Observation of the parliamentary elections in Albania (11 May 2025)
Election observation report
| Doc. 16201
| 19 June 2025
1 Introduction
1. On 27 January 2025, the Bureau
of the Parliamentary Assembly decided to observe the parliamentary elections
in Albania scheduled on 11 May 2025 (subject to receiving an invitation)
and to set up an ad hoc committee composed of 20 members (SOC: 6;
EPP/CD: 6; ECPA: 4; ALDE: 3; UEL: 1), as well as the two co-rapporteurs
of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments
by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee),
and to conduct a pre-electoral mission. On 5 February 2025, the Speaker
of the Parliament of Albania invited the Assembly to observe the
parliamentary elections in the country. On 31 January 2025, the
Bureau appointed me chairperson of the ad hoc committee. The composition of
the ad hoc committee (hereafter the “PACE delegation”) is provided
in Appendix 1.
2. Albania is under the post-monitoring procedure of the Assembly
and has therefore committed to inviting the Assembly to observe
elections. The PACE delegation notes that Albania has signed and
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and
its Additional Protocol (ETS No. 9), which enshrine fundamental
principles crucial for a functioning democracy, including the right
to free elections (Article 3 of the Additional Protocol), freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and the prohibition
of discrimination (Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention).
3. In accordance with the co-operation agreement signed on 4
October 2004 between the Parliamentary Assembly and the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), a representative of
the Venice Commission provided legal support to the PACE delegation.
4. A two-day pre-electoral mission took place on 3-4 April 2025
in Tirana to assess the electoral campaign and the broader political
environment. The programme of the mission is outlined in Appendix
2, and its pre-electoral statement is provided in Appendix 3.
5. For the observation of the parliamentary elections on 11 May
2025, the PACE delegation worked from 9 to 12 May as part of an
International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), together with
delegations from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE-PA), the European
Parliament (EP) as well as the electoral observation mission of
the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).
The programme of the meetings held during this period is detailed
in Appendix 4.
6. The PACE delegation thanks the Albanian authorities for their
invitation and assistance, as well as all interlocutors and international
partners for their co-operation. The delegation also extends its
appreciation to the Council of Europe Office in Tirana for its support
in facilitating the smooth organisation of the pre-electoral mission
meetings.
7. The IEOM issued a joint press release (see Appendix 5) and
a “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions”,
Note which provide detailed information.
These documents were presented at a joint press conference in Tirana
on 12 May 2025.
2 Context and recent
developments
8. Parliamentary elections were
held on 11 May in a highly polarised political environment. European
Union (EU) accession featured prominently in political discourse,
with the ruling Socialist Party (SP) campaigning for membership
by 2030 and highlighting negotiation milestones. However, the opposition
parties criticised the SP for using EU integration rhetoric to distract
from domestic issues such as living standards, corruption and democratic
backsliding.
9. The first-ever implementation of out-of-country voting in
these elections was widely regarded as a significant achievement.
10. The political landscape is dominated by the SP, led by Prime
Minister Edi Rama, and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP),
led by Sali Berisha. The SP has won three consecutive parliamentary
elections since 2013, further consolidating its power in the 2023
local elections. Internal conflicts within the DP have led to the formation
of splinter parties (and three DP factions in parliament) following
a profound leadership crisis that, until recently, prevented DP
from properly functioning as an opposition party and impacted its
campaign.
11. In October 2024, former Albanian President Ilir Meta, leader
of the Freedom Party (FP), was arrested on corruption charges. In
November, the house arrest measures imposed on Sali Berisha in December
2023 were lifted pending trial on corruption charges. Several DP-led
protests took place in late 2024 and early 2025, driven by concerns
over the perceived erosion of democratic institutions and allegations
of government corruption and misuse of State resources. The protests
also responded to high-profile arrests which some opposition groups saw
as politically motivated. In February 2025, Erion Veliaj, the mayor
of Tirana and a prominent SP member, was arrested on corruption
charges.
12. Although women have become more politically engaged in recent
years, they continue to face long-standing systemic obstacles to
advancement, including weak internal party democracy and limited
access to financing. While women hold half of the ministerial posts,
they are less represented in parliament, occupying 50 out of 140
seats (36%).
3 Legal electoral
framework and recent amendments
3.1 Legal framework
13. The legal electoral framework
primarily consists of the 1998 Constitution, which was last amended
in 2020, and the 2008 Electoral Code, which was last amended in
2025. Other legislation and regulations complement these core provisions
with specific rules (e.g. on disqualification).
14. A major revision of the Electoral Code was adopted in 2020,
with subsequent amendments being adopted in July and October of
that year. The first set of amendments was adopted based on a consensus between
all political parties, following lengthy negotiations in the Political
Council (an informal, ad hoc, cross-party working group aimed at
building consensus, particularly during electoral or constitutional
reforms), which was urged by the international community. When the
necessary constitutional amendments were discussed, the DP's parliamentary
faction introduced the proposal of open lists, which had not been
part of the Council's agreement. The SP supported this, contrary
to the non-parliamentary wing of the DP and the LSI (Socialist Movement
for Integration), who feared it would weaken their control over
the lists. President Ilir Meta sent the second set of amendments
to the Venice Commission. Consequently, the Venice Commission and
the ODIHR examined the latter amendments, but the 2020 major reform
of the Electoral Code was not reviewed.
15. Some of the recommendations set out in the 2020 Opinion
Note were
adopted, including the abolition of the right of political party
leaders to stand in multiple constituencies. However, others were
not, including the reduction of the minimum number of candidates
required on a list, the introduction of provisions to ensure equal rights
for all parties within a coalition to appeal actions and decisions
of the coalition, and the right of individual candidates to submit
complaints and appeals regarding the allocation of seats within
a list.
16. Since then, the Electoral Code has been amended three times
(in 2021, 2024 and 2025). The 2024 and 2025 amendments implemented
and further specified provisions on postal voting for Albanian citizens
living abroad, enabling voters abroad to participate in national
elections for the first time. These amendments were adopted at the
last minute, despite the Constitutional Court's decision – back
in December 2022 – that the Albanian Parliament had violated the
Constitution by preventing Albanians living abroad from voting in
the 2021 parliamentary elections. This option is made available
to all eligible voters and is administered by the Central Election
Commission (CEC). While the diaspora vote represents an important
step forward in Albania's electoral process, international experience
shows that implementing this voting channel is not easy. In this regard,
both the CEC and political representatives expressed concerns before
the elections about the limited timeframe for mailing and receiving
ballots from abroad. According to some sources, there were concerns
that “postal services would require more than 40 days to deliver
ballots to voters and return them to the CEC for counting. Since
ballot printing would occur only 20 days before election day, this
delay posed a risk of excluding diaspora votes from the final tally”.
