B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. This report originated in the
motion for a resolution entitled “Journalists matter: the need to
step up efforts to liberate Ukrainian journalists held in captivity
by the Russian Federation”
(Doc. 16020). Its signatories are concerned by the fact that Ukrainian
journalists are increasingly targeted by the Russian invaders for
their professional activities.
2. Since the start of the full-scale war of aggression in February
2022, the
Institute
of Mass Information (IMI) a Ukrainian non-profit, non-governmental organisation
that has been monitoring freedom of speech in Ukraine for over 20
years, has documented over 800 crimes committed by the Russian Federation
against media and media professionals. Russia has killed 108 media
professionals since 24 February 2022. 12 died while reporting, 96
died as combatants or were killed by Russian shelling or torture
(data as of 9 May 2025).
Note
4. Journalists are civilians and should be treated as such. However,
at least 26 media professionals and journalists are unlawfully deprived
of their liberty and held as civilian detainees in the Russian Federation,
Note facing fabricated criminal charges,
violation of basic rights, torture, and even death. The whereabouts
of several Ukrainian journalists remain unknown. Unfortunately,
the number of victims among journalists continues to grow.
6. The European Court of Human Rights has recently found that
many of the Russian Federation’s administrative practices in the
occupied territory of Ukraine have breached Article 10 of the
European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), and that it “must without delay release or safely return
all persons who were deprived of liberty on Ukrainian territory
under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in
breach of Article 5 of the Convention before 16 September 2022 and
who are still in the custody of the Russian authorities” (see chapter
5.1).
7. It is of the utmost importance that member States increase
political and diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation to ensure
the release and return to Ukraine of the journalists who have been
arrested and illegally detained. In this respect, most recently,
on 9 July 2025, a
Report by the Secretary
General on the human rights situation in the territories of Ukraine
temporarily controlled or occupied by the Russian Federation encouraged relevant human rights bodies, including the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, to prioritise victims
and protect and promote their rights, compensation and rehabilitation.
Such efforts could include actions through international organisations
to which the Russian Federation is a member, including the United
Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and the International Committee of Red Cross could also
play a role in this regard. Moreover,
Journalists
Matter, the Council of Europe Campaign for the Safety of Journalists, could be used more extensively to highlight the situation
of Ukrainian journalists illegally detained in the Russian Federation,
and this awareness-raising effort could be amplified through international
and local journalists associations.
8. The aim of this report is to raise awareness about the plight
of Ukrainian journalists held in captivity in the Russian Federation.
To this end, I will analyse the existing Council of Europe instruments
that could be helpful and explore the avenues for member States
to increase political and diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation
to ensure the release and return of captured and illegally detained
journalists to Ukraine. Such efforts could include actions through
international organisations to which the Russian Federation is a
member, including the UN and the OSCE. The potential involvement
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will also
be examined.
9. While focussing on the plight of journalists, this report
should also serve the purpose of promoting measures in respect of
all Ukrainian civilian detainees facing a similar situation to ensure
that they are not forgotten and return to their families and loved
ones.
10. I will consider the following issues:
- international humanitarian law regarding the protection
of journalists at war, including the Council of Europe’s soft law;
- concrete violations of International humanitarian law
by the Russian Federation regarding Ukrainian journalists;
- legal actions brought before the ICC;
- investigations by the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office into
crimes against journalists;
- possible strategies to increase political and diplomatic
pressure on the Russian Federation to ensure the release of detained
journalists;
- the possible role of the Council of Europe, and in particular
its Campaign for the Safety of Journalists: “Journalists Matter”;
- the work of local journalists’ associations.
11. The discussions at the joint hearing on 30 January 2025 on
“Ukrainian prisoners of war, journalists and other civilians held
in captivity by the Russian Federation”
Note and the hearings
on 10 April 2025
Note and 3 June 2025
Note have enabled me to develop
my proposals in further detail.
2 International
humanitarian law regarding the protection of journalists
12. In accordance with international
humanitarian law, there are two categories of journalists: 1) war correspondents
and 2) all others, which are considered as civilians provided that
they take no action adversely affecting this status.
13. According to Article 4 A (4) of the
Geneva
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, “war correspondents” are “persons who accompany the
armed forces without actually being members thereof […] provided
that they have received authorization from the armed forces which
they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an
identity card similar to the annexed model.”
14. Prisoners of war (POWs) cannot be prosecuted for taking a
direct part in hostilities, and their detention aims to prevent
further participation in the conflict. They must be released and
repatriated without delay after the end of hostilities. The detaining
power may prosecute them for possible war crimes, but not for acts
of violence that are lawful under international humanitarian law.
In any event, POWs must be treated humanely and are protected against
any act of violence, as well as against intimidation, insults and
public curiosity. There are further rules concerning the minimum
acceptable conditions of detention, covering such issues as accommodation,
food, clothing, hygiene and medical care.
15. The
Convention
relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war and especially Article 79 of the
Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) extends the protection of humanitarian
law to journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in
areas of armed conflict. These journalists are to be considered
as civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1, of Protocol
1. As such, journalists are to be protected under the Conventions
and this Protocol, provided that they take no action adversely affecting
their status as civilians, and without prejudice to the right of
war correspondents accredited to the armed forces to the status
provided for in Article 4 A (4) of the Third Convention. They may
obtain an identity card that attests to his status as a journalist
similar to the model in Annex II of this Protocol, which shall be
issued by the government of the State of which the journalist is
a national or in whose territory he resides or in which the news
medium employing him is located. If justified by imperative security
reasons, a party to the conflict may subject civilians to assigned residence
or internment but these measures cannot be used as a form of punishment.
Interned persons must be released as soon as the reasons that necessitated
their internment no longer exist. Rules governing civilian internees’
treatment and conditions of detention under international humanitarian
law are very similar to those applicable to prisoners of war.
