C Explanatory
memorandum by Mr Agramunt, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of the report
1. The fight against extremism represents a continuous
challenge for democracies, which must respect the rule of law and
human rights in all circumstances, including when countering threats
against democratic and human rights values.
2. The present report was initiated by a motion presented by
Mr Berényi and others, which focused on racist extremist groups
and parties. I have decided, however, to expand the scope of the
report in order to include other forms of extremism which represent
a pressing problem for European governments, such as Islamic fundamentalism
and separatism.
3. In this report, it is not my intention to point the finger
at specific political parties or groups with a view to accusing
them of being extremist. When referring to specific parties or groups,
I will only do so to illustrate how Council of Europe member states
have dealt with them, to evaluate whether they have done so in line
with European standards and verify whether there is scope for improvement.
1.2 Previous Assembly
work
4. The Assembly has played an active role in supporting
the efforts undertaken by Council of Europe member states in the
fight against extremism by adopting a number of resolutions, in
particular in recent years, as a result of the resurgence of some
forms of extremism and the increasing awareness of the threat which they
represent. In this context, the Assembly has adopted:
5. On the related matter of terrorism – which is a form of extremism
intended to provoke a state of terror in the general public for
political purposes
Note – I would like
to mention, for their relevance:
2 What
is “extremism”?
6. Historically, the idea of the “political extreme”
is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation, according to
which the midpoint stands for morally appropriate behaviour that
neither exaggerates nor understates.
7. Scientifically, various definitions of extremism have been
given. One which I found to be particularly well-fitting is “a rejection
of basic values and rules of the game in a democratic constitutional
state”.
Note
8. Even if there can be agreement on scientific definitions,
politically, putting a label of extremism on groups or parties is
a controversial matter. It is not unusual for extremists to consider
themselves as radicals, which has much less of a derogative character;
on the other hand it is not uncommon for some politicians to try
to deprive their political opponents of democratic legitimacy by
labelling them as extremists.
3 Extremist movements
on the rise
9. Extremist ideas or attitudes are not the prerogative
of the right or the left but can be found throughout the political
spectrum; in fact, some forms of extremism which have emerged over
the last decades do not fit in the traditional distinction between
right and left at all. It is an over-generalisation to say that
in Europe, nowadays, extremism is on the rise; it cannot be denied,
however, that some extremist ideas have lost their potential of
attraction, while others have acquired it and in some cases have
become a matter of concern also for the general public.
10. This trend is reflected in the composition of national parliaments,
where the number of seats occupied by representatives of extremist
parties has not ceased to increase in recent years. The same can
be said for the European Parliament, where, following the June 2009
elections, a number of far-right political parties managed to obtain
seats (the National Front from France, the National Front from Belgium,
the British National Party and the Movement for a Better Hungary).
These parties, together with others which enjoy limited or no representation
in national parliaments, have even set up the Alliance of European
National Movements, with a prospective view to forming a European
political group.
3.1 Racism
11. All over Europe, racist movements are acquiring growing
importance and have been responsible for incitement to racial violence
and racist attacks on persons and properties, sometimes leading
to the death of their victims. This phenomenon became particularly
virulent in eastern Europe and in Russia after the end of the Cold
War but continues to affect western European countries as well.
It can take various forms, such as anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsism,
xenophobia or Islamophobia.
12. Racist ideologies feed into a sub-culture addressed to young
people, using music, DVDs, books and video games to encourage hatred
against ethnic or religious groups. The same sub-culture, which
is very difficult to eradicate, finds expression on the Internet
and in some forms of hooliganism during football matches and other
sports events.
13. From the organisational point of view, racist movements or
groups often set up associations or even political parties and hide
their real nature in order not to fall under the prohibition enshrined
in the law of most Council of Europe member states. The main legal
and political challenge, however, is not so much how to tackle groups
whose deeds and discourse are outright racist, but how to deal with
“mainstream” political parties which flirt with racist ideas, in
order not to lose part of the electorate to the advantage of more
radical parties.
3.2 Islamic fundamentalism
14. Islamic fundamentalism represents a major threat
to the internal security of Council of Europe member states in so
far as Islamist groups or individuals are prepared to use violence
in Europe and/or want to impose a socio-political order which is
not compatible with democratic and human rights standards.
