Observation of the early parliamentary elections in Armenia (20 June 2021)
Election observation report
| Doc. 15352
| 25 August 2021
1 Introduction
1. On 18 March 2021, the Prime
Minister of Armenia announced that early parliamentary elections
would be held on 20 June.
2. On 16 April 2021 the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly
decided to observe these elections, subject to the receipt of an
invitation, and to set up an ad hoc committee composed of 20 members
(SOC-7; EPP/CD-6; EC/DA-3; ALDE-3; UEL-1) as well as the two co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee. On 26 April the Bureau authorised the
President to appoint its chairperson.
3. On 13 May 2021 the President of the National Assembly of Armenia
invited the Parliamentary Assembly to observe the early parliamentary
elections.
4. On 28 May the Bureau approved the final list of members of
the ad hoc committee to observe these elections and confirmed the
appointment of Mr George Katrougalos (Greece, UEL) as its chairperson.
The list of members having participated in the election observation
mission is set out in Appendix 1.
5. In accordance with the co-operation agreement signed between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) on 4 October 2004, a representative from
the Venice Commission was invited to join the ad hoc committee as
an adviser.
6. The ad hoc committee (PACE delegation) worked from 18 to 21
June 2021. It operated as part of an International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM) together with a delegation from the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE-PA) and the electoral observation mission of the OSCE’s Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR EOM). The
programme of the delegation’s meetings is set out in Appendix 2.
7. On election day the PACE delegation split into 11 teams and
observed the voting process in a number of polling stations in Yerevan
and its surroundings, as well as in Hrazdan, Gavar, Artashat, Gyumri,
Ararat, Masis, Vanadzor, Azatan, Artik, Maralik and Dzorakap.
8. The IEOM concluded that the 20 June 2021 early parliamentary
elections in Armenia were competitive and generally well-managed
within a short time-frame. However, they were characterized by intense polarization
and marred by increasingly inflammatory rhetoric among key contestants.
The legal framework is generally comprehensive, but the fact that
amendments were adopted so close to the elections caused some legal
uncertainty. The election administration conducted its work in a
transparent, collegial and professional manner and enjoyed electoral
stakeholders’ confidence. Voters were provided with a broad range
of options, and fundamental rights and freedoms were generally respected,
with contestants being able to campaign freely. However, the negative
tone and the personality driven nature of the campaign hindered
a policy-focused debate. Generally, women were sidelined throughout
the campaign. Election day, including the vote count, was assessed
positively overall. The press release by the IEOM is set out in
Appendix 3.
9. The PACE delegation wishes to thank the heads and members
of the parliamentary delegation of the OSCE-PA and of the OSCE/ODIHR
EOM for their excellent co-operation within the IEOM. It also wishes
to thank the Council of Europe Office in Yerevan for the co-operation
and support.
2 Political
context
10. The Assembly has observed elections
in Armenia since 1995. The last parliamentary elections in Armenia
took place on 9 December 2018 and the Assembly’s delegation concluded
that they were held “with due regard for fundamental freedoms and
enjoyed broad public trust that needs to be preserved through further electoral
reforms. Open political debate, including in the media, contributed
to a vibrant campaign, although cases of inflammatory rhetoric online
were of concern. The peaceful so-called “velvet revolution”, in
conjunction with the political will of the current authorities,
enabled the holding of democratic elections.” The Assembly’s observation
delegation also highlighted that “despite the complex electoral
system and reported instances of intimidation via social media,
the electoral irregularities which tainted many elections in the
past were absent. It is up to Armenia’s elected representatives
to launch legal reforms to consolidate the democratic process in the
country”.
11. On 18 March 2021, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced
that early parliamentary elections would be held on 20 June. In
compliance with relevant legal deadlines, he resigned on 25 April,
and the elections were called via presidential decree on 10 May.
The decision to hold early elections arose in the aftermath of anti-government
protests following the signing of a ceasefire statement with Azerbaijan,
brokered by the Russian Federation in November 2020. The ceasefire
statement followed a 44-day war in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
12. The elections took place in an atmosphere of continuing tension
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The national security situation
dominated political discourse during these elections. The Covid-19
pandemic aggravated the economic downturn resulting from the war,
further impacting the electoral environment. The political environment
leading up to the elections was highly polarised, often personality-driven,
and characterised by aggressive accusations and inflammatory rhetoric.
13. The most recent parliamentary elections were early elections
held in 2018. They resulted in the My Step alliance led by Mr Pashinyan’s
Civil Contract party receiving 70.4% of votes cast and 88 of the
132 seats. Prosperous Armenia and Bright Armenia were the only other
parties to pass the 5% threshold, with 8.3% (26 seats) and 6.4 (18
seats), respectively.
14. The political landscape in Armenia during the past 20 years
was dominated by the ruling Republican Party which in 2018 could
not even enter the parliament anymore, as it only received 4.7%.
To be noted that only 18 months before, in April 2017, the same
Republican Party won the elections with 55.23%.
3 Legal framework
and electoral system
15. The PACE delegation recalls
that Armenia signed and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5) and its Additional Protocol (ETS No. 9), which enshrine
a number of principles crucial for an effective and meaningful democracy,
such as the right to free elections (Article 3 of the Additional
Protocol), freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association,
as well as prohibition of discrimination (Articles 10, 11 and 14
of the Convention).
16. Parliamentary elections are regulated by the 1995 Constitution
(last amended by referendum in 2015), the 2016 Electoral Code, and
other legislation. Armenia is a party to the main international
treaties related to democratic elections. Overall, the legal framework
is conducive to the conduct of democratic elections.
17. The electoral legal framework provides comprehensive regulation
of issues related to election administration, voter lists and voter
identification. While the rules on candidate registration, campaigning
and campaign financing are detailed, certain shortcomings, previously
noted by the Venice Commission and the ODIHR, remain unaddressed.
