’s international obligations in the sphere of
human rights, in particular the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which became, upon its ratification, an integral
part of the law of the Republic of Belarus.
Note
24. Earlier laws, enacted after the 2004 referendum and parliamentary
elections:
- criminalise foreign
assistance to political parties, non-governmental organisations
and civil society;
- oblige political parties and non-governmental organisations
to be located in public buildings.
25. I draw particular attention to the obligation placed on political
parties and non-governmental organisations to be located in public
(non-residential) buildings. This requirement, combined with the systematic
practice of denial or termination of leases vis-à-vis any groups
that are perceived by the authorities as having links with the opposition,
has led to the suspension or closure of numerous NGOs, thus exposing their
members and activists to criminal sanctions under the “anti-revolution
law”.
Note
26. Another disturbing feature of the legislation targeting civil
society is the fact that the same acts punishable under the Criminal
Code, as described above, are also outlawed in the newly redrafted
Code of Administrative Offences. Articles 9.9 and 23.39 of the new
Code of Administrative Offences deal with the same actions connected
with the participation of citizens in the activities of parties,
public associations (including religious ones), which have been
liquidated or suspended or failed to be registered by the state.
Administrative punishments can include crippling fines, or arrest
(imprisonment) for up to fifteen days.
27. As the criteria for distinguishing criminal and administrative
liability are not made explicit anywhere, the authorities have a
large amount of discretion as to the harshness of their reaction
against civil society activists. This grey zone facilitates “flexible”
intimidation tactics oscillating between harsh criminal sanctions
and more “lenient” administrative sanctions, depending on the internal
and international climate, and violates the legal security requirement
of the rule of law and of the principle of nulla
poena sine lege.
2.1.2 Some examples of the abusive application of the
specific provisions targeting civil society
28. It should be made clear from the outset that it is
neither possible, nor necessary, to include in this report all cases
of the abusive application of the above-mentioned norms. Due to
the lack of co-operation of the Belarusian authorities, I have also
not been able to confront the information received from different
sources (non-governmental organisations, diplomatic sources) with
the official position of the authorities. I cannot even be sure
that all the political prisoners mentioned below are still in prison,
or, if I indicated that they were set free, that they have not been
arrested again.
29. This being said, I still consider it useful to point out some
specific cases to illustrate the practical consequences of the legislation
described above:
- in October
2006, 60-year-old human rights activist Katerina Sadouskaya was
sentenced to two years in a penal colony, for “insulting the honour
and dignity of the Belarusian leader”;
- in November 2006, youth activist Zmitser Dashkevich received
an eighteen-month prison sentence for “activities on behalf of an
unregistered organisation”;Note
- in April 2006, four leading members of the Belarusian
opposition (Alyaksandr Milinkevich, Alyaksandr Bukhvostov, Zmitser
Dashkevich and Sergei Kalyakin) were tried and convicted and sentenced
to fourteen to fifteen days’ detention for “organising an unsanctioned
meeting” (Article 167-1, Code of Administrative Offences). The charges
related to a peaceful commemoration of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster
on 26 April. The marchers had received permission to march to Bangalore
Square in Minsk, where speeches were to be given. The “crime” in
this case: Mr Milinkevich was accused of having addressed the crowd
before the March began;Note
- in August 2006, four members of a citizens’ election-monitoring
group Partnerstvo (Mikalay Astreyka, Enira Branizkaya, Tsimafey
Dranchuk and Alyaksandr Shalayka) were sentenced to prison terms
of between six months and two years for “organising and running
an unregistered organisation that infringes the rights of citizens”
(Article 193-2, Criminal Code);Note
- during the mass demonstrations in Minsk after the presidential
elections of March 2006, hundreds of demonstrators were brutalised
by the police and arrested. On 21 March in Minsk alone, according
to the Human Rights Centre “Viasna”, 65 people were sentenced to
short prison terms for participation in unauthorised meetings and
“hooliganism”. These demonstrators had braved the announcement of
the chief of the KGB that post-election protesters would be considered
as “terrorists” and were subject to the death penalty;Note
- dozens of activists were arrested and condemned to short
terms of imprisonment or administrative fines under different pretexts
in the run-up to the “European March” on 15 October 2007.Note
30. These cases, and many more that I have not been able to list
for reasons of time and space, are manifestations of raw intimidation
tactics. This view is supported by remarks reportedly made by Lubomir Rehak,
Slovakian chargé d’affaires in Minsk, with reference to the above-mentioned
“European March”: “During several weeks we witnessed intimidation
of people, arrests and detention for distribution of information about
the European March.” Mr Rehak’s gesture of meeting two young activists,
Zmiter Barodka and Leanid Navitski, at the prison gate when they
were released after doing their time (fifteen days for alleged use
of “obscene language”) is particularly commendable.
