C Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Gross, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. As rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee
for both the 2007 debate on the state of human rights and democracy
in Europe and the 2008 debate on the state of democracy in Europe,
I adopted a normative approach. I thought it was essential in the
first place to identify and define the normative basis of democracies which
would serve as criteria for the evaluation of the state of democracy
in European countries, its main challenges and the remedies, as
well as the reform perspectives which might be proposed.
2. In my 2007 report, I thus defined the constituent dimensions
of democracy and their relevance at the level of the individual,
political organisations and governmental institutions. As democracy
is an ongoing, never accomplished process, I also proposed sets
of criteria (standards) which could be applied to different stages of
democracy building – from basic to strong democracies. The establishment
of these criteria enabled me to examine the achievement of standards
of democracy in Council of Europe member states and thus identify shortcomings
of the democratic process in our countries and on the continent
as a whole. I refer all those interested to
Doc. 11203, as well as
Recommendation
1791 (2007) and
Resolution
1547 (2007) on the state of human rights and democracy in Europe.
3. In my 2008 report, following the decision by the Political
Affairs Committee that the report should focus on one of the challenges
facing democracy today, namely on migration, I examined the phenomenon
of how democratic systems in our countries are increasingly confronted
with the enormous diversity of their own societies. I argued that
one of the ultimate objectives of every democratic system should
be the elimination of political advantages linked to the status
of citizen as compared to non-citizens. Moreover, there should be
no major differences between citizens of different origins or cultural
communities in exercising their involvement in the democratic process.
The essence of democracy is that all those concerned by decisions
taken within a democratic process should be a part of the decision-taking
process – independently of their nationality, gender, age, wealth
or education. I refer all those interested to
Doc. 11623, as well as
Recommendation
1839 (2008) and
Resolution
1617 (2008) on the state of democracy in Europe: the specific challenge
facing European democracy – the case of diversity and migration.
4. The purpose of this year’s report, which is meant to be yet
another contribution in the periodic debate on the state of democracy
in Europe, is to provide an evaluation of the two previous reports
on the state of democracy in Europe and verify the relevance of
the criteria on the quality of democracy developed therein, in the
light of the present situation, including the veracity of the hypothesis
that democracy in Europe is in crisis. It also aims at presenting
the perspectives of democracy and those for the “democratisation
of democracy” in the near and longer future. In the light of this
year’s evaluation, I would also like to strengthen some of the arguments
developed in the previous reports and specify the reforms we need
in order to overcome the crisis of democracy and regain the trust
and faith of all in the process of democracy. Finally, specific
proposals on what the Council of Europe can do to strengthen participation
of all in the conduct of public affairs and thus enhance participatory
democracy, as well as to reinforce and render more visible its own
role and message on democracy are made.
2 Main conclusions
of previous debates on the state of democracy in Europe
5. Firstly, we all agreed that it is impossible to identify
a perfect model of democracy. Even if there is a consensus on the
main principles of democracy, there is no agreement for a unique
and perfect way to implement them. There are too many variables,
including geography, history, tradition, culture, the state of development
of the country, the way in which the values and beliefs have shaped
democracy and the way in which democracy has come about.
6. We also concluded that there is no single democracy in our
member states which would be spared by the crisis of democracy.
And I repeat again in order to avoid misunderstandings: the paradox
of today’s democracies is that, although never ever in the past
have so many people lived in democracies, never were so many people
disappointed with the quality of the democracy they live in and
experience on a daily basis. This is what I see as a crisis in our
contemporary democracies calling for a better understanding and
action in order to investigate all means to strengthen, develop
and improve our democracies.
7. Democracy is also a substantial promise to produce a fair
distribution of life chances and opportunities for all. The way
in which democracy is exercised at present does not allow it to
deliver these promises. This is one of the main reasons why so many
citizens in today’s Europe turn their back on institutionalised
politics, abstain from participating in elections or, by voting,
express their populist, nationalistic and even xenophobic tendencies,
a phenomenon we witness in the whole of Europe, whether eastern,
central or western.
8. The result of the imbalance of power between economy and democracy
is that important decisions are increasingly taken outside parliaments
and the whole democratic process.
Note On the contrary, more and
more decisions are rather prompted by non-democratic actors of power
and decision making. People have doubts about democracy because
they feel unable to influence the political process of making decisions
of utmost importance for their daily life.
9. Furthermore, during our previous debates, we agreed that if
we want to overcome the crisis of democracy, we must think about
overcoming the reduction of democracy to mere representation (“it
is always democracy but not only representative!”) and about constituting
democracy on the transnational level, including on the European
Union level. In this latter respect, there have recently been small
positive developments that are worth being noted. At the same time,
with respect to enlarging representative democracy with elements
of direct democracy, we have witnessed examples which can show us
how to design such processes in a way that majorities can never
put into question fundamental and human rights of minorities.
10. As it is practically impossible to present an ideal model
of democracy and since democracy is an ongoing process, in permanent
development, we also agreed that it was even more important to elaborate
criteria for the evaluation of the state of democracy. In particular,
already in my 2007 report, I proposed to establish sets of criteria
which could be applied to qualify and improve four different stages
of democracy: basic, developed, stable and strong democracies.
11. I also proposed, for the purpose of evaluation of the quality
of democracy, to establish its five constituent dimensions. Also
three levels on which the validity of these principles is to be
tested have been defined: the micro-level of the individual citizen,
the medium level of social groups and political organisations, and
the macro-level of governmental institutions and governance. This
allowed specific achievements and shortcomings of democracies in
Europe to be assessed and the four stages of democracy, identified
on the basis of sets of criteria, to be defined as a basis for more
effective programmes and efforts to democratise our democracies.
12. In my 2008 report, I further developed my arguments, also
in the context of one of the most important challenges that our
democratic systems are confronted with at present, namely a considerable
increase in migration. Indeed, the standards and stages of democratic
systems that I identified in the 2007 report were verified by practice
and experience in our countries in my 2008 report. In the latter
report, I proposed, in particular an improved table for the purpose
of evaluating the quality of democracy in our countries by adding two
further constituent dimensions: one on diversity
Noteand
integration and one on the culture of citizenship. This resulted
in 21 fields in which the substance of the respective principles
is outlined for each level, for example, “freedom of association”
and “protection of minorities” as the expression of the first principle
(“fundamental human rights”) for all those acting on the medium-level,
that is, groups and organisations.
Note
13. The 2008 debate being focused on diversity and migration as
one of the challenges facing European democracy nowadays, I had
the opportunity to demonstrate to what extent migrants who, as I
showed, make up a large proportion of our societies, may enjoy the
rights which result from the requirements (criteria) for basic democracy
(the first among the four stages of democracy I described). The
report also demonstrated that this question is also linked to the
assessment of the quality of democracy in our countries as it implies representation
and participation in a political decision-making process. And I
pointed out that, since the diversification of our societies will
continue along with their modernisation, if we turn a blind eye
to this process, if we do not try to include the large groups of
migrants and people of migrant origin in our democratic systems, we
put in danger the very principle and future of democracy in our
countries.
14. Both the 2007 and 2008 reports end with a series of proposals
for overcoming democratic deficits in Europe. The 2007 report lists
a series of reform measures. The key aim is to extend and enlarge
rights of participation: the participatory rights of the citizens
of European states should no longer be linked to citizenship, but
to length of residence, and they should be extended through forms
of participatory democracy. The 2008 report presents possible measures
to remedy the situation in countries in which a large part of the
population is excluded from the democratic process, mainly: naturalisation
and granting political rights to non-citizens. Finally, the report
went over a list of measures that can be taken so as to increase
and encourage participation of migrants in political life.