17. In the absence of a specific international convention that
provides a definition of the concepts of freedom of information
and the right of journalists, the implementation of these principles
is subject to the constraints imposed by national laws, which are
often guided by the principle of public order. Consequently, journalists
and the media may be subject to various charges under national law,
including threats to national security, enemy propaganda, incitement
to violence, internal disturbances, hatred, separatism, defamation,
and more.
Note
3 Measures
for the protection of journalists at international level
3.1 United
Nations
18. A number of initiatives have
been implemented within the United Nations (UN) system with the
aim of preventing acts of violence against journalists.
Note
19. UNESCO
Resolution 29 (1997) “Condemnation of violence against journalists” invited the Director-General to condemn assassination
and any physical violence against journalists as a crime against
society and to urge that the competent authorities discharge their
duty of preventing, investigating and punishing such crimes and
remedying their consequences. Furthermore, it called upon member
States to adopt the principle that there should be no statute of
limitations for crimes against persons when these are perpetrated
to prevent the exercise of freedom of information and expression
or when their purpose is the obstruction of justice. Governments
should make it possible to prosecute and sentence those who instigate
the assassination of persons exercising the right to freedom of
expression and that the persons responsible for offenses against journalists
discharging their professional duties or the media are judged by
civil and/or ordinary courts.
20. UN
Security Council Resolution 1738 (2006) condemned intentional attacks against journalists, media professionals
and associated personnel, as such, in situations of armed conflict,
and called upon all parties to put an end to such practices. It
reaffirmed its condemnation of all incitements to violence against
civilians in situations of armed conflict, as well as the need to
bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law,
individuals who incite such violence. Furthermore, it recalled its
demand that all parties to an armed conflict comply fully with the
obligations applicable to them under international law related to
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including journalists,
media professionals and associated personnel. It urged States and
all other parties to an armed conflict to do their utmost to prevent
violations of international humanitarian law against civilians,
including journalists, media professionals and associated personnel.
Moreover, it urged all parties involved in situations of armed conflict
to respect the professional independence and rights of journalists,
media professionals and associated personnel as civilians. Finally,
it requested the Secretary-General to include as a sub-item in his
next reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict the
issue of the safety and security of journalists, media professionals
and associated personnel.
22. The
UN
Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity aims to create a free and safe environment for journalists
and media professionals, thus strengthening peace, democracy and sustainable
development worldwide. It addresses the fundamental aspects of prevention,
protection, and prosecution. The UN Plan of Action calls for a coalition-based
and holistic approach to its implementation including six areas:
- Raising awareness: UNESCO, in
association with Member States and other UN agencies, organises International
Days such as World Press
Freedom Day on 3 May, the International Day for Universal Access
to Information on 28 September, and the International
Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists on 2 November; and awards the UNESCO/Guillermo
Cano World Press Freedom Prize.
- Standard Setting and Policy making: a fundamental aspect
of the UN Plan of Action is the establishment of global standards
upon which regional and national policies can draw inspiration from.
At least 30 countries have created or strengthened National
Safety Mechanisms for the protection of, prevention against, and
prosecution of attacks against journalists, based on resolutions by the UN.
- Monitoring and Reporting: the UN have developed since
1993 various databases to monitor the state of press freedom both
internationally and nationally, in particular the UNESCO
Observatory on Killed Journalists.
- Capacity Building: this includes trainings for local actors,
including journalists, security forces, and the judiciary. These
efforts also involve assisting national governments in developing
and enacting legal frameworks favourable to freedom of expression
and freedom of information.
- Research: the UN Plan of Action commits to the area of
academic research. For instance, UNESCO has been organising, since
2016, an annual academic conference on the safety of journalists,
to actively promote further research in this area.
- Coalition Building: the UN joined forces with media, NGOs,
academia and governments to develop the UN Plan of Action on the
Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.
3.2 Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
23. The OSCE, through its Representative
on Freedom of the Media (OSCE RFoM), monitors the safety of journalists,
Note particularly in cases of physical
attacks, incarceration and harassment. The RFoM responds with the
participating States and other parties concerned through diplomatic
channels and public statements. Moreover, the OSCE RFoM assists
the participating States to further media freedom. In 2022, the Representative
launched a new project that aims to take stock of existing policies
and measures in OSCE participating States to promote and ensure
the safety of journalists, to identify persisting gaps and to develop recommendations
based on good practice examples. The project consists of seven roundtables,
each covering another aspect of the topic of safety of journalists:
- data collection, analysis and
reporting on attacks and violence against journalists and promotion
of journalistic work;
- secure working conditions;
- safety of journalists in conflict situations;
- intersectional perspectives;
- digital safety;
- legal harassment;
- police prevention and fight against impunity.
3.3 Council
of Europe
24. The protection of journalists
has been dealt with by the Council of Europe in different occasions.
The most important legal instrument in this regard is
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on
the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other
media actors, which condemned the alarming and unacceptable level
of threats to journalists and media actors in Europe and provided
specific Guidelines to member States to act in the areas of prevention,
protection, prosecution, promotion of information, education and
awareness rising.
Note Subsequently, the
Resolution
on the safety of journalists of the Conference of Ministers responsible
for Media and Information Society of 11 June 2021 invited the Council of Europe to carry out a comprehensive
campaign at European level to promote the protection of journalism
and the safety of journalists and support corresponding campaigns
at national level, leading to the launch, in 2023, of Journalists
Matter, the Council of Europe campaign for the safety of journalists.
25. This campaign is an initiative aiming to promote press freedom
and protect journalists from violence, threats, and harassment while
performing their duties.
26. The objectives of the campaign are the following:
- promoting the development of
corresponding campaigns at national level;
- encouraging States to take measures towards the adoption
of national action plans for the safety of journalists;
- providing help to the development of appropriate legal
and institutional frameworks at national level;
- changing the situation effectively and significantly in
practice.
