B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Thorhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. This report stems from a motion
for a resolution
Note on the worsening human rights situation
of Crimean Tatars since the Crimean peninsula was illegally annexed
by the Russian Federation in 2014. This motion for a resolution
notes that the many resolutions already adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly calling on the Russian Federation to refrain from discrimination
against the population of the Crimean peninsula, to cease political
and cultural suppression against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
people, to suspend the decree banning the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people, to take all necessary steps to halt the disappearance
of Crimean Tatars and to promptly investigate those disappearances
that have already occurred have been ignored.
Note The Assembly was accordingly
invited to draw up a comprehensive report on the matter and to propose
recommendations in this regard.
2. Following the departure from the Assembly of the previous
rapporteur, Mr Manuel Tornare (Switzerland, SOC) in January 2020,
I was appointed rapporteur by the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination. I have
analysed only the current situation and that prevailing over the
last seven years, taking note also of the situation before spring
2014. Since that date, not only the Assembly but also the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe and other bodies of major
international organisations, in particular the United Nations General
Assembly, have condemned the situation many times.
Note The positions taken by
these bodies have however been regularly contested by the Russian
Federation.
Note
3. This draft report draws on numerous written sources, especially
reports by international organisations and organisations for the
defence of human rights, as well as recent press articles. Following
the meeting held by our Committee on 12 September 2019, the Russian
parliamentary delegation forwarded a written statement, which has
also been taken into account. The report further relies on the oral
testimony of eyewitnesses of the situation in Crimea and of organisations
and human rights defenders working directly with Crimean Tatars.
Due to the particularly complex context in Crimea, it was unfortunately
not possible to organise a fact-finding visit during the preparation
of this report. However, several bilateral meetings were held by
my predecessor with international figures and NGOs who had been
able either to travel to Crimea or to meet people active on the
ground and directly hear their testimony. In addition, the committee
held two hearings. On 7 March 2019, it heard a representative of
the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, which gathered first-hand
information through direct interviews with victims and witnesses
of human rights violations, and a representative of Human Rights
Watch, who was able to travel to Crimea several times between early
2014 and October 2017. On 15 October 2020, the committee held a
second hearing, with the participation of Ms Liudmyla Denisova,
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights; Ms Tatiana Moskalkova,
High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation; and
two representatives of Crimean Tatars living in Crimea, Mr Refat
Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, and
Mr Nariman Dzhelialov, Head of Information and Analysis Department,
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.
4. Throughout this report, wherever it occurs in relation to
facts arising as from the spring of 2014, the term “Crimea” should
be understood as referring to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the
Russian Federation.
Note
2 Situation of the Crimean Tatars before
spring 2014
5. The Crimean Tatars have lived
on the Crimean peninsula for hundreds of years. In May 1944, on
Stalin’s orders and on the pretext that they had collaborated with
the Nazi regime, the Crimean Tatars were deported
en masse to Uzbekistan and other
Soviet republics. More than 180 000 Crimean Tatars were deported, together
with people from other ethnic groups, in under three days.
Note In
1956, Khrushchev denounced these mass deportations
Note but this did not lead to the return
of the deportees.
6. The Crimean Tatars began to return to Crimea in significant
numbers in 1989.
Note According
to the last Ukrainian population census, carried out in 2001, 248 200
Crimean Tatars were living in Ukraine, of whom 243 400 (98%) were
in Crimea, where they made up 12% of the population. The total population
of the peninsula stood at 2 024 000 people. At the time, 58.3% of
the population of this region identified themselves as being of
Russian nationality (ethnic origin) and 24.3% as being of Ukrainian
nationality (ethnic origin). 93% of Crimean Tatars reported that
Crimean Tatar was their mother tongue, while approximately 85% of
Crimean Tatars said they were fluent in Russian and approximately
20% fluent in Ukrainian.
Note
7. The returns continued in the years following the census, with
the result that by the beginning of 2014, according to the Ukrainian
authorities, there were 282 000 Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine;
former deportees made up 13.4% of the population of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol at that time). In addition,
there were still about 100 000 Crimean Tatars outside Ukraine who
might return to Crimea.
Note
8. Although, following the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine facilitated
the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported
persons, individuals wishing to return faced major administrative
and legal obstacles. Because of the numerous administrative procedures
involved, the resettlement process was costly and potentially lengthy,
and the various rules relating to nationality meant that some of
the individuals concerned were at risk of statelessness.
Note
9. Furthermore, following their deportation in 1944, the Crimean
Tatars lost their land and their homes, and this property – which
was situated for the most part on the southeast coast – was redistributed.
Note Despite the considerable
efforts made by Ukraine to facilitate the resettlement of formerly
deported persons, and in particular the Crimean Tatars, following
the break-up of the USSR, Crimean Tatars undeniably suffered from injustice,
especially in terms of access to economic and social rights. In
2012, it was noted that the Crimean Tatars “continue to face inequalities
due to the continued lack of a legislative framework pertaining
to the restitution and compensation for the loss of farmland suffered
as result of the deportations. They often live in sub-standard conditions
on unauthorised settlements with limited access to public services,
utilities and infrastructure”.
