B Explanatory memorandum
by Lord Leslie Griffiths, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
"I
am a Dutch national. Yet my identity is constantly defined by others.
In the United Kingdom, I am Dutch. In the Netherlands, I am Afghan
because of my heritage. In Afghanistan, I am European. Across most
of Europe, I am often seen simply as a person of colour"Note
1. Europe is undergoing rapid
social and demographic change, marked by growing diversity, new
patterns of migration, and increasing numbers of people who identify
as both “from here” and “from elsewhere.” Simultaneously, the persistent
challenges of exclusion and discrimination threaten both our social
fabric and our democratic institutions.
2. When properly supported and empowered, diasporas are a valuable
asset for any member State to address these challenges. Diasporas
actively contribute to economic development, help build more cohesive societies
and foster democratic engagement. They also play a crucial role
in the integration of newly arrived migrants. Among them, young
diaspora members, in particular, possess immense potential. They
are often multilingual, multicultural, deeply European and natural
bridges between their countries of origin and their host societies.
3. This matter is of particular significance to me. I have, for
more than half a century, worked seriously with (“with” and not
“for”) a swathe of diasporic groups (people from South Korea, Ghana,
Sierra Leone, Fiji, Haiti and many smaller groups, too). I felt
the need to give serious attention to the lives and prospects of
those who have already found their place (however tenuously) in
their host society.
4. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has long
acknowledged the role of diasporas as agents of integration and
policy change. The resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly, together
with the previous work of the Sub-Committee on Diasporas and Integration,
demonstrate the attention that parliamentarians have paid to this
issue.
5. The Council of Europe and its member States have developed
and implemented a multitude of programmes and policies intended
to address these challenges and ensure that diasporas can develop
their full potential. Yet, despite these relative successes, the
meaningful engagement with diaspora communities at all governance
levels too often remains insufficient or fragmented, falling short
of building genuine co-ownership of our shared European future and
sometimes falling into tokenism. The lack of consultation and engagement
of local communities in these projects also risks alienating them
and creating a backlash.
6. Funding cuts, shrinking civic space and restrictive policies
seriously undermine diasporas’ capacity to develop their full potential.
These shortcomings jeopardise social cohesion and the representative
legitimacy of our democratic systems. There is thus a vital political
need to refocus attention on diasporas not as mere objects of policy
or as programme beneficiaries but as subjects and partners.
7. First of all, this report identifies and promotes good practices
among a wide range of both State-led and civil society diaspora
programmes and policies being implemented across Europe and turns
them into concrete recommendations for political action. Special
attention is dedicated to the meaningful engagement with diasporic
communities, involving the people concerned in the design, implementation
and evaluation of the policies affecting them to avoid tokenism
and improving their effectiveness and sustainability.
8. Second, this report expands the scope of previous Assembly
texts by looking beyond the fields of integration and economic growth,
highlighting the role of diasporas in strengthening our democracies,
in line with the New Democratic Pact.
9. Third, the report pays special attention into the contributions
and specific challenges of diaspora youth and faith-based diaspora
groups to social cohesion and democratic engagement.
10. And last but not least, this report contributes to building
a fact-based positive counter-narrative to the often-toxic current
discussions about immigration by acknowledging the potential of
diasporas to encourage shared growth, but also challenge stereotypes
and foster pathways toward a more cohesive and progressive Europe.
11. To achieve this, I relied on a combination of desk research,
direct engagements, and a fact-finding mission. My starting point
was the extensive mapping of existing diaspora-related policies
and practices across Europe, conducted in co-operation with the
European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD).
Beyond these documents, I actively sought to hear the voices of
diaspora members through a series of exchanges of views, including
an especially insightful session with young diaspora pupils in London.
12. A fact-finding mission to Sweden offered another crucial perspective,
allowing me to engage with faith communities, government officials,
local civil society, and academics. Additionally, dialogue with
diaspora youth representatives from the Council of Europe Joint
Council on Youth (CCJ) enriched the process with viewpoints from
those most affected by the policies discussed.
13. In a previous Assembly report “For a European policy on diasporas”
(
Doc. 15250), the rapporteur defined diaspora as “a group of people
originated from the same country residing abroad and keeping strong
cultural, economic and social links with their country of origin”.