27. At the heart of the campaign lies the recognition that journalists
not only report events, but are often themselves caught in the crossfire
of those they sought to cover. Ukrainian journalists have been targeted
in ways that severely undermine their ability to report freely.
Many have been killed and many are still unlawfully detained. In
addition, many journalists have disappeared, their families were
left in the dark, and the international community often struggled
to mount an effective response.
28. The campaign has consistently placed a spotlight on the situation
of the Ukrainian journalists at multiple levels, including conferences
and debates, as well as major events and activities. One example
was the
2024 Annual
Conference, which addressed the situation of journalists in Ukraine
and organised a photo exhibition with the National Union of the
Ukrainian. The campaign also brought international attention to
the issue through the screening of several films, including Twenty
Days in Mariupol, which chronicled the risks journalists take to inform
the public during war times, and by having Ukrainian journalists
give a direct testimony to those present.
29. In 2025, the campaign is focusing on prosecution and combating
impunity for crimes against journalists with representatives of
the Ukrainian prosecutors’ office among the participants, journalists,
and the Ukrainian focal points of the campaign. Such activities
usually include the presence and participation of other international
organisations, which widen their audience and put the Ukrainian
journalist situation on a global scene. Further media groups and
international associations of journalists take part in such events,
echoing further the situation. Such partnerships help building a
robust advocacy network. By ensuring that the Ukrainian journalist
cases are consistently raised in international forums, this co-ordinated
action enhances the visibility of the crisis and increases the diplomatic
pressure on Russia to release the detained journalists.
30. With regard to the participation of Ukraine in the campaign,
Note the country was the first of the
46 member States to set up a campaign committee, gather relevant
national actors and adopt a national action plan for the safety
of journalists. This plan included protective measures, although
the continuing military aggression underlines the need for further
international pressure and support for Ukrainian journalists.
31. The campaign could play a role in accelerating efforts to
liberate Ukrainian journalists by heightening the political and
diplomatic pressure, as the campaign provides a ready-made network
to amplify this call. The campaign’s advocacy channels could also
bring the plight of Ukraine into the international spotlight and
at high-profile events, and it could bring together our international
partners in organisations where Russian representatives still participate,
to somehow facilitate new forms of multilateral co-operation designed
to protect journalists that may be at risk.
32. The Assembly has also addressed the issue of the protection
of journalists for several years.
Note
33. In
Resolution 2573
(2024) “Missing persons, prisoners of war and civilians in
captivity as a result of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine”, the Assembly recalled that, although the illegal Russian
detentions started back in 2014, many of those abducted have been
captured since the beginning of the full-scale war in 2022, and
underlined that the situation in temporarily occupied Crimea remained particularly
difficult. It urged its members to engage their governments, civil
society and media networks to raise awareness of the plight of Ukrainian
journalists. The Assembly also called for sustained international
pressure on the Russian Federation to release the detained journalists
and to provide immediate access for independent international bodies
to inspect the conditions in which these journalists were being
held. The international community must insist on transparency and
accountability to protect the human dignity and rights of those unlawfully
imprisoned.
34. Our committee in particular has highlighted the Council of
Europe’s instruments that can be helpful in this regard.
35. In
Resolution 2317
(2020) “Threats to media freedom and journalists’ security
in Europe”, the Assembly stated that the Council of Europe bodies
should not only continue to advocate the development in all European countries
and beyond of a safe environment for journalists and other media
actors, but they should also make use of all their leverage to prompt
member States to remedy quickly and effectively any threats to media freedom,
urging and supporting the reforms required to this end. All Council
of Europe member States should effectively guarantee the safety
of journalists, create an environment conducive to freedom of the
media and prevent the misuse of laws or normative provisions that
may affect this freedom, without which there is no democracy. Furthermore,
Recommendation 2168 (2020) highlighted the role of the
Council of Europe Platform to
promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and made a number of recommendations to the Committee
of Ministers in order to reinforce the role of the Platform and
tap all of its potential.
36. In
Resolution 2532
(2024) “Guaranteeing media freedom and the safety of journalists:
an obligation of member States”, the Assembly expressed its strong
concern over the multiple attacks to media freedom and the numerous
cases of impunity, especially in relation to murders of journalists.
It further commended the launch of Journalists Matter, the Council
of Europe campaign for the safety of journalists, and called on member
States to fully endorse and take an active part in this campaign.
Finally, the Assembly called on all member States to engage with
the partners of the Platform to promote the protection of journalism
and safety of journalists and establish effective response mechanisms
to their alerts.
37. The Platform’s objective is to be a real-time mechanism for
monitoring and addressing threats against journalists and media
professionals. Since 2015 the Council of Europe has co-operated
in this ground-breaking project together with leading journalists’
and freedom of expression organisations.
38. The Platform operates by collecting and verifying alerts on
serious threats to media freedom and the safety of journalists.
These alerts are submitted by the Platform's partner organisations
and are then published to raise awareness and prompt action from
national authorities. By making these alerts public, the Platform seeks
to ensure accountability and encourage member states to fulfil their
commitments under the
European Convention
on Human Rights to protect freedom of expression. It also facilitates
dialogue between journalists, civil society, and governments to
address systemic issues affecting media freedom. The member States
are expected to act and address the issues and inform the Platform
on the actions taken in response to the alerts. Council of Europe
member States also have a positive obligation to ensure an enabling
environment for media pluralism.