17. The amendments also remove the requirement for independent
candidates to obtain at least 1% of the valid votes nationwide in
order to be included in the allocation of mandates. This strengthens
the effective participation of citizens who are not aligned to a
party in the electoral process. The national electoral threshold for
political parties and coalitions remains unchanged.
18. Regarding the allocation of mandates, an important change
from 2024 onwards is that political parties and coalitions must
present both a closed multi-name list of candidates in a fixed order
and an open multi-name list subject to preference voting. The closed
list takes precedence over the open list in the allocation of mandates.
19. While the Albanian legal framework and international election
observation reports consistently refer to these systems as “preferential
vote” or “preferential voting”, the system in question is not strictly
preferential. For this reason, the term “preference” is used here
instead.
20. By requiring two different sets of candidate lists, the amendments
significantly reduce voters' role in electing candidates from party/coalition
lists. The amendment faced significant criticism from several minor parties
who took the mixed candidate list system to the Constitutional Court,
claiming that the addition of closed lists was designed to favour
large parties by increasing their control over candidate selection.
21. Following the amendment in 2024, which eliminated an exception
for leaders of parties in the Electoral Code, the candidates registered
on a fixed-order list in one electoral district cannot be registered
in another one or appear on a list subject to preference voting.
22. Some of the amendments follow up on prior recommendations,
while other recommendations remain unimplemented, particularly those
relating to a more balanced composition of lower-level election
commissions and the suffrage rights of persons with intellectual
or psychosocial disabilities.
3.2 Electoral system
23. According to Article 64 of
the Constitution, the 140-member Parliament is elected for a four-year
term using a regional d'Hondt proportional system. Candidates are
elected from 12 multi-seat electoral districts (zones) that correspond
to the administrative regions. In 2024, the CEC reallocated the
number of seats for each district, ranging from 3 in Kukës to 37
in Tirana, which gained an additional seat.
24. The threshold to obtain a seat is 1% nationwide, except for
independent candidates.
25. As indicated above, parties/coalitions must submit two lists
for each electoral district. The number of candidates on the closed
(fixed-order multi-name) list must match one third of the seats
allocated to the electoral district (this number may be rounded
up or down), while the number of candidates on the open multi-name
list, which is subject to preference voting, must match the number
of available seats in each electoral district. To improve gender
balance in parliament, the Electoral Code requires that one out
of every three candidates nominated on the closed list and one out
of three candidates elected from the open list must be from the
gender that is less represented in parliament.
26. Voters may express a preference for either a fixed-order multi-name
list or a candidate from a multi-name list subject to preference
voting.
27. When allocating seats to candidates, the Electoral Code stipulates
that candidates from the closed list take precedence over those
from the open list, in order of position on the list. Candidates
from the preference voting list may only be elected once all the
available candidates from the closed list have been exhausted. Candidates
on the preference voting list are reordered based on the number
of preference votes received by each candidate, taking into account
the gender-balanced representation rule (at least the third seat
must be assigned to the gender that is less represented). According
to Article 4 of the Electoral Code, the gender quota for the under-represented
gender is set at a minimum of 30% of the Parliament of Albania's
composition.
3.3 Election administration
28. The election administration
is composed of the Central Election Commission, 92 Commissions of Electoral
Administration Zones (CEAZs), and some 5 200 voting centre commissions.
Counting is performed by counting teams in 92 ballot counting centres
(BCCs), one for each electoral administration zone.
29. The structure and composition of the CEC did not change in
the last electoral cycle and consists of three sub-structures. Firstly,
there is the State Election Commissioner, who exercises executive
powers, steers the administration and represents the CEC in relations
with third parties, as well as the State Election Deputy commissioner
who is tasked with supervising voter identification technology,
as well as the recruitment and training of election officials. Secondly,
there is the Regulatory Commission, which is responsible for adopting normative
sub-legal acts as prescribed by the Electoral Code. Thirdly, there
is the Complaints and Sanctions Commission, which examines complaints
against the decisions of the Commissioner and the CEAZs. It also decides
on the invalidity of votes and election results and imposes sanctions
for violations of the Electoral Code upon the Commissioner's request.
All CEC members are elected by parliament for different lengths
of time to ensure turnover while retaining institutional memory.
30. The remaining levels of election administration comprise delegates
appointed by political parties in proportion to their parliamentary
representation. The politicisation of the lower levels of election
administration is a key concern, given the possibility that members
may be removed by the political parties that appointed them, even
shortly before elections. This has been found to cause several issues
in the conduct of democratic elections, including cascading delays
in appointing polling station commissioners and counting teams,
which leaves little time for training and preparation. Another problem
is the frequent, last-minute and discretionary dismissal of appointees
by political parties. Overall, these delays and dismissals undermine
professionalism on election day, challenge dispute resolution process
deadlines and jeopardise trust in the electoral process. Observers
have identified negative consequences such as polling station staff
not showing up at opening time and/or lacking adequate knowledge,
group and family voting, abuse of assisted voting, poor polling
station layout, and presence of unauthorised people. The under-representation
of women in election administration is another shortcoming resulting
from the current framework.
31. In 2024, amendments to the Electoral Code entrusted the CEC
with registering and organising voting for citizens residing outside
Albania, including votes counting. However, political parties remain
reluctant to entrust the CEC with managing election operations,
and a later legislative revision entrusted counting procedures to multi-party
commissions.
3.4 Right to vote
32. The right to vote is granted
to Albanian citizens who are 18 years of age or older. This right
is suspended for citizens who are serving a prison sentence for
committing specific crimes. Citizens whose legal incapacity is declared
by a court decision cannot vote, at odds with international obligations
prohibiting discrimination based on disability. The voter registration
system is passive; however, voters residing abroad must actively register
no later than 60 days before election day. Additionally, voters
aged over 100 are automatically removed from the electoral register.
Some 3.6 million voters were registered for these elections, including
those residing abroad.
33. Biometric voter identification was used for the second time
in parliamentary elections. Accordingly, on election day, all voters
had their fingerprints scanned and stored electronically prior to
being handed a ballot. The collected data is then checked for potential
cases of multiple voting. Stakeholders have confirmed the general
credibility of the voter identification system.
34. Any eligible voter can stand in the elections, except those
serving a prison sentence, those with a prior conviction for specific
crimes, and certain categories of officials whose activities are
incompatible with the right to stand.
