B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991 led to the emergence of various democratic movements
in the Russian Federation. Boris Yeltsin’s presidency saw initial
political liberalisation, but the challenges of economic transition
of the late 1990s weakened public support for democratic reforms.
2. Since 2000, Vladimir Putin’s government has systematically
dismantled democratic opposition through election manipulation,
restrictions on civil society, and political repression. Opposition
figures have been arrested, exiled, or assassinated.
3. The gradual dismantling of democratic institutions was mirrored
in increasingly aggressive, revanchist and expansionist foreign
policy, culminating in the Russian Federation’s full-scale war of
aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
4. As a consequence of Russia’s armed attack and full-scale invasion
of Ukraine, the Committee of Ministers, on 16 March 2022, taking
into account the unanimous Opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly, decided
to expel the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe.
5. While terminating all co-operation with Russian official institutions,
the Assembly, in its
Opinion
300 (2022) “Consequences of the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine”, underlined that “the Council of Europe should
envisage initiatives to be able to continue to support and engage
with human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent
civil society in the Russian Federation”.
6. In line with this decision, the Assembly decided first to
set up an informal platform for dialogue bringing together members
of the Assembly with members of Russian democratic forces, and then
to create the function of General Rapporteur on Russian democratic
forces, with the mandate of promoting the coherence of the Assembly’s
action aimed at building dialogue with them.
7. The dialogue with Russian democratic forces should amplify
their outreach and visibility; strengthen their capacity to bring
about a regime change in Russia; and help to achieve a lasting and
just peace in Ukraine, while providing to the Assembly an insight
into developments in the Russian Federation and amongst Russian democratic
forces.
2 Scope of the report
8. This report defines which Russian
individuals and groups can be considered as “democratic forces”. Furthermore,
it aims at outlining the approach towards a more a structured engagement
with Russian democratic forces, through the establishment of a Platform
for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces (“the Platform”) of
the Assembly, and ensuring that the Council of Europe remains a
key partner in supporting regime change and post-authoritarian processes
towards democracy in Russia.
9. The report also presents other supporting initiatives. In
that respect, collaboration and synergies will have to be encouraged,
in particular with the European Parliament.
10. The report contains recommendations for Council of Europe
member States and their national assemblies to adopt measures in
support of Russian democratic forces and to strengthen dialogue
with them at the national level.
3 The supporting work of the Parliamentary
Assembly
11. The Assembly has repeatedly
shown its support to Russian democratic forces and civil society
in the last years. Based on the above-mentioned
Opinion 300 (2022), in its
Resolution
2433 (2022) “Consequences of the Russian Federation's continued
aggression against Ukraine: role and response of the Council of
Europe” the Assembly resolved “to intensify its engagement with
Belarusian and Russian civil society, human rights defenders, independent
journalists, academia and democratic forces respecting the values
and principles of the Organisation, including the territorial integrity
of sovereign member States”.
12. Subsequently, in its
Resolution
2473 (2022) “Strengthening the role of the Council of Europe as
a cornerstone of the European political architecture”, the Assembly
called on Council of Europe member States to “consider new initiatives
to support Russian human rights defenders, democratic forces, free
media and independent civil society that respect the values and
principles of the Council of Europe, including the territorial integrity
of sovereign member States”.
13. Following up on these resolutions, a process of reflection
started in Paris on 20 March 2023, when the Presidential Committee
of the Assembly held a meeting with members of Russian democratic
forces.
Note
14. In addition, during the June 2023 part-session, the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy and the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons held a joint hearing on “Issues confronting Russians
in exile” with the participation of members of Russian democratic
forces and civil society.
15. During the October 2023 part-session, the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights and the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons
held another joint hearing, chaired by the President of the Assembly,
on “Dialogue with the members of the Russian democratic forces sharing
Council of Europe values”.
Note
16. Concluding this meeting, the President of the Assembly announced
its intention to set up an informal platform for dialogue with members
of Russian democratic forces. During the same part-session, the
decision was endorsed by the Presidential Committee and taken note
of by the Bureau of the Assembly.
Note
17. In line with this decision, in April 2024 the Assembly decided,
with
Resolution 2540
(2024) “Alexei Navalny’s death and the need to counter Vladimir
Putin’s totalitarian regime and its war on democracy”, to create
a function of a general rapporteur on Russian democratic forces.