15. Islamic fundamentalism in Europe is not structured in political
parties or associations but it acts through independent cells that
are either dormant or active, and are spread all over the world.
This international dimension, in conjunction with a loose organisational
structure, poses huge challenges for domestic law enforcement agencies
and transnational co-operation both in prevention and detection.
What makes prevention even more complicated is that, often, it is
individuals outside any organised network who commit criminal acts
inspired by Islamic fundamentalism, as was the case for the murder
of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 or for the attempted
murder of Kurt Westergaard, the author of the controversial cartoons of
Mohammed, in January 2010.
16. There should be no confusion between Islam as a religion and
Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology: “Islam is the second religion
in Europe and a constituent component of European societies: in
some Council of Europe member states, it is traditionally the religion
professed by the majority of the population; in others, it is the
religion of the majority of immigrants and of citizens with an immigrant
background, who represent a growing proportion of the population.
Islamic fundamentalism, instead, is an extremist ideology with a
political agenda, which promotes a model of society which is not
compatible with human rights values and standards of democracy,
and which, in its worst form, calls for the use of violence to achieve
its aims”.
Note
17. Although still a marginal phenomenon in Europe, Islamist ideology
exerts a growing attraction for young European Muslims, finding
a breeding ground in their frustration due to discrimination, racism,
lack of equal opportunities, social exclusion, low educational achievement
and unemployment, which tend to affect them more extensively than
the rest of the population, and the preclusion – de jure or de facto
– of the ordinary channels which are open to citizens for the expression
of such dissatisfaction.
18. In parallel with the increased potential of attraction of
Islamic fundamentalism, the perception by public opinion of the
threat that it represents has also increased, especially due to
the great mediatisation of the terrorist attacks that, starting
with September 11 2001 in the United States, hit Istanbul (2003),
Madrid (March 2004), London (July 2005) and other cities in the
world.
19. Unfortunately, this has also provoked the rise of Islamophobia
and episodes of racism and mistrust against Muslims, in European
societies where, due to immigration, the number of citizens or residents belonging
to this religious faith is constantly on the rise and where a growing
number of people manifest their Muslim faith by wearing cultural
or religious symbols, such as head-scarves or the niquab, or by
growing a beard.
20. In the current context, European governments face two major
challenges:
- the first one
is how to tackle Islamic fundamentalism as a political ideology
without stigmatising Islam as a religion;
- the other, which has been postponed for too long, is how
to initiate an honest and inclusive debate on how it is possible
to reconcile some aspects of Muslim religion, practice or culture
with fundamental values, such as the secular character of the state
and the equality between women and men. In my opinion, it would
greatly help to calm down the fears and the mistrust of European
citizens if they were reassured that no erosion of these values
will be allowed, even in the name of an alleged respect of freedom
of religion.
3.3 Organisations fomenting
extremist activities in other countries
21. In Europe, nowadays, there are a number of extremist
groups, formed by foreign citizens, which are not interested in
doing harm to the host country but take advantage of the freedoms
and rights afforded by European democracies in order to pursue extremist
objectives in their members’ countries of origin, such as the overthrowing
of the authorities through violent means, political destabilisation
through terrorist or guerrilla attacks, or secession. Examples of
these groups include Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which has bases
in France and possibly also in Portugal, and the People's Mujahedin
of Iran, which is present in many Council of Europe member states.
22. These groups use the host country as a basis where:
- they can form associations or
non-governmental organisations under the relevant legislation of
the host country, are subjected to the relevant obligations and
benefit from the relevant advantages, also in tax terms;
- they carry out propaganda activities in support of their
objectives, by holding demonstrations, distributing information,
material, etc.;
- they recruit members and collect funds;
- they establish links with sister organisations in other
countries, while the “mother” organisation in the country of origin
may be banned and its members subjected to prosecution – but sometimes
also to persecution – by the authorities.
