A Conclusions of the committee
1. The committee welcomes the report of the Political
Affairs Committee on the Ban on cluster munitions.
2. The committee is pleased to note that many of its principal
concerns have been reflected in the report, draft resolution and
draft recommendation, including the humanitarian consequences of
the use of cluster munitions in conflict and post-conflict situations.
3. However, the committee remains concerned that, for the reasons
provided by the rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee, the
class of real and potential cluster munition victims in conflict
and post-conflict states is very wide. Urgent action should be taken
by States, not only to prohibit the prospective use of cluster munitions,
but also to address violations of rights and suffering of cluster
munition victims which have already occurred.
4. It is appropriate to consider the humanitarian consequences
of cluster munitions as a global problem (in particular due to proliferation
or stock-piling of such weapons). Nevertheless, the committee urges
all Council of Europe member states to fully accept their obligations
as signatories of treaties banning cluster munitions and their obligations
under international humanitarian law and international human rights
law.
5. The committee also remains concerned by reports of international
organisations
NoteNote and
NGOs
Note concerning
the use of cluster munitions by Russian and by Georgian forces in
the August 2008 war. Some evidence collected, specifically names
those individuals killed as well as the particular model of cluster munitions.
NoteNote Urgent
action must be taken by the authorities in Russia and Georgia to
reduce the scale of the potential impact of the cluster munitions
already reportedly dropped. For this to happen, it is necessary
for all sides to exchange information on all bombs used and the
locations in which they were used. Your rapporteur refers in this
respect to Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 1648 (2009) on the humanitarian
consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, paragraph 24.11
in which the Assembly calls on Georgia, Russia and the de facto
authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to: “exchange information
on mines and unexploded ordnance and remove, together with the assistance
of the Halo Trust and other experts in the area, all remaining explosive
remnants of war. Ensure that all areas of danger are mapped, fenced
and identified for the local population and that awareness-raising
programmes of the dangers of these explosive remnants continue to
be run for those at risk, whether they are civilians, police officers,
members of the authorities or others.”
6. The issue of responsibility for clearing mines and unexploded
ordnance after a conflict is not always clear. For example, accountability
mechanisms for failures, as regards mine clearance and victim assistance activities,
by states acting individually or as troop contributing Nations to
international organisations, must be clarified and addressed. In
one case, in 2000, 8 boys playing in the Mitrovica hills came across
a number of undetonated cluster bomb units dropped during the NATO
bombardment of Kosovo in 1999 and began playing with them. Believing
it was safe, one boy threw an undetonated cluster munition into
the air. It exploded, killing one boy and blinding and disfiguring
his brother. French troops forming part of UNMIK had failed to support
de-mining activities and warn the local population as it was not
a “high priority”. In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights found
that the impugned action was attributable to the UN and not to the
French Government. Clear lines of responsibility must be drawn between
the troops on the ground, the troop contributing Nations and the
organisations of which they form part (e.g. NATO, UNMIK, UNMACC).
Note
7. The above example concerning the Behrami boys highlights the
importance of educating local populations as to the location of
munitions and the risks entailed (an obligation found in the 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). Children make up a
significantly high proportion of all casualties of these indiscriminate
weapons. Children are attracted by munitions which are shaped like
every-day objects, such as balls and canisters, and are likely to
pick up and touch unexploded cluster munitions, putting themselves
and others at risk. Those who work in agriculture or on the land
are also at particular risk. Major awareness campaigns must be run
on a continuous basis, aimed at both adults and children, until
the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance has been dealt with.
Note
8. The report identifies the rules of international humanitarian
law which confine the acceptable means and methods of warfare which
can be employed by states. The Convention on cluster munitions creates
a total ban on direct and indirect use of cluster munitions, and
enters into force six months after 30 states have ratified it.
Note As
the Rapporteur points out, there have been 6 ratifications to date,
including 3 from amongst the 47 Council of Europe Member States.
Note
9. The Committee encourages states to sign and ratify the Convention
on cluster munitions and to reconsider the reasons put forward for
failing to do so. For example, some states argue that ratifying
the Convention on cluster munitions would pose a threat to national
security, especially if one’s enemies have not joined; or that it
places a heavy burden on States with large stockpiles of weapons,
or those which bear ultimate responsibility for clearance and victim
assistance. In countering these arguments, it should be highlighted
that the factual evidence concerning the catastrophic nature of
cluster munitions is clear. Equally clear is the fact that cluster
munitions are of limited military use in modern warfare and are
poor defensive weapons. The Convention gives States Parties 8 years
to destroy stockpiles of cluster munitions, extendable by 4 years. Ultimate
responsibility for clearance is placed on affected states in order
to protect their sovereignty and in recognition of international
human rights obligations to care for their own people. The Convention
also provides that all states “in a position to do so” provide technical,
material and financial assistance to affected states and deadlines
for clearance in an affected state may be extended by 5 years if
the territory is too contaminated to clear within the 10-year deadline.
Note
