B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Larysa Bilozir, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. The Global Report on Food Crises
warned in 2022 in the following terms: “The number of people facing acute
food insecurity and requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood
assistance has increased for the fourth consecutive year.”
Note In other
words, even if conflicts were to cease today, global food insecurity
would persist. Neither geopolitical shocks nor climate shocks are
the root cause; they are amplifiers of long-standing fragilities and
of the systemic violence embedded in food systems.
2. Every food crisis results from interactions between the economy,
climate, conflicts and governance. The disastrous effects on global
food security of the war in Ukraine or of the blockage of the Strait
of Hormuz are not anomalies in a global food model that would otherwise
be robust. They merely exacerbate the structural vulnerabilities
of food systems: the asymmetry of interdependence between States,
excessive productive specialisation, insufficient diversification
of sources of supply, the excesses of the financialisation of agricultural markets,
and an approach centred on securing flows.
Note In
simple terms: a few industrially produced staple foods, a limited
number of exporting countries and a handful of private actors structuring
value chains and trade.
3. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Mr Amartya Sen already showed
in 1981, food insecurity in times of peace as in times of war results
less from overall food availability than from the loss of access
to food, poverty and pre-existing structural vulnerabilities. These
deep-seated characteristics of markets make food systems vulnerable
to climate and geopolitical shocks and, in some cases, turn food
into a strategic issue liable to be instrumentalised as a means
of pressure or as a weapon of war.
4. My report gives particular attention to the consequences of
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine on the global food system
and to the additional strain it has added to the already multidimensional
global food crisis. However, it is not the only conflict causing
record levels of food insecurity. The humanitarian catastrophe in
Gaza resulting from the hostilities and Israel’s military operations
has become one of the most emblematic examples and illustrates the
devastating consequences of war on food security.
5. The conceptual framework of my report is set out in Assembly
Resolution 2577 (2024) and
Recommendation
2286 (2024) “Guaranteeing the human right to food”. Guaranteeing
the human right to food implies that “all people, at all times,
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food that enables them to lead a healthy and active life”.
Note All
the measures advocated in this resolution are incorporated into
my proposals to strengthen food resilience and improve resistance
to crises.
6. In drafting my report, I relied on the committee’s hearings
with Mr Taras Vysotskyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment
and Agriculture of Ukraine; Mr Jean-Martin Bauer, Director of Food
Security and Nutrition Analysis at the World Food Programme (WFP);
Mr Michael Fakhri, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right
to food; and Mr Fabrice Santini, Head of Unit for Agri-food Market
Governance at the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural
Development of the European Commission. Ukrainian farmer, Mr Viktor Hordiienko,
representing frontline agricultural area along the military contact
line and demined land and Mr Dmytro Solomchuk, member of the Ukrainian
Parliamentary Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy, were also heard.
I also attended the Black Sea Security Forum held in Odessa from
29 to 31 May 2026.
2 Food
as an instrument of war against civilian populations
7. Food systems are not neutral;
they are used as instruments of domination, pressure and deprivation
in times of crisis.
8. Even before the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion in
Ukraine in February 2022, food insecurity in Ukraine was already
significant: according to analyses by the Integrated Food Security
Phase Classification (IPC), between 2019 and 2021 approximately
9.9 million people were in a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity,
particularly in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since then, the
continuation of the war has profoundly aggravated the country’s
economic and social situation. The WFP estimates that around 5 million Ukrainians
were still facing moderate or severe food insecurity in 2025, while
10.8 to 12.7 million people required humanitarian assistance.
Note
9. Russia’s instrumentalisation of food in the context of the
war is multidimensional, as I have explained to our committee on
several occasions. It began with the siege and destruction of cities
strategic for agriculture such as Mariupol, repeated bombardments
of the port facilities of Odesa, the destruction of the Kakhovka
dam in June 2023, which caused massive flooding and the loss of
irrigated agricultural land, the degradation of the production capacities
of the Kherson region in southern Ukraine, and the disruption of
the logistical function of the Dnipro as an inland river corridor
linking the agricultural regions of the south to the Black Sea ports.
The Black Sea ports have been particularly affected, with military
blockades, attacks on grain storage facilities and access restrictions
that paralysed part of commercial flows. Finally, the occupation
of the territories of Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk) has been accompanied
by the confiscation and appropriation of land and agricultural assets
by the occupying forces, which seize harvested products for export
to their own benefit.