23. Some of these groups are listed as terrorist organisations
by national authorities or the European Union, in which case they
are forbidden, such as ETA, the IRA, the GRAPO (the First of October
Anti-Fascist Resistance Group), HAMAS, etc. It is not unusual, however,
for terrorist organisations to reconstitute themselves under a different
name and a different statute after having been dissolved, in order
to continue to operate.
3.4 Separatism
24. A number of Council of Europe member states have
to tackle the threat of groups calling for the separation of a part
of their territories in order to form a separate independent state
or to unite with another state. Some of them are prepared to use
violence in order to achieve their goal.
25. It is not uncommon for separatist movements to have two wings:
an armed one, which is considered as a terrorist organisation and
is normally banned on these grounds (such as Euskadi ta Askatasuna,
[ETA] in Spain, the Workers Party of Kurdistan [PKK] in Turkey,
the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland) and a political one,
which often takes the form of a political party. The extent, or
even the right, to which these political wings can act on the public
and political scene and participate in elections depend on whether
they are prepared to act through lawful means and to refuse violence,
for instance, in Spain, Batasuna, a political party linked to ETA
which was banned in 2003, due to its failure to condemn ETA’s violence.
Note
4 Fight against extremism:
priorities for more effective action
4.1 Adopting a more
strategic approach to address the root causes of extremism
26. Although extremism can take different forms, the
reasons why it has a potential of attraction are the same, namely:
the failure of the political system to ensure participation by all
segments of society, lack of equal opportunities, poverty, discrimination
and a feeling of exclusion.
27. Council of Europe member states should make further efforts
to address these root causes, with a strategic approach:
- emphasis should be placed on
sensitive groups, such as young people, immigrants and minorities,
in order to give them the instruments to resist the appeal of extremism,
through the provision of civic and human rights education in schools
but also through the involvement of NGOs and civil society representing
these groups in consultation processes, with the authorities, at
local, regional and national level;
- there should be a clear and sustainable immigration policy,
accompanied by a clear and appropriately-funded integration policy;
- states should take resolute action against discrimination,
in all fields;
- they should strengthen their commitment to intercultural
dialogue, including in its religious dimension;
- political representatives should endeavour to explain
potentially controversial policies or decisions in a clear way,
in order to address the widest possible audience, avoid misinterpretations
by some segments of society and reduce the impact of political manipulations;
- regional or minority languages and cultures should not
be repressed; on the contrary, they should be protected and promoted.
4.2 Improving monitoring
and data collection
28. Although a major problem in contemporary Europe,
extremism is not a very well studied phenomenon from the scientific
point of view, especially when it is of transnational character,
with academic literature concentrating only on some countries or
some political parties.
29. At the same time, the monitoring of the phenomenon is not
systematic: some Council of Europe member states collect data on
specific aspects, most often the racist nature of crimes which are
reported to the police (for instance, Austria, Germany, France and
Sweden).
30. These figures are certainly useful to identify trends. In
Austria, for instance, the number of complaints against right-wing
extremist, xenophobic and anti-semitic behaviour has soared over
the last two years, rising from 419 in 2006 to 752 in 2007 and to
831 in 2008.
Note
31. However, these data reflect only one aspect of the phenomenon
of extremism, they are not completely accurate as not all cases
are reported, and they are not comparable with the data collected
by other countries because of different definitions used to label
a crime as racist. The European Union Fundamental Rights Agency
considers the absence of reliable and comparable statistical data
in this field as a major flaw. The European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance (ECRI) regularly underlines, in its country-by-country reports,
the importance of establishing and operating a system for recording
and monitoring racist incidents.
4.3 Ensuring adequate
intelligence and analysis, under democratic scrutiny
32. A complex and ever-changing phenomenon, such as extremism,
requires the setting up of flexible but efficient intelligence and
analysis structures. Just to give an example, in Germany the Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz),
which is tasked with the collection and analysis of intelligence
concerning efforts directed against the free and democratic order,
has undergone a comprehensive restructuring since the September
11 attacks and major investments have been made in order to improve
its technical expertise in the informatics field.
33. Needless to say, as already highlighted by the Assembly, it
is imperative that intelligence bodies are subjected to democratic
oversight.