3 Evaluation of our argumentation
on the crisis of democracy
3.1 Symptoms and causes of crisis
15. The 2007 and 2008 reports place the “crisis of democracy
in Europe” on three levels.
16. They note first of all citizens’ increasing distance from
institutions and institutionalised procedures of democracy, which
is not to be confused with disinterest in politics, their resignation
in the face of the complexity of political issues, their diminishing
trust in the integrity and competence of politicians and their doubts
about the reliability and effectiveness of political decision-making
processes and their real power to influence their lives.
17. Secondly, they criticise the politically ambivalent role of
the media which, to boost audience figures and further their own
business interests, try to set the political agenda and to suggest
which persons should run as candidates for public offices – instead
of critically scrutinising the performance of the several existing
political parties.
Note They thus
reduce political debate to a clash of personalities and simple personal
conflicts. More and more modern media perceive themselves as a mere
business and source of profit rather than as a service for democracy
and for the common interest.
Note
18. Thirdly, the reports point to institutional deficits of democracy,
such as the lack of effective rights of citizen participation, the
weakness of parliaments vis-à-vis the executive, unsatisfactory
and insufficiently transparent financing of political parties, and
governmental work that is geared to short-term electoral success and
lacks long-term vision.
19. As to the question why democracy in Europe is today in a critical
or fragile state, the reports see the reasons in the destabilising
effects produced by modernisation and the globalisation of markets
in the absence of adequate transnational constitution of political
counter-powers and emphasise in particular the increasingly dominant
role played by the economy in the political decision-making process
and (in the 2008 report) the inadequate responses to the dynamics
of transnational and transcontinental migration movements. One of these
aspects affects the democratic political system, while the other
transforms and even destabilises its societal basis.
20. This reflection has, since then, been further widespread by
the prominent British historian Eric Hobsbawm. Referring to the
increasingly dominant role played by the economy in the process
of political decision making, he wrote recently that “the problem
is precisely that the supremacy of the market is not a complement
to liberal democracy, but an alternative to any form of political
organisation. In practice, by denying the need to take political
decisions specifically affecting the public interest or the interest
of a particular group, the market gives precedence to the sum of
all the choices, rational or otherwise, made by individuals in search of
personal well-being. … Participation in the market takes over from
political participation, and the consumer takes over from the citizen”.
Note
21. We are thus experiencing a process which is the opposite of
the one recommended by Cornelius Castoriadis for an independent
democratic society, which can only be introduced through autonomous community
activity. According to Castoriadis, “such activity presupposes a
strong human focus on something other than the opportunity to buy
a new colour television set. Taking this further, it presupposes
that a passion for democracy and freedom, for community affairs,
takes over from lack of attention, cynicism, conformity and the
drive to consume”.
Note
22. In written comments provided, upon my request, to the two
reports on the state of democracy in Europe, Professor Martin Schaffner
Note introduces
a further consideration which allows a clearer understanding of
the connection between the above-mentioned macro-processes and the
crisis of democracy. In particular, he proposes, more emphatically
than the reports themselves, an analysis of the conflict-generating
dynamics of these processes, and specifically their effects on democratic
principles and procedures.
Note
23. In these processes, economic and social inequality is increasing,
for example, in terms of the distribution of personal income and
wealth or employment opportunities. Massive regional disparities
are appearing. Social antagonism is increasing and political debate
is becoming more sharply polarised. Lobbies (for example, global corporations)
are acquiring a dominant position. Inclusion and exclusion mechanisms
are growing stronger, affecting principally the immigrant population.
The democratic political system is reaching the limits of its effectiveness
and threatening to lose its legitimacy. The democratic model which
took shape and came to the fore in 19th-century Europe is being
eroded and is perceived as outdated. Its future is in question.
24. Given these dynamics, it is necessary to place the notion
of “conflict” firmly at the centre of our analytical approach. If
the aim is to design a democratic political system for the future,
it is advisable to adopt a conflict-oriented approach because, after
all, democratic systems do claim to be effective mechanisms for
conflict resolution. On the one hand, this helps to create an understanding
of conflict in which it is viewed as a necessary element of social
development and political innovation and, hence, not as having solely
negative connotations. It should not be forgotten that the advent
of democratic statehood in Europe was the result of a long series
of conflicts.
Note
25. On the other hand, a focus on conflicts can be useful in creating
a conceptual basis for democratic political action. It is not enough
to enumerate the destabilising effects produced by modernisation
and global economic growth. What is needed is detailed identification,
description and analysis of social crises and specific conflicts,
particularly at the micro-level, in local and regional contexts.
It is important to know the parties to a conflict, the lines of
conflict and the substance of the conflict, not least because this
introduces a player-oriented perspective, which is politically relevant.
26. The understanding that can be gained from an investigation
of this kind is the prerequisite for being able to identify intervention
points, develop useful strategies and take concrete initiatives.
This can be seen, for example, in the current religiously motivated
conflicts or the trend towards ethnicisation of conflicts.
27. For Professor Schaffner, adding the conflict-generating dynamics
as an element for better understanding the crisis of democracy leads
us to a further improvement of the proposed table for evaluating the
quality of democracy.
Note In fact, while he sees
the obvious potential of the table in the fact that it is oriented towards
democratic values and can be utilised for analytical purposes and
democratic reforms, as well as for transnational comparisons, he
considers that this framework is only partly suitable for helping
to understand the crisis of democracy in Europe.
28. Only partly suitable, that is, only where this crisis concerns
democratic deficits of the political system, for example where a
lack of effective rights of citizen participation leads to disaffection
with or hostility towards democracy. But where the above-mentioned
conflicts are concerned, the table is not sufficient, because what is
reflected in these conflicts is not necessarily the lack of binding
force of democratic principles, but rather their non-recognition,
in principle or in fact, by social groups (not confined to the immigrant
population). In other words, there is a crisis of democracy in Europe
which cannot be understood with the help of this framework because
it finds expression in fundamental criticism of the democratic principles
on which the framework is based. Such criticism may be voiced in
debates over the meaning of “formal democratic criteria” or in scepticism
regarding the claimed universality of the democratic system of government.
Note To an even greater extent, however,
it is expressed implicitly in specific laws and measures through
which, in many places, civil rights are curtailed and political
power is centralised and concentrated in the hands of the executive.
29. Such a broader approach also requires the inclusion of an
historical perspective. When talking about the crisis of democracy
and trying to assess the state of democracy, we cannot base our
arguments solely on criteria internal to democracy, but must also
reflect the historical background, that is, try to understand the contexts
in which democracy has developed in Europe from the mid-19th century
to the present day.
Note
3.2 Recent illustrations of the
crisis of democracy
30. In written comments provided, upon my request, to
my two previous reports on the state of democracy in Europe, Professor
Theo Schiller accurately summarises the main developments since
2008 which further illustrate the symptoms of crisis of democracy
nowadays.
Note
31. The most significant event of the last two years has surely
been the recent world economic crisis. Although the political consequences
of the economic crisis are the subject of a separate report prepared
by our colleague Emanuelis Zingeris, some key aspects have also
to be mentioned here.
3.2.1 The recent world economic crisis
32. The crisis revealed global mechanisms of economic
crisis production and global lack of political control, transparency
and system stability. This lack of necessary regulation and co-operation
at the international level has allowed the process of globalisation
to become more like “what the wild west was” – to use the terms
of Greek Prime Minister Papandreou when he addressed our Assembly
last January: those who survive are those who have the power.
Note The necessity of global co-operation and
regulation has only indeed partly been realised by the G-20 conferences.
