B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Edite Estrela and Ms Sabina Ćudić, co-rapporteursNote
1 Introduction
1. Over the past year, the Assembly
has closely followed the rapid and dramatic democratic backsliding
in Georgia. In addition to its
Resolution 2585 (2025) “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials
of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia” adopted during the January
2025 part-session, the Assembly adopted in a debate under urgent
procedure
Resolution
2600 (2025) on “The situation in Georgia and follow up to
Resolution 2585 (2025) ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified
credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia’” during
the April 2025 part-session. Subsequently, again in a debate under
urgent procedure, during its October 2025 part-session, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2624 (2025) on “Uphold democracy and the rule of law in Georgia”.
2. In
Resolution 2624
(2025), the Assembly expressed its serious concerns about the
rapid democratic backsliding and deep political and social crisis
in Georgia, concluding that the very existence of democracy in Georgia
was in question. The Assembly therefore deplored the fact that the
Georgian authorities had systematically ignored its concerns and
recommendations about the democratic crisis in the country, which were
shared by the international community at large.
3. The Assembly urged the Georgian authorities to immediately
reverse the breakdown of democracy in the country and reiterated
its readiness to engage in open and constructive dialogue with the
authorities as well as all political and social forces in Georgia,
with the aim of reversing the democratic backsliding and ensuring that
the country honours its membership obligations and accession commitments
to the Council of Europe. However, at the same time, the Assembly
emphasised that such a dialogue can only be based on acceptance of
the Council of Europe's fundamental norms and principles.
4. Crucially, in
Resolution
2624 (2025), the Assembly noted that reversing the breakdown of
democracy in Georgia is an issue for all Council of Europe bodies.
It therefore urged the bodies of the Council of Europe to use all
available means, including those under Article 52 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (
ETS No. 5, the Convention), and invites member States to use interstate
applications to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 33
of the Convention to ensure that Georgia fully honours all the standards
and obligations stemming from Council of Europe membership.
5. This report outlines the developments that have taken place
since the adoption of
Resolution
2624 (2025). Regrettably, over the recent period, the breakdown
of the democratic system has continued unabated as have the crackdown
on civil society, political opposition and dissent. In addition,
the authorities' policies have become increasingly isolationist
and antagonistic towards European organisations and their member
States, as evidenced by the frequent and baseless attacks against
members of the international community inside and outside Georgia.
The Georgian authorities' rejection of practically all forms of
dialogue and their refusal until now to co-operate with,
inter alia, the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), are deeply concerning
in that context.
6. However, in a welcome development, we were able to make a
fact-finding visit to Tbilisi from 10 to 13 November 2025. This
allowed us to familiarise ourselves with ongoing developments and
views within Georgian society, as well as to assess the willingness
of the authorities to engage in open dialogue with the Assembly,
to address the Assembly's and the international community's key
concerns and recommendations.
7. During our visit, we met with the Speaker of the Georgian
Parliament, the Chairpersons of the Legal Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committees, representatives of the ruling majority, representatives
of all parliamentary and extra parliamentary opposition parties,
as well as civil society and members of the international community.
To our regret, the representatives from the government, including
the nominally independent Prosecutor General and Head of the Anti-Corruption
Bureau, refused to meet with us, in what we were informed was a
clear political message. However, we welcome that we were able to
meet with three imprisoned opposition leaders although our request
to meet with detained journalist Mzia Amaglobeli was regrettably
refused.
Note
8. As we were asked by the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee), during our visit we directly asked the Speaker of the Parliament,
the Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee as well as the members
of the Georgian Dream (GD) faction, if they were willing to co-operate
with the Council of Europe and in particular with the Venice Commission
in addressing the concerns on problematic legislation including
transparency legislation and the Code of administrative offences.
In all cases, their response was negative stating that Georgia was
a sovereign nation that would only implement changes if ordered
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (unless its judgments
were considered political). We deeply regret this unwillingness
to engage in dialogue and co-operate, which essentially reduces
co-operation between Georgia and the Council of Europe to litigation
before the ECtHR. Unfortunately, this seems to be part of a wider
pattern that defines Georgia’s relations with the international
community which has become increasingly isolationist and antagonistic,
especially towards the European organisations and their member States.
9. That notwithstanding, the fact that our visit took place should
be seen in a positive light, as it allowed an opportunity to maintain
some – albeit limited – form of dialogue in the framework of the
monitoring procedure. We therefore intend to make a next visit in
the second part of this year.
