C Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Damien Cottier, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. In times of crisis, governments
face formidable challenges when protecting the health and safety
of their population. Both a crisis and the State’s response to it
can have significant implications for a range of rights and freedoms,
as well as for the functioning of democratic institutions.
2. Free and fair elections are the foundations upon which democracies
are built, based on the five cardinal principles of Europe’s electoral
heritage of universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage.
The Covid-19 pandemic brought into sharp relief the impact public
emergencies have on the functioning of our democratic institutions
and the democratic process, not least on the organisation and holding
of elections.
3. Beyond the Covid-19 pandemic, crises such as terrorist attacks,
natural disasters, and the full-scale war of aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine have had an extensive impact on elections,
testing the resilience, integrity and fairness of electoral processes
in emergency situations.
4. At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that elections
today are rarely held in conditions of normalcy. They take place
against a constant environment of heightened strain: polarisation,
systemic disinformation, foreign interference, cybersecurity threats,
climate-related disruptions and the spillover of conflicts. This
evolving landscape blurs the line between extraordinary and ordinary
challenges, underscoring the need for States and institutions to
treat electoral resilience as a structural necessity.
5. When elections are scheduled or occur during a crisis, gaps
in legislation can be exposed and institutional shortcomings may
appear. Limitations that may arise regarding campaigning, voter
turnout, equality of participation and assuring election observation
can weaken the integrity of the electoral process itself, and, ultimately,
the legitimacy of results.
6. In the face of risks to the life, health and security of the
population, authorities need to make difficult legal and operational
decisions, including whether, in the interests of health and security,
an election should be postponed. In the context of the wider pressures
facing electoral processes, these dilemmas are not confined to moments
of acute emergency but can arise where the integrity or safety of
electoral processes is threatened. These decisions are made no easier
where there is an absence of a clear legal basis for the possibility
of postponing elections in emergency situations, nor an operational
methodology for adjusting elections to extraordinary circumstances
precipitated by a crisis.
7. Electoral management bodies (EMBs) face further pressure as
they confront the effects of widespread foreign interference with
electoral processes, which includes the expanded scope for pre-poll
disinformation and manipulation heralded by advances in modern information
and communication technologies (ICTs). These challenges are not
confined to periods of declared crisis but have become a recurring
feature of the electoral landscape, compounding operational pressures
and posing major risks to citizen trust in electoral systems and the
reliability of processes and results.
8. These myriad risks to the integrity of electoral processes
take place against the European and global background of democratic
backsliding. The challenges posed by holding elections in crisis
situations can compound already existing risks to human rights standards,
especially to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, which
are essential during election campaigns.
9. In order to prevent and counter democratic backsliding, the
Heads of State and Government of Council of Europe member States
committed to “securing and strengthening democracy and good governance
at all levels throughout Europe” in their adoption of the Reykjavik
Principles for Democracy at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and
Government of the Council of Europe in May 2023.
Note
10. Furthermore, the commitment made in the Reykjavik Declaration
to ensure that elections are held in accordance with international
standards, grounded in respect for relevant human rights standards, demonstrated
the continued need to take steps to protect and strengthen electoral
processes in Europe.
11. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe has stressed
the need for a New Democratic Pact in Europe to protect and strengthen
our common heritage of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Note In this context, the importance
of protecting democracy, the integrity of elections, and the need
to strengthen election observation were all underlined.
Note
12. The parliamentary conference on "Elections in times of crisis:
challenges and opportunities", organised by the Parliamentary Assembly
in co-operation with the Swiss Parliament on 9 and 10 May 2023 in
Bern, marked an important step in reflecting on how to ensure the
security, the resilience and the strengthening of electoral processes.
Note
13. In addition to examining the aforementioned emergency situations,
the Bern conference addressed challenges specific to the digital
age and its impact on electoral processes. It also addressed the
issue of organising elections in Ukraine, when conditions permit,
and the role that the Council of Europe could play in this regard.