These include restrictions on the rights of persons with dual citizenship
to stand for election, the short time-frame for reviewing campaign-finance
reporting, as well as the narrow definition of campaign expenditures.
The legal framework regulating the handling of complaints and appeals
and addressing electoral violations, while adequate, could also
benefit from review.
18. The Venice Commission was requested to produce several opinions
on the electoral reform since 2016. In October 2018, the government
submitted to the parliament proposed amendments to the Electoral
Code including outstanding recommendations from the Venice Commission
and the ODIHR, but they were not backed by the required three-fifths
majority in the Assembly. In 2020 an inclusive working group of
election stakeholders recommended significant changes including
the end of the district lists. The most recent Venice Commission/ODIHR
opinion (March 2021) dealt with that change to a single closed list,
and many other changes arising from the discussions of the working
group.
19. The Electoral Code was adopted in 2016 and has been amended
several times since then. In April and May 2021, shortly before
elections were called, parliament adopted two sets of amendments.
The 1 April amendments eliminated open territorial lists of candidates
with corresponding procedural changes, among others, to candidate
registration, the distribution of mandates, and election-day procedures.
These amendments were adopted by a majority of 82 out of 132 members
of parliament (MPs); notably Prosperous Armenia and Bright Armenia
did not participate in the vote. While the move to a single nationwide
constituency had long been debated and advocated by many political
parties and civil society actors, some suggested that the change
was made too close to the elections. The President of the Republic
opted not to sign the amendments, citing their timing and lack of
consensus in the parliament. A second, more comprehensive, package
of amendments that are not applicable to this election was adopted
on 7 May 2021. Until both sets of amendments were adopted and signed,
electoral stakeholders were uncertain which amendments would apply to
these elections thereby affecting legal certainty and leaving limited
time for implementing regulations and informing voters on new procedures.
20. In these parliamentary elections, voters were called to elect
a minimum of 101 MPs, through a closed-list proportional system
within a single nationwide constituency. MPs are elected for a five-year
term. In order to qualify for the distribution of mandates, political
parties had to obtain at least 5% of votes cast, while alliances of
two or more political parties were required to obtain at least 7%.
The amendment to reduce the 5% threshold did not take effect for
these elections. These thresholds remain high for the stated aim
of a purely proportional system and relatively higher than the European
average. The Electoral Code stipulates that if less than three parties
and/or alliances pass the threshold, the three parties or alliances
with the highest number of votes gain parliamentary representation.
In addition to the MPs elected under the proportional system, the
law provides for up to four reserved seats in parliament, one for
each of the four largest national minorities: Yezidis, Russians,
Assyrians and Kurds.
21. The Constitution requires a proportional electoral contest
and a multiparty system. The Constitution also requires a “stable
parliamentary majority” (which the Electoral Code defines as 54%
of seats in parliament) in order to form a government. If the winning
party or alliance list obtains at least 50% of seats plus one, but
falls short of 54%, that party or alliance would be assigned additional
seats in order for it to reach the required stable majority. If
no single party or alliance wins a 50% plus one majority, and no
political parties or alliances are able to form a coalition within
6 days of the finalisation of the results, a second round between
the top two candidate lists was to be held 28 days after first election
day. In the second round, these two remaining contesting parties or
alliances are permitted to form new alliances with other parties
that ran in the first round.
4 Election administration
22. Elections are administered
by a three-tiered system comprising the Central Election Commission
(CEC), 38 Territorial Election Commissions (TECs), and 2008 Precinct
Election Commissions (PECs). The CEC is a permanent and professional
body composed of seven members who are elected for a six-year term,
for a maximum of two consecutive terms. The CEC, in its current
composition, was appointed in October 2016. Most IEOM interlocutors
expressed confidence in the capacity of the CEC to deliver on its
mandate professionally. However, some interlocutors voiced apprehensions
over the election administration’s ability to maintain its independence.
23. The CEC conducted its work in a transparent, collegial and
efficient manner, meeting all legal deadlines despite a short time-frame
for preparations. Its sessions were live-streamed and attended by
party and alliance proxies, observers and the media. Meeting agendas
and decisions were published in a timely manner on the CEC website.
The CEC developed election-day procedures and guidelines for PEC
members, Voter Authentication Device (VAD) specialists, as well
as for observers and proxies.
24. While the CEC has the regulatory power to issue instructions,
a significant proportion of clarifications on election-day procedures
were not adopted in CEC sessions, nor were they the subject of formal
CEC decisions. Importantly, the determination of ballot validity
was not adequately regulated. Limited Covid-related procedures for
polling operations were adopted, though these did not address possible
overcrowding.
25. The CEC’s voter-education campaign was launched 20 days before
election day. It included posters, brochures, as well as TV and
radio advertisements on new voting procedures, including in the
languages of the four main national minorities, for persons with
visual and hearing impairments and with the help of civil society
for persons with intellectual disabilities. However, the visibility
of the CEC voter-education campaign remained limited across the
country.
26. TECs are permanent professional bodies composed of seven members
appointed by the CEC for a six-year term. TEC sessions were open
and characterised by a consensus-led approach. The public display
of TEC decisions was not consistent, contrary to legal requirements
and TEC decisions were not published on the CEC website.
27. PECs are temporary bodies formed for each election, with a
minimum of seven members selected by parliamentary groups as well
as by the TECs. For these elections, each PEC was composed of seven
to eight members, two of whom were nominated by the respective TEC
and two by each of the three parliamentary groups represented in
the outgoing parliament. While most PECs were formed by 2 June in
accordance with the CEC calendar, many TECs were required to nominate
additional candidates, after parliamentary factions, particularly
Bright Armenia, did not nominate sufficient candidates for all PECs.
