C Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Domagoj Hajduković, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. On 8 October 2023, the Bureau
decided to hold an urgent debate on the “Humanitarian situation
in Nagorno-Karabakh” and to seize the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons for a report on the same topic. I was appointed
rapporteur on 9 October 2023.
2. I have chosen throughout the following explanatory memorandum
to refer to this region as “the region of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh”.
When naming places in the region, I have also decided to use both Azerbaijani
and Armenian toponyms, such as Kakhendi/Stepanakert, thus reflecting
Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty over the region and the rights
of the Armenians from there.
3. Following a period of several months of extreme tension and
suffering linked to the blockage of passage through the Lachin Corridor,
the current situation has been triggered by the unannounced decision
of the Azerbaijan authorities on 19 September 2023 to launch military
force in the region, to crush the separatist self-proclaimed authorities
of the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region. This military show of strength
led then to the de facto surrender of the self-proclaimed authorities
of the region, and at the same time the mass exodus of almost the
entire Armenian population of the region, in the space of days.
4. Developments were still unfolding as this report was being
drafted. Following the exodus of over 100 000 Armenians from Azerbaijan
to the neighbouring Armenia, Azerbaijan has announced its undertaking
of “tangible work in relation to the reintegration of Armenian residents
living in the Karabakh region”.
Note In parallel, peace negotiations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan are still ongoing. However, in the current
climate of mistrust and recriminations, and lack of very tangible
acts of goodwill on the part of the authorities of Azerbaijan to
redress the situation of mass exodus and build a truly harmonious
and diverse society in the region, the prospect of sustainable and
mutually recognised peace and reconciliation seems very distant.
5. The military operation launched by Azerbaijan against the
Armenian-populated areas of the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region
on 19 September 2022 was the culmination of a ten-month period of
tension, following the blockade of the Lachin Corridor on 12 December
2023, which resulted in an acute human rights and humanitarian situation.
The Parliamentary Assembly deplored the lack of free and safe access
through the Lachin corridor, leading to the prospect of a slow starvation
of the local Armenian population, and the deprivation of their basic
essentials, such as water, fuel, gas, electricity and medicine.
Note
6. As regards the events of September, two very different narratives
are presented. From the point of view of Azerbaijan, the recourse
to a military operation represents an “anti-terrorist operation”,
necessary to remove a self-proclaimed separatist regime and exert
the right of Azerbaijan to defend its territorial integrity. From
the alternative perspective, the military operation is seen as an
attack or an assault which has entailed significant civilian casualties
and deaths and triggered the exodus of the Armenian population as
refugees. Time and careful fact-finding will be needed to establish
the responsibilities of the authorities regarding the deaths and injuries
of civilians in this 24-hour military operation. Pending this wider
evaluation, my report will focus on the immediate humanitarian consequences
of the events of the past months and of the operation of 19-20 September
2023, namely the displacement and exodus of more than 100 000 persons
seeking refuge. I will also consider the question of the respect
by Azerbaijan of its international obligations towards the Armenian population
of this region and measures needed to redress the current tragic
situation of an entire minority group leaving its homeland. I believe
that the Council of Europe can and must play a very active role
in bringing to bear its considerable expertise in confidence building
and minority rights, to ensure that the Armenians native of the
Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan feel safe and able
to remain in or return to their homes. This is essential not only
for the population in question, but as a prerequisite for the establishment
of genuine good faith and trust between two of its member States,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are seeking a just and sustainable
peace and the resolution of the long-standing conflict around this
region.
7. Given the urgency of the situation and the impossibility to
carry out a fact-finding mission on the spot, I have based my report
on reports from international bodies, independent media reports,
and information provided by Armenia and Azerbaijan, with a view
to evaluating the situation on the ground and the climate which
has led in the last two weeks to the mass exodus of the Armenian
population of the region following the military operation and the
subsequent re-opening of the Lachin Corridor which provides the
passage towards Armenia.
2 Azerbaijan’s international obligations
in the current situation of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
8. Azerbaijan is a State party
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) and
to most of its additional protocols, except Protocols No. 12 and
13. It must secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and the ratified protocols.
By virtue of its recognised territorial sovereignty over Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
and its current effective control over this region, it exercises
“jurisdiction” and has negative and positive obligations under the
Convention vis-à-vis the Armenian population living in this territory
or fleeing from it. It has an obligation under Article 2 to protect
the life of this population, notably in the context of the use of
force by State agents during and after the recent military operation.
