C Explanatory
memorandum by Ms Err, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. Equal participation of women and men in political
life is one of the foundations of democracy and one of the goals
of the Council of Europe, reaffirmed by the Organisation’s Committee
of Ministers as recently as last May.
NoteUnfortunately, gender equality
in politics has remained an ideal rather than becoming a reality:
many recommendations contained in Committee of Ministers Recommendation
Rec(2003)3 on balanced participation of women and men in political
and public decision making have yet to be implemented,
Noteand many of the recommendations
made by the Parliamentary Assembly in
Recommendation 1676 (2004) on women’s participation in elections and
Resolution 1489 (2006) on mechanisms to ensure women’s participation in decision
making have suffered the same fate. Even though the whole international
community – not just the Council of Europe – has paid great attention
to women’s representation in, and impact on, political decision-making
structures (in particular since the first United Nations World Conference
on Women held in Mexico City in 1975), progress has been slow and
disappointing. As the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU), Anders B. Johnsson, put it in 2008: “In 1975, women
held 10.9% of all parliamentary seats worldwide. After more than
thirty years of pledges, prescriptions and persuasion, women occupy
less than 18% of all parliamentary seats in 2008.”
Note
2. The situation when it comes to the executive level is not
any better. In 2008, only 16% of ministerial portfolios were held
by women. Women are also a minority in the highest positions of
the state: of the 150 heads of state at the start of 2008, only
seven (4.7%) were women. Only eight of the world’s 192 governments (4.2%)
were headed by women.
Note
3. There are many factors which lead to women’s under-representation
in politics – which constitutes not just a waste of talent, but
also weakens democracy and human rights (gender equality being a
human right and one of the foundations of democracy). The most important
factor leading to women’s under-representation in politics, in my
view, is the fact that most of us – even in Europe – still live
in societies which are characterised by attitudes, customs and behaviour
which disempower women in public life, discriminate against them,
and hold them hostage to prescribed role-models and stereotypes
according to which women are “not suited” to decision making and
politics. It should thus come as no surprise that the findings of
a very large survey of parliamentarians, undertaken by the IPU in
2008, support the idea that “for men politics is, on the whole,
a largely accessible profession while for women, it is not.”
Note According
to a March 2009 poll, 77% of women and 71% of men in the European
Union believe politics is a male-dominated field.
Note
4. However, a country’s institutional landscape and framework
can also impact greatly on the representation of women in politics.
At first glance seemingly neutral factors – such as electoral systems
– can have wide-ranging effects. Electoral systems are, however,
not set in stone, which is why I presented a motion for a resolution
on the impact of electoral systems on women’s representation in
politics to the Assembly in January 2008, together with several
of my colleagues. This motion was referred to this committee for
report, and I was appointed rapporteur.
5. The Committee decided to make use of the expertise of the
Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission). The commission presented the committee with
a report on the matter in June 2009, based on a contribution by
the German expert Michael Krennerich. This report – published as
CDL-AD(2009)029 – is publicly available, and, in my view, an excellent
basis on which to prepare my own report. I agree with the Venice
Commission’s opinion that the impact of electoral systems on women’s representation
in politics is linked with gender quotas, that is, the same electoral
system may lead to totally different outcomes depending on whether
or not gender quotas (of any kind) have been instituted and are enforced.
I will thus devote a significant portion of this explanatory memorandum
to the question of the effect of gender quotas in conjunction with
the electoral system.
2 Electoral
systems and their impact on women’s representation in politics
6. I subscribe to the Venice Commission’s definition
of the electoral system, which “regulates the means by which voters
express their political preferences and how votes are translated
into political mandates/seats”.
Note The commission’s
study focused only on the electoral systems for elections to lower
or single houses of parliament – as did, incidentally, the above-mentioned
IPU study and a 2008 study commissioned by the European Parliament
on electoral gender quota systems and their implementation in Europe.
Note In these circumstances, I have
little choice but to do likewise.
7. According to the Venice Commission’s report, one of the most
well-established findings is that countries applying proportional
representation systems have a higher proportion of women in their
parliaments than those with majority or plurality systems.
Note Combined
electoral systems, such as, for example, mixed member proportional
systems, appear to be more conducive to women’s parliamentary representation
than plurality or majority systems, but less favourable than traditional
proportional representation systems.
Note I
would add that plurality/majority systems actually are unfavourable
to all “atypical” candidatures – in other words, all candidatures
by people other than white, middle-class, middle-aged men with a
good education. Choosing an electoral system more conducive to women’s
representation should thus automatically also serve candidatures from
young or old people, immigrants, or others.