2 Democratic environment
10. In all its resolutions on its
democratic backsliding in Georgia, the Assembly has called for the establishment
of an inclusive political process – involving all stakeholders and
social actors – with a view to creating a political environment
that would be conducive to the conduct of new genuinely democratic
elections. However, as a combined result of the crackdown on the
democratic opposition, civil society and independent media, as well
as the extreme social and political polarisation in the country,
a political environment conducive to the conduct of genuinely democratic
elections currently does not exist in Georgia. The reestablishment
of such a democratic civic and political environment is a key priority
for the Georgian society.
11. On 4 October 2025, local elections took place in Georgia.
The EU enlargement report, published on 4 November 2025, noted that
the run up to these elections “was marked by intense political polarisation, violence,
as well as intimidation targeting civil society and independent
media” while “the amendments to the electoral legislation favouring
the ruling party, coupled with the extensive crackdown on dissent,
drastically reduced the possibility of holding competitive elections”.
The local elections were boycotted by most of the opposition – with
the exception of Gakharia’s for Georgia and Lelo-Strong Georgia
– because of the absence of the necessary conditions for their democratic
conduct. As mentioned in the last resolution, these elections were
neither observed by the international community
Note nor by the
credible domestic observer organisations due to the crackdown on
civil society. Georgian Dream won 81.7% of the vote with a (for
Georgia low) turnout of 40.9%, Strong Georgia won 6.7%, and For
Georgia won 3.7% of the vote. The democratic opposition parties, including
those that had participated in the elections, denounced these elections
as undemocratic, rigged and manipulated in favour of the ruling
majority. Despite their misgivings about the electoral process both
Strong Georgia and For Georgia announced that they would take up
the mandates they won in the local councils.
12. The differences over the participation in the local elections,
often accompanied by acrimonious exchanges, underscore the different
strategies existing among the democratic opposition parties who
have until now not succeeded in establishing a united political
front to achieve the political change they are striving to effectuate.
This apparent fragmentation has been criticised by some social activists
and protesters. Nevertheless, all democratic opposition parties
have stated they will participate in any national elections when organised.
13. The differences within the opposition were also evident when,
on 20 October 2025, “For Georgia” broke with the rest of the opposition
and announced that it would end its boycott of the parliament. This
decision was strongly criticised by all other oppositions parties.
On 28 October 2025, For Georgia’s 12 members
Note took
up their mandates. However, their role and manoeuvring possibilities
are very limited in what is, in effect, a practically single-party
parliament.
14. Efforts have continued, albeit far from the media and public
eye, to overcome the apparent differences between the opposition
forces, and agree on a joint strategy and platform to achieve their
common aims. In that respect, on 2 March 2026, nine opposition parties
Note formed
the “Opposition Alliance
Note” to present a united front towards
the ruling majority. Lelo and For Georgia did not join this coalition,
emphasising the importance of plurality, but have stated that they
would collaborate with this new alliance to change the current government and
combat the ongoing democratic backsliding.
15. As mentioned in previous reports, the ruling majority had
established a parliamentary investigative commission into the activities
of the “United National Movement (UNM) regime” and its political
representatives between 2003 and 2012, better known as the Tsulukiani
Commission. Its mandate was later extended to also cover the period
from 2012 until the present day. On 2 September 2025, this Commission
presented its report, in which it concluded that the United National
Movement and “its affiliated parties” – in effect practically the entire
democratic opposition in Georgia, hindered the establishment of
a “healthy political system” in Georgia and should therefore be
banned. As underscored in
Resolution
2624 (2025), such a ban on the democratic opposition would effectively
establish a one-party dictatorship in Georgia, which would be incompatible
with Council of Europe membership.
16. Nevertheless, in a major escalation in the crackdown on the
democratic opposition, the ruling majority, on 28 October 2025,
announced that it had appealed to the Constitutional Court to ban
three key democratic opposition movements: the United National Movement,
Ahali/Coalition for Change and Strong Georgia/Lelo. The ruling party
stated that it had not appealed for a ban on the For Georgia party,
as it had now entered parliament, nor – at that time – for the ban
of smaller opposition parties as, in the majority’s view they “do
not have significant influence due to their size and organisational
structure, including the real prospect of overcoming the electoral
threshold”. Following the establishment of the Opposition Alliance
on 9 March 2026, Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced that the ruling
party was contemplating amending its appeal to the Constitutional
Court to include all the parties that had joined the alliance and
that were not included in the original appeal.