Note
33. The crisis forced immediate political action of all major
states and huge financial measures to avoid the breakdown of the
financial system and of economies at large. This prompted:
- highly centralised executive
decision making and global negotiation mechanisms with little parliamentary control
and without opportunities for citizens’ participation, in fact without
any substantial mandate from earlier elections;
- extremely large parts of state budgets being devoted to
save banks and stabilise the economies leading to huge additional
state debts;
- major revision of expenditure structures, cut-backs of
vital services and transfers;
- strong restraints on future political decision making
and on opportunities of democratic consultation and participation.
34. The unstable conditions of world economy and finance will
reproduce these factors which replace political decision making
by a “coercive system mechanism”. Big and global corporate interests
gain strong positions of influence, whereas the democratic vote
is being devalued. We are witnessing a huge concentration of power
and money, and very often also a huge concentration of the media,
in the hands of a few, so that our democratic institutions become
vulnerable. Politicians are lobbied by the powerful, and more and
more politicians become dependent on huge budgets or the favours
of those who own the media if they want to be elected. The same
goes for many of our other institutions that uphold the rule of
law, whether it be judges or the police. They are also targets of
corruption. As inequality and huge concentration of wealth increase,
so does the corruption of our democratic institutions. Confronted
with the consequences of globalisation and of the worst economic
crisis since the 1930s, people are becoming increasingly conscious
of the fact that nation states, national governments and national
parliaments cannot solve these problems alone. This further increases
their feeling of powerlessness, fear and frustration.
Note It
also brings on extremism and defeatism. It brings on the desire
to look for solutions in a populist leader who promises magic or
to find scapegoats – those who are different, foreign – for our
problems.
35. When democracy is weak, solidarity or less selfish ways to
solve conflicts are not opted for. Thus those who bear no responsibility
for the near collapse of the financial systems and losses amounting
to thousands of billions are those who have to bear today the biggest
burden as a result of the way in which the euro crisis and the more
general economic crisis is managed by austerity measures: in Greece
nearly 30% of the young people are unemployed, while in Spain this
percentage is over 44%. Economist and Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stieglitz
repeated recently what he had already written in the British
Guardian on the same day that Prime Minister
Papandreou addressed our Assembly: “The austerity politics leads
us to a disaster. Only by solidarity and investments Europe will
really find a way out of the crisis!”.
Note
36. Major consequences to be seen immediately are severe erosions
of democratic trust in representative institutions, as the examples
of Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania have shown. In
Hungary, this breakdown of trust began already before the world
financial crisis. The consequence will be the weakening of established
political parties and the danger of nationalist and violent reactions.
3.2.2 Political apathy
37. The symptom of increased disinterest of citizens
in institutional affairs and procedures of democracy, that is a
specific kind of political apathy which I have identified in my
previous reports, has become even more evident during the last two
years.
38. The divide between citizens and politics has deepened as election
turnouts went into free-fall in most democratic countries. Indeed,
if elections are the main yardstick for measuring democratic representativeness, to
what extent can we still speak of the democratic legitimacy of leaders
for whom one third of the potential electorate voted?
39. An obvious example are the last elections to the European
Parliament which have recorded the lowest turn-out ever, especially
in the member states which have most recently joined the European
Union. General turnout was 43% (down from 45.5% in 2004). Abstention
reached 80.4% in Slovakia, 79% in Lithuania and 75.5% in Poland.
Note
40. However, it should be noted that indifference is only one
of several reasons for voter abstention. For most citizens, abstention
is a positive political decision which, although reflected in a
negative action, is not a matter of indifference. It would thus
be a serious mistake to regard abstention levels as an indicator
of democratic participation.
Note As Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader
of the Greens in the European Parliament, said recently, having
in mind the general interest, which – as Jean-Jacques Rousseau had
already stressed – is not necessarily the interest of the majority,
it might be better for people to abstain rather than double the
vote for the Front National or other nationalistic and aggressive
parties or movements
.
3.2.3 Democratic fatigue twenty years
after the fall of communism and lessons to be learnt from the Hungarian
case
41. The twentieth anniversary of the fall of communism,
the founding moment for democracy in central and eastern Europe
and one of the main reasons why today more people than ever in the
history of mankind live in states which are constituted as democracies,
was marked by a notable lack of public fervour and a slight twinge
of embarrassment in the countries concerned. A few months earlier,
in June 2009, at a time when the global economic crisis was at its
peak, a poll was released suggesting that almost half of all young
Hungarians thought life under what used to be called “goulash communism”
had been better than life today.
Note And a poll released
in March 2009 found that a majority in what had once been East Germany
thought that life had been better under the old German Democratic
Republic (GDR).
Note In
the Czech Republic, the term “velvet revolution” is used with caution
or even diffidence.
42. As Jacques Rupnic points out,
Note notwithstanding such“nostalgia”
– spread among a new generation that only vaguely remembers the
communist regimes – there is no actual desire in central and eastern
Europe to return to dictatorship. But there is, unmistakably, a
“crisis of expectations”, and even a sense of the “revolution betrayed”
that expresses itself as disenchantment with liberal and representative
democracy after two decades of experience. Democracy can no longer
derive its legitimacy from 1989 and the overwhelming rejection of
the old regime which had been witnessed that year.
43. Rupnic lists recent developments in the old Warsaw Pact countries
to explain the absence of “1989 triumphalism”: the real-estate bubble
which has burst in the Baltic states and the social unrest facing,
in particular, Latvia for the first time; the “war of words and
nerves” between Hungary and Slovakia over minority issues; the fact
that, in the Czech Republic, fresh
elections have been delayed due to an intense political controversy
over a Constitutional Court ruling leaving in office an unelected
caretaker government run by an ex-communist statistician. We can
add that in Albania and Moldova, which
were quoted as positive examples in the 2007 report on the state
of democracy in Europe, the functioning of democratic institutions
has been paralysed since last year, blocking badly needed reforms
and further European integration. In both countries, although maybe
for different reasons, the development of a common democratic citizenship
culture and the respect for basic democratic values in no way followed
the pace of implementation of the market economy.
44. Elections may mechanically be organised in a more or less
correct way,
Note but
participation is declining. The right institutions are there, but
after close inspection, they look like “empty shells”. There is
no alternative to democracy, but there is little trust in its institutions
and political elites who presided over two decades of transition
seem utterly exhausted. And this despite EU integration and economic
growth at least across a belt of central Europe stretching from
the Baltic States to Slovenia. As Rupnic notes, from one country
to the next, there is an atmosphere of burnout and exhaustion surrounding
the transitions to democracy, markets, and European integration.
45. The recent general elections in Hungary have confirmed this
process in a country where aggressive and violent right-wing propaganda
has been growing in recent years, particularly since the irresponsible
discourse and behaviour of the former socialist prime minister.
Note The results of the
elections serve as an echo to last year’s poll: national/conservative
forces occupy now nearly 80% of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament;
a quarter of them are openly authoritarian and nationalistic. Michael
Frank’s comment in the
Süddeutsche Zeitung is
pertinent: “Hungary is in this sense exemplary for the whole post-soviet
space: with the market economy, only the thin spirituality of money
came into the country. This does not carry you a long way. Other old
and sometimes really abused values were not replaced. A democratic
mindset and enthusiasm for a parliamentary democracy have not been
developed. Even the biggest financial crisis was not able to bring together
all strong forces to serve the common good … A fundamental vacuum
of values created a space for those who preach the Nation and Folklore
as the only values given by God.”
Note
46. Some months earlier, in a letter sent to the editor of the
Neue Zürcher Zeitung as a feedback
to a “sensitive” – as she calls it – essay on the political situation
in Hungary by the writer György Dalos, the German reader Ilse Bindseil
wrote: “Shouldn’t we say that maybe the peaceful transformation
in Hungary did not turn the Hungarians into Democrats? Instead,
‘national criteria’ set the tone in which they explain their disaster. Shouldn’t
we stress that those who want democracy have to overcome nationalism
as a doubtful part of the nation (
Auf
das Völkische am Volk verzichten)?”