8. In most Council of Europe member states, parliamentarians
are elected by proportional representation in multi-member (rather
than single member) constituencies. Usually, multi-member constituencies
are considered to be more conducive to female nomination and representation
than single member constituencies.
Note The reason
given is that multi-member districts allow for balancing the party
ticket, and thus represent various internal party interests, strengthen
the party’s coherence, and attract female voters.
Note
9. District magnitude in multi-member constituencies also seems
to play a role. It is assumed that, the larger the district magnitude,
the more women will be nominated and elected.
Note However,
“party magnitude” may play an even bigger role, that is, the number
of seats a party wins or expects to win in a given district. It appears
that only if a party anticipates that it will win several seats
in a constituency will it truly practice ticket-balancing (which
is favourable to women candidates).
Note
10. Legal thresholds – which define the minimum vote share a party
needs to be awarded seats – should not normally favour female representation,
as small parties which may represent women’s interests are excluded
from parliamentary representation. However, in practice, thanks
to the legal threshold, only parties with a relatively high party
magnitude enter parliament – they even profit from the exclusion
of small parties. Since they thus have more room on the ticket to
nominate women, it is more likely that women will be among the mandate-holders.
Note However,
the Assembly has been critical of thresholds of more than 3% for
other reasons related to fair democratic representation. I will
leave the question of thresholds to my fellow rapporteur of the
Political Affairs Committee, Mr Daems, since I will be presenting
this report together with his more general report devoted,
inter alia, to the threshold question,
in a joint debate during the January 2010 part-session of the Assembly.
11. While only individual (party) candidates are possible in plurality/majority
systems in single member districts, in proportional representation
systems, different list forms are applied: closed, open or free.
With closed lists the political parties determine the ranking order
of candidates on the electoral ballot and the voter endorses the
entire list without any possibility of changing the order in which
the seats are allocated to the candidates. In contrast, with open
lists, the voter may express a preference for particular candidates,
thus changing the ranking order of the list. With free lists, the
voter may even choose between candidates from different lists. Which
type of list is most advantageous to women’s representation depends
on whether or not gender quotas regarding the ranking order exist
and are effectively implemented – in which case, closed lists would
seem more advantageous – and to what degree women organise themselves
and actively campaign for female candidates – in which case, preference
voting may not work against women.
Note
12. The Council of Europe has just published an information document
entitled “Parity democracy – A far cry from reality”, a comparative
study on the results of the first and second rounds of monitoring
of Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2003)3 on balanced
participation of women and men in political and public decision
making.
Note This
study also includes a short analysis of the possible impact of the
electoral system and of quota laws or quota rules or regulations
on the representation of women in parliament. Essentially, it comes to
the same conclusions regarding the impact of electoral systems as
the Venice Commission (“according to the data provided, the systems
that seem to favour higher participation of women in both surveys
are the proportional representational systems”
Note),
but lacks data to make an effective assessment of the effect of
quota rules and regulations.
Note
3 The impact of gender
quotas in conjunction with electoral systems
13. According to the Venice Commission, electoral gender
quotas can be considered an appropriate and legitimate measure to
increase women’s parliamentary representation. I would add that
arguments against gender quotas lack even basic legitimacy when,
in many of our member states, regional/language/nationality and/or
socio-professional quotas are accepted and implemented. An impressive
number of countries worldwide have introduced electoral gender quotas
in recent years, and in many more countries political parties apply,
additionally or alternatively, voluntary gender quotas.
Note A
cautionary note has to be added here, however: not all quotas are
the same. The real difference between the different types of quotas
is not really whether or not they are mandatory, but rather whether
they are means- or result-orientated,
Note and
whether or not they are precise and fine-tuned to a country’s situation
(rank-order on electoral lists and sanctions).
14. So far, 10 Council of Europe member states have introduced
mandatory legal quotas for national parliaments,
Note but they differ considerably with
regard to the minimum percentage of each sex among the candidatures,
from a 15% to a 40% required minimum of both sexes. A few countries
also provide for ranking order on the list,
Note but
none of these legal quotas provides for a “zipper system”, where
every other candidate on the list must be a woman. Legal sanctions
for non-compliance may lead to non-approval of the list – the most
effective sanction (applied in Armenia, “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain), limiting the number
of candidates (applied in Belgium) or reducing public funding (applied
in Albania, France and Portugal).