39. Additionally, the Safety of Journalists Platform serves as
an advocacy and reporting tool, offering an evidence-based overview
of trends and challenges to journalists’ safety and media freedom
within Europe. Its annual reports and data inform the Council of
Europe's policies and actions, providing a foundation for broader efforts
to counter threats to press freedom. The Platform also highlights
the work carried out by the Council of Europe in the field of media
freedom, such as texts prepared by the Assembly, standards adopted
by the Committee of Ministers, relevant case law of the European
Court of Human Rights or the work of the Commissioner for Human
Rights.
40. The Platform relies on voluntary contributions from governments
to finance its activities in support of press freedom and safety
of journalists.
41. The Platform’s annual assessment provides essential evidence
on the trends and press freedom issues in Europe as well as guidance
on how to address them at the national and European levels.
42. Their
2024
assessment shows that never before had journalists been exposed
to so many different and varied forms of threat that undermined
journalism and the public's right to be informed. The impact of
the war in Ukraine was felt well beyond the country's borders and
there was a tightening of security across Europe that often ran
counter to fundamental freedoms. In times of crisis, even our liberal
democracies may feel the temptation to take measures to curb freedoms.
43. Concerning Ukraine, the 2024 assessment lists the war in Ukraine
as the most pressing concern, with Ukrainian and international journalists
risking their lives daily on the front lines. It is the country
with the highest number of alerts on the Platform (40), and most
violations occurred in Russian-occupied territories or were attributed
to Russian forces. In 2024, the Platform documented at least seven
incidents in which journalists were targeted, including the tragic
death of Reuters safety adviser Ryan Evans in late August in a missile
strike in eastern Ukraine. In a number of other cases, journalists
were injured, and media offices were targeted.
44. The following chapter provides a more comprehensive overview
of the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukrainian journalists.
4 Violations
of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation regarding
Ukrainian journalists
4.1 Introduction
45. Since the start of the war,
the Ukrainian media market and community have suffered great losses,
Note and Ukrainian journalists had to
face new challenges, such as working in unsafe and unstable conditions
in all areas of the war zone, surviving in a financial crisis, without
electricity, etc. A significant number of media outlets have been
forced to close, while others have had to reduce their activity
and temporarily lay off their employees without pay. Local and print
media have been particularly impacted by these challenges.
46. The Russian Federation has targeted media facilities on diverse
occasions, hitting TV towers in Kyiv, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian
regions.
Note On 6 April 2025 a Russian ballistic
missile struck Kyiv, causing significant destruction to buildings
housing the editorial offices of Ukraine’s State Foreign Broadcasting Enterprise.
Note To this, the Russian Ministry of
Defence officially stated that it had destroyed a military facility.
As a result of a massive Russian missile strike on Kyiv during the
night of 10 July, the offices of the Ukrainian TV channel “Channel
5” suffered significant damage.
Note More recently, on 28 August 2025,
a massive Russian attack on Ukraine damaged the Kyiv offices of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Ukrainska Pravda, while
in the Dnipropetrovsk region, a drone strike damaged the office
of local newspaper Mezhivsky Merydian.
Note
47. The safety of journalists is of increasing concern. Despite
displaying their "PRESS" identification, they are sometimes deliberately
targeted by military fire, and the list of reporters injured or
killed and media outlets badly damaged by airstrikes has continued
to rise. Investigative journalists are facing an increase in attacks, both
physical and online, from Russian authorities. Finally, cyberattacks,
breaches of source confidentiality and restrictions on access to
information are also matters of concern.
48. According to the
IMI, Russia has killed 108 media professionals since 24
February 2022. 12 died while reporting, 96 died as combatants or
were killed by Russian shelling or torture (data as of 9 May 2025).
Dozens of journalists have suffered concussions, limb fractures
and injuries, and shrapnel wounds while reporting. At least 333
media outlets have ceased all or part of their operations as a result
of the large-scale Russian invasion. Thousands of media professionals
had left the country or had to change jobs. Also, IMI recorded cases
of threats being sent to journalists and editors of both national
and regional media. At first, the occupiers were threatening the
journalists physically (by coming to the homes of journalists or
their parents); later, the threats moved over to the online realm
(by way of e-mails with threats of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
in Siberia, torture, interrogations and nuclear weapons). In particular,
on 18 May 2022, the editorial board of the Center for Journalistic
Investigations Syla Pavdy received a letter including threats about
nuclear weapons from Russia.
Note
49. The abduction and mistreatment of journalists began with the
Russian annexation of Crimea, continued with the occupation of the
eastern Donbas, and escalated during the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine.
50. In the first months of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula,
almost all professional journalism in Crimea was destroyed by the
Russian security forces in order to suppress freedom of speech,
take control of the media and force journalists to spread Russian
propaganda. As a result, a large number of Crimean media ceased
their activities, and many journalists left the territory of the
peninsula. These events contributed to the emergence of citizen
journalists in Crimea, who take daily risks to cover everything
that is happening under the occupation. They are mostly not professional
journalists, but Crimean Tatar activists and relatives of political prisoners,
most of whom are forced to work anonymously for their safety. Citizen
journalists are often persecuted by the Russian occupation security
forces. During the occupation, many citizen journalists were illegally
imprisoned. There are currently 15 citizen journalists on the list
including Amet Suleymanov, Iryna Danylovych, Server Mustafaev, Osman
Arifmemetov, Tymur Ibrahimov, Marlen Asanov. Russia is gradually trying
to completely suppress freedom of speech, including by amending
legislation that was illegally integrated into the temporarily occupied
territories, and the occupation authorities are constantly looking
for excuses to illegally imprison citizen journalists, spying on
them, kidnapping them, holding them incommunicado, torturing them,
conducting searches in their homes, seizing professional equipment,
imposing administrative fines, and illegally trying them in fabricated
cases and on charges of sabotage, extremism, or terrorism.
51. The Russian authorities do this in order to avoid acknowledging
the crimes committed against journalists, and there is no mechanism
for releasing civilians from custody, as it is the case for prisoners
of war.