It has a procedural obligation to conduct a thorough, independent
and effective investigation into all deaths and disappearances that
occurred during and after the operation. This also applies to any potential
allegations of torture and ill-treatment at the hands of State agents,
in accordance with Article 3. Other Convention rights that must
be protected for Armenians remaining in Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
that may be at risk in the current situation are: the right to liberty
and security (Article 5), the right to respect for private, family
life and home (Article 8), freedom of religion (Article 9), freedom
of expression (Article 10), freedom of assembly and association
(Article 11), the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14), the
right to the protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(ETS No. 9)), the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol No.
1), freedom of movement, which includes the freedom to choose their
residence and the right to leave any country (Article 2 of Protocol
No. 4 (ETS No. 46)), and the right to an effective remedy in relation
to these rights (Article 13). Many of these rights are also enshrined
in other international treaties to which Azerbaijan is a party,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Note It is also important to note
that Azerbaijan has not derogated from any of the Convention rights
by virtue of an Article 15 notification related to the current events, unlike
during the 2020 conflict.
9. For those Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians having fled
the region and wanting to return in the future, the right of nationals
not be expelled and the right to enter the territory of the State
of which they are nationals (Article 3 of Protocol No. 4) could
potentially be at stake. If displaced Armenians were to be prevented from
returning voluntarily to their homes and lands in Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
or if these were to be transferred to Azerbaijani settlers or de
facto expropriated, the right to respect for their private and family
lives and homes and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions could be potentially breached.
Note
10. Azerbaijan is also a State party to the Council of Europe
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS
No. 157). In its last report submitted to the relevant monitoring
mechanism (2022), Azerbaijan noted that “after the end of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict the reintegration of all citizens in conflict affected
territories into the political, legal, economic and social system
of the country on the basis of equal rights (…) will ensure the
implementation of the provisions of the Framework Convention with
respect to persons of the Armenian origin in the conflict affected
territories (…)”.
Note This statement was made
in relation to Article 16 of the Framework Convention, which imposes
the obligation on States Parties to “refrain from measures which
alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons
belonging to national minorities”. This provision is highly relevant
to the current situation of mass displacement of Armenians from Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
following the military operation. Other applicable provisions of
the Framework Convention to the human rights situation of Armenians
remaining in the region are: Articles 4 (right of equality before
the law and equal protection of the law), 5 (right to maintain and
develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of
their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and
cultural heritage); 6 (obligation to encourage a spirit of tolerance
and intercultural dialogue and promote mutual respect and understanding);
7-9 (freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression,
and freedom of religion); 10 and 14 (right to use and learn their
minority language); 15 (effective participation in cultural, social and
economic life and in public affairs); and 17 (right to establish
and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with other
persons sharing the same identity).
11. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have instituted proceedings before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with regard to alleged
violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In the context of these proceedings,
the ICJ granted provisional measures ordering Azerbaijan, among
other things, to “take all necessary measures to prevent the incitement
and promotion of racial hatred and discrimination, including by
its officials and public institutions, targeted at persons of Armenian
national or ethnic origin”, as well as “to prevent and punish acts
of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage”.
Note In 2023 it granted
further provisional measures ordering Azerbaijan to “take all measures
at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles
and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions”.
NoteFollowing
the recent events, Armenia has submitted a new request for provisional
measures, including among others to order Azerbaijan to “refrain
from taking any actions directly or indirectly aimed at or having
the effect of displacing the remaining ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh,
or preventing the safe and expeditious return to their homes of
persons displaced in the course of the recent military attack (…)”.
Note
12. Azerbaijan has ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention. It is
obliged as such to prevent and punish any acts of genocide.
NoteThis
includes direct and public incitement to commit genocide and attempt
to commit genocide. One of the acts defined as genocide in the Convention
that has been mentioned with respect to the obstruction of the Lachin
Corridor (before the military intervention) is “deliberately inflicting
on the group [national, ethnic, racial or religious] conditions
of life calculated to bring about is physical destruction in whole or
in part” (Article II, c)). On 16 August 2023, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency meeting upon the request
of Armenia but did not adopt any resolution. The Armenian foreign
minister, Mr Ararat Mirzoyan, urged the UNSC to avert a risk of
“genocide”. A similar opinion was expressed on 7 August 2023 by
Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo, former Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), who wrote that “the blockade of the Lachin Corridor
by the Azerbaijani security forces impeding access to any food,
medical supplies, and other essentials should be considered a genocide
under Article II, c) of the Genocide Convention: “Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part”.”
Note However, the Mr Moreno Ocampo’s
opinion has been contested by Mr
Rodney
Dixon KC, a British barrister, who had been appointed as an expert
by the government of Azerbaijan.
13. The factual situation today of mass displacement of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians following the military intervention has led to allegations
and reasonable suspicion of ethnic cleansing against Armenians. Ethnic
cleansing is generally described as rendering an area ethnically
homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given
area persons of another ethnic or religious group.