Note The
de facto impact of the legal quotas on women’s representation in parliament
has varied according to their severity (the minimum percentage fixed)
and the sanction applied. Thus, for example, political parties in
France were willing to accept the massive loss of public funds for
not having met the legal gender quota.
Note
15. In about 30 Council of Europe member states, one or more political
parties have adopted voluntary quotas in order to guarantee the
nomination of a certain proportion of women – most of them Green,
Socialist or leftist parties. As with legal quotas, the severity
of the quotas varies – usually they range from a 20% to a 40% minimum
requirement for the under-represented sex. However, there are also
a number of parties with a 50% quota for women on party lists.
Note Parties
operating outside of proportional representation electoral systems
have innovated gender quotas, such as “all-women shortlists” (the
British Labour Party) or by “twinning” constituencies (the Scottish
Labour Party). One party, the Socialist Party of Portugal, went
so far as to mandate a 33% gender quota for all parties for all
elections, thus exporting its own voluntary party quota to all political
parties when it was in government, a feat for which the party was
awarded the first Gender Equality Prize of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe in 2009.
Note
16. It is noteworthy that in some countries which apply only voluntary
party quotas, women’s parliamentary representation is relatively
high. As a rule, it can be said that the larger the parties that
apply voluntarily gender quotas, the greater the impact. However,
voluntary party quotas in small parties can also make an impact
on women’s representation, as there is an effect of “contagion”
on parties of similar political ideology in competition with that
small party, who may feel obliged to emulate that party to be able
to effectively compete in elections.
Note
4 Further considerations
17. The Venice Commission thus concludes that, in theory,
the following electoral system should be most favourable to women’s
representation in parliament: a proportional representation list
system in a large constituency and/or a nationwide district, with
a legal threshold, closed lists and a mandatory quota which provides
not only for a high portion of female candidates, but also for strict
rank-order rule (for example, a zipper system), and effective sanctions
for non-compliance.
Note
18. It would, of course, be tempting to take this recipe and apply
it to all Council of Europe member states. Sadly, this would probably
not work – not because the recipe is wrong, but because the political
will is lacking. Women’s representation in politics is, unfortunately,
not exactly a priority for many member states – and even less so
for some political parties. Not all Council of Europe member states
have associated the gender equality and anti-discrimination provisions
in their constitutions and other applicable legislation with the
necessary exception allowing positive discrimination measures for
the under-represented sex. Thus, for example, the first runner-up
to the 2009 Assembly Gender Equality Prize, the British Labour Party,
had to change the law when in government to make it possible to
continue applying the innovative “all-women shortlists” within their
party.
19. The true motor is the political will to feminise the world
of politics. If this will existed, quotas would be unnecessary.
But since this will is lacking, quotas can replace the strong political
will necessary, and will produce results providing the legal and
internal rules are complete. Unfortunately, few voters realise that quotas
really are the answer to the lack of political will: in a March
2009 poll, 70% of women across the European Union were in favour
of 50% women in parliaments, but only 10% of women and 12% of men
thought that gender quotas were the answer.
Note
20. As Professor Drude Dahlerup of Stockholm University has pointed
out,
Note this
is because many people continue to blame women for their under-representation
in politics, rather than a political system which excludes women
and discriminates against them. Underlying the belief that gender
quotas are not needed is the idea that there is a lack of qualified
women willing to run for office and that women voters do not vote
for women candidates. However, in reality, it is male voters who
do not vote for women candidates, and women’s education and qualifications
have long since matched or even overtaken men’s, especially in Europe.
The true problem remains old-fashioned discrimination against women,
and this can only be overcome with affirmative action, including
electoral and party gender quotas, as agreed in Beijing nearly fifteen
years ago.
21. In addition, as the Venice Commission itself pointed out,
the aim of improving women’s representation may conflict with other
aims, such as ensuring a fair parliamentary representation of small
parties and improving the voter-representative relationship. The
Venice Commission thus concludes: “In order to increase effectively
both the descriptive and substantial representation of women in
politics, a much broader and more comprehensive approach is necessary
than changing electoral legislation. Nevertheless, appropriate electoral reforms
may facilitate such a process.”
Note
22. The IPU survey I mentioned earlier in this report may hold
some of the answers regarding the comprehensive approach needed.
The IPU works on the principle that there is a fundamental link
between democracy and a genuine partnership between women and men
in the management of public affairs, and that the historic sidelining
of women from the structures of state that determine political and
legislative priorities must thus stop.
