B Explanatory
memorandum by Mr Bies, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. At the sixteenth session of
the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, held in Cancun (Mexico) on 9 December 2010, the
Director General of the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Mr William Lacy Swing, stated that “[c]limate change is already triggering
displacement and migration, as a result of increasingly intense
weather events, rising sea levels, and accelerated environmental
degradation. In the future, we may be facing an increase in population
flows that the world is presently ill-equipped to tackle effectively.
While climate change is not the only driver of such movements, it
is likely to be one of the major ones in the decades to come”.
2. Recent events have corroborated these words and shown that
much still remains to be done in order to address this new challenge.
3. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) estimates that about 50 million people have been displaced
worldwide. Although the majority of these people have been forced
from their homes because of conflicts, persecution and violence
or for economic reasons, forced migration is increasingly being
attributed to other factors such as natural, environmental and chemical
disasters, the consequences of climate change, food insecurity and
development policies. The growing inability of States to meet essential
needs and secure fundamental rights for those living within their
territories is a contributory factor in worsening this state of
affairs, so that these people have no alternative but to migrate.
4. Another factor complicates matters; some forms of migration
can act as strategies for adapting to pressures which may force
people to emigrate in the future. Thus early migration can reduce
vulnerability and enhance the resilience of communities of origin,
thanks to diversification of income and accumulation of financial
and social remittances.
5. These new factors forcing people to change their surroundings
are of a growing intensity but are not recognised by legislation
governing migration. The global governance system must therefore
acknowledge the vulnerability of the groups concerned in order to
provide adequate protection for their rights, for instance by establishing
a new category of forced migrants and identifying gaps in their
protection status. Accordingly, it is necessary to review the relevant
international rules and, in particular, the United Nations 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
6. This therefore raises the question what is meant by forced
migration and protection. One of the aims of this report is to answer
the question whether protection should extend beyond refugees under
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol
and, if so, what would be the European and international legislative
framework for meeting the expectations of the victims of forced
migration.
2 Distinguishing between forced
migrants and economic migrants
7. Before discussing the new causes
of forced migration, I would recall the background to migratory
flows. In the last half century, the three most common types of
migration have been permanent resettlement (mainly for economic
reasons), temporary labour migration and forced migration (due to
violence or armed conflicts). All these often led subsequently to
migration for the purpose of family reunification, which became
the largest flow in several receiving countries. Furthermore, as
migration trends have evolved, combinations of the three aforementioned
types have become common, with migrants citing several causes for
leaving their countries of origin.
8. After the Second World War, officially sanctioned flows of
economic migrants under guest worker programmes helped establish
bridges between communities in the countries of origin and the receiving countries,
making the adjustment easier for newcomers. Much of the current
debate on European migration policy centres on the regulation of
economic migration. In particular, policies have been aimed at giving
high-skilled workers precedence over low-skilled workers.
9. Furthermore, the debate focuses on distinguishing between
refugees and economic migrants, even though it is often impossible
to make such a distinction. The pressure to migrate is often based
on the desire both to escape impoverishment and to flee from conflict
and human rights abuses; weak economies are often also States which
are unable to protect their citizens’ human rights. The causes of
migration therefore involve various motivations, often including
the desire to improve conditions both for the migrants themselves
and for their families.
10. Studies of migration in Africa point to the fact that the
decision to send one family member abroad is a collective survival
strategy that concerns the entire community. A family invests its
sparse resources in one family member, usually the eldest son, believing
that the benefits of this investment might be better realised in a
more secure, stable economy. This kind of strategy represents a
coping mechanism for people living in crisis-ridden conditions.
It does not mean that the migrant is invariably sent to another
country; it might involve rural-to-urban migration as well. Therefore,
when analysing the new forms of forced migration, it becomes evident that
economics, without a doubt, also enter into the rationalisation
of the decision to leave, thereby blurring the distinction between
forced and economic migrants. For example, some of the consequences
of slow-onset climate change will include desertification, the shrinking
of fertile land and rising sea levels, making living conditions
untenable in some areas.
3 Emerging forms of forced
displacement
11. Despite the complexities of
separating out the different factors compelling individuals, households
and communities to migrate, it is clear that new and interacting
pressures to migrate from phenomena outside the control of those
affected are likely to increase in the future. Climate change and
environmental stress are increasingly significant features of forced
displacement and mobility.
12. However, I wish to mention that, concerning climate change
and environmental stress, the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa could provide
a sound basis for protecting the rights of people susceptible to
internal displacement in the context of climate change, natural
disasters or environmental stress.