Note The difficulties
regarding access to land and the lack of transparency in the procedures
for allocating land were also a major source of tension within Crimean
society and the Crimean Tatars found themselves trapped in a vicious
circle.
Note They also faced high
levels of poverty and difficulties in accessing employment, health
care, social services and education.
Note
10. Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported peoples were also
adversely affected by the tensions over the status of the Russian
language in Ukraine and lacked opportunities to preserve and develop
their languages and cultures and to practise their religion (mainly
Islam in the case of the Crimean Tatars).
Note While 92% of Crimean
Tatars regarded Crimean Tatar as their mother tongue, fewer than
5% of them considered that their co-ethnics knew the language perfectly.
There were only 15 schools with instruction in Crimean Tatar, compared
with 371 before the Second World War, and only 3% of pupils belonging
to this minority studied in Crimean Tatar.
Note Two
television channels (one State-run, GTRK Krim, and the other privately
owned, ATR) broadcast a few hours of programmes in Crimean Tatar
per week and a radio station broadcast 24 hours a day in Crimean
Tatar but its coverage outside of Simferopol was limited. As for
the Crimean Tatar-language written press, its survival was under
threat due to lack of funding.
Note
11. In addition, according to various sources, senior politicians
at regional and national level had engaged in hate speech against
Crimean Tatars that had gone unpunished, and there was an increase
in the level of anti-Tatar sentiment among the population from 2010
onwards.
Note
12. In April 2014, following efforts by Crimean Tatar representatives
over many years, the Ukrainian parliament recognised the Crimean
Tatars as an indigenous people.
3 Events
of spring 2014
13. Towards the end of 2013, mass
political protests began in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, including
in Crimea, and continued for several months, until February 2014.
The protests were initially peaceful but turned violent in a context
of political crisis and growing polarisation of Ukrainian society.
The Ukrainian president left the country on 21 February 2014. On
23 February the Ukrainian Parliament appointed an interim president
and set 25 May 2014 as the date for the election of a new president.
14. On the same day, following the resignation of the mayor of
Sevastopol, a new mayor of Russian nationality was installed in
office. There were violent clashes on 26 February in Simferopol
between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian factions. That night, armed
men without insignia took control of certain public buildings in
Crimea and stood guard in front of military bases and other strategic
sites. Members of the Russian armed forces participated in these
operations.
Note On 27 February 2014, with armed
men present, members of the Crimean Parliament elected Sergey Aksenov
as the head of Crimea in a vote tainted by fraud.
Note On 6 March 2014
the Crimean Parliament passed a resolution calling for the holding
of a referendum on 16 March on the status of Crimea.
Note
15. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe immediately
voiced its “grave concern concerning the intention to hold a referendum
on the status of Crimea not authorised by Ukraine” and supported
the Secretary General's referral of the question of the lawfulness
of such a referendum to the Venice Commission, officially European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).
Note On 20 March 2014, reiterating that
the crisis in Ukraine had to be resolved peacefully, on the basis
of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,
as well as in strict adherence to international law, the Committee
of Ministers condemned the holding of the referendum in violation
of Ukrainian legislation
Note, taking the view that both the referendum
and the annexation of Crimea were illegal and stressing that they
could not form any basis for any alteration of the status of Crimea
or of Sevastopol.
NoteNote
16. The United Nations General Assembly noted on 27 March 2014
that the referendum, which had not been authorised by Ukraine, had
no validity and could not form the basis for any alteration of the
status of the entities concerned.
Note Accordingly,
it did not recognise the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, considering
the latter as an occupying power bound by all the international
obligations arising from that position, and has since consistently
reiterated that view. It has moreover repeatedly “strongly condemn[ed]
the continuing and total disregard by the Russian Federation for
its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international
law regarding its legal responsibility for the occupied territory,
including the responsibility to respect Ukrainian law and the rights
of all civilians”.
Note
17. At its part-session in April 2014, the Assembly condemned
Russia's military aggression and its violation of Ukrainian sovereignty
and territorial integrity, described the annexation of Crimea by
the Russian Federation as unlawful and having no legal effect and
condemned the military occupation of Ukrainian territory.
Note These views have been reiterated
on numerous occasions.
Note
18. International legal scholars have also repeatedly concluded
that that the purported annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
was illegal in international law.
Note It
has further been observed that – although the Russian Federation
has invoked the right to self-determination as a basis for its actions
– the only people with a right to self-determination in Crimea is
the Crimean Tatar people.