14. The Bern conference acknowledged that while crises are a test
for democracy, they also provide an opportunity for member States
to learn from each other, and adapt to challenges and changes more
quickly. The lessons learned from crisis response can provide pathways
for innovation, the enhancement of electoral operational effectiveness,
and for re-addressing and re-evaluating election frameworks in the
light of vulnerabilities found during crises.
15. As follow-up to the conference, it was proposed that the main
recommendations emerging from the conference should be developed
in an Assembly resolution.
16. In the light of the above considerations and the emphasis
on democracy at the Reykjavík Summit, this report seeks to follow
up on commitments contained in the Reykjavík Principles for Democracy.
It builds on the recommendations made at the Bern Conference and
the operational experience and the tools of the Assembly’s Parliamentary
and Electoral Co-operation Division, which supports national authorities
in meeting European electoral standards.
Note
17. The report encourages the strengthening of the visibility,
coherence and impact of the Council of Europe's work on the electoral
cycle, covering the pre-election period (legal framework, planning
and implementation, training and education, voter registration,
electoral campaign, electoral co-operation), the election period (operations
and election day, verification of results) and the post-election period.
2 Scope of the report
18. The report will highlight recent
risks to electoral processes posed by crises, examine the conduct
and resilience of electoral processes, and look at promising practices
and steps that can be taken to safeguard electoral integrity in
times of crises. These questions are relevant not only to electoral
polls but also to the organisation of referendums in countries whose
constitutional frameworks provide for such a mechanism.
19. Risk management, resiliencebuilding, crisis preparedness and
crisis management methods will be explored in order to propose steps
that can be taken in order to ensure that elections can be held
in line with international standards, even when under the most severe
stress.
20. The report will build on the
acquis of
the Council of Europe in the field of elections, with particular reference
to principles applicable to states of emergency compiled by the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).
Note
21. Approaches proposed by election experts are explored, as are
work and studies undertaken by national stakeholders and international
organisations that promote electoral integrity. To this end, I am
grateful to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (International IDEA) and the Swedish authorities for
providing expertise and insights during my fact-finding visit to
Stockholm in February 2025.
22. Findings of the Assembly report entitled “Foreign interference:
a threat to democratic security in Europe” inform the analysis of
foreign interference and hybrid warfare as vectors of electoral
disruption.
Note These phenomena both actively create
crisis situations, and amplify their risks by exploiting emergencies
at the very moment when institutions and societies are most vulnerable.
3 Crisis
situations and electoral disruption
23. In legal and political terms,
a “crisis” often denotes a state of emergency – a temporary and
exceptional situation that poses a fundamental threat to the functioning
of the State and requires a departure from ordinary legal norms.
Note
24. Under such conditions, emergency powers may be conferred upon
the executive, enabling the adoption of extraordinary measures aimed
at mitigating the threat and restoring normalcy.
25. Crisis situations may be triggered by a wide range of events
including natural disasters, civil unrest, armed conflict, pandemics,
large-scale terrorist attacks, economic crisis, or institutional
collapse.
26. Such situations may provoke a tension between the need to
protect public order, health, or national security with the need
to take measures that inevitably encroach on rights and freedoms
which are an integral and necessary part of a democratic society
governed by the rule of law.
Note
27. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 exemplified this
tension. The sudden and unprecedented nature of the health crisis
led governments across Europe to adopt the most extensive set of
emergency measures seen in the modern post-Second World War history
of Europe in order to curb transmission and safeguard public health.
Note Council
of Europe member States were confronted with the dual imperative
of fulfilling their positive obligation to protect health, safety
and well-being, while refraining from disproportionately restricting
citizens’ freedoms. The organisation and holding of elections rely
on a range of freedoms that were significantly affected by Covid-19
measures, such as freedom of association and assembly.