Note On 20 April 2026, the ruling majority
subsequently withdrew its original appeal to the Constitutional
Court, replacing it with a new appeal asking the Constitutional
Court to ban the Federalist Party, as well as the three parties
included in the original appeal. This is widely believed to have
been driven by a desire to reset the nine-month legal deadline for
the Constitutional Court to deliver a decision on such appeals.
Note
17. On 16 October 2025, the Georgian Parliament passed a legislative
package that allows individuals 'associated' with parties deemed
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Georgia to be stripped
of their fundamental political rights, including the right to found
or join political parties or hold public office. On 9 December 2025,
the Monitoring Committee agreed to request an opinion of the Venice
Commission on this legislative package. This opinion is foreseen
to be adopted by the Venice Commission during its June 2026 plenary
session.
18. The ruling majority, at the time of writing, has not appealed
to the Constitutional Court to have the provisions in the amendments
adopted on 16 October 2025 being applied to individuals associated
by those parties it requested to be banned. However, on 6 November
2025, the Prosecutor General announced that he had started criminal
proceedings against several leading politicians
Note from
practically all democratic opposition parties for “crimes against
the State”, in particular sabotage; assistance in hostile activities
to a foreign country; financing activities directed against the
constitutional order of Georgia and the foundations of national
security; and calling for the violent change of the constitutional
order of Georgia or the overthrow of the State government. These
charges, which are commonly referred to as the sabotage case, carry
prison sentences between 7 and 15 years. Initially, the For Georgia
party, of former Prime Minister Gakharia, was the only major opposition
party whose leader had not been charged by the Prosecutor General.
However, this changed when, on 10 November 2025, the Prosecutor
General charged Mr Gakharia, who lives in exile in Berlin, for abuse
of power and endangering lives when being Minister of the Interior
of Georgia.
Note These
charges similarly carry heavy prison sentences of up to 13 years.
19. Given the lack of independence of the judiciary including
the Constitutional Court, the chance that most of all opposition
parties will be banned, and their leadership imprisoned, is considerable.
This is a clear example of the abuse of politically motivated legal
proceedings to silence opposition and dissenting voices. As emphasised
in
Resolution 2624 (2025), the banning of the democratic opposition and imprisonment
of its leadership would effectively establish a one-party dictatorship
in Georgia.
20. On 19 December 2025, Zurab Japaridze (Girchi – More Freedom)
was released from prison after serving his sentence for refusing
to appear before the above mentioned Tsulukiani Commission. On 22
December 2025, the Tbilisi City Court set a 30 000 GEL bail bond
and ordered him to surrender his passport in connection with the
aforementioned 'sabotage' case. On 23 January 2026, Giorgi Vashadze
(Strategy Aghmashenebeli) was released from prison after serving
his sentence for refusing to appear before the Tsulukiani Commission, as
was Nika Gvaramia on 12 February 2026. Both men have also been charged
in the so-called “sabotage” case. The Tbilisi City Court has also
set a 30,000 GEL bail bond for both men and ordered the surrender
of their passports. In a separate development, Nika Maleia (Ahali)
was sentenced to an additional 18 months in prison for throwing
water at a judge during a heated hearing about his controversial
arrest. He is also charged in the so-called “sabotage case.”
21. The crackdown is not limited to the opposition leadership.
There has been a series of arrests and criminal proceedings levied
against current and former high-level GD officials for corruption,
money laundering, and abuse of office. These individuals include
former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. On 12 January 2026, Mr Garibashvili
entered into a plea bargain with the Prosecutor General’s Office,
whereby he will serve five years in prison for serious money laundering
offences. These arrests are widely perceived as being part of an internal
power struggle within the ruling elite. However, irrespective of
this power struggle, these arrests highlight the ongoing prevalence
of widespread corruption at the highest levels of Georgian society.
It is therefore important that the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval) closely
monitor the developments in Georgia in respect to the fight against
corruption and money laundering.
22. Despite insisting that the next elections will only take place
in 2028, the parliament has recently adopted several amendments
to the election legislation that are considered to be particularly
advantageous for the ruling majority. On 17 December 2025, the Georgian
Parliament abolished the right of the sizeable Georgian diaspora
to vote abroad. Voting in elections, referendums and plebiscites
can now only take place within Georgia's State borders. On 2 March
2026, the parliament adopted in first reading a number of limitations
on international observers while granting the right to the Central
Election Commission (CEC) to decide by decree on the rules for photo,
video, and audio recordings during election commission sessions.