18. I was appointed to this new role on 26 June 2024, with the
mandate of promoting “the coherence of the Assembly’s action aimed
at building dialogue with Russian democratic forces who share the
Council of Europe’s values and recognise the territorial integrity
of Ukraine in its internationally recognised border, supporting
their efforts to bring about a democratic change in Russia”.
Note
19. Furthermore, as provided in the Information document
AS/Pol/Inf
(2024) 12, the general rapporteurship seeks to establish and pursue
a “structured and regular dialogue” between the Assembly and the
Russian democratic forces.
20. In June 2024, the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
held a joint meeting with the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, on “Examining the legitimacy and legality of the ad hominem
term-limit waiver for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation”.
21. Under the aegis of the informal platform, the President of
the Assembly convened a round table in Berlin, on 12 June 2024,
to discuss the effectiveness of sanctions against the Russian Federation,
and ways to counter the official propaganda and support free media
in Russia, with a view to ensuring that the Russian public can have
access to unbiased information on the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine.
22. A second round table was held in Paris, on 9 September 2024,
to discuss the content of the Roadmap I drafted in my capacity of
General Rapporteur.
23. On 9-10 November 2024, I participated in the 4th Conference
of the Russian Anti-War Committee, held in Berlin. In addition,
the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy held hearings in
December 2024 (with Mr Garry Kasparov) and in March 2025 (with Mr Dmitry
Gudkov and Mr Dmitry Nekrasov), exploring different matters of relevance.
24. On 11 December 2024, I was also appointed rapporteur on “Russian
democratic forces” by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy.
This report was prepared under this capacity.
25. Finally, it is worth to mention that in addition to the texts
indicated above, the Assembly has adopted other relevant resolutions,
which this report also takes into account. These are:
- Resolution 2436 (2022) and Recommendation 2231 (2022) “The Russian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine: ensuring accountability for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and other international crimes”;
- Resolution
2448 (2022) “Humanitarian consequences and internal and external
displacement in connection with the aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2463 (2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”;
- Resolution
2509 (2023) “Transnational repression as a growing threat to the
rule of law and human rights”;
- Resolution
2519 (2023) “Examining the legitimacy and legality of the ad hominem
term-limit waiver for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation”;
- Resolution
2541 (2024) “The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and
the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian
Federation and Belarus”;
- Resolution
2542 (2024) “Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list"”.
4 Other supporting initiatives: the
European Parliament
26. The European Parliament (EP)
has also long advocated for a free and democratic Russia, expressing concerns
for the human rights violations and the state of democracy in the
country.
Note In particular, the EP has a dedicated
Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee
(D-RU), which focuses on the Russian democratic forces, and has
appointed a main rapporteur on Russia (Ms Sandra Kalniete, Latvia,
EPP), as well as different shadow rapporteurs.
27. In September 2021, it adopted a recommendation on the direction
of EU-Russia political relations requiring the EU to “ensure that
any further engagement with the Kremlin will depend on the latter’s
promise to end its domestic aggression against its own people...
to repeal or amend all laws that are incompatible with international
standards, such as the ones on ‘foreign agents’ and so-called extremist
or undesirable organisations, to stop the repression of civil society
organisations, in particular the ones fighting corruption and defending
human rights in Russia, and to end its external aggression against
neighbouring countries”.
Note
28. Furthermore, in its Resolution adopted in October 2022 on
Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, the
EP called on the EU and its member States to “start reflecting on
how to engage with Russia in the future and how to assist it with
a successful transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic
country that renounces revisionist and imperialistic policies”,
considering “that a first step would be for the EU institutions
to engage with Russian democratic leaders and civil society and
mobilise support for their agenda for a democratic Russia”, and
supporting “the creation of a democracy hub for Russia, hosted by the
European Parliament”.
Note
29. The EP repeatedly condemned Vladimir Kara-Murza’s and Alexei
Navalny’s detentions, along with those of other political prisoners,
and expressed solidarity with people in Russia protesting against
the war of aggression against Ukraine. The EP adopted a resolution
on the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support
of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia.
Note
30. Thus, the EP has also engaged directly in a dialogue with
members of Russian democratic forces and civil society. Under the
patronage of the EP, on 5-6 June 2023, its major political groups
Note organised
a conference titled “The day after – Brussels dialogue – Roundtable
of EU and Democratic Russia Representatives”. While calls have been
made to institutionalise the Brussels dialogue, this has not yet happened.