28. The impact of the pandemic on electoral processes globally
was widespread. According to the International IDEA, between February
2020 and February 2022 more than 80 countries and territories globally decided
to postpone national and subnational elections due to the pandemic.
In member States of the Council of Europe, some 30 electoral processes
were rescheduled through the course of 2020.
29. At the same time, there were numerous occasions where elections
were held during the pandemic under constrained conditions such
as special health measures, remote voting options, or limiting campaign
activities. The Venice Commission has noted that holding elections
in emergency situations may be problematic from the point of view
of free suffrage, in particular in view of the freedom of voters
to form an opinion, as well as with respect for human rights during
the electoral process. Conversely, risks of abuse of the right to
periodic elections exist when deciding to not hold an election,
and as an avenue for keeping incumbents in power.
Note
30. In both scenarios, the central challenge remained of reconciling
crisis-driven constraints with the democratic imperative of holding
credible, inclusive and transparent elections.
31. Crises affecting electoral integrity are not limited to formally
declared states of emergency. Elections may also come under threat
from a further range of factors. This could involve targeted violence
against electoral actors or events, operational failures within
electoral management bodies including electoral equipment, or deliberate
malign attempts to manipulate the outcome such as large-scale cybersecurity
attacks on electoral infrastructure or foreign interference operations.
When such actions occur at a scale capable of undermining public
confidence in the electoral process or distorting the fairness and
credibility of results, they constitute a profound threat to democratic
legitimacy.
4 Key
democratic risks during elections in times of crisis
32. The most immediate and visible
risk in times of crisis is that elections may be postponed, suspended,
or cancelled altogether, thus interfering with the right to periodic
elections under Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 9). Such decisions, even when
justified by compelling public interest, risk undermining democratic
legitimacy when made without sufficient legal clarity, political consensus,
or proportional safeguards.
33. Crisis-driven measures such as curfews, restrictions or bans
on gatherings or limitations on movement directly impede freedoms
of assembly, association and expression. These rights, enshrined
in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
are foundational to democratic electoral engagement. Restrictions
on public meetings and campaigning can create unequal conditions,
often disadvantaging opposition parties and new political entrants
with fewer digital resources or media access.
34. Unequal electoral conditions can be created via sudden or
ad hoc changes to voting methods or electoral timelines. When electoral
legislation is amended without proper public debate or parliamentary
scrutiny, the risk of unfair advantage or the erosion of legal certainty
is increased.
35. The onset of a crisis situation can also drastically reduce
transparency and oversight. Parliamentary scrutiny may be weakened,
judicial remedies delayed, and oversight bodies sidelined. At the
same time the ability to evaluate electoral integrity is greatly
reduced by the inability of electoral observers, particularly of international
observers, to attend elections, due to restrictions on movement,
deployment or access to polling stations limited during crises.
Limited observation capacity can hamper efforts to verify electoral
transparency and fairness, with the effect of diminishing public
trust.
36. In circumstances where freedom of assembly and association
are temporarily reduced to respond to crisis situations, member
States have trialled the deeper use of digital tools. This increased
reliance for both campaigning and voting poses contrasting risks.
Digitally marginalised groups and those without online access may
face heightened exclusion from their inability to freely receive
information. Conversely, the greater use of digital tools increases
the risks of digital manipulation and exposure to digital foreign
interference through disinformation campaigns. However, it should
also be emphasised that, when used appropriately, digital tools can
enhance the inclusion of certain segments of the population and,
as such, do not inherently pose a barrier to a credible electoral
process.
5 Electoral
resilience and crisis response
37. The ability of democratic systems
to endure and adapt during crises depends heavily on the resilience of
their electoral institutions. Regardless of the nature of the disruption,
EMBs, legal frameworks and oversight institutions have a remit to
safeguard the integrity, accessibility and legitimacy of electoral
processes. The credibility of democracies hinges not only on the
regular holding of elections, but on their ability to meet fundamental
democratic standards, even under adverse conditions. Components
of this include the legal mechanisms for crisis-era elections, operational
adaptation by EMBs, and maintaining democratic safeguards.