NoteAlthough
not a self-standing crime under international law, it has the characteristics
of specific war crimes (e.g. ordering the displacement of civilian
population
Note, unlawful deportation or transfer
Note) or crimes against humanity (deportation
or forcible transfer of population, persecution against any identifiable
group, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population
Note). For instance, according to
the elements of crime of the crime against humanity of deportation
or forcible transfer of population, “the term “forcibly” is not
restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment”.
Note Although Azerbaijan has not
ratified the ICC Statute, these are also crimes under customary
international law and give rise to individual criminal responsibility.
Note
3 Military
operation of 19 September and developments since that date
3.1 The
military operation
14. On 19 September 2023, just
a day after the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
was allowed to resume transport of humanitarian aid, Azerbaijan
announced that it had launched “local counter-terrorism activities
in the Karabakh economic region” in response to the deaths of two
civilians and four police officers in incidents involving landmines.
The Azerbaijani authorities alleged that these landmines had been planted
by Armenian armed forces.
Note The
Russian peacekeeping forces, whose mandate stems from the Trilateral
Agreement signed on 9 November 2020 by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham
Aliyev, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin, did not intervene to prevent this use of force.
Note
15. The Armenian authorities have alleged that this military operation,
following on from the blockade of the last months, constitutes a
process of ethnic cleansing. The Armenian government has also firmly
rejected Azerbaijan’s claims that Armenia had maintained armed forces
in this region of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh, that it had been involved
in the setting of minefields and was hindering direct talks between
Baku and Kakhendi/Stepanakert.
Note
16. On 20 September 2023, after 24 hours of intense hostilities,
an agreement was reached on a complete cessation of hostilities
The conditions included disarmament, demilitarisation and disbanding
of the “Armenian illegal military formations”. It was also agreed
that the following day, a meeting between Azerbaijani officials and
representatives of the Armenian residents living in the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
region would take place in Yevlakh (Azerbaijan) to discuss “reintegration
issues, based on the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan
and its laws” (see paragraph 50).
Note
17. The military operation has reportedly led to more than 200
deaths and 400 wounded, including civilians and children. Bodies
were still being recovered in early October.
Note Some international media have
reported “indiscriminate attacks” against civilians, notably in
the village of Aghbulag/Sarnaghbuyr, surrounded by forest and far
from any significant military targets, where at least two children
were killed on 19 September 2023. At the same time, Azerbaijani
officials claim that its army had orders “to neutralise only legitimate
military targets”.
Note Pursuant to Articles 2 and 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights, Azerbaijan is under
the obligation to conduct an independent, thorough transparent and
effective investigation into all the deaths and injuries that might
have happened during the military operation of 19 and 20 September
2023. Conducting such investigations in a timely fashion will undoubtedly
contribute to creating the necessary trust which is so much lacking
between Armenians and Azerbaijan.
18. Due to the military operation, several front-line villages
had to be evacuated by Russian peacekeepers.
Note As a result, 13 400 persons,
including several hundred children, were lodged and provided with
food and medical aid at the Russian base near the airport In the
first days following this evacuation, despite requests being made,
these persons had not been evacuated further to Armenia by the Russian
peacekeepers as they had not received an order to do so.
19. On 21 September 2023, the Armenian self-proclaimed authorities
of the region claimed that the Azerbaijani military had violated
the ceasefire and continued to attack Stepanakert. Since then, the
ceasefire seems to have been holding. The Azerbaijani army and the
Russian peacekeepers have been collecting weapons and ammunitions
handed over by the Armenian separatist forces.
3.2 Political
and legal developments
20. On 21 September 2023, a meeting
between Azerbaijani officials and the self-proclaimed authorities
of this region took place in Yevlakh. At this meeting, the parties
discussed Azerbaijan’s plans for "reintegration" of the region's
Armenian population, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the
restoring of infrastructure in the region and Baku’s demands as
laid down in the ceasefire agreement. A second meeting took place
in Khojali on 25 September 2023, in which mainly humanitarian issues
were discussed.
Note A similar third meeting took
place on 29 September 2023 in Yevlakh. which focused on the reintegration
of the Armenian population of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh, restoration
of infrastructure and organisation of its activities based on the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Note
21. As regards the position of Armenia, it can be stated that
Armenia’s Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan has reiterated several
times that Armenia has not been a party to discussions on and the
drafting of the ceasefire agreement. He has also stressed that Armenia
has no military personnel or army present in the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
region of Azerbaijan. During a live address on Facebook, the Prime
Minister stated that Armenia was ready to host 40 000 persons from
the region, although a mass evacuation should be avoided.