Note
4 Human
rights violations since the spring of 2014
19. The Crimean Tatars who, through
their representative body, the Mejlis, supported the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and boycotted the so-called “referendum” of
16 March 2014, quickly found themselves in a very precarious situation.
Note
20. In the months following the “referendum”, serious human rights
violations occurred, including extrajudicial killings, abductions
and enforced disappearances, chiefly targeting Crimean Tatars and
pro-Ukrainian activists. There were reports of politically motivated
prosecutions, discrimination, harassment, intimidation, violence,
arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment of detainees and
their transfer from Crimea to the Russian Federation, as well as
reports of abuses of freedom of expression, freedom of religion
or belief and freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly.
Note
21. In the following paragraphs, without trying to paint an exhaustive
picture, I list the main matters of concern that have come to my
knowledge during the preparation of this report. While certain events
dating from the weeks and months following the Russian Federation’s
occupation of Crimea are well known, other (more recent) events
are less so.
22. I take note before proceeding further that, according to information
provided by the Russian delegation, efforts are under way to strengthen
the socio-economic situation and the social and political rights
of Crimean Tatars. Also according to these elements, as of 1 January
2019, the population of the Crimean peninsula stood at 2 355 000
people, of whom 1 493 000 (65.3%) were Russian, 343 000 (15%) were
Ukrainian and 232 800 were Crimean Tatars.
Note
4.1 Extrajudicial
executions, forced disappearances, acts of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
23. According to the OHCHR, 42
people were victims of forced disappearances in Crimea between early March
2014 and the end of June 2018, of whom 28 went missing in 2014 alone.
The OHCHR documented 2 enforced disappearances in 2015, 3 in 2016,
7 in 2017 and 2 in the first six months of 2018. Among these 42 cases,
27 victims were ethnic Ukrainians, 9 were Crimean Tatars, 4 Tajiks,
1 Uzbek and 1 person of mixed Tatar-Russian origin. Twenty-seven
of these persons had been released after having been illegally detained for
periods lasting from a few hours to two weeks; 12 were still missing
as of 30 June 2018; two were still in detention, and one had been
found dead.
24. The victims of these acts were mostly pro-Ukrainian activists.
Five had links to Crimean Tatar groups or institutions, four were
journalists and five were migrants from Central Asia. There were
also a member of the Ukrainian armed forces, a Ukrainian Muslim
and a Greek-Catholic priest. None of the perpetrators had been prosecuted;
the authorities had refused to register certain complaints and had
suspended investigation proceedings in others.
Note
25. In the first months following the illegal annexation of Crimea,
Human Rights Watch also documented several cases of forced disappearances
of Crimean Tatars, into which no effective investigation has been conducted.
Note Some
Crimean Tatars targeted in the operations carried out on 27 March
2019 (see chapter 4.2 below) also allegedly experienced cruel or
degrading treatment, or even torture.
Note Methods such as electroshocks,
threats of sexual violence, suffocation and beatings with wet towels,
fists, metal objects and bats are reported to have been used by
the Russian FSB and penitentiary staff.
Note
26. According to the findings of the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
those who opposed the March 2014 referendum were particularly at
risk from these human rights violations, as well as other people
having criticised the
de facto authorities
– journalists, bloggers, activists and Crimean Tatars, including
in particular those who supported the Mejlis.
Note He stressed
that, to prevent torture, it was crucial to guarantee access for
persons deprived of their liberty to independent, international
control mechanisms.
27. Regarding the situation of persons deprived of their liberty,
detained Crimean Tatars have reportedly been given food they could
not eat for religious reasons.
NoteAppalling
conditions of detention have been reported, particularly in the
Simferopol pre-trial detention centre (SIZO). Up to eight people
were said to be accommodated per 9m² cell there, having to take
turns to sleep; the cells were infested with bed-bugs, cockroaches
and mice; sick inmates slept alongside the others, and access to
medical care was inadequate and often delayed. Furthermore, there
had been no independent investigations of deaths in custody.
Note
28. Several cases in which the lack of access to medical care
has gravely endangered the health of Crimean Tatars detained in
the Simferopol SIZO have been reported. In the case of Edem Bekirov,
the authorities waited two months and sixteen days after the European
Court of Human Rights had ordered his immediate transfer to a civilian
hospital in order to make the transfer; while in detention, he was
denied adequate medication and later forcibly treated with inappropriate
medication.
Note In March 2020, Server
Mustafayev, founder and coordinator of the grassroots Crimean Solidarity
movement, and two of his co-defendants, Memet Belyalov and Seyran
Saliyev, were reportedly forced to attend court hearings over nine
hours, without water or food, despite suffering symptoms of viral
respiratory infection, including high fever. In September 2020,
they were amongst seven Crimean Tatars sentenced to between 13 and
19 years of imprisonment on terrorism-related charges, though none
related to planning, carrying out or being an accessory to any act
of violence.
Note
4.2 Threats,
assaults, illegal searches and arbitrary arrests
29. In the first months after the
illegal annexation of Crimea, Human Rights Watch gathered evidence
of the harassment of Crimean Tatars, as well as threats, physical
assaults and unfounded prosecutions, and even convictions based
on false accusations, especially extremism- or terrorism-related
offences. It has also documented instances of the arrest of Crimean
Tatars on trumped-up terrorism charges. The latter cases involved
no accusation of planning or carrying out any acts of violence and
the prosecutions seem to have been calculated to stifle dissent.