Note Unfortunately, in recent
months, a number of examples have been observed where relevant parliamentary
committees have met with difficulties or have been prevented altogether
from having access to files, often because this would have put at
prejudice co-operation between the national intelligence agency
and foreign agencies.
Note
4.4 Introducing an
appropriate legal framework and ensuring its consistent implementation
34. From the legal point of view, member states have
built up a framework against extremism, based on:
- their constitutions which, especially
in countries that have experienced totalitarian regimes, often include the
explicit prohibition to form or reconstitute totalitarian parties;
- criminal law;
- specific anti-terrorism legislation, which was introduced
or reviewed after the terrorist attacks of September 11;
- in a few cases, specific anti-extremism legislation, as
is the case in Moldova and the Russian Federation.
35. However, criticism has been raised at the compliance of this
legislation, especially legislation adopted in the aftermath of
terrorist attacks, with national constitutions and the main international
instruments for the protection of human rights, including Council
of Europe instruments such as the ECHR. The main points of criticism
concern the exceedingly general or vague definition of the crimes,
as well as the lack of appropriate guarantees in the gathering and
use of personal data by the authorities, the increased power of
law enforcement officials to arrest and the lack of appropriate
judicial oversight over such arrests and detentions.
36. The fact that this legal framework is not applied systematically
and consistently to all forms of extremism is also a matter of concern:
it makes one wonder about the existence of a deliberate political
decision to target certain extremist groups while tolerating others.
37. An issue of particular importance in this context is the limitations
that can be imposed on extremist political parties. The constitutional
and legal framework of the majority of Council of Europe member
states emphasises the threat posed by extremist political parties.
The underlying reason is the recognition of the special importance
of pluralism and the role played by political parties in a democracy.
The measures foreseen to limit the activities of extremist parties
vary in intensity. They are:
- a
ban on forming a political party and subsequent dissolution;
- the prohibition imposed on a political party on running
in elections;
- the prohibition on obtaining public funding.
38. For instance, either at constitutional or at legal level,
racist parties are prohibited in Portugal; fascist parties are prohibited
in Bulgaria, Italy and Portugal; in Poland there is a ban against
parties using totalitarian methods; parties promoting discrimination
or racial hatred are forbidden in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, France,
Spain, Ukraine and the Russian Federation; parties calling for violence
are forbidden in Albania, Denmark, France, Georgia, Latvia, Portugal
and Ukraine.
39. In a few Council of Europe member states there are no provisions
on banning political parties; in others, such as Switzerland, the
requirements are so high that it is nearly impossible to do so in
a time of peace. In some other Council of Europe member states,
such as Denmark, Finland and Liechtenstein, this possibility exists
but has not been applied for decades.
40. Finally, some countries, such as Turkey, have a long history
of party closure, a matter which has been followed very closely
by the Council of Europe, including the Assembly and the European
Court of Human Rights (the Court), within their respective remits.
In 2004, when closing the monitoring procedure for Turkey, while
acknowledging that the relevant judgments of the Court taken between
1991 and 1997 had been appropriately executed, the Assembly emphasised
that the frequency with which political parties were dissolved was
a real source of concern and called for a full revision of the constitution
and a comprehensive review of the law on political parties. These
concerns were reiterated in the Assembly’s latest resolution on
the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey, which focused
on the judicial proceedings aimed at dissolving the ruling Party
AK.
Note The latest party dissolution
in Turkey took place only a few weeks ago and concerned the pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (DTP).
Note
4.5 Enhancing international
co-operation
41. International co-operation is fundamental in order
to counter extremist groups based on international networks. A challenging
problem is how to effectively block the distribution of extremist
material online. The Internet is the main tool used by extremist
movements in order to:
- communicate
with other members;
- spread propaganda, by setting up websites or sending extremist
promotion material to random addressees who had not expressed any
interest;
- recruit, for instance by advertising training, summer
holidays or other activities under the cover of which they broaden
their membership;
- raise funds.
42. It is indeed a serious difficulty for domestic enforcement
agencies that the majority of extremist websites are hosted outside
Europe, and therefore cannot be taken down from the Internet even
if such a power is granted under relevant anti-terrorism or anti-extremism
legislation. At the moment, the British, Czech, Dutch and German
governments are co-operating on a research project in this field,
in order to identify ways to make it possible to filter extremist
websites even if the domain is located outside Europe. At the same
time, the European Commission has agreed to fund a project called
Exploring the Islamist Extremist Web of Europe – Analysis and Preventive
Approaches, in the context of its anti-terrorism activities.