31. On the other hand, the EP has also engaged members of Russian
democratic forces in its meetings, such as the one held by the D-RU
in association with the Democracy Support and Election Coordination
Group (DEG) in February 2024 on “Why Russia's 2024 presidential
‘election’ matters?”,
Note or the meeting organised in February
2025 by the D-RU in association with the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine
Parliamentary Association Committee on “Russia's economic capacity
to wage war under sanctions – what's next for EU policies?”.
5 Russian democratic forces
5.1 Russian democratic forces inside and
outside of the Russian Federation
32. From the outset, Vladimir Putin's
rule has been characterised by attempts to silence critical voices.
The magnitude of threats, intimidation, and repression has progressively
escalated over the span of over two decades under his governance.
33. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, any criticism of the regime
has been cracked down with the most brutal means. Draconian punishments,
such as extended prison sentences for calling a war a war, make
it extremely difficult for the democratic opposition in Russia to
organise itself in a visible manner.
34. In this regard, there are notable parallels with the repressive
regime in Belarus (see also
Resolution
2530 (2024) “A democratic future for Belarus”). In contrast to Belarus,
however, the Russian democratic forces in exile lack one prominent
leading figure as well as a unified, representative political structure.
Instead, they consist of a large number of individuals and organisations
that work together in a selective way but do not systematically
pursue a common agenda.
35. Many of these structures were founded to support Russian citizens
who have left their country, helping them to organise their everyday
lives in exile. Others, however, are more focused on a political
agenda centred on Russia and are explicitly committed to the goal
of working towards a post-Putin democratic Russia.
36. Among the latter, key actors and organisations are:
- Mikhail Khodorkovsky / Russian
Action Committee; Russian Anti-War Committee: A former political prisoner,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky established numerous organisations, media outlets
and projects, and contributed to the foundation of initiatives like
the “Russian Action Committee” and the “Russian Anti-War Committee”,Note with the aim of unifying opposition
forces. Together with opposition figures such as Garry Kasparov
and Dmitry Gudkov, he is one of the most prominent critics of Putin’s
regime and supporters of Ukraine. Their Berlin Declaration of 30
April 2023,Note in which the Putin regime was labelled “illegitimate
and criminal” for its aggression against Ukraine, was signed by
more than 50 members of the Russian democratic forces. Despite internal
differences of opinion on the best approach to achieving change,
the Committee plays a crucial role in unifying and coordinating
the Russian democratic forces in exile, developing projects to support
Ukraine politically and financially, providing support to Russian activists
facing persecution for opposing the war, advocating for increased
sanctions against Putin’s regime and the future reintegration of
Russia into European political structures.
- Garry Kasparov / Free Russia Forum: Garry Kasparov, the
former world chess champion, became a vocal critic of Putin's regime,
co-founding the Free Russia ForumNote to consolidate opposition efforts.
In broader terms, it serves as a platform uniting Russians committed
to democracy, freedom, and human rights. In light of Russia's invasion
of Ukraine, the Forum has actively supported Ukraine through advocacy
for military support, co-organising anti-war conferences and supporting
Russian volunteers in Ukraine.
- Natalia Arno, Vladimir Kara-Murza / Free Russia Foundation:
The US-based Free Russia Foundation (FRF)Note operates as an advocacy organisation,
engaging in practical policy making and legislative lobbying. In
this capacity, the FRF maintains a database detailing Russian individuals
and entities sanctioned by the United States government. Natalia
Arno, the FRF’s president, joined the International Republican Institute
in 2004,Note leading
its Russia programs until she was forced into exile in 2012. Vladimir
Kara-Murza, a journalist and opposition politician, is one of the
FRF’s Vice-Presidents. In April 2022, he was arrested in Moscow
for his public denunciation of the invasion of Ukraine, sentenced
to 25 years for “high treason”, and kept in solitary confinement
at a maximum-security prison in Siberia. In October 2022, the Assembly
honoured him with the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize, acknowledging his
steadfast commitment to democratic values and human rights in Russia.
He was released in August 2024 as part of the largest East-West
prisoners’ exchange since the Cold War. Vladimir Milov, an economist
and vocal critic of Putin’s regime, is also a Vice-President of
the FRF. The FRF is the patron for the “Free Russia House” in Kyiv,
which declares itself an alternative cultural and political embassy for
Russian civil society in Ukraine.Note
- Alexei Navalny / Anti-Corruption Foundation: The Anti-Corruption
Foundation (FBK)Note became known for its anti-corruption
investigations and built a Russia-wide network of political activists
mobilising against the supremacy of the ruling United Russia party.