3.1 Natural, environmental and
chemical or nuclear disasters
13. Parallels between the Fukushima
disaster and the 1986 Chernobyl power plant explosion have been drawn
in terms of the government response to both disasters. The governments
of both Japan and the USSR adopted a heavy-handed, directive approach
to communicating with their populations; and while this method proved
effective in the short term for the evacuation of the immediately
affected areas, it also resulted in a lack of clear information
about contamination and environmental degradation in the medium
to long term. In the areas surrounding Chernobyl, the official announcement
was very short and there were no clear instructions for evacuation.
Following the disaster in Chernobyl, a computer system was developed
in Japan to predict the spread of radioactive particles the better
to guide evacuations; however, most radiation dose-monitoring systems
had been damaged by the tsunami or deactivated by the loss of power.
Inadequate communications with affected populations and ill-planned
relocation efforts have continued to plague these communities, leaving
millions in contaminated areas. Furthermore, accidents of this nature
do not occur in a vacuum. The contamination continues to have an
untold impact on the oceans, producing the largest discharge of
radioactive material in history.
3.2 Consequences of climate
change
14. Given the potential impact
of climate change on migration and the necessary distinction between
climate processes and climate events, it is expedient to develop
a definition applicable to the populations affected. It can be seen
that these consequences are already beginning to take effect, for
instance in Asia and the Pacific. In this context, the World Bank
has identified Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Myanmar and Pakistan
as the countries with the highest risk of mass environment-related
displacement.
15. Another disturbing trend in the Asia-Pacific region is the
sinking of islands, which represents an unprecedented challenge
to the international community. Island nations like the Maldives,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Kiribati are among those perceived as the most
vulnerable to population displacement due to rising sea levels. The
international community has a responsibility to protect the rights
of these vulnerable populations and must endeavour to maintain their
collective rights should entire nations need to be resettled as
their territory disappears.
16. The substantial majority of climate-induced displaced persons
try to remain in their own country. The question which must be considered
concerns the specific protection of migrants displaced owing to
climate change, and who has the duty to protect them. It is in fact
the duty of States to provide for the vulnerable conditions to which
people and communities are exposed, because all forced migrants
must receive some form of protection.
17. As we can see, environmental migrants are not protected by
the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol and even proposals to create
a new international convention on environmental refugees have found
no support.
18. However, Sweden and Finland have less restrictive temporary
protection provisions which open the possibility for claims resulting
from environmental displacement. The Finnish Aliens Act provides
“aliens residing in the country are to be issued with a residence
permit on the basis of a need for protection if they cannot return
because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster”.
19. Another initiative in the context of events due to environmental
and climate change is the Nansen Initiative, led by the Governments
of Norway and Switzerland, intended to fill the legal gap in the
protection of people displaced across national borders due to natural
disasters, particularly in the context of climate change.
3.3 Food insecurity
20. Food insecurity is a problem
already affecting the world’s most vulnerable populations; however,
it is also a common symptom of inadequate resettlement policy and
a consequence of slow-onset climate change. Being uprooted from
a habitual place of residence increases a community’s risk of suffering
from temporary or chronic undernourishment, which is defined as
calorie-protein intake levels less than the minimum amount required
for normal growth and work.
21. A two-year research project conducted by the European Commission
called the Environmental Change and Forced Scenarios project (EACH-FOR)
showed that with changing precipitation patterns and increasing populations,
shortages of water and food are likely to occur unless strict adaptation
policies are adopted. Rising sea levels near low-lying agricultural
plains could also lead to sea-water intrusion, causing a potential
40% decrease in food and grain production in Bangladesh, forcing
populations into shanty towns. These forecasts serve to highlight
the fact that the most vulnerable populations will be impacted by
a combination of push factors prompting them to leave their present
places of residence, making migration inevitable in some cases.
22. In this context, I shall refer to a study on migration in
Bangladesh funded by the British Department for International Development
and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which supported the Climate
and Development Knowledge Network on behalf of the Bangladeshi Government.
In the study it is suggested that specialised training centres be
established in those locations prone to the impacts of climate change
so that vulnerable people and communities can better benefit from
their migration by making it a skilled rather than unskilled labour
migration.
23. Gauging the potential scope of the forced displacement that
will take place in the coming decades will be necessary in order
to implement a meaningful policy framework to address it. Estimates
of the number of people who have been or will be displaced this
century vary considerably among the international research organisations
that have worked on these forecasts. According to the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, environmental
migrants have already exceeded the number of refugees displaced by
war. The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) estimates
that the flow of environmental migrants will reach 150 million by
2050, while the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
puts forward a figure closer to 200 million.