3 Civil
society, media and academia
23. As highlighted by the Assembly
on numerous occasions, a dynamic and pluralistic civil society is essential
for a well-functioning democracy. This is especially the case in
Georgia where civil society has historically played a pivotal role
in the country’s democratic development and has been a crucial partner
and reservoir of democratic expertise. The Assembly has therefore
on several occasions expressed its deepest concern about the increasingly
shrinking space for civil society to operate. It condemned the continued crackdown
on civil society organisations (CSOs) and their leadership through
the abuse of controversial legislation ostensibly aimed at regulating
the transparency of foreign influence, such as the Foreign Agent Registration
Act, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, and the Law on
Grants.
24. Regrettably the crackdown has continued unabated, and the
continuing existence of a viable and diverse civil society is now
very much in doubt.
25. The Georgian Parliament, on 16 April and 2 June 2025, adopted
the Law on Grants. This law requires international donors, including
the Council of Europe and its member States, to obtain the Georgian Government's
approval before providing funds or assistance to Georgian CSOs.
Receiving an unauthorised grant will result in the local organisation
being fined twice the amount received. Numerous CSOs have been informed
that they will be subjected to inspections to ensure compliance
with the transparency legislation and the Law on Grants. These inspections
were originally to be carried out by the Anti-Corruption Bureau
(ACB) However the ACB was abolished and its tasks taken over by
the State Audit Service (see below), which is directly responsible
to the Prime Minister. Civil society representatives have underscored
that the cumulative effect of these laws is impeding their proper
functioning and that their continued existence is at risk. Numerous CSOs
have ceased their operations. Several of the larger organisations
are still continuing their operations, albeit often in reduced format,
but with considerable risks for their staff and volunteers.
26. On 10 April 2025, the Monitoring Committee requested an opinion
on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments
to the law on grants and other laws relating to “foreign influence”.
In its opinion
Note adopted on 9 and 10 October 2025,
the Venice Commission concluded that “the legal regime established
by GEOFARA risks undermining the rule of law, civic space, and democratic
freedoms” and recommended this law to be repealed. With regard to
the Law on Grants, the Venice Commission considered that the amendments
“provide no clear and objective criteria for refusal and contain
insufficient safeguards, thereby leaving wide scope for arbitrary
or discriminatory application. The extensive investigatory and enforcement
powers of the Bureau, including the power to order immediate seizure,
combined with constrained procedural timelines and disproportionate
sanctions, further undermine fairness and due process”. It therefore recommended
that these amendments be repealed. Moreover, the Venice Commission
also considered the amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, that
introduced a blanket ban on foreign funding for broadcasters. In
the view of the Venice Commission, these amendments “undermine media
pluralism and fail the standards of necessity and proportionality.”
It therefore recommended that these amendments be repealed. Only
with regard to amendments to the Law on Political Association of
Citizens, which prohibit political parties from receiving in-kind
support
Note from
legal entities or associations in Georgia or abroad, the Venice
Commission concluded that they “fall within the permissible national
margin of discretion of a country.”
27. It is regrettable that the authorities, who had declined to
meet and co-operate with the Venice Commission during the preparation
and adoption of this, as well as other recent opinions, completely
dismissed this opinion and its recommendations. Prime Minister Kobakhidze
reportedly told journalists following the adoption of the opinion
by the Venice Commission that “The Venice Commission is one of the
most frivolous European structures [….] It has turned from a legal
expertise centre into an ordinary body serving the interest of the
global war party […] We cannot take their conclusions seriously.”
28. On 17 December 2025, the Georgian Parliament abolished the
Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Personal Data Protection Service,
transferring their functions to the State Audit Service. This is
another sign that power is increasingly concentrated in the hands
of Prime Minister Kobakhidze, as he consolidates his power within the
Georgian Dream party.
29. The assault on civil society and independent media
Note has been continuing in 2026. On
28 January 2026, the Georgian Dream majority announced its intention
to introduce further changes to the Law on Grants and the Law on
Political Unions of Citizens.
Note On 2 February
2026, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights urged
the Georgian Parliament to reject these amendments which are “stifling
civil society” and are “inconsistent with Georgia’s obligations
under international law to guarantee the right to freedom of association”.