While this definition remains broadly valid, this report proposes
to expand it into “a group of people originating from the same country,
residing in a third country and keeping strong cultural, linguistic,
family, economic and social links with their country of origin”
to reflect the importance of language and extended family ties within
diasporic groups. Yet, it is important to point out that the term
“originating” in this definition should be understood in a very
broad sense of provenance, which may be distant and go back several
generations. Many members of diasporas are born in their “host”
country and hold citizenship of that country, and yet they retain
links to their country “of origin” even if they may have never resided
there. This report will use the words “diaspora” or “diasporic”
in this broad sense without further explanation.
2 Diasporas as actors of social cohesion
“[We]
need people daring to cross the bridge, but also people awaiting
them on the other side”Note
14. This statement by a young British
person of migrant background reflects how social cohesion requires both
an effort from the newcomer and a welcoming from the host. Our Assembly
has consistently emphasised that the integration of diasporas is
a central condition for social cohesion, framing it as a reciprocal
and structural process requiring both inclusion and active participation.
Note
15. According to the International Organization for Migration,
social cohesion is about the “bonds tying a community together through
trust and common social norms. While these bonds can be undermined
by disparities in wealth and income, poverty, or intercommunal,
ethnic or racial tensions, the impact of migration, and especially
of diversity, on social cohesion has been increasingly questioned”.
Note
16. The UN Development Programme distinguishes between horizontal
social cohesion, which refers to the trust and relationships among
individuals from diverse identities and social groups or affiliations,
and vertical social cohesion which concerns the quality of the relationship
between the State and its citizens.
Note
17. Diaspora groups have a great potential to create trust-based
bonds, contributing to both horizontal and vertical social cohesion.
First, very often they are the first ones “waiting for them at the
other side”: they play a key role in welcoming and integrating newly
arrived migrants into their host society, helping them to navigate their
host country administratively and socially. Alongside and beyond
this, organised diasporic groups provide reliable interlocutors
that act as a bridge between their communities and host country
institutions.
18. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has recognised
the role of diasporas in enhancing social cohesion, through the
integration of “persons of immigrant background”
Note and
their involvement in co-development programmes.
Note
19. Furthermore, the Council of Europe
Intercultural
Cities Programme (ICC) views diasporas as a strategic diversity advantage for
international co-operation, economic development, cultural exchange,
and narrative transformation. Across ICC tools, themes, and city
practices, diaspora actors appear as co-designers, economic partners,
cultural mediators, and international connectors. This report acknowledges
the contribution of the programme to the integration of diasporic
groups and other migrants, but also as a source of information to
identify best practices at the local level.
20. Meaningful social cohesion requires sustained investment in
community-led initiatives that bring together young people with
lived experience, practitioners and legal experts. As an example,
the implementation of the Committee of Ministers Recommendation
on supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood
Note has
demonstrated the value of this approach, ensuring that policy is
informed by both professional expertise and lived experience. It
also showed that social cohesion cannot be achieved by focusing
solely on supporting diaspora communities; it requires investment
in educating wider society, challenging prejudice and discrimination,
and creating opportunities for meaningful dialogue between people
from different backgrounds.
2.1 National
Action Plans and other State-led initiatives
21. Our Assembly has called for
member States to take concrete action at national, regional and international
levels to promote diaspora engagement policies and create a positive
environment for the fulfilment of their potential.
Note This
has materialised through the development and implementation of national action
plans and strategies, which provide political direction, concrete
initiatives and funding.
22. Traditionally, State-led integration efforts focused on delineating
responsibilities among government agencies in a top-down approach.
The overview of State-led initiatives conducted in the outline report
Note identified
the risk that imposing models or systems on people can alienate
them and create unnecessary tension in the host community. “Top-down”
projects, often devised in committees or parliaments or even by NGOs
are not always “owned” by the communities who are supposed to benefit
from them.
23. For all these initiatives to work fully, affected communities
need to be entirely involved at every stage: from planning to implementation
and all the way to monitoring and evaluation. And talking about
affected communities here refers to both diasporic groups, newly
arrived migrants as well as the local non-diasporic local population.