3.4 Development policies and
projects
24. Development policies and projects
are often a major cause of forced displacement, especially in regions of
high growth. These types of large-scale infrastructure projects,
which include roads, dams and reservoirs, utility networks, airports
and urban and industrial development, are frequently accompanied
by the uprooting of development-induced displacees (DIDs).
25. Governments have a responsibility to protect internally displaced
populations, rather than considering the negative side effects as
a mere externality to be tolerated. Resettlement failure occurs
because the welfare of the affected population is given a low priority
in the planning phase and the displaced population is rarely consulted
directly. Rather than land-for-land and cash compensation, development
projects should involve the affected populations as much as possible
and compensation should also include a “generalised safety net”. Furthermore,
responsibility for implementing population resettlement has often
been assigned to the agency in charge of the infrastructure projects,
whereas engineering and civil works firms do not necessarily possess
the knowledge and skills for relocating vulnerable populations.
Resettlement should be the responsibility of a more appropriate
agency possessing experience in migrant relocation. In this way,
policy planning would better reflect the social and cultural needs
of DIDs, allowing the effects of these changes to be distributed
more widely.
3.5 Importance of the reaction
of States
26. Fragile and failing States
are unable to provide for the population’s fundamental rights and
needs on their respective territories. In this context of poor governance,
the movement of large groups can rekindle disputes between formerly
divided ethnic groups, bringing these groups into close proximity
and into competition for resources. For example, in Nigeria, 3 500
square kilometres of land is becoming desert each year, shrinking the
arable land available and aggravating competition for it. The crisis
in Darfur is believed to have at least partly originated because
of an extended drought, and a similar catalyst could easily emerge
elsewhere.
27. In order to help the States, particularly the most vulnerable,
to address this problem, it would be useful to prepare country/regional
reports in order to gather information and assess the evidence on
environmental migration on a scale that could be useful for policymakers.
3.6 Reactions and consequences
resulting from the different social categories
28. Beside all of the general problems
of forced migration, I want to underline also that of the different
social categories and their consequences. As a general remark, I
noted that people coming from a higher social class had fewer problems
when displacing internally or even when emigrating.
29. Indeed, the ability to migrate internationally typically requires
money and family contacts in the country of destination. Therefore,
the emerging forms of forced migration will probably result in more
internal displacement than in international border crossing. Migrants
will often seek refuge rather in places where there are cultural
or ethnic similarities, or where precedents or post-colonial relationships
exist. National adaptation strategies must be put in place to mitigate
the vulnerability of IDPs.
30. Likewise, women and vulnerable people encounter more difficulties
in going abroad and so prefer to desist even if their living conditions
are disastrous.
4 Definitions and the current
legal framework
31. It was as early as 1990 that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change claimed that the movement of
people could be the biggest single impact of climate change, warning
that people would be displaced by coastal flooding, shoreline erosion
and a myriad of extreme weather conditions. The term “environmental refugees”
had been coined even earlier, in the 1980s, but is a source of much
controversy, and still no universally recognised term exists. Furthermore,
the current international legal framework does not afford these
new vulnerable groups full protection.
4.1 Gaps in the international
legal framework
32. The international legal framework
does provide for a degree of protection for forced migration as
a result of causes or “push factors” other than human rights violations;
however, there is still a lack of consensus on where many of these
migrants fit into the existing structures.
33. Article 1A of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees defines refugees as those who, owing to a well-founded
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or
political affiliation, are outside the country of their nationality
and unable to return owing to this fear. This definition excludes
a growing number of cases where people are forced to move because
of events beyond their control.
34. There are other international guidelines and standards which
also apply to forced migrants, including the United Nations Economic
and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Operational
Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters and the Nansen
Initiative, which is a State-led process outside the United Nations
framework. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state
that people have the right not to be arbitrarily displaced from their
place of residence and that IDPs have the right to seek safety in
another part of the country and to leave the country. The Operational
Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters aim to ensure that
displaced persons’ rights are maintained and acknowledge that they
have a need for greater protection and assistance. Lastly, the Nansen
Initiative, which was launched by the Governments of Switzerland
and Norway in October 2012, seeks to build a consensus on a protection
agenda that addresses the needs of people who have been displaced
by natural disasters, including those resulting from climate change.