Note
47. Several intellectuals note that, more than anything else,
Hungary needs real public debates, real societal deliberations which
would help citizens understand that it is not possible to overcome
the biggest economic crisis since the 1930s by creating expectations
requiring even more public resources at a time when the economy
is not growing and unemployment is already extremely high. But,
instead of public deliberation, the Hungarian society is marked
by extreme polarisation, hate speech and the unwillingness of many
politicians to reflect and discuss openly in a self-critical manner.
Note The writer
György Dalos therefore asks for a new “public round table” in Hungary,
similar to the Polish movement Solidarnosc twenty-one years ago,
to overcome the “ruling atmosphere of hate and fear”, which tends
to deteriorate into a collective neurosis of fear and which could
lead to even more right-wing extremism.
Note
48. In trying to understand why “the democratic invention” of
1989 was so promptly pushed aside, Rupnic points to rapid and faithful
imitation of Western models across central and eastern Europe that
came about after 1989. This imitation has been generally successful,
at least as far as the constitutional and institutional framework
is concerned. But it involved following a model “which was already
showing symptoms of fatigue and even crisis”. Central and eastern
Europe thus inherited, together with the fundamentals, Western democracy’s
ills, including: steadily dropping rates of political participation;
a huge gulf between citizens and political elites, low trust in
parliamentary and state institutions, and the rise of populist and
nationalist challengers to liberal democracy.
49. Vaklav Havel recently said that “we fought for a different
political system from the one [that] we ended up with”. The disappointments
of post-revolutionary life “could to a degree have been predicted,
but [they] turned out to be much worse than anyone expected”.
Note
50. And only a few months ago, in March 2010, talking about “Perestroika,
25 years later” Mikhail Gorbachev wrote: “The democratic process
has lost momentum; in more ways than one, it has rolled back. All
major decisions are taken by the executive branch; parliament just
gives formal approval. The independence of the courts has been thrown
into question. We do not have a party system that would enable a
real majority to win while also taking the minority opinion into
account and allowing an active opposition. There is a growing feeling that
the government is afraid of civil society and would like to control
everything. We’ve been there, done that! Do we want to go back?”
Note
51. Görgy Dalos’ appeal for a national, deliberative “round table”
in Hungary to overcome – at least partly – the country’s crisis
of democracy is well-founded. In fact, one of the greatest results
of a strong and healthy democracy is that it produces a learning
and integrated society by communicative efforts of all conflict
partners in an open public sphere – which is much larger than the
space the media requires for itself. Jürgen Habermas, the German
political philosopher, stated recently about the public sphere:
“Democracy is injured when the ‘public sphere’ is dominated by media
which have an opinion monopoly, manipulated by lobbyists and driven by
politicians. Democracy fails where societies blindly, without any
deliberation and formulation of a common will, understand and follow
progress as a movement in itself; for them, science and technology
turn out to be an ideology”.
Note The
French philosopher Edgar Morin stressed a similar idea, when he
wrote recently about the need “to reform the democracy”.
Note
3.2.4 Many signs of a derailed democracy
in Europe: the rise of extreme right-wing, xenophobic and identity
politics and rhetoric
52. It is important not to fall into the trap of a kind
of Western arrogance whereby western countries are said to know
exactly what democracy is and to have achieved it.
Note Populist and extremist movements,
as well as identity and symbol politics and nationalistic rhetoric,
have been present for some time also in western European countries
and have been strengthened during the last two years under crisis
conditions. To quote some examples:
53. In Italy, the aggressiveness of politicians, including those
holding state office, against various groups of foreigners and refugees
has become notorious. The continuing executive attacks of the Berlusconi
government against judicial authorities endanger the principle of
separation of powers and of the independence of the judicial system.
In addition, the media system is also under strong pressure from
the government. Following recent structural, personal and even programme
interventions into the public channels of RAI, basic mechanisms
of democratic control by free media are no longer guaranteed.
54. The Italian political scientist Gian Enrico Rusconi tried
to understand and explain the “Phenomenon Berlusconi” in three ways:
Note “First: the democratic populism in the
way Berlusconi is practising it leads to a mutation of democracy.
Second: this mutation is the expression of a deeply unsatisfied
civil society, full of conflicts and rather rude. Third: Berlusconi
has become a real system, much more than a person. Behind him and
this system you have an entire political class which defends its
interests. … The Berlusconi system reveals the deep lack of orientation
in the Italian society. Many societal illnesses we suffer from do
not come from outside but are home-made in Italy: no sense of the
citizens’ role, no respect for the state, deep links, in many Italian
regions and many social groups, with mafia-structures, a selfish
behaviour and a latent racism …. We might speak of a deeply divided
society, socially split and lost ….”
55. In Austria, the extreme right-wing FPÖ could consolidate itself
and even re-unite its different components. At the presidential
elections in Austria, one of the candidates came from among its
ranks, but failed clearly and this made the leader of the right-wing
movement say that they should abstain from references to the Nazi
past and move towards the centre.
56. In the Netherlands
, the
growing electoral support for the xenophobic and anti-Islamic party
led by Geert Wilders is about to seriously undermine the structure
of the Dutch party system. A former Dutch Ambassador to the Council
of Europe, who has lived since his retirement for nearly ten years
in Switzerland, Mr Henk Wagenmakers, recently wrote in a comparative
text: “In Switzerland, the Initiative against the Minarets focused Islamophobic
tendencies in one referendum; in the Netherlands, Islamophobia became
an element of the general and entire political debate. … In view
of the forthcoming elections on 9 June, the centre is eroding and falls
apart. A new coalition government of not less than four parties
can no longer be excluded …. A (political) explosion on the election
day cannot be excluded. … In the Netherlands we may face a deep
transformation process with consequences that we cannot just bypass
or overlook”.
Note
57. In France, where a “Ministry of National Identity” has for
the first time been created, the recent regional elections showed
a rise of the votes for the extreme right (which was in some cases
decisive in the election result) in comparison to those it obtained
in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament.
58. In Greece, in the 2009 national elections, a relatively new
nationalist extreme right-wing party got the highest score ever,
obtaining 15 seats in the 300-seat parliament.
59. In Switzerland
, the
referendum against Islamic minarets has illustrated how shortcomings
in the constitutional design of direct democracy can lead to undemocratic
results. The majority of the Swiss people still understand democracy
as a privilege of the Swiss citizens and not as a human right. That
every human being has basic rights, which cannot be the object of
the decisions of a majority, is less anchored in the Swiss political
subconscious than the majority rule. Therefore, the Swiss Parliament
has no right to prevent from putting to a referendum any popular
initiatives which do not respect human rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention on Human Rights; and there is no Constitutional
Court with such a competence. This is one of the reasons which led
to the result of the referendum of 29 November 2009 when nearly
60% out of the 53.4% of the Swiss voters who took part in the referendum
decided to ban the construction of minarets in a discriminatory
way and without fully respecting freedom of religion.
Note
60. For such shortcomings, it is not direct democracy as a principle
to be blamed, but the Swiss way of implementing it and its design
of the interface between direct democracy and human rights. In order
to prevent direct democracy from turning into the “tyranny of the
majority” (Tocqueville), fundamental freedoms and human rights have
to be protected in a way that they cannot be put to a referendum.
Many Swiss people have understood this lesson following last November’s
vote and a debate has now started in Switzerland on how to implement
such reforms into the federal constitution. Democracy in general,
and direct democracy in particular, loose their dignity when the
majority is invited to restrict the basic freedoms and rights of
a minority. There can indeed be no democracy without respect for
the basic human rights of all.