Note However, the developments in
the following days demonstrated that his wish to “not to depopulate
Nagorno-Karabakh” but to ensure that residents of the region “have
the opportunity to live in their homes without fear, with dignity
and safety” has not materialised, since the vast majority of the
Armenian inhabitants of the region have left their homes and sought
refuge in Armenia.
22. On 28 September 2023, the self-proclaimed authorities of this
region announced it would dissolve itself and that the unrecognised
republic of Nagorno-Karabakh would cease to exist by 2024. This
was confirmed in the signing of a decree by the self-proclaimed
president, Samvel Shahramanyan, in which he committed to the dissolution
of all the related institutions by 1 January 2024. The decree also
stated that the local population must “familiarise themselves with
the conditions of reintegration presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan”
and make “an independent and individual decision” on whether to
stay or leave the region. The statement emphasised that the decision
was taken because of the “complex military–political situation”
created after Azerbaijan’s attack on the region on 19 September
2023.
Note
23. In Yerevan, the opposition organised protests, in which the
government was accused of abandoning the Armenian population of
the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region to its fate. Although still
ongoing, these anti-government protests have lost substantial momentum
in the last week of September, but it is clear that unrest against
the government in Armenia may also impact negatively both upon the
democratic reforms underway in that country and also on the on-going
peace negotiations with Azerbaijan.
24. Upon a submission by Armenia, the European Court of Human
Rights has issued interim measures under Rule 39 of its Rules. The
Court “found that the military escalation of 19-20 September 2023
put the life and health of civilians and others at risk and accordingly
decided, notwithstanding the ceasefire agreement reached on 20 September
2023, to indicate to the Government of Azerbaijan to refrain from
taking any measures which might entail breaches of their obligations
under the Convention, notably Article 2 (right to life) and Article
3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment)”. The Court also decided to give immediate notice of
the above interim measure to the Committee of Ministers.
Note
25. On 28 September 2023, Armenia submitted a request to the ICJ
for the indication of provisional measures, “to preserve and protect
rights enshrined in the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)”. Armenia requested
the Court to indicate a number of provisional measures, and to reaffirm
Azerbaijan’s obligations under the Orders it has rendered in this
case, in particular those of 7 December 2021 and 22 February 2023.
26. Another important development in these troubled times has
been the ratification by the National Assembly of Armenia – with
60 votes to 22 – of the Rome Statute on 3 October 2023, thus recognising
the jurisdiction of the ICC. It will come into force 60 days after
the vote.
Note Armenia’s commitment to become
the 124th State party to the Rome Statute had to be postponed because
of an initial ruling of the Constitutional Court of Armenia that
the Rome Statute conflicted with Armenia’s Constitution. The obstacle
was removed after a new ruling by the court, on 24 March 2024, which
determined that there was no longer a constitutional conflict regarding
ICC membership. This important step was taken despite Russia’s political
pressure and statements by State representatives, such as Russian
presidential spokesperson Mr Dmitry Peskov, that Russia did not welcome
this process of ratification. This courageous political decision,
particularly in the current particularly complex circumstances,
will undoubtedly bear consequences on the peace process underway
and the transitional justice that should follow.
Note
3.3 International
reactions
27. The recourse to military force
by Azerbaijan in the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region has been almost unanimously
condemned by the international community. Indeed, in doing so, Azerbaijan
has put into question its important commitment to end the conflict
through peaceful means. The following mass exodus of the Armenian
population was also met with huge concern on the part of the international
community. The Armenian diaspora around the world has been active
in drawing international attention to the plight of the Armenians
of this region, particularly during the months of the blockade of
the Lachin Corridor and in the current situation of mass exodus
towards Armenia.
Note
3.3.1 United
Nations
28. On 21 September 2023, at the
request of Armenia and France, the UNSC held an urgent meeting on
the situation in the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region following
Azerbaijan’s military operation. Due to a veto from the Russian
Federation, it was not possible to adopt a resolution but the discussion
in the UNSC confirmed the worsening of the humanitarian and human
rights crisis in the region and the fact that the lives and safety of
the Armenians living there were at risk. The participating delegations
stressed that the use of force by Azerbaijan was unacceptable and
contradicted the norms and principles of international humanitarian
and human rights law. It was also stressed that the rights and security
of the Armenian population of this region must be ensured, including
their right to live in their homes in dignity.
Note
29. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, and
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Morris Tidball-Binz, recalled Azerbaijan’s international obligations
towards the Armenians from Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular
regarding the protection of their rights and under humanitarian
law.
Note “The Special Adviser of the Secretary
General on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, has
also expressed her alarm over the military operation by Azerbaijan,
emphasizing the importance of preventing further violence and of
ensuring a durable peace in the region that protects the rights of
all people.