5 The activities
of the Council of Europe
43. In its sixty years of existence, the Council of Europe
has largely contributed to the elaboration of democratic and human
rights standards and assisted member states in attaining them, also
in their fight against extremism. In addition, through its manifold
monitoring mechanisms, as well as through the case law of its European
Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe has highlighted deficiencies
and shortcomings in member states’ law and practice, and indicated
how to remedy them. As far as terrorism is concerned, it is worth
mentioning the Council of Europe guidelines on human rights and
the fight against terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers
in 2002.
44. The fight against extremism is thus closely linked with the
main expertise of the Organisation, namely how European democracies
can counter extremism in a manner which upholds democratic principles
and the respect for human rights.
5.1 Freedom of association
45. Both the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission) and the European Court of Human Rights have
spelled out limits to what Council of Europe member states can do
to restrict the activities of extremist political parties, respectively
through a comprehensive series of guidelines adopted in 1999 and
a rich case law.
46. The European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, the Convention)
itself states that restrictions to freedom of association are possible
but only when they are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others
(Article 11, paragraph 2).
47. The first caveat to keep in mind is that a party that aims
at a peaceful change of the constitutional order through lawful
means should not be prohibited or dissolved for this. Merely challenging
the established order in itself cannot be considered as a punishable
offence in a democratic state. In its case law, the Court has clarified
that a political party may promote a change in the law or the constitutional
order of a state on two conditions: firstly, the means used to such
an end must be legal and democratic; secondly, the change in itself must
be compatible with fundamental democratic principles.
48. On the contrary, a political party which incites violence
or promotes policies which fail to respect democracy or which aims
at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and
freedoms laid down in the Convention, cannot lay claim to the protection
of the Convention against penalties imposed on those grounds:
Note as Article 17 of the Convention clarifies,
nothing in it should be interpreted as implying for any state, group
or person, any right to engage in an activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms set forth
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the Convention.
49. As the Venice Commission says in its 1999 Guidelines: “prohibition
or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified
in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use
violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional
order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the constitution.” (guideline 3).
50. In addition, banning or dissolving a political party is an
exceptional measure and other avenues should be explored before
having recourse to it: “The
prohibition or dissolution of political parties as a particularly
far-reaching measure should be used with utmost restraint. Before
asking the competent judicial body to prohibit or dissolve a party,
governments or other state organs should assess, having regard to
the situation of the country concerned, whether the party really
represents a danger to the free and democratic political order or to
the right of individuals and whether other, less radical measures
could prevent the said danger” (guideline 5) and “Legal measures
directed to the prohibition or legally enforced dissolution of political
parties shall be a consequence of a judicial finding of unconstitutionality
and shall be deemed as an exceptional nature and governed by the
principle of proportionality. Any such measure must be based on
sufficient evidence that the party itself and not only individual
members pursue political objectives using, or preparing to use, unconstitutional
means” (guideline 6).
51. The Venice Commission guidelines reflect a consistent case
law of the Court which has repeatedly stated that the dissolution
of a political party is the most drastic measure; a measure of such
severity should be applied only in the most serious cases.
Note
52. For its part, the Assembly, in its
Resolution 1308 (2002) on restrictions on political parties in the Council of
Europe member states, underlined that, although democracies have
the right to defend themselves against extremist parties, the dissolution
of political parties should be regarded as an exceptional measure
to be applied only in cases where the party concerned uses violence
or threatens civil peace and the democratic constitutional order
of the country.
Note
5.2 Freedom of expression
53. Also freedom of expression, enshrined in Article
10 of the Convention, is not an absolute right: in the Assembly’s
words, the enjoyment of this right “may be limited by competing
public interests, amongst which are the prevention of disorder,
the protection of morals and the protection of the rights of others.
In particular, this allows for limitation of these rights and freedoms
when they are exercised is such a way as to cause, incite, promote,
advocate, encourage or justify racism, xenophobia and intolerance”.