In line with the law, the positions of PEC chairperson and secretary
were distributed among the alliances in the outgoing parliament
in proportion to their current representation, hence providing a
large majority of PEC management positions to the ruling party.
28. The CEC and all TECs complied with the legal requirement to
include at least two members of each gender. Three of the seven
CEC members were women (42%), including the deputy chairperson.
At the TEC level, out of 266 members 94 were women (35%), with only
a few holding decision-making positions, including two chairpersons
(5%) and six deputy chairpersons (16%). Gender disaggregated data
on the composition of the TECs needs to be extracted and is not
readily available, which is at odds with international standards.
The CEC did not publish gender disaggregated information on the
composition of PEC members.
5 Voter lists and
candidate registration
29. All citizens who are at least
18 years old on election day are eligible to vote, unless convicted
of a serious crime or declared mentally incompetent by a court decision.
Deprivation of the right to vote on the basis of a mental disability
is inconsistent with international standards. Voter registration
is passive, with voter information being provided automatically
by the State Population Register. The voter register is maintained
by the Passport and Visa Department (PVD) of the police and includes
all eligible citizens who maintain a permanent residence in Armenia.
As of 13 June, there were 2 577 172 registered voters, including
a significant number of voters residing abroad who remained on the
voter register because they maintain an official residence in Armenia. While
all IEOM interlocutors recognised that a significant number of those
included in the voter list are abroad and therefore not in a position
to vote, no concerns were expressed with regards to the accuracy
of the voter register.
30. The legal framework provides extensive measures ensuring the
transparency and accessibility of voter lists, with public display
of voter lists and the publication of the lists online in searchable
and downloadable versions. Preliminary voter lists were displayed
at polling stations for public scrutiny by the 31 May deadline. Voters
were able to request corrections, inclusions and deletions concerning
themselves or other voters until 10 June. Voters omitted from the
voter lists, as well as those in medical facilities or detention
centres, could be included on supplementary voter lists up until
the end of voting on election day.
31. On election day, voters were identified through the scanning
of their ID document and fingerprint with electronic VADs, which
contained an electronic copy of the voter list for the respective
polling station. The law requires the CEC to publish scanned copies
of the signed voter lists from all polling stations on 22 June, allowing
for public verification. While international standards and best
practices recommend the protection of data privacy and secrecy of
individual voter data, including whether they voted and at which
location, all IEOM interlocutors expressed support for the measure
as an effective way to enhance transparency and prevent electoral
malfeasance.
32. The April 2021 amendments specify that the signed voter lists
should remain available until the tabulation of results at the CEC
or, if appeals are filed, until their adjudication. However, neither
the rules for consulting the lists nor confidentiality obligations
are specifically addressed.
33. For parliamentary elections, political parties and alliances
of political parties can each submit a single closed list for the
nationwide constituency, containing between 80 and 300 candidates.
Women and men must account for at least 30% of the candidates, with
a requirement that both genders are represented in each group of
three consecutive candidates on the list. This quota increased from
25% in the most recent elections.
34. In order to be eligible to stand as a candidate, one must
be an eligible voter of at least 25 years of age, be a citizen of
and resident in Armenia for the preceding four years and have command
of the Armenian language. Citizens holding another nationality are
not eligible to stand as candidates. Judges, prosecutors, military
personnel, police officers, other categories of civil servants,
and election commissions members are also not permitted to stand
as candidates. Candidate lists may include up to 30% of non-party
members. The law does not provide the possibility for candidates
to stand individually.
35. In an inclusive process, the CEC registered the candidate
lists of 22 political parties and 4 alliances. Following the withdrawal
of one political party by the 10 June deadline, a total of 25 contesting
lists remained, composed of 2 498 candidates of whom 925 were women
(37%). All lists complied with the gender requirement, including
after the withdrawal and cancellation of 39 candidates’ registration.
Only two candidate lists were headed by a woman. One alliance and
three parties registered a total of 13 candidates for the four seats
reserved for national minorities. Among the contestants were the
three largest parties represented in the outgoing parliament, as
well as those affiliated with all three presidents to have held
office between 1991 and 2018: Levon Ter-Petrosyan (Armenian National
Congress; ANC), Robert Kocharyan (Armenia Alliance; AA) and Serzh
Sargsyan (With Honor Alliance; WH). While Mr. Sargsyan was not a
candidate in these elections he was prominent in the campaigning
for his party.
36. All registered parties and alliances submitted the required
financial deposit of 10 million Armenian dram (AMD, approximately
€15 700). The deposit will be returned if a list obtains seats in
parliament or more than 4% of valid votes.
6 Election campaign,
funding and the media
37. For these early elections,
the official campaign period was 12 days, compared to 35 to 45 days
for regular elections, in accordance with the law. The official
campaign period commenced on 7 June and ended on 18 June, with campaigning
prohibited on the day before election day and on election day itself.
38. As in the pre-campaign period, the national security situation
dominated the political discourse in the campaign period. The economic
situation, exacerbated by the war and the Covid-19 pandemic, was
the next most important issue. The polarisation intensified during
the campaign period, with some contestants levelling derogatory
and inflammatory accusations against one another, rather than engaging
in issue-based discussions. For example, at rallies in Ashtarak
on 8 June, in Yerevan on 11 June, in Tashir and Vanadzor on 12 June,
former President Kocharyan accused the current Prime Minister of
being a “traitor”, “lunatic” and stated that he should leave the
country. During a Civil Contract rally in Talin on 8 June, Prime
Minister Pashinyan accused the former president of being part of
a “criminal gang” and threatened to “break the teeth of that pack”,
threatened a “staff massacre” and said that he has a “vendetta”
against those whom he accuses of working against him within the
administration or as leaders of private businesses.