Note
30. From the outset, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has been providing support to those fleeing their
home, while calling for the protection of civilians and full respect
of international humanitarian and refugee law. UNHCR has expressed
its concern that “the majority of those arriving are vulnerable,
including mainly older people, women and children. People arriving
at the borders are exhausted and require urgent emergency assistance,
as well as psychosocial support. With freezing temperatures at night and
limited accommodation, emergency shelter support is urgently needed”.
UNHCR, together with other UN agencies, has been supporting the
government of Armenia in setting up co-ordination structures. UNHCR
is also leading the inter-agency refugee response, working with
the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office. UNHCR, together with UN agencies
and NGO partners, has appealed for 97 million USD to provide urgent
humanitarian aid and protection to refugees and those hosting them
in Armenia, in support of the Armenia Emergency Refugee Response
Plan (RRP), launched on 7 October 2023 and covering relief efforts
until the end of March 2024.
Note
31. For the first time in more than 30 years, a UN mission led
by the UN Resident Coordinator in Azerbaijan, has been permitted
by Azerbaijan to carry out a mission in the region of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
in order to assess the humanitarian needs on the spot. The visit
took place on 1 October 2023, and the delegation travelled from
Aghdam to Kakhendi/Stepanakert. In a press release issued the same
day, the mission expressed how it had been “struck by the sudden
manner in which the local population left their homes and the suffering
the experience must have caused”. Furthermore, “from the conversations
that the team was able to have, it [was] difficult to determine
at this stage whether the local population intend[ed] to return”.
Note
3.3.2 Council
of Europe
32. It is important to recall once
again that when it applied to the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan
committed “to a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”
and “to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means
and according to the principles of international law (an obligation
incumbent on all Council of Europe member States), resolutely rejecting
any threatened use of force against its neighbours”.
Note
33. The Secretary General was attending the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) in New York on the day of the launch of the military operation
and was able to meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan
in the margins of the UNGA general debate. After that meeting, she
issued a statement in which she expressed her “grave concern about
reports of a military escalation around the Karabakh region”. The
Secretary General also “deplored that innocent, vulnerable civilians,
who have already been suffering an acute humanitarian crisis in the
region, once again bear the brunt of the use of force” adding that
“this cannot be tolerated.” She “called on Azerbaijan to immediately
halt the military actions” underlining that “[o]nly a meaningful,
unconditional dialogue, involving all sides, can lead to a long-lasting
peace, which has no alternative. The Secretary General also recalled
that “[t]he Council of Europe remains ready to engage and assist
in this process, with a view to ensuring the full enjoyment of human
rights by all, including rights of national minorities.”
Note
34. On the same day, the President of the Assembly expressed his
deep shock “by the decision of the government of Azerbaijan to launch
a new and aggressive military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh […]”.
He also “strongly condemn[ed] these actions and call[ed] on the
authorities of Azerbaijan to cease their fire immediately”. He recalled
that “[f[or months [the Assembly has] been witnessing and calling
for an end to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in
the region due to the blockade of the Lachin corridor” adding that “[…][t]his
surely represents a major blow to the prospects of achieving sustainable
peace and stability in the South Caucasus”. Tiny Kox concluded his
statement by emphasising that “[…] the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh can
only be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and unambiguous signals
of goodwill, and on the basis on the applicable international law,
paying full respect to the human rights of everyone living there."
Note
35. The military operation led to a statement issued by the Commissioner
for Human Rights deploring “the renewed military escalation around
the Karabakh region and its impact on civilians, especially on the
most vulnerable” and reiterating her “commitment and readiness to
engage with all the relevant interlocutors and to travel to the
region to assist in overcoming the existing human rights challenges.”
Note On 2 October
2023, after the region had already been emptied of its inhabitants,
she issued another statement in which she called for the “safety
and human rights of Karabakh Armenians” and for a “free and unhindered
access of humanitarian assistance providers and international human
rights missions to all areas and people affected by the current circumstances”.
Note Finally, the President
of the Congress for Local and Regional Authorities expressed “grave concern
over the Nagorno-Karabakh situation”.
Note
36. The seriousness of the situation has also led the President
of the Assembly to propose the holding of a joint committee meeting
(with the Committee on Ministers), to be held on 12 October 2023.
37. There is no doubt that one or more fact-finding visits to
Azerbaijan from institutions or bodies of the Council of Europe,
in the shortest possible time span, would considerably help in clarifying
this very volatile situation, in entering into constructive dialogue
with the authorities of Azerbaijan, and in determining the measures
that can be put in place to redress the current dramatic departure
of almost the entire Armenian population of the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
region of Azerbaijan. In this respect, the announced intention to
organise a visit of the Commissioner for Human Rights is especially
welcome.