The intended beneficiaries of these policies must be consulted and
listened to, so that they can develop “ownership” of such plans,
programmes and policies.
24. Increasingly, policymakers acknowledge the importance of involving
diasporic partners in their integration plans. The Czech Republic’s
2025 National Strategy on Integration of Foreigners in Mutual Respect
Note is a good example of this
participative approach implemented in all phases of policy development and
implementation. The strategy mandates the operation of 18 regional
Integration Centres, which include representatives of migrant organisations,
local authorities, schools, and NGOs. Crucially, the national strategy earmarks
resources to support “integration activities based on the own initiative
of foreigners” and includes the use of intercultural mediators and
community interpreters drawn from diaspora backgrounds.
25. Finland has also made significant efforts to engage diasporas
within both its legislative and strategic planning frameworks. Under
the 2025 Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration
Note, the State supports
the participation of organisations representing migrants in planning,
implementation, and evaluation of national and local integration
policy. The
Tampere
Talent Ambassadors programme, for example, employs international professionals
who have settled in Tampere to promote the resettlement and professional
inclusion of other university graduates who have settled in Tampere.
It is therefore the diasporic community itself that helps to integrate
newly arrived people.
26. A research project commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers
has produced a report on the voices of young immigrants in Iceland,
a country which has witnessed significant growth of immigrant communities
in its population. Among lessons learned are the importance of inclusion;
the value of listening to the voices of young immigrants; collaboration
as a catalyst for integration; and the importance of a holistic
approach.
Note
27. Other States are adapting similar approaches. In Italy, the
city of Reggio Emilia’s “DiTutt’ intercultural strategy” demonstrates
how city-level action plans can create space for diaspora-led associations
to participate in priority-setting, implementation, and monitoring
of inclusion policies. Across these contexts, a common lesson emerges:
durable social cohesion is best promoted when State-led strategies
move beyond consultation to tangible, ongoing partnership with diaspora
groups.
28. These are all steps in the right direction and must be commended.
They acknowledge the need to ensure that policies remain grounded
in community experience and benefit from the knowledge, networks,
and leadership within diaspora communities. However, caution is
needed not to assume that good policies on paper bring meaningful
inclusion in practice. If not properly implemented, these policies
can become an exercise of formal box-ticking, where consultation
does not result in meaningful participation nor equal partnership.
29. Despite the proven benefits of these good practices, some
of them are being hindered by funding cuts, which reduce the capacity
of diaspora-led organisations to contribute to integration and democratic participation.
In Sweden, for example, the Botkyrka Intercultural Centre, which
was recognised by the Intercultural Cities Programme as a good practice,
has faced drastic budget cuts that have forced it to reduce its
activities. If organisations that represent, support and empower
diasporas are no longer able to exist, their integration and meaningful
democratic participation will be significantly hindered.
2.2 Faith-based
initiatives
30. In contemporary Europe, diaspora
faith-based groups are vital actors in promoting both social cohesion and
democratic engagement. These religious communities – notably churches,
mosques, and other faith-based entities – offer far more than spiritual
sustenance. They serve as multidimensional hubs that provide practical
resources such as language courses, housing support, legal guidance,
and psychosocial care, while simultaneously fostering networks of
trust, solidarity, and belonging crucial for successful integration.
NoteNote
31. The St. Eugenia Catholic Church in Sweden is a clear example,
celebrating mass not only in Swedish but also in English, Ge’ez,
Polish, Arabic, and Filipino welcoming a wide range of diasporic
groups of all ages. Upon arrival to a new social reality, St Eugenia
provides new arrivals with a safe, known place to connect with their
own diaspora and gain a sense of community that gradually helps
them to integrate into Swedish society.
32. Faith communities act as extended families and networks of
solidarity for their members, offering not only spiritual guidance
but also practical and emotional support that facilitates integration.
This setting provides a stable environment where new arrivals find
a sense of belonging in the short term, but this can also lead to challenges
with the broader society when they remain too inward-looking. The
Syriac Orthodox Church in Sweden exemplifies this pattern, providing
a strong support network for community members and internal social
cohesion but sometimes struggling to fully engage with the broader
Swedish society. Nonetheless, State and local partnerships with
these faith-based organisations are crucial for leveraging their
potential to bridge cultural gaps and strengthen social cohesion
for society as a whole
Note.
