Russia: new threats to European democracies
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly debate on 2 October 2025
(34th sitting) (see Doc. 16272,
report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur:
Mr Iulian Bulai). Text adopted by the
Assembly on 2 October 2025 (34th sitting).
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply
concerned by the growing and multifaceted threat posed by Russia
to Europe’s security and stability. New military and hybrid threats
build upon a long history of repeated and extensive violations of
international law by Russia, including human rights violations against
its own citizens and attempts to assert its de
facto control and undue influence in neighbouring countries.
It is imperative that Council of Europe member States fully grasp
the magnitude of the threat posed by Russia and do everything in
their power to strengthen their capabilities for deterrence, preparedness
and resilience, in order to safeguard Europe’s democratic security
and peaceful future.
2. Russia has responded to diplomatic efforts to end its full-scale
war of aggression against Ukraine by escalating its attacks. In
recent weeks, the intensification of Russia’s missile and drone
attacks on civilian infrastructures in Ukraine, including in Kyiv,
have taken a devastating toll on civilian lives, destroying schools and
residential buildings and damaging diplomatic facilities. The Assembly
strongly condemns this further escalation of the illegal, unjustified
and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, including
the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children and
civilians from temporarily occupied territories, acts recognised
as grave violations of international law, and reiterates its urgent
call for just and lasting peace in Ukraine to ensure Europe’s long-term
security and Ukraine’s European future.
3. The Assembly deplores and firmly opposes the military-style
education system imposed by the Russian Federation on children from
the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, viewing it as an
integral part of the Russian Federation’s broader strategy to prepare
for a renewed wave of aggressive warfare. The Assembly denounces
this policy as constituting a real and objective threat to the peace
and security of mankind, and underlines that only by ensuring accountability
for the militarisation of a young generation can the international community
provide an adequate response.
4. Likewise, the Assembly is deeply alarmed by the increasing
number of incursions by unidentified drones and Russian military
aircraft into the airspace of Council of Europe member States. In
September 2025, Estonia, Poland and Romania recorded unacceptable
and intentional violations of their airspace that led Estonia and
Poland to call for consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Drone activity near critical infrastructure and military
sites in Danish and German airspace has also disrupted civilian
aviation, including causing temporary airport closures in Denmark.
These deliberate provocations are part of a wider strategy to test
Europe’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, Europe’s internal cohesion
and the strength of Euro-Atlantic relations. They recklessly increase
the risk of an enlargement of military operations in Europe. If left
unanswered, such airspace violations risk normalising deliberate
Russian provocations and undermining collective security across
Europe.
5. Furthermore, in recent months, Russia has intensified its
hybrid warfare – combining hard and soft power – through sophisticated
cyberattacks, intelligence operations and co-ordinated disinformation
campaigns. Heightened military activities and growing hybrid threats
have significantly challenged the security and stability of the
Baltic Sea region. Russia has particularly increased its hybrid
assault on European electoral processes. It has deployed an unprecedented,
sophisticated combination of covert interference, information warfare
and destabilisation tactics through large-scale use of social media,
vote buying and cyberattacks. These methods were used to the full
in the presidential elections in Romania in 2014 and 2015, and in
the Republic of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, where unprecedented
foreign interference and co-ordinated online manipulation networks
targeted institutions and voters to derail the country’s pro-European
course and seek wider destabilisation. On the election day itself,
the attempts at destabilisation continued with bomb threats against
polling stations in the Republic of Moldova and abroad. The Moldovan
people and institutions demonstrated exceptional resilience and
solidarity in defending the electoral process against such massive foreign
interference, thereby allowing the people’s pro-European choice
to prevail. Persistent risks caused by disinformation and foreign
interference have also been highlighted in the context of the observation
of the 2025 presidential election in Poland. Beyond electoral contexts,
at the end of September 2025 disinformation campaigns in Latvia
concerning the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210, Istanbul
Convention) illustrate how Kremlin propaganda narratives are used
to polarise societies and undermine democracies.
6. Referring to its
Resolution 2593 (2025) “Foreign
interference: a threat to democratic security in Europe”, the Assembly
firmly condemns Russia’s interference in democratic processes across
Europe and its attempts to destabilise European democracies, increase
domestic polarisation and undermine trust in public institutions.