3.3.3 The
European Union
38. Despite the tense situation
which has resulted from the blockade of the Lachin Corridor in December 2022,
peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued under
the auspices of the European Union, and to a lesser extent, the
United States of America. Thus, on 26 September 2023, the European
Council hosted a meeting between Secretary of Armenia’s Security
Council Armen Grigoryan and Foreign Policy Advisor to the President
of Azerbaijan Hikmet Hajiyev, with the participation of Diplomatic
Advisers to French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor
Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Bonne and Jens Ploetner, as well as EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
Toivo Klaar. On this occasion, the European Union reiterated its
position on Azerbaijan’s military operation and stressed the need for
transparency and access for international humanitarian and human
rights actors and for more detail on Baku’s vision for Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians’ future in Azerbaijan.
Note Azerbaijan
announced on 4 October 2023 that it would not participate in a much-awaited
meeting for the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders which was supposed
to take place in Granada (Spain) in the framework of the Third European
Political Community Summit on 5 October 2023. This meeting was seen
as an important milestone to engage in talks on possible concrete
steps to advance the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, such as those
with regard to border delimitation, security, connectivity, humanitarian
issues, and the broader peace treaty, and for both Yerevan and Baku
to reiterate publicly their commitment to each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty in line with agreements reached.
Note
39. European Union officials, including Mr Josep Borrell, High
Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security
policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and
a delegation from AFET (Committee on Foreign Affairs) MEPs, condemned
the escalation of the tensions and called for a cessation of the
hostilities during the military operation.
Note Following
the ceasefire, they reiterated their call for guarantees for the
rights and security of the population of this region following the
ceasefire – in particular in a phone conference between Council
President Charles Michel and President Ilham Aliyev. The HR/VP also released
a statement warning that forced displacement of the civilian population
through military or other means will be met with a strong response
by the European Union. He added that the European Union is ready to
take measures if the situation deteriorated further. He reiterated
this position including a call for the recommitment by Azerbaijan
to Armenia’s territorial integrity, at the dedicated UNSC meeting.
Note Discussing
the matter with the European External Action Service (EEAS), MEPs
from across the political spectrum called on the European Union
to reassess its relationship with Azerbaijan and in particular to
suspend gas imports; some MEPs called for sanctions against Azerbaijan.
40. On 29 September 2023, the EEAS Spokesperson released a statement
recalling the urgent need “to ensure continuous unimpeded humanitarian
support to those who are still in need in Karabakh, as well as to those
who have left.” Announcing an additional package of humanitarian
aid of EUR 5M to assist displaced people who have left their homes
towards Armenia and those who find themselves in a vulnerable situation inside
the region, EEAS underlined that “Azerbaijan bears the responsibility
to ensure the rights and security of the Karabakh Armenians, including
their right to live in their homes in dignity without intimidation
and discrimination, as well as the right to return for those displaced.”
It also deemed it “essential that a UN mission can access the territory
within the next days”.
Note
41. In a resolution adopted with 491 votes – and 9 against – on
5 October 2023, the European Parliament demanded the European Union
to review its relation to Azerbaijan, assessing that the current
situation with Armenians fleeing Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh amounted
to ethnic cleansing. It called for targeted sanctions against Azerbaijani
government officials responsible for ceasefire violations and human
rights abuses in the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region and the suspension
of any negotiations on a renewed partnership with Baku. The MEPs
also called on Türkiye to restrain its ally Azerbaijan.
Note
4 The
exodus
4.1 A
human tragedy
42. Tens of thousands of Armenians
from the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region took the road towards Armenia
immediately after the cease-fire came into force and Azerbaijan
opened the Lachin Corridor. The self-proclaimed authorities of this
region stated that evacuees would be accompanied across the border
from the disputed region into Armenia by Russian peacekeepers. “Dear
compatriots, we would like to inform you that, accompanied by Russian
peacekeepers, the families who were left homeless as a result of
the recent military operations and expressed their desire to leave
will be transferred to Armenia,” a statement read. “The government
will issue information about the relocation of other population
groups in the near future.”
Note Local NGOs also assisted the
evacuation.
43. Despite the cease-fire agreement between the authorities of
Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed authorities in the region, it
was alleged that shelling continued even after the official end
of the military operation by Azerbaijan. As of 3 October 2023, the
Armenian government reported that more than 100 617 Armenians had
been forcibly displaced from Azerbaijan to Armenia, representing
nearly 99% of the Armenian population of the region.
Note It
has also been reported that nine children are being treated in intensive
care.
Note
44. Those seeking refuge travelled by car or minibus with the
possessions they could carry, in a journey lasting for over two
days for the few kilometres of road out of the country. Food, water
and fuel were in short supply, and the video and photo reports of
this exodus are testimony to the panic and confusion which prevailed.