52. The Russian Federation has seized the offices of Ukrainian
media outlets in the occupied territories to deliberately spread
their aggressive propaganda in those areas. Some media outlets are
also forced to shut down due to overt threats by the Russian forces,
the inability to operate under temporary occupation, damage to media
offices and the financial crisis caused by Russia’s war. Furthermore,
IMI has also recorded instances of journalists being captured and
kidnapped by Russian forces. At least 100 journalists with regional
and national media outlets have been in Russian custody since the
start of the Russo–Ukrainian war in 2014.
53. According to Reporters Without Borders,
Note in the occupied territories, all
local Ukrainian information professionals who refuse to collaborate
with the Russian occupation forces are arrested. The Russian occupation
forces come to their homes and arrest them in the middle of the
night. From one day to the next, their families have no news and
do not know where they are being held. It is a long and arduous
task for their families to identify them and locate them.
54. To date, at least 26 Ukrainian civilians working in journalism
are unlawfully held in Russian custody, in appalling conditions,
simply for doing their important job of documenting the truth. These
are journalists from occupied Crimea and, since the start of the
full-scale invasion in 2022, from parts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast,
Kyiv city, and Kyiv Oblast as well. The Russian Federation has tortured
and mistreated them, withholding medical assistance. Neither the
journalists’ families nor their lawyers have had access to them.
Their loved ones live in fear and uncertainty. These journalists
had no access to due process, legal aid, or basic humanitarian assistance,
which is another violation of fundamental human rights.
55. A report on denial of fair trials in Russia provides data
suggesting that violations of fundamental guarantees of independence
and impartiality of the judiciary may not merely be procedural weaknesses
but rather a reflection of an intentional approach to guide the
court system in ways that serve political interests, possibly by
undermining the rights of individuals who challenge or contradict
the prevailing political objectives.
Note Trials
are weaponised as a tool of persecution against real or perceived
opponents to the Russian regime. Ukrainian prisoners of war are
subjected to especially harsh show trials, often paraded as “dangerous Nazis”
or “terrorists” before the Russian public, being falsely accused
of war crimes or other serious crimes under Russian criminal law
to sway the Russian public opinion in support of the special military
operation. The victims are unable to invoke international humanitarian
law protections, as they are tried on the charges of ordinary crimes
under Russian criminal law. There is a systematic denial of justice
through the degradation of the Russian justice system and laws.
The report concludes by urging the ICC to acknowledge the heinous nature
of the crime of the denial of fair trial and prioritise the investigation
of the crime on the same par as the crimes committed in the places
of unlawful detention and torture.
4.2 Examples
of dead or missing journalists
56. Ukrainian photojournalist Maks
Levin was reporting on the Russian invasion and the fighting between Russian
and Ukrainian forces in Kyiv Oblast when he went missing on 13 March
2022. Evidence gathered by the international organisation “Reporters
Without Borders”
Note showed that he was executed in cold
blood by Russian troops on the day he disappeared, possibly following
interrogation and torture. Levin’s body and car were found on 1
April 2022 in a forest north of Kyiv, which had been a battlefield
at the time.
57. The case of Victoria Roshchyna is emblematic. Ms Roshchyna
was a Ukrainian journalist who died after spending over a year in
Russian custody. The Russian forces detained her without charges
in August 2023 in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories, where
she was performing her duty as a journalist, planning to report on
the life of the people under occupation. She was first held in Russian
torture prisons in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast and
later moved to jail No. 2 in Taganrog, Rostov region, Russia. In
October 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence wrote to her father
Volodymyr Roshchyn, notifying him that Victoria had died while in
custody.
58. A Reporters Without Borders documentary investigating Ms Roshchyna’s
case
Note was released in March 2025, which
showed that she had been brutally tortured: her body had stab wounds,
she had been electrocuted and weighed under 30 kilos. When the Russian
Commissioner sent an inspection to the jail, the guards hid her away
in a closed room on another floor. Ms Roshchyna was last seen on
8 September 2024, when she was taken out of her cell and taken to
an unknown location. According to an investigation by
Forbidden
Stories,
Note Ms Roshchyna’s remains were part
of 757 corpses repatriated to Ukraine from Russia in February 2025.
In a letter to Forbidden Stories, Ukrainian prosecutors explained
that the forensic examination “revealed numerous signs of torture
and ill-treatment on the victim’s body, including abrasions and
haemorrhages on various parts of the body, a broken rib, neck injuries,
and possible electric shock marks on her feet.” Moreover, Ms Roshchyna’s
body had been returned in bad shape (it had been frozen and was
in a state of mummification), “with signs of an autopsy that was
performed before arrival in Ukraine” and missing certain organs,
including parts of the brain, the larynx, and eyeballs, which would
have been seemingly performed as an attempt to hide the cause of
death.
59. The Main Investigation Department of the Security Service
of Ukraine is conducting a pre-trial investigation into her unlawful
imprisonment and death. A molecular examination was ordered to identify
her body to confirm that it was her. Experts took DNA samples from
both of Ms Roshchyna 's parents. Based on the results of this examination,
the expert concluded that with a probability of more than 99%, the
body belonged to Ms Roshchyna.
60. In addition, in February 2025, a forensic medical examination
was ordered to determine the cause of her death, the injuries and
the nature of their infliction. According to its results mentioned
above and due to the condition of the body, it was not initially
possible to determine the cause of death. Therefore, the necessary samples
were taken and the issue of conducting an additional forensic examination
with the participation of French experts to determine the cause
of death and the nature of the injuries is currently being resolved.
There is an ongoing investigation by Ukrainian law enforcement officers
to establish all the circumstances of Ms Roshchyna’s deprivation
of liberty, her death and the use of torture against her.