5.1 Legal
and procedural mechanisms
38. An important part of electoral
resilience lies in the legal and procedural mechanisms available
for adapting electoral modalities in response to extraordinary circumstances.
The decision on whether, when and how to respond when a crisis affects
a planned election involves a complex balancing act. It needs to
uphold constitutional norms and political rights while responding
proportionately to the exigencies of the crisis. In many Council
of Europe member States, existing constitutional or electoral legislation
provides limited flexibility in the face of unexpected disruptions.
Note
39. The principle of stability of electoral law, a guarantee for
legal certainty, means that changes to the fundamental rules governing
the conduct of an election should take place well in advance of
an election, with the Venice Commission suggesting one year at least.
However, the exigencies of extraordinary circumstances may justify
late changes of electoral legislation if they are necessary to the
holding of elections in conformity with international standards.
Note When
adopted during an emergency situation, the changes should be as
limited as possible and citizens provided with clear information
about any such changes. Moreover, such changes require that all
political forces be closely involved in these adaptations.
40. Legal provisions for the postponement or modification of elections
during emergencies vary across Council of Europe member States.
In some countries, constitutional or statutory provisions explicitly
permit the rescheduling of elections under states of emergency,
martial law, or natural disasters and provide for this by either
extending the term of a parliament or precluding the dissolution
of parliament.
Note
41. The Assembly has outlined in its response to the Covid-19
pandemic a number of safeguards that should exist to guard against
abuses of the decision to postpone elections, as proposed by the
Venice Commission.
Note These included the need for judicial control
by a national independent and impartial court, the need for all political
parties and stakeholders to be involved in the decision to postpone,
that postponement be limited in time by law, and that a qualified
majority in the parliament be required to decide on the postponement.
42. During the Covid-19 pandemic legislative gaps became particularly
evident. In several cases, the absence of clearly defined legal
pathways for postponement required ad hoc legislative interventions.
As noted by the Assembly in the report entitled “The impact of the
Covid-19 pandemic on human rights and the rule of law”, many States
chose to legislate especially for the pandemic situation, indicating
that few, if any States felt that their existing emergency laws
were adequate for the emergency at hand.
Note The
absence of clear procedures risks legal and political uncertainty,
and on occasion may contribute to political polarisation and distrust
in political procedures and in some cases can give the impression
that the incumbent majority wishes to extend its position.
43. The experience of the pandemic highlighted the importance
of embedding legal flexibility within robust procedural safeguards.
The Venice Commission has underscored that changes to electoral
law during emergencies must adhere to the key principles of legality,
necessity, proportionality, and temporariness. Moreover, alterations
to the electoral process should be undertaken with broad political
consensus, independent verification and clearly communicated to
the public.
44. This need for robust procedural electoral safeguards was further
stressed by the Venice Commission in its urgent report of March
2025 regarding the cancellation of election results by Constitutional
Courts. The ability to invalidate elections can be allowed only
under very exceptional circumstances and when clearly regulated.
Note
5.2 Operational
adaptation
45. Emergencies pose major logistical
challenges that can force elections into major compromises or make them
undeliverable.
Note EMBs have been confronted in recent years
with different crisis scenarios that can impact election processes,
including public health crises, natural disasters, technology failures
and cybersecurity breaches.
46. When elections are to take place in emergency situations,
decisions must be made to ensure democratic institutions function
during extraordinary circumstances.
47. During the Covid-19 pandemic, a large range of adaptations
were trialled across Council of Europe member States to respond
to the challenges raised by the health crisis. This included measures
to expand early voting periods and enhance hygiene measures, as
well as exploring how electoral processes could be automated, such
as by the use of machine counting of ballot papers. Such steps also
sought to ensure the security of election management staff and members
of election commissions during election day and vote counting.