3.2.5 Unlimited collection of personal
data by state agencies
61. An almost unlimited collection of personal data by
state agencies represents a severe threat to personal freedom and
privacy, which is an important precondition of free participation
in democratic life.
62. In particular, databases of the police, but also of social
security agencies (ELENA in Germany), represent such a danger. Several
technologies serve as data sources:
- telecommunication and Internet contact data are saved
not only on suspects but on everybody for long periods of time;
- video surveillance in public spaces and stores has substantially
expanded;
- growing surveillance potential by Internet search engines
and social networks open up more opportunities for use and abuse;
- private banking data are also made available for public
security purposes. The SWIFT Agreement between the European Union
and the USA even provides uncontrolled access to American security agencies
(the agreement will be revised shortly). But banking data collected
by SWIFT may also be available to security agencies in European
member states and at the EU level. Fortunately, the European Parliament
put an end to this agreement with the USA, but some of the Council
of Europe member states, which are not EU members, seem still to
accept this agreement.
4 Perspectives of democracy and
new challenges
4.1 Moving towards a more participatory
and deliberative form of democracy
63. The current crisis in representation, which has recently
been compounded by the economic and social crisis, means that we
must approach the political relationship between society and the
authorities in a different manner from the traditional forms of
mandates and delegation, with which citizens are no longer satisfied.
Note The limitations
of the electoral system and the failings of representative democracy
have bred distrust among the public, especially the young.
Note They feel powerless
and frustrated in the face of political challenges.
64. It should be noted that Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tom Paine and
Ferguson believed that true democracy meant the participation of
the entire community in public affairs.
Note However, when the liberal theory
of the political constitution emerged and took hold in the late
18th century, it was based on the explicit assertion that such participation
was impossible in contemporary societies and on acceptance of the
state as being separate from the political community.
Note
65. It is not simply a coincidence that the Australian/British
professor and Paine-biographer John Keane wrote a year ago an article
in the
Guardian under the
title “Tom Paine, we need you”.
Note Keane raised the question: “Faced
with our own deepening political recession, a new corruption fuelled
by public disaffection with party politics, parliamentary fiddles
and rudderless government, where can we turn for inspiration?” And
he answered: “Considering what he contributed to visionary democratic
ideals, it makes sense to remember Tom Paine, perhaps the greatest
English Champion of clean, open, humble government, who died in
New York City 200 years ago this week. Paine advocated in his best-selling
book ‘The common sense’, that citizens do not need kings to govern
and to defend the common cause. He drew from the principle that
the earth is common property the conclusion that the most vulnerable
in society, especially the young and the old, ought to be guaranteed
as of right their fair share of its wealth.” Keane concluded: “The
public debate about parliamentary reform must continue and intensify,
informed by the understanding that history matters.”
66. The
Guardian’s editor,
Polly Toynbee, concluded from the British crisis of parliament and
the loss of public confidence in the latter: “Let the people decide
to blow fresh air into politics”.
Note And even the then British Justice
Minister Michael Wills argued for radical democratic reforms: “The
political class is in the dock and radical reform is essential.
… Representative democracy – and so the parliament – must remain
at the heart of this country’s governance. … But people are becoming
disengaged from the democratic process. Some see politics as irrelevant
for their lives, others wish to become more involved, exercising
power between elections as well as at them. … Direct democracy should
have a place in our constitutional arrangements, but it can also be
a recipe for passing control of our democracy to the wealthy and
powerful.”
Note Hence,
another way to stress what we mentioned above with respect to Switzerland,
namely that those who argue for the integration of direct democratic
elements into representative democracy have to be careful to design
it in a way that unintended negative effects can be avoided.
67. Our democracies now need to be given a broader base again.
Instead of the conventional representative approach, there is a
need to establish much more permanent forms of interaction between
citizens and those who govern them. Politicising society is not
based solely on considering the proper use of universal suffrage. Participatory
and deliberative structures which involve citizens must be found.
Representatives must be elected, but we must also constantly keep
an eye on them and hold them to account. The idea of a political system
that involves choosing a champion for four or five years must be
given up. Reducing decision-making opportunities to elections alone
prevents politics from functioning properly. The rate of change
in society has speeded up, while parliamentary terms remain unchanged.
The solution to the crisis in representation therefore lies in moving
from an “intermittent democracy” to an “ongoing or permanent democracy”.
Note
68. It should be noted here that direct democracy should not be
confused with plebiscite democracy. Direct democracy, provided that
it is properly regulated and well designed,
Note allows
citizens to become effectively involved through referenda and popular
initiatives and thus constitutes a kind of “correction” of representative democracy.
In the plebiscite abuse of direct democracy, where the President,
the government or the majority of the parliament may put questions
to a referendum, there is a high risk of manipulation and an increase
of dominance rather than a democratisation of democracy.
69. A citizen-based direct democracy has no plebiscite elements,
but, as the institutionally most developed segment of participatory
democracy, should be perceived as an ongoing communicative process
in which more and more people become involved in public affairs.
Citizens create together “communicative power” which influences
the “administrative power” and obliges the economic powers to respect
the needs of poor market forces as well as ecological needs. Professor
Volkmann calls this “the heart of democratic life”.
Note Participatory democracy
is therefore much more closely linked to the idea of association,
deliberation, information, accountability and transparency on the
part of those who govern. In a truly participatory and deliberative democracy,
the point of view and interests of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups
can also be taken into account in the decision-making process, itself
based on an open public debate. If all citizens are deemed liable to
pay taxes, they should all also be deemed capable of taking part
in public affairs and decision making and of holding their representatives
and rulers to account.
70. A very strong democratic infrastructure is necessary to ensure
that direct democracy will not be manipulated by traditional powers,
such as big business or “big money”, as this is too often the case
in Switzerland and California, the two places in the world where
direct democracy is most practised. Elements for such an infrastructure
that a “free and fair” direct democracy needs include: the proper
funding of political parties and “issue-action committees”; transparency
and a fair balance in the resources available to the various actors
in a referendum campaign; strong civil society organisations which
must be able to participate in the public debate; a genuine curb
on commercial lobbying; media which are not dependent on the market
alone but are able to serve – as a pillar of democracy – the common
cause, as well as public institutions which are able to offer civic
education to all.
Note
71. Sieyès said that democracy was not just achieved through institutions
but by building public squares, pavements and meeting places. Democracy
is a matter not only of delegating and taking decisions but also
of discussing and living together in dignity, respect and solidarity.
Note There can be no prevarication;
the democratic model remains that of redistribution and devising
a shared existence. Democracy is therefore a form of society, which
requires rules for social justice and distribution, not just a system
or the sum of individual rights. It is a work in progress, which
is put to the test on a daily basis.
72. Democracy is indeed much more than a way to defend individual
and private personal interests.
Note The idea
of democracy is to work with other equal citizens on a common project,
the future of our common life. For Professor Volkmann: “People see
and understand each other as equal participants and co-authors of
the legal order they all have to respect. It’s like a good orchestra:
The common concert is more than the sum of individual voices or
instruments just beside each other.”
Note Professor
Volkmann notes the paradox that, as the traditional links between
citizens (religion, class, lifestyle) become weaker and weaker,
this may raise more expectations towards the community identity
of democracy which the actual democracy, as has been functioning
until now, is not able to meet.
73. The renewal of politics also requires the development of a
new culture of political responsibility. The latter also needs to
be considered in terms of responsiveness and of accountability.
Independent supervisory institutions such as ombudspersons’ offices
and bodies dealing with access to public documents and data protection,
as well as constitutional courts, can help to develop this concept
of political responsibility, provided that their own membership
and methods of operation are democratic and that they are perceived
as democratic by people.