NoteThe
inhuman character of the system of persecution of young activists
is illustrated by the fact that one of the young men, Zmiter Barodka,
was kept in prison while his wife gave birth to twins.
31. Intimidation is sometimes countered with a dose of humour
by young activists. For example, Siarhei Parsiukevich of the “Movement
for Freedom”, in order to avoid being framed for “foul language”,
reportedly taped his mouth shut as soon as his car was stopped by
policemen near his house who said that his car was on a wanted list
and took him to the police station. A few days earlier, Uladzimir
Katsora, a member of the same group, had been detained under the
same pretext, and later sentenced to seven days in prison for “dirty swearing
in public”. These events occurred in early October 2007.
32. Valery Levaneuski, chairman of the All-National Strike Committee
of Vendors, and his deputy, Alyaksandr Vasilyeu, were sentenced
on 7 September 2004 to two years of imprisonment for “public slander of
the president” (Article 368, paragraph 2, Criminal Code). The verdict
reportedly states that the sentence “come and say that you are against
somebody’s skiing in Austria at your expense”, printed in leaflets,
contains an insult to the honour and dignity of the President of
the Republic of Belarus.
Note
33. Last but not least, the case of Alyaksandr Kazulin, leader
of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Narodnaïa Hramada), former
presidential candidate in March 2006 and former Rector of the Belarusian
State University, shows that prosecutions under the “anti-revolution”
articles of the Criminal Code are by no means limited to fines or
short prison terms. Professor Kazulin was arrested on 25 March 2006
and charged with “hooliganism” (Article 339, paragraph 2, Criminal
Code) and the “organisation of group activities that breach public
order” (Article 342, paragraph 1, Criminal Code) and sentenced,
on 13 July 2006, to five and a half years of imprisonment. Interestingly,
the EU visa ban against certain Belarusian officials responsible
for human rights violations was reportedly extended in September
2006 to include those who were directly involved in the sentencing
of Professor Kazulin.
Note
2.2 Politically motivated prosecutions under general
criminal provisions
34. More dangerous still for the persons targeted than
the application of mostly
Noteshort
prison sentences under the specific provisions described above is
the fabrication of criminal cases under “general” provisions such
as fraud, tax evasion, corruption, etc. Such prosecutions are more
dangerous for two reasons: firstly, the offences in question usually
carry longer prison terms, and, secondly, it is more difficult for
national and international human rights defenders to intervene,
given that the forms of legal proceedings under criminal provisions
that exist in similar terms in all countries are usually more or
less respected. Human rights defenders, who often lack access to
firsthand information, are reluctant to criticise court proceedings,
or to expose themselves to accusations of supporting common criminals.
35. In such cases, the first line of defence against politically-motivated
abuses is the professional conscience of the actors of criminal
proceedings themselves, that is to say, of the judges, prosecutors,
police investigators and, last but not least, the defence lawyers.
It is first and foremost their responsibility to ensure that justice
is truly done.
36. Unfortunately, in some cases that have been brought to my
attention, this line of defence has quite obviously failed. Whilst
I am myself, as a practising lawyer, extremely reluctant to criticise
court proceedings and their outcomes, the following cases are so
obviously fabricated that I cannot but add my voice to those who criticise
the verdicts. Again, these are but examples. Experience shows that
where structures are in place that allow manipulations of court
proceedings for political motives – in particular a judiciary lacking
independence – such manipulations do occur, and the cases that become
known to the outside world are just the tip of the iceberg.