Lawyers working on such cases are also subjected to pressure and,
especially, threats of disbarment.
Note
30. In 2018, 19 Crimean Tatar men were sentenced to 10- to 24-years’
imprisonment following a highly questionable trial on terrorism-related
charges on the basis of their alleged affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir, despite
the fact that none of them were found to have planned, committed
or supported any act of violence. Their sentences were upheld on
appeal in September 2020.
Note On
12 November 2019, Crimean Tatar human rights defender Emir-Usein
Kuku and five co-defendants were similarly sentenced to prison terms
of between 7 and 19 years, following their transfer outside Crimea,
to the territory of the Russian Federation, for trial; their convictions
were also upheld by a military appeals court in June 2020.
Note
31. There have also been reports of numerous searches carried
out by armed and masked members of the security forces in Muslim
religious institutions, as well as in businesses and private residences
belonging to Crimean Tatars.
Note These
operations and searches conducted by the police, the security forces
(FSB), the special forces (OMON) and/or the Russian National Guard
(Rosgvardia) are reportedly disproportionately directed against
the Crimean Tatars and often conducted in a manner failing to respect
fundamental rights, culminating in excessive use of force in some
cases.
Note
32. Besides the Crimean Tatars detained after such operations,
many other Crimean Tatars have received suspended sentences or been
placed under house arrest under procedures based on criminal law
provisions relating to terrorism, extremism or separatism. In this
context, more and more people have found themselves on the “list
of terrorists and extremists” kept by the Russian federal financial
monitoring service. Their bank accounts are suspended as a result,
which prevents them from carrying out day-to-day banking transactions and
even from being paid pensions.
Note
33. Where more recent developments are concerned, 26 Crimean Tatars
were arrested following house searches carried out on 14 February
2019 in the Oktyabrsky district (three arrests) and a second operation carried
out on a particularly large scale on 27 March 2019 in Simferopol
and several other areas (23 arrests on the same day), targeting
persons accused of being members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, which
is banned as a terrorist organisation in the Russian Federation
but not in Ukraine.
Note Sources claim that
false evidence was planted on the premises searched by members of
the law enforcement agencies.
Note Eight
other Crimean Tatars were arrested on 10 June 2019 in similar circumstances.
Note A further 24 Crimean
Tatars were arbitrarily arrested in March 2020.
Note Most of the people arrested
during the operations of 27 March 2019 are reportedly members of
the Crimean Solidarity organisation, an association of journalists
and civic activists set up following the events of spring 2014 with
the aim of providing support to detainees and their families or
the families of missing persons. Such raids and arrests moreover
continue: on 17 February 2021, seven Muslim men, of whom six were
Crimean Tatars and all of whom were reportedly either members of
Crimean Solidarity or had supported some of its activities, were
arrested following night-time raids on their homes. Six were accused
of involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir and placed in custody.
Note
34. Those arrested in March 2019 are currently on trial, in several
separate trials but facing identical or strongly similar terrorism-related
charges, based on Articles 205.1 or 205.2 and Article 278 of the
Russian Criminal Code. Defendants who expressed themselves in the
Crimean Tatar language at the Southern District Military Court in
Rostov-on-Don on 16 March 2021 were expelled from the courtroom.
Note
35. I note with concern the view expressed by numerous observers
that accusations of terrorism – which are punished with very severe
criminal sanctions – against Crimean Tatars are a powerful means
of intimidating or silencing activists opposed to the current regime
in Crimea and also serve to create a climate of anti-Muslim feeling
among the population.
Note As the Director of Amnesty
International Ukraine stated with respect to Crimea Tatar leaders
Ilmi Umerov and Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy heads of the Mejlis sentenced
to two and eight years’ imprisonment in 2017, “It is increasingly
clear that leaders of the Crimean Tatar community who dare to speak out
against the Russian occupation and illegal annexation of the peninsula
face two options: either exile or prison.”
Note
36. Pressure is reportedly also exerted through imposing (sometimes
disproportionate) administrative fines, repeated house searches,
placing people in administrative or preventive detention (often
for periods ranging from several months to more than a year), charging
individuals with several offences relating to the same events and/or
bringing criminal proceedings.
Note This pattern
was followed in the cases of Volodymyr Balukh and Emir-Usein Kuku
for instance.
Note
37. The Assembly has already expressed concern over the situation
of Ukrainian nationals detained in Crimea or the Russian Federation
for political reasons or on the basis of false accusations and called
on the Russian Federation to release these political prisoners without
delay.
Note Many of these issues
are currently being examined by the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights in its work on a report on Political prisoners in the
Russian Federation, for which I have also been appointed rapporteur.
Note Subverting justice in this manner
is clearly contrary to all democratic principles and does much to
create a climate of hostility, fear and repression.