Note
74. How can we make our democracies more participatory and more
deliberative? Participatory budgeting and citizens’ conferences
or juries are just some examples from northern Europe, Canada and
even Latin America. Such public fora, however, must not be restricted
to nationals alone. It is not only nationals but all people living
in a country who should participate in the conduct of public affairs,
at both local, regional and national level.
75. Recently and in a positive development, the capacity for political
participation has increased remarkably. Networks and blogs in the
Internet provide growing opportunities for millions of people including
for political communication
Note at the local
and national level as well as in the transnational dimension. In
addition, more concepts are being practised for developing innovations,
mediating conflicts and finding compromises. This may support the
extension of civil society groups and decentralised self-government.
However, the opportunities to make such potential relevant in practice
are threatened by the overall conditions of democracy in the world
economic crisis.
76. It is worth noting that, in Latvia, the
Congress of the newly created centre/left-wing party, which is likely to
come to power, argued recently in favour of increased participatory
democracy.
4.2 Improving education in public
affairs
77. In Athenian democracy, effective citizen participation
was not an abstract right but a genuine practice; it was not left
to chance or the willingness of citizens. This effective participation
was shaped by the whole life of the community, the whole education
of citizens and education in public affairs (
paideia
pros ta koina).
Note
78. In reinventing democracy today, we will also have to focus
again on education in public affairs and improve citizens’ civic
education. Again, this must not be restricted to nationals alone.
Today, it is not only nationals but all people living in a country
who should be educated in involvement in public affairs, at both
local, regional and national levels.
4.3 Taking account of long-term
concerns and tackling the short-termism and short-sightedness of
democraciesNote
79. Democratic systems struggle to take account of long-term
concerns. This is all the more worrying given the current economic
and environmental crises, both of which require account to be taken
of long-term concerns and of future generations. Our governments’
economic and budgetary policies to date show that the burden of
public debt has constantly been passed on to future generations.
The environment has been sacrificed to economic and social imperatives.
80. Democratic short-sightedness of this kind is probably the
result of regular elections and the influence of opinion polls,
which determine the behaviour of modern politicians. What can be
done to correct it?
81. Personally, I am not in favour of solutions from “inside”
the representative electoral system. Instead, it is by rethinking
democracy outside this representative electoral order that we should
be able to take up this challenge and reinvigorate politics.
Note
82. Reference can be made here, for instance, to the Economic,
Social and Environmental Council in France, which could play a key
part in such a process. Similar bodies could be set up or strengthened
in other member states.
4.4 Humanising and democratising
globalisation
83. As the Greek Prime Minister Georges Papandreou put
it when addressing our Assembly a few months earlier, at a time
when the scope and consequences of the economic crisis in Greece
were probably not yet fully grasped by his European partners today
“the Council of Europe, along with the European Union, faces a renewed
and daunting task: to defend democracy at a time of globalisation,
and to humanise and democratise the process of globalisation.”
Note
84. In effect, today, as mentioned also above, globalisation provides
a great opportunity and great wealth, but is subjected to few, if
any, rules. Whether we are talking about the financial crisis, the
struggle for energy resources, the threat of climate change, or
poverty and inequality, what we lack at global level are the necessary
rules and regulations, the necessary common understanding and values,
and the necessary institutions to deal with those important challenges
in a collective, just and effective way. The Copenhagen gathering
of so many heads of state and government in December 2009 highlighted
the lack of processes and institutions and even the will to regulate
and humanise our model of growth and development in the face of
the threat of climate change.
85. If we do not meet the challenges of globalisation and face
up to them in a way that strengthens human rights, the rule of law
and the sense of justice and security for all, particularly for
those who are weaker, we will see massive competition at the global
level between the differing geopolitical interests be it over energy,
water resources or whatever else, and we will also see great insecurity
and fear at the societal level. So we either humanise and democratise
globalisation, or globalisation will become synonymous with violence
and barbarism.
86. Today, we have separated the market and the economy from the
polity in a way that allows the market, rather than our democratic
institutions and our citizens, to make policy. We need to bring
back politics so that our decisions in our economies are informed
and regulated by the democratic will of our peoples.
87. Let me quote the conclusion of Mr Papandreou, which I fully
share: “In this globalising world, the world needs more Europe,
not less. If Europe was a peace project after the First World War
and Second World War, today it is also a project in how to deal
with a globalising world. We can and must become a model for a globalising
society – one that provides that different nations, different cultures
and different languages and traditions can partake and share in
the same fundamental values and the same core practices and, in
doing so, guarantee the rule of law and a democratic and humane
globalisation.
4.5 Moving towards a transnational
democracy
88. It is again outside the system based on elections
that efforts must also be made to activate a kind of transnational
democracy.
Note It
is through citizen ownership that this should take shape in practice.
And it is through a public opinion which supports more active co-operation
between states and greater solidarity – rather than isolationism –
that states themselves will become more receptive to such international
co-operation.
89. Progress could perhaps be achieved by supporting and networking
movements formed by citizens to address specific issues. As the
problems that have to be solved locally or regionally often transcend
national borders (for example, environmental issues), transnational
networks are already growing up at this level in Europe. It is therefore
essential to give such initiatives stronger support, in the form
of know-how and financial resources, especially with an eye to a
future transnational European democracy, as the 2008 report already mentioned.
Note
90. The mere exchange of experience between movements and groups
already active at local/transnational level would be valuable in
this context.
91. Let me also note that while democracy as a mechanism for redistribution
and for producing public services remains structurally national,
democracy in terms of regulation and the recognition of rights does
not need nation states and can be national, international or transnational.
Note
92. In December 2009, the European Union Lisbon Treaty came into
force. This is important for the future of democracy in the 27 EU
member states which represent a large share of Council of Europe
member states, for several reasons. The integration of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights into the treaty and the substantial elaboration
of principles of democracy in several treaty articles will strengthen
the basic norms of liberty and democracy in all member states.
93. One special feature is the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)
which, for the first time ever in history, constitutes a transnational
citizen right and gives one million European citizens from a significant
number of member states an opportunity to present legislative proposals
to the European Commission (Article 11.4).
94. By supporting this new citizen right, the European Parliament
followed a central principle of direct democracy: it showed its
readiness to share its power with a number of citizens. Those who
see this innovation as a “baby-step” should not forget that also
the European Parliament has no power to initiate European law but can
only propose to the Commission a revision or new European law making.
95. In order to prevent this new instrument being used only by
those European organisations which have already a big lobby power
in Brussels and enable also smaller and new civil society organisations
to make use of it, the Commission and the European Parliament should
implement the ECI in such a manner as to provide communicative,
travel and translation resources to those who start to use the ECI
in a credible way.
Note
5 The Council of Europe’s contribution
5.1 Guaranteeing the right to participate
in the conduct of public affairs as a human right and a fundamental
political freedom
96. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention
of Human Rights, ratified by all but two (Monaco and Switzerland)
Council of Europe member states, guarantees the right to vote and
to be elected.
Note
97. However, there is no guarantee of the right to participate
in the conduct of public affairs. In this respect, Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 falls behind Article 21 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The latter, while it enshrines the right to free,
fair and universal suffrage in its third paragraph, guarantees in
its very first paragraph that “Everyone has the right to take part
in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives” – the word “government” being referred to in the
French version of the text as “direction
des affaires publiques” (conduct of public affairs).
98. Also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
in its Article 25, guarantees “the right and opportunity” of every
citizen “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives”.
99. In the context of the Council of Europe, considerable work
has been done to enshrine the right of participation in the conduct
of public affairs at local level.
100. Already in 1992, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention
on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level.
Although it entered into force in 1997, its record of ratifications
has been very poor: it has only been ratified by three member states
and signed by another eight.