Note
10. From 2023 onwards, Russia also began targeting Ukraine’s energy
system. As processing agricultural products and producing food are
energy-intensive activities, these attacks had a major impact on
the activity of many enterprises. Each time the cold returned, Russia
intensified its attacks on the energy sector and logistics, targeting
electricity production and transmission systems, as well as natural
gas extraction and transport systems. These attacks destroyed Ukraine’s
national oil production and refining capacities and destroyed more
than 60% of its natural gas production capacity.
11. In addition, hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural
land are contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war. This
contamination not only prevents immediate access to the land, but
also has long-term effects on soils (erosion, chemical pollution,
destruction of the structure of arable land) and therefore on production
capacity. Land demining has become the invisible front of the war,
and farmers are risking their lives to clear their fields of mines.
Our committee heard the testimony of the son of Ukrainian farmer
from the Kherson region, who continues his father’s work under constant
danger. Before being killed in Russian drone attack while working
in the fields, Mr Hordiienko had cleared thousands of mines from
agricultural land and neutralised more than 100 Russian drones,
thereby protecting both agricultural production and civilian lives.
I would like to highlight that Ukraine has, under urgent circumstances
and on an unprecedented scale, developed cutting-edge expertise
in agricultural demining, including the use of drones and satellite
mapping, counter-drone protection and coordination between public
authorities, international organisations, and local farmers.
Note This exceptional
experience could eventually serve as a model for other countries
facing war and its consequences.
12. The rapporteur is particularly concerned by the destruction
of wetlands and ecosystems of international importance resulting
from the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
According to recent assessment made by the conference of the Contracting
Parties to the UN Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (2 February 1971)
such damage will have major long-term consequences for biodiversity,
water systems, agricultural resilience and food security in Ukraine
Note.
13. In terms of damage, the most recent assessments by the Kyiv
School of Economics, supported by data from the Ministry of Economy,
Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine, estimate direct losses in
the Ukrainian agricultural sector at over 10 billion US dollars
(approximately 8.5 billion Euros), mainly due to the destruction of
storage infrastructure, agricultural machinery and production stocks.
Numerous surveys, including those by the FAO, document a general
deterioration in the productive and logistical capacities of farms.
Independent analyses based on satellite imagery estimate that around
one fifth of the country’s grain storage capacity has been affected
by the conflict.
Note The World Bank estimates the war-related
damages and losses suffered by Ukraine’s agricultural sector at
more than 90 billion Euros, mainly linked to the loss of access
to land in occupied and frontline areas, mined and contaminated
land, damaged irrigation systems and other productive assets, thereby
compromising the country’s long-term productive capacity.
14. On 9 October 2023, Israel announced and implemented a total
siege on Gaza and immediately blocked the entry of food, water,
electricity and fuel into Gaza. Given that IPC analyses prior to
7 October 2023 indicated that approximately half of Gaza’s population
was already suffering from acute food insecurity and that more than
80% depended on humanitarian aid provided by UNRWA due to the blockade
imposed by Israel and Egypt, the total siege posed an immediate
risk of famine. According to the IPC analysis published on 21 December
2023, around 577 000 inhabitants of Gaza had fallen into Phase 5
(catastrophe) of food insecurity, with a high risk of famine, representing
more than 80% of those classified in that category worldwide at
that time.
15. Before the start of the war, Gaza had significant agricultural
production (fruits, vegetables, poultry and fish). Since October
2023, repeated bombardments, blockades and population displacements
have largely destroyed its production capacities: according to an
FAO-UNOSAT assessment of 9 August 2025,
Note only 1.5% of cropland
remained accessible and undamaged, while almost all cattle and poultry
had been decimated. Offshore fishing has been prohibited. In addition,
Israel created a buffer zone along its border with Gaza and across
parts of the Strip, reportedly effecting up to on 32% of Gaza’s
territory, and thereby reducing cultivable land. As for the limited
food supplies available, their price has soared: according to the
Palestinian chamber of commerce, flour costs thirty times more than
before the war. This situation has been compounded by severe disruption
by the Israeli forces of the humanitarian system supporting the
occupied population, particularly in terms of food supplies.