Note
48. A core risk in such contexts is that the need for rapid response
can erode transparency, accountability and public trust. To mitigate
this, States made efforts to ensure public communication and oversight
remained key to the crisis response. In the Republic of Moldova,
the Central Electoral Commission engaged proactively with health
authorities and civil society in the lead-up to the 2020 presidential
election to try and establish confidence in new procedures, while
in Germany, local electoral authorities collaborated closely with
public health bodies to develop uniform hygiene protocols and communication
campaigns.
Note
49. The Covid-19 pandemic also significantly hastened the transition
of electoral campaigns to digital platforms, particularly through
the extensive and systematic use of social media to engage with
voters, creating new methodological challenges for election observation
and heightening the risk of electoral processes being influenced
by both domestic and external actors.
50. To address equality of participation concerns and to combat
the risk of lower election turnout in emergency situations, where
elderly people or certain vulnerable groups of voters are likely
to participate less actively, special means of participation were
introduced during the pandemic, such as the use of drive-through polling
stations in Finland,
Note or the use of mobile ballot
boxes in Montenegro.
Note In Ireland, legislation
was adopted to provide for additional polling days and providing
postal votes for certain groups of voters who would otherwise not
be able to participate.
Note
51. Crisis situations have also impacted upon the possibility
of out-of-country voting, with voters living abroad being disenfranchised
on occasion during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Note
52. Different challenges have been faced when responding to other
crisis situations. The earthquake in Türkiye in 2023 that struck
three months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections
of 14 May 2023 affected 13 million people living in the earthquake-hit
provinces, claimed 50 000 lives, and destroyed over 100 000 buildings.
With constitutional provisions not allowing election postponement
except in cases of war, the authorities sought to put in place measures
to register some 3 million internally displaced persons, redesign electoral
districts on the basis of relocated people, introduce security measures
to carry out polls in affected provinces, and make provisions to
ensure that campaigning could take place in those provinces to the
extent possible.
53. In some contexts, administrative flexibility may be constrained
by political or legal factors. The Council of Europe co-operation
activities have sought to strengthen the institutional capacity
and professional standards of EMBs through targeted training, certification
schemes, and peer learning in order to contribute towards enhancing
the ability to effectively adapt electoral processes to crisis situations.
Note
5.3 Co-operation
and co-ordination networks
54. Co-operation and co-ordination
among relevant State actors and entities can help respond to emergency situations
in the electoral context. In 2018, the European Union recommended
the establishment of national election co-operation networks.
Note Such networks
can ensure an operational forum to strengthen government capacity
to identify, counter and recover from risks to the election process.
55. In Sweden, a national election co-operation network was established
in 2021 which brought together the Election Authority, County Administrative
Boards, the Civil Contingencies Agency, the Psychological Defence Agency,
the Police Authority and the Security Service.
Note
56. The installation of such networks allows for a systemised
risk management framework that can utilise the specialist knowledge
from different State agencies. In the Swedish example, this included
using inputs from the Public Health Agency to develop comprehensive
precautions to ensure in-person voting could be safely facilitated,
and to provide special voting arrangement for vulnerable groups.
Note
57. Co-operation projects of the Assembly have also sought to
foster such exchanges through regional and bilateral platforms that
bring together EMBs, civil society and relevant institutions. The
Council of Europe further facilitates the sharing of knowledge and
expertise on international standards, domestic legislation, and good
practice in the electoral field. Two key element for these activities
include the Council for Democratic Elections, a tripartite body
of the Council of Europe in charge of electoral matters, composed
of representatives from the Venice Commission, the Assembly and
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the organisation
by the Venice Commission of the European Conference of Electoral
Management Bodies.
5.4 Resilience
building
58. Numerous Council of Europe
member States have identified the need to strengthen the resilience
of their electoral systems in view of the deteriorating security
situation globally and increases in foreign interference risks.