Note
54. A number of Council of Europe texts have been adopted on the
issue of hate speech, and the necessity to introduce it as a crime
in domestic legislation. According to the Committee of Ministers,
the expression “hate speech” covers “all forms of expression that
spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism
or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination
and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of migrant origin”.
Note
55. The Council of Europe published a detailed and comprehensive
handbook on hate speech in 2008, which reviews the relevant case
law of the Court, clarifying the limits to freedom of expression,
which can vary according to:
- the
context in which the relevant statements are made (political or
religious);
- the capacity of the people having made the statement (politicians,
journalists or civil servants);
- the instruments (press, television) and the potential
impact of the statement.
56. As regards the use of the Internet, it is worth recalling
the 2003 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, which
envisages the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic
nature committed through computer systems.
5.3 Fight against racism
and intolerance
5.3.1 The European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
57. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) is the Council of Europe human rights monitoring mechanism
entrusted with the task of combating racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance in Europe from the perspective
of the protection of human rights, in the light of the Convention,
its additional protocols and related case law.
Note
58. ECRI’s objectives are: to review member states’ legislation,
policies and other measures to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism
and intolerance, and their effectiveness; to propose further action
at local, national and European level; to formulate general policy
recommendations to member states; to study international legal instruments
applicable in the matter with a view to their reinforcement where
appropriate.
59. ECRI provides Council of Europe member states with advice
on how to tackle problems of racism and intolerance in their country.
To this end, through a system of periodic visits and reports, it
examines in each country the legal framework for combating racism
and racial discrimination, its practical implementation, the existence
of independent bodies to assist victims of racism, the situation
of vulnerable groups in specific policy areas (education, employment,
housing, etc.) and the tone of political and public debate around
issues relevant for these groups.
60. In addition, ECRI carries out work on general themes and adopts
general policy recommendations. Amongst the most relevant for the
present report are General Policy Recommendation No. 5 on combating intolerance
and discrimination against Muslims, No. 7 on national legislation
to combat racism and racial discrimination and No. 8 on combating
racism while fighting terrorism.
61. Whereas its privileged interlocutors are governments, ECRI
has decided to consolidate the communication aspect of its work,
being convinced that combating racism can only be effective if the
anti-racist message filters down to society in general. This has
involved, among other things, organising round tables in member
states and strengthening co-operation with other interested parties
such as NGOs, the media, and the youth sector.
5.3.2 The Commissioner
for Human Rights
62. The Commissioner for Human Rights is an independent
institution within the Council of Europe, mandated to promote the
awareness of and respect for human rights in the organisation’s
member states. Its tasks are: fostering the effective observance
of human rights and assisting member states in the implementation
of Council of Europe human rights standards; promoting education
in and awareness of human rights in Council of Europe member states;
identifying possible shortcomings in the law and practice concerning human
rights; facilitating the activities of the national ombudsperson
institutions and other human rights structures; and providing advice
and information regarding the protection of human rights across
the region.
63. The eradication of discrimination in Europe has been mainstreamed
in the work of the current Commissioner, Mr Thomas Hammarberg. Particularly
in the context of his country’s monitoring work, the Commissioner
examines and makes recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness
of national polices as well as legal and institutional frameworks
against discrimination. His interlocutors include a broad range
of actors, from governments to the victims of discrimination themselves
and non-governmental organisations representing them.
64. Also the Commissioner devotes great attention to the outreach
impact of his work. His Viewpoints and press articles which he publishes
in international journals and newspapers often address xenophobia, Islamophobia,
anti-gypsyism, anti-Semitism, discrimination against minorities
and the need to safeguard human rights in the fight against terrorism.
6 Concluding remarks
65. In recent years there has been an upsurge of certain
forms of extremism in Europe which pursue objectives that are in
contravention with Europe’s democratic and human rights values and,
in the worst cases, condone or even promote violence.
66. Council of Europe member states have become increasingly aware
of the threat of extremism and have put in place a number of legal
and policy instruments to tackle it. However, the implementation
of existing instruments is not uniform for all forms of extremism
and serious problems remain as regards the compatibility of national
legislation with Council of Europe conventions and guidelines. I
have, therefore, formulated some proposals and recommendations which
I have attached to this report.