4.3 Freedom
of religion
38. Incidents targeting both individuals
and places of worship, the obligation to re-register religious organisations,
searches of religious buildings and restrictions imposed in the
name of combating extremism all constitute violations of freedom
of religion.
Note
39. As mentioned above, many Crimean Tatars accused of being members
of Muslim groups that are banned in the Russian Federation (but
not in Ukraine) such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have been prosecuted for terrorism,
although they have not called for the commission of any public order
offences.
Note Many have had extremely
harsh sentences imposed on them and have been transferred to serve
them in penitentiary colonies with strict regimes far from Crimea
(see further below, 5.4). Other Crimean Tatars have been convicted
on the basis of their links with the Tabligh Jamaat religious movement,
which is banned as an “extremist” organisation in Russian law (but
not in Ukrainian law). While the Russian delegation has drawn attention
to the construction of several new mosques which it indicates is
ongoing, to the recognition of Muslim religious feasts and to assistance
in carrying out the hajj,
Note representatives
of civil society observe a lack of trust in the new religious structures
that have been put in place since the events of spring 2014; moreover,
leaders of Muslim communities not affiliated to the Spiritual Administration
of Muslims of Crimea, but who, prior to occupation, had been granted
the right to use mosques indefinitely, reportedly faced a growing
trend of prosecutions for proselytism since early 2020.
Note
40. Where other religions are concerned, the numbers of parishes
and priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox church have fallen heavily
in Crimea since spring 2014, and the lease granted to the Ukrainian
Orthodox cathedral, concluded in 2002 between that church and the
Ukrainian authorities, was revoked on 28 June 2019 by an arbitration
tribunal in Crimea.
Note The Orthodox
Church of Ukraine has repeatedly been denied registration in Crimea;
courts have ordered the eviction and demolition of places of worship
under Russian law, and the number of parishes and priests has dropped
dramatically.
Note Jehovah's Witnesses
have been imprisoned under Russian criminal legislation on the charge
of involvement in an “extremist” organisation banned under Russian law,
although this religious movement is not banned in Ukraine; one-third
of house searches documented in Crimea in 2020 are reported to have
concerned Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Note
4.4 Freedom
of expression and of peaceful assembly and access to information
41. In the months following the
illegal annexation of Crimea, the former Chairman of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatar people, Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev (a member of our
Assembly since October 2006) and the current Chairman, Mr Refat
Chubarov, were banned from entering Crimea as from 22 April and
5 July 2014 respectively.
Note On 26 April 2016, the so-called
Supreme Court of Crimea, followed by the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation on 29 September 2016, declared the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatars an extremist organisation and outlawed its activities.
Note The ban on the Mejlis remains in
force despite a decision of the International Court of Justice in
2017 (see section 7 below). Mr Dzhemiliev is currently on trial
in absentia in Crimea. The ban on
his entering Crimea was recently reported to have been extended
for a further 15 years from the initial 5 years; he will be over
90 years old when it ends in 2034.
Note
42. The Crimean Tatars’ main television channel, ATR, was refused
a broadcasting licence and forced to stop broadcasting on 1 April
2015. The move came after the de facto authorities put pressure
on ATR to change its editorial policy, which was highly critical
of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Two radio stations and a children’s
TV channel owned by the same Crimean Tatar businessman as ATR, together
with the Crimean Tatar news agency QHA, suffered the same fate.
Note While more than 3 000 media outlets were
allowed to work under Ukrainian legislation, only 232 were (re-)registered
on 1 April 2015.
Note Such broadcasting
restrictions and the regular blocking of internet sites mean residents
of Crimea are in an information vacuum, and leave Crimean Tatars
feeling isolated, forgotten and threatened.
Note
43. Journalists covering events organised by Crimean Tatars have
been attacked or investigated for “extremist” activities.
Note There is a pattern of journalists being
denied entry to Crimea, and some have been banned from entering
the territory of the Russian Federation for decades. On 18 January
2020, Ukrainian journalist Taras Ibrahimov, who had been reporting
on events in Crimea and working
inter
alia for an outlet of RFE/RL focusing on Crimea, was
denied entry to Crimea and banned from entering the Russian Federation until
2054.
Note This contributes
to the isolation of Crimea and to a lack of independent reporting
about the situation in Crimea outside the peninsula.
44. Many Ukrainian websites, together with the sites of the Crimean
Tatar Mejlis, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Jehovah's Witnesses are blocked
by several internet providers in Crimea.
Note Signals from a number of Ukrainian
radio channels have also been jammed or replaced by signals from
Russian channels in many areas in northern Crimea.
Note
45. Other actions are taken to silence critics or voices of dissent.
Freedom of expression is violated by the excessively widespread
application of legislation against extremism, as mentioned above.
Even people who demonstrate individually are regularly prosecuted.
Note On 18 December
2017, more than 70 Crimean Tatar activists were tried simultaneously
for having staged peaceful, individual protests in various locations
in Crimea – although single-person picketing does not require prior
authorisation.