16. The first deaths linked to malnutrition and dehydration were
reported as early as February 2024 by the Gaza Ministry of Health.
In August 2025, Gaza entered the famine phase according to the IPC,
and at least 461 people had died from causes linked to malnutrition
and dehydration, mainly children and older persons.
Note Nevertheless, Humanitarian
organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières consider that this
toll is probably underestimated due to the collapse of the health
system.
Note The
WFP representative heard by our committee stated that today, after
the famine that lasted until the end of 2025, the majority of Gaza’s
population remains, according to the IPC, in Phase 4 (emergency)
of acute food insecurity, with a risk of sliding into Phase 5 (catastrophe/famine)
in certain areas.
17. Our committee also heard the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the right to food on the situation in Gaza. He warned that the
situation in Gaza had reached levels of acute food insecurity among
the most severe observed in recent contexts of armed conflict and
that the capacity of Palestinians in Gaza to feed themselves had
been weakened for decades
Note,
which is also extensively documented by the FAO.
Note The World Bank and the United Nations
also noted that the shock suffered by Gaza’s economy as a result
of the current siege was one of the largest recorded in recent economic
history and that addressing it would require recovery measures unprecedented
since 1945.
Note
18. These tragic realities lead me to encourage member States
to act on several levels:
- strengthen
their financial, technical and institutional support for the 2026-2028
multiannual agricultural reconstruction plan developed by the FAO
together with the Ukrainian State, and therefore for programmes
aimed at demining agricultural land in regions affected by the war.Note The expertise developed in
Ukraine in the demining of agricultural land, digital risk mapping
and the rapid rehabilitation of production capacities could be supported,
documented and shared with other territories affected by armed conflicts.
- encourage the development, under the auspices of the Food
and Agriculture Organization, of an international multiannual agricultural
reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for Gaza Strip, based on international
humanitarian law, the protection of civilian infrastructure essential
to the survival of the population, and the right to food.Note
3 The
framework of international law and accountability issues
19. The situations described in
the previous chapter are not only tragic; they also breach law and
liable to sanctions.
20. The use of methods of warfare based on food is clearly condemned
by contemporary international law. At the normative level, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2417 (2018),
the first thematic Council text establishing a direct link between
armed conflict and food insecurity. This resolution condemns the
use of starvation as a method of warfare, the unlawful denial of
humanitarian access and the destruction of objects indispensable
to the survival of civilian populations, in particular agricultural
and food infrastructure. It also recalls the obligations of the
parties to the conflict under international humanitarian law, including
the prohibition on targeting or rendering unusable resources essential
to the survival of civilians. I echo in this regard the view of
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food that
famine should not be understood solely as a humanitarian consequence
of armed conflict, but as the result of prolonged systems of restriction,
control and destruction of food production and distribution capacities.
Note
21. These elements, which fall within the framework of international
humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and their Protocols
Note, are reinforced by
international criminal law Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court criminalises the act of “intentionally
using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving
them of objects indispensable to their survival”, including by wilfully
impeding relief supplies. This crime is recognised in situations
of international armed conflict and, since 2019, also in non-international
armed conflicts. This provision therefore provides a direct criminal-law
basis for the prohibition of famine as an instrument of armed conflict,
beyond its classification solely under humanitarian law.
22. In the context of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression
against Ukraine, these norms have been actively mobilised by international
mechanisms. The International Criminal Court opened, on 28 February 2022,
an investigation into the situation in Ukraine following referrals
by several States. While the arrest warrants mainly concern the
unlawful deportation of children, the ongoing investigation also
includes the examination of other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, including those that may amount to crimes involving
the deprivation of resources essential to the survival of civilians.
In this regard, I welcome the fact that crimes involving attacks
on essential infrastructure, the destruction of food systems, and
the obstruction of humanitarian aid are now among the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’s investigative
priorities in conflict situations.
23. With regard to Gaza, the mobilisation of international law
norms has mainly crystallised in the contentious proceedings brought
by South Africa before the International Court of Justice. In its
order of 26 January 2024 in the case South
Africa v. Israel, the Court recognised the existence
of a plausible risk of violation of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and ordered
binding provisional measures, including the obligation to ensure
the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid. By an order of 28 March
2024, the Court strengthened these measures, specifying the requirement
of effective protection of the conditions of survival of civilian
populations. These proceedings fall within litigation concerning
the international obligation of prevention, which is one of the
central mechanisms of the Convention.