67. In conclusion, I would like to mention what I see as future
trends:
6.1 The foreseeable
impact of the financial crisis
68. The current financial crisis and its consequences
on poverty and unemployment in Council of Europe member states might
aggravate the present trend of resurgence of extremist movements.
On the one hand, extremist groups reviewed in this memorandum will
find more and more fertile ground for recruiting new members; on
the other hand, other radical protest movements might become more
virulent and better organised. I am thinking, in particular, of
the anti-globalisation movement, some members of which have been condemned
for vandalism due to their behaviour during demonstrations, or to
the street protests and disorders which took place in Greece during
several weeks in 2009.
69. The Council of Europe should exercise increased vigilance
on these possible developments. In this context I welcome the ECRI’s
ongoing reflections on the impact of the economic crisis on racism
and intolerance.
6.2 The danger of stigmatising
immigration
70. The effects of the financial crisis will be felt
also in developing countries from Asia and Africa. It is, therefore,
predictable that migration flows into Europe will increase and that
calls for more restrictive immigration policies will rise.
71. Calling for restrictive immigration policies is a legitimate
political stand; however, these calls become unacceptable when they
rely on racist arguments.
72. In recent years, in parallel to the growing importance of
Europe as a destination for migrants and asylum seekers from Africa
and Asia, there has already been a rise in the electoral support
to parties which, although not having a programme which can be considered
as extremist in its entirety, stigmatise immigration as a problem
for society, linking it to insecurity, criminality, poverty and
social problems.
73. The risk of this trend is, on the one hand, the erosion of
the human rights of refugees and migrants; on the other, the rise
in more or less overt racism and xenophobia, in political discourse
as well as amongst the general public.
6.3 The urgency of
addressing the concerns of European Muslims and preventing their radicalisation
74. On 29 November 2009, the majority of the Swiss electorate
voted in favour of a provision which will prevent the construction
of additional minarets in Switzerland. This decision was met with
concern and disappointment by all the main human rights organisations
and bodies, including the Council of Europe.
75. Observers explained this vote on the basis of the widespread
fear of Islamic fundamentalism, which has been manipulated by some
political forces. However, as the President of the Assembly remarked
in his statement, the decision not to build any more minarets in
Switzerland cannot have any positive role in addressing the causes
of Islamist extremism; on the contrary, this decision will be resented
by Muslims in Switzerland – who represent 5% of the population,
as a discrimination and a violation of their fundamental rights,
and will aggravate their feeling of exclusion.
76. This example highlights the challenges which we are confronted
with as politicians: how to tackle effectively Islamist extremism
– which is contrary to our values – without alienating European
Muslims; how to ensure that European citizens understand the difference
between the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and the peaceful
practice of Islam as a religion; how to prevent the spreading of
Islamophobia and stereotypes against Muslims and protect Muslims
from discrimination; how to ensure that intercultural dialogue takes
root in our societies.
6.4 Ethics in politics
77. In 2003, the President of the Assembly and the President
of the European Parliament signed the Charter of European Political
Parties for a Non-Racist Society. This text was a civil society
initiative which had received the support of the EUMC, the European
Union Fundamental Rights Agency’s precursor, and called on political parties
to act responsibly when dealing with issues related to race, ethnic
and national origin and religion.
78. Although the establishment of a steering committee to monitor
the implementation of the charter was initially envisaged, there
was no follow-up. In my view, the charter is more than ever a valuable
basis for introducing more ethics in politics, and I strongly encourage
the Assembly political groups and individual members to further
promote it at national level. Likewise, I subscribe to the Declaration
on the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic elements in political
discourse, adopted by ECRI in 2005, which, in my opinion, should
be better disseminated amongst political parties.
79. In particular, I would like to commend the suggestion made
by ECRI, that self-regulatory measures should be introduced by political
parties or national parliaments aimed at sanctioning party members
or parliamentarians who promote racism and xenophobia. This view
is also supported by the Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice
in the Field of Political Parties.