The Lachin Corridor effectively operates as a one-way passage out
of the country for people, while it operates both ways for ICRC
trucks bringing in the very much needed humanitarian aid for the
few who have remained.
45. International organisations have expressed concern that many
of those seeking refuge have been separated from their family; they
also underlined the massive need for mental health support for refugees. Reports
bear witness to children too weak to walk, a tragic sign of the
vulnerability and trauma experienced by this population after the
long period of deprivation they have endured.
Note
46. A number of vulnerable persons, including the elderly, sick,
and disabled, are certainly unable to leave and the ICRC is now
operating in the streets, using megaphones, to try to identify persons
in need of assistance or who wish to be evacuated.
Note
47. To compound this situation, an explosion at a fuel storage
depot near Kakhendi/Stpeanakert occurred on 26 September 2023. Hundreds
of cars were queuing for petrol to leave, and at least 170 persons
died, with more than 200 were wounded, most of whom were evacuated
by helicopter to Armenia. The remains found at the scene of the
blast have been sent to Armenia to identify the victims through
DNA analysis.
Note
48. From the outset of this exodus of the population, fears have
abounded that Azerbaijani border guards might use the opportunity
to arrest persons suspected of association with the self-proclaimed
authorities. On 27 September 2023, a prominent politician and former
self-proclaimed State Minister Ruben Vardanyan was detained by the
Azerbaijan Border Service as he attempted to cross the Lachin checkpoint
into Armenia. The following day, the Azerbaijani authorities brought
criminal charges against him, such as “financing terrorism, illegally
entering Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh last year and supplying its armed
forces with military equipment”. An Azerbaijani court subsequently
remanded him in pre-trial custody. The Armenian media has reported
that the Government of Armenia has applied to the European Court
of Human Rights over the capture of Mr Vardanyan, with a demand
for an interim measure requesting that Azerbaijan provide information
on the condition of the detainee. There are reports of other detentions.
NoteIn
my view, in this very difficult and tense period it is all the more
important that any steps taken as regards suspicions of terrorist
or illegal activities are clearly delimited, measured and transparent,
to avoid perceptions of reprisals or revenge which could further exacerbate
the fears of the Armenian population. The necessary safeguards,
including the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights, should be applied, and
ideally measures for a transitional justice mechanism should be
given first precedence and priority.
Note
4.2 Reception
of refugees in Armenia
49. The Armenian government, led
by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has demonstrated its readiness
to welcome and provide shelter for the refugees, although the numbers
concerned exceed the announced capacity of 40 000 refugees.
Note As
of 3 October 2023, according to the Armenian government, 100 632 refugees
had crossed into Armenia, of which 92 216 were registered.
Note The
United Nations estimates that those remaining number between 50
and 1000 persons.
50. Based on an immediate urgent needs assessment, the Armenian
government has rapidly adopted several measures to assist the refugees
and to provide them with food, housing, medicines, education, and other
basic amenities. It has also implemented multiple cash-based assistance
programmes.
51. Special attention has been paid to separated children. Those
who were not reunited with their families have been accommodated
at the Goris crisis centre, while single elderly people were accommodated
in elderly homes.
52. After reaching their immediate destination beyond the border
in Goris or Kornidzor and being registered, the refugees were transported
to Yerevan, from where they were further transported to other regions
in Armenia, notably Syunik, Kotyak and Ararat. A primary need platform,
a support mapping platform to coordinate the work of private support
initiatives and a hotline were launched, and more than 600 volunteers were
registered.
53. The international donor community has stepped in to help in
this urgent and dramatic situation. UNHCR has been co-leading the
interagency contingency and response plan with the Office of the
UN Resident Coordinator in Armenia.
Note The
European Union, Austria, Denmark, France, Spain, Sweden, Norway,
the United Kingdom and the United States notably announced an additional
package of humanitarian aid.
54. Despite all the efforts made, the huge numbers of arrivals
in a very short time period has stretched to the limit of the abilities
of the authorities to cope. Urgent and large-scale support and burden
sharing need to be provided to the host communities and the refugees
themselves.
55. While the project on displaced persons of the Armenia-Council
of Europe Action Plan is now fully funded, the Special Representative
of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees could play a
crucial role in assessing the further support which the Council
of Europe could provide to Armenia to cope with this large number
of refugees.
4.3 Azerbaijan’s
position
56. Azerbaijan has strongly rejected
any allegations of ethnic cleansing, as put forward by Armenia,
and has affirmed its willingness and efforts to resolve the situation
and to reintegrate the Armenian population in this region. The authorities
drew attention to the press release issued by the UN after its mission,
which states that the observers “[…] saw no damage to the civilian
infrastructure, including hospitals, schools and housing, or to cultural
or religious structures.” A UN representative has also been quoted
saying that there had been no “recorded incidences of mistreatment”
on the part of Azerbaijani forces against those who crossed the
border to Armenia.