3.5 Registration
of candidates
35. Candidate lists can be submitted
by political parties and party coalitions. Independent candidates
can stand for election by being nominated by groups of voters. In
line with the 2024 amendments to the Electoral Code, political parties/coalitions
must submit two candidate lists (see above, paragraphs 18 and 25). Candidates
submitted on a fixed-order list in one electoral district cannot
be registered in another district or appear on a list subject to
preference voting.
36. Failure to submit a sufficient number of candidates in any
given district may lead to denial in registration.
37. In 2025, amendments were made to the Electoral Code, enacted
less than a year before election day and after the President had
called for parliamentary elections. These amendments reduced the
time limits for registering political parties, electoral coalitions
and independent candidates with electoral authorities (Articles 64,
65 and 69 of the Electoral Code), and for making corrections to
documentation that has been submitted (Article 73 of the Electoral
Code).
38. Due to the new requirement to submit two different lists,
changes have been made to the layout of the ballot, particularly
in Tirana district, where the ballot paper did not include the names
of candidates on the closed list. This may cause issues regarding
voters' knowledge of the candidates they are voting for.
3.6 Election campaign
and financing
39. The regulated election campaign
began on 12 April 2025 and ended 24 hours before election day. There are
no sanctions for early campaigning. Civil servants are prohibited
from engaging in political activities during official working hours,
and public institutions are barred from conducting election-related
campaigns.
40. Public institutions, State agencies and enterprises must report
to the CEC through a dedicated platform hosted on the CEC website
on all activities involving citizens' and media's participation
during the four months preceding election day. This information
is available on the CEC website. The CEC has the power to declare an
activity as potentially constituting a misuse of State resources
and to block broadcast media or other campaign coverage events.
41. Election campaigns may be financed from public and private
funds, including loans. Parliamentary parties receive an annual
funding from the State budget. Additionally, all parties that received
more than 1% of valid votes in the previous parliamentary elections
are entitled to public funding for their campaigns. Independent
candidates are not entitled to public funding. Donations from citizens
and legal entities, including in-kind donations, are capped at 1 million
Albanian leks (ALL) (approximately 10 150 EUR). Contributions above
50 000 ALL must be made via a designated bank account and disclosed.
42. A political party's campaign expenses may not exceed three
times the highest amount received from public funds for campaigning,
while an independent candidate's expenses may not exceed 50% of
this amount. Each contestant must record the amount of donations
received, as well as donor identification data, in a special register
approved by the CEC. Contestants must submit reports on their campaign
finances within 60 days of the election results being announced.
43. Following the announcement of the final election results,
the CEC must appoint auditors to oversee each contestant's campaign
funds. The CEC must publish the auditors' reports within 30 days
of their submission. The CEC is authorised to verify the information
in these reports and may impose sanctions on contestants for non-compliance
with campaign finance rules. According to local stakeholders, campaign
finance regulations could be improved further, particularly by introducing
more effective and dissuasive sanctions and regulating third-party
campaigning.
3.7 Complaints and
appeals
44. Decisions of election administration
bodies can only be challenged by parties and independent candidates
standing for election before the CEC, while citizen observers can
only challenge CEC and CEAZ decisions concerning their accreditation.
Complaints against decisions made by the Commissioner and the CEAZs
(including those relating to election results) are submitted to
the Complaints and Sanctions Commission. Complaints and appeals
against other CEC entities can be brought to the Electoral College
of the Court of Appeals of Tirana, whose decisions are final.
45. The Electoral College is the highest authority on electoral
disputes. It consists of eight judges from the first instance and
appeal courts, who are appointed for a four-year term and selected
by lot. All cases are considered during open hearings, with decisions
published on the website of the Court of Appeals of Tirana.
3.8 Election day
46. There is a limited option to
vote electronically in Tirana and Vorë, where electronic voting
pilots are conducted with contingency measures in place in case
of dysfunction of the e-voting system.
47. Once the voting centre commissions complete the closing procedures,
the ballot boxes and the box containing the voting materials are
sent to the 92 ballot counting centres, where counting takes place,
carried out by dedicated teams, with one centre covering each electoral
administration zone. Counting shall not to start until all boxes
containing ballot papers and voting materials have been received
from all voting centres under the jurisdiction of the respective
counting team.
48. Counting should proceed without interruption until all ballot
boxes have been processed. Once counting for one electoral administration
zone is complete, the CEAZ must compile the aggregate table of election results
and issue it no later than 22:00 on the day after election day.
Copies of the aggregate table of results and the tables of results
for each polling station are sent immediately to the CEC.
3.9 Out-of-country
voting
49. Albanian citizens residing
abroad who wished to vote in the parliamentary elections had to
register individually on an out-of-country voters list managed by
the CEC, which assigns voters to their last district of residency.
This list is compiled anew for each election, starting 120 days
before election day and closing 60 days prior. Registration requires
the submission of documents proving residence abroad, and identity
is verified through the National Civil Registry. A preliminary list
is published 63 days before the election to allow for corrections,
and the final list is confirmed 60 days prior to the election. Voters
on this list are removed from the domestic voter register, and any
disputes can be appealed to the Tirana First Instance Court. The
process is governed by detailed rules and timelines issued by the
CEC, with oversight from technical auditors and in co-ordination
with the National Civil Registry.
50. Voting begins abroad when the CEC starts sending voting documents
and instructions to registered voters, and ends when voting concludes
in Albania. The CEC must prioritise selecting reputable international express
mail providers using the fastest procedures permitted by public
procurement rules. Voters abroad receive their ballot papers and
other materials by post at their declared address; the ballot papers
are almost identical to the domestic version. Voters must return
their completed ballots to the CEC via the aforementioned international
postal services. Only ballots received by the deadline, or clearly
marked as having entered Albania by that time, are accepted.
51. Upon arrival at the CEC, the ballots are registered and sorted
according to the electoral zone of the voter’s last Albanian residence.
Initially, the counting was entrusted to the CEC; however, following
the 2025 amendments, postal ballots are now to be counted at a designated
centre, and the process begins simultaneously with the in-country
counting for the corresponding electoral zone. This process is overseen
by a commission of four members, with two proposed by the largest
parliamentary majority party and two by the largest opposition party.
A legally qualified secretary is also selected through an open process.
Additional commissions may be formed if the number of registered
voters abroad exceeds 80 000.
52. Article 2 of the 2025 amendments modifies Article 25/1, which
stipulates that the CEC will cover all mailing costs related to
voting from abroad, including the return of completed ballots and
the initial dispatch of electoral materials.