Note Nevertheless, these amendments were
subsequently adopted by the Georgian Parliament in final reading
already on 4 March 2026. The amendments to the Law on Grants will
extend its provisions to local branches of foreign organisations,
as well as to foreign organisations registered in Georgia. Additionally,
the definition of a grant was widened to include technical assistance,
donations in kind and salaries paid to Georgian experts by international
organisations. Breaching the Law on Grants will now result in criminal liability,
with prison sentences of up to six years. The amendments to the
Law on Political Unions of Citizens bar any individual working for
a 'foreign agent' from joining a political party or an “organisation
with declared party-political objectives” for eight years. Additionally,
the leader of a political party that receives foreign funding in
violation of the amended Law on Political Unions of Citizens will
be subject to criminal liability, with punishments ranging from
fines and community service to up to six years' imprisonment.
Note On 17 March 2026, the Monitoring
Committee requested an opinion of the Venice Commission on amendments
to the Law on Grants, the Law on the Political Union of Citizens
and the Criminal Code, as well as related legislation, as adopted
by the Georgian Parliament on 4 March 2026. If adopted before the
June session we will cover these two opinions in an addendum to
this report.
30. On 15 April 2026, the parliament adopted, under an accelerated
procedure, amendments to the Law on Grants that introduced some
exemptions for diplomatic missions and international organisations,
as well as banks. According to these amendments, funds of diplomatic
missions and international organisations that are used for “activities
arising from the political or public interests, approaches, or relations
of a foreign government or a foreign political party” will not be
considered grants requiring government approval.”
Note However, the Chairperson of the Legal
Affairs Committee of the Georgian Parliament has stressed that “if
an embassy provides funds to any natural or legal person, aimed
at shaping policy in Georgia and influencing the public, this will
be considered a grant and will require agreement with the government”.
Note
31. In the 2026 Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without
Borders (RSF), Georgia’s ranking decreased from 114thplace
out of 180 countries in 2025 to a 131st place
in 2026, continuing the decline from 2024 when Georgia ranked 103rd.
According to the RSF report: “Official interference undermines efforts
to improve press freedom. The environment remains hostile for independent
and opposition media, with a growing number of verbal and physical
attacks against journalists. The adoption and tightening of laws
on “foreign influence” and “family values” further marginalise journalists,
expose them to censorship and significantly reduce space for free
speech”.
Note
32. Academia in Georgia have been a source of dissent and protest
against the recent developments in Georgia. There are increasing
indications that, as a result, the authorities wish to crackdown
on the academic freedom of universities and educational institutions
with a view to bringing them under political control
Note of the authorities.
Note Several interlocutors, including
from the international community, have expressed their concern about
the rapidly shrinking space for academic freedom in Georgia. On
4 February 2026, in an accelerated procedure, the Georgian Parliament
adopted a proposal of the authorities for a far-reaching education
reform, that, inter alia, increases the power of the government
to reorganise universities and appoint university administrators,
and which dramatically reduces the number of university faculties
Note. Under the policy of “One City,
One Faculty”, many universities are forced to close numerous faculties.
These closures seem to disproportionally affect those universities
where the student bodies have been most critical of the authorities. Several
interlocutors have expressed concern about corruption risks with
regard to the privatisation of the now surplus university properties.
4 Freedom
of assembly, police brutality, impunity, lack of effective investigations,
and abuse of legal proceedings
33. Since the adoption of
Resolution 2624 (2025), the authorities have, regrettably, continued their relentless
crackdown on freedom of expression and assembly. This has included
the use of repressive legislation and politically motivated legal
proceedings against civil society, the independent media, opposition forces,
and individual protesters. These seemingly politically motivated
prosecutions, which appear to have no other objective than to silence
dissenting voices, raise the spectre of political prisoners and
are incompatible with a democratic society and membership obligations.
34. On 4 October 2025, the day of the local elections in Georgia,
a large-scale protest rally against the country’s democratic backsliding
was organised. Regrettably, while overall peaceful, a small number
of protesters reportedly tried to storm the presidential palace
which resulted in skirmishes between these protesters and the police
guarding the presidential palace. Several interlocutors have raised
questions about the small number of police guarding the presidential
palace during the demonstration and the possible presence of agents
provocateurs. The authorities have tried to paint these actions
as a foreign instigated attempt of a violent coup d’état and have
used the unrest on 4 October 2025 as a pretext for a crackdown on the
daily peaceful demonstrations that have taken place on Rustaveli
Avenue and around the country since December 2024.
35. Subsequently, on 16 October 2025, under an accelerated procedure,
the Georgian Parliament adopted a series of amendments to the Law
on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code that substantially increased
the administrative and criminal penalties for actions such as covering
faces, blocking roads and participating in assemblies that officials
have ordered to be terminated.