With Navalny's death in a penal colony on 16 February 2024, the
FBK lost its prominent leader. It continues its work, partly under
the leadership of Navalny's widow, Yulia Navalnaya. However, the
FBK also attracted attention through actions that triggered criticism
and controversy within the Russian opposition. Notably, the FBK
abstained from signing the Berlin Declaration of Russian Democratic
Forces. The attempts made so far to engage them in the Assembly’s
initiatives mentioned above have not been successful and as of now
they do not qualify as Russian Democratic Forces as defined by the
Assembly.
- Representatives of peoples of Russia: Being stripped of
the possibility to stand up for their rights in Russia, national
minorities were forced to carry out their activities from abroad.
Their involvement encompasses advocacy for self-determination and
decolonisation; critique of Russian imperialism; promotion of cultural
and political rights. There are several independence movements and
numerous autonomy movements.
37. Other exiled opposition activists, journalists and academics
have also formed networks, for instance supporting independent journalism;
contributing to the documentation of war crimes; or providing information to
Ukraine or international organisations about Ukrainian prisoners
of war and detained civilians in support of their exchange and in
order to hold Russia accountable for the unlawful aggression.
5.2 Criteria
38. For the purposes of this report,
and for the establishment of a more structured engagement with the Assembly,
a clear distinction must be made between genuine democratic actors,
and those who are opposing the current Russian regime without however
a clear and public commitment to the Council of Europe values of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law.
39. The Assembly should consider as Russian democratic forces
those persons of the highest moral standing who are currently in
exile and who meet the following requirements:
- be Russian political leaders,
civil society representatives, human rights defenders, independent journalists,
scholars and/or other members of the Russian resistance to the Putin
regime;
- share the values of the Council of Europe and be willing
to promote them;
- respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Ukraine;
- have a record of publicly opposing Putin’s regime and
work towards a regime change with the goal of the establishing of
a democratic political system in the Russian Federation;
- have signed the Berlin Declaration of the Russian Democratic
Forces and continue to uphold the principles it sets forth.
40. Key indicators to be considered should be the position they
have taken regarding the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine,
and concrete initiatives in support of Ukraine. An indispensable
condition is a clear, public condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine, e.g. through the subscription of the Berlin Declaration
of Russian Democratic Forces of 30 April 2023.
Note
41. Among Russian democratic forces, priority should be given
to those individuals and groups who have actively worked to expose
war crimes, counter Kremlin propaganda, provide direct support to
Ukrainian refugees (including humanitarian aid and legal assistance),
organise protests, mobilise international pressure against the Russian
regime, and fight Putin's regime on the battlefield.
42. Thus, the Russian democratic forces’ support for Ukraine underscores
their commitment to European democratic values and highlights their
role as a legitimate alternative to Putin’s regime. By aligning
with Ukraine, Russian democratic forces strengthen their case for
international recognition.
5.3 Possible initiatives in support of
Russian democratic forces
43. The Russian democratic forces,
both inside and outside the country, operate under challenging conditions,
facing repression and extremely limited political freedoms. They
are heterogeneous and consist of different groups with different
strategies, goals and needs.
44. Support from governments and international organisations should
therefore be targeted, and focused on political, legal and administrative
measures that help creating a framework within which the opposition
can structure its activities, strengthen its co-operation and articulate
its position with greater unity.
45. Financial support is important, especially in light of the
US government's shift in priorities. On the other hand, the democratic
opposition has been successful in securing financial resources from
Russians both inside and outside Russia and who oppose Putin’s regime.
These sources should remain the financial basis for the Russian
democratic forces’ activities. In addition, European governments
could consider how to provide appropriate incentives to facilitate
these sources of funding.