4 Key findings
of the PACE pre-electoral mission
53. During our pre-electoral mission
to Tirana on 3-4 April 2025, which aimed to assess the electoral campaign
and the political climate ahead of the parliamentary elections,
we met with a wide range of electoral stakeholders: the Speaker
of Parliament, leaders and representatives of the main parliamentary
groups and the main extra-parliamentary political parties, members
of the Albanian delegation to the PACE, the Head and Deputy Head
of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the State Election
Commissioner and members of the CEC, representatives of the diplomatic
community, civil society and the media, representatives of the Audio-visual
media Authority, the Media and Information Agency and the National
Bureau of Investigation Special Structure for Combating Corruption
and Organised Crime (SPAK).
54. We identified several challenges that need to be addressed
to ensure democratic processes and fair and competitive elections.
55. While acknowledging the importance of fighting corruption,
we emphasised the need to avoid the perception of favouring one
political party over another, as this could undermine public confidence
in the fight against corruption and in the electoral process itself.
56. We were informed of the deep-rooted “winner-takes-all” culture
of political competition in Albania, where the objective is not
to encourage future collaboration, but rather to minimise the influence
of opponents, resulting in limited opportunities for constructive
dialogue.
57. We noted that Albania will be using out-of-country voting
for the first time. While this is a positive step towards more inclusive
elections, we have heard concerns that it could benefit the larger,
more established parties and potentially influence the outcome of
the elections.
58. We have also received allegations that the lines between political
parties and the State are blurred, and credible information that
the ruling party is exerting pressure on civil servants dependent
on State jobs, sometimes directly and sometimes more subtly.
59. We also heard that vote-buying, which was already present
in previous elections, remains endemic in rural, less developed
areas, including through indirect methods such as cash incentives
and 0% interest loans. We have called on all political actors to
refrain from such practices, and for all allegations to be properly investigated.
60. We also noted that party leaders have strong control over
party lists, which limits internal democracy.
61. In our statement, we emphasised that the absence of meaningful
political discourse indicates that elections are more about personalities
than concrete policy platforms. Young people are disinterested in elections
because they feel unrepresented and see little difference between
the policies of existing political parties.
62. We were made aware of the concentration of media ownership
in the hands of private groups with links to political parties.
We also understood that online platforms are not regulated, which
creates opportunities for manipulation. The recent temporary ban
on TikTok highlights concerns about the instrumentalisation of social media
and the flow of information in the run-up to elections.
63. We welcomed the fact that several interlocutors mentioned
that current legislation providing for a mandatory gender quota
ensures adequate female representation on electoral lists.
64. Our interlocutors expressed confidence in the CEC's ability
to work transparently and in co-operation with civil society. However,
we regretted that there would be no large-scale observation by civil
society at polling stations on election day, thus likely to reduce
the transparency of the electoral process.
65. While we recognised that some of these issues may be difficult
to address before election day, we urged the authorities and all
election stakeholders to address those that could still be resolved.
5 Election day
observation
66. On election day, around 350
international observers were deployed by the IEOM to cover approximately 1
350 polling stations and almost 100 counting centres, ensuring comprehensive
coverage of the electoral process. PACE teams were deployed in Tirana
and the surrounding area, as well as several other cities and their
outskirts, including Dibër, Durrës, Elbasan, Krujë and Lezha.
67. Most members of the PACE delegation concluded that the elections
were well organised and that the voting process was calm and transparent.
Observers were given access to observe the entire process. However,
procedures were not always followed.
68. PACE members noted the low turnout and suggested this was
due to general dissatisfaction with politicians across the board.
They also noted that in most polling stations there were observers
from the SP and the DP, but not from civil society. One team witnessed
the electronic identity-checking device malfunctioning, which led
to a 30-minute delay in the opening of voting. Another team observed
voters instructing their family members on for whom to vote. Some
members received confirmation from voters about the pressure they
had been under before election day, including credible details about
how this pressure had been exerted, such as personal telephone calls.
This information had already been received by the PACE delegation
during the pre-electoral mission and briefings.
69. Access for disabled voters was an issue, as more than half
of polling stations visited by IEOM observers did not allow these
voters to access them independently.
70. The PACE teams direct observations are consistent with the
findings of the IEOM, which reported that election day was calm
in most areas and transparent, but with a lack of adherence to procedures
in many voting centres. While voting was assessed generally positively
in 95% of observations, there was a fairly high number of negative
assessments, largely regarding procedural shortcomings, and some
pressure on voters. Serious irregularities that were observed included
a significant number of incidents of intimidation and party observers and
affiliates interfering in the process, inducements and allegations
of vote buying. Further, the secrecy of the vote was frequently
compromised due to the layout of polling stations, overcrowding,
and interference. Electronic voting generally proceeded without
hindrance, though many voters appeared unfamiliar with the process,
and some electoral officials were not adequately trained or lacked
clarity on their roles. The electronic transmission of results from
e-voting centres was cancelled, and a manual transmission was conducted
at the district level instead. While the counting proceeded in an
orderly manner in many places, not all IEOM observers had full access
to the process and noted some procedural shortcomings and a chaotic
atmosphere in some locations.
6 Outcome of the
elections
71. According to data available
on the CEC website, the results are as follows: the SP secured 83
mandates (53.27%), while the DP won 50 (32,93%). The remainder of
the seats were distributed among the Social Democratic Party with
three mandates, the Opportunity Party with two, and the “Albania
Becomes” initiative and the Together Movement Party, which secured
one mandate each.
72. The SP won the diaspora vote with 61.14%, followed by the
DP coalition with 23.54%, and “Albania Becomes” with 7.4%.
73. According to the CEC, a total of 339 893 profiles of out-of-country
voters were created on the electronic registration platform, with
245 935 applications approved for voting. Of these, 227 097 envelopes
were successfully delivered to voters, representing a 92% delivery
rate. The CEC received 202 309 completed ballots, which accounts
for 82,2% of approved applications. Voters participated from 85
countries worldwide, with the largest concentrations in Italy, Greece,
Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The logistical
process involved 680 personnel over a six-month period, with 14
designated ballot boxes and continuous 24/7 video monitoring.
74. The turnout was 42.21% compared to 46,29% in the 2021 parliamentary
elections.
75. The outcome of the elections in number of seats reflects the
fact that the electoral system favours big parties over small ones.