Note
36. On 24 October 2025, the Georgian Public Defender (Ombudsperson)
requested an urgent legal opinion of the OSCE/ODIHR on these amendments
as adopted on 16 October 2025. This urgent opinion was issued by
the OSCE/ODIHR on 12 November 2025. In this opinion, the OSCE/ODIHR
concluded that the amendments raised “serious concerns about Georgia’s
lack of compliance with international human rights obligations,
especially Articles 9, 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 5, 10, 11 and 18
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and should be
repealed.”
Note Despite these recommendations,
on 10 December 2025, the Georgian Parliament further tightened protest rules
by extending them fully to pedestrian areas, among other measures.
Subsequently, On 20 January 2026, the Georgian Public Defender filed
an appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the restrictions
introduced in the Law on Demonstrations and the Law on Administrative
Offences. In his appeal, the Public Defender cited proportionality
concerns including with regard to the blanket ban on covering faces
and introduction of criminal liability for blocking roads.
Note However, to our knowledge, at the
moment of writing, the Constitutional Court has not started its
consideration of this appeal.
37. As we mentioned, on 26 November 2025, Nika Melia, co-chairperson
of Akhali, was sentenced to an additional 18-month prison term for
contempt of the Court, in relation to a courtroom incident on 30
May 2025, when he threw water from his drinking bottle at the presiding
court judge during a heated hearing about his controversial arrest.
In a case that was widely condemned domestically and internationally,
on 24 March 2026, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa party, which
is part of the “Opposition Alliance” received a one-and-a-half-year
prison sentence for “damaging or destroying property resulting in
substantial damage”
Note as
a result of writing “Russian Dream” on a Georgian Dream campaign
banner of Tbilisi Mayor and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha
Kaladze. These disproportionate sentences give credence to the allegations
of their political motivated nature.
Note Ms Khoshtaria and several other
female detainees have alleged to be subjected to degrading treatment
and human rights abuses while in detention and have written to the
Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner to investigate.
Note
38. Regrettably, and despite the Assembly's clear calls to the
contrary, including in
Resolution
2624 (2025), no effective investigations have been conducted into
police brutality and other human rights abuses committed during
demonstrations, nor into the many reports of torture and ill-treatment
of demonstrators during their arrest and detention. As it noted
in
Resolution 2624 (2025): this is in stark contrast to the lengthy prison sentences handed
down to protesters on questionable and fabricated charges.
39. On 18 February 2026, the European Committee for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT),
published its report on its periodic visits to Georgia of 18 to
29 November 2024 and from 21 to 22 January 2025.
Note The CPT reported that it had been
“inundated with allegations of ill-treatment” by persons detained
in connection to the 29 November 2024 demonstrations who “bore visible injuries,
some of them severe and having required urgent medical attention”.
The CPT noted that there appeared to be “a clear pattern of police
behaviour during the demonstration: masked and hooded, unidentifiable
police officers reportedly made arrests in groups, punching and
kicking detained persons indiscriminately all over their bodies,
threatening them. Further, the beatings were allegedly carried out repeatedly,
by several officers at a time, including whilst the persons had
their hands cuffed behind their backs. In nearly all cases, the
violence stopped once persons were handed over to non-masked police
officers.”
Note The CPT
expressed its concern about these allegations of police brutality
and the lack of effective investigation into them. It reiterated
its call to the Georgian authorities to address impunity and expressed
its concern about the abolition of the Special Investigation Service
(SIS) and the transfer of its functions to the Prosecutor’s Office, which
it considered to be “a move in precisely the opposite direction”.
Note
40. Since the start of the protests in December 2024, there have
been reports of participants in the demonstrations, and journalists
who covered them having long lasting health problems and other side
effects after been sprayed by the water cannons that were being
used to disperse the protests. For more than a year, CSOs and others
have been asking the authorities to provide information about the
any chemicals mixed into the water. The authorities denied initially
that any chemicals were mixed into the water that was sprayed by
the water cannons. This issue was brought to the foreground on 1
December 2025, when the BBC published the results of an investigation
which concluded that there was evidence to suggest that a First
World War chemical compound named “camite” may have been used in
the water cannons.