Note Women face obstacles at several levels.
a First, they must decide to enter
politics, and be able to do so.
b To run for parliament, they must persuade their political
parties (or the decision makers therein) to field them as a candidate.
c They must win the election.
23. In the IPU survey, respondent parliamentarians identified
domestic responsibilities as the most important deterrent for women
to enter politics (while respondents identified lack of support
from the electorate as the single most important deterrent for men).
Prevailing cultural attitudes were the second most significant factor to
deter women from entering politics (not surprisingly, this was one
of the least important deterrent factors for men).
Note For
these attitudes to change, the general population needs to be convinced
that women make as effective legislators as men: awareness-raising
campaigns and gender-sensitive civic education thus seem to be required.
Unsocial hours in parliament and a lack of childcare facilities
for parliamentarians can further deter women candidatures.
24. To run for parliament, both female and male respondents agreed
that one of the biggest obstacles was financial: the type of campaign
finance thus also seems to require special attention, for example
in order to limit or cap campaign expenditure, as well as to implement
funding mechanisms to support women’s candidacies.
Note Political parties,
and the decision makers within their hierarchies, maintain firm
control over the selection of candidates to contest elections, as
well as the determination of the ranking order of candidates on
the electoral ballot. These “gatekeepers” are typically closed entities
and many maintain “old boy networks” that make it difficult for
women to infiltrate the party leadership. Without clear rules (for
example, party quotas), candidate selection and determination of
ranking order on electoral lists is thus often dominated by male
leaders, which hampers women’s access to legislatures.
Note For
this to change, parties need to become more open to women, and need
to change their perception of women – this is more likely to happen,
according to the IPU survey, when women are organised effectively
and make the increased representation of women in the legislature
and the party an explicit goal.
Note
25. Finally, for women to win the election, they must gain the
support of the voters – including women voters. According to the
Venice Commission’s report, women, once nominated, tend to do as
well as men in parliamentary elections in established democracies.
Note This means that political parties which
refuse to field women are not acting rationally, but rather in accordance
with fallacious gender or sexist stereotypes.
5 Conclusions
and recommendations
26. It follows from the above that:
a women are still grievously under-represented in politics
in most Council of Europe member states;
b the lack of equal representation of women and men in political
and public decision making is a threat to the legitimacy of democracies
and a violation of the human right of gender equality which must
be rectified as a priority;
c the most important factor leading to the current under-representation
of women in politics is linked to attitudes, customs and behaviour
widespread in society which disempower women, discriminate against them
and hold them hostage to prescribed role-models and stereotypes
according to which women are “not suited” to decision making and
politics;
d these attitudes, customs and behaviour also influence
a country’s institutional, party and electoral landscape; but conversely,
a change in that landscape can also impact on society’s attitudes;
e changing the electoral system to one more favourable to
women’s representation in politics, including by introducing gender
quotas, can lead to more gender-balanced, and thus more legitimate,
political and public decision making;
f in theory, the following electoral system should be most
favourable to women’s representation in parliament: a proportional
representation list system in a large constituency and/or a nationwide
district, with a legal threshold, closed lists and a mandatory quota
which provides not only for a high portion of female candidates,
but also for strict rank-order rule (e.g. a zipper system), and
effective sanctions (preferably not financial, but rather the non-acceptance
of candidacies/candidate lists) for non-compliance.
27. The Forum for the Future of Democracy, which was devoted to
electoral systems, debated this topic, amongst others, in October
2009 in Kyiv (Ukraine). The general rapporteurs of the forum concluded
that women should be fairly represented at all stages of the electoral
process: “Built-in bias should be eliminated and member states and
political parties should take measures to improve the conditions
for women’s participation and representation throughout the electoral
process. This should include gender-sensitive civic education and
possible adaptation of electoral systems to make them more open
to women’s representation in politics, including by introducing
gender quotas for candidates.”
Note
28. At its last plenary session, the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe also took up the subject in
its Recommendation 273 (2009) on equal access to local and regional
elections. In paragraph 5b., the Congress recommends that the Committee
of Ministers urge the governments of member states “to achieve equal
representation of each sex, to establish an electoral system at
local and regional level ensuring that men and women alternate on
lists (with a minimum of 1 to 3), with financial penalties in the
event of non-compliance, and to enable the under-represented sex
to attain positions of responsibility within the executive bodies
of municipalities and regions”. This means that the Congress has
come to very similar conclusions to my own and those of the Venice
Commission, with the exception of sanctions: since experience has
shown that, at the national level, some parties are willing to shoulder
hefty financial penalties for non-compliance with mandatory gender
quotas, I would plead for more effective sanctions, for example,
the non-acceptance of candidatures/candidate lists.