Note As far as the
right of peaceful assembly is concerned, there are reports of arbitrary
arrests and prosecutions in breach of that right.
Note
4.5 Language
rights
46. With regard to the use of languages,
the Crimean Tatar language has been recognised as a State language
in the constitution of Crimea and it has been reported that new
signs in Crimean Tatar had recently been placed on some public buildings.
Note The
Russian parliamentary delegation has stated that since 2014, the number
of classes in which the Crimean Tatar language is the language of
instruction has increased.
Note However, the formal linguistic
status assigned to educational establishments that are supposed
to provide such teaching does not always correspond to the reality
on the ground: there are reportedly no longer any schools where
teaching is solely in the Crimean Tatar language.
Note The committee has
also heard that, while 31 000 pupils are enrolled in Crimean Tatar
language classes, the recognition of the Crimean Tatar language
has not led to more children receiving instruction in this language,
as parents are discouraged from requesting it.
Note Moreover, as noted above (section
5.2), Crimean Tatars facing criminal charges have been denied the possibility
of expressing themselves in their language during their trial.
47. The possibility of following a course of study in Ukrainian
in Crimea has fallen by 98% since the 2013/2014 school year. It
is said that only 0.2% of pupils were taught in Ukrainian during
the 2018-2019 school year.
Note
48. The refusal by the authorities in Crimea to grant a licence
to media outlets broadcasting or produced in the minority languages
in Crimea can also be considered a violation of the language rights
of the persons who belong to these minorities.
5 Violations of international humanitarian
law
5.1 Illegal application of Russian law
in Crimea
49. The Russian Federation is imposing
its legal system in Crimea. This is contrary to international humanitarian
law and has been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations General
Assembly.
Note
50. According to the OHCHR, the application of this legislation
has a disproportionate impact on practising Muslims and members
of religious organisations that are banned in the Russian Federation.
As I have already pointed out, the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation,
of whom some persons – chiefly Crimean Tatars – were alleged to
be members and targeted in a massive operation carried out on 27
March 2019 (see above) is classified as a terrorist organisation
and banned in the Russian Federation but not in Ukraine.
Note Prior to the operation
on 27 March 2019, 27 Crimean Tatars accused of organising or participating
in that organisation's activities had already been prosecuted under
the Russian Criminal Code.
Note Such prosecutions
are moreover carried out in military courts.
51. Furthermore, Russian law is being applied retroactively, including
in the area of criminal law, which constitutes a breach of human
rights. For example, on 11 September 2017, a Crimean court sentenced
one of the deputy speakers of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chiygoz, to eight
years’ imprisonment for offences under the Russian Criminal Code,
dating from 26 February 2014.
Note In January 2018, Enver
Krosh was detained due to a message published on social networks
back in 2013.
Note On 7 December 2018,
the Crimean Tatar Emil Kurbedinov, a lawyer, who in particular had
defended several individuals accused of being members of organisations
that were outlawed in the Russian Federation, was sentenced to five
days in administrative detention for having published on social
networks – before Russian legislation was applied
de facto in Crimea – symbols regarded
as extremist under Russian law.
Note
5.2 “Passportisation” and forcible transfers
and deportation of non-Russian citizens
52. As of 18 March 2014, all persons
resident in Crimea automatically acquired Russian citizenship unless they
expressly objected within one month. However, the conditions allowing
a person to refuse Russian nationality were both lacking in transparency
and very restrictive, depriving many individuals of any real possibility
of making a choice. Some people who were nevertheless able to refuse
Russian nationality were deported.
Note
53. The effect of the “passportisation” process has been to compel
residents of Crimea, including Crimean Tatars to adopt Russian citizenship
in order not to be treated as foreigners. Those who did not do so
laid themselves open to discrimination in areas such as employment,
education and health, including being denied access to the distribution
of personal protective equipment and sanitising products during
the pandemic.
Note Hundreds
of individuals who are considered foreigners under Russian Federation
immigration law have been deported since 2014, including high numbers
of Ukrainian citizens. Those expelled are frequently banned from entering
the Russian Federation for up to 10 years; due to the fact that
the Russian Federation applies Russian law in Crimea, this in effect
also bans them from returning to Crimea.
Note
54. The imposition of Russian citizenship on detainees originally
from Crimea has moreover led to the denial of Ukrainian consular
visits to them in places of detention in the Russian Federation.
Note
5.3 Forced conscription
55. The OHCHR has reported that
ten conscription campaigns have been run in Crimea since the beginning of
the occupation; in the most recent campaign, at least 3 000 men
from Crimea were enlisted into the Russian armed forces. The total
number of men concerned is now over 21 000
Note. Since 2017, Russian
legislation has provided that conscripts from Crimea may be transferred
to the territory of the Russian Federation to carry out their military
service. Those who do not wish to undertake military service in
the Russian armed forces, including Crimean Tatars, face prosecution;
they are subject to a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment, which does
not however absolve them from the obligation to carry out military
service. Many consider they have no option but to leave Crimea.