The ruling SP’s 53,27% vote share translates into 83 seats in the
140-seat legislature. This is the largest majority ever enjoyed
by the party since 1997, which is one seat short of the three-fifths majority
that would give it considerable power in parliament without having
to seek any support from other parties. This electoral system therefore
appears to reinforce the deep-rooted “winner-takes-all” culture
of political competition, leaving limited space for new political
actors to emerge.
7 Conclusions and
recommendations
76. The IEOM concluded that the
2025 parliamentary elections were competitive and professionally conducted
but took place in a highly polarised environment and that contestants
did not enjoy a level playing field. Still, candidates were generally
able to campaign freely although some reported facing intimidation.
The electoral administration managed the process in an inclusive
and transparent manner. The ruling party benefited from widespread
use of administrative resources during the campaign, creating an
undue advantage of incumbency. There were also numerous allegations
of pressure on voters, especially public employees. Further, the
electoral legislation and its narrow interpretation by the election
administration did not prevent abusive practices. Concentration
of media ownership undermining the plurality of news sources, along
with self-censorship among journalists and the two largest parties
dominating the news coverage, limited opportunity for voters to
make an informed choice. The active use of online social networks
by the contestants, amplified the strong confrontational discourse,
and no authority was designated to detect harmful manipulative content.
The new co-ordination mechanism among institutions to investigate
and prosecute electoral crimes is a welcome development, but follow-through
is necessary to address persistent concerns of electoral malpractice.
Election day was generally calm and well organised but there was
a frequent lack of adherence to procedures, and the day was marked
by a number of incidents of intimidation and inducement of voters
and some procedural and transparency shortcomings in the vote count.
77. The diaspora vote marks an important milestone in Albania's
democratic history. Out-of-country voting, introduced for the first
time for these elections, enabled Albanians living abroad to contribute
to their country's development as citizens, in addition to their
significant economic contributions. Their voting was well managed, despite
the late political agreement and adoption of this measure, as well
as some organisational issues which will need to be properly assessed.
78. The shortcomings observed raised some questions about the
integrity of the electoral process. In this context, our delegation
valued the work of the Albanian “triumvirate” — the SPAK, the General
Prosecutor's Office and the CEC — in effectively co-ordinating their
efforts to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process.
79. However, progress is still needed in the broader political
culture to strengthen public trust and ensure good governance reaches
all levels of society, which starts with elections fully complying
with European standards. In particular, the issues mentioned below
must be highlighted.
80. A number of shortcomings and ambiguities reduce the clarity
of the legal framework and create uncertainty in its implementation
in both letter and spirit.
81. While some Venice Commission and ODIHR recommendations were
addressed, the majority of long-standing recommendations, including
those related to the composition of lower-level election commissions, interim
reporting on campaign finance, misuse of administrative resources
and provisions to provide a conducive media environment, including
removing criminal liability for defamation, have not yet been addressed.
82. The parliament is elected through a modified electoral system
combining closed and lists subject to preference voting which was
introduced ahead of these elections. The system appears to favour
the two largest parties, and it limits the impact of preference
voting, enabling the party leaders to retain significant control
over parliamentary representation, in part due to the lack of internal
party democracy.
83. There were some disruptions caused by the late replacement
of members nominated by political parties, especially for voting
centre members in the days leading up to the election.
84. Despite efforts made by the CEC to improve accessibility at
voting centres for persons with disabilities, accessibility problems
remain in some places.
85. During the campaign, the playing field was uneven. The ruling
party benefitted from the widespread use of administrative resources
and institutional leverage, including the waiving of a large number
of State fines announced shortly before election day, and senior
government officials engaged in a high number of official events
that often overlapped with campaign messaging, blurring the line
between State and party.
86. There was a large number of credible allegations of pressure
on public employees, cases of intimidation of opposition supporters
and the misuse of patronage networks. There were also reports of
vote-buying, attempts to unduly influence marginalised voters, and
alleged influence of criminal elements on some political parties.
87. Campaigning on social networks was not regulated, and no authority
was designated to monitor it. Despite most political parties signing
a Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns, several contestants disseminated
divisive or manipulative content, while third-party accounts reportedly
used co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour on online platforms to amplify
attacks against the opposition.
88. We heard that the government’s ban on TikTok as of 6 March
2025 – which was justified by the authorities by the lack of filters
for harmful content – was perceived by some interlocutors as a manipulation
by the ruling party to limit some candidates' campaign opportunities.
89. Women’s political participation has grown in recent years,
yet their advancement remains constrained by entrenched structural
barriers, particularly weak internal party democracy and limited
access to funding.
90. Only limited changes to campaign finance have been enacted
since 2020. Key Venice Commission and ODIHR recommendations remain
unaddressed and shortcomings in the regulatory framework impact
the transparency of campaign finance and the equality of opportunities
for parties and candidates.
91. The media environment remained highly constrained, with the
independence, diversity, and integrity of news content undermined
by non-transparent financing, concentrated ownership, interference
in editorial autonomy, and political influence.
92. A lack of funding for local civil society, notably from international
donors, limited its capacity to undertake a comprehensive observation
of these elections, reducing the level of scrutiny of the election
process.
93. Election day was calm in most areas and transparent, but with
a lack of adherence to procedures in many voting centres. There
was a fairly high number of negative assessments, largely regarding
procedural shortcomings, and some pressure on voters. Serious irregularities
that were observed included a significant number of incidents of
intimidation and party observers and affiliates interfering in the
process, inducements and allegations of vote buying. Further, the
secrecy of the vote was frequently compromised due to the layout of
polling stations, overcrowding, and interference. More than half
of the polling stations observed were not adequately accessible
for persons with disabilities to vote independently. Electronic
voting generally proceeded without hindrance, though many voters
appeared unfamiliar with the process, and some electoral officials
were not adequately trained or lacked clarity on their roles. The
electronic transmission of results from e-voting centres was cancelled,
and a manual transmission was conducted at the district level instead.
While the counting proceeded in an orderly manner in many places,
not all IEOM observers had full access to the process and noted
some procedural shortcomings and a chaotic atmosphere in some locations.
94. The Assembly calls on the Albanian authorities to demonstrate
strong and genuine political will to address the shortcomings identified
during the election observation process. This is crucial to ensure
the alignment with European standards in electoral processes. This
should be followed up in the framework of the Assembly’s post-monitoring
dialogue and electoral co-operation programmes.