24. In light of the above, I propose that we rely on Recommendation
2245 (2023) “The Reykjavík Summit of the Council of Europe – United
around values in the face of extraordinary challenges” and
Resolution 2609 (2025) “Global peace under threat: halting the humanitarian
catastrophe in Gaza and addressing the wider conflict in the Middle
East” to urge, again, member States to act consistently in all circumstances:
- support the work of international
and national courts whose mandate is to investigate genocide, war crimes,
violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against
humanity committed in the context of aggressions, and to prosecute
perpetrator;
- refrain from obstructing the work of the International
Criminal Court and, for States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, co-operate fully with it;
- support the work of United Nations bodies and agencies
and ensure compliance with the rules laid down in the aforementioned
Geneva Conventions.
25. Likewise, the Assembly should reaffirm, as it did in
Resolution 2539 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”, that the
aggressor State has an obligation to provide full compensation for
the damage, losses and injury caused by its internationally wrongful
acts, including the destruction of infrastructure and economic hardship
and other adverse effects. To this end, it must also recall its
Resolution 2605 (2025) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine” and reiterate that any future peace
negotiations aimed at ending the aggression must include a comprehensive
and fair mechanism for reparation of the damage caused. In this
context, I would like to highlight the essential role of the Register
of Damage for Ukraine as the first operational component of an international
compensation mechanism. Against this background, I particularly
welcome the recent expansion of the categories of claims relating
to damage to infrastructure, production capacities, assets and economic
losses suffered by legal entities and public authorities, enabling
the recording not only of individual losses, but also of broader
economic damage sustained by business entities and the State of
Ukraine as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine.
Note
26. In the same vein, it is also crucial to maintain a complete
embargo on the import and transit of agricultural inputs and fertilisers
originating from the Russian Federation and Belarus where their
trade contributes, directly or indirectly, to the financing of the
war of aggression and to the instrumentalisation of food and agricultural dependency
as tools of geopolitical pressure.
27. While the Assembly already expressed abhorrence and condemnation
“in the strongest terms [of] the devastating toll inflicted – with
over 55 000 deaths according to figures reported to the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [and of] reported
Israeli attacks on civilians seeking aid, the obstruction of humanitarian
aid, the mass displacement of communities and the widespread destruction
of civilian infrastructure, including housing, hospitals, schools
and religious and cultural sites”, in its
Resolution 2609 (2025), I consider that further attention and action by the
Assembly remain necessary. As the Assembly has already stated in
its
Resolution 2582 (2025) “The absolute and urgent need to end the humanitarian
crisis for women, children and the hostages in Gaza”, observer and
partner for democracy status with the Assembly entails the duty
and responsibility to uphold the values of the Council of Europe.
The instrumentalisation of food contributing to famine conditions
in Gaza is in total contradiction with these duties and responsibilities.
4 Lessons
from the war in Ukraine in the light of the human right to food
and food security
28. Russian war of aggression against
Ukraine has strikingly revealed structural shortcomings in both
global and national food systems, shortcomings that alignment with
the human right to food can help overcome. I am convinced that the
lessons to be drawn from this apply to all types of crises and enhance
resilience and access to food in the face of them.
4.1 Remaining
integrated into the global food market while reducing market logics
29. At the beginning of 2022, Ukraine
was one of the world’s leading exporters of wheat, maize and sunflower
oil and a major guarantor of global food security, and supplied
food to about 400 million people worldwide particularly for food-import-dependent
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and East Africa.
As such, before the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, the country supplied almost 50% of the WFP’s cereal stocks.
Note Russia also remains the world’s
largest exporter of wheat and increasingly instrumentalises low-cost
grain and fertiliser supplies to expand geopolitical influence and
create economic dependencies across parts of the Global South. Russia
also instrumentalised war to expand its influence over food-import-dependent
markets in the MENA region, creating artificial shortages and supplanting
traditional European and Ukrainian suppliers. As a result of the
war, Ukraine lost approximately 70% of its wheat market share in
Egypt for example.