Forcing persons who are protected under international humanitarian
law to serve in the armed forces of an occupying power is however
contrary to international humanitarian law.
Note
5.4 Transfers of detainees to the territory
of the Russian Federation
56. The Russian Federation is continuing
to transfer detainees to its own territory, in violation of international law.
These individuals then find themselves a long way from their families,
who are rarely able to afford to travel, and from their lawyers,
whose ability to defend them is therefore significantly reduced.
Note According to the findings of the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, hundreds of prisoners and
others held in provisional detention have been transferred to the
Russian Federation, and some of them incarcerated in high-security
penitentiary colonies in Siberia
Note.
57. Many of these detainees are Crimean Tatars, prosecuted for
alleged membership in Hizb Ut-Tahrir (banned under Russian Federation
law but not Ukrainian law – see above, 4.3) and sentenced for excessively long
periods. Their detention in remote facilities far from Crimea, cut
off from family contacts, exacerbates their vulnerability to torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment, as in the case of Teimur Rza-ogly
Abdullaiev.
Note
6 Obstacles to monitoring human rights
58. No international organisation
has been able to gain access to the Crimean peninsula since 2014.
Neither the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, who
undertook a mission to Crimea in September 2014, nor the OSCE High
Commissioner for National Minorities, who made a series of visits
to Ukraine, including Crimea, between 8 March and 17 April 2014,
Note has
been able to return to Crimea since. The United Nations Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine also continues to be denied access
to Crimea, despite its mandate, which covers the entire territory
of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
Note
59. I wish to highlight the considerations set out by the Assembly
in its
Resolution 2240
(2018) “Unlimited access to member states, including “grey
zones”, by Council of Europe and United Nations monitoring bodies”. I
would emphasise in this regard the importance of a constructive
attitude on the part of both the
de jure and the
de facto authorities in order to
permit the effective monitoring of the human rights situation in
these areas. As pointed out by the Assembly in the above resolution,
it should be noted that the activities of human rights monitoring
bodies with respect to territories under the control of de facto
authorities, including their contacts with those authorities and
visits to the territories concerned, do not constitute and should
not be presented as recognition of the legitimacy of those authorities
under international law.
7 Ongoing international judicial or
arbitration proceedings
60. A number of judicial or arbitration
procedures linked to the situation of the Crimean Tatars are currently pending
before international bodies.
61. Since 2014, Ukraine has lodged several interstate applications
with the European Court of Human Rights against the Russian Federation,
some of which relate to the situation in Crimea.
Note As
of 14 January 2021, there were two other inter-State cases and over
7 000 individual applications pending before the Court concerning
events in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov.
Note
62. In the case of
Ukraine v. Russia
(re Crimea) (application no. 20958/14), referring to
events between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015 (the date on
which the application was introduced), the Ukrainian Government
complains that the Russian Federation is responsible for an administrative
practice of human rights violations in Crimea. Following a hearing
held on 11 September 2019, the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights, proceeding on the basis that Russia’s jurisdiction
over Crimea was in the form of effective control over an area, rather
than of territorial jurisdiction, declared the case to be partly admissible.
It found admissible complaints of:
- enforced disappearances and the lack of an effective investigation
into such a practice (Article 2);
- ill-treatment and unlawful detention (Articles 3 and 5);
- extending the application of Russian law to Crimea from
27 February 2014, with the effect that the courts in Crimea could
not be considered to have been “established by law” (Article 6);
- automatic imposition of Russian citizenship and raids
of private dwellings (Article 8);
- harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming
to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raids of places of worship
and confiscation of religious property (Article 9);
- suppression of non-Russian media (Article 10);
- prohibiting public gatherings and manifestations of support,
as well as intimidation and arbitrary detention of organisers of
demonstrations (Article 11);
- expropriation without compensation of property from civilians
and private enterprises (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention);
- suppression of the Ukrainian language in schools and harassment
of Ukrainian-speaking children at school (Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention);
- restricting freedom of movement between Crimea and mainland
Ukraine (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4);
- targeting Crimean Tatars (Article 14, taken in conjunction
with Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and with Article
2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention).
The question whether Russia is responsible for the acts complained
of will be determined at the merits phase of the proceedings. Complaints
raised in this case of administrative practices of killing and shooting
and of the detention of foreign journalists and seizure of their
equipment in the first half of March 2014 were however found inadmissible
due to the limited number of allegations. Finally, both the admissibility
and the merits of additional complaints regarding the transfer of
prisoners from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, raised
in December 2018, will be determined by the Court at a later stage.Note
63. On 24 April 2014, the International
Criminal Court launched a preliminary examination of the situation
in Ukraine, including crimes committed in Crimea. On 11 December
2020, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced
that she had concluded her preliminary examination and that the
statutory criteria for opening investigations were met.