46. Possible support measures for members of Russian democratic
forces in exile and political structures abroad include:
- visibility and acknowledgment:
governments and organisations should create platforms which can
raise awareness of the role and work of Russian democratic forces;
- institutional support: this entails the establishment
of exile structures with support from governments, for example through
administrative and legal support to help Russians with a clear anti-war
stance in emergency situations (such as the risk of extradition
to Russia). The support should also include the development of a
legal basis for replacing expired Russian documents for those who
cannot approach Russian consular missions (e. g. persons on the
Russian “terrorist list” and/or considered as “foreign agents”;
or in case Russia replicates the Belarusian decree on the impossibility
of renewal of passports abroad), for example through a “democracy
passport” or special visa arrangements;
- protection from repression by Russian authorities: actions
range from granting asylum to the provision of protection from Russian
secret service persecution and improved security measures. The Council
of Europe should also support access to digital security tools and
encrypted communication platforms to ensure that Russian democratic
forces – especially those operating inside Russia – can safely co-ordinate
activities and avoid surveillance or persecution. Training in digital
hygiene and information on warfare resilience should be integrated
into support programmes;
- financial and organisational support: in particular, by
providing help in setting up media platforms, think tanks and organisational
structures abroad, especially those aimed at countering transnational repression,
disinformation, discreditation and infiltration campaigns of Putin’s
regime, and at providing accurate and factual information to Russian
citizens living in Russia.
47. For what concerns democratic forces members and organisations
remaining in Russia, including structures (informally) operating
in Russia, as well as individuals such as independent journalists
and activists, their needs are particularly sensitive as they are
subject to direct repression. Possible support measures include:
- protection under international
law: this includes putting continuous international pressure on
Russia to respect human rights, including targeted sanctions against
authorities and individuals that repress opposition activists;
- visibility and diplomatic protection: European governments
should recognise arbitrarily detained persons as political prisoners
and demand their release. Their diplomatic missions to Russia should
observe court proceedings whenever possible;
- promotion of legal support: this can be done by providing
funding and legal support to human rights lawyers in Russia, and
when it is applicable, helping them with access to international
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights;
- protection from repression: in particular, support should
be provided to those needing to flee the Russian Federation at short
notice, by requesting host countries – to which Russians have visa-free
access – to accept them as refugees, eventually on a temporary basis,
and facilitating onward travel to EU countries or the US, if so
desired.
6 The Platform for Dialogue with Russian
Democratic Forces of the Assembly
48. The primary objective of the
dialogue with the Russian democratic forces is to facilitate the
participation of a group composed of members of the Russian democratic
forces in Assembly activities.
49. This could be achieved by establishing a Platform for Dialogue
with Russian Democratic Forces (“the Platform”), to be chaired by
the President of the Assembly or a member of the Assembly delegated
by the President.
50. Firstly, the Platform would grant a forum for engagement between
members of the Assembly and members of the Russian democratic forces,
to address issues of common concern, through exchanges in the context
of the Platform itself.
51. In addition, participation in the Platform would enable Russian
democratic forces to attend meetings of the Assembly’s committees,
sub-committees and networks during part-sessions, and to take the
floor when authorised by the respective Chairpersons.
52. The participation of a group of members of Russian democratic
forces in some of the Assembly’s activities would be beneficial
for both the Russian democratic forces and the Assembly.
53. For the Russian democratic forces, it would provide an international
platform to advocate for democratic change, counter the Kremlin’s
narrative, and provide input for European policies on Russia; it
would also provide them access to the national assemblies of member
States of the Council of Europe.
54. For the Assembly, welcoming a group of members of Russian
democratic forces would reflect the Council of Europe’s support
to democratic values, human rights and rule of law, against authoritarian
and hostile stances. This step would strengthen international efforts
to hold the Russian regime accountable, amplify democratic voices
from within Russia, uniting forces to support Ukraine, and enhance
Europe’s role in supporting the country’s turn to a democratic path.
6.1 “Participants of the Russian Democratic
Forces” in the Platform
55. In light of the aforementioned
context, preliminary discussions were held with members of Russian democratic
forces; for example, the Russian Anti-War Committee, the Free Russia
Foundation, journalists and academics.
56. Once the present report is approved, the Secretary General
of the Assembly will prepare a memorandum on the modalities for
the functioning of the Platform, including the participation of
members of Russian democratic forces. The memorandum will subsequently
have to be approved by the Bureau of the Assembly.
57. The members of the Russian democratic forces shall first prepare
a proposed list of “Participants of the Russian Democratic Forces”
in the Platform.
58. The President of the Assembly, after consulting the General
Rapporteur on Russian democratic forces on the proposed list submitted
by the Russian democratic forces, will make a proposal to the Bureau
of the Assembly for approval.
59. The respect of the requirements for Russian democratic forces
described above should be a conditio sine
qua non for being included in the list, and considered
a priority. This means that not all Russian opposition forces will
be represented in the Platform, as sharing the Council of Europe’s
values and showing a public stance against the war of aggression
against Ukraine, as done by those who signed the Berlin Declaration,
will be a non-negotiable condition. The Bureau of the Assembly will
verify the respect of the requirements at the time of the approval
of the list, or at any other time following its decision to that
effect.