30. It is this strong integration of Ukraine into global food
circuits that explains the scale and speed of the consequences of
the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on agricultural markets
worldwide. The geopolitical shock immediately translated into a
global inflationary shock. I wish to emphasise that the brutality
of this shock was not due to the level of global food stocks. At
the beginning of the war, these were in fact generally sufficient: the
wheat export shortfall, for example, represented only 0.9% of the
global harvest. This brutality reflected above all the high level
of uncertainty that emerged the day after the invasion regarding
the future availability of agricultural products and inputs. In
other words, the scale of the price surge was explained more by expectations,
fear and panic behaviour of financial market operators, as well
as by speculative dynamics.
NoteNote As other food
crises had already revealed, this large-scale invasion showed that
the financialisation of globalised agricultural markets makes them
structurally more vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.
31. From the perspective of the human right to food, I believe
that Member States must recognize that the heavy reliance of global
agricultural markets on concentrated and financialised supply chains
makes food security highly vulnerable to geopolitical shocks and
must be counterbalanced by strengthening public regulatory and coordination
mechanisms. I therefore propose inviting member States to follow
the recommendations made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food, as well as the FAO and the WFP, aimed at ensuring
that the human right to food takes precedence over market logic.
In particular, I note:
- the
establishment of public food reserves co-ordinated at regional level,
and the creation of emergency financing mechanisms to protect vulnerable
populations against sudden price surges.
- the strengthening of public information systems on stocks
and prices of foodstuffs and agricultural inputs.
- the investment in international systems for collecting
and analysing food-security data, in particular those developed
by the WFP, which make it possible to identify vulnerable populations
in real time and target humanitarian responses effectively.
4.2 Securing
food flows while reducing the interdependence of food systems
32. Over time, despite major logistical
disruptions and massive destruction, global markets gradually regained
a certain stability through the reorganisation of trade flows. New
trade routes were put in place to bypass the blockages imposed by
the Russian army. European initiatives, in particular the Solidarity
Lanes launched in May 2022 by the European Commission and the bordering
member States, enabled the continuity of flows through the European
Union’s road, rail and river networks, complemented by temporary
trade liberalisation facilitating access to the European market.
In parallel, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, established in July
2022 under the auspices of the United Nations and Türkiye, contributed
to maintaining flows until its suspension in 2023, before a Ukrainian
Maritime Corridor partially took over.
33. It is also worth noting that, despite the operation of the
Ukrainian Maritime Corridor and alternative routes, ongoing Russian
attacks on port and agricultural infrastructure continue to significantly
disrupt Ukraine’s export capacity and global food supply chains.
It reaffirms the critical importance of secure maritime routes,
and in particular the Food for Ukraine initiative as essential contributions
to global food security. Besides, I also emphasise that Russian
attacks on civilian vessels operating within the Ukrainian Maritime Corridor,
which led to deaths and injury of international crew members, constitute
clear violations of international maritime law and undermine the
fundamental rule of the safety of navigation.
34. The reconfiguration of trade routes enabled a gradual recovery
of Ukrainian export flows. Since their establishment in May 2022,
the European Union’s Solidarity Lanes have enabled the export of
more than 200 million tonnes of Ukrainian goods, including almost
91 million tonnes of cereals, oilseeds and derived products. This
alternative route also benefited agricultural markets in the European
Union: although they remained under pressure, additional imports
from Ukraine nevertheless provided relief in terms of supply. It
is, for example, well documented that the availability of cereals,
oilseeds and poultry from Ukraine under the EU’s preferential measures
reduced feed and input costs for EU producers and helped stabilise
sectors during the period of avian influenza.
Note
35. I welcome the fact that international responses to the Ukrainian
crisis prioritised securing and maintaining trade flows. These arrangements
illustrated the ability of international actors to maintain essential food
flows in a context of war. The combination of alternative logistics
corridors, regulatory flexibilities and multilateral mechanisms
for securing exports proved very effective in preventing an immediate
disruption of global supplies. It constitutes a good practice in
the management of a global food crisis. It is moreover reflected in
co-ordinated risk-planning strategies not only in Europe, with the
establishment at European Union level of the European Food Security
Crisis Preparedness and Response Mechanism, but also in other regions
of the world, such as West Africa, under the Food Systems Resilience
Program supported by the World Bank.