61. On 1 August 2025, the President of Ukraine, by presidential
decree,
Note posthumously awarded Victoria Roshchyna
the Order of Freedom — a State award conferred for outstanding and
exceptional merits in affirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence,
and in defending constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals
and citizens.
62. An example of a missing civilian journalist is Dmytro Khyliuk,
who was captured by Russian troops in March 2022,
Note while Kyiv Oblast was occupied,
and taken to the territory of the Russian Federation. Civilian hostages
should be released outside of prisoner swaps, but in Mr Khyliuk’s
case, the Russian Federation tried to frame him as a combatant.
Dmytro was held in a prison in Russia’s Vladimir region and the
Russian authorities have not disclosed any details of his conditions
of detention. Another former Ukrainian prisoner of war, who was
released last year and had shared a cell with Mr Khyliuk’s for a
year, said that he had lost a lot of weight and had weighed “no
more than 45 kilos” at the time. He also said that the journalist
had been cruelly mistreated. An investigation by Reporters Without
Borders
Note traced Mr Khyliuk to Preventive
Detention Centre No. 2 in Novozybkov, a small city in southwest
Russia about 50 km from the Ukrainian border.
63. On 24 August 2025, Mr Khyliuk was released as part of a prisoner
exchange between Ukraine and Russia.
Note
4.3 Testimonies
of released journalists
64. As mentioned before, the abduction
and mistreatment of journalists predate the full-scale invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022.
65. For instance, Stanislav Aseyev, one of the few independent
journalists to remain in eastern Ukraine's Donbass region following
the separatist takeover, was arbitrarily detained there for two
and a half years.
Note Following his abduction by Russian-backed
separatists on 2 June 2017, Mr Aseyev was held in solitary confinement
for a period of one and a half months. During this time, he was
subjected to torture. He was subsequently transferred to Isolatsia,
a former contemporary art centre that had been converted into a
secret concentration camp in Donetsk, where he was compelled to
make public “confessions” on Russian television. He was convicted
on charges of espionage and extremism, that is, simply for being
a journalist. He was finally released during a prisoner exchange
on 29 December 2019. Following his return to Kyiv, Mr Aseyev collaborated
with the investigative journalism group Bellingcat to locate Denis
Kulikovsky, the director of Isolatsia, in Kyiv in 2021 and to facilitate
his arrest. At the beginning of January 2024, Mr Kulikovsky was sentenced
to 15 years' imprisonment by an Ukrainian court for “cruel treatment”.
Note
66. Maksym Butkevych is a journalist and human rights defender,
who has worked for 15 years on behalf of victims of human rights
abuses, primarily refugees and asylum seekers. His work with Russian
nationals who had had to flee Russia and with human rights defenders
who remained in the country made him aware of the human rights situation
in Russia. After the start of the full-scale invasion, he feared
that human rights would be eviscerated and that all of the progress
made in Ukraine would be erased. He therefore joined the Ukrainian armed
forces, working as a platoon commander. On 21 June 2022 he was captured
by Russian troops in the Luhansk region, leading to over 2 years
in Russian captivity.
Note Upon learning who he was, the Russian authorities
orchestrated charges of war crimes, and tortured him until he made
a forced confession, before sentencing him to 13 years imprisonment
only on the basis of that fake confession.
Note He has met many prisoners who have
been subjected to the same process. The scheme is that Russians
destroy a town with artillery, then blame the civilian casualties
on Ukrainian POWs. He learned first-hand how international humanitarian
law and human rights law is utterly disregarded by Russia. Over
the first few months, he lost 25 kilos. There was a total absence
of hygiene, he lived without shoes for several months, and was subjected to
beatings, threats of sexual violence, and electric shocks. The vast
majority of the abuse was not intended to extract important information,
but to inflict suffering on Ukrainian soldiers for maintaining that
they are Ukrainian. Russian propagandist officers told them that
Russia would soon prevail on the battlefield, that they had the
most battle-hardened army in Europe, and that they would not stop
at Ukraine in teaching the importance of traditional values. Unfortunately,
apart from military POWs, he came across detained civilians who
had been sentenced for co-operating with Ukraine; many of them were
tortured and forced to confess to crimes that they had never committed.
Torture is a system organised from the very top and it is encouraged. Legal
changes had made them traitors to the Russian Federation. Another
group of civilian detainees were under “preventive arrest”, not
accused of anything, and their three-months’ detention was extended
again and again, with no information for their loved ones. The real
number of such detainees is unknown, but Mr Butkevych assesses that
there are more civilian detainees than POWs, with torture and ill-treatment
just as widespread as it is against military detainees. Special
groups are targeted, such as media professionals, journalists, and
activists of the Crimean tartar movement.
5 Court
proceedings
5.1 European
Court of Human Rights
67. Since early 2014 the
European Court
of Human Rights has received several inter-State applications and thousands
of individual applications
Note concerning the conflicts in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol and in
eastern Ukraine, and concerning the Russian Federation’s military
operations on the territory of Ukraine.
68. In
Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea), the Court found on 25 June 2024 that the Russian authorities
were responsible for “administrative practices” entailing numerous
violations of the Convention, including the following:
- Article 2: enforced disappearances
and lack of effective investigations into them;
- Article 3: ill-treatment of Ukrainian soldiers, ethnic
Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and journalists; degrading conditions
of detention in the Simferopol pre-trial detention centre (SIZO)
resulting from overall shortcomings in the organisation and functioning
of the Crimean prison system; ill-treatment of “Ukrainian political
prisoners” both in Crimea and the Russian Federation and lack of
effective investigations into such ill-treatment;
- Article 5: unacknowledged and incommunicado detention
of Ukrainian soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and journalists;
- Article 10: unlawful suppression of non-Russian media,
including closure of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar television stations;
unlawful deprivation of liberty, prosecution and conviction of the
“Ukrainian political prisoners” in Crimea for exercising their freedom
of expression;
- Article 18 (in conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and
11): ongoing restriction of the rights of “Ukrainian political prisoners”
for an ulterior purpose not prescribed by the Convention.