37. One such case is that of Mikhail Marinich. A prominent opposition
figure and presidential candidate in 2001, former Minister for External
Economic Relations and Ambassador of Belarus, Mr Marinich was convicted in
December 2004 of “embezzlement by means of his official position
executed on a large scale” and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment
in a hard labour colony with confiscation of property. Marinich’s
detention began in April 2004 with an arrest for a driving offence.
He was released after confiscation of his possessions, including money,
and later summoned to the KGB offices where he was told that his
money was counterfeit. KGB officers then took him to his dacha,
where an unlicensed pistol was “found”. Whilst he was acquitted
of the firearm charge for lack of evidence, he was convicted for
embezzling IT equipment used by the NGO he was presiding, Delovaia
Initsiativa. The absurdity of this conviction is illustrated by
the fact that the equipment that he was accused of embezzling was
officially on loan to his organisation by the United States embassy.
The US State Department stated publicly in response to these charges
that “[t]he equipment has at all times remained the property of
the United States. The United States makes no claims against Ambassador
Marinich or his organisation regarding disposition of this equipment”.
NoteAmnesty
International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience, and
his liberation from prison has also been requested by the Parliamentary
Assembly.
NoteHe was
finally released on 14 April 2006, after he developed serious health
problems in prison.
38. Another case is that of Andrei Klimau, a former deputy of
the Supreme Soviet of Belarus and pro-democracy activist. He has
cumulated widely recognised trumped-up convictions for economic
crimes (six years in prison in 1998 for alleged embezzlement of
funds and counterfeiting) and for organising a public meeting (one
and a half years in 2005). Four months after he was released from
prison, he was arrested again in April 2007 and convicted, on 1
August 2007, to two more years in prison for a literary article
published on the Internet for “calling for the overthrow of the
government” and for “insulting the president” – reportedly the first
conviction under Article 361 of the Criminal Code.
NoteThe
article in question discusses ways and means of changing the political
system in Belarus, and links President Lukashenko to the disappearance
of Viktar Hanchar, one of the victims of the high-profile disappearances
which were the subject of a report adopted by the Assembly in 2004.
NoteAles
Bialiatski, Vice-President of the International Federation of Human
Rights and a professional literary critic, rightly qualifies the
trial and conviction of Mr Klimau as “absurd”, given that the article in
question is not in any way a programme of action, but a work of
literature.
NoteThis
is also the first conviction, in Belarus, of the alleged author
of an Internet publication. According to Reporters Without Borders, Mr Klimau’s
mother, who visited him in prison on 17 September 2007, found him
depressed and physically diminished. He is most obviously a prisoner
of conscience and must be released most urgently.
2.3 Other politically motivated abuses of the criminal
justice system
39. Whilst the cases described above concern the unjustified
prosecution of innocent persons, the opposite can be just as abusive:
the failure, for political motives, to properly investigate and
prosecute criminal acts committed by state agents against members
of the opposition.
2.3.1 Failure to hold to account those responsible for
the disappearance of prominent opposition figures and the cover-up
of responsibilities
40. The disappearance of Yuri Zakharenka, former Minister
of the Interior, Viktar Hanchar, former Vice-President of the Parliament
of Belarus, Anatoly Krasovski (businessman and supporter of Mr Hanchar)
and Dmitri Zavadski (cameraman for the Russian television channel
ORT) in 1999/2000 was the subject of
Resolution 1371 (2004) and
Recommendation 1657 (2004).
NoteIn
the underlying report, completing the work begun by an ad hoc sub-committee
chaired by our former colleague Sergey Kovalev, I had come to the conclusion
that steps were taken at the highest level of the state actively
to cover up the true background of the disappearances, and to suspect
that senior officials of the state may themselves be involved in
these disappearances. These officials are Mr Sheyman (former head
of the Presidential Administration, then general prosecutor), Mr Sivakov
(former Minister of the Interior, then Minister for Sports), and
Mr Pavlichenko (a colonel of the special forces). The evidence,
collected under difficult circumstances in Minsk, is presented in
detail in the above-mentioned report, which, so I was told by many
Belarusian interlocutors, is well-known in this country.