59. Building electoral resilience requires more than technical
safeguards. It necessitates legal, institutional, operational and
societal measures. Resilience means ensuring that electoral processes
can withstand shocks, adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, and
maintain public trust. Best practice has seen flexibility embedded in
legal frameworks while preserving stability, investment in the professionalisation
and independence of electoral management bodies, the protection
of infrastructure from cyberattacks, and providing avenues to ensure
an informed and engaged electorate.
60. As part of these efforts, member States have taken steps to
maintain public confidence in electoral processes, in recognition
that even unsubstantiated allegations of interference could undermine
trust in electoral integrity. Transparent communication by authorities
and EMBs is essential to pre-empt hostile misinformation that seeks
to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes.
61. As outlined in Assembly Resolution “Foreign interference:
a threat to democratic security in Europe”,
Note member States should
adopt holistic and “whole-of-society” approaches to combat foreign
interference activities and enhance societal resilience. Such steps
include training for public sector communication to respond to disinformation
narratives about elections, partnership with news organisations
to provide accurate information about electoral procedures, information
literacy campaigns, and steps to improve the integrity of the online
information environment. In Lithuania and Sweden, cross-agency networks
have linked EMBs with security services, media regulators, and fact-checking
organisations to counteract malign information campaigns in the
pre-electoral period.
62. Authorities in Finland have pursued media literacy programmes
that seek to equip citizens with the skills to recognise and resist
disinformation. Established in 2013 under Cultural Policy Guidelines
to promote media literacy, successive national strategies have sought
to address threats to society and democracy by promoting a media
literate society.
Note In Sweden, the Civil Contingencies
Agency provided households with information regarding crisis situations
and psychological defence.
Note
63. Efforts to enhance the protection of electoral infrastructure
from cyber-attacks have included the creation of the European Union
Permanent Structured Cooperation Cyber Rapid Response Teams and
Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security initiated by Lithuania in 2018.
Through the deployment of experts from European Union member States,
these teams conduct cyber-threat analysis, analyses infrastructure
vulnerabilities, and responds to potential incidents.
Note
64. More broadly, the solidity of democratic institutions helps
ensure that electoral processes will be more resilient to stresses
and shocks. Research by International IDEA has highlighted how effective
parliaments can play an important role in ensuring the integrity
of elections through their legislative and oversight functions, while
judicial independence enables the fair resolution of electoral disputes.
Note Media integrity
can help EMBs counter disinformation and ensure voter information
and education, while free political parties and a strong civil society
can ensure a healthy and thriving electoral environment. By strengthening
these institutions in ordinary times, member States reinforce their
ability to conduct credible elections under extraordinary pressure.
5.5 Election
observation
65. Election observation is an
integral part of democratic oversight and the promotion of transparency
and trust in electoral processes. However, the ability to conduct
effective observation in times of crisis is often severely constrained.
The Covid-19 pandemic showed the range of issues, including travel
restrictions, health concerns, and logistical barriers.
66. In such contexts, both the Assembly’s and other international
electoral observer missions have had to innovate and adapt their
methodologies. Flexibility and resilience have become essential
features of election observation in crisis contexts, whether through
shortened deployments, smaller teams, or the use of hybrid and remote
methods.
67. Council of Europe member States also took extra measures to
ensure that international observation remained possible. These included
waiving quarantine and self-isolation periods on arrival for international observation
missions,
Note and facilitating entry and
unrestricted observation opportunities for international observers
despite wider pandemic restrictions.
Note
68. The effectiveness of these adapted approaches varied. Reduced
access to polling stations, limitations on in-person interviews
and shortened deployment periods have sometimes compromised the
ability to gather information. Alternative strategies might be necessary
in cases where the physical presence of observers in a country is
not possible. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of
the Council of Europe outlined how remote meetings with key stakeholders
such as the Central Election Commission, candidates, political parties, domestic
observers, civil society and the media can maintain a platform for
dialogue.