33. Empirical evidence demonstrates that strong religious engagement
in itself can transform potential disadvantages associated with
minority status, equipping individuals with social capital and resilience
that enhance integration outcomes – provided the institutional context
is sufficiently inclusive.
Note In
Belgium, the
Forum
of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), with a strong diasporic element, organises
regular international study sessions in partnership with the Council
of Europe to train young diasporic Muslim people in democratic engagement,
among other skills.
34. Another clear example is provided by the CAFOD - Catholic
international development charity, which engages with the African
Catholic diaspora in the United Kingdom as active partners in community development
and social cohesion. For instance, Ghanaian Catholics in London
are particularly active, volunteering in their parishes, cooking
traditional meals to support parish priests, fundraising and organising monthly
African Masses that provide spaces for cultural expression and community
support.
Note
35. The Council of Europe has likewise recognised the important
contribution of faith-based communities to social cohesion and democratic
life. Through its work on interreligious and interconvictional dialogue,
including exchanges organised by the Committee of Ministers, the
work of the Conference of INGOs, and initiatives of the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities, the Organisation has created
spaces for religious and non-religious actors, public authorities
and civil society to foster mutual understanding, tolerance, human
rights and democratic participation.
2.3 The
role of diaspora youth
“I
shouldn’t feel like an outsider in a country I was born in.”Note
36. Europe’s youth, especially
those with diasporic backgrounds are a particularly well-positioned
collective to contribute to social cohesion and democratic engagement.
Harnessing their energy and insights is an essential condition for
social cohesion and the future democratic health of European societies.
The Parliamentary Assembly has consistently acknowledged this potential
Note and
called for their effective participation in Council of Europe processes
Note and
for their full inclusion into host societies.
Note
37. Yet, they sit at the intersection of complex identities, new
patterns of mobility, and rapidly shifting social realities. Their
lived experience is defined as much by resilience, aspiration, and
belonging as by structural discrimination, generational tension,
and feelings of alienation. Young people with migrant backgrounds
often lose vital legal protections and support once they reach adulthood,
resulting in abrupt interruptions to their inclusion and participation
in society.
38. One example of these interruptions is the case of Mr Youssef
Abo, a young diaspora member based in the Netherlands who had been
working and volunteering for years on inclusion, diversity, and
gender equality as project developer and facilitator. Due to recent
changes in the Dutch asylum policy, Mr Abo has been forced to step
back from his activities to focus on securing his administrative
status, which is now uncertain.
Note In
his own words: “I feel I have no other choice. I hope one day I
can return to the work that made me feel I had finally found my
place.”
Note
39. Other structural barriers were also underscored most clearly
during an exchange of views with secondary school students from
Central Foundation Schools in London, each representing families
with roots as diverse as Albania, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Ethiopia and Ghana.
Note These young Europeans spoke
eloquently about the ongoing struggle for representation and genuine
belonging. Feeling “between two cultures,” these students highlighted
the need for policies that do not force them to choose between heritage
and host society, but rather celebrate and enable the richness of
both. As one of them put it: “You need to hear our voices so your
policies are rooted in our lived experiences”.
40. Crucially, the students emphasised the urgent need for representation
at every level – including in school councils – and for the creation
of safe spaces where young people can participate and deliberate.
As one of them put it: “we need policymakers to step up. But You
cannot step up without the voices of those [diaspora youth] who
should sit at the table.” As a concrete proposal, they expressed
the need for more events like the exchange of views organised by
the committee to address their concerns.
41. Beyond individual testimony, the Assembly’s engagement with
youth advocacy platforms – such as the exchange with #DiasporaVote!
and input from youth representatives like Maurizio Cuttin – reveals
a new generation determined to move from consultation to co-creation.
These platforms urge policymakers and institutions to think with
migrants and diasporic communities, to learn from and with them,
and most importantly, to intensify action, not just dialogue. Young
people with diasporic heritage do not only want to be heard: they are
demanding a meaningful partnership in shaping policies, combating
discrimination, and securing their place as full and equal partners
in the continent’s present and future.