29. It should also be recalled that the Committee of Ministers
already made the following recommendation to member states six years
ago: “where electoral systems are shown to have a negative impact
on the political representation of women in elected bodies, adjust
or reform those systems to promote gender-balanced representation”,
a recommendation which was taken up by the Assembly on several occasions,
as described in the introduction to this report. It should thus
go without saying that all these recommendations should be implemented
without further delay.
30. Thus, a recommendation should be made to Council of Europe
member states to:
a change their
electoral system to one more favourable to women’s representation;
b associate the gender equality and anti-discrimination
provisions in their constitutions and their electoral laws with
the necessary exception allowing positive discrimination measures
for the under-represented sex, if they have not done so already;
c accompany these changes by measures such as gender-sensitive
civic education and the elimination of nefarious gender stereotypes
and “built-in” bias against women candidates, in particular within
political parties, but also in the media.
31. Finally, the Assembly should also recommend that the Committee
of Ministers consider drafting an additional protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights in order to enshrine the right to equality
for women and men therein, as well as the necessary exception allowing
positive discrimination measures for the under-represented sex.
Reporting committee:
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
Reference to committee: Doc.11503, Reference 3417 of 14 April 2008
Draft resolution and recommendation adopted
by the committee on 30 November 2009
Members of the committee:
Ms Pernille Frahm (Chairperson),
Mr José Mendes Bota (First
Vice-Chairperson), Ms Ingrīda Circene (Second Vice-Chairperson),
Ms Anna Čurdová (Third Vice-Chairperson),
Ms Sonja Ablinger, Mr Francis Agius, Mr Florin Serghei Anghel,
Ms Magdalina Anikashvili, Mr John Austin,
Mr Lokman Ayva, Ms Marieluise Beck, Ms Déborah Bergamini, Ms Oksana
Bilozir (alternate: Ms Olha Herasym’yuk),
Ms Rosa Delia Blanco Terán (alternate: Ms Luz Elena Sanín Naranjo), Ms Olena Bondarenko,
Mr Han Ten Broeke, Ms Anna Maria Carloni, Mr James Clappison, Ms Diana Çuli, Mr Kirtcho Dimitrov, Ms Lydie Err, Ms Catherine Fautrier, Ms
Mirjana Ferić-Vac, Ms Sónia
Fertuzinhos, Ms Doris Frommelt, Ms Alena Gajdůšková, Mr
Giuseppe Galati, Ms Gisèle Gautier,
Mr Neven Gosović, Ms Claude Greff, Mr Attila Gruber, Ms Carina Hägg,
Mr Håkon Haugli, Ms Francine John-Calame, Ms Nataša Jovanoviċ, Ms
Charoula Kefalidou, Ms Birgen Keleş,
Ms Krista Kiuru, Ms Elvira Kovács, Mr Terry Leyden, Ms Mirjana Malić,
Ms Assunta Meloni, Ms Nursuna Memecan,
Ms Danguté Mikutiené, Mr Burkhardt Müller-Sönksen, Ms Hermine Naghdalyan,
Ms Yuliya Novikova (alternate: Mr Ivan Popescu),
Mr Mark Oaten, Mr Kent Olsson, Ms Steinunn Valdis Óskarsdóttir,
Ms Antigoni Papadopoulos, Ms Mª del Carmen Quintanilla
Barba, Mr Stanislaw Rakoczy, Mr Frédéric Reiss, Ms Mailis Reps, Ms Maria Pilar Riba Font,
Ms Andreja Rihter, Mr Nicolae Robu, Ms Marlene Rupprecht, Ms Klára Sándor, Ms
Albertina Soliani, Ms Tineke Strik, Mr Michał Stuligrosz, Ms Doris Stump, Ms Elke Tindemans, Mr Mihal
Tudose, Mr Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, Ms Tatiana Volozhinskaya, Mr
Paul Wille, Ms Betty Williams,
Mr Gert Winkelmeier, Ms Gisela Wurm,
Mr Andrej Zernovski, Mr Vladimir Zhidkikh
NB: the names of the members who took part in the meeting
are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee:
Ms Kleinsorge, Ms Affholder, Ms Devaux