35. Examples of arrangements can be found in national legislation,
such as temporary protected status (TPS) in the United States and
the Temporary Protection Directive at European Union level, aimed
at protecting groups of people who have been displaced by natural
disasters; however, the legislation applies only in these extraordinary
cases and for a limited time, on the principle that the migrants
will return after order is restored. Furthermore, Sweden and Finland
have included protection measures for environmental migrants in
their national immigration policies.
36. The common feature of these protection measures is that they
are piecemeal and often applied on a case-by-case basis. Besides,
they generally only address natural disasters, not the slow-onset
consequences of climate change.
4.2 Defining new vulnerabilities
37. Another persistent issue related
to the difficulty of establishing international protection for new
causes of forced migration has been the absence of an agreed definition
for these migrants. Terms such as environmental or climate refugees
have been posited, but applying the term “refugee” has been controversial, as
environmental factors are non-discriminatory and no form of “persecution”
is involved in these situations. The UNHCR further argues that the
inclusion of “environmental refugees” under the 1951 convention
could weaken protection for refugees already coming under the convention.
38. In order to remedy the lack of a term for these displaced
persons, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) proposed
in 2007 a working definition of what it calls “environmental migrants.”
According to the IOM, these are defined as “persons or groups of
persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the
environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions,
are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or
abroad.”
4.3 Defining the nature of the
impact of climate on mobility
39. The impacts of climate change
can be divided into two categories: climate processes and climate
events. The slow-onset changes happen gradually and are less sensational;
the migrants who will be affected by these slower climate changes
seldom enjoy formal international protection and will likely be
subject to other challenges, such as food insecurity and similar
vulnerabilities.
4.3.1 Climate processes
40. Climate processes are slow-onset
impacts of climate change such as rising sea levels, salinisation
of agricultural land, desertification and growing water scarcity.
For these slow processes, the urgency to migrate may appear less
pressing and intending migrants could find different adaptive strategies
for some time. For example, in Africa, indigenous populations have
been able to make incremental changes to migration routes in response
to decreased rainfall, incorporating new routes into their cyclical
migration patterns. Adaptation strategies, especially linked to
development policies, are an essential element for alleviating the
vulnerability of people who will be affected by climate processes.
4.3.2 Climate events
41. Climate events encompass disasters
and hazards that force people from their homes in a sudden and dramatic
way. This would include hurricanes, typhoons, floods and other large
storm surges. The impact of these natural disasters on populations
is largely a function of the vulnerability of the population affected.
The levels of exposure, such as living on a river delta, and the
adaptive capacity of the community, are both to be considered in
determining which storms or climate events become disasters.
5 An example of forced migrations
and relocations: the situation in Central Asia
42. Since the late 1980s, the region
of Central Asia comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
and Tajikistan has been fraught with numerous tensions of an ethnic
and political kind resulting in a surge of migrations and forced
relocations which continued into the 1990s. This stems from the
fact that these newly created States have taken measures favouring
the indigenous populations, causing forced relocations, also linked
to the growth of unemployment and poor job prospects.
43. Of more specific relevance to this report is that Central
Asia has faced environmental challenges which have forced the populations
to move. These movements have been caused especially by very intense industrial
activity leading to contamination of the environment and pollution
of soils and rivers.
44. Central Asia is also subject to natural disasters such as
earthquakes or landslides, and scientists have predicted that the
melting of glaciers will have effects on the frequency of flooding
and landslides.
45. At present, water scarcity and desertification make it impossible
to survive, especially for those working in agriculture. For example,
the Aralkum desert has over time taken the place of a lake. Experts
estimate that this ecological disaster has caused the displacement
of over 100 000 persons.
6 Conclusions
and recommendations
46. If gaps in the international
governance framework persist, millions of forced migrants will risk
the denial of their fundamental rights. The emerging causes of forced
migration are evolving at such a rapid pace that neither research
nor policy implementation has managed to keep up.
47. Governments should give greater priority to devising protection
policies and norms and mainstreaming them in plans and strategies
dealing with climate change and migration. They should also try
to expand professional expertise in human rights protection and
environmental law, in connection with climate change- related displacement.
48. Member States should consider adopting further protection
measures for those people forced into migration primarily by environmental
changes beyond their control, so as to protect those affected by
acute natural, chemical or nuclear disasters. Furthermore, development
policies should avoid overexploitation of natural resources and
pursue sustainable solutions that mitigate deterioration in the
ability of environments to meet fundamental needs and even to secure
fundamental rights for those living there. And where resettlement is
necessary, member States should support Least Developed Countries
in the planning of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs)
that protect fundamental rights and are responsive to the needs
of the affected population.