101. Work was therefore engaged to prepare a new instrument to
guarantee the right to participate in public affairs at local level
for all, foreigners and nationals alike. This work led to the elaboration
of an Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government
on “the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority”
which was open for signature only last year, on 16 November 2009,
in Utrecht. The new protocol has already been signed by 12 member
states and ratified by two (Norway and Sweden).
102. The Utrecht protocol guarantees the right to participate in
the affairs of a local authority to “everyone within the jurisdiction”
of a state party although some specific rights are reserved only
to nationals. It defines this right as “the right to seek to determine
or to influence the exercise of a local authority’s powers and responsibilities”.
103. Interestingly enough the Preamble to the Utrecht protocol
states:
“Considering that the
right to participate in the conduct of public affairs is one of
the democratic principles that are shared by all member states of
the Council of Europe;”.
104. The question is then raised: why not enshrine the right to
participate in the conduct of public affairs, be it at local, at
regional or at national levels as a fundamental freedom and a human
right in a new protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights?
105. This would supplement, on the one hand, the right to vote
and stand for elections and, on the other, previous initiatives
taken at local level. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, in the globalising
world we live in, many local issues become global issues. For instance,
we may feel the consequences of climate change around us but it
is a global issue. And most people, especially young people, tend
to be much more interested in the conduct of public affairs at national
or even international level than in local issues.
106. The elaboration, within the Council of Europe, of a new legal
instrument, in the form of a protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights, on the right to participate in the conduct of public
affairs (without restriction to the local level) would make it clear
that this is a fundamental human right the scope of which goes beyond
the right to vote every four or five years for members of parliament
or heads of state or even to stand for elections. This would be
a concrete and high-profile contribution of our Organisation to
promoting participative democracy throughout the continent. The
drafting process in itself would offer a unique opportunity for
animating the debate on the need to increase active participation
and further involvement of people in the conduct of public affairs.
107. Of course a number of questions have to be discussed in the
context of such a process, namely as regards the beneficiaries and
the precise scope of this right. In my view, it would not make much
sense to establish today a new legal instrument on participation
if it is to limit it to nationals only. Whereas in principle the
right to participate in the conduct of public affairs should be
granted “to everyone within the jurisdiction of a state”, some specific
expressions of this right may have to be reserved to nationals or
residents. Also, should a person have the right to participate in
the conduct of public affairs of both his/her state of origin and residence?
All these are questions that need further reflection and public
debate.
108. The Venice Commission could be an excellent partner for assisting
the Assembly in elaborating a draft protocol on the right to participation
in public affairs. The Political Affairs Committee of the Assembly,
together with the Venice Commission, could indeed organise joint
hearings but also open public debates on the issue before proposing
a draft text to the Committee of Ministers for consideration. Other
interested parties could also be invited to take part in the reflection
process on an ad hoc basis.
109. In conclusion, I would therefore propose that the Assembly
decides to pursue further reflection, in close consultation with
the Venice Commission, with a view to elaborating a protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights guaranteeing the right to
participate in the public affairs.
5.2 Enhancing democratic citizenship
education
110. The Council of Europe has long-standing expertise
in the field of democratic citizenship. The latter is defined as
“education, training, dissemination, information, practices and
activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills
and understanding and moulding their attitudes and behaviour, to
empower them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and
responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active
part in democratic life, with a view to the promotion and protection
of democracy and the rule of law”.
Note
111. A major contribution by our Organisation is the Charter on
Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education,
which was developed over a period of several years with wide consultations
and finalised in 2010. This non-binding instrument provides a broad
framework for promoting democratic citizenship in formal and vocational
education and training, and the active participation of learners
and parents in the governance of educational institutions. It also
encourages multilateral and transfrontier activities, including
the existing network of co-ordinators on education for democratic
citizenship and human rights.
112. Only a few weeks ago, at its ministerial session in Strasbourg,
on 11 May 2010, the Committee of Ministers adopted a recommendation
calling on member states to comply with this charter.
Note
113. I propose that the Assembly joins the Committee of Ministers
in recommending compliance with the new charter, which will be also
used as a basis for the Council of Europe’s future work in this
field in the coming years.
5.3 Setting up a Strasbourg democracy
forum
114. The Assembly has repeatedly stated, both in its reports
and debates, that the democracy pillar of the Organisation needs
to be strengthened and gain in visibility.
115. The other two statutory pillars of the Council of Europe,
that is, human rights and the rule of law, are firmly anchored within
the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Court
case law and thus are also visible. The role of the Council of Europe
as Europe’s human rights watchdog has been widely recognised and
will be further enhanced with the process of accession of the European
Union to the ECHR following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
116. But when it comes to democracy, although progressively reinforced
since the 2005 Warsaw Summit, the Council of Europe’s message and
role are not yet visible enough. Several mechanisms and structures
today exist and important activities are regularly carried out,
such as: the Forum for the Future of Democracy, the Assembly’s biennial
debates on the state of democracy in Europe, the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the Summer University
of Democracy, bringing together each year in Strasbourg young leaders
participating in the Schools of Political Studies network – a civil
society initiative aimed at training new generations of democratic
leaders in eastern and South-Eastern Europe on key topics of European
society, with an emphasis on democratic institutions and European
co-operation.
117. However, what seems to be missing is an umbrella structure
that ensures synergies among these various structures and activities
and enhanced visibility of the Council of Europe’s pan-European
message on democracy.
118. In fact, the Forum for the Future of Democracy (FFD), created
at the Warsaw Summit, at the instigation of the Assembly, has the
advantage of bringing together all Council of Europe partners of
the democratic process in its Quadrilogue: representatives of the
Assembly, the Congress, the Committee of Ministers and the Conference
of INGOs, that is representatives of elected bodies at local and
national level, of governments and of civil society.
119. However, the very strong influence of the host country and
the limited institutional links with the Organisation’s decision-making
bodies result in a limited impact on the democracy related activities
of the Council of Europe and very limited visibility outside the
host country. It also lacks permanent high-profile direction and
leadership.
120. At present, a reform of the FFD is under way, in which the
Assembly actively participates as a partner of the Quadrilogue.
The reform proposals currently on the table are to be welcomed,
in particular as regards the ideas of transforming the previous
“advisory” body to a “steering” body with increased responsibilities, associating
external experts in the preparation of events in a Forum cycle,
as well as the decision to hold a Forum session biennially rather
than annually, etc.
121. The ongoing reform of the FFD will certainly improve its functioning
but will not solve the above-mentioned problems of ensuring high-profile
direction and leadership and increasing the Council of Europe’s visibility
as a major actor in the democracy field since the Forum sessions
will continue to be organised in various member states.
122. On the other hand, the Summer University of Democracy, which
involves the 16 Schools of Political Studies operating all over
eastern (including South Caucasus) and South-Eastern Europe, and
to which the City of Strasbourg is closely associated, is progressively
becoming a major political event attracting increased media interest.
Prominent personalities have participated in the Summer University
since it started operating in 2006.
123. However, as no Schools of Political Studies operate in western
European countries, the Summer University of Democracy represents
less than half of the Council of Europe membership.
124. Therefore, a possible solution to combine the advantages and
avoid the inconveniences of the two existing structures, the Forum
for the Future of Democracy, on the one hand, and the Summer University
of Democracy, on the other, would be to join them and organise a
major event on democracy in Strasbourg which could give greater
prominence and visibility to the Council of Europe’s message on
democracy and could be called the “Strasbourg Democracy Forum”.
125. The idea of establishing a “Davos of democracy” on the basis
of existing Council of Europe mechanisms and structures, as a real
laboratory for ideas, thoughts and expertise, was recently launched
in Mr Mignon’s report on the future of the Council of Europe in
the light of its sixty years of experience. However, the term “Davos
of democracy” was not well received by part of the Assembly’s members
and of the Ministers’ Deputies and this has influenced – I think
– discussions on the merits. I personally do not like the idea of
linking to “Davos” any future initiative in the field of democracy
either, whereas I fully share Mr Mignon’s proposal in its essence.