36. However, I also note that like previous crises, in particular
the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine
has highlighted the negative effects of a high concentration of
production and supply chains, as well as the strong interdependence
of global food systems. FAO explains that before the war, 50 countries
depended on Russia and Ukraine for more than 30% of their wheat
imports and 26 for more than 50% (for example, around 75% of Egypt’s
wheat imports originated from the Russian Federation and Ukraine).
Note This concentration of
supply sources greatly amplified the vulnerability of food-import-dependent countries
to disruptions caused by the war. The disruption of Ukrainian supply
chains enabled the Russian Federation to expand its presence and
geopolitical influence over food-import-dependent markets in the
MENA by increasingly replacing traditional Ukrainian supplies. This
dependency, combined with the sharp rise in global food prices in
2022, caused situations of acute food insecurity affecting more
than 40 million people in East Africa and the Horn of Africa in
2022-2023. Consequently, these countries had to call on the WFP
to feed their populations and countries such as Somalia, Yemen and
South Sudan rapidly emerged as hunger hotspots. As emphasised during
the committee hearing, armed conflicts destroy livelihoods, disrupt
markets and humanitarian access, and directly aggravate food insecurity
among civilian populations.
37. Comparable dynamics is now occurring for fertilisers passing
through the Strait of Hormuz, where maritime traffic has fallen
drastically. As approximately one third of the global fertiliser
trade transits through the Strait, particularly urea (more than
40% of whose exports depend on Gulf countries) this situation has caused
fertiliser prices to rise by around 30%, with direct effects on
agricultural production costs, with fertilisers accounting for up
to 20 to 30% of cereal production costs in some regions of the world.
The WFP therefore estimates that an additional 45 million people
could fall into food insecurity if the crisis were to continue,
in a context in which 2.3 billion people are already affected. Mr Santini
from the European Commission noted that disruptions linked to geopolitical
tensions, including attacks in the Red Sea region, had not produced
an immediate impact on European food supply. However, he warned
that difficulties related to fertilisers could become more significant
by 2027 than in the short term, underlining the need for sustained
preparedness and monitoring rather than purely short-term responses.
In this context, he referred to the EU fertiliser action plan, which
aims to reduce dependence on fossil-based fertilisers, improve input
efficiency, promote recycled nutrients and support low-carbon alternatives
as part of a broader resilience and preparedness strategy.
38. From the perspective of the human right to food,
Note I
note that the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
right to food and that of the FAO and the WFP converge on several
measures intended to mitigate the effects of crises on the food
security of vulnerable countries. These same measures have become priorities
since 2022 for the World Bank under the aforementioned Food Systems
Resilience Program. I therefore propose that it be recommended to
member States to draw inspiration from them in the framework of
their international co-operation policies and their commitments
on food security and sustainable development, and at least:
- reduce the concentration of
food and fertiliser supply sources and diversify them in order to
reduce excessive dependence on a limited number of exporting countries;
- invest in local and regional food and fertiliser production
capacities in order, where possible, to reduce structural dependence
on imports and increase the productive autonomy of States and regions;
- encourage the development of regional solidarity and co-ordination
agreements aimed at securing intra-regional trade in the event of
disruption in global markets or international logistics corridors.
- develop sustainable alternatives to imported chemical
fertilisers.
4.3 Supporting
exports and smallholders
39. The third lesson from the Russian
Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine is that a country
may rank among the world’s major agricultural exporters and yet
be vulnerable when it comes to domestic food security in wartime.
When ports were blocked, major logistics chains were disrupted and
food availability in Ukraine decreased, small farms, rural households
and local markets continued to work. Attacks against logistics and
energy infrastructure, mining of agricultural land and the occupation
of territories severely disrupted food production, storage and distribution
capacities across Ukraine. In regions located close to the line
of combat, access to food, logistics and distribution capacities
for basic products became extremely difficult and dangerous. The
population of Ukrainian regions located at a distance of 0 to 50-60
kilometres from the line of combat is about 8 million people. These
people are also in a zone of constant risk of loss of production, logistics
and distribution of food products, primarily basic ones.