41. This report has sparked a storm of reactions both inside and
outside Georgia. Although the authorities decried it as fake news
distributed by deep State actors, a former Georgian Minister of
the Interior confirmed that his ministry had previously purchased
camite but ceased using it in 2012. The Prime Minster later admitted that
chemicals indeed had been mixed into the water that was used by
the water cannons to disperse protesters, but he denied that this
had been camite or a similar agent. Although police forces are permitted
to use chemicals for crowd control under international law, provided
they are considered proportionate and have only short-term effects,
the use of chemical warfare agents such as camite raises serious
human rights concerns. Therefore, the Monitoring Committee has asked
the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe to investigate
the alleged use of prohibited chemical agents and their human rights
implications during the police dispersal of the protest in Georgia.
42. On 10 December 2025, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner
for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, wrote to the General Prosecutor
of Georgia to express his concern about the lack of tangible progress
in the investigations into the disproportionate use of force by
law enforcement against protesters and journalists during the demonstrations
in Tbilisi. These investigations were transferred to the Prosecutor
General’s office following the abolishment of the Special Investigative
Service. He noted the numerous allegations of ill-treatment, including
torture and threats of sexual violence against women, which had
been documented by Georgia’s Public Defender (Ombudsperson) and
for which there had been no accountability. In addition, in relation
to the alleged of camite, the Commissioner raised concerns about
the “legality, necessity and proportionality” of the use of force,
“especially considering official acknowledgements that chemicals
were mixed into water cannons during protests.”
Note However, on 21 April 2026, Prime
Minister Kobakhidze announced the appointment of Sulkhan Tamazashvili
as the new Minister of the Interior. Mr Tamazashvili is the former
head of the Tbilisi Police Department and has been sanctioned by
several countries for his role in suppressing the demonstrations
in 2024 and 2025. This raises questions about the Georgian authorities' willingness
to genuinely investigate the allegations of police brutality and
other human rights abuses committed by law enforcement personnel
during the 2024 and 2025 demonstrations.
43. The Commissioner visited Georgia on 14 and 15 April 2026.
While welcoming the long overdue decision by the Ministry of the
Interior that all law enforcement personnel should wear visible
identification numbers, he expressed again his concern that, until
now, no law enforcement personnel has been brought to justice for
the violent dispersal of the protest in 2024 and 2025. He also repeated
his call for an “independent and thorough” investigation into the
use of chemicals to disperse demonstrations. He also expressed his
concerns about the cumulative effect of the increasingly restrictive
legislation that limits freedom of Assembly and Expression. In that
context he urged the Georgian authorities to repeal the Transparency
of Foreign Influence Law and the Foreign Agents Registration Law
(GEOFARA) as well as any other “oppressive” legislation.
Note
44. On 11 December 2025, the ECtHR delivered its grand chamber
judgment in the case
Tsaava and Others v.
Georgia.Note It held that Georgia had violated
Articles 3 (prohibition of torture), 10 (freedom of expression)
and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the ECHR during
the violent dispersal of protests in Tbilisi on 20 and 21 June 2019.
This case is under enhanced supervision. Unfortunately, the Georgian
authorities construed this judgment as a justification for their
decision to charge former Prime Minister Gakharia, who was Minister
of the Interior at the time. This case should be seen in connection
with the case
Makharashvili and others
v. Georgia where the Court found violations of Article
6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and
association) in the context of a demonstration that took place in
November 2019. The execution of this case is also still under supervision
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
Note The pattern of Court judgments
against Georgia finding violations of the Convention in relation
to freedom of assembly continued on 20 January 2026, when, in the
case of
Mekvabishvili v. Georgia,Note the ECtHR ruled that Georgia had
violated articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 11 (freedom of assembly
and association) of the ECHR when it convicted a protester during
the March 2023 demonstrations against the so-called foreign agent’s
law for disobeying lawful police orders, basing its decision solely
on police testimonies. The European Court found that nothing in
the case file suggested that the demonstration as a whole was intended
to obstruct parliamentary work, and that the authorities had failed
to demonstrate that they had “relevant and sufficient grounds to disperse
the demonstration” or that this action had been “necessary and proportionate”.
The Georgian authorities, who often emphasise their willingness
to abide with the Convention, are urged to fully implement these
judgments, as well as the other 77 cases pending execution that
are being supervised by the Committee of Ministers, including the
cases
Kezerashvili v. GeorgiaNote and
Tsintsabadze group v. GeorgiaNote,
which concern issues of direct relevance to the finding in this
report.