42. Within the structures of the Council of Europe, young diasporas
are already making valuable, substantive contributions to current
debates within our organisation. The Advisory Council on Youth (CCJ),
for example, issued a principled statement reacting to the adoption
to the Chișinău Declaration, warning against the increasing politicisation
of human rights, the risk of selective protection and calling States
to ensure that migration policies do not scapegoat young people,
migrants, or refugees.
Note
43. Yet, within our Assembly, engagement with diaspora at large
and youth in particular remains piecemeal and not systematic. Given
the proven value of their contributions, we should pledge to conduct
at least one exchange of views at Committee, Sub-Committee or Network
level with representatives of migrant or diaspora groups in the
preparation of each report concerning their integration or their
political, social and cultural rights.
44. This report insists that the voices of diaspora youth must
not just be listened to, but acted upon. Their plea is clear: “papers
are not enough”. Sustained and tailored investment in youth-led
diaspora organisations – including dedicated capacity-building,
mentorship, and training programmes – is essential to ensure their continued
engagement. More than consultation, these groups must be empowered
to take leadership as main applicants and equal partners.
45. The continent’s democratic future depends on an active commitment
to listen, to consult, and to co-create policies that they can truly
own. Social cohesion cannot be secured for the next generation unless
young Europeans of all backgrounds are trusted, included, and empowered
as architects of that future.
3 Diasporas
as actors of democratic engagement
“We
are part of Europe – not guests, but active contributors to its
democratic and social life.Note”
46. Social cohesion, cultural diversity
and economic development cannot be achieved without a functioning democracy.
And a functioning democracy must allow for all its communities to
participate, including diasporas. The need to involve diasporas
(among other groups) in democratic life was well-established by
the Reykjavik Declaration, calling for a full, equal and meaningful
participation in political and public life “for all”, free from discrimination
on any grounds.
Note In the Parliamentary Assembly,
we also firmly recognise the need to involve diaspora members in
policy making, particularly regarding citizenship policies and other
issues directly affecting them.
Note
47. The importance of strengthening democratic engagement is currently
high on the Council of Europe agenda. The New Democratic pact aims
to serve as a collective and inclusive process to reinforce democracy’s foundations,
amplify its benefits, and innovate its forms to make it tangible
for everyone.
Note More
specifically, it aims to protect democracy by advancing equality
and combat all forms of discrimination and ensuring full participation
and representation of marginalised groups in democratic life,
Note which
includes diasporic groups.
48. This report frames democratic engagement as civic participation
in political decision making, understood by the Committee of Ministers
as the engagement of individuals, NGOs and civil society at large
in decision-making processes by public authorities. These may include
community-based groups,
Note like diasporas. This is a concept closely
linked to “active citizenship”, which ensures that all individuals
(including foreign residents where appropriate) have the right,
the means, the space, the opportunity and the support to freely
express their opinions and influence decision making on matters
that affect them.
Note
49. Democratic engagement includes but is not limited to the right
to vote and to stand for office. The European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5)
Note allows
member States to impose restrictions on these rights for non-nationals,
and this means they are not accessible too many diaspora members
who are not citizens of their host country. However, there are many
other forms of democratic engagement like deliberative and participative
democracy that are not necessarily linked to citizenship.
3.1 Voting
and standing for office
50. Notwithstanding the aforementioned
restrictions, the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners
in Public Life at the Local Level (ETS No. 144) commits signatory
States to granting foreign residents the right to vote and to stand
for office in local elections.
Note It is crucial for elected representatives
to reflect the community they serve, which means ensuring those
from a migrant background can vote in and run for election. The Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities has also acknowledged voting in
local elections as a powerful tool to integrate migrants.
Note In line with that position, our Assembly
supported the idea of granting foreign residents the right to vote
and the right to stand in local and regional elections after a residence
period of five years or less.