40. Thus, the war revealed not the failure of one particular agricultural
model, but the structural vulnerability of food systems operating
under conditions of armed conflict. Indeed, producing operation
areas of 500 hectares and more, which cultivate the majority of
Ukraine’s arable land according to the Deputy Minister of Economy,
Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine, showed that these structures
were more resilient than smaller farms. At the same time, small
and medium-sized farms, rural households and local markets contributed
to maintaining local food availability particularly in a number
of regions affected by the war. During the committee hearing, Mr Vysotskyi,
emphasised that food security during the war depended on effective
co-ordination between public authorities, agricultural producers,
humanitarian actors and logistics operators. Public-private co-operation
mechanisms were rapidly established in order to prevent disruptions
in food supply chains and maintain the physical and economic accessibility
of food products. The Government also organised the distribution
of millions of food parcels in combat zones, threatened areas and
liberated territories.
41. The war highlighted the fact that different categories of
farmers contributed to food resilience in different ways. Large
agricultural enterprises, mainly specialised in cereals for export,
which cultivate 53.9% of Ukraine’s arable land and generate 54.5%
of the country’s agricultural gross domestic product, often proved more
resilient in maintaining large-scale production and export capacities
under wartime conditions, despite severe disruptions to logistics,
infrastructure and export routes. At the same time, small and medium-sized family
farms and rural households – which cultivate 45.5% of the land and
contribute 46.1% of agricultural production – played a crucial role
in preserving domestic food security and local access to food. More diversified,
flexible and less dependent on export channels, these actors continued
to supply vegetables, potatoes, milk, eggs, poultry and meat for
local needs and helped maintain access to basic foodstuffs in many regions.
The war therefore revealed the limits of an agricultural system
highly specialised in export-oriented production when confronted
with a prolonged territorial shock affecting food distribution and
local access to essential products.
NoteNote
42. As the war continued, a broad wave of solidarity and collective
actions were organised in rural areas of Ukraine. This solidarity
goes further, as many farmers host internally displaced persons
who often become involved in subsistence agricultural activities
and help local farmers. The war highlighted the resilience of local communities
and farmers. In many regions, smallholders collaborate and support
one another, farmers, local authorities and civil society organisations
co-operated to maintain food production, support internally displaced persons
and preserve local supply chains despite constant security risks
and logistical disruptions.
43. The research I consulted
Note draws
several lessons for the post-war period that are aligned with the approach
based on the human right to food.
Note The
first is the need to rebalance the Ukrainian agricultural model
by giving greater place to production intended for the domestic
market, local processing and territorial food circuits. This does
not, of course, mean abandoning exports, which are essential for
the Ukrainian economy,
Note but rather finding
a better balance and reducing excessive dependence on the sale of
agricultural raw materials shipped through a few strategic routes.
44. The second lesson is the need to better value small farmers,
who have demonstrated their crucial role in food security and social
cohesion. This objective can be achieved by providing them with
diversified access to markets and by stimulating demand for their
products through the implementation of programmes such as targeted
food subsidies to promote healthy diets among vulnerable populations,
as well as the introduction of criteria linked to proximity and
local anchorage in public procurement, particularly for school catering,
hospitals and nursing homes.
45. I attach particular importance to school-meal programmes based
on local procurement. Analyses by the WFP and the FAO
Note show that
these schemes both support producers and strengthen children’s food
security. They make markets more predictable for local producers
and foster, from the earliest age, the adoption of eating practices
based on fresh and local products. In contexts of conflict or institutional
fragility, these programmes constitute a tool for development and
social protection which, in my view, should be encouraged by the
Government.
4.4 Using
the prospect of accession to the European Union to move towards
ecological sustainability
46. Before the Russian Federation’s
war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the Ukrainian agricultural system
was already characterised by a high structural dependence on imported
inputs, including European and international commercial hybrid seeds,
fertilisers, plant protection products and agricultural machinery.
This structure is particularly visible in the maize sector, a strategic
crop for the country, which represents one of Ukraine’s key export-oriented
crops. In 2021, Ukraine imported around 16.9 million kilograms of
hybrid maize seeds and 4 to 5 tonnes of fertiliser.
Note Before
the full-scale war, Ukraine accounted for more than 15% of global corn
exports and regularly exported over 80% of its annual corn production.