Note
5 Miscellaneous
observations
45. On 4 November 2025, the European
Commission adopted its 2025 annual Enlargement Package. Its report
on Georgia stated that it witnessed “serious democratic backsliding,
with a rapid erosion of the rule of law and fundamental rights being
severely restricted” and restrictive laws targeting activists, civil
society and independent media, threaten the survival of democratic
foundations”. It therefore concluded that “The basic foundations
of democracy were significantly undermined during the reporting
period. The Georgian authorities’ attack on democratic institutions
and fundamental freedoms through hostile rhetoric, constant spreading
of disinformation, intimidation, repressive actions and legislative
measures is a drastic setback for the country's democracy. Civil
liberties, the principle of checks and balances, and democratic
decision-making have been eroded” as a result of which “Georgia
does not have a viable path to the European Union unless conditions change
dramatically. It is now a candidate country in name only.”
Note
46. On 29 January 2026, 24 countries
Note invoked
the so-called OSCE Moscow Mechanism in response to the “deteriorating
human rights situation in Georgia”.
Note The report of the expert appointed
in the framework of the Moscow mechanism was published on 12 March
2026.
Note Unfortunately the Georgian authorities
have dismissed the report and the State Security Service subsequently
summoned former Public Defender (Ombudsperson) Ucha Nanuashvili,
and reportedly also others, over their communications with the expert appointed
under the Moscow Mechanism.
Note It should be emphasised that the
findings and conclusions of the report prepared under the Moscow
Mechanism largely coincide with those of the Assembly. We therefore
fully support the OSCE Participating States in their call for the
full implementation of the recommendations made in this report.
47. We reiterate our readiness for dialogue. However, this should
be based on the shared understanding that membership of the Council
of Europe is a privilege that comes with membership rights as well
as obligations. The principles of our organisation, as well as the
obligations stemming from membership and the need incumbent on all
member States to honour these obligations cannot be put into question
or negotiated.
48. It is clear that any initiative to ban democratic opposition
parties and to criminally prosecute their leadership on politically
motivated and trumped-up charges is unacceptable in a democracy.
The Assembly should therefore insist that the authorities repeal
their appeal to the Constitutional Court to ban the democratic opposition
parties and to end the unjustified and politically motivated prosecution
of its leadership.
49. The continued relentless crackdown on freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly, including through repressive legislation
and the abuse of politically motivated legal proceedings against
civil society, independent media, opposition forces and individual
protesters should end. The seemingly politically motivated prosecutions
with no other objective than to silence dissenting voices, raises
the spectre of political prisoners and is incompatible with a democratic
society and membership obligations. The Assembly, in
Resolution 1900 (2012) has elaborated a clear definition of political prisoner
that could guide the discussions on this topic. The repressive legislation
that was adopted in 2024 and 2025 should be fully repealed, followed
by the adoption of a completely new Code of Administrative Offences
that should be drafted in close consultation with the Council of
Europe to ensure its compliance with European norms and standards
including the ECHR.
50. Civil society in Georgia plays a pivotal role in the country’s
democratic development and is a crucial reservoir of democratic
expertise. The increasingly shrinking space in which civil society
can operate should be reversed and the crackdown on CSOs and their
leadership through the abuse of controversial legislation should
end. The Transparency of Foreign Influence Law and Foreign Agents
Registration Law (GEOFARA), as well as the recent amendments to
the Law on grants should be fully and unconditionally repealed.
51. The credible allegations of police brutality, ill-treatment
and torture by law enforcement representatives as well as all other
human rights abuses in the contacts of the demonstrations in Tbilisi
– including the alleged use of prohibited chemical agents to disperse
protesters -, should be transparently and effectively investigated in
line with the requirements of the ECHR for the right to an effective
investigation. The climate of impunity for such human rights abuses
should end.
52. A a result of the relentless crackdown on the democratic opposition,
civil society, the independent media, and dissent against the authorities
in general – compounded by the extreme social and political polarisation
in the country – it is highly doubtful that a political environment
that would allow for the conduct of genuinely democratic elections
actually still exists in Georgia. The reestablishment of a democratic
civic and political environment is a key priority.
53. We remain fully ready to engage in a constructive, results
oriented dialogue on these priorities with a view to ensuring that
Georgia will again start honouring its basic membership obligations
to the Council of Europe.
54. In
Resolution 2624
(2025), the Assembly urged the relevant bodies of the Council
of Europe to use all available means, including those under Article 52
of the ECHR. In addition, it invited all member States to use interstate
applications to the ECtHR under Article 33 of the Convention, to
ensure that Georgia fully honours all the standards and obligations
stemming from Council of Europe membership. Regrettably Article
52 has not yet been invoked.