39. Increasingly high levels of intolerant, inflammatory and discriminatory
rhetoric were reported in the period leading up to election day.
The Human Rights Defender criticised the use of such rhetoric and
called on all contestants, in particular current leaders (or officials),
such as the prime minister, to refrain from using such language.
The CEC also called on contestants to refrain from such rhetoric.
40. Fundamental rights such as the freedoms of assembly were generally
respected throughout the campaign, and contestants were able to
campaign freely throughout the country. While voters had a wide
range of options of political parties and alliances, the most visible
parties and alliances in the campaign were incumbent Prime Minister
Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract and former President Robert Kocharyan’s
Armenia Alliance. Campaign messages were aggressive with accusations
of corruption against the former president from one side and criticisms
of the so-called failures of the current administration, particularly
in relation to the conduct of the war from the other side. Negative
campaign materials targeting Mr Kocharyan were also noted before
and on election day near some polling stations.
41. In-person campaign activities took place around the country.
Many observed events did not adhere to government mandated measures
against the Covid-19 pandemic. Among the features of the campaign
were marches, car parades, door-to-door canvassing, public meetings
and meetings with specific groups, as well as extensive use of social
networks and advertisements on television. Contestants also made
widespread use of billboards and posters, including in places allocated
by the CEC equally to contestants for paid advertising. Parties
and Alliances reported a few significant concerns relating to the
destruction of posters and billboards during the campaign, but no
official complaints were filed. Despite the 30% gender quota, women
have been notably side-lined in campaign events, rarely participating
as speakers. Further, there was an observable absence of messages
targeting women and national minority groups during the campaigns.
42. Prime Minister Pashinyan was criticised for using his working
visits to the regions during the pre-campaign period to promote
his electoral messages in meeting local communities and visit local
offices of his party. While these events were not labelled as campaign
events, they featured campaign messages and materials such as banners
with the Civil Contract logo. The Electoral Code restricts campaigning
by civil servants and government officials to off-duty hours but
does not clearly define working or non-working hours. Visits to
party offices in the course of a working visit by a State official,
or to government offices while campaigning blurs the line between
the ruling party and the State.
43. There were incidents of pressure on private and public sector
employees by employers connected to contestants to attend campaign
events. Allegations of vote buying were also made, in particular
concerning larger parties and investigations were opened against
three candidates on vote-buying charges during the campaign period.
44. On 8 June a Prosperous Armenia candidate was arrested on charges
of vote buying in Gegharkunik region. On 11 June the former Mayor
of Armavir, standing as a With Honor candidate, was also arrested
in Armavir region. On 18 June a With Honor candidate was arrested
on vote buying charges in the Zeytun district in Yerevan. In addition
to the three candidates arrested, investigations were initiated
in 14 cases related to vote buying.
45. Allegations of the misuse of administrative resources also
persisted throughout the campaign and were not uniformly addressed.
46. The campaign silence was generally maintained, but following
a complaint by With Honor, the CEC issued a warning against Civil
Contract candidate Mr Pashinyan for campaigning on the day before
the elections.
47. Campaign financing is primarily regulated by the Electoral
Code and the Law on Political Parties. Political parties or alliances
that received at least 3% of the vote in the previous elections
are entitled to annual public funding, but there is no direct public
funding of campaign expenses. Parties and alliances contesting the elections
are required to open a dedicated bank account for campaign finance
transactions. Campaigns may be funded by donations from voters,
as well as from candidates’ own contributions and funds transferred
by political parties. Contributions from commercial and non-commercial
entities, as well as from foreign and anonymous sources, are not
permitted. The law limits campaign expenses to AMD 500 million (approximately €788 000)
per contesting party or alliance.
48. While campaign finance regulation is detailed, a number of
shortcomings allow for the circumvention of legal provisions. For
instance, despite a long-standing ODIHR recommendation, the legal
definition of campaign expenditures does not cover organisational
expenses, such as costs for office space, transportation, communications,
and campaign staff, leaving the opportunity for contestants to use
these expenses as a means to circumvent spending limits. Some parties
used charitable organisations and personal publicity to bypass campaign
spending limits. While the amended law on Political Parties banned
contributions from commercial entities to party funds and introduced
corresponding sanctions, it seems that the ban can be circumvented
by channelling large corporate donations through individual citizens
as smaller contributions to campaign funds. While new sanctions
were introduced in recent amendments to the legal framework, some
of the most necessary amendments addressing criminal and administrative
liability for violations of campaign financing rules will only become
applicable in 2022.
49. The CEC’s Oversight and Audit Service (OAS) is in charge of
overseeing the compliance of contesting parties and alliances with
campaign finance legislation. OAS published summarised data on the
total amounts of contributions and expenditures per contesting party/alliance
and posted their pre-election financial reports online, thereby
contributing to financial transparency. The second financial reports
have to be submitted no later than three days before the summarisation
of the election results by the CEC.
50. The media landscape is diverse and includes 50 broadcasters,
including 6 TV channels and 4 radio stations with nationwide outreach,
over 35 periodical print publications, and more than 200 online
news portals. The role of online sources and social networks, in
particular Facebook, is growing rapidly, and they have become significant
platforms for the exchange of election-related information. Nevertheless,
television remains the most important source of political information,
especially outside the capital. Public television, which is financed
from the State budget, continues to be perceived as having a pro-government
editorial policy. Long-standing concerns exist about the political
affiliation of private broadcasters.
51. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution and
international organisations have noted overall improvements in this
respect since 2018. Defamation was decriminalised in 2010, but a
Civil Code amendment from April 2021 tripled the maximum pecuniary
damages that can be claimed in insult and libel cases. However,
there is a growing level of harsh, intolerant and inflammatory rhetoric
in the political arena. The political environment in which different
opinions are routinely confronted with hatred and reprimand, particularly
on social networks, is negatively affecting public discourse. Additionally,
the number of recent instances of physical harassment of journalists
performing their professional duties raise questions about respect
for media freedom.
52. On 1 June, in line with the law, the CEC, through a public
lottery, allocated 30 minutes of free airtime on public television,
and 60 minutes on public radio, both during prime time, to each
contesting party or alliance. In addition, each contesting party
or alliance had the right to purchase up to 60 minutes on public
television, and up to 90 minutes on public radio. Thirty-two private
broadcasters, including 26 regional broadcasters, provided contestants
with an opportunity to buy paid advertisements.
53. By law, the Commission for Television and Radio (CTR) oversees
all broadcasters during the official campaign period, including
through its own media monitoring. In a welcome step, the CTR interpreted
the requirement in the Electoral Code to provide “impartial and
non-judgemental information” in a manner that allows for a more
comprehensive coverage of the various parties and alliances rather
than a formalistic emphasis on equal amounts of coverage to each
contestant. On 16 June, the regulator issued its first monitoring
report, which did not note any major violations of the law.
54. There were discernible differences in the media coverage of
political developments before and after the start of the official
campaign. Monitored broadcasters, in particular public television
decreased their coverage of the current government and the acting
prime minister, and coverage dedicated mostly to contesting parties and
alliances. A significant portion of the television content related
to elections were campaign adverts, including frequent negative
campaigning, primarily by Armenia Alliance.
55. The share of coverage dedicated to the government on public
H1 decreased from 66 to 4%, remaining overwhelmingly positive or
neutral in tone. Public H1 covered all contestants to a generally
comparable extent, providing the largest coverage to Civil Contract
with 12%, followed by Armenia National Congress with 11%, Armenian
Alliance with 8% and With Honor Alliance with 7%. The coverage was
mostly positive and neutral in tone, and generally avoided harsh
rhetoric. The public television adhered to its requirements for
free and paid airtime allocation. It also aired numerous electoral
debates and interviews; including two live debates with the leaders
of contesting parties and alliances. However more than half of the
leaders of the contesting parties and alliances declined to participate
in the final two public television debates, which negatively affected
their informational value. Several opposition parties complained
about various aspects of H1 election coverage, including the editing
and rejection of paid advertising materials which were critical
of the ruling party and its supporters and the means for determining
the debate order.
56. During the official campaign, some private broadcasters, particularly
Shant TV, made an observable effort to cover most electoral contestants
in a largely impartial manner, contributing to the diversity of information
available and to the voters’ ability to make an informed choice.
Shant TV dedicated 11% of its politics related coverage to Armenia
Alliance and 10% to Civil Contract. The tone of the coverage was
neutral or positive. By contrast, the news channel Armnews often
presented one-sided and critical biased coverage against the ruling
authorities and Civil Contract, including derogatory statements
voiced by its journalists.
57. Channels that are perceived to be openly affiliated with particular
parties did, however, give those contestants preferential treatment.
For example, Yerkir Media dedicated 36% of coverage in a mostly
positive or neutral tone to the Armenia Alliance.
7 Election day
58. On election day the PACE delegation
split into 11 teams and observed the voting process in a number of
polling stations in Yerevan and its surroundings, as well as in
Hrazdan, Gavar, Artashat, Gyumri, Ararat, Masis, Vanadzor, Azatan,
Artik, Maralik and Dzorakap.
59. Election day was generally peaceful, with a voter turnout
of 49.4% announced by the CEC. The CEC started posting detailed
preliminary election results on its website, by polling station,
in the early hours of 21 June.
60. The opening was assessed positively in all 123 polling stations
where it was observed. Established procedures were generally followed,
but 12 of the polling stations observed opened with slight delays.
61. Voting was assessed positively in 98% of polling stations
observed. While IEOM observers characterised the process as smooth,
transparent and well-organised, they reported problems such as interference
by party or alliance proxies, and frequent overcrowding as well
as a general disregard for Covid-19 protection measures.
62. Campaign materials and activities were noted in the vicinity
of 7% of the polling stations observed. 23 instances of tension
or unrest around polling stations observed were reported (2%), as
well as isolated indications of vote buying and pressure on voters.
14% of the polling stations observed were overcrowded, in particular
in Yerevan and other cities. Approximately 67% of the polling stations
were not accessible for persons with physical disabilities, and
in 32% the layout was not suitable for such voters.
63. Party and alliance proxies were present in 97% of the polling
stations observed, and citizen observers in 77%. However, PACE teams
noted that some observers were not aware what entity they were representing. The
presence of unauthorised persons was noticed in 8% of polling stations
observed, mostly police who had not been invited into the voting
room by the PEC chairperson. In 73 polling stations observed (6%),
persons other than PEC members interfered in or directed the process;
in 55 cases, these were proxies. Official complaints were filed
in 7% of the polling stations where voting was observed. Some 43%
of PECs observed were chaired by women, and overall, 65% of PEC
members in the polling station observed were women.
64. No problems with the VADs were reported and voter identification
procedures were almost universally adhered. In 7% of the polling
station observed, one or more voters were turned away, mostly because
they had come to the wrong polling station, could not be found on
the voter list, or were unable to produce a valid ID. In 8 polling
stations observers saw that voters without a valid ID were still
allowed to vote. Voting procedures were respected, with a few exceptions
where not all voter confirmation slips were stamped by the PEC or
retained after voters cast their ballots. There were some problems
with the secrecy of the vote, including not all voters voting in
secret (4% of the polling stations observed) or voters taking their
unused ballots out of the voting booth (2%). A limited number of
cases of violations were reported, such as group voting (3%), proxy
voting (1%), or attempts to influence voters (less than 1%). Isolated
instances where voters were not handed a full set of ballots were
reported, as was one case where a PEC member handed an envelope
already containing a ballot to a voter. In 3% of the polling stations
observed, the ballot boxes were not sealed properly.