41. The case of Viktar Hanchar is also being followed by the Committee
on Human Rights of Parliamentarians of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
The Belarusian authorities had recently submitted to the said committee
a paper purporting to refute the Assembly’s report. On behalf of
the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, I participated
in a hearing of the said committee in Geneva in July 2007 and took
position on the Belarusian paper. In short, the Belarusian paper
actually further comforts my earlier findings, as even the purported
“errors” concern only minor details and not the main chain of evidence.
Without going into detail, I should like to give but one example:
during my inquiry in 2003-04, I had been informed (and obtained
a copy) of a handwritten note by Police General Lapatik, who had
summed up the results of the police investigation in a way that
corresponds largely to my own conclusions. Mr Sivakov and the press
spokesman of the general prosecutor’s office are on record for having
stated publicly that General Lapatik’s note, which had been leaked
to the media, was a fake, a politically-motivated “provocation”.
After Sergey Kovalev and I had offered to carry out a graphological
expertise, Mr Sivakov and Mr Sheyman admitted in their interviews
with me in Minsk that the note in question was not a fake after
all, but a mistaken “version” (among others) which had indeed been
prepared by the elderly and ill general. Despite my insistence,
I was not offered any other “versions” of General Lapatik’s note.
In their recent paper addressed to the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
the Belarusian authorities now claim that it had never been their
official position that General Lapatik’s leaked note was a fake.
The spokesman of the general prosecutor’s office and the Minister
of the Interior, Mr Sivakov, had merely expressed their private
opinions. But during my interview in Minsk with general prosecutor
Sheyman, I asked him whether his spokesman had to obtain his prior
agreement for public statements of any importance made on behalf
of his office – and Mr Sheyman made it very clear that this was
of course the case, as it would be in any country.
42. As shown by their behaviour before the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, the Belarusian authorities have in no way followed the Assembly’s
recommendations, which included the initiation of criminal investigations
with a view to clarifying, and punishing, as the case may be:
- the alleged involvement of the
three persons mentioned above in these disappearances;
- and the crime of perversion of the course of justice possibly
committed by certain other high-ranking officials who have been
involved in the investigations carried out so far and who may have
falsified, dissimulated or destroyed evidence in their possession
in order to protect the true perpetrators of the crimes.Note
43. Instead, they have harassed
Notethose who demand
justice and keep alive the memory of the disappeared persons, who
have become a symbol of resistance against the Lukashenko regime
much in the same way as the Gongadze affair in Ukraine had galvanised
popular protest against the Kuchma regime.
2.3.2 Other alleged cases of failure to hold to account
the perpetrators of crimes against persons linked to the opposition
44. The murder of Veronika Cherkasova, an outspoken journalist
working for the independent weekly
Solidarnost,
who was found dead in her apartment with multiple stab wounds in
October 2004, has not yet been elucidated. Her stepfather, Mr Meleshko,
and her son, Anton Filimonov, aged 16 and suffering from chronic kidney
and heart disease, were declared suspects, though the charges were
later dropped. Anton Filimonov was released on bail on 13 March
2006, after an international campaign in his favour. Amnesty International had
been concerned that his detention (for alleged counterfeiting of
banknotes) was motivated by the intention to pressurise him into
confessing to the murder of his mother, or to incriminate other
relatives.
NoteAccording
to Reporters Without Borders, Veronika Cherkasova had been investigating
a possible arms deal between the Belarusian Government and Saddam
Hussein.
NoteThe
Committee to Protect Journalists had complained that the possible
link between her death and her work was never properly investigated.
Note
45. In October 2005, journalist Vasiliy Grodnikov, who worked
for the opposition daily
Narodnaya Volya,
was found dead inside his locked apartment. Whilst his brother,
who had found the body, reported signs of a struggle, police closed
the case in November, concluding that Grodnikov fell while intoxicated.