Note
64. On 16 January 2017, Ukraine initiated proceedings before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Application
of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (
Ukraine
v. Russian Federation). In this case, on 19 April 2017,
the ICJ issued an order for the indication of provisional measures, in
which it found that the Russian Federation must refrain, pending
the final decision in the case, from maintaining or imposing limitations
on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions,
including the Mejlis, and ensure the availability of education in
the Ukrainian language. The Russian Federation has not complied,
however.
Note The ICJ held public hearings from
3 to 7 June 2019, devoted to the preliminary objections raised by
the Russian Federation in this case; on 8 November 2019, it rejected
these preliminary objections, found that it had jurisdiction to
entertain the claims made by Ukraine, and fixed 8 December 2020
as the time-limit for the filing of the counter-memorial of the
Russian Federation. At the request of the latter, this time-limit
was extended to 8 July 2021.
Note
65. Following the seizure by the Russian Federation of three Ukrainian
naval vessels passing through the Kerch Strait and its arrest of
24 Ukrainian servicemen on 25 November 2018, Ukraine addressed a
new interstate application to the European Court of Human Rights
(
Ukraine v. Russia (VIII) (application
no. 55855/18). Ukraine also applied to the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea in this context. On 25 May 2019, the Court
ordered the Russian Federation to release immediately the three
ships and return them to the custody of Ukraine, and to release
the 24 servicemen immediately and allow them to return to Ukraine.
Note On 27 May
2019, however, the court in Moscow upheld the extending of pre-trial
detention of those servicemen.
Note These 24 servicemen
were among the 35 prisoners transferred to Ukraine by the Russian
Federation in the framework of the exchange of prisoners carried
out by the Russian and Ukrainian authorities on 8 September 2019.
8 Conclusions
66. As I pointed out above (in
section 2), Crimean Tatars suffered violations of their rights before
March 2014. Although measures were taken to help them gain access
to teaching of and in their language and to media in their language,
those measures remained below the level of protection they enjoyed
before their deportation, and their request to be recognised as
an indigenous people went unheeded until March 2014.
67. Since March 2014, however, the situation of the Crimean Tatars
has considerably worsened, and constant pressure has been exerted
on them by the authorities. A striking pattern of harassment, prosecution and
intimidation of Crimean Tatars and of the lawyers defending them,
as well as of journalists reporting on this situation and activists
contesting it, has developed. The grave human rights violations
set out above – forced disappearances, torture and inhuman treatment,
as well as violations of personal security, unjustified searches, excessive
use of force, unjustified prosecutions, violations of freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly – occurred only after the Russian
Federation's occupation of Crimea and remain to date unpunished. International
law and the principle of the rule of law are also flouted.
68. Many actors emphasise that a climate of fear and hostility
exists in Crimea that has an impact on everyone living there. This
is why I have also relayed in this report some concerns regarding
the treatment of people who do not identify as Crimean Tatars, in
particular Jehovah’s Witnesses and persons who identify as Ukrainian
or who may be considered to support pro-Ukrainian positions, as
well as concerning difficulties around access to media and education
in Ukrainian.
69. Crimean Tatars seem however to be disproportionately affected
by unjustified repressive measures that are contrary to both international
and Ukrainian law. These abusive measures often affect Crimean Tatars
who work actively to protect the rights of persons belonging to
this minority. It seems that these persons may be being targeted
by the Russian authorities at least in part because they have voiced
political dissent against the occupation. Regardless, and whether
such treatment is based on ethnic origin, religion or political
opinion, the effect is that Crimean Tatars are not only victims
of violations of their human rights as such but also appear to be
discriminated against, directly or indirectly, as a result of the
disproportionate use of such abusive measures against them.
70. Most of the recommendations made in the draft resolution are
based on the above conclusions. In addition, I underline that when
ratifying the credentials of the Russian delegation on 26 June 2019
(
Resolution 2292 (2019)), the Assembly called on the Russian Federation to implement
all the recommendations set out in resolutions
1990 (2014),
2034 (2015) and
2063
(2015). Where the situation of Crimean Tatars is concerned, that
includes the following requirements:
- to reverse the illegal annexation of Crimea;
- to fully and transparently investigate the deaths and
disappearances of political activists who were critical of this
annexation;
- to refrain from exerting pressure on and threatening to
close independent media outlets, and reopen the Crimean Tatar television
channel, ATR;
- to refrain from harassing and putting pressure on Crimean
Tatar institutions and organisations;
- to allow Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev and Mr Refat Chubarov to
return to Crimea and allow them to move freely across the administrative
boundary line;
- to ensure that the rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians
are not violated.
In its Resolution
2292 (2019), the Assembly also called on the relevant Russian authorities
to co-operate fully with all human rights monitoring agencies and
with the Monitoring Committee, including by granting them access
to all relevant sites.
71. All these requirements are
still pending. I wish to point out that all member states of this
Organisation have an obligation to uphold the fundamental rights
set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights, in relation
to everyone within their jurisdiction. This report and all of the
recommendations formulated in the draft resolution are firmly geared
towards the goal of ensuring respect for international law and protection
for human rights, which must be secured no matter what the political
situation.