65. PACE teams stressed that there was some confusion caused by
the large number of ballot papers (25 in total), this causing bottlenecks
at the queue for getting the ballots. There was also some confusion
caused by the use of the envelopes and the discarding of the unused
ballots.
66. One PACE team observing in the Erebuni district saw very many
flyers on the streets containing a negative message of a violent
nature against one leading candidate (Robert Kocharyan). It also
noted that in the rural area, many people on the voter lists were
not living at those places.
67. The vote count was assessed positively in 91 of the 97 polling
stations in which it was observed and characterised by a high level
of transparency and general adherence to established procedures.
Party and alliance proxies and citizen observers were present at
almost all counts observed. IEOM observers reported 10 cases of
undue interference in the count, 9 of which were by proxies. They
reported only a few cases of PECs failing to follow basic reconciliation
procedures before opening the ballot boxes. However, in 20 counts the
number of signatures on the voter list did not match the number
of voter confirmation slips issued by the VAD. Counting procedures
were followed overall with very few significant procedural errors
or serious violations such as intimidation of PEC members (2 reports)
or evidence of falsification of official election material (3 reports).
The determination of ballot validity was reasonable and consistent
in all but 4 and 1 counts, respectively. Persons other than PEC
members participated in 14 counts, and in 4 polling stations PEC members
had pre-signed the results protocol. 21 PECs observed had problems
completing the results protocol. In 4 polling stations observed,
the PEC did not post a copy of the protocol for public display.
68. The tabulation process was assessed negatively in 6 of the
32 TECs where it was observed. While tabulation procedures were
mostly followed, with very few procedural omissions or violations
reported, in many TECs, the handover process was poorly organised
and there were frequent reports of insufficient space and overcrowding
negatively affecting the process and transparency. No interference
was reported in the tabulation process. Unlike in PECs, proxies
were only present in 13 TECs observed.
69. On election day, the CEC registered 27 reports of violations,
several of which were confirmed. They included attempts to direct
voters how to vote and cases of interference by proxies. The Prosecutor’s
Office reported that it had received 319 reports of violations during
voting hours. Of these, 79 concerned obstruction of voting, 89 concerned
voting more than once or of impersonation, 49 were for violations
of the secrecy of the vote, and 69 for vote-buying. Six criminal
cases were initiated. In addition, the police reported that they
received 87 reports. On election day, the Special Investigation
Service arrested three persons, including a candidate, on suspicion
of vote buying in Vayots Dzor region.
70. The PACE delegation felt that in general it was a calm election
day, with only minor irregularities and incidents without any influence
on the validity of the vote and on the legitimacy of the results.
71. The CEC announced the results on 27 June:
|
Total number of voters
on the Voter Lists
|
2 591 316
|
|
Total number of voters
on the ad hoc supplementary lists prepared at PECs
|
1 245
|
|
Total number of voters
on supplementary lists of mobile ballots
|
2 451
|
|
Total number of voters
participated in e-voting
|
500
|
|
Total number of voters
|
2 595 512
|
|
Total number of voters
participated in elections
|
1 281 997
|
72. The results are as follows:
|
##
|
Party
/ Alliance Name
|
Number
of Votes
|
Percentage
|
|
#1
|
Fair Armenia Party
|
3 914
|
0.31%
|
|
#2
|
Armenian National Congress
Party
|
19 691
|
1.54%
|
|
#3
|
Civil Contract Party
|
688 761
|
53.91%
|
|
#4
|
Zartonq (Awakening) National
Christian Party
|
4 619
|
0.36%
|
|
#5
|
Liberty (Azatutyun) Party
|
1 844
|
0.14%
|
|
#6
|
With Honor Alliance
|
66 650
|
5.22%
|
|
#7
|
Unified Homeland Party
|
964
|
0.08%
|
|
#8
|
Pan-Armenian National
Statehood Party
|
803
|
0.06%
|
|
#9
|
Bright Armenia Party
|
15 591
|
1.22%
|
|
#10
|
Our Home Is Armenia Party
|
12 149
|
0.95%
|
|
#11
|
Republic Party
|
38 758
|
3.03%
|
|
#12
|
Hayots Hayreniq (Homeland
of Armenians) Party
|
13 130
|
1.3%
|
|
#13
|
Free Motherland Alliance
|
4 119
|
0.32%
|
|
#14
|
Prosperous Armenia Party
|
50 444
|
3.95%
|
|
#15
|
Democratic Party of Armenia
|
5 020
|
0.39%
|
|
#16
|
5165 National Conservative
Movement Party
|
15 549
|
1.22%
|
|
#17
|
Citizen’s Decision Social
Democratic Party
|
3 775
|
0.3%
|
|
#18
|
Shirinyan-Babajanyan
Democrats’ Union
|
19 212
|
1.5%
|
|
#19
|
National Agenda Party
|
719
|
0.06%
|
|
#20
|
Verelk Party
|
1 233
|
0.1%
|
|
#21
|
Liberal Party
|
14 936
|
1.17%
|
|
#23
|
European Party of Armenia
|
2 440
|
0.19%
|
|
#24
|
Armenia Alliance
|
269 481
|
21.09%
|
|
#25
|
National Democratic Axis
Party
|
18 976
|
1.49%
|
|
#26
|
Sovereign Armenia Party
|
3 915
|
0.31%
|
8 Conclusions and recommendations
73. Armenia’s early parliamentary
elections were competitive and well-managed within a short time
frame. However, they were characterised by intense polarisation
and marred by increasingly inflammatory language from key contestants.