I also find it important to give the City of Strasbourg the opportunity
to be closely associated in a major Council of Europe event on democracy
so that the city which hosts our Organisation may increasingly be known
not only as hosting the European Court of Human Rights and the European
Parliament but also a “House of Democracy”.
126. The Strasbourg Forum would not only develop synergies among
the various existing Council of Europe structures and activities
in the field of democracy, but, above all, would provide a high-profile
laboratory for ideas, proposals and expertise in the field of democracy,
along the lines of what Mr Mignon proposed in his earlier report
and the Assembly endorsed in its
Resolution 1886 (2009). It could also serve as a barometer with respect to
the main challenges to democracy in Europe, including those raised
by globalisation, climate change, sustainable development, terrorism
and violence, organised crime, migration and racism. It could thus become
an international reference in the field of democracy.
127. Modelled on the advisory or Steering Board of the FFD, the
Strasbourg democracy forum could be organised as a structure which
associates representatives of the Quadrilogue partners (Committee
of Ministers, Assembly, Congress, INGO Conference) and the Venice
Commission, as well as representatives of the recently created Association
of the Schools of Political Studies. Participants would come from
the same bodies so that participation from all Council of Europe
member and observer states would be ensured.
128. To ensure the required co-ordination, as well as enhanced
visibility, a high-profile personality, a sort of “Delegate for
Democracy”, could lead and animate the Strasbourg democracy forum.
He or she could provide continuous reactivity on democracy-related
issues of major/current interest in a manner similar – but probably more
modest due to financial constraints – to what the Commissioner for
Human Rights does in the field of human rights. It could also be
envisaged that he or she chairs the steering board of the FFD.
129. I believe these proposals would fit perfectly well with the
Secretary General’s priorities for the Organisation who wants to
make the Council of Europe “the reference organisation in Europe
– and beyond – for human rights, rule of law and democracy”.
6 Conclusions
130. In conclusion, the report has demonstrated that the
recent world economic crisis has accentuated symptoms of crisis
of democracy which have been present for some time now. In particular:
- lack of necessary regulation
and co-operation at the international level, as well as lack of
political control over financial interests, to face the challenges
of globalisation;
- highly centralised executive decision-making and global
negotiation mechanisms with little parliamentary control, insufficient
transparency and without opportunities for citizens’ participation.
This has further bred people’s distrust in democratic institutions
and the quality of the democracy they live in and increased their
feeling of powerlessness and frustration;
- concentration of power and money, and, in some Council
of Europe member states, also an excessive concentration of the
media in the hands of a few. More and more politicians have become
dependent on the huge fortunes or the favours of those who own the
media. As inequality and the concentration of wealth increase, so
does the corruption of democratic institutions;
- a disinterest in the current institutionalised procedures
of democracy and a crisis in representation. Election turnouts have
gone into free-fall in most European countries and abstention rates
reached up to 80% in some of them in the 2009 elections to the European
Parliament;
- populist, extremist and identity politics, as well as
nationalistic rhetoric, have been reinforced during recent years
under crisis conditions in many member states;
- an almost unlimited collection of personal data by state
agencies, notably the police and social security agencies, as well
as by private companies, threatens personal freedom and privacy,
which is one of the preconditions for free participation in democratic
life.
131. Therefore, the current crisis in representation requires that,
apart from the traditional forms of mandate and delegation, with
which less and less citizens are satisfied, the political relationship
between society and the authorities must also be approached in a
different manner. Thus, without putting into question representative
democracy, it should be underlined that representation can no longer
be the only expression of democracy; the latter has also to be developed
beyond representation, in particular by the following means:
- more sustained forms of interaction
between people and the authorities must be established, beyond the conventional
representative approach, in order to include, in a carefully designed
manner, direct democratic elements in the decision-making process;
- participatory democracy should be enhanced as a process
in which all people, and not only nationals, are involved in the
conduct of public affairs, at both local, regional and national
levels;
- democracy should be understood not just as a system or
the sum of individual rights, but as a form of society which requires
rules for social justice and redistribution and implies not only
delegating and taking decisions, but also discussing and living
together in dignity, respect and solidarity. It is work in progress
which is put to the test on a daily basis;
- the renewal of politics also requires the development
of a new culture of political responsibility. The latter needs to
be considered in terms of responsiveness and accountability, as
well as transparency, on the part of those who govern.
132. The right to participate in the conduct of public affairs,
be it at local, regional or national levels, is a human right and
a fundamental political freedom and should thus be embodied as such
in the European Convention on Human Rights.
133. Humanising and democratising the process of globalisation
is another challenge the Council of Europe is facing. Its contribution
could consist in developing, along with other actors, guidelines
to regulate globalisation in full respect of human rights, including
social rights, ecological imperatives and the rule of law.
134. Stronger support should be given to transnational networks
formed by people to address specific issues, such as environmental,
social or even constitutional ones, especially in view of the advent
of transnational European democracy building. In this context, the
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) provided for by the European
Union Lisbon Treaty, which gives European citizens an opportunity
to present legislative proposals to the European Commission, thus
constituting the first instrument of transnational and direct democracy
in the European Union, is to be welcomed. The EU Institutions should
now implement the ECI in such a manner as to enable all democratically
engaged civil society groups, and not only the privileged ones,
to make use of it in the common European interest.
135. With a view to contributing to enhancing people’s participation
in the conduct of public affairs, improving the quality of democracy
and promoting the common interest, I therefore propose that the
Assembly calls on Council of Europe member states to:
- establish participatory and
deliberative structures, such as participatory budgeting, citizen-initiated referendum
processes and citizens’ juries or conferences, open to all those
living in a country and not only to nationals;
- set up, enhance and promote independent supervisory institutions,
such as ombudsperson’s offices and bodies dealing with access to
public documents and data protection, so as to enhance the concept
of political responsibility and accountability;
- improve citizenship education and political training by
ensuring compliance with the new Council of Europe Charter on Education
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education.
136. I also propose that the Assembly pursues further reflection,
in close consultation with the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), with a view to elaborating an additional protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights guaranteeing the right
to participate in the conduct of public affairs as a human right
and fundamental freedom. This would supplement, on the one hand,
the right to vote and stand for elections, guaranteed by Protocol
No. 1 to the ECHR (ratified by all but two member states of the
Council of Europe) and, on the other, similar initiatives taken
at local level.
137. Open public debates should be organised in the context of
the drafting process of the new protocol so that this process in
itself offers an opportunity for promoting public discourse and
raising awareness on the need to increase citizens’ active participation
and further involvement of all people in the conduct of public affairs.
138. Among the three main pillars of the Council of Europe, the
democracy pillar needs to be strengthened, further conceptualised
and gain in visibility. I therefore propose that:
- a Strasbourg democracy forum
be set up as an umbrella structure providing an international reference in
the field of democracy and a laboratory for new ideas and proposals
– including older ones which have been forgotten and need to be
put back on the agenda – with a view to strengthening and restoring democracy.
Such a structure could also serve as a barometer with respect to
the main new challenges to democracy in Europe today, including
those raised by globalisation;
- a high-profile personality, a sort of a “Delegate for
Democracy”, be entrusted with the task of leading and animating
the Strasbourg democracy forum, as well as disseminating, on a permanent
basis, the Council of Europe’s message on democracy-related issues
of major current interest.
139. Finally, the Assembly should invite the national parliaments
of the Council of Europe member states to examine the present report
and resolution and provide their feedback in an appropriate manner
with a view to ensuring relevant follow-up in the framework of national
legislation and policies.
