Examining the legitimacy and legality of the ad hominem term-limit waiver for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 13 October 2023 (24th sitting) (see Doc. 15827, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, rapporteur: Mr Pieter Omtzigt). Text
adopted by the Assembly on 13 October 2023 (24th sitting).
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses
the importance of presidential term limits, in particular in countries where
the constitution provides for a strong presidency, as opposed to
those where parliament is supreme.
1.1 A president and their political allies usually have substantial
power to nominate allies to high positions in the State, including
roles in a court of accounts, electoral bodies, the central bank,
the leadership of the armed forces or other security bodies. The
checks and balances provided by these bodies may thereby tend to
erode over time as these key positions are progressively occupied
by the allies of the president. At the same time, dissenting voices
gradually disappear from the president’s inner circle. Ultimately
this has a high cost for the country and for the president, as a
range of opinions and a functioning system of checks and balances
indubitably contribute to preventing large-scale errors. Presidential
term limits therefore ensure that the checks and balances provided
by independent institutions do not erode over time.
1.2 Term limits also serve to keep in check those who might
be tempted to use their presidential power to curtail any opposition.
When presidents know that their term is finite, and they wish to
live out the rest of their lives in their home country, they have
an incentive not to use excessive force against political opponents,
for they know that one day one of them may be elected as their successor
and they will no longer be able to exercise political power to protect
themselves from the consequences of their acts.
1.3 Once a president has taken the path of severe oppression
of the opposition and cruelty against their own people, they risk
spending the rest of their life trying to avoid accountability by
clinging to office at ever higher cost to their own country, their
own people and ultimately themselves.
1.4 Civil society stands as a cornerstone of any democratic
nation. When there is a lack of political opposition, it not only
undermines the rule of law but also results in a less diverse and
enduring democratic environment. This, in turn, causes reduced citizen
engagement and exacerbates indifference to the nation’s current
affairs, making the population susceptible to State propaganda.
1.5 For the above and other reasons, the Assembly considers
that any country that extends presidential term limits beyond the
usual two terms of four or five years is taking a large step away
from democracy and the rule of law.
2. The Assembly notes that Vladimir Putin has been continuously
in power as president or prime minister since 2000 and that the
changes made to the Russian Constitution enacted in July 2020 allow
him to remain in office as president until 2036, when he will be
83 years old. The growing brutality of repression against internal
opponents and the war of aggression against Ukraine show that the
cost of the lack of checks and balances in the Russian Federation
is indeed becoming ever higher.
3. The Assembly recalls that the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) in its Interim Opinion of 23 March
2021 found that the ad hominem term-limit waiver for the incumbent
President of the Russian Federation violates both Russian constitutional
law and international legal principles.
3.1 The relevant constitutional changes were adopted in an
accelerated ad hoc procedure not foreseen in the Russian Constitution.
The regular constitutional amendment procedure requires the convocation
of a constitutional assembly and specific amending laws for each
of the different changes proposed, rather than a single en bloc
vote on all amendments. Instead, a novel ad hoc sui generis procedure was introduced
by an amending law. Under this procedure, the president requested
the Constitutional Court’s opinion on the compatibility with the
constitution of the amending law, which was delivered within seven
days. Then a single ad hoc “nationwide vote” was held that was not
subject to the strict safeguards applicable to referendums.
3.2 The Assembly therefore fully agrees with the conclusion
of the Venice Commission that the novel, ad hoc procedure used to
amend the constitution creates an obvious tension with Article 16
of the constitution, which safeguards the “firm fundamentals of
the constitutional system of the Russian Federation”.
3.3 The Assembly also fully shares the Venice Commission’s
view that “[a] decision to alter or remove presidential term limits
should be subject to thorough public scrutiny, as it has a significant
impact on the political system, a country’s stability and on confidence
in the electoral process. In the long term, a reform of these provisions
may affect democratic quality or even democratic endurance. A broad consensus,
as well as respect for constitutional and legal procedures, are
crucial to maintain strong democracy and confidence in institutions
and electoral processes”.
3.4 It also agrees with the Venice Commission in that “to
the extent that constitutional amendments strengthening or prolonging
the power of high offices of state are proposed ... such amendments
(if enacted) should have effect only for future holders of the office,
not for the incumbent”.
3.5 The Assembly therefore considers that, in view of the
hasty procedure followed for the adoption of the amendments in question,
the en bloc vote on very disparate issues, including protection
of social rights, and the fact that the incumbent himself benefits
from these changes, the international standards summed up by the
Venice Commission were clearly not met. The abolition of presidential
term limits for the benefit of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
thus violates not only the Russian Constitution but also well-established
international legal principles.
4. The overwhelming power of the president resulting from the
extremely long term in office combined with the lack of any checks
and balances such as a strong parliament, an independent judiciary,
free media and a vibrant civil society has turned the Russian Federation
into a de facto dictatorship.
5. These developments, which have drawn a limited response from
the international community, set a concerning precedent for countries
lacking a robust democratic tradition, as seen in the case of Belarus,
where the self-proclaimed president de
facto maintains power despite the results of the 2020
elections not being recognised.
6. As the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its political
and economic consequences show, dictatorships constitute a threat
to international peace and security and to the territorial integrity
and political independence of their neighbours, within the meaning
of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Russian Federation
employs acts of aggression against sovereign nations as a strategy
to enhance the president’s domestic image, with the Chechen wars
of the late 1990s, the Russian Federation’s influence in the Transnistria
region of Moldova and its aggression against Georgia in 2008 serving
as illustrative examples. Dictatorships also destroy the fundamental
rights and the social and economic well-being of their own population.
It is therefore in the interest first and foremost of the people
of the Russian Federation, but also of Europe and the whole world,
that democracy is restored in the Russian Federation.
7. The Assembly recalls that all States Parties to the Statute
of the International Criminal Court are legally bound to arrest
Vladimir Putin when he enters their jurisdiction on the basis of
the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on
17 March 2023.
8. The Assembly calls on the member States of the Council of
Europe to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end
of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him,
except for humanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace.
9. Finally, the Assembly reiterates its strong support for the
creation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the crime
of aggression, which is needed in order to hold to account the Russian
leadership, including Vladimir Putin, for the original crime enabling
all other war crimes and crimes against humanity, namely the launch
of the war of aggression against Ukraine.
10. The Assembly considers that the ad hoc international criminal
tribunal should investigate all events on the territory of Ukraine
from February 2014, starting with the illegal annexation of Crimea,
the war in the Donbas region and the downing of flight MH17.