74. The PACE delegation took note that the dramatical change in
the political landscape in Armenia – dominated in the last two decades
by the Republican Party – which started with the 2018 parliamentary elections
has been confirmed in 2021.
75. The PACE delegation concluded that the electoral legal framework
is generally comprehensive, but some shortcomings still remain.
The observers noted that while recent changes in the electoral system
were broadly debated and supported by the majority of political
parties and civil society groups, the fact that amendments were
adopted so close to the elections caused legal uncertainty and left
little time to implement the new rules or inform voters about the
changes.
76. National security issues dominated the political discourse
in the pre-campaign and campaign periods. The PACE delegation expressed
its concern on the fact that the debate was driven by increasingly
aggressive language and accusations, worsening the high degree of
polarisation and further reducing attention to political programmes
and policy.
77. The PACE delegation noted that election day itself was generally
peaceful, and observers made an overwhelmingly positive assessment
of the voting processes in the polling stations visited. However,
many polling stations were inaccessible for voters with disabilities,
and there was frequent overcrowding. There were also some cases
of interference in the voting process by party or alliance proxies.
At the same time, observers found that the vote counting process
went well and was highly transparent.
78. The PACE delegation felt that in general it was a calm election
day, with only minor irregularities and incidents without any influence
on the validity of the vote and on the legitimacy of the results.
79. The PACE delegation was informed that during the brief campaign
period, candidates were able to campaign freely, and the fundamental
freedoms essential for democratic elections were generally respected. Observers
noted that in some cases there was pressure on workers in both the
private and public sector to take part in specific campaign events,
while allegations of vote-buying and the misuse of State resources continued
throughout the campaign period. Despite the fact that women candidates
were included in the party lists, their visibility during the campaign
was markedly low.
80. The PACE delegation noted that freedom of expression is guaranteed
by the Constitution. However, cases of journalists being harassed
in the course of their duties raised questions about respect for
media freedom. Several media outlets made a visible effort to cover
a wide range of contestants, organising debates that helped ensure
voters had enough information to make an informed choice on election
day. At the same time, there are long-standing concerns about the
political affiliation of private broadcasters.
81. The Assembly and the Venice Commission are ready to continue
the collaboration with the Armenian authorities to further improve
the legal framework and electoral practices in the country and to
contribute to their implementation.
Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee
Chairperson: Mr George
Katrougalos, Greece
Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
(SOC)
- Mr Gerardo GIOVAGNOLI,
San Marino
- Ms Bela BACH, Germany
- Mr Paulo PISCO, Portugal
- Ms Sibel ARSLAN, Switzerland
- Mr Christian PETRY, Germany
Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Arin KARAPET, Sweden
- Ms Catia POLIDORI, Italy
- Mr Luís LEITE RAMOS, Portugal
- Mr Francesco SCOMA, Italy
- Mr Franck HEINRICH, Germany
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
- Mr Olivier FRANÇAIS,
Switzerland
- Mr Arminas LYDEKA, Lithuania
- Ms Alexandra LOUIS, France
- Mr Georges-Louis BOUCHEZ, Belgium
European Conservatives Group and Democratic
Alliance (EC/DA)
- Mr Arkadiusz MULARCZYK,
Poland
- Mr Alberto RIBOLLA, Italy
- Mr Ulrich OEHME, Germany
Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
- Mr George KATROUGALOS,
Greece
Co-rapporteurs AS/MON (ex officio)
Venice Commission
- Mr Richard BARRETT,
expert, Ireland
Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan TORCĂTORIU,
Administrator, Secretary of the ad hoc committee, Election Observation
and Interparliamentary Cooperation Division
- Ms Ivi-Triin ODRATS, Administrator, Election Observation
and Interparliamentary Cooperation Division
- Ms Daniele GASTL, Assistant, Election Observation and
Interparliamentary Cooperation Division
- Mr Gaël MARTIN-MICALLEF, Legal advisor, Venice Commission
Appendix 2 – Programme of the ad hoc committee
(18 to 21 June 2021)
Friday, 18 June 2021
09:45-10:45 Internal meeting of the PACE delegation
10:00 Registration of OSCE PA observers and distribution of
observation packs
11:15-11:30 Welcome and Introductory remarks
- Ms Margareta Cederfelt, Special
Coordinator and Leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission
- Mr George Katrougalos, Head of the PACE Observer Delegation
- Mr Kari Henriksen, Head of the OSCE PA Observer Delegation
11:30-13:00 ODIHR LEOM Briefing
- Welcome and overview of the ODIHR EOM’s work, Mr Eoghan Murphy, Head of
the ODIHR Election Observation Mission
- Electoral legal framework, Ms
Svetlana Chetaikina, Legal Analyst
- Election administration, Ms
Caroline Gonthier, Election Analyst
- Political landscape, candidate
registration and campaign, Mr Martin Kunze, Political Analyst
- Media landscape and coverage of the elections, Mr Ivan Godarsky, Media Analyst
- Security issues, Mr
Laszlo Belagyi, Security Expert
14:00-15:30 Election campaign panel
- Armnews, General
Director, Mr Narek Nikoghosyan
- Azatutyun (RFE/RL), Director
of the Armenian Service, Mr Hrayr Tamrazyan
- Council of Public Broadcaster of Armenia, President, Mr
Ara Shirinyan
- Helsinki Citizens' Assembly – Vanadzor, Democratic Institutions
Monitoring and Reporting Coordinator, Ms Vardine Grigoryan
- Regional Studies Center, Director, Mr Richard Giragosyan
- Transparency International, Executive
Director, Ms Sona Ayvazyan
- “WomenNet” NGO, Correspondent, Ms Lia Khojoyan
15:45-18:45 Representatives of political parties and party
alliances
15:45-16:15 Armenia Alliance (Armenian Revolutionary Federation
+ Reborn Armenia), Leader, Mr Robert Kocharyan
16:15-16-45 Armenian National Congress (ANC), Deputy Chairman, Mr Levon Zurabyan
16:45-17:15 Bright Armenia Party (LHK), Press Secretary, Mr