After reopening the case, the general prosecutor’s office announced
in December 2005 that no crime had been committed as Grodnikov died
as a result of “his careless actions”.
Note
46. Ryszard Badon-Lehr, a Polish diplomat, was found unconscious
in his residence on 22 March 2006 in Hrodna (Belarus) and subsequently
died at a Polish hospital without having regained consciousness.
A criminal investigation was launched by Polish prosecutors into
allegations that he had been beaten before his death and the possibility
of involvement of the Belarusian authorities, who denied the beatings
and concluded that the cause of death was a stroke.
47. Another mysterious death involving a foreign diplomat and
intelligence officer occurred on 23 August 2006. Vytautas Pociunas
fell to his death from the 9th floor of the hotel in Brest (Belarus)
that he was staying at.
NoteWhilst
the Belarusian authorities quickly spoke of an accident, Vitautas
Landsbergis, MEP and former President of Lithuania, called the incident
a “political murder”.
Note
48. Last but not least, the numerous cases of police violence
against peaceful demonstrators,
Noteincluding very
young or frail elderly persons that have been described in much
detail by the victims themselves and independent witnesses such
as journalists and foreign diplomats have not given rise, to my
knowledge, to any prosecutions against the perpetrators – police
officers, special forces troopers and KGB officers. In my view, this
is not a coincidence, but part of the systematic abuse of the criminal
justice system for the purpose of intimidating opposition activists.
2.3.3 The death penalty practice in Belarus as an abuse
of the criminal justice system
49. Belarus is the only country in Europe which still
pronounces and carries out the death penalty. Official statistics
are not published.
NoteExecution
is reportedly carried out by gunshot in the back of the head. According to
Amnesty International, neither relatives nor death row inmates themselves
are informed of the date of the execution in advance. Relatives
are sent a death certificate once the execution has been carried
out; however, the notification can take several weeks. After the
execution, the state even refuses to reveal where the body has been
buried.
Note
50. I consider this barbaric practice as another abuse of the
criminal justice system which the Assembly must oppose. In my view,
it is no coincidence, but fully in line with this barbaric practice,
that the same pistol which was used for “official” executions in
the SIZO-1 prison in Minsk under the responsibility of Colonel Alkayev
was most likely also used for the execution of the “secret death
penalties” in the above-mentioned disappearances cases.
Note
51. The death penalty practice in Belarus must of course exclude
any extradition from a member state of the Council of Europe to
this country of a person who risks being subjected to capital punishment.
The Assembly must therefore support the recent appeal by human rights
defenders to the Ukrainian authorities not to extradite Igor Koktysh
to Belarus.
NoteIgor
Koktysh, a rock musician, was accused of murder after antagonising
and being threatened by local police for organising rock festivals
and setting up a Catholic youth group to combat drug addiction and
other social problems in the town of Baranovici. He was first acquitted
by the Brest district court (Belarus) in December 2001, and the
decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Belarus one year
later. But following another appeal by the general prosecutor, the
case was returned to court for a re-trial, after which Mr Koktysh
moved to Ukraine, where he was arrested in June 2007.
3 Conclusions
52. In view of the above, it is obvious that the criminal
justice system is frequently abused in Belarus.
53. Persons abusively convicted for political reasons must be
recognised as political prisoners and compensated for their sufferings
as soon as possible.
54. Officials ordering or participating in politically-motivated
abuses of the criminal justice system must be held to account personally
for their responsibility regarding such abuses when the time comes.
55. I am confident that the Republic of Belarus will one day join
the family of European nations upholding human rights and the rule
of law, and that justice will be done – by compensating victims
and punishing perpetrators of the abuses described above.
56. Meanwhile, the Assembly should urge:
- the Parliament of the Republic of Belarus to repeal Law
No. 71-3 of 15 December 2005 (the so-called “anti-revolution law”),
and in particular Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code criminalising
activities of non-registered associations and to abolish the death
penalty;
- judges, prosecutors and police officers in Belarus to
avoid, to the best of their ability, participating in abuses of
the criminal justice system and to bring to bear their personal
courage and imagination in order to mitigate the effects of the
abusive legislation on its victims;
- Belarusian and international human rights defenders to
keep a record, in a transparent and objective manner, of both the
victims and the perpetrators of politically-motivated abuses of
the criminal justice system.