Note
69. The Assembly has further identified methodological gaps within
international election observation in relation to the effect of
technological and hybrid threats to electoral processes. It has
called for the modernisation of international election observation
methodologies to mitigate these risks, and highlighted the need
for collaboration among relevant institutions to establish a cohesive
framework capable of countering foreign interference.
Note
70. The establishment by the Assembly of the Parliamentary Alliance
for Free and Fair Elections provides a platform for addressing challenges
to electoral integrity, and for upholding high standards in election observation
to ensure transparent, fair, and inclusive democratic processes.
It can foster further dialogue and co-operation on electoral issues
in order to meet the electoral observation challenges outlined following Assembly
election observation missions.
Note
71. In parallel, the Assembly’s electoral co-operation activities
reinforce the capacity of domestic observer organisations, enabling
them to play a more active role in promoting transparency and credibility. Strengthening
local observation is particularly valuable in contexts where international
access is limited or impossible, as domestic actors are often best
placed to provide continuous monitoring and insight. By supporting
local expertise and fostering networks between international and
domestic observers, the Assembly helps to build resilient systems
of electoral accountability that can withstand the pressures of
crisis.
5.6 Innovation
and future preparedness
72. Crises are often a catalyst
for innovation. The pandemic accelerated the adoption of digital
tools for voter registration, communication and even for voting.
Artificial intelligence is being used to monitor misinformation, manage
logistics and enhance accessibility. Such innovations need to be
accompanied by sufficient human rights protection to avoid new forms
of bias, discrimination or surveillance.
73. The Council of Europe and its Venice Commission have issued
guidance on the human rights implications of digital electoral technologies.
Note Safeguards
such as transparency and human oversight are essential. At the same
time, digital innovation can expand participation, streamline administration,
and build resilience.
74. Preparedness for future crises must therefore include both
physical and digital readiness. This involves investing in secure
infrastructure. The numerous cyberattacks on online electoral infrastructure
in recent years have shown the major strategic risks faced by Council
of Europe member States to protect the legitimacy and fairness of
elections and thus the integrity, legitimacy and confidence in the
elected government The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
(ETS No. 185, the “Budapest Convention”) and its Protocols (ETS
No. 189 and CETS No. 224) are crucial instruments in this effort
to secure electoral processes. The Second Additional Protocol to
the Convention provides additional and expedited tools for enhanced
co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence across borders
and during emergency situations.
Note
75. The Council of Europe guidelines on the use of ICT in electoral
processes and the Venice Commission’s 2020 Principles for a fundamental
rights-compliant use of digital technologies in electoral processes
provide further elements of the Organisation’s electoral co-operation
toolkit, alongside technical assistance projects to support safe
digital voter registration and e-voting pilot reviews.
Note
6 Prolonged
emergency situations
76. Some crises are not temporary
disruptions, but prolonged states of emergency with profound implications
for governance issues. Nowhere is this more evident than in Ukraine,
where the full-scale war of aggression by the Russian Federation
launched in February 2022 has placed extraordinary strain on State structures
and the population.
77. Martial law, declared in Ukraine at the outset of the invasion,
has suspended national elections, as permitted under the Ukrainian
Constitution. The legal basis for this suspension is clear. Elections
are prohibited during periods of martial law to preserve national
security and prevent abuse.
78. Such provisions are not arbitrary political decisions, but
constitutionally viable solutions aimed at ensuring stability in
times of crisis and ensuring all branches of the State function
until conditions allow for lawful elections.
79. International actors have provided support to Ukraine’s electoral
institutions through scenario planning, legal analysis and capacity
building, but the fundamental dilemma remains of how to prepare
credible elections as soon as conditions allow in a context of ongoing
conflict where large parts of the population are displaced or under
occupation and in the face of risks to the life, health and security
of the population, as well as at a time where political debate and
media interest are focused primarily on the war.