47. Despite the disruptions to logistics routes caused by the
war, I am proud to note that large Ukrainian farmers and agricultural
producers managed to maintain significant export capacity under
extremely difficult conditions. I was very moved by the testimonies
given to our committee on regarding farmers continuing to work for
the country’s economy despite shelling, mined fields, destroyed
infrastructure and constant security risks. The war has also highlighted
the structural vulnerabilities of the sector, including dependence
on imported agricultural inputs and global supply chains. During
the war, several international companies, including Bayer Crop Science,
provided Ukrainian producers with free or subsidised seeds and technical support
in order to sustain agricultural production. While these initiatives
provided important emergency assistance, some researchers and experts
have also raised broader concerns regarding the long-term resilience
of agricultural systems characterised by high dependence on concentrated
global input markets.
Note
48. In the long term, these challenges highlight the importance
of strengthening the sustainability and resilience of the agricultural
sector, particularly in the context of environmental pressures and
post-war reconstruction. The war has caused severe environmental
damage, including large-scale pollution from fires and explosives,
destruction of forests, degradation and contamination of soils,
damage to agricultural land and disruptions to aquatic systems.
The environmental consequences of the war will continue to affect
agricultural production, public health and food security for many
years. In this context, the human right to food has a strong ecological
dimension and requires sustainable food systems capable of ensuring
stable and long-term access to adequate food. I recall that the
human right to food has a strong ecological dimension and entails
a requirement of sustainability of food systems, as well as a reduction
of the structural dependencies that weaken access to adequate food.
Note
49. Ukraine has also embarked on a path of integration into the
European Union, expressing its ambition to bring its agricultural
model closer to European standards, in particular through its agricultural
and rural development strategy up to 2030. The requirements set
by the European Commission entail gradual alignment with the standards
of the Green Deal and the “Farm to Fork Strategy”, particularly
in the areas of environmental sustainability, biodiversity protection,
soil health, animal welfare and the reduction of excessive chemical inputs.
At the same time, compliance with European standards requires substantial
investment, technological modernisation and long-term institutional
support, especially for small and medium-sized producers. European institutional
analyses have nevertheless identified several structural features
of the current agricultural model in Ukraine as factors of divergence
from these objectives, notably the high intensity of chemical inputs, dependence
on large export-oriented farms, monoculture production patterns
and the strong influence of multinational agri-food companies. These
issues have been widely discussed in the context of the long-term sustainability
and resil ience of agri-food systems and of the future alignment
of Ukrainian agriculture with European standards.
NoteNote
50. I propose that member States be invited to support Ukraine
in its integration into the European Union by providing the necessary
financial, technical and institutional assistance for a profound
transformation according to the EU standards of the agri-food system,
affecting its production structures and models of regulation. In
this context, the comparative research
Note and the work of the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food
Note suggest
that agro-ecological systems, based on crop diversification, the
reduction of external inputs and the strengthening of local food
circuits, offer greater resilience to shocks while contributing
to ecosystem restoration and improved food security. In my view,
these approaches should be further explored and supported alongside
Ukraine’s broader agricultural development objectives and its strategic
role in ensuring regional and global food security.
5 Conclusion
51. The preparation of this report
opened my eyes to an obvious fact: violence is omnipresent in food systems,
in times of peace as in times of war. While armed conflicts and
violence are the main cause of food insecurity, this violence is
also generated by food systems themselves. From this perspective,
the human right to food requires us to rethink food systems not
only as mechanisms of production and exchange, but also as structures
that must guarantee, in all circumstances, human dignity, effective
access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and sustainable food, and
the ability of populations to feed themselves by their own means.
52. Seeking to bring those responsible for violations of the right
to food that constitute war crimes to justice before an international
criminal court, something I wholeheartedly support, must not prevent
us from addressing the urgent structural problems that are at the
root of serious violations of the right to food in times of crisis.
The human right to food implies strengthening food resilience, understood
as the capacity of societies to guarantee access to food despite
shocks, through the diversification of sources of supply, support
for local agriculture, protection of small producers, the establishment
of strategic reserves and better regulation of globalised agricultural
markets.
53. Food insecurity is political in origin. The issue is not only
the quantity of food produced worldwide, but rather access to food,
which is shaped by political, cultural, economic and military choices.
Consequently, solutions to food insecurity are also necessarily
political. Within the framework of the human right to food, they consist
in guaranteeing food resilience based on social justice, the reduction
of structural dependencies and the primacy of the public interest
over market logics. Only on this condition can food security become
a genuine pillar of lasting peace.