57. The Assembly should further encourage:
- all member states of the Council of Europe, through their
diplomatic representations in Minsk, and in collaboration with local
and international human rights defenders, to continue intervening
with the authorities on behalf of political prisoners and their
families, and to offer them temporary protection;
- the European Union and the United States of America to
continue imposing targeted sanctions, such as visa bans or the freezing
of assets, on Belarusian officials responsible for serious human
rights abuses;
- the international community to set up a mechanism for
humanitarian assistance to victims of human rights violations in
Belarus. Such a mechanism could be governed by a working group also
involving local and international human rights defenders, in Minsk
or in a neighbouring capital. The group’s tasks could also include
the identification, in a fair and transparent manner, of officials
responsible for abuses, with a view to the imposition of targeted
sanctions;
- the Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation
to intervene urgently with the authorities in Minsk on behalf of
political prisoners and the other victims of politically-motivated
abuses.
Reporting committee: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights.
Reference to committee: Doc. 10856 and
Reference No. 3214 of 29 May 2006.
Draft resolution and draft recommendation adopted unanimously
by the committee on 12 November 2007.
Members of the committee: Mr Dick Marty (Chairperson),
Mr Erik Jurgens (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr György Frunda (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Athanasios Alevras, Mr Miguel Arias, Mrs Aneliya Atanasova, Mr Abdülkadir Ateş, Mr Jaume Bartumeu Cassany,
Mrs Meritxell Batet, Mrs Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc,
Mr Erol Aslan Cebeci, Mrs Pia
Christmas-Møller, Mrs Ingrīda Circene, Mrs Alma
Čolo, Mrs Lydie Err, Mr Valeriy Fedorov (alternate: Mr Alexey Aleksandrov), Mr Aniello Formisano, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Jószef Gedei, Mr Stef
Goris, Mr Valery Grebennikov, Mrs Carina Hägg, Mr Holger Haibach, Mrs Gultakin Hajiyeva,
Mrs Karin Hakl, Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Serhiy Holovaty,
Mr Michel Hunault, Mr Rafael Huseynov, Mrs Fatme Ilyaz, Mr Kastriot
Islami, Mr Želiko Ivanji,
Mrs Kateřina Jacques, Mr Karol Karski, Mr Hans Kaufmann, Mr András Kelemen, Mrs Kateřina Konečná,
Mr Nikolay Kovalev (alternate: Mr Yuri Sharandin),
Mr Eduard Kukan, Mrs Darja
Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr Andrzej Lepper, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Humfrey
Malins, Mr Andrija Mandić,
Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Alberto Martins,
Mr Andrew McIntosh (alternate: Lord John Tomlinson),
Mr Murat Mercan, Mrs Ilinka Mitreva, Mr Philippe
Monfils, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral,
Mr Philippe Nachbar, Mrs Nino Nakashidzé, Mr Fritz Neugebauer, Mr Tomislav Nikolić, Ms Ann Ormonde, Mr Ángel Pérez Martínez,
Mr Claudio Podeschi, Mr Ivan Popescu,
Mrs Maria Postoico, Mrs Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Jeffrey Pullicino
Orlando, Mr Valeriy Pysarenko, Mrs Marie-Line Reynaud, Mr François
Rochebloine, Mr Francesco Saverio Romano, Mr Paul Rowen, Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Ellert Schram, Mr Christoph Strässer (alternate:
Mr Jürgen Herrmann), Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr Vasile Ioan Dănuţ Ungureanu, Mr Øyvind Vaksdal, Mr Egidijus Vareikis,
Mr Miltiadis Varvitsiotis (alternate: Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou), Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mr Marco Zacchera, Mr Krzysztof
Zaremba, Mr Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Mr Miomir Žužul.
NB: The names of those members present at the meeting are
printed in bold.
The draft resolution and draft recommendation will be discussed
at a later sitting.