Note
51. There are numerous member States across the Council of Europe
that already allow non-citizens to vote and stand for office at
the municipal level, including Norway, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland. In Finland, for example, people
who reside in a municipality can vote and stand as candidates in
local elections after two years of residence regardless of their
citizenship. Some civil society initiatives like the
Migrant
Democracy Project in the United Kingdom advocate for the right to vote
to be extended to all residents, regardless of their nationality.
52. Having the legal right to vote is not equal to making it effective.
Empirical studies reveal that turnout among non-citizen immigrants
with right to vote is consistently and significantly lower than
among native citizens. Factors such as lack of information, unfamiliarity
with host-country political institutions, language barriers, and
lower levels of social and political capital all contribute to this
gap.
Note However,
evidence also shows that political participation increases clearly
with both length of residence and acquisition of citizenship, and
that tailored outreach, civic education, and the opportunity to
build local social networks all foster greater electoral participation
among migrants over time.
Note
53. Certain projects from civil society aim to overcome these
hurdles through training, mentoring and awareness-raising. Through
the NGO
#DiasporaVote!, for example, local youth ambassadors, members of several
diasporas organised events to raise awareness around EU elections
among their peers to inform them about their rights and encourage
their participation. In the United Kingdom,
Voice4Change conducts free, impartial, political literacy workshops
in towns and cities across the country under the slogan “Your Voice,
Your Democracy”, to promote voter registration. In Sweden, the refugee-led
Järvaveckan foundation organises a yearly festive-political event
to bring together politicians and diaspora members in a non-formal
setting to foster their democratic engagement and bring their realities
closer to politicians.
54. Some innovative programmes enhance democratic participation
of diasporas by getting them to work directly with lawmakers. The
EU-wide project
“Work with your MEP” selects a limited number of diaspora youth, provides
them with training and connects each one of them with one member
of the European Parliament, with whom they will work closely for
a year to co-create a shared action plan with clear goals and timelines.
Ireland has a similar programme through the
Migrant-Councillor
Internship Scheme, a mentoring programme that pairs local councillors
with migrants who want to learn about Irish politics and get involved
in their local communities.
55. These kinds of schemes are a particularly promising practice
that should be replicated, providing diaspora youth with a meaningful
way to engage politically but also getting local politicians closer
to the realities of young diaspora members. To start preaching by
example, our Assembly should consider the development of its own
mentorship programme linking young diaspora members with Assembly
members.
3.2 Consultative
mechanisms
56. Democracy is more than just
voting and standing for office. Beyond the formal channels of political participation,
it is necessary to engage diasporas in decision making through other
mechanisms so that they can fully participate in public life. The
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at
the Local Level (ETS No. 144) mandates efforts to involve them in
local decision making and consultations.
Note Both the Committee of Ministers
Note and
our own Parliamentary Assembly
Note have encouraged the use of participative
and deliberative mechanisms to ensure proper intercultural integration.
57. Migrant consultative councils are one of such mechanisms,
which intend to create a structured dialogue between public authorities
and diasporic groups. In Lisbon, the Municipal Council for Interculturality
and Citizenship brings together migrant associations and city officials
in a formal advisory body. Through regular consultations on issues
such as housing, employment, and social inclusion, migrant representatives
can influence policy agendas while fostering mutual understanding
and long-term civic engagement.
58. Finland has also established
several
of these Councils in cities like Turku and Tampere, with bodies representing
diasporic perspectives in the city’s decision-making processes.
In Sweden, the municipality of Örebro established the
Interreligious
and Intercultural Council, a consultative body that engages with diasporas with
a special emphasis on interfaith dialogue and co-operation. In Poland,
the municipality of Gdansk
Immigrants’
Council advises the mayor and other local authorities on issues
and policies related to migrant and refugee inclusion.
59. In Italy, Bologna’s “Council of Foreign and Stateless Citizens
of the Province” and the “Neighbourhood Councils of Foreign Citizens”
act as consultative bodies allowing diaspora representatives to
express their voice and concerns. Up in Germany, district-level
“Integrationsbeiräte” are often elected by migrant residents and
consulted on a wide range of policy areas, including education,
urban development, and anti-discrimination measures. In a rare example
of national level consultative mechanism, the
Azerbaijani
Migrant Council provides an avenue for diasporas and migrants to participate
in the migration management of the country.