69. Regarding this judgment, the
Council of Europe’s
Committee of Ministers, in its role of supervising the implementation of the
Court’s judgments, stated in a
decision
of 6 March 2025 that the Russian authorities must immediately restore
application of the Ukrainian law in Crimea, cease all administrative
practices found by the Court to be in breach of the European Convention
on Human Rights and release all Ukrainian political prisoners whose
human rights were restricted by these practices in Crimea, as well
as to free all illegally detained Ukrainian soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians,
Crimean Tatars and journalists. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers invited
the authorities of member States to explore all possible means to
ensure execution of this judgment, with a view to ensuring accountability
for the serious breaches of international law established in it.
70. On 9 July 2025 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights delivered a
judgment in 4 inter-state
cases brought by Ukraine against the Russian Federation. In its judgment, the Court,
inter
alia, found that the administrative practice in the occupied
territory of Ukraine of unjustified interference with freedom to
receive and impart information and ideas, instances of intimidation,
detention, ill-treatment and killing of journalists, blockages and
refusals to register and accredit media outlets and journalists,
application of purported laws prohibiting and penalising dissemination
of information in support of Ukraine including on social media,
application of terrorism and extremism laws to instances of free
speech and independent media reporting, excessive and arbitrary
effects of measures blocking access to websites and broadcasters
in occupied territory, all breached requirements of Article 10 of
the Convention. It found the Russian Federation responsible for
these grave and serious breaches and a follow up to implementation
measures would be given to the judgment at the September 2025 human
rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers. Most notably, in the
operative part of the judgment, the Court called on the Russian
Federation that it “must without delay release or safely return
all persons who were deprived of liberty on Ukrainian territory
under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in
breach of Article 5 of the Convention before 16 September 2022 and who
are still in the custody of the Russian authorities”.
5.2 International
Criminal Court
71. Reporters without Borders (RSF)
has to date filed nine complaints with the ICC, including about
Russian strikes on four radio and TV towers in Ukraine, journalists
or media crews that have been deliberately targeted by Russian forces
or have been the victims of indiscriminate bombardment, the case
of a Ukrainian fixer detained for nine days, tortured by Russian
forces, the killing of Agence France-Presse’s video co-ordinator Arman
Soldin and Ukrainian journalist Bohdan Bitik.
72. These RSF complaints triggered or contributed to 14 investigations
by the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office into crimes against journalists.
73. In February 2025, RSF filed its
ninth
complaint against Russia with the ICC and the Ukrainian judiciary regarding the
Russian Federation’s arbitrary arrest and deportation of at least
19 Ukrainian journalists to its territory or other occupied areas
in Ukraine.
74. RSF has also filed two criminal complaints in France. In all,
RSF has documented 53 events that could be classified as war crimes,
in which a total of 121 journalists have been victims, and the targeting
of 14 TV towers and media infrastructure.
5.3 Ukrainian
courts
75. Since the beginning of the
full-scale invasion launched by Russia, pre-trial investigations
have been conducted in Ukraine in 122 criminal proceedings related
to war crimes against journalists during the armed conflict.
76. The following facts have been established to date:
- 65 journalists were killed,
including 8 foreign nationals;
- 46 journalists were injured, 25 of them international;
- 18 people were illegally detained or imprisoned;
- 2 journalists are in captivity, and 1 is missing.
77. The pre-trial investigation has yielded the following results:
- a total of 16 people were served
notices of suspicion in 8 criminal proceedings;
- 5 indictments against 11 people were sent to court: 3
persons were convicted, 1 to 9 years, 2 to 12 years of imprisonment.
As for the other persons, the trial is ongoing.
78. Aside from the case of Victoria
Roshchyna, which is outlined above, the following paragraphs present several
examples of criminal proceedings undertaken by the Ukrainian judiciary.
79. On 12 March 2025, journalist Oleh Baturin was detained following
a tip-off for his pro-Ukrainian position and journalistic activities.
He was held for some time in the Kakhovka District Police Department.
During his interrogation, he was threatened with a scalp and “bidding
farewell to life”. he was handcuffed in the cell to a pipe, where
he had to stand all the time, for 6 days. Subsequently, he was taken
to the Kherson Regional Administration, where he was interrogated
without torture, and then moved to the Kherson Detention Center. He
was released on 25 March 2022. On 27 March 2024, the Suvorovskyi
District Court of Odesa sentenced the defendants, two representatives
of the Russian Federation occupation formations, to 12 years in
prison.
80. In July 2022, a journalist of the TV channel “Ukraine”, Slobodian
A., was detained for filming stories in Kherson that covered the
situation in the city. She was not tortured but she was held from
5 July to 5 August 2022 in the Kherson temporary detention centre,
where the conditions were inhumane. The trial is ongoing.
81. On the night of 24-25 August 2024, Reuters journalists were
staying at a hotel when a missile hit the premises, killing one
journalist and wounding five. This hotel was the only one in Kramatorsk
that did not work on a regular basis and it was possible to stay
there only after making a prior arrangement with the owner. Journalists
from various publications usually stayed at the hotel. According
to the investigators, someone informed the Russian armed forces
about the location of the hotel. The suspect is a Colonel-General
of the Russian Armed Forces. The investigation is ongoing.