80. Any future electoral process in Ukraine will require careful
sequencing. This may include defining minimum security thresholds,
ensuring the participation of internally displaced persons and refugees
(IDPs), and addressing the legal and logistical issues posed by
territories under occupation. It will also be a matter of facilitating
a public space in which the debate of ideas can unfold freely, between
political parties, in the media and in society as a whole, beyond
questions linked to the conflict itself and its consequences.
81. At the same time, post-conflict elections in Ukraine will
need reinforced efforts to protect electoral processes from foreign
interference. The heightened risks of large-scale disinformation
campaigns, cyber operations, illicit financing of political proxies
will require active responses in order to protect the integrity
of democratic processes.
82. The Council of Europe, through its Action Plan for Ukraine
“Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction” for 2023-2026 provides
electoral co-operation support for democratic post-war elections
in Ukraine.
Note This work supports
multilateral dialogue to reach consensus on the elaboration of the
necessary legal framework on issues related to ensuring passive
and active suffrage in a post-war period, and supporting the organisation and
administration of post-war national and local elections in line
with European electoral standards and good practices.
Note Support has included legal reviews
of electoral legislation, operational guidance for out-of-country and
IDP voting, and scenario-based planning for post-war electoral operations.
Note
83. Given the scale of the task, the Council of Europe's commitment
must be complemented by that of member and observer States and the
international community as a whole.
7 Conclusions
and proposals
84. Recent crises have underlined
the need to reflect on how our democracies are administered. The
rules, norms, methods and procedures that govern the organisation
and administration of elections need both to be protected and updated
to provide the necessary resilience, agility and adaptability for
EMBs to fulfil their mandates and ensure the populations confidence
in the system and its integrity.
85. The institutionalisation of crisis-management processes can
determine the effectiveness of EMBs and other State institutions
in restoring the continuity of the electoral process when disrupted
by emergency situations. A framework that combines best practices
from risk management, resilience building, and crisis management
could be explored to further strengthen a whole-of-society approach
to the delivery of elections during or after emergencies. Equally,
the modification of electoral legislation to provide for holding
elections during emergencies as well as clear criteria for the postponement
of elections is an avenue that should be explored to enhance legal
and operational clarity.
86. The Russian Federation’s full-scale war of aggression against
Ukraine, and its hybrid threats across Council of Europe member
States, have highlighted the urgency to update national security
concepts and to upgrade election security, a question which has
become a major strategic issue for all democratic States.
87. The war of aggression against Ukraine has equally shown a
need to further develop standards and criteria for the preparation,
conduct, observation and assessment of post-conflict elections.
The Council of Europe should work with key stakeholders to provide
relevant support to Ukraine when pre-conditions for holding elections
are met.
88. In view of the importance of its election observation role,
the Assembly has previously resolved to consider modalities, in
co-ordination with its institutional partners, which would allow
election observation missions to be carried out during emergency
situations. The development of guidance and joint frameworks for how
observation missions should approach emergency situations should
be explored as a way of bridging the gaps that have been exposed
during recent crises. The framework and methods of observation are
likely to need to be re-evaluated in light of the risks and developments
linked to the digitalisation of electoral campaigns and election
management.
89. The Assembly can play an important role in safeguarding the
functioning of democratic institutions by continuing to contribute
to electoral integrity in Europe. This includes supporting efforts
to bring greater clarity to electoral processes in times of crisis,
reinforcing its own observation and co-operation activities, and fostering
dialogue among parliamentarians on resilience and innovation throughout
the electoral cycle. In this regard, the Assembly may consider conducting
election observation missions in the future also in member States
or partners that are not subject to monitoring or post-monitoring
dialogue procedures, in order to contribute to the exchange of best
practices and look particularly at the resilience of the electoral
system throughout the continent. The Assembly may also contribute
actively to the ongoing development of the New Democratic Pact for
Europe, ensuring that the protection of electoral processes remains
central to efforts to reinforce democratic foundations.