Note
57. A number of measures have, indeed, rapidly been taken, in
particular the appointment of Ramin Mammadov as a focal point person
for contacts with the Armenian population of the region.
58. The reintegration plans presented in three meetings held on
21, 25 and 29 September 2023, focused on the legal and governance
sphere, security issues, economy, social issues and cultural, educational
and religious areas.
Note On the basis of the available
information, concrete measures have not yet been implemented. Such
tangible and visible measures are absolutely necessary to reassure
the Armenian population of its possibility of safe return and of
the full respect and protection of its rights, including minority rights.
59. Azerbaijan has made available online a “reintegration portal
of Armenian residents living in the Karabakh economic region of
the Republic of Azerbaijan” allowing Armenians from the region to
register in order to join the reintegration process.
Note It is explained that the registration
process is intended to enable them to effectively use all the government
services and help meet their socio-economic and humanitarian needs.
The portal is available in four languages, including in Armenian.
Azerbaijani social media have given examples of several Armenians
who have opted for this process of registration.
60. The Provisional Management Centre under the Coordination Headquarters
has also started providing medical services in Khankendi/Stepanakert
with the dispatching of a specialised medical personnel, including medical
specialists, ambulances and an emergency medical brigade. The next
step will be the assessment of the medical and sanitary-epidemiological
situation of the city’s remaining population.
61. All these steps seem positive. However, trust must certainly
be built up over time. The long-standing conflict and dispute over
the blockade of the Lachin Corridor and the cutting off of energy
supplies, consistently refuted by the authorities of Azerbaijan,
as well as a lack of agreed figures on the numbers of Armenians
living in this region and other very different perspectives on the
facts, will contribute to a lack of belief in the intentions and
good will of the authorities. Whether or not it accepts certain
presentations of the situation, Azerbaijan must take the fears and
perceptions of the population into account and focus its efforts
on building up confidence and trust.
5 Conclusion
and recommendations
62. Over the past few weeks, Europe
and the world have witnessed a mass population exodus from one country
to another following a long-standing situation of conflict and tension.
More than 100 600 Armenians, representing nearly 99% of its population,
have left the region of Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh following a ten-month
humanitarian crisis linked to the blockage of the Lachin Corridor.
63. The opposing narratives around this exodus are hard to reconcile;
while Azerbaijan asserts its right to protect its territory from
separatist terrorist activity and its willingness to work towards
a harmonious living together of all groups in this region, Armenia
considers the exodus as a de facto forced displacement amounting
to ethnic cleansing.
64. In any event, the authorities of Azerbaijan have the responsibility
and the obligation to protect the rights and security of all inhabitants
of this region and to now do everything in their power to reassure
the Armenian population of their safety and the respect of their
rights, including their rights as a minority group. The international
obligations of Azerbaijan are the blueprint, including the Statute
of the Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights,
the Framework Convention for the Protection on National Minorities.
65. As regards the largest part of the Armenian population, which
is now in refuge abroad, it is imperative for Azerbaijan to demonstrate
in words and concrete actions its readiness to welcome back these
citizens, in full confidence and trust that they will be accepted
and protected as an equal and respected component of the population
of this country.
66. Armenia has demonstrated strong solidarity and resilience
in receiving and welcoming in just a few days the almost entire
population of the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region. The international
community must step up to provide adequate support to protect and
care for these vulnerable refugees and to support them in recovering
from the trauma and deprivation they have experienced over recent
months.
67. The Council of Europe can and must play a major role in following
this situation, providing its expertise and input over the next
weeks and months and encouraging Azerbaijan to put in place the
necessary measures to demonstrate its goodwill and good intentions
as expressed on a number of occasions. This support should start
as rapidly as possible, with fact-finding and other missions to
the two countries, including to the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region.
In particular, an early visit of the Commissioner for Human Rights
and the planned one of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention
for the protection of National Minorities, will be critical.
68. In the shortest possible period, Azerbaijan should provide
information on the measures it has put in place to preserve the
cultural and religious heritage and the property of the Armenian
population of this region, and to prepare for the return of those
who so wish, and actively work towards this return.
69. In a situation of heightened rhetoric, recriminations, opposing
perceptions and disputed presentations of the facts, it is not easy
to move forward and make progress. However, this is the only way
in which the long-awaited peace in this troubled region can be achieved.
Azerbaijan has stated its willingness and commitment to the harmonious
living together of all the inhabitants of the Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh
region, and must now follow up on this in good faith and with concrete
actions.