82. In 2022, Lithuanian director Mantas Kvedaravičius was working
on a film about Mariupol. He was in the city officially on a humanitarian
mission, and at the end of March he tried to leave Mariupol. He
was on the evacuation list. On 28 March 2022, he and another man
(located in the occupied territory) were detained because there
were suspicions that Mantas could be an adjuster or a member of
the Ukrainian sabotage group. Mantas was not released, and on 1
April 2022 his body was handed over to his wife. He had been executed and
there were bruises on the body. The suspects are members of illegal
armed groups of the Russian Federation. There is an ongoing joint
investigation with Lithuania, and these suspicions were announced
on 20 February 2024.
83. On 13 March 2022, between 12 and 13 pm, near the Zhyraf shopping
centre in Irpin, Bucha district, Kyiv region, Russian military personnel
fired at a car with people inside, resulting in the death of The
New York Times journalist Brent Reno. The case is investigated by
the National Police, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Office
of the Prosecutor General.
84. On 19 September 2022, a local journalist and editor of the
Kakhovska Zoria newspaper, Kyselyova Zh., was detained after a search
of her apartment. She was taken to the Novokakhovka police department,
where she was interrogated, given a preventive conversation, and
persuaded to co-operate with the occupation authorities. They threatened
to imprison her minor son. She was detained at the police station
until 1 October 2022 and then released. The pre-trial investigation
is ongoing.
85. On 27 June 2024, representatives of the administration or
Russian military again came to Ms Kiselyova's home, tied her up,
put a bag over her head and took her in an unknown direction. They
brought her to a private house, unknown to her, where she was interrogated
about her pro-Ukrainian position, journalistic activities, co-operation
with the Armed Forces, the SBU, etc. She was interrogated about
local activists, including Oleh Baturin. The next day, she was probably
dragged to the outskirts of Genichesk, where she was placed in the basement
of a small hotel. There, she was tortured, struck all over her body,
electrocuted, and accused of subversion. On 31 July 2024, she was
released. The pre-trial investigation is ongoing.
86. A journalist of Radio Liberty, Tolstyakova K., while conducting
her activities in the vicinity of Kyiv, found documents of Russian
servicemen and subsequently began communicating via WhatsApp and
Telegram to find out their whereabouts. In response, a Russian serviceman
began to threaten to kill her via messenger apps. On 26 September
2022, the Solomianskyi District Court of Kyiv sentenced this serviceman
to 9 years in prison.
87. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have been co-operating
with the International Criminal Court (ICC) since the beginning
of the invasion. The Office of the Prosecutor General fulfils the
ICC's requests in accordance with international and national law.
6 Summing
up
88. Since the start of the full-scale
war of aggression in February 2022, the Russian Federation has committed
over 800 crimes against media and media professionals.
89. This war is also a war against truth, and as such free media
and journalists are treated as enemies by the aggressor.
90. The recent prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation prove once again that the process of liberating journalists
in Russian captivity presents specific challenges.
91. We all know that the current Russian regime does not care
for international law. Therefore, the only means to ensure the release
and return to Ukraine of those journalists who have been arrested
and are illegally detained is exerting political and diplomatic
pressure on the Russian Federation. Pressure of sanctions and accountability
mechanisms should also be mounted and steadily and continuously
increased.
92. This is a role that every member State of the Council of Europe
should play. It is an obligation both under the Statute of the Council
of Europe (ETS No. 1) and under the Reykjavík Declaration.
93. Moreover, I believe that international organisations to which
the Russian Federation is a member, in particular the UN and the
OSCE, as well as the ICRC as an international non-governmental organisation,
could play an important role in this regard.
94. Regarding the Council of Europe itself, Journalists Matter,
the Council of Europe Campaign for the Safety of Journalists, could
be used more extensively to highlight the situation of Ukrainian
journalists illegally detained in the Russian Federation, and this
awareness-raising effort could be amplified through international and
local journalists’ associations. The Platform on the Safety of Journalists
should be engaged in documenting instances of serious and grave
breaches of international human rights law by the Russian authorities.
95. I would also wish to encourage parliamentarians to engage
with their governments to support journalists. Financial help would
be useful in this regard, as Ukrainian media’s financial situation
has been hit hard. The European Union is doing its part with a new
€10 million grant programme,
Note and member States could do the same
to help free media survive in times of war. In addition, measures
should also be taken to integrate Ukrainian journalists displaced
externally, to report on events as regards Ukraine and the war of
aggression in the national media of the host member States.
96. It is important not to be silent. In this regard, I would
like to mention the example of Nariman Dzhelyal, first deputy chairman
of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, who was a political prisoner
but also a journalist, and who was probably one of the first civilians
in captivity to be released. He was aware that the Assembly had
spoken about him and called for his release, and it was important
for him when he returned to see that he had not been forgotten.
97. On the matter of remembrance, I would like to salute and support
the proposal made by the President of the Assembly, Mr Theodoros
Rousopoulos, to establish an annual “Victory for Victoria”
Note commemoration, honouring
war correspondents and journalists who risk (and often lose) their
lives in the line of duty while defending the right to information
and truth in conflict zones. Mr Rousopoulos proposed that this commemoration,
which could be celebrated at the autumn part-session of the Assembly,
should be named in memory of Victoria Roshchyna, although her story
is not an isolated one. Every year, dozens of journalists are killed,
imprisoned, or forcibly disappeared in war zones.
98. The objectives of this commemoration would be to:
- commemorate journalists killed
or disappeared in conflict, especially those covering war crimes
or defending human rights;
- promote freedom of expression, media independence, and
the protection of journalists as enshrined in the European Convention
on Human Rights and Council of Europe standards;
- support Council of Europe initiatives such as the Platform
for the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists.
99. The “Victory for Victoria” commemoration could be marked for
example by specific resolutions of the Assembly, a minute of silence
during Assembly autumn part-session (Victoria was born October 1996
and killed September 2024), or side events or committee hearings
in co-operation with journalism organisations across Europe.
100. Drawing upon these conclusions, I hereby propose a set of
concrete measures in the draft resolution.