7. The Assembly also condemns the deployment by Russia of information
warfare through State-sponsored media outlets and Russian cultural
centres, which are used to destabilise political systems, distort public
opinion and undermine democratic processes across Council of Europe
member States. It underlines that Russian oligarchs and affiliated
actors residing in Europe have been implicated in exerting financial
and political pressure, underscoring the necessity for co-ordinated,
transparent and robust responses at national and international levels.
8. In its current warfare, Russia has rewritten the concept of
weaponry. The Assembly has already acknowledged the weaponisation
of migration by Russia and its attempts to destabilise democratic
societies by exploiting or amplifying alleged minority grievances
and misusing the status of the Russian language. These attacks have
also undermined economic resilience and exacerbated societal divisions
throughout the continent.
9. Furthermore, Russia has intensified its diplomatic activity
worldwide, strengthening ties with non-democratic countries that
tangibly support its aggression against Ukraine by providing weapons
or troops, or by making their territory available to host Russian
weapons and launch attacks, such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea;
relying on economic partners, in Europe and elsewhere, to circumvent
the sanctions system; and developing an alliance with global players
such as China to promote a new world order.
10. The Assembly reiterates that the strategy of Russia, aimed
at destabilising European democracies using force, fear and foreign
influence, should be strongly opposed and defeated. Russia must
stop its aggression and provocations and be held accountable for
its repeated crimes and violations of international law. In the
light of accelerating attacks and threats, the Assembly, at this
critical juncture, stresses that enduring peace in Europe will only
be achieved through democratic security and resilience.
11. In the light of these considerations, with regard to the need
for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Assembly:
11.1 referring to its previous resolutions,
in particular
Resolution
2588 (2025) “European commitment to a just and lasting
peace in Ukraine”, calls for unwavering European commitment and
greater unity beyond Europe, in support of Ukraine and a just and
lasting peace, which is indispensable for Ukraine’s European future
and the security of the entire European continent;
11.2 insists that any peace negotiations must involve Ukraine
and respect its right to determine its own future, including its
sovereign right to continue its integration into the European Union
and its membership of other international organisations, including
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as Ukraine also has
the sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements; such negotiations
must also include the necessary security guarantees;
11.3 considers that a just, lasting and effective peace can
only be achieved by anchoring it in the international human rights
framework, as stressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights;
11.4 reiterates that enhanced support for Ukraine is also crucial
in order to strengthen its capacity to effectively uphold human
rights, the rule of law and democracy, which remains key to its
democratic security and recovery and its accession process to the
European Union;
11.5 calls on Council of Europe member and observer States,
as well as relevant European institutions and international partners,
to increase their support for the Council of Europe Action Plan
for Ukraine “Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction” 2023-2026.
12. With regard to the need to ensure accountability, the Assembly:
12.1 referring to
Resolution 2605 (2025) “Legal
and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine”, welcomes the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights of 9 July 2025 in the case of
Ukraine
and the Netherlands v. Russia, which held the Russian
Federation responsible for widespread and flagrant abuses of human
rights in Ukraine – including the downing of Malaysian Airlines
flight MH17, torture, the use of rape as a weapon of war, summary
executions and unlawful and arbitrary detentions;
12.2 welcomes the landmark signing of the agreement between
the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the establishment of the Special
Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine on 25 June
2025, as well as the finalisation of a draft convention establishing
an international claims commission for Ukraine;
12.3 stresses the need to expedite the establishment of a comprehensive
accountability system, bearing in mind that reparations should remain
a core component of any peace settlement;
12.4 asks Council of Europe member and observer States and
like-minded countries to:
12.4.1 work without delay towards
the establishment of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management
Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against
Ukraine and to join the enlarged partial agreement as soon as possible,
in accordance with their national procedures;
12.4.2 conclude co-operation agreements with the future special
tribunal;
12.4.3 work towards the adoption and opening for signature of
the convention establishing an international claims commission for
Ukraine, taking into account the Assembly’s
Opinion 308 (2025);
12.4.4 intensify efforts to establish the third component of
the international compensation mechanism, an international compensation
fund, which could be funded by repurposing and transferring frozen
Russian State assets;
12.5 calls for the swift operational launch of the International
Claims Commission for Ukraine to ensure that victims of Russian
aggression, including deported children and survivors of torture,
can file claims effectively;
12.6 underlines the need to ensure accountability for deliberate
and systematic attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural identity and
for all war crimes;
12.7 calls on national parliaments to strengthen parliamentary
diplomacy to mobilise broader support for Ukraine, in particular
for accountability mechanisms and its accession process to the European Union.