60. Refugee-led consultative structures represent an important
complementary mechanism to migrant councils, as they ensure that
refugees themselves can directly inform policies that affect them
while materially supporting each other. In Belgium, UNHCR-supported
“
Umbrella
Refugee Committees” are articulated around diasporic groups, with 10 Committees
representing different nationalities. The Committees are providing
a shelter and support refugees and asylum-seekers in their integration
process and elect a common President, who represents them in discussions
with local authorities.
61. Within our own organisation, the Council of Europe's youth
co-management system demonstrates the value of structured and continuous
participation. Through the Advisory Council on Youth (CCJ), young
people work alongside government representatives to shape youth
policy and contribute expertise across thematic portfolios through
an established, permanent mechanism. Beyond its youth-centred nature,
the CJJ structure is a good example of co-management that could
be applied to institutions working with diaspora groups.
62. All these consultative and advisory mechanisms have great
potential to engage diasporas in democratic processes. However,
their effectiveness is frequently constrained by structural limitations:
their advisory nature, lack of decision-making power, and dependence
on political will can reduce them to symbolic or “tokenistic” forms
of participation. Diaspora voices are heard in some places, and
this is good. But without genuine co-design, adequate resources,
and clear channels into decision making, such mechanisms risk becoming
performative inclusion rather than meaningful democratic engagement.
4 Conclusions
63. Diasporas are not only beneficiaries
of integration policies but essential actors in strengthening both social
cohesion and democratic engagement, acting as bridges between communities,
institutions and countries. Their meaningful participation must
go beyond formal political rights and include a wide range of mechanisms
– from consultative bodies and civic initiatives to education, culture
and faith-based engagement.
64. This report has showcased numerous examples of State-led frameworks,
local participatory models and civil society initiatives that empower
diasporas to contribute actively to social cohesion and democratic engagement.
These activities must be recognised and commended.
65. At the same time, the report has identified certain shortcomings,
notably, the risk of tokenistic participation, and the limitations
of top-down approaches that fail to ensure community ownership.
Other structural barriers such as discrimination, lack of information,
and insufficient recognition of second-generation migrants and precarious
administrative status further hinder effective democratic engagement.
State-led programmes must ensure that their beneficiaries can sense
ownership through meaningful participation and consultation.
66. Against this background, several promising practices emerge.
Innovative programmes such as “Work with your MEP” and similar mentoring
schemes demonstrate how direct co-operation between diaspora youth and
policymakers can foster meaningful political engagement and mutual
understanding. The development of a similar programme within the
Parliamentary Assembly should be explored.
67. The extension of the right to vote and stand in local elections
for non-citizens, already implemented in several member States,
is also identified as a crucial lever for strengthening democratic
inclusion and ensuring that institutions reflect the diversity of
the societies they serve. The right to vote and stand for office,
as well as other forms of innovative democratic engagement, make
this report relevant for the New Democratic Pact, and it is therefore
necessary to engage with the Special Committee on the Pact to share
these new ideas.
68. Exchanges of views between diasporic groups and the Committee
on Migration, International Protection and Economic Co-operation
have proven to be extremely enriching for both members and diasporas,
so similar engagements should be conducted as often as possible.
The Assembly should systematise these exchanges by committing to
conduct at least one exchange of views at Committee or Sub-Committee
or Network level with representatives of migrant or diaspora groups
in the preparation of each report concerning their integration or their
political, social and cultural rights.
69. More broadly, the work of diaspora organisations – including
faith-based ones – illustrates their role as mediators, service
providers and drivers of social cohesion. Among them, diaspora faith-based
communities, are key actors to provide practical support, build
trust networks and facilitate access to civic participation. To ensure
that these organisations can develop their full potential, sustainable
structural funding is essential.
70. I want to finish my report with a call to action to my fellow
Assembly members to work with their diasporas at national level,
to include them in decision making and to make sure that Council
of Europe best practices and standards are implemented not only
on paper, but also effectively and meaningfully on the ground.
71. Allow me to end this report by, once again, quoting Paolo
Freire, who noted that “we will organise our capacity to learn and
teach so much better for being subjects and not simply objects of
the process we are engaged in”.