60. The Bureau’s decision will be subject to ratification by the
Assembly through its progress report. The approved list of Participants
in the Platform shall be valid for the ordinary session.
61. One year after the establishment of the Platform, the Bureau
shall review its functioning and consider possible amendments or
other measures to be taken.
6.2 Other activities
62. Other different formats of
participation can be proposed, including regular hearings, consultations, working
groups, advocacy campaigns, capacity building, side events and ad
hoc events within the Assembly and Council of Europe’s activities.
63. The Platform and the related activities should be co-ordinated
with relevant Assembly rapporteurs working on Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,
and on other relevant matters, including sanctions’ policy. Cross-collaboration
will be encouraged to align efforts in strengthening democratic
forces in and from Russia, ensuring that findings and recommendations
are integrated into broader Assembly initiatives.
64. The question of rights of Russia’s national minorities and
preparedness to engage into a meaningful dialogue with the representatives
of Russia’s national and ethnic groups will play a critical role
in shaping post-Putin Russia. The Platform could also address this
issue.
65. Reports from various Assembly committees will be used to monitor
and assess the effectiveness of the Platform and its impact on policy
recommendations. It is recommended that the Platform adopts measurable performance
indicators – such as number of participating organisations, visibility
in European institutions, policy proposals submitted, and feedback
from Ukrainian civil society – so that the initiative’s progress
and credibility can be objectively assessed. Joint initiatives with
other international parliamentary bodies and human rights organisations
will be explored to strengthen synergies, advocacy efforts and increase
political pressure on the Russian government.
66. In particular, the activities organised within the framework
of the Platform should take into account similar initiatives also
undertaken by the European Parliament. Considering that the interlocutors
will be the same in most cases, this will allow for a better use
of the resources of both institutions, ensuring at the same time
a broader outreach and a larger visibility.
67. Synergies with the European Parliament should also be sought
at the level of the respective rapporteurs and general rapporteurs,
in terms of exchanging relevant information, documents and contacts,
organising joint meetings with members of the Russian democratic
forces, and organising joint public activities and ad hoc hearings.
7 Conclusions
and recommendations
68. The aim of this report is to
ensure that the Assembly and the Council of Europe remain a key
partner in supporting democratic change in Russia.
69. A number of actions can be implemented in order to increase
the effectiveness and sustainability of the support provided to
the Russian democratic forces, ultimately contributing to the long-term
goal of democratisation in Russia.
70. First, the Assembly should establish a Platform for Dialogue
with Russian Democratic Forces.
71. There are still questions to be addressed however, such as
issues related to legal protection of and administrative support
to members of the Russian democratic forces in exile in Council
of Europe member States (e.g. refugee / residence status; naturalisation
issues).
72. The Council of Europe should also explore stronger mechanisms
to hold the Russian regime accountable for the suppression of democratic
forces, including political repression, electoral fraud and human rights
violations.
73. At the same time, the member States of the Council of Europe
should be encouraged to facilitate the functioning of the Platform,
to amplify the voices of Russian democratic forces’ leaders in exile,
ensuring their perspectives are heard at the European level.
74. This should include the provision of administrative, legal
and logistical support, including assistance with travel, visas,
residence issues and digital engagement, as well as financial contributions
and capacity building activities. This should also entail the organisation
of advocacy campaigns that focus on countering Russian State propaganda
and informing European citizens about the democratic aspirations
of the Russian democratic forces. This support will be particularly
important to ensure that the voices of the Russian democratic forces are
heard.
75. The Council of Europe should also facilitate networking and
capacity building. Such formats could include training programs,
workshops, and strategic planning sessions for Russian opposition
members to enhance their political and organisational capacities
and encourage their collaboration with other democratic movements
in exile.
76. Ultimately, the dialogue should outline a pathway to future
engagement with a democratic Russia: the instatement of a group
of members of Russian democratic forces in the work of the Assembly
is not an end in itself. It should be part of an array of instruments
to counter Russian aggression against Ukraine. This should prepare
for the scenario in which, once the regime change in Russia takes
place, democratic forces will be ready to engage in governance and
institution building that reflect the values of the Council of Europe,
and the Assembly will also be ready to do its part in supporting
them.