95. In particular, the Assembly calls on the Albanian authorities
to prioritise the following measures and to:
- address the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations
in a comprehensive and inclusive manner and review the campaign
finance rules in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission
and Group of States against Corruption (GRECO);
- depoliticise the electoral administration, especially
at lower levels, to prevent frequent, last-minute and discretionary
dismissal of appointees by political parties, ensure sufficient
time for training and preparation and strengthen professionalism
of election officers on election day for greater trust in the electoral
process;
- take resolute action to safeguard the integrity of the
electoral process, in particular adopt measures to prevent vote-buying,
pressure on both public and private sector employees, undue influence
on marginalised voters, misuse of administrative resources and abuse
of State resources by parties in power during electoral campaigns
and the alleged influence of criminal elements, as well as the risk
of their infiltration into the electoral process;
- take action to clearly separate the ruling party from
the State;
- adopt measures to increase political education, civic
engagement and access to political representation for young people;
- strengthen the capacity of the SPAK to effectively fight
corruption and organised crime, including in the context of elections;
- carry out a proper assessment of the out-of-country voting
which was introduced for the first time and identify areas for improvement.
96. In the spirit of the Reykjavík Summit of Heads of State and
Government and the Reykjavík Principles for Democracy, the Assembly
urges the Albanian authorities to take concrete steps to safeguard
and strengthen democracy, uphold good governance, and “encourage
democratic participation at all levels through free and fair elections”.
97. The Assembly is ready to support this process, working within
the framework of its post-monitoring procedure and in close co-operation
with the Venice Commission.
Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee
Chairperson:
Mr Simone BILLI, Italy
Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group
(SOC)
- Mr Jone BLIKRA, Norway
- Mr Cerni ESCALE CABRE, Andorra
- Ms Luz MARTINEZ SEIJO, Spain *
- Mr Axel SCHÄFER, Germany
- Ms Céline THIEBAULT-MARTINEZ, France
Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Borianna ÅBERG, Sweden
- Mr Branislav BORENOVIĆ, Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Ms Linda Hofstad HELLELAND, Norway
- Mr Pablo HISPÁN, Spain
- Mr Jan Filip LIBICKI, Poland
European Conservatives, Patriots &
Affiliates (ECPA)
- Mr Simone BILLI, Italy
*
- Dame Karen BRADLEY, United Kingdom
- Mr Malte KAUFMANN, Germany
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
- Mr François BONNEAU,
France
- Ms Valentina GRIPPO, Italy *
- Ms Rian VOGELS, Netherlands
Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
- Mr Andrej HUNKO, Germany
*
Co-rapporteur AS/MON (ex officio)
- Mr Ionuț-Marian STROE,
Romania, EPP/CD
Venice Commission
- Mr Saša ZAGORC, Substitute
Member in respect of Slovenia
- Mr Domenico VALLARIO, Venice Commission Secretariat
Accompanying person
- Mr Stepan DENEGA, accompanying
Mr Jan Filip Libicki
Secretariat
- Mr Bogdan TORCĂTORIU,
Senior Elections Officer, Elections Division, Secretary of the ad
hoc committee
- Ms Carine ROLLER-KAUFMAN, Assistant, Elections Division
(*members of the pre-electoral
delegation)
Appendix 2 – Programme of the pre-electoral
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
Thursday, 3 April 2025
09:00-10:00 Delegation meeting with the participation of Mr Olsi
Dekovi, Deputy Head of the Council of Europe Office in Tirana
10:00-11:00 Meeting with Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Head
of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, and Mr Mark Stevens,
Deputy Head
11:00-13:00 Meeting with members of the diplomatic corps in
Tirana:
- Germany: Mr Thilo
Schroeter, Chargé d’affaires
- Italy: Mr Luigi Mattirolo, Deputy Head of Mission
- Romania: Mr Alin Barbu, Minister plenipotentiary
- Spain: Mr Gabriel Cremades, Ambassador
- EU Delegation: Mr Silvio Gonzato, Ambasador, and Ms Artes
Butka, Political Officer
- OSCE Presence in Albania: Mr Michel Tarran, Ambassador,
Mr Blerim Vela, Head of Democratization Department, and Mr Florian
Hobdari, National Elections Adviser
14:30-15:30 Meeting with representatives of the civil society:
- Ms Gerta Meta, Association
for Democratic Culture
- Mr Dritan Taulla, Deputy Chair of KRIIK, and Ms Antuela
Male, Election Analyst
- Mr Emanuel Xhindi, Albanian Helsinki Committee
- Mr Rigels Xhemollari and Mr Migen Qiraxhi, Civic Resistance
- Mr Erjon Tase, School of Political Studies
15:30-16:30 Meeting with media representatives:
- Mr Lutfi Dervishi, Media Expert
- Mr Koloreto Cukali, Albanian Media Council
- Ms Kristina Voko, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
(BIRN)
16:30-17:15 Meeting with representatives of the Audio-visual
Media Authority (AMA):
- Ms Armela
Krasniqi, Chair
- Ms Ronelda Rrapollari, Secretary General
- Ms Alida Cenaj, Advisor
- Ms Donika Daci, Director of Legal Unit
- Mr Arben Muka, Director of the Monitoring and Analysis
Unit
and with Mr Alteo Hysi, Director General, Media and Information
Agency
17:15-17:45 Meeting with representatives of the National Bureau
of Investigation – Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure
(SPAK)
- Ms Aida Hajnaj (Veizaj),
Director
- Ms Sadleva Bodo
Friday, 4 April 2025
09:15-10:00 Meeting with Ms Elisa Spiropali, Speaker of the
Parliament, with the participation of the Albanian delegation to
the Assembly
10:00-12:00 Meetings with leaders and representatives of the
main parliamentary groups
10:00-10:30 Socialist Party (SP):
Ms Blerina Gjylameti, Head of the Albanian delegation to
the Assembly, Ms Klotilda Bushka, Chair of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and member of the Albanian delegation to the Assembly, Ms Etilda
Gjonaj, Vice Chair of the Committee on EU Integration, member of
the Albanian delegation to the Assembly
10:30-11:00 The Alliance for Change:
Mr Fatmir Mediu, Mr Agron Duka, Mr Vangjel Dule
11:00-11:30 Democracy and Integration:
Ms Andia Ulliri
11:30-12:00 Democratic Party (DP):
Mr Oerd Bylykbashi, Vice Chair; Ms Albana Vokshi, Vice Chair
(member of Albanian delegation to the Assembly), Ms Jorida Tabaku,
Chair of the Committee on EU Integration (substitute member of the
Albanian delegation to the Assembly)
12:00-12:45 Meeting with Mr Ilirjan Celibashi, State Commissioner
of Elections, and members of the Central Electoral Commission
14:00-15:40 Meetings with leaders and representatives of the
main extra-parliamentary political parties:
14:00-14:20 Mr Agron Shehaj, Opportunity Party
14:40-15:00 Mr Endri Hasa, Chairman of the Euro-Atlantic
Coalition, and Mr Ibri Sako, Legal Representative, Euro-Atlantic
Democratic Party
15:00-15:20 Mr Enkelejd Alibeaj and Mr Dashamir Shehi, Right
for Development Party
15:20-15:40 Mr Enri Shabani and Mr Adriatik Lapaj, “Albania
Becomes”
16:00-17:00 Delegation meeting and preparation of a statement
Appendix 3 – Statement of the pre-electoral
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
In Tirana, PACE pre-electoral delegation
hopes that the 11 May parliamentary elections in Albania will confirm
the country’s democratic orientation
A four-member delegation* from the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE), led by Simone Billi (Italy, ECPA),
made a pre-electoral visit to Albania on 3-4 April 2025 to assess
the electoral campaign and the political climate ahead of the parliamentary
elections on 11 May 2025.