Aren Petunts
17:15-17:45 Civil Contract Party (QP), Chair of the Standing
Committee on European Integration of the Parliament, Mr Arman Yeghoyan
17:45-18:15 With Honour Alliance (Republican Party of Armenia
+ Homeland Party), Representative of the Campaign HQ, Mr Davit
Harutyunyan; Campaign Manager, Mr Armen Ashotyan
18:15-18-45 Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK), Secretary of the
party, Mr Arman Abovyan
Saturday, 19 June 2021
09:00-10:30 Election legislation panel
- Armenian Helsinki Committee,
Chair, Mr Avetik Ishkhanyan
- National Assembly Working Group on Electoral Reform, Coordinator,
Mr Hamazasp Danielyan
- Transparency International, Elections Systems Consultant,
Mr Harout Manougian
- Union of Informed Citizens, Programme Coordinator, Mr
Daniel Ioannisyan
10:45-12:15 Election administration panel
- Central Election Commission,
Chairperson, Mr Tigran Mukuchyan
- Central Election Commission Oversight and Audit Service,
Senior Specialist, Mr Tigran Babikyan
- National Commission for Television and Radio, President,
Mr Tigran Hakobyan
12:15-13:15 ODIHR LEOM Briefing continuation
- Election Day procedures: Mr
Stefan Krause, Deputy Head of ODIHR EOM, Ms Caroline Gonthier, Election
Analyst, Mr Max Bader, Statistics Expert
13:15-13-45 Briefing by ODIHR Long Term Observers deployed
in Yerevan
13:45-14:00 Final remarks
14:00-15:00 PACE observers meeting with E-day drivers and
interpreters
15:00-16:00 Covid PCR testing for PACE observers at Armenia
Marriott Hotel
Sunday, 20 June 2021
08:00 Covid PCR testing for PACE observers at
Armenia Marriott Hotel Yerevan
All day Election Day – Observation in polling stations
Monday, 21 June 2021
08:00-09:00 Debriefing of PACE observers
14:30 Joint press conference
All day Departure of observers
Appendix 3 – Statement by the International
Election Observation Mission
Armenia’s early parliamentary elections
were competitive and well run, but polarized and marred by aggressive
rhetoric, international observers say
YEREVAN, 21 June 2021 – Armenia’s early parliamentary elections
were competitive and well-managed within a short time frame. However,
they were characterized by intense polarization and marred by increasingly inflammatory
language from key contestants, as well as by the sidelining of women
throughout the campaign, international observers said in a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),
concluded that the electoral legal framework is generally comprehensive,
but some shortcomings still remain. The observers noted that while
recent changes in the electoral system were broadly debated and supported
by the majority of political parties and civil society groups, the
fact that amendments were adopted so close to the elections caused
legal uncertainty and left little time to implement the new rules
or inform voters about the changes.
“Despite
the limited time for the implementation of the recent amendments
to the electoral code, the administration of the elections was positively
assessed by the majority of our observers,” said Margareta Cederfelt,
special co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer
mission. “Most of our observers also assessed election day positively,
up to and including the vote count.”
National security issues dominated the political discourse
in the pre-campaign and campaign periods. However, the debate was
driven by increasingly aggressive language and accusations, worsening
the high degree of polarization and further reducing attention to
political programmes and policy.
Election day itself was generally peaceful, and observers
made an overwhelmingly positive assessment of the voting processes
in the polling stations visited. However, many polling stations
were inaccessible for voters with disabilities, and there was frequent
overcrowding. There were also some cases of interference in the voting
process by party or alliance proxies. At the same time, observers
found that the vote counting process went well and was highly transparent.
“The deep polarization didn’t detract
from a well-run election,” said George Katrougalos, Head of the PACE
delegation. “It is to be hoped that the results will be accepted
by all parties across the political spectrum, and the harsh rhetoric
of the campaign will be consigned to history.”
During the brief campaign period, candidates were able to
campaign freely, and the fundamental freedoms key to democratic
elections were generally respected. Observers noted that in some
cases there was pressure on workers in both the private and public
sector to take part in specific campaign events, while allegations
of vote buying and the misuse of State resources continued throughout
the campaign period. Despite the fact that women candidates were
included in the party lists, observers noted that their visibility
during the campaign was markedly low.
“While the recently introduced electoral changes have
resulted in larger representation of women in the candidate lists,
they remained largely absent from the public discourse during the
campaign,” said Kari Henriksen, Head of the OSCE PA delegation.
“It is important that women are not just equally represented, but
are also given the opportunity to engage actively in public and
political life.”
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution. However,
cases of journalists being harassed in the course of their duties
raises questions about respect for media freedom. The observer mission’s
media monitoring found that several media outlets made a visible
effort to cover a wide range of contestants, organizing debates
that helped ensure voters had enough information to make an informed
choice on election day. At the same time, there are long-standing
concerns about the political affiliation of private broadcasters.
“All candidates could campaign
freely throughout the election process, and it was good to see the election
authorities deliver on their mandate professionally,” said Eoghan
Murphy, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “But the
antagonistic language we heard during the campaign was not in any
way constructive for an informed public debate.”
The international election observation mission to the Armenian
parliamentary elections totalled 341 observers from 37 countries,
composed of 249 ODIHR-deployed experts and long-term and short-term observers, 71 parliamentarians
and staff from the OSCE PA, and 21 from the PACE.