13. With regard to the need for increased pressure on Russia,
the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member and observer States
as well as relevant European institutions and international partners
to:
13.1 reinforce the current sanctions
regime against Russia, its allies and their political and military leaderships,
notably by:
13.1.1 renewing efforts to reduce sanctions
circumvention, including through secondary sanctions against third
countries and other economic actors facilitating it, and ensuring
greater transparency to prevent the use of complex ownership structures
to bypass restrictions;
13.1.2 enlarging the list of targeted individuals and entities,
including all senior financial officers, all Russian banks and all
shadow fleet vessels;
13.1.3 enlarging the sectoral scope of sanctions, by targeting
the supply chain of larger groups of dual-use materials, machinery
and technologies;
13.1.4 lowering further oil price caps and tightening energy-related
sanctions;
13.1.5 strengthening the co-ordination among national authorities
in terms of compliance enforcement of sanctions;
13.2 pursue further diplomatic isolation of Russia through
co-ordinated efforts to exclude Moscow from key forums and rally
global partners in defence of international law; these efforts should
include sport diplomacy, which is widely used by Russia to project
its influence;
13.3 strengthen accountability mechanisms for all Russian violations
of international law and their respective rules.
14. With regard to increased hybrid warfare, the Assembly calls
on Council of Europe member and observer States as well as relevant
European institutions and international partners to:
14.1 develop non-military responses
to violations of airspace and related threats – alongside adequate military
responses when needed – through a comprehensive strategy and cross-cutting
action, combining measures to ensure deterrence, preparedness, protection
and reactivity, for both infrastructures and populations, in order
to enhance the resilience of democratic societies. Such a comprehensive
resilience strategy should ensure co-ordination among public authorities
across sectors, including legislators, law enforcement, education
and health services, as relevant. It should also seek to preserve
national unity, as Russia aims at polarising and dividing European
countries and their societies;
14.2 implement robust countermeasures against foreign interference,
particularly in the context of electoral integrity, including updating
national legal frameworks to criminalise covert foreign involvement in
political funding, electoral campaigns and information operations,
and enhance transparency and oversight of media and financial flows;
14.3 offer solid counternarratives to Russian propaganda seeking
to undermine European core values, notably by supporting free media
such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other independent media
platforms countering disinformation in occupied and neighbouring
regions;
14.4 operate closely with and provide support to States targeted
by Russian threats to help them to resist covert Russian attempts
to undermine elections and national sovereignty;
14.5 reinforce international co-operation and co-ordinated
measures to defend European democracies, and develop an ever stronger
and more agile multilateralism that can react quickly to Russian
threats and ensure accountability, as the current security situation
requires a unified response from like-minded countries;
14.6 improve the efficiency and resilience of the European
security architecture.
15. While defence issues are excluded from its remit, the Council
of Europe should contribute to enhancing the comprehensive and long-term
security of its member States within the scope of its mandate, by
making them more resilient in countering threats and preventing
conflicts. In this context, the Assembly:
15.1 welcomes the New Democratic Pact for Europe, launched
by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, which should
help reinforce democratic security in Council of Europe member States;
15.2 considers that the Council of Europe should strengthen
its work on democratic security in order to take into account the
rapidly evolving nature of the threats and challenges faced by Europe,
including those from Russia. Projects on fighting disinformation
should be further developed, possibly with the support of the Council
of Europe Development Bank. The Council of Europe should also play
a proactive role in the discussions on the European political and
security architecture, within the scope of its mandate;
15.3 invites Council of Europe member States to adopt a strategic
long-term approach to shaping the Council of Europe’s support for
Ukraine, bringing together the closely related aspects of democratic security,
resilience and reconstruction;
15.4 calls on Council of Europe member and observer States
to continue strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities including
by, but not limited to, increasing investment in Ukraine’s security
and defence sectors, as one of the core elements of a resilient
and stable Europe, able to defend democracy and human rights;
15.5 stresses the need to develop interparliamentary dialogue
and co-operation with relevant security forums, including the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly.