The PACE pre-election delegation identified several challenges
that need to be addressed to ensure democratic processes and fair
and competitive elections.
The fight against corruption is an important and laudable
goal. However, it is important that it is not seen as interfering
with the democratic nature of the electoral process by favouring
one political party or another, which could undermine public confidence
in the fight against corruption and trust in the electoral process.
The PACE delegation heard that there is a deep-rooted 'winner-takes-all'
culture of political competition in Albania, where the aim is not
to foster future co-operation but to minimise the power of competitors,
leaving little room for constructive dialogue in the future.
The delegation noted that, for the first time, Albania will
use out-of-country voting. While this is a positive step towards
more inclusive elections, concerns were expressed that it could
benefit the larger, traditional parties and potentially influence
the outcome of the elections.
The delegation is concerned about allegations of blurred lines
between political parties and the State. Information was received
about pressure being exerted by the ruling party, sometimes directly
and sometimes more subtly, on civil servants dependent on state
jobs. This further distorts the playing field. The delegation also
heard that vote-buying – already present in previous elections –
remains endemic in rural, less developed areas (including through
indirect methods such as cash incentives, 0 per cent interest loans,
etc.). The delegation calls on all political actors to refrain from
such practices. All allegations should be properly investigated.
The delegation notes that party leaders have strong control
over party lists, which limits internal democracy.
The lack of real political debate shows that elections are
more about personalities than clear policy platforms. Young people
lack interest in elections as they feel unrepresented and see little
difference between the platforms of existing political parties.
The delegation was informed about the concentration of media
ownership in the hands of private groups close to political parties.
There is no regulation of online platforms, creating opportunities
for manipulation. The recent temporary ban on TikTok highlights
concerns about the instrumentalisation of social media and the flow
of information in the run-up to elections.
The delegation welcomed the fact that several interlocutors
mentioned that the current legislation providing for a mandatory
gender quota ensures adequate representation of women on electoral
lists.
Interlocutors expressed confidence in the ability of the Central
Electoral Commission to work transparently and in co-operation with
civil society.
The PACE delegation was saddened to learn that there will
be no large-scale observation by civil society observers at polling
stations on election day, as this is likely to reduce the transparency
of the electoral process, while some interlocutors expressed fears
of voter pressure and intimidation on election day.
The delegation recognises that some of these issues may be
difficult to address before election day but urges the authorities
and all election stakeholders to address those that can still be
resolved.
In Tirana, the delegation met with the Speaker of Parliament,
leaders and representatives of the main parliamentary groups and
the main extra-parliamentary political parties, as well as members
of the Albanian delegation to PACE. It also met with the Head and
Deputy Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the
State Election Commissioner and members of the Central Election
Commission, representatives of the diplomatic community, civil society
and the media, representatives of the Albanian Media Agency, the Media
and Information Agency and the National Bureau of Investigation
Specialised Structure for Combating Corruption and Organised Crime.
PACE – which represents parliamentarians from 46 European
nations – is observing the elections in Albania as part of its post-monitoring
dialogue with the country. A full Assembly delegation of 22 members, accompanied
by legal experts from the Venice Commission, will travel to the
country to observe the vote on 11 May as part of an international
election observation mission, together with the ODIHR and delegations
from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament.
PACE will discuss its conclusions in due course.
Appendix 4 – Programme of the meetings of
the PACE delegation and of the IEOM (9 to 12 May 2025)
Friday, 9 May 2025
09:00-10:00 PACE delegation meeting
- Welcome by Mr Simone Billi, Head of Delegation
- Presentation by Mr Olsi Dekovi, Deputy Head of the Council
of Europe Office in Tirana
- Presentation by Mr Saša Zagorc, Representative of the
Venice Commission
- Presentation of the programme by the secretariat
Joint Parliamentary Briefing Programme
10:30-10:50 Welcome and introductory remarks:
- Ms Farah Karimi, Special Co-ordinator
and leader of the OSCE short-term observers
- Mr Björn Söder, Head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Delegation
- Mr Simone Billi, Head of the PACE Delegation
- Mr Michael Gahler, Head of the European Parliament Delegation
10:50-11:30 Introduction on the country:
- Ambassador Michel Tarran, Head
of the OSCE Presence in Albania
- Mr Olsi Dekovi, Deputy Head of the Council of Europe Office
in Tirana
- Mr Silvio Gonzato, EU Ambassador to Albania
11:45-13:45 Briefing by the ODIHR election observation mission:
- Welcome and overview of the
EOM's work – Mr Lamberto Zannier, Ambassador, Head of Mission
- Political overview, the Contestants and the Election Campaign
– Ms Julia Manchin, Political Analyst
- Media – Ms Elma Šehalić, Media Analyst
- Legal Framework, Electoral dispute resolutions – Ms Smaranda
Săndulescu, Legal Analyst
- Election Administration – Mr Rishi Datta, Election Analyst,
and Ms Liisa Past, Election Technologies Analyst
- Security – Mr Davor Corluka, Security Expert
15:15-16:45 Elections and political context:
- Ms Ines Leskaj, Executive Director,
Awen Network
- Mr Bledi Taho, Executive Director, Institute for Romani
Culture in Albania
- Mr Dritan Taulla, Deputy Chair, KRIIK Albania
- Ms Edlira Çepani, Chairwoman, Women’s Network “Equality
in Decision Making”
- Mr Erjon Tase, Executive Director, Academy for Political
Studies
17:00-17:30 Election administration:
- Mr Ilirjan Celibashi, Commissioner of the Central Election
Commission
17:30-18:30 Election administration:
- Mr Altin Dumani, Head of SPAK (Special Anti-Corruption
and Organized Crime Structure)
- Mr Olsian Çela, General Prosecutor
Saturday, 10 May 2025
09:00-10:00 Campaign and election coverage panel:
- Ms Kristina Voko, Executive
Director, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)
- Ms Armela Krasniqi, Chair, Audio-visual Media Authority
- Mr Osman Stafa-News24
10:00-10:20 Mr Edi Rama, candidate, Chairman of the Socialist
Party
10:35-10:55 Mr Sali Berisha, candidate, Chairman of the Democratic
Party
11:00-12:15 Candidates/Parties contesting the elections:
- “Albania Becomes”, Adriatik
Lapaj
- “Republican Party”, Fatmir Mediu
- “Together Movement”, Jani Marka
- “Opportunity Movement”, Agron Shehaj
- “Euro-Atlantic Coalition”, Endri Hasa
12:15-13:15 Briefing by the ODIHR election observation mission
(continued):
- Election day procedures
– Mr Rishi Datta, Election Analyst, and Ms Liisa Past, Election
Technologies Analyst
- Short Term Observers reporting – Mr Anders Eriksson and
Mr Max Bader, Statistical Analysts
- Briefing by Long Term Observers deployed in Tirana
Sunday, 11 May 2025
07:00-24:00 Observation of the opening of the polling stations,
of the voting and of the counting
Monday, 12 May 2025
08:00-10:00 Meeting of the PACE delegation (debriefing and
preparation of a statement)
14:00 Joint press conference
Appendix 5 – Press release of the International
Election Observation Mission
Albania’s parliamentary elections competitive
and well run but lacked level playing field, international observers
say
Elections to Albania’s parliament were competitive and professionally
managed, the authorities rose to the challenge of organising out-of-country
voting for the first time and candidates could mostly campaign freely,
but they were marked by widespread misuse of public resources and
institutional power by the ruling party, while numerous reports
of pressure on public employees and other voters as well as cases
of intimidation were of concern, international observers said in
a statement today.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and
the European Parliament (EP), found that the legal framework forms
an adequate basis for holding democratic elections, although the
need remains for comprehensive electoral reform. Shortcomings and ambiguities
in the legal framework created uncertainty and limited accountability.
Many longstanding recommendations by international observers remain
unaddressed, raising concerns about a lack of political will.
“The legal framework and institutional capacity enabled well-run
elections, reinforcing a solid democratic foundation, but voters
were not given a chance to hear a genuine exchange of political
ideas,” said Farah Karimi, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the
OSCE short-term observers. “The campaign was focused on hostile
and personal attacks, especially by leaders of the two main parties,
rather than on solution-based debate. That deepened public distrust
in politics. The country deserves honest and constructive politics
not just on election day, but every day.”
Some 3.7 million voters were registered to vote in yesterday’s
elections, including almost 250,000 registered abroad. Overall,
the voter registration process was transparent and the inclusion
of out-of-country voters for the first time marked an important
step toward broader electoral participation. Albania is continuing
to roll out the use of new technologies through biometric identification
of voters and electronic voting. Observers noted there was generally
high confidence in the use of technology, although some concerns
were expressed, mainly by the opposition. Preparations for the elections
were efficient and election day itself was generally well assessed,
but procedures were often not followed and a number of cases of
intimidation and interference in the process were observed.
Simone Billi (Italy, ECPA), Head of the PACE delegation, said:
“I recognise the valuable work of the Albanian triumvirate – SPAK,
the General Prosecutor’s Office, and the CEC – to effectively coordinate
efforts to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process, and
the inclusion of the diaspora vote marks an important milestone
in Albania's democratic history. However, we see that progress is
still needed in the broader political culture to strengthen public
trust and ensure that good governance reaches all levels of society.”
The campaign was characterised by a confrontational and polarizing
tone, with the two main political parties using divisive language
and attempting to unduly influence voters. Observers noted the misuse
of state resources, with senior government representatives engaging
in numerous official events that often overlapped with campaign
messaging and included the announcement of social benefit programmes
and infrastructure projects, giving the ruling party an undue advantage.
“The introduction of out-of-country voting is a commendable
development that enables diaspora participation in elections. However,
despite recent changes to the legal framework, some previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations
remain unaddressed,” stated Björn Söder, head of the OSCE PA delegation.
“Closer alignment with international democratic standards would
signal a continued commitment to European values and help reinforce
public trust in electoral processes.”
The independence and diversity of the media were undermined
by untransparent financing, ownership concentration, and interference
with editorial autonomy, which led to self-censorship among journalists
and had a negative impact on the amount and quality of information
available to the public. The lack of independent reporting also
hindered the media’s oversight role. In addition, the observation
mission’s media monitoring showed that the two largest political
parties dominated the news coverage.
“Albania’s commitment to a future in the EU is an appreciated
and rare element of national consensus. Whichever of the two main
parties emerges victorious in this election will prove this. However,
the conduct of this election should be seen not only through the
prism of a well-run election day, but also factor in unilateral steps
ahead of the election that impacted the level playing field,” said
Michael Gahler, head of the European Parliament delegation. “As
elections are a central instrument of democracy all relevant stakeholders
must continue to seek to obtain broad consensus on the electoral
framework and strive to increase trust in its conduct. Furthermore
I call on the new government to build on success already achieved,
such as in the field of the judiciary.”
The authority responsible for resolving electoral complaints
(CSC) dealt with cases transparently and in public sessions, although
its narrow interpretation of the rules on the use of public resources
meant that such practices often went unsanctioned. The authority
working to combat corruption and organised crime (SPAK) played a
positive role in investigating electoral corruption, while closer
coordination between SPAK, the election administration, and the
General Prosecutor’s Office improved information sharing on election-related crimes.
“While these elections were well managed, our long-term observers
witnessed widespread intimidation and abuse of public resources
during the campaign,” said Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, who headed
the ODIHR election observation mission. “I welcome the new coordination
mechanism to combat electoral crimes, as we are witnessing extreme
political polarization resulting in excessive pressure on voters
and on the electoral process itself. This undermines the positive
steps once seen in Albania, and may negatively affect progress towards
the achievement of the country’s long-term goals.”
The international election observation to the Albanian parliamentary
elections totalled 365 observers from 47 countries, composed of
238 ODIHR-deployed experts and long-term observers, 97 parliamentarians
and staff from the OSCE PA, 22 from PACE, and 12 from the EP.